

A Dictionary of the European Union

Toni Haastруп,
Lee McGowan and
David Phinnemore

10th edition



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OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**



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Foreword

A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION aims to give a comprehensive overview of the development and current status of the European Union. Information on a variety of European issues is brought together to give the reader a wide range of facts and background knowledge on the European Union. Thus, this Dictionary includes entries on the history of the European Union and the issues of importance to its development, as well as on current achievements, debates, concepts, programmes and people.

Most entries in the Dictionary will point the reader towards other relevant entries by means of cross-references. These cross-references within entries will be found in bold type, to denote the existence of a separate entry. However, it should be noted that the potential number of highlights precludes putting in bold those terms that are used in almost every entry. Thus, European Communities, European Union, etc. are not highlighted, unless the authors deem it necessary to further understanding for the reader to be pointed towards such entries.

The reader should be aware of the difference between the terms European Union, European Community and European Communities. The European Communities (often, however, referred to as the European Community) were established by three separate treaties, with, from 1967, common institutions. The name of one community, the European Economic Community, was formally changed to the European Community from 1993. The European Union, consisting of three inter-related pillars until their unification under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, came into existence in 1993. Thus, with respect to the period 1993–2009, the first supranational pillar of the European Union continues to be known in this book as the European Community.

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The Authors

Toni Hastrup is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Stirling, United Kingdom. A part of her current research agenda draws on critical feminisms to understand the foreign policy practices of the African Union and the European Union. Hastrup has published extensively on the two regional institutions, including her monograph *Charting Transformation through Security: Contemporary EU-Africa Relations* (2013), and recently a new edited collection, *The Handbook on EU-Africa Relations* (2020), published by Routledge. She has published in several leading international journals, including the *Journal of European Integration*, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* and *Foreign Policy Analysis*. She is currently teaching or has taught on themes such as international organizations, the politics of European security, and contemporary global security challenges and crisis. Hastrup is currently joint Editor-in-Chief of *JCMS*.

Lee McGowan is Professor of Comparative European Politics and Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration at Queen's University Belfast, United Kingdom, where his teaching interests focus primarily on the politics of the European Union (EU), far-right politics, comparative European politics and politics and government in Northern Ireland. His research interests concentrate largely on the political dimension of EU competition policy; relations between the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland and the EU; and the politics of the far right. He has published widely in leading journals such as *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, *Journal of European Integration*, *Governance*, *European Business Review*, *German Politics*, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *European Journal of Political Research*, *Public Administration*, and *Regional and Federal Studies*. His latest book is *Preparing for Brexit: Actors, Negotiations and Consequences* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Other publications include *The Anti-Trust Revolution in Europe* (Edward Elgar, 2010), *Competition Policy in the European Union* (jointly authored with Michelle Cini, Palgrave, 2009) and *The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to the Present* (Longman, 2003).

David Phinnemore is Professor of European Politics at Queen's University Belfast, United Kingdom and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium. His research and teaching interests include European Union (EU) enlargement and EU treaty reform, external relations and Brexit. Among his publications are *The Proliferation of Privileged Partnerships between the European*

Union and its Neighbours (edited with Sieglinde Gstöhl, Routledge, 2019), *The Treaty of Lisbon: Origins and Negotiations* (Palgrave, 2013), *Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome* (edited with Alex Warleigh-Lack, Palgrave, 2009), *Romania and the European Union* (jointly authored with Dimitris Papadimitriou, Routledge, 2008) and, co-authored in each case with Clive Church, *Understanding the European Constitution* (Routledge, 2006) and *The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties* (Penguin, 2002). Other publications include articles in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *Journal of European Integration*, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* and *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*.

Abbreviations

e.g.	exempli gratia (for example)
etc.	et cetera
i.e.	id est (that is to say)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
m.	million
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
v	versus

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À LA CARTE EUROPE is a term related to concepts of differentiated integration. Effectively, it suggests that European Union (EU) member states could select the programmes and policies that they wish to adopt and participate in. Opponents of the concept argue that such a development would lead to disarray and confusion, undermine solidarity and make the EU unmanageable. Nevertheless, the idea is not infrequently espoused by some member states as a means of showing their opposition towards certain priorities. After the **United Kingdom** referendum vote in June 2016 in favour of a withdrawal from the EU, the UK was warned that it should not expect to have ‘à la carte’ access to the **single market** and other benefits of EU membership.

ABATEMENT was the term used to describe the annually calculated ‘rebate’ received by the **United Kingdom** from the European Communities’ **budget** following an agreement reached in 1984 at the **Fontainebleau summit** of the **European Council**. Member states other than the UK to benefit from rebates from the EU budget have included **Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands** and **Sweden**.

ABSTENTION: See **Constructive Abstention**

ACCESSION CRITERIA, also referred to as the **Copenhagen criteria**, were adopted at the **Copenhagen summit** of the **European Council** in June 1993, when the European Community committed itself to admitting the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe** (CEE). Accession was, however, to depend on the **candidate countries** meeting the following criteria: having stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, **human rights** and protection of minorities; possessing a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures of the **single market**; and having the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of the European Union (EU), notably political, economic and monetary union. In 1995 a **summit meeting** of the European Council held in Madrid, **Spain**, added a further criterion: that the countries seeking membership should possess the administrative capacity to implement the *acquis communautaire*. Formally, countries in the **Western Balkans** also have to

ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

pursue regional co-operation before they can be admitted to the EU. In addition, states are required to have made every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. This was agreed in 1999, with a particular view to the division of **Cyprus** being resolved before **Turkey** could join the EU. Since the **enlargements** of the EU in 2004 and 2007 there has been a noticeable tightening of the criteria. The EU has also placed increased emphasis on its own **integration capacity**. This has led to justifiable claims that accession to the EU is becoming more difficult. No further accessions have taken place since 2013.

ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS need to be completed before **applicant countries** can join the European Union (EU). They are conducted on a bilateral basis, with the **European Commission** co-ordinating the position of the EU's member states. Recent decades have seen the EU engaged in an unprecedented number of accession negotiations, beginning with **Cyprus** and five Central and Eastern European countries (the **Czech Republic**—Czechia, **Estonia**, **Hungary**, **Poland** and **Slovenia**—the 'Luxembourg group') in 1998. In 2000 accession negotiations were opened with **Bulgaria**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Malta**, **Romania** and **Slovakia**. Negotiations with those applicant countries meeting the **accession criteria**—the Luxembourg group plus Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia—were concluded at the **Copenhagen summit** of the **European Council** held on 12–13 December 2002. The **Treaty of Accession** was signed on 16 April 2003. Following **ratification** of the Treaty of Accession, the 10 countries joined the EU on 1 May 2004. The following month, Bulgaria concluded its accession negotiations with the EU. Romania followed suit in December 2004, and a Treaty of Accession was signed on 25 April 2005. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007. Accession negotiations with **Croatia** and **Turkey** were opened on 4 October 2005. Progress in the negotiations with Turkey proved to be particularly slow, partly because the EU insisted on certain benchmarks being met before negotiations were opened and partly owing to political opposition, notably from **France**, to the prospect of Turkish membership. Negotiations with Croatia were completed in 2011, and the Treaty of Accession was signed on 9 December. Croatia became a member of the EU in July 2013. Of the current applicants, the EU opened accession negotiations with **Montenegro** on 29 June 2012 and with **Serbia** on 21 January 2014. The three other candidate states are **North Macedonia**, **Turkey** and **Albania**. The opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia was approved by the European Council in March 2020, although by late 2021 these had not yet commenced.

ACCESSION PARTNERSHIPS were first adopted by the European Union (EU) for **applicant countries** from **Central and Eastern Europe** in 1998 and were designed to assist them in meeting the **accession criteria** and preparing themselves for membership of the EU. They list priority areas for

legal adaptation and administrative reform in the countries concerned and for EU financial assistance through the former **instrument for structural policies for pre-accession** (ISPA), **PHARE** and SAPARD programmes (which were replaced in January 2007 by the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**). Similar in purpose and content, and precursors to accession partnerships, **European partnerships** were developed for countries of the **Western Balkans** seeking membership of the EU.

ACCESSION TREATY: see **Treaty of Accession**

ACCOUNTABILITY has often been raised as a major issue within the construct of the European Union (EU), as the EU's institutions have been widely perceived to be increasingly remote from the people. Although the EU has a democratically elected **European Parliament**, which has become a co-legislator in many areas, issues about an enduring **democratic deficit** still abound. The issue is presented as one where the citizens are far removed from unaccountable decision makers in **Brussels**. The issue, however, may have been overplayed, as the institutions are accountable to each other and to the public. Indeed, the institutions of the EU have been seeking to promote greater **transparency** and **openness** since the 1990s. The **European Commission** has placed more emphasis on engaging with civil society and on seeking views on its policy ideas through **Green Papers** and wider consultations. It has also sought to ensure tighter financial control over the **budget**. The Council also pledged to make more of its business open to media and public scrutiny.

ACP STATES was the collective title of those African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries that entered into an **association agreement** with the European Communities (EC) under Articles 182–188 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Articles 198–204 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**) 'to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire'. The provisions were originally directed towards the colonies and ex-colonies of the **Six** and were finalized in the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969. With the successive rounds of **enlargement**, ex-colonies of new member states joined the arrangement, which from 1975 was regulated by the **Lomé Conventions** (Lomé I-IV). The **Cotonou Agreement** replaced the Conventions in 2000. In parallel and from 2002 the bilateral **economic partnership agreements** (EPAs) were being negotiated to take over the trade dimensions of the ACP-EU relationship. The original 18 participants were known collectively as the Associated African States and Madagascar. The above title was adopted in 1975, and 79 states signed the Cotonou Agreement. ACP states were traditionally allowed

ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE

duty free entry to the European Union (EU) market for most of their products on a non-reciprocal basis and were also eligible to receive both grants from the **European Development Fund** and low-interest loans from the **European Investment Bank**. Preferential treatment for ACP states caused friction between the EC and members of the **World Trade Organization** (WTO), especially the **USA**, which long objected to the preferential treatment given to **banana** producers in Caribbean states. Indeed, the EPAs were a response to a WTO ruling that the Cotonou Agreement was not WTO-compatible. (See also **Development Aid** and **Overseas Countries and Territories**.) The EU and ACP countries sought to negotiate a successor to the Cotonou Agreement, due to expire in 2020, to align with the Sustainable Development Goals. Formal negotiations commenced in September 2018 but were delayed. The ninth summit of ACP leaders was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2019, with the title ‘A Transformed ACP Committed to Multilateralism’. The Nairobi Nguvu Ya Pamoja declaration was endorsed, formalizing the ACP’s position on issues such as good governance, security and the environment, and commitments made by ACP leaders for the next three years. Notably, agreement was reached on significant revisions to the Georgetown Agreement (which formally constituted the ACP in 1975). From 5 April 2020, in conformity with the provisions of the revised Georgetown Agreement, the ACP states became collectively known as the **Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States**.

ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE is a phrase that collectively describes all the secondary **legislation** of the European Union (EU) passed under the provisions of the **founding treaties** and their subsequent amendments. It covers all the **directives**, **decisions** and **regulations** adopted by the EU. States that apply for EU membership have to accept the *acquis communautaire*.

ACQUIS POLITIQUE is a phrase describing all the **decisions** and **resolutions** adopted by the member states of the European Union (EU) in the field of foreign policy. It is also used in a broader sense to describe the principles and goals underpinning the activities of the EU.

ADDITIONALITY is a principle first applied to the allocation of money from the **European Regional Development Fund** (ERDF) in 1989 to indicate that ERDF funding was additional to that provided by local and national authorities. The principle was designed to ensure that member states contribute to the financing of infrastructural projects.

ADONNINO REPORTS: See **Committee for a People’s Europe**

ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF FRAUD PREVENTION (COCOLAF) has responsibility for co-ordinating action by the member states and the **European Commission** to combat fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES are bodies that advise the **European Commission** on problems and issues in specific areas. They are part of the world of **comitology**. More than 200 such committees exist and include advisory committees on food, consumer products, health and environmental risks, and equal opportunities. The membership of each committee is drawn from experts and professionals in the relevant area.

ADVOCATES-GENERAL: See **Court of Justice**

The **AETR JUDGMENT**, sometimes referred to by its English equivalent—the **ERTA Judgment**—was a 1971 ruling by the **Court of Justice**, which established the important principle that, where the European Communities (EC) had an explicit internal competence, they also had a parallel external competence. Its implication was that in such areas of competence, member states could not act independently of the EC. Where a member state entered into an international agreement that conflicted with EC law, the latter took precedence over any obligation arising from the agreement.

AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES: See **ACP States**

The **AFRICAN UNION** (AU) is a regional organization that was established on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It launched the following year in Durban, South Africa. The idea of forming such a body was conceived by the then leader of Libya, Col Muammar al-Qaddafi, and in the Sirte Declaration the AU aspired to ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena’. The AU has some institutions that are similar to the EU’s, including an Assembly, an Executive Council, a Commission, a Pan-African Parliament (established in March 2004) and an African Court of Justice. The AU comprises 55 African states. **Morocco** became the AU’s 55th member in January 2017. The AU’s broad aims are: to accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the African continent; to promote and defend common positions on key issues that are vital to the states in Africa; to pursue peace and security in Africa; and to work towards the creation and development of democratic institutions, good governance systems and **human rights** across the continent. In accordance with these goals, a number of member states have been suspended from

AGGREGATE MEASURE OF SUPPORT

the AU. The AU's secretariat is based in Addis Ababa. Similar to the EU, the AU aimed to create an African Economic Community and to introduce a single African currency by 2023. In March 2018 44 members of the AU signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in Kigali, Rwanda, to establish a continental Free Trade Area (FTA). By July 2019, when the agreement became operational, it had been signed by all African countries except Eritrea, and ratified by 27 countries. Its ratification by all 55 countries would make this the largest FTA since the establishment of the **World Trade Organization**. Beyond the economic dimension, the Union recognizes the need to resolve conflicts on the continent and the majority of the AU's activities are to support peace there. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) established by the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU seeks to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and crises on the African continent. The EU maintains close relations with the AU through the EU delegation to the organization in Addis Ababa. While the overt dependence on the EU has always been a source of tension within Africa and the AU's epistemic communities, AU reform proposals put forward by Rwanda's President, Paul Kagame, provided a roadmap for extricating the AU from its dependency on the EU in the near future.

AGGREGATE MEASURE OF SUPPORT: See **AMS**

AGRICULTURAL POLICY: See **Common Agricultural Policy**

AIR TRANSPORT POLICY was slow to develop towards a level that met the **competition policy** requirements of the European Communities (EC). The airline industry has been dominated by an international **cartel**, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and by a series of intergovernmental agreements. The emphasis of these was upon the mutual protection by governments of state-owned airlines, their pricing arrangements and access to scheduled routes. The result was an absence of competition, and some of the highest air fares in the world, in terms of cost per kilometre. Before 1986, **European Commission** initiatives were restricted to technical matters relating to, for example, co-operation on accident procedures and noise emissions. Challenges to the government-supported IATA structure were largely left to small, independent airlines.

In April 1986 the **Court of Justice** ruled in the *Nouvelles Frontières* case that EC competition policy also applied to air transport. The European Commission immediately threatened legal action against 10 European airlines unless they substantially modified their price-fixing arrangements. Simultaneously, it sought to persuade the member states to opt for more liberal policies. In April 1987 the airlines indicated that they would comply with the Commission's demands. In anticipation of the introduction of the **internal**

market, and partly because many state-owned airlines were substantial money-losers, governments began to accept a greater degree of private ownership and capital, and also to urge the consolidation of their national companies as a way of warding off foreign competition in a more competitive market. However, airline agreements and co-operative arrangements were subject to Commission approval and the EC's **merger policy**. The acceptance of liberalization also varied from one country to another. Full liberalization of the market took place in 1997, when restrictions on European airlines within the European Union (EU) were removed, with the result that airlines were able to operate domestic air services in EU countries other than their own. In 2002 the European Commission adopted proposals for the creation of a **European Aviation Safety Agency** (EASA), as an independent organization within the EC; the EASA began operating in September 2003. In October 2001 the Commission adopted proposals for a Single European Sky (SES), which aimed to establish a single legislative framework for aviation in the EU. Accordingly, a first legislative package, SES I, was adopted by the **European Parliament** and the **European Council** in March 2004. Revised SES regulations, incorporating improvements aimed at addressing environmental challenges and fuel cost efficiency, were adopted in June 2008 as the Single European Sky second package, SES II. In 2013 the European Commission presented its so-called SES II+ package of measures, which aimed to challenge the system of state-owned monopolies responsible for providing air navigation services.

In December 2015 the Commission published its new Aviation Strategy for Europe, which sought to stimulate the regional economy, reinforce its industrial base and reaffirm Europe's status as a global leader. Despite the economic crisis resulting from the coronavirus disease (**COVID-19**) pandemic, in the long term global air transport was nevertheless expected to grow at an annual average rate of some 5% until 2030.

AIRBUS was one of the successes of European industrial co-operation. Founded in 1967 as a consortium of European aircraft manufacturers, Airbus aimed to design and build large passenger aircraft that could compete with Boeing, the large US corporation. From 1992, Airbus's share of the large civil aircraft market grew steadily.

Airbus comprises four partners: British Aerospace, Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA) of **Spain**, Daimler-Benz Aerospace of **Germany** and Aérospatiale of **France**. Each of the four partners specializes in producing different parts of the aircraft. In the wake of **Brexit**, the UK remains involved in Airbus. Airbus was adversely affected by the coronavirus disease (**COVID-19**) pandemic from 2020.

Boeing frequently complained about the massive government **subsidies** channelled into Airbus in order to make it viable, and labelled such activity as constituting unfair competition. Tension was particularly acute in the 1980s,

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until a bilateral agreement on civil aircraft, which capped government support for new aircraft, was reached in June 1992. In 1999 Airbus was transformed into a limited company; it became a single integrated operating company in 2001.

In early October 2019 the **World Trade Organization** (WTO) ruled that the USA could impose tariffs on a range of European goods worth some \$7,500m., after the WTO had ruled earlier in the year that the EU had failed to halt illegal subsidies to Airbus for the development of A380 and A350 aircraft.

ALBANIA is a candidate country for European Union (EU) membership, and the **European Council** endorsed a decision by EU ministers to launch formal accession negotiations with the EU in March 2020. Albania first concluded a trade and co-operation agreement with the **European Community** in 1992 that held out the prospect of negotiating an **association agreement**. Progress towards such a goal was hampered in the 1990s by domestic political and economic instability. In 1999, however, the country became part of the **Stabilization and Association Process** that the EU launched in the aftermath of the **Kosovo** crisis. This led to assistance under the former **CARDS** programme, and the possibility of opening negotiations on a **stabilization and association agreement** (SAA). Albania was keen to become a member of the EU, and at a **summit meeting** of the European Council, held in Feira, **Portugal** in 2000, Albania, along with other countries in the **Western Balkans**, was confirmed as a **potential candidate state**. Although negotiations on an SAA were opened in February 2003, effectively representing Albania's first step towards eventual EU membership, the then **European Commission** President, Romano Prodi, asserted that substantial problems remained, which required serious consideration by the Albanian authorities before any real progress could be made towards membership. These included suppressing criminal activities and showing evidence of solid economic progress. A **European partnership** was adopted in 2004, however, and negotiations on the SAA were eventually concluded in February 2006. Albania also began to receive assistance under the new **instrument for pre-accession assistance**, with €213m. allocated for 2007–09. A new European partnership was adopted in 2008, the same year that an EU-Albania agreement on visa facilitation, signed in 2007, entered into force. This was followed by the entry into force of the SAA on 1 April 2009, the same day that the country joined the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, and Albania's integration with the EU entered a new phase. Further confirmation of this came with the submission of an application for EU membership on 28 April 2009. In October 2012 the Commission recommended that the European Council give Albania **candidate status**, provided that further reforms of the judiciary and public administration were undertaken in advance of legislative elections in June 2013. The EU provided Albania with some €95m. in 2013 to assist with its transitional reforms. On 27 June 2014 the **European Council** granted Albania candidate

status. The opening of EU accession negotiations was contingent on the adoption of planned reforms of the judicial system, in accordance with stipulations of the **European Commission**. In late June 2018 it was announced that the General Affairs Council of the EU was expected to initiate accession negotiations with Albania in mid-2019, but in June 2019 a final decision was postponed until October. However, in October the leaders of France, Denmark and the Netherlands vetoed the opening of accession negotiations with Albania. President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker criticized the decision as ‘a historic mistake’. In late March 2020 EU ministers finally reached political agreement on opening accession talks with both Albania and **North Macedonia**, a decision that was subsequently endorsed by the European Council.

ALDE: See **Renew Europe**

ALE: See **European Free Alliance**

ALGERIA: See **Maghreb States**

ALLIANCE OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE: See **Renew Europe**

ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND (AfD—Alternative for Germany) is one of **Germany’s** newer political parties. The AfD was established in February 2013, initially as a centre-right conservative party, but has since gained the reputation of being a right-wing populist party. It is widely considered to be Germany’s first **Eurosceptic** party, with a majority of male supporters. Many of its supporters formerly belonged to **Angela Merkel’s** Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU—Christian Democratic Union). The party has attracted considerable attention both in Germany and abroad, and narrowly missed securing representation in the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) following the September 2013 elections, falling just short of the required 5% threshold. Such thresholds have since been deemed unconstitutional and seven AfD members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were elected to the **European Parliament** (EP) in May 2014. In late 2014 the AfD secured its first representation in the three regional parliaments of Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia, and it gained representation in Bremen and Hamburg in the first half of 2015. However, in mid-2015 the AfD experienced internal divisions, and a number of members left the party, forming a new centre-right party, the Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch (Alliance for Progress and Renewal). The AfD’s electoral gains continued, none the less: in March 2016 the party finished second in regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt,

and third in Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg. In regional elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in September, the AfD finished second, ahead of the CDU, amid popular opposition to Merkel's liberal policy on accepting refugees. A splinter party, Die Blaue Partei (The Blue Party), was founded in 2017.

In the EP, the AfD was initially part of the **European Conservatives and Reformists** (ECR) group. The AfD was expelled following an alliance with the **far-right** Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ—Freedom Party of **Austria**) and discriminatory comments by its leadership, calling for the shooting of immigrants. The AfD, like the Government, is highly critical of the case for Turkish membership of the EU. However, unlike the Government, the AfD staunchly opposes the country's membership of the euro and the earlier decisions to bail out ailing economies such as **Greece**. The AfD is known for its anti-immigration stance and opposition to Islam, and has been accused of **Islamophobia**. The party has advocated the complete exclusion of asylum applicants to Germany and a willingness to revoke the German citizenship of those born to non-German parents. At the party conference in 2016, the AfD adopted a manifesto banning Islamic symbols, including *burqas*, minarets and the call to prayer.

The AfD performed strongly in the federal elections of September 2017, becoming the third largest party in the Bundestag after winning 94 seats. By 2018 it was the country's largest opposition party. In the elections to the EP in May 2019 the AfD secured 11.0% of the votes and 11 seats, sitting as part of the **Identity and Democracy** group. In regional elections held in Germany in late August the AfD recorded its best result in a regional poll, securing 27.5% of the votes in Saxony and 23.5% of the votes in Brandenburg, thereby becoming the second most successful party in each state. Similarly, in October the AfD won 23.4% of the votes in the election held in Thüringer. In the elections to Bundestag in September 2021, the AfD won 83 seats (a loss of 11).

AMS is the acronym for Aggregate Measure of Support, the calculation of the costs to taxpayers and consumers of both the domestic farm support and the export subsidies provided by the **common agricultural policy** (CAP).

AMSTERDAM TREATY: See **Treaty of Amsterdam**

The **ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS** (Comunidad Andina—CAN), formerly the Andean Pact, comprises four South American countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The community is based on a **customs union**, and formal ties with the **European Community** date back to agreements on bilateral trade and aid signed in 1983 and 1986. Since then, cooperation has developed both on a European Union (EU)-Andean Community basis and within the context of the EU's developing relations with **South**

and Central America. Following a series of declarations in 1996, a new institutional framework for relations was developed, with dialogue focusing particularly on drugs. A political dialogue and co-operation agreement with the Andean Community and its member states was signed in December 2003. In mid-2007 the EU and the Andean Community initiated negotiations on an Association Agreement, which were, however, suspended in mid-2008. On 1 March 2010 an agreement on trade was concluded between the EU and Colombia and Peru. The trade agreement was signed in June 2012 and was provisionally applied from 2013. A draft text for a proposed free trade agreement between the EU and Ecuador was published in February 2015. In November 2016 the EU and its member states, together with Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, signed the accession protocol of Ecuador to the trade agreement. Ecuador joined the trade agreement on 1 January 2017.

ANIMAL WELFARE aims to address issues surrounding the keeping of millions of animals for economic purposes (for example, farming) across Europe. Under the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the EU regards animals as sentient beings and seeks to ensure that they do not encounter avoidable pain or suffering. The Commission seeks to ensure minimum welfare requirements for all those who keep animals (including pet owners). The Commission adopted its first animal welfare strategy in 2006. The **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** reaffirmed a number of fundamental principles regarding animal welfare (first introduced under the **Treaty of Amsterdam**) that should be respected. Article 13 states that ‘in formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, **internal market, research and technological development** and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall ... pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative customs of the Member States’.

The **ANNUAL REPORT** is a general report on the activities of the European Union (EU) and the member states. It is published annually in all EU languages and is submitted to the **European Parliament**.

The **ANTICI GROUP** is named after its Italian founder, Paolo M. Antici. The Antici Group comprises the personal assistants of the Permanent Representatives (see **Permanent Representation**) in **Brussels**, Belgium, a member of the private office of the head of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers and a member of the Council’s legal service. It has no formal status, but functions as an integral and important part of the structure of the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** and is consulted by the Presidency on work programmes and procedures.

ANTI-DUMPING: See **Dumping**

ANTI-TRUST: See **Competition Policy**

APPLE INC. is a multinational information technology company, which was originally founded in 1976 by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and Ronald Wayne, to produce and distribute personal computers. The company is based in the **USA**'s so-called Silicon Valley, in Cupertino, CA, and now designs, develops and sells electronics, including mobile telecommunications and tablet computer devices (such as iPhones and iPads), consumer software (including the OS X and iOS operating systems) and online services. In 2016 Apple Inc. was reportedly the largest publicly traded corporation worldwide, in terms of market capitalization. In August the European Union's Commissioner, responsible for Competition, **Margrethe Vestager**, concluded that Apple had been in receipt of illegal **state aid** from **Ireland**, and had been directing much of its sales and profits outside the USA through Apple International in Ireland, an artificial corporate structure without premises or personnel. Apple was ordered to pay unpaid taxes amounting to as much as €13,000m., in addition to interest. The ruling was the result of a three-year investigation into claims that Ireland had violated EU legislation in offering Apple tax advantages not available to other companies, amid increased efforts to combat tax avoidance. The EU pursued these efforts through the EU's state aid policy, which gives the **European Commission** the authority to monitor the state support offered to companies to guarantee competition. However, in July 2020 the **General Court** overturned the ruling.

The **APPLICANT COUNTRIES**, in order of application for membership of the European Union (EU), are: **Turkey** (14 April 1987), **North Macedonia** (22 March 2004), **Montenegro** (15 December 2008), **Albania** (28 April 2009), **Iceland** (16 July 2009—withdrawn in June 2013), **Serbia** (22 December 2009) and **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (15 February 2016). Other countries have also signalled their intention to apply for EU membership in the future. These include **Moldova** and **Ukraine**. **Switzerland** applied for membership, but the Swiss Government froze its application following popular rejection of Swiss participation in the **European Economic Area** in 1992.

Of the current applicant countries, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey are formally **candidate countries**, Albania having had the status conferred on it most recently, in June 2014. Of the candidates, Turkey opened **accession negotiations** in October 2005 (currently effectively suspended), Iceland in July 2010 (later suspended), Montenegro in June 2012 and Serbia in January 2014. In March 2020 the European Council approved an agreement by EU ministers to open accession negotiations with both Albania and North Macedonia (although these had yet to start).

APPROXIMATION is a term used to describe the process of removing undesired or unwarranted differences in national **legislation** within the context of the **single market**. Proposals for approximation come from the **European Commission** but must be approved by the **Council of the European Union**. Approximation can involve not only member states, but also non-member countries.

ARAB SPRING is the term coined to describe the popular uprisings that took place across the Middle East and North Africa from December 2010. A series of large-scale demonstrations in Tunisia followed the self-immolation of a young Tunisian man in protest at state restrictions in mid-December 2010, and led President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country in mid-January 2011. A number of governments in the region were subsequently overthrown with significant political effects in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, and civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic** is still ongoing. Additionally, there were sustained protests in Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman and Sudan. In June 2011 the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** and Vice-President of the **European Commission**, Catherine Ashton, established a Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean, which aimed to combine expertise from the **European External Action Service**, the Commission, the **European Investment Bank**, the **European Bank for Reconstruction and Development** and other international financial institutions to act as a focal point for assistance to countries in North Africa experiencing political transformation.

An **AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE** was a goal inserted into the **Treaty of Rome** by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, involving co-operation in many of the areas previously dealt with under pillar III of the European Union (EU), the third **pillar** covering **justice and home affairs** (JHA). The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the issues of asylum, immigration and judicial co-operation in civil matters from this third pillar into the European Community pillar, with the more sensitive issues of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters in a newly renamed pillar III, **Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters** (PJCCM). Hence, an emphasis on assuring the **freedom of movement** of persons was accompanied by measures governing external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. The **Treaty of Lisbon** abolished the pillar structure and brought all JHA and PJCCM issues back together under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. It also enabled the **European Parliament** and the **Court of Justice** to wield greater influence regarding these issues.

ARIANE

ARIANE is the name of a series of European civilian rockets that have been taking satellites into space since the late 1970s. The Ariane project, originally conceived as a French-designed rocket-launcher, became Western Europe's second attempt successfully to design commercial rockets to compete with their US and Soviet counterparts. The Ariane project was partly funded by loans from the **European Investment Bank**. In 1980 the **European Space Agency** (ESA) established the Ariane space company (Arianespace) to market the launcher commercially. Its facilities were made available to all, and Arianespace has shareholders from 10 European states, particularly **France**. The company has been involved in a regular programme of launches, putting satellites in space since 1979. Over time the rockets have been adapted and re-designed to allow for greater efficiency and capacity. The latest version is the Ariane 5, although it is due to be replaced by Ariane 6.

An **ARTICLE** is the basic clause or unit of a European treaty. It may be subdivided into paragraphs.

ARTICLE 36 COMMITTEE, formerly the K.4 Committee, and also known as CATS, was established by the **Treaty on European Union**. Its role is primarily to co-ordinate European Union **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**. In addition, the Committee is expected to provide the **Council of the European Union** with opinions and assist in the preparation of the Council's discussions, along with the **Committee of Permanent Representatives**.

ARTICLE 50 of the **Treaty of Lisbon** allows any member state of the European Union (EU) to decide to withdraw from the Union, 'in accordance with its own constitutional requirements'. Should a member state decide to leave the Union, it is obliged to notify the **European Council** of its intention, thereby formally invoking Article 50. In accordance with guidelines provided by the European Council, upon being informed of a member state's intention to withdraw, the Union begins negotiations with that state, with the aim of concluding an agreement to establish arrangements for the country's withdrawal, while considering the framework for the country's future relations with the rest of the Union. Any such agreement must be concluded on behalf of the Union by the European Council, acting by means of a qualified majority (see **Qualified Majority Voting**), and with the consent of the **European Parliament** (EP). The treaties of the EU cease to apply to the withdrawing member state upon the entry into force of the **withdrawal agreement** or, alternatively, two years after the government of the withdrawing state has invoked Article 50 (unless the European Council, in agreement with the relevant member state, unanimously decides to an extension of this period). Members of the European Council or of the **Council of the**

European Union representing the withdrawing member state are not permitted to take part in discussions in those bodies or in decisions concerning it; however, members of the EP from the withdrawing member state retain the right to vote in discussions pertaining to its withdrawal. The eventual withdrawal agreement is not considered to be primary law, as it will not amend EU treaties. If the withdrawing member state wished to apply in future to re-join the EU as a full member, it would be considered as a third country (under Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon). The resulting **association agreement** could take, should the applicant state wish, an entirely new, unique format, not comparable with existing agreements for associate members of the bloc. The **United Kingdom** became the first member state to invoke Article 50, under Prime Minister **Theresa May**, after voters decided in a national referendum in June 2016 to leave the Union (see **Brexit**). On 29 March 2017 the Prime Minister formally informed European Council President **Donald Tusk** of the UK's intention to leave the Union, thereby invoking Article 50.

ARTICLE 352 (formerly **Article 308**) allows the European Union, in the absence of any explicit powers and acting by **unanimity**, to take 'appropriate measures' to achieve a particular treaty objective.

ASEAN: See **Association of Southeast Asian Nations**

ASIA has not been the subject of a co-ordinated **regional policy** by the European Union (EU), although most Asian countries participate in the EU Generalized System of Preferences, and the EU has developed links with the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations** (ASEAN). In addition, there are **co-operation agreements** and **strategic partnerships** with several Asian countries, including the People's Republic of China, India and **Japan**, while others have been the subjects of separate economic and development accords. In 2012 the EU acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia.

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION (APEC): See **Association of Southeast Asian Nations**

ASSIZES (or Conferences of the Parliaments) are consultative meetings of representatives of **national parliaments** designed to improve awareness of and support for the integration process.

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS were concluded with numerous countries both within Europe and beyond. Agreements concluded with the latter include the **Lomé Conventions** and the **Cotonou Agreement**. Within

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

Europe, association agreements were initially drawn up only with countries aspiring to but as yet insufficiently developed economically for membership. Hence, those with **Greece** (1961) and **Turkey** (1963) envisaged the creation of a **customs union** with the EC as well as co-operation in a wide variety of areas. Later agreements with **Malta** (1971) and **Cyprus** (1972) were, by contrast, far less ambitious, restricting themselves to little more than the creation of a free trade area, although they too involved the establishment of a series of bodies (e.g. an Association Council and an Association Committee) to oversee the operation of the Association. Since the early 1990s an increasing number of association agreements have been concluded with European countries. These include the formation of a **European Economic Area** with the member states of the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA), **Europe agreements** with the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe**, and the **stabilization and association agreements** with countries in the **Western Balkans**. Association agreements were subsequently envisaged for the Eastern European countries covered by the EU's Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine). In June 2014 association agreements were signed with Georgia and **Moldova** (both of which entered into force in 2016), and the process of signature (which had commenced in March) was completed with **Ukraine** (the agreement entered into force in 2017). In November 2017 an EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement was signed. An association agreement with **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, signed in 2008, entered into force in 2015; an association agreement with **Kosovo** was signed in October 2015 and entered into force in April 2016.

The **ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS** (ASEAN) is a regional organization. When formed in 1967, it comprised Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei and Viet Nam joined in 1984 and 1995 respectively, with Myanmar and Laos joining in 1997. Cambodia became a member of ASEAN in 1999. The Association's main current purpose is to promote free trade between its member states and other members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) organization, which includes Australia, **Japan**, the **Russian Federation** and the People's Republic of China among its 21 members. Relations with the European Union (EU) date back to the early 1970s and include a **co-operation agreement** signed in 1980, although at times development of relations has been hampered by concerns over alleged **human rights** abuses in certain ASEAN countries, notably Indonesia. In 1997 a 'new dynamic' to EU-ASEAN relations was launched with a view to increasing co-operation and encouraging greater collaboration in business and trade. In 2007 the first EU-ASEAN summit took place in Singapore. This endorsed a Plan of Action to implement an Enhanced Partnership covering political and security co-operation, as well as co-operation on economic, energy, environmental and socio-cultural issues. A second EU-ASEAN summit was held in Brunei in April

2012. The EU is ASEAN's second largest trading partner, after the People's Republic of China. In May 2015 the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** and the **European Commission** adopted a joint communication entitled 'The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose', and in September the first ASEAN-EU Policy Dialogue on Human Rights took place. In August 2017 a second EU-ASEAN Plan of Action (for 2018–22) was agreed during the EU-ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. In December 2020 EU-ASEAN relations were elevated to the status of a 'strategic partnership'.

ASYLUM, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION FUND (AMIF): See **Migration and Asylum Policy**

ATLANTIC ALLIANCE is an alternative name for the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO).

The **ATLANTIC ARC COMMISSION** (ARC) is an intergovernmental association of regional authorities from those regions of the European Union (EU) and the **United Kingdom** that border the Atlantic, including islands located in this ocean and any other regions with close economic and cultural ties with areas bordering the Atlantic. The five states covered are: **France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain** and the UK. The ARC was founded in 1989 and has as its main objective securing EU funding for infrastructural developments for the poorer, more peripheral areas of the EU that border the Atlantic Ocean.

ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION was a central element of initiatives in the field of **environmental policy** from the mid-1980s. Regulations governing automobile emissions were introduced in 1985 and 1987, although the extent of improvement was hindered by disagreements between the member states. There was also a series of **directives** on industrial pollution, especially the discharge of sulphur dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) into the atmosphere, which provided for CFCs to be totally banned by 1997. The European Union (EU) agreed in 1997 to curb emissions of six greenhouse gases by 8%, in comparison with 1990 levels, by 2008–12. The Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) programme began in 2001, aiming to co-ordinate the collection of scientific and technical data necessary for policymaking in this area. As part of the EU's Sixth Environmental Action Plan, adopted in 2002, the EU aimed to bring about, *inter alia*, by 2020: a 47% reduction in the erosion of life expectancy owing to exposure to particulate matter and a 10% reduction in acute mortality resulting from ozone exposure. An **Emissions Trading Scheme** (ETS) was launched in January 2005, which obliges companies that exceed their agreed carbon dioxide emissions to buy extra allowances from more

AUDIOVISUAL POLICY

efficient companies or incur considerable fines. In April 2008 a new air quality directive was approved by the Council, which merged five existing pieces of legislation into a single directive, and imposed limits on fine particle emissions (PM_{2.5}) from vehicles, agriculture and small-scale industry. Emissions of PM_{2.5} in urban areas were to be reduced by 20% by 2020, compared with 2010 levels. The Commission estimated that some 370,000 EU citizens died each year from conditions linked to air pollution. A review of legislation on air pollution commenced in 2011, which concluded in December 2013 with the adoption by the Commission of a new CAFE, specifying objectives for air quality until 2030. In December 2016 a new National Emissions Directive was signed into law, strengthening limits on five principal pollutants with effect from 31 December. The Directive sought to reduce pollution-related ill health by almost 50% by 2030. In December 2019 the Commission published a communication on the new **European Green Deal**, which pledged to make the EU carbon neutral by 2050, and to limit carbon emissions to 50%–55% of 1990 levels by 2030. The **European Environment Agency** is the body that monitors atmospheric pollution and air quality, and supports the implementation of related EU legislation.

AUDIOVISUAL POLICY dates from the 1980s and activity in the audiovisual sector has comprised two broad aspects. The first focused mainly on industry sector considerations centred on efforts to ensure the standardization of the systems used in the member states to broadcast programmes by satellite and cable. The first **directive** on this specific issue was approved in 1986. In 1989 objectives were defined for the development of high-definition television (HDTV). In 1991 a single standard for HDTV production and financial support for a programme of co-operation between the businesses concerned were introduced. There has also been a legal dimension to audiovisual policy, and this was centred on the Television without Frontiers directive, which was adopted in 1989 and amended in 1997. This directive sought to provide a harmonized framework in order to promote the free movement, production and distribution of European television programmes. To this end, common rules were agreed on advertising, sponsorship, the protection of minors and the right of reply. This directive also introduced distribution quotas, thus requiring TV channels to reserve, whenever possible, more than one-half of their transmission time for European productions. An updated Television without Frontiers directive, renamed the Audiovisual Media Services without Frontiers directive, was adopted by the **European Parliament** in November 2007. In March 2010 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a directive on Audiovisual Media Services, with the aim of implementing a cross-border framework for audiovisual media services, thereby strengthening the EU's market for both production and distribution, and ensuring fair competition. In November 2018 a review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive was

completed, and a revised directive was adopted, to take into account the evolution of video-sharing technology and social media.

The European audiovisual market has faced a series of hurdles: language barriers, which serve to prevent the free movement of programmes; an unwieldy decision-making process generally requiring **unanimity**; and the need to make considerable investment to anticipate technological developments, which has required international alliances and/or mergers. It is important to stress that the development of European Union (EU) audiovisual policy must respect certain interests and priorities, such as competition rules (especially regarding state aid—see **subsidies**), the rules on intellectual property and the principles of public service.

From 1991 the MEDIA programme (measures to promote the development of the audiovisual industry) supported the European audiovisual industry by encouraging the development and distribution of European works and financing schemes to improve the training of professionals in the sector. The **MEDIA 2007** Programme (2007–13) followed on from MEDIA II (1996–2000) and Media Plus (2000–05). The MEDIA programme was incorporated into the Creative Europe Programme (2014–20), which sought to stimulate employment in the cultural and creative industries; Creative Europe was renewed for 2021–27, with a budget of €1,842m. in current prices.

AUSTRIA initially felt unable to consider European Communities (EC) membership because of its neutral status and the terms of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which ended the Allied military occupation of the country. It did, however, become a founder member of the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA) in 1960, despite the disapproval of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR), which had been a party to the 1955 Treaty. Austria requested a special arrangement with the EC, and exploratory talks began in 1964. The Italian Government vetoed subsequent negotiations in 1967. Hence, it was not until **enlargement** was included on the agenda of the EC that Austria concluded a **free trade agreement** with the EC, in 1972. Given its large volume of trade with the EC, especially with the Federal Republic of **Germany**, in the late 1980s Austria began to fear that its economy would suffer from the establishment of the **internal market**, unless it was party to the process. It supported the attempt by EFTA to reach a general agreement with the EC, but soon broke ranks with its EFTA partners to apply formally for EC membership in July 1989, arguing that membership was not, in fact, precluded by the 1955 State Treaty. Although the EC indicated that action on the application was unlikely until after 1992, the collapse of communism in **Central and Eastern Europe**, the successful completion of the **European Economic Area** talks and the decision by most of the other EFTA states to seek EC membership led to early progress being made. Negotiations on terms of entry began in 1993 and the terms were endorsed by a popular referendum in June 1994. Austria's membership of the European

Union (EU) was effective from 1 January 1995 (**Finland** and **Sweden** also joined on the same date). Adapting to membership was a relatively smooth process, although Austria endured a period of diplomatic isolation in 2000 when the **far-right** Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ—Freedom Party of Austria) led by Jörg Haider entered briefly into coalition government. In 2005 the Austrian Government strongly resisted the opening of accession negotiations with **Turkey**. However, it eventually agreed to remove obstacles to the opening of talks with Turkey, provided that accession negotiations could commence with **Croatia**. Austria held presidential elections in June 2016, in which the **Eurosceptic** candidate of the FPÖ, Norbert Hofer, was narrowly defeated. Upon an appeal to the Constitutional Court by the party's supporters, the result was overturned in July, after it was demonstrated that absentee votes had been mishandled; fresh elections took place in December, in which Hofer was defeated by Alexander Van der Bellen, the former leader of the Greens, who stood as an independent. In 2017, at the October legislative elections, the **Österreichische Volkspartei** (ÖVP—Austrian People's Party) won 62 of the 183 seats in the National Council, bringing Sebastian Kurz to power as Federal Chancellor until 2019, and again in 2020–21. In the second half of 2018 Austria assumed the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union**.

AVIS is the term applied to the opinion issued by the **European Commission** on the acceptability of a country's formal application for membership of the European Union.

The **BACKSTOP** or Irish backstop was effectively an insurance policy that was a great source of controversy in the context of **Brexit** and efforts, in 2018–19, to secure approval by the UK Parliament of the associated **withdrawal agreement**. A temporary mechanism of last resort that sought to avoid a ‘hard’ border between Northern Ireland and **Ireland**, the backstop was the **United Kingdom’s** initial proposal to ensure that there was no trade border on the island of Ireland, should the EU and UK not negotiate a future trade deal by the end of the transition period as allowed by the withdrawal agreement. The backstop was intended to last until such a time as a deal was made. In the context of the backstop, the UK would have been within a single customs territory, which would have removed most trade restrictions. Moreover, Northern Ireland would have been aligned to some additional EU rules in sync with the Republic. This would have meant some checks on goods coming into Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK. The backstop was very controversial, and was the main reason UK lawmakers initially rejected the draft withdrawal agreement. Some feared that if used, the backstop could result in enduring regulatory disparities between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, effectively resulting in a permanent close alignment of the UK with the EU (despite the UK’s commitment to leaving the EU customs union and the **single market**). Ultimately, in October 2019 UK Prime Minister **Boris Johnson** signed a protocol on Northern Ireland in an attempt to avoid a hard border (see **Northern Ireland Protocol**).

BALKANS: See **Western Balkans**

BALTIC STATES: See **Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania**

BANANAS were the cause of a trade dispute between the European Union (EU) and the **USA** throughout the 1990s. The EU’s banana regime had always been strongly contested as it granted preferential access to British and French markets to banana producers in their former colonies among the **ACP** (African, Caribbean and Pacific) **states**. The EU banana trade regime (BTR) antagonized the Government of the USA as it restricted access for US

producers. With the support of several Central American producers, an appeal was made by the USA to the **World Trade Organization** (WTO) disputes settlement panel against this apparent discrimination. The WTO backed the US complaint and forced the EU to reconsider its BTR. Although a majority of EU member states wanted to abolish the BTR, a minority, including **France** and the **United Kingdom**, wished to defend it. Efforts to enlarge the quota for Central American producers were rejected by the USA in 1999 and heralded the imposition of substantial tariffs on a range of British and French goods entering the US market. This trade war was resolved in April 2001 when a resolution was reached between the EU and the USA, which agreed a transition to a tariff-only system by 2006. Despite this, in June 2007 the USA again raised allegations at the WTO that EU treatment of Latin American banana producers was unfair, citing the continued existence of a ‘discriminatory’ tariff quota. In December 2009 the EU–Latin American Bananas Agreement (the Geneva Agreement) finally sought to end the 20-year dispute between the EU and Latin America over the former’s preferential treatment of the ACP states. In the agreement, the EU opted to reduce its tariffs and the Latin American states pledged to abandon all disputes over bananas before the WTO. It was hoped that the agreement would bring greater stability to the banana market and form the basis of a more significant agreement. In November 2012, after much deliberation, a new agreement between the EU and 11 Latin American states (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela) ended one of the longest trade disputes in the EU’s history. Pascal Lamy, the then Director-General of the WTO, described the agreement as ‘truly historic’. The agreement pledged the signatories to start moving towards a new set of maximum tariffs.

The **BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS** (BIS) is a joint venture, originally of European national central banks, established in 1930 as an aid to the resolution of the problem of German reparations. After 1945 it extended its activities and membership to include, among others, Canada, **Japan** and the **USA**. Based in Basel, **Switzerland**, it has served as the headquarters of the **Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks**, and has acted on behalf of the European Communities as their agent for the **European Monetary Co-operation Fund** (EMCF). By working closely with the IMF, BIS provides a forum for the co-ordination of international monetary policy and holds deposits for international financial institutions and central banks worldwide.

The **BANKING UNION** refers specifically to the countries of the **euro-zone**. Its origins evolved as a response by the **European Commission** to the financial crisis that commenced in 2008. The Commission sought to pursue a series of initiatives to create a much safer and sounder financial sector for the

single market. The Commission sought to ensure greater prudential requirements for banks, to ensure that banks provided increased protection to depositors, and to agree rules for managing failing banks across the **European Union (EU)**. These initiatives were brought together within a **single rule-book** for all financial sectors and for all 28 member states. This rulebook comprises a series of legislative texts that all banks (some 8,300) within the EU must adhere to. However, as the debt crisis within the eurozone deepened, it became ever clearer that the countries that shared the single currency required a more interdependent and deeper form of banking integration. The Banking Union is the product of these initiatives and necessitated the creation of a **Single Supervisory Mechanism** and a **Single Resolution Mechanism**. It is intended that these mechanisms will prevent a recurrence of the crises that erupted in a number of countries, notably **Greece** and **Ireland**, and which necessitated substantive bailouts from public funds. Although the Banking Union applies to eurozone member countries, countries outside the euro area can also opt to participate. **Sweden** is the only member state not to participate in the Single Resolution Mechanism, which entered into force in 2015.

BARBER PROTOCOL is the name given informally to a **protocol** introduced by the **Treaty on European Union** intended to clarify the remuneration criteria contained within Article 141 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Article 157 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**) regarding **equal pay** for equal work by men and women. It restricts the definition of remuneration by largely excluding benefits under occupational social security schemes, and has been interpreted as meaning that the **Court of Justice** has a more limited ability to clarify its own judgments. The protocol results from political pressures and financial expediency.

The **BARCELONA DECLARATION** of November 1995 launched the **Euro-Mediterranean partnership** and, in doing so, committed the signatories to the establishment of a **Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA)**. The signatories were the European Union and the so-called MED-12 states: Algeria, **Cyprus**, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, **Malta**, **Morocco**, the Palestinian Authority (Palestinian Territories), the **Syrian Arab Republic**, Tunisia and **Turkey**. (See also **Barcelona Process** and **Union for the Mediterranean**.)

The **BARCELONA PROCESS**, initiated in 1995, was designed to promote closer ties between the European Union (EU) and the so-called MED-12 states of the Mediterranean (Algeria, **Cyprus**, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, **Malta**, **Morocco**, the Palestinian Authority—Palestinian Territories, the **Syrian Arab Republic**, Tunisia and **Turkey**). Forming the central element of the EU's **Mediterranean Policy**, it was initiated by the **Barcelona**

Declaration of 1995, and subsequently came to form part of the **European Neighbourhood Policy**. In July 2008 a new, but rather nebulous multilateral partnership, the **Union for the Mediterranean**, was created; the Union comprises the EU member states and 16 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans.

MICHEL BARNIER (1951–) was appointed in 2016 as the European Union's (EU) chief negotiator for the **United Kingdom's** exit from the EU. He is a former French Commissioner to the **European Commission**. Barnier graduated from ESPC Europe in 1972 and then worked for a number of centre-right Gaullist ministers in successive French governments, before being elected to the National Assembly in 1979, in which he served as a deputy until 1993, when he joined the Government of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, as Minister for the Environment. In 1995 Chirac appointed him Secretary of State for European Affairs, in which post he served until 1997. In 1999 he was appointed to the European Commission as Commissioner for Regional Policy, until 2004. He then re-entered domestic French politics as Minister of Foreign Affairs until 2005, when he resigned after the French electorate rejected the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in a national referendum in June. In March 2006 Barnier was elected Vice-President of the **European People's Party** for a three-year term, during which time he served as an adviser to Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso, and participated in a panel of senior European politicians who redrafted the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe into what eventually became the **Treaty of Lisbon**. Under Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency he re-joined the French Cabinet as Minister of Agriculture in 2007, serving until 2009 when he was elected as a **Member of the European Parliament**. He resigned from that position in February 2010 when he was appointed as France's Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, in which role he served until May 2014, overseeing significant new legislation on financial regulation, **Banking Union** and the single European digital market. From 2015 he was a special adviser to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on defence policy, until he was appointed in 2016 as the Commission's chief negotiator for the UK's exit (**Brexit**) from the EU and subsequently director until 2021 of the so-called UK Task Force.

The **BARRE PLAN** was one of the alternative strategies for **economic and monetary union** that was advanced after the 1969 **Hague summit**. Prepared by Raymond Barre, who was the French Minister of Economy and Finance in 1976–78, and written at the request of the **European Commission**, it was supported by **Belgium** as well as **France**. It favoured a monetarist approach to union with the immediate introduction of fixed exchange rates. This tactic, it argued, would enforce a **convergence** and **harmonization** of the economic policies of the member states. The alternative argument, an economic

approach, was expounded in the Schiller Plan. (See also **Optimum Currency Area; Werner Report.**)

BASIC PRICE: See **Target Price**

BATTLEGROUPS were created as part of the EU's commitment, following the development of the **European Rapid Reaction Force**, to equip itself with the military capacity to fulfil the Petersberg tasks set out in the **Treaty on European Union** and pursue its **European Security and Defence Policy**. The battlegroups, usually drawing on personnel from a coalition of member states and often with niche capabilities, each consist of up to 1,500 personnel deployable within five–10 days.

BELGIUM is a constitutional monarchy and dates its origins to 1830. It emerged as one of the pioneers of European integration after 1945. It is part of the **Benelux** Economic Union, and a founder member of the European Communities (EC). Belgian governments have been consistent supporters of the European Union (EU) integration process and all have regarded economic integration as only a step towards a political union. In the 1960s Belgium was strongly in favour of **enlargement**, especially the admission of the **United Kingdom**. After the mid-1980s it believed that neither the **Single European Act** nor the **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** had been sufficiently far-reaching, and was critical of states such as the UK and **Denmark** that were reluctant to accept fully the political implications of integration. However, it has at times been wary of a too forceful Franco–German leadership in the EC; this was a further reason for it to favour a strengthening of the EC's supranational institutions. Belgium was one of the first member states to ratify the TEU. It has, overall, been a net beneficiary of EC membership, not least perhaps in terms of the employment possibilities that membership has created in **Brussels**: the fact that the city is the institutional heart of the EU means that Belgium has developed almost a proprietorial interest in the organization. However, the formal decentralization of the state on linguistic lines, which was concluded in 1993, along with an expensive social security system, imposed heavy public sector costs and raised initial doubts as to whether the country could meet the **convergence criteria** set by the TEU for **economic and monetary union (EMU)**. In the end, the criteria were relaxed sufficiently for Belgium to be declared eligible for EMU membership, and the country entered as one of the first wave of 11 states in January 1999.

Belgium remains one of the EU's most enthusiastic members and maintained that a flexible approach to EU integration should be adopted in order to enable a central core of states to integrate more rapidly than others, if they so desire. In contrast, Belgium's internal political scene has been much more complex and divides along linguistic lines that see two main communities

within the state, each with its own political parties, newspapers and television networks. After six months without a government, following an inconclusive general election in June 2007, an emergency coalition Government was established in December under the temporary leadership of (outgoing) Guy Verhofstadt. Yves Leterme became the new Belgian Prime Minister in March 2008, ending some nine months of political impasse. Leterme was replaced by a fellow Christian Democrat, Herman Van Rompuy, in December, but became Prime Minister for a second time when Van Rompuy was appointed President of the **European Council** in December 2009. Ongoing tensions, primarily over language issues and rights within Belgium between the Flemish and the Walloons, led to the collapse of the Government and Leterme's resignation as Prime Minister in April 2010. The domestic difficulties were not resolved in the subsequent legislative elections (of 9 June) and were the backdrop to Belgium assuming responsibility for the EU's six-month rotating Presidency in July. In the absence of an agreement on the formation of a new government, Leterme continued to serve as the head of what was widely viewed as an ineffective administration. A new Government, headed by the francophone socialist Elio Di Rupo, took office on 6 December 2011. On 25 May 2014 a general election was held concurrently with elections to the **European Parliament** (EP). Prime Minister Di Rupo resigned, and negotiations commenced on the formation of a new governing coalition. Di Rupo carried on as caretaker Prime Minister until the appointment of **Charles Michel** on 11 October. Michel, the leader of the Reformist Movement since 2011, became, at the age of 39, the youngest Prime Minister in Belgium's history, and his selection also marked the first occasion on which one francophone Prime Minister had been succeeded by another.

In late 2015 it emerged that a number of the assailants in a series of co-ordinated terrorist attacks in Paris, **France**, in November, which had killed 130 people, had originated from Brussels. The assailants, who claimed allegiance to **Islamic State** (previously known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), and some of whom had fought in the ongoing civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, had apparently evaded surveillance from the Belgian security agencies. In March 2016 suicide bombers linked to Islamic State killed 35 people in attacks at Brussels international airport, and on an underground train in the city centre, in what appeared to be a symbolic assault against Brussels as representative of the heart of the EU (Belgium was not involved in any military action in Islamic nations at that time, having suspended air strikes against Islamic State in Syria in 2015 on grounds of cost, although it re-joined the US-led coalition against Islamic State in Syria in July 2016). The apparent lack of co-ordination in Belgium between different levels of government, and between police and security agencies at federal, regional, community and municipal levels, attracted criticism. One of the principal tasks of the new **European Counter Terrorism Centre**, established in January 2016 under **Europol**, was to address the issue of violent Islamism apparently being fomented in Belgium.

In December 2018 the Belgian Government collapsed amid disagreement over migration policy, and Michel resigned as Prime Minister. In May 2019 legislative elections took place, together with elections to the country's 21 seats in the EP. By late 2019 a new government had still to be formed. In October Sophie Wilmès took office as acting Prime Minister. Michel took up the post of **President of the European Council** in December. A new Government, under Alexander De Croo, was agreed at the end of September 2020.

The **BELGO-LUXEMBOURG ECONOMIC UNION** (BLEU) is primarily a **customs union**, but in many ways a complete economic union, between **Belgium** and **Luxembourg**. The BLEU agreement dates from 1921 and led to the removal of frontier controls between the two states from May 1922. Although originally scheduled to last for some 50 years, the agreement was renewed in 1972, 1982 and 1992. A new convention was signed in 2002. In 1944 the customs union element was extended with the creation of **Benelux**, although BLEU still exists within Benelux.

BENCHMARKING involves the use of comparison (from the perspective of a member state or an EU institution) with other states or organizations (for example, with regard to issues such as pension reform or employment practices) with the aim of improving one's own performance by learning from the experience of others.

BENELUX is the commonly used shortened name of the Benelux Economic Union, an economic grouping of **Belgium**, the **Netherlands** and **Luxembourg** within the broader economic structure of the European Union (EU). The exiled Governments of the three states formed the Benelux in 1944, and a Customs Union was formally established in January 1948. Ten years later a new treaty of economic union was signed in The Hague and came into operation in January 1960. As this treaty was due to expire in 2010, a new legal framework (known as the Treaty revising the Treaty establishing the Benelux Economic Union) was signed on 17 June 2008. The most recent treaty has no fixed expiry date, and the name of the Benelux Economic Union was changed to the Benelux Union, to reflect the wide scope of the union. Benelux survives within the EU because the **Treaty of Rome** permits the existence of internal regional groupings of states, as long as these conform to its own stipulated goals. (See also **Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union**—BLEU.)

BEP: See **Biotech**

BERLAYMONT

BERLAYMONT is the name of the large 13-storey building in **Brussels** that was purpose-built in 1969 to house the **European Commission** and its administrative personnel, although not all Commission employees based in the city work in the building. Berlaymont became a shorthand term often used to describe the Commission and the administrative structures of the European Communities, and has sometimes been employed in a derogatory sense to refer to bureaucratization. In 1991 the building had to be evacuated for substantial renovations because large quantities of asbestos had been used in the original construction. The staff was relocated to a number of adjacent buildings. The renovation and futuristic makeover of this vast star-shaped building, measuring 230,000 sq m (which critics dubbed the 'Berlaymonster'), took 13 years to complete. The building opened again in November 2004. In 2002 the Commission opted to buy the building from the Belgian state for €553m. by means of a 27-year annuity. Structural problems remained, and the building was damaged in a major fire in May 2009.

The **BERLIN DECLARATION** was adopted at an informal gathering of the **European Council** on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the **Treaties of Rome**, on 25 March 2007. It offered a formal statement on the achievements and purposes of the European Union and paved the way for negotiations on a mandate for an **intergovernmental conference**, which resulted in the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

BICS: See **Business and Innovation Centres**

BIOTECH (Biotechnology) is an area in which the **European Union** has been promoting research and development policy since the mid-1980s. In 1985 the Biotechnology Action Programme (BAP) was established as part of the new emphasis on the importance of **research and technological development (RTD) policy**. BAP succeeded the 1982–86 Biomolecular Engineering Programme (BEP), sponsoring collaborative research and training between industry and research institutions across the whole field of biotechnology. The original programme was concluded in 1989, but its work and objectives were incorporated into the subsequent Bridge programme of 1990, which also later changed its name to Biotech. This was superseded by the quality of life and management of living resources programme in 1999. A Life Patent directive on biotechnology was adopted in 1997 in an attempt to harmonize rules on gene patenting. In the context of the Lisbon strategy (see **Lisbon agenda**), in February 2002 the Commission presented a communication setting out a strategic vision for life sciences and biotechnology up to 2010, and proposing how to address ethical issues, following a broad public consultation. In 2007 the Commission carried out a mid-term review of the progress made since 2002, and examining the economic, social and

environmental impact of biotechnology, in order to enable it to draw up proposed revisions to its strategy for Europe on life sciences and biotechnology. Biotechnology was an important part of the **Europe 2020** Strategy and Innovation Union programme.

BLACK LIVES MATTER (BLM) is a movement that originated in the **USA** in 2013. It was founded by three black women (Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi) in response to the racist brutalization of black people particularly, but not only, by the police. BLM has the core goal of social justice for black people worldwide. Following the murder of George Floyd by police in the USA in May 2020, and evidence that in North America and Europe black people and other ethnic minorities have been more significantly impacted by the novel coronavirus disease (**COVID-19**) in comparison with the general population, in 2020 there was a greater mobilization of BLM protests across European capitals. These protests signalled a refusal to remain silent on centuries of injustice, and challenged the status quo of society and government.

BLEU: See **Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union**

BLOCK EXEMPTIONS refer to those categories of agreements under **European Union (EU) competition policy** between the EU member states and other states that, as stipulated by the **European Commission**, are exempted from the general prohibition of restrictive trade agreements. Under these, specific economic sectors are exempted from the general provisions relating to competition policy for a period of up to 10 years, after which time they need to be renewed or they lapse. Although such exemptions were initially designed as a means to allow the EU competition authorities greater time to investigate more pressing cases, the Commission has been rather cautious about allowing too many block exemptions, and they were granted only rarely. The first, covering exclusive dealing agreements, came into force in 1967 and the second in 1972. They have been applied, for example, to patent licences, specialization agreements, research and development agreements, and motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements. Block exemptions provide some legal certainty for firms and have benefited **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs) in particular. As both policy statements and enforcement tools, they exclude the application of competition law for certain types of agreement (such as liner shipping agreements) and provide delineation between law-abiding and illegal practice. There remain less well-defined areas where the competition rules *might* apply, but the regulations also take these into consideration and make allowances for agreements that are not clear-cut. However, if there is any doubt, firms are wise to pursue the more conventional individual exemption route. This applies when firms draft or alter their

BLUE FLAG

agreements to include provisions that are not covered by the block exemption. Block exemption regulations are frequently renewed and updated to incorporate the latest data. A General Block Exemption regulation (GBER) was adopted in August 2008 and in May 2014 the Commission adopted a revised regulation. In 2017 an amendment was added to the GBER, governing aid to ports and airports.

The **BLUE FLAG** is a voluntary eco-label that is awarded annually to bathing beaches and marinas in 47 countries around the world that meet strict standards of water quality and environmental management. The idea of the Blue Flag originated in **France** and the scheme was presented to the **European Commission** by the Foundation for Environmental Education in Europe (FEEE) in 1987 as part of the 'European Year of the Environment'. The programme is run by a non-governmental organization, which was renamed the Foundation for Environmental Education (FEE) in 2000 to reflect the global nature of the scheme. The Blue Flag concept is a core aspect of the **environmental policy** of the European Union, and specifically its water framework **directive**. More than 4,400 beaches and marinas in some 46 countries have been awarded a Blue Flag. Information on the recipients of the award is published annually.

The **BOLKESTEIN DIRECTIVE** or, officially, the Directive on Services in the Internal Market, prompted a great deal of debate and controversy in various European Union (EU) countries, and especially **Belgium, France, Germany** and **Italy**, in 2005. The directive was put together by Frits Bolkestein, former Commissioner for the **internal market**, and aimed to establish a single market for services within the EU. Services were a rapidly growing sector, accounting for around 70% of EU economic activity. The directive contained changes to the EU services market, which can be summarized via two fundamental principles. The first principle focused on the 'freedom of establishment' and sought to ensure that any company or individual providing a service in one EU member state should be allowed to provide it in all EU member states. The second was the 'country of origin' principle. This sought to establish that if goods were produced in one EU member state, then it was legitimate and acceptable to sell such goods in other EU member states. In short, the Services Directive sought to remove the administrative and legal barriers that prevented firms from offering their services in other countries. The directive presented a radical vision and certainly could have had a wide-reaching impact in the EU services sector. Services that were covered included, for example, car hire, estate agencies, advice from architects, social care and environmental services. Trade unions argued that such changes would culminate in **social dumping** practices, as rules in Eastern European countries were often less rigid than in Western Europe. The Commission maintained that the directive would create 600,000 jobs, stimulate economic growth and provide greater choice for

consumers. Critics feared, however, that the directive would unleash unwelcome competition between workers in different parts of the EU, reduce income levels and lower standards of social and environmental protection. These fears, combined with concerns about the dangers of companies opting to relocate to low-cost economies, led to a series of mass protests, which culminated in a 100,000-strong march through **Brussels, Belgium**, in opposition to the directive in March 2005.

The pressure of public opinion led the **European Council** effectively to postpone the directive in late March 2005 by demanding amendments. There can be little doubt that this example of liberalization fed into the discussions on the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in France**. The **European Parliament** (EP) approved the Services Directive at its first reading in February 2006. However, the directive excluded a number of services such as broadcasting, postal services, gambling and audiovisual services. The **European Commission** pledged to take the EP's views into account before producing an amended proposal in April 2006. After substantial amendments (including for example the exclusion of public and private health care and social services), the directive was finally adopted in December 2006 by the EP and European Council, and came into force in December 2009.

JOSEP BORRELL FONTELLES (1947–) is the third person to hold the title of **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, taking office as High Representative and Vice-President of the **European Commission** on 1 December 2019. He is an experienced Spanish–Argentine socialist politician and former President of the **European Parliament**, who served, most recently, from June 2018 as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Union and Co-operation in the Government of **Spain**. In July 2019 he was nominated by the **European Council** as the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in succession to Federica Mogherini. Borrell Fontelles was born and raised in a Catalan village, and is an engineer and economist by training, leaving a career in academia for politics in the 1970s. Borrell Fontelles was educated at the Technical University of Madrid, Spain, at Stanford University in California, **USA**, and at the Complutense University of Madrid and at the French Institute of Petroleum in Paris, **France**.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA declared its independence from **Yugoslavia** in 1992 only to become the focus of a civil war, which lasted until 1995, when the Dayton Peace Accords, marking an agreement to end the war, were signed. Subsequently, the government of the country has been overseen by the Office of the High Representative of the International Community (which was created under the agreement) and by the Special Representative of the European Union (between 2002 and 2011 these two positions were held concurrently by the same person), with initially a **North Atlantic Treaty**

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

Organization-led force (IFOR) and, since December 2004, a European Union (EU) peacekeeping force (EUFOR), seeking to maintain peace and stability. Since 1999 relations with the EU have developed, albeit slowly, in the context of the **Stabilization and Association Process** (SAP). A road map initially detailed a catalogue of essential measures that would have to be adopted in the country before the feasibility of concluding a **stabilization and association agreement** (SAA) could be explored. Appropriate measures were eventually taken, with negotiations on an SAA opening on 25 January 2006. These were closed in December 2007 and the agreement was eventually signed in June 2008, following the implementation of further reform of the police, public broadcasting and public administration and an improvement in the country's co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Along with the other countries in the **Western Balkans**, Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted the status of **potential candidate state** in 2000. The country also has a **European partnership** arrangement with the EU. This was first adopted in 2004 and has subsequently been revised, with a new European partnership being adopted in February 2008. This followed a **European Commission** progress report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which noted the deceleration of political reforms, limited progress with economic reforms, that state institutions continued to be compromised by ethnic division and that the country had yet to assume full ownership of its own governance. The report, however, recorded the EU's continued commitment to supporting reform, noting that pre-accession financial assistance to the country was being provided under the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**. Subsequent reports have raised similar concerns. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina had planned to apply for EU membership by the end of 2010, and the EU had then provided the Bosnian Government with a road map in 2012 for submitting such an application, no application was initially submitted. Under an initiative by the British and German Governments, in late 2014 a new EU action plan was proposed, under which financial assistance would be released in exchange for commitments by all main political parties to significant reforms. In February 2015 both houses of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina approved a statement committing the country to reforms, and the SAA with the EU entered into effect on 1 June. Following the further adoption of a Reform Agenda by the authorities in July, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted a formal application for membership of the EU in February 2016. EU officials welcomed the initiative; however, they indicated that further significant reforms were necessary before it could be considered. Although the main state and Federation parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared support for EU membership, those in the Republika Srpska entity expressed strong reservations.

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) or, as it became widely known, 'mad cow disease', became an issue for the European Union

(EU) in early 1996 following a public announcement made by the British Government about the possible connection between BSE and a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (a degenerative and ultimately deadly brain disease) in humans. Several British scientists had long believed that there was a link between the two diseases that originated in feeding offal (the remains of sheep and cattle) to cattle, and that the disease was being passed to humans following their consumption of BSE-infected beef. The British Government's recognition of that possibility prompted public alarm about the safety of eating diseased beef, and the fact that the Government had not consulted its EU partners prior to its announcement only made matters worse. The **European Commission** responded by banning the import of all British beef into the EU, as did the Governments of both the **USA** and Australia. The British agricultural community suddenly lost its export markets and sales of beef in the **United Kingdom** fell dramatically. The British Government responded by introducing a 'no co-operation agreement' with the EU that effectively meant blocking all proposals (even those supported by the UK) that were subject to unanimity in the **Council of the European Union**. At the same time many cattle herds were slaughtered on suspicion of infection. In June 1996 the **European Council** approved a plan to have the ban on British beef gradually lifted once each sector was given the all-clear by the Commission's Scientific Veterinary Committee. The episode was investigated by the **European Parliament**, which in a 1997 report was critical of the Commission's handling of the crisis, accusing it of placing farmers' interests above those of consumers. Despite the lifting of the ban on British beef, some states, notably **France**, continued to refuse to import British beef, which led to legal action against the French Government before the European Courts. Exports of British beef to France resumed in 2002.

THIERRY BRETON (1955–) is the Commissioner responsible for the Internal Market in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen**. A businessman, Breton was previously French Minister of Finance during the presidency of Jacques Chirac and a professor at Harvard Business School in Boston, MA, the **USA**.

BRETTON WOODS in New Hampshire, **USA**, was the location and name of an agreement, made in 1944 by several Western countries, on the introduction of a new international monetary system based upon fixed exchange rates, and backed by two reserve currencies, the US dollar and British pound sterling. The intention was to make currencies convertible for current account transactions, so facilitating multilateral trade and reducing the need for disruptive devaluations. The system experienced a number of problems in the late 1940s, and did not become fully operational until 1958. In the 1960s the fixed exchange-rate system, especially the two reserve currencies, came under increasing pressure. The agreement effectively disintegrated in 1971, when the

BREXIT

USA unilaterally suspended dollar convertibility against gold. The Smithsonian Agreement and the European **Snake** were efforts to salvage some advantage from the failure of the Bretton Woods agreement since, despite the benefits that floating currencies may have held for governments, the consequent currency fluctuations adversely affected international monetary stability. The **European Monetary System** (EMS) of 1979 was an attempt by the European Communities to stabilize currency fluctuations by introducing a modified exchange-rate system that would replicate what were believed to have been the virtues of Bretton Woods.

BREXIT is the term coined to refer to the departure of the **United Kingdom** from the **European Union** (EU), following that country's decision to hold an 'in/out' referendum in June 2016, at which the British electorate voted by a margin of 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the EU. (The term **Brexit** evolved from the widespread use of the popular term **Grexit**, to describe a possible Greek exit from the EU, from 2012–15.) The decision of the British electorate had been largely unpredicted by opinion polls, a substantial number of political observers, financial markets and, indeed, leaders of the 'Leave' campaign (then Secretary of State for Justice Michael Gove, former Conservative Mayor of London—and eventually Prime Minister—**Boris Johnson**, and leader of the **UK Independence Party** Nigel Farage). Immediately following the announcement of the result, British Prime Minister **David Cameron** (who had made a manifesto pledge in 2015 to hold a referendum on EU membership, and subsequently urged British voters to choose continued membership of the EU, having negotiated concessions on British membership of the bloc in early 2016) announced his intention to resign as premier. Cameron was succeeded by **Theresa May** in July 2016. In March 2017 the British Government invoked **Article 50** of the Treaty of Lisbon, initiating formal proceedings for an eventual (and unprecedented) departure from the bloc. Formal negotiations commenced between the EU and the UK on 19 June, with the aim of concluding an agreement establishing arrangements for the country's departure from the Union, while seeking to develop a framework for the country's future relations with the EU.

Some observers suggested that leaving the EU without an agreement could be economically catastrophic for the UK. Increasingly fears were even expressed that there might be an insufficient food supply, leading to the stockpiling of food. At the time of the vote in favour of Brexit, the EU had 22 separate free trade agreements with individual countries, and five multilateral agreements covering multiple countries or trading blocs (comprising 30 countries). Therefore, the UK would effectively have to renegotiate, separately, 52 trade agreements to retain a preferential trading relationship with these countries.

A final deal could come about only after the questions of any transitional arrangements, the UK's financial commitments, **citizens' rights** and Northern Ireland, as well as trade, had been resolved to the satisfaction of the EU and

British negotiators. Observers initially noted the inherent risk to the EU of so-called political and economic contagion from Brexit: the UK had been the second largest country in the bloc, in terms of both population and economic output. The UK still had an important role to play in Europe, and it was felt that a delicate balance had to be struck to maintain a good relationship with the EU in terms of trade and diplomatic relations, without agreeing such lenient terms that other EU member states with a significant proportion of **Eurosceptic** voters were encouraged to demand that their governments hold a similar referendum on membership. Although parties with a Eurosceptic inclination were widespread throughout EU member states, **Austria, Denmark, Sweden** and **France** were the most notable examples.

In July 2016 former European Commissioner **Michel Barnier** of France was appointed as the EU's chief negotiator with the UK over its planned exit from the bloc, and subsequently director at the **European Commission** of a Task Force on Brexit, and in September former Belgian premier and senior **MEP** Guy Verhofstadt was appointed as the representative of the European Parliament for Brexit. The deputy chief negotiator of the Commission task force, from October of that year, was Sabine Weyand of Germany, hitherto a deputy director-general at the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade. President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in a State of the Union speech to the European Parliament in mid-September, warned the British Government that it should not expect '**à la carte** access to the benefits of the EU', without assuming responsibilities to member states (such as **freedom of movement**). This view was reiterated by Michel Barnier in August 2017, following the largely inconclusive third round of Brexit negotiations, when he stated that 'The UK wants to take back control but also wants (its regulatory) standards recognized automatically in the EU ... this is simply impossible. You cannot be outside the single market and shape its legal order'. It remained to be seen how significant the impact of the UK's departure from the EU would be in the context of schemes that have facilitated co-operation in, variously, combating cross-border criminality, such as **Europol**; managing the security of the EU's borders, such as **FRONTEX**; and education, such as the **Erasmus+** scheme, which allows students in any EU member state to study at universities throughout the Union.

The vote in favour of Brexit led to internal disputes in the UK among a political elite polarized between those who wanted to leave the EU (**Brexiters**) and those who wished to remain (**Remainers**). The level of division became especially evident following the so-called **Chequers Plan**, negotiated within Theresa May's cabinet in July 2018 as the UK's vision for its relationship with the EU. The aftermath of the Chequers Plan, however, led to the resignations of prominent Brexiters including David Davis and Boris Johnson, who was then the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

On 14 November 2018 a **withdrawal agreement** was published. On 25 November the withdrawal agreement and the associated political declaration on the future relationship between the UK and the EU were approved at a

special meeting of the **European Council**. The aim of the withdrawal agreement was to establish terms for the UK's orderly exit from the EU, including provisions for the implementation period. The political declaration provided guidelines for the negotiation of the future relationship between the two parties, with provision for an economic partnership, a security partnership and agreement on other areas deemed to be of shared interest. However, in December a parliamentary vote on the withdrawal agreement in the UK was delayed, owing to widespread opposition to it by both Eurosceptic parliamentarians and those who had supported remaining in the EU. Particular controversy surrounded the so-called **backstop**. Subsequent attempts to secure parliamentary approval for the withdrawal agreement in the UK failed.

EU leaders agreed to allow the UK to extend Article 50, and delay Brexit (originally envisaged for 29 March 2019) first until 22 May 2019, and then, amid a continuing impasse in the UK Parliament, until 31 October. As a further consequence of the lack of support in Parliament for the withdrawal agreement, several MPs defected from both the ruling Conservative Party and the Labour Party, the official opposition, to form the short-lived Independent Group for Change (or Change UK). The inability of May to secure backing for the withdrawal agreement led to her eventual resignation in June. In July Conservative Party members voted to appoint Eurosceptic Boris Johnson to the position of leader of the party and, therefore, Prime Minister of the UK. A general election later in the year endorsed and solidified Johnson's leadership of the UK Government. Johnson had publicly asserted his commitment to leaving the EU on the scheduled departure date at the end of October regardless of whether an agreement with the EU was in place.

However, Brexit was subsequently delayed again, until 31 January 2020. Johnson's Conservative Party having secured a large majority in the general election, obstacles to the parliamentary approval of a revised withdrawal agreement (which had been agreed on 17 October 2019) had been effectively removed. Its signature by both sides took place on 24 January 2020 and the UK officially left the EU at the end of January. The UK immediately entered into a period of transition during which a new relationship had to be negotiated between both parties, including trade arrangements. The negotiations were described as difficult, with each side blaming the other in relation to progress and the opposing demands made by both the UK and the EU. Moreover, the negotiations were initially largely eclipsed by the global **COVID-19** pandemic, which required the UK to turn its attention to domestic matters. The UK Government declined to request an extension to the transition period, despite the impact of COVID-19. On 24 December both sides finally concluded a wide-ranging trade and co-operation agreement, which was signed on 30 December and provisionally applied from 1 January 2021, and the UK exited the transition period. The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement entered into force on 1 May 2021. The UK has embarked on efforts to negotiate trade deals on a bilateral basis with several countries, although none as comprehensive as was the case within the EU. In

the aftermath of the transition, the negotiated agreement on the status of Northern Ireland—the **Northern Ireland Protocol**—has become a source of conflict within the region.

BREXITEERS are **Eurosceptics** and the term refers to a person who supports the UK's departure from the European Union (EU). While it refers to anyone who takes this position, it is often used in reference to political elites.

The **BREXIT PARTY** was a right-wing, populist political party founded by Catherine Blaiklock in January 2019 and led by Nigel Farage, former leader of the **UK Independence Party**. A **Eurosceptic** party, it won 29 of the UK's allocated seats in the elections to the **European Parliament** held in May of that year, campaigning for the UK's withdrawal (**Brexit**) from the European Union without a negotiated deal.

BRITAIN: See **United Kingdom**

BROADCASTING: See **Cultural Policy; European Broadcasting Union; Media Policy**

BRUSSELS is the capital city of **Belgium**, with a population of some 1m. people. Brussels is also home to the executive and administrative branches of the European Union (EU). In addition to being the location of the **European Commission** and the Secretariat of the **Council of the European Union**, it houses the offices of both the **Committee of the Regions** and the **European Economic and Social Committee**. The **European Parliament** has much of its staff in this city and the majority of its committee meetings take place in its new Brussels headquarters. In addition, all the national representations of the member states reside in Brussels, as do representations of many regions (e.g. the German *Länder*) and sub-national authorities. Moreover, Brussels has attracted the attention of a variety of public, private and voluntary organizations that either own or rent offices in the city in the hope of being able to influence policy development and EU **decision making**. Finally, Brussels has also been the home of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) since 1967. The concentration of EU institutions in the city has meant that the name 'Brussels' has often been used as a term to describe the EU and its decision-making bodies. Suggestions have been made that Brussels, as it functions in many ways as a capital-elect of the EU, should be given a special status similar to that accorded to Canberra (Australian Capital Territory) or Washington, DC (**USA**).

BRUSSELS, TREATY OF: See **Treaty of Brussels**

'BRUSSELSIZATION'

'BRUSSELSIZATION' is a term that is associated with the evolution of the European Union's (EU) **Common Foreign and Security Policy**, established under Pillar II of the **Treaty on European Union** in 1993. Although the EU's supranational powers have been highly marginalized in this policy area, there was a growing sense that this policy's development was being determined to a greater extent than ever in **Brussels** by a number of Pillar II working groups. Since the era of **European political co-operation** in the 1970s and the 1980s, working groups have played an instrumental role in EU foreign policy business. Foreign policy may remain firmly under the control of the national governments, but after the **Maastricht summit** it became increasingly apparent that more authority and expertise on Pillar II questions had shifted from member states to their national delegations (**Permanent Representations**) in Brussels, which collaborate with the working groups. In other words, the process of 'Brusselsization' ensures that a substantial amount of information on foreign policy is exchanged between the national delegations, and more so than between any other sovereign states in any other international organization.

BSE: See **Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy**

The **BUDGET** has always proved to be a source of controversy, first for the European Communities (EC) and then for the European Union (EU). When the **European Economic Community** was established in 1957, it was agreed that its budget would be financed by national contributions from the member states, the contribution of each state to be determined by its gross national product (GNP). This was the standard means for financing international organizations such as the **United Nations**. The **European Commission** regarded the EC as being a different type of organization, however, and since the mid-1960s has sought access to its own revenue sources. In 1970 the original **six** member states in the **Treaty of Luxembourg** decided that national contributions would be progressively phased out by 1975, to be replaced by a system of EC **own resources**, that is, funds that originate in the member states but are the property of the EC. In other words, the amount of money that is available to the EU is determined by an agreement among the member states. It was generally assumed at the outset that the contributions and the receipts would more or less balance. This has not been the case, and the budget has been a politically sensitive issue. However, the European Commission states that the financial contributions made by EU countries to the EU budget are distributed equitably, so that each country contributes a percentage of its **value-added tax** (VAT), together with around 1% of its gross national income.

Revenue comes from two main additional sources, as the EU receives levies on imports of sugar, and **customs duties** from outside the EU. In addition, fines imposed by the Commission for infringements of EC

competition policy were added to the budget, and in recent years accounted for approximately 1% to 2% of the entire budget. The **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC) retained its own budget, which was financed by a direct levy upon coal and steel enterprises within the EU. The **Treaty on European Union** formally recognized that the EC had their own sources of revenue, stipulating that there must be sufficient own resources to cover all agreed expenditure.

The annual spending plans of the EU are determined after lengthy negotiations between the Council and the **European Parliament** (EP). The budget process consists of five stages. The Commission prepares a preliminary draft budget for presentation to the **Council of the European Union**, usually by the end of May of the year before the one during which the budget is to be implemented. The Council can then accept or amend the draft. By October the Council must have agreed, by a qualified majority (see **Qualified Majority Voting**), upon a draft budget and have sent it to the EP. The EP enjoys 'power of the purse' with regard to the budget and has 42 days in which to consider the draft. Prior to the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, on those items that represented compulsory expenditure, the EP was only able to suggest modifications to the Council's proposals; the EP has since gained co-decision over the entire budget. On **non-compulsory expenditure**, it is free to amend the draft budget, albeit only within a general limit previously defined by the Council. Once its deliberations are complete, the revised budget returns to the Council, which may reject the EP's changes. When the proposed modifications to compulsory expenditure do not entail an overall increase in expenditure, a qualified majority vote is needed in the Council; when an increase is involved, a positive majority in the Council is required for rejection.

In cases where the Council decides to reject EP amendments to non-compulsory expenditure, the two institutions are obliged to enter into a conciliation procedure to seek a compromise. (If the Council and the EP are unable to reach agreement, the Commission must draw up a new draft budget.) The final revised document is then returned to the EP for adoption. For the budget to be rejected by the EP a two-thirds' majority of the recorded votes must be against adoption, and this qualified majority must also constitute an overall majority of the total EP membership. If the EP votes against adoption, the net effect is that the EU does not have a budget for the new calendar year, and expenditure is restricted each month to one-twelfth of the budget approved for the previous year. This restriction remains in force until a new budget can be approved. The EP rejected the budget in 1979 and 1984, but each time it ultimately accepted a version that was only marginally different from the one it had refused to adopt. From 1993 the budget was the subject of an inter-institutional agreement seeking to inject greater budgetary discipline and to improve budgetary procedures between the Council, the Commission and the EP.

Fraud has been a significant problem and it was estimated that between 2% and 10% of the budget was subject to fraudulent financial claims, primarily from the operation of the **Common Agricultural Policy** (CAP). The

Treaty of Amsterdam introduced measures to protect against fraud and misuse of EU finances. It also provided for greater scrutiny of agricultural expenditure. The **European Court of Auditors** was to have an enhanced role in ensuring that the budget was not being misspent.

In the 2000s the issue of EU financing became more controversial than at any time since the early 1980s. For example, discussions between the EU member states stalled in June 2005 at a meeting of the **European Council**, as the **United Kingdom** refused to compromise on its rebate unless the French Government showed willingness to engage in serious CAP reform; the French and British Governments disagreed over how best to finance the 2004 **enlargement** to the advantage of the new entrants. EU leaders finally secured an agreement for the new financial perspective (2007–13) of €862,400m.

Discussions for the financial perspective running from 2007 to 2013 also proved to be contentious. The Commission, with the support of some of the smaller EU states, had been keen to maintain the existing level of 1.24% of GNP to determine the overall size of the budget. However, the net contributors to the budget (**Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands** and the UK) wanted to limit spending to 1% of GNP. The final agreement, determined by the member state governments, was capped at 1.05%.

In June 2011 the European Commission, in the course of preparations for the 2014–20 **Multi-annual Financial Framework** (MFF), proposed to increase the **transparency** and fairness of the system for financing the EU budget by introducing a new financial transaction tax (FTT). In late September the Commission presented a directive on the proposed FTT, which would be levied on all transactions between financial institutions, provided that at least one of those institutions was located in the EU; it was proposed that the exchange of shares and bonds be taxed at a rate of 0.1%, and derivatives at a rate of 0.01%. Two-thirds of revenue from the FTT was to be directed to the EU budget, thereby reducing the gross national income (GNI)-based contributions of member states, while the remaining one-third would be retained by individual member states. In early 2013 11 member states (including **France** and **Germany**) agreed to adopt the new FTT; however, some member states were strongly opposed to the proposals. In February the Commission announced modified proposals for the enactment of the proposed FTT under enhanced co-operation rules; the proposal required approval by all the participating member states, with the agreement of the EP, before its entry into force.

The political sensitivities behind the drawing up and objective setting of the EU budget, and over identifying the net beneficiaries and net contributors, have become a routine aspect of EU affairs. The tensions were displayed once again as EU member state governments entered into the final stage negotiations for a new financial perspective for 2014–20. Although the European Council agreed on the terms and size of the 2014–20 budget in February 2013, the EP raised concerns about some of the budget lines and especially the cuts in expenditure. In November the EP endorsed the EU's MFF for 2014–20,

and the European Council approved the MFF deal in December 2013. The framework provided for some €960,000m. (or 1% of EU GNI) in commitments and €908,400m. in payments. Jobs and **competitiveness** were at the heart of the MFF.

In November 2019 the Council and the EP approved the EU budget for 2020, which set total commitments at some €168,700m. (an increase of 1.5% compared with 2019) and payments at some €153,600m. (an increase of 3.4%). The negotiation of the new MFF for 2021–27 was under way in 2020, with negotiations complicated by the need to finance recovery efforts amid the **COVID-19** pandemic; an agreement was reached by EU leaders on 21 July 2020 (subject to approval by the EP), which provided for funding of €1,074,300m. during 2021–27, at 2018 prices. (See also **Next Generation EU**.) Political agreement on the MFF for 2021–27 was reached on 10 November 2020, and the MFF was adopted in mid-December. Under the 2021 budget, authorized expenditure appropriations were set at €164,251.5m. in commitments and €166,060.5m. in payments. From January 2021 a new category of budgetary contribution was introduced to the MFF for 2021–27, based on non-recycled waste from plastic packaging (and initially calculated on the basis of Eurostat forecasts).

BULGARIA is one of the 10 Central and Eastern European countries that applied for European Union (EU) membership in the 1990s, submitting its formal application in 1995. Prior to this it had signed a **Europe agreement** with the European Communities in 1993, which entered into force in 1995. The **European Commission's** report on the **applicant countries** of July 1997, entitled Agenda 2000, proposed that **accession negotiations** with Bulgaria should be deferred, owing to the limited measures undertaken with regard to economic reform and the degree of political instability experienced in the early to mid-1990s. Although the country had almost fulfilled the political criteria for membership, the report stated that investment was still needed in the areas of environment, transport, energy, home affairs, justice and agriculture. Bulgaria was thus not a participant in the first round of accession negotiations that began in March 1998. However, greater political stability helped Bulgaria's image, and the country was included in the second round of negotiations that commenced in 2000. The country continued to make steady progress, although difficulties persisted over specific economic targets and the EU's demands for the early closure of the obsolete reactors at the controversial Kozloduy nuclear plant. The Bulgarian Government closed two of the reactors in December 2002 and announced its intention to shut down a further two by the end of 2006. The final negotiating chapters were closed in June 2004 and in April 2005 a **Treaty of Accession** was signed. This was ratified by the Bulgarian parliament on 11 May 2005, with 230 MPs voting in favour and two against. Bulgaria joined the EU on 1 January 2007 alongside **Romania**. From 26 September 2005 to 31 December 2006 Bulgaria had 18 observers in

the European Parliament (EP), who were appointed from government and opposition parties, as agreed by the Bulgarian National Assembly. Following accession on 1 January 2007 the observers became MEPs, who then contested the EP elections, which were held in June 2009. Upon Bulgaria's accession to the EU in 2007, many existing EU member states imposed extensive labour market restrictions; only nine countries guaranteed unlimited access to migrant workers from Bulgaria and Romania; however, all transitional migration restrictions were lifted from 1 January 2014. As with Romania, Bulgaria was subject to post-accession monitoring by the Commission of progress in compliance with judicial reform and anti-corruption measures. The Commission suspended nearly €500m. in development aid to Bulgaria in July 2008, after releasing a report that strongly criticized the country's continued failure to reduce levels of organized crime and corruption. After taking office in July 2009, the administration of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov introduced measures aimed at improving the management of EU funds. In September it was announced that the Commission was to resume farm subsidy payments and other agricultural aid to Bulgaria. In December 2015 the National Assembly adopted a reform intended to strengthen the independence of the Bulgarian judiciary (in accordance with EU requirements). However, most parties opposed curbs on the powers of the Prosecutor-General and voted in favour of an amended version of the legislation. In a report issued in January 2017, a decade after Bulgaria's accession to the EU, the Commission noted that although Bulgaria had made progress in implementing judicial reforms, significant efforts to combat corruption were still required. In July 2020 **euro-zone** ministers of finance confirmed that Bulgaria had fulfilled the economic criteria for admission to the **exchange rate mechanism**, a pre-requisite for **euro** adoption. There was no indication when Bulgaria might be expected to adopt the euro as its national currency.

The **BUNDESBANK** is the central bank of the Federal Republic of **Germany**, and was established in 1957. Because of the importance of the German economy and the strength of its currency, the Bank has had a substantial influence upon Western European economic policy and activity, and was the core of the **European Monetary System**. The Bundesbank's central policy concern was to fight inflation in West Germany. However, this obsession with price stability as the core policy objective in turn affected other European economies, which experienced rising unemployment and weaker economic growth. This was particularly the case in **France** by the late 1980s, and was a prime motivating factor behind the French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur's pursuit of **economic and monetary union** (EMU). By the early 1990s the heavy financial strains of the German reunification process only fortified the Bundesbank's priorities of controlling domestic inflation and maintaining high interest rates, and led to further political controversy in 1992–93, when these domestic objectives took precedence over policies that other member states

believed the Bank should have adopted in order to preserve the **exchange rate mechanism** (ERM). The problem with the Bundesbank's policy was external, in that other countries, with weaker currencies, had to match the level of German interest rates if they wished to stay in the ERM. This adversely affected their own economies, while exposing them to market speculation on the grounds that their currency values were artificially high. The Bundesbank and a majority of the German electorate remained unenthusiastic about the notion of EMU and feared that any new currency would be less stable than the Deutsche Mark. The decision for Germany to embark on the EMU project was, however, politically driven and decided. With the establishment of the **euro** and the **European Central Bank** (ECB), the direct influence of the Bundesbank over European finance policy inevitably declined.

The **BUREAU** or Executive Committee is an essential part of the organization of the **European Parliament**. The Bureau comprises the President, Vice-Presidents, Quaestors and potentially others, and focuses its activities on both political and administrative matters.

BUSINESS AND INNOVATION CENTRES (BICs) were launched by the **European Commission** in 1984 to encourage diversification of activity by small enterprises, and to help establish new small companies in innovative areas of activity and production. Their role today is very much to promote regional development. There are more than 160 BICs (full members) in the member states. (See also **European Business and Innovation Centre Network**.)

BUSINESSEUROPE was until January 2007 known as the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), a transnational federation of employers' associations. It is one of the earliest (founded in 1958) and most influential of the pressure groups (see **Interest groups; Lobbying**) operating in **Brussels**. BUSINESSEUROPE represents the interests of industry as a whole, and comprises a confederation of national federations of major business associations from across Europe. In 2020 there were 40 members from 34 countries, including the European Union countries, the **European Economic Area** countries, and some Central and Eastern European countries. BUSINESSEUROPE plays both an informal and a formal role in European public affairs. On an informal level, its representatives meet **European Commission** officials regularly, and on a more formal level it is frequently asked for its views on policy initiatives. Its priorities centre on market **liberalization** and **deregulation**. It remains much more unenthusiastic, however, about initiatives in the area of **social policy**. BUSINESSEUROPE has as one of its objectives the promotion and elaboration 'of an industrial policy in a European spirit', which is qualified by the statement that it 'should mainly

consist in taking into consideration the industrial imperatives in the various policies of the European Communities and not become an instrument of intervention'. BUSINESSEUROPE has therefore tended to oppose measures such as the proposed **Company Law Statute**, which threatened to place restraints upon its members, although on occasion its impact on the European Communities was weakened by differences of interest among both its economic and its national components. BUSINESSEUROPE operates as one of the Commission's **social partners** alongside the **European Trade Union Confederation**. The organization's activities can be grouped under six principal headings. These strive to release entrepreneurial energy; to promote innovation; to liberate the **single market**; to improve the functioning of the labour market; to make **environmental policy** more effective and efficient; and to foster international trade and investment.

CABINET is the name given to the group of personal advisers and aides attached to each Commissioner within the **European Commission**. Its purpose is to provide the Commissioner with political and policy advice, as well as liaising with other groups within the European Union and speaking for the Commissioner in meetings of officials.

CABOTAGE is the system whereby transport providers may offer temporary services in the domestic market of another member state. As part of the European Communities' (EC) **road transport** policy, the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) agreed in 1993 on measures including a common tax system for heavy goods vehicles using EC roads, which led to full liberalization of road cabotage by 1998. Subsequently efforts focused on promoting cabotage on the rail network and within shipping. From 2010 cabotage was governed by a new regulation, which replaced two earlier regulations (of 1992 and 1993) and a 2006 directive.

DAVID CAMERON (1966–) was Prime Minister of the **United Kingdom** between May 2010 and July 2016, when he resigned following a national referendum on British membership of the European Union (EU), in which voters chose by a narrow majority to exit the bloc (see **Brexit**—Cameron had supported remaining a member of the EU). Cameron was elected as the leader of the Conservative Party of the UK in December 2005, in which role he served until July 2016, when he was succeeded as both Prime Minister and party leader by **Theresa May**. Following the 2009 **European Parliament** (EP) elections, in June Cameron unveiled his new European alliance—the **European Conservatives and Reformists Group**.

Cameron recognized that the 'Europe issue' remained contentious within parts of the Conservative Party and pledged to renegotiate a number of aspects of the EU treaties (especially social and employment issues) if the Conservatives won the 2010 British general election. Cameron's party won a majority of the votes at the 2010 general election, but the Conservative Party did not win enough to secure a majority of the seats within the House of Commons (producing the first 'hung parliament' since 1974). Although the subsequent coalition with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats had been expected to

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dilute the more abrasive tone towards the EU that many Conservative supporters may have wanted, in November 2010 the Cameron-led Government introduced an 'EU Bill', which required increased parliamentary and, in several cases, popular approval of further treaty amendments and decisions concerning the UK's position within the EU. In an attempt to dampen dissent among his backbench colleagues and to dent the growing popularity of the **UK Independence Party** (UKIP) in marginal parliamentary seats, Cameron expressed his view in June 2012 that a referendum on the UK's relationship with the EU should take place. In January 2013 Cameron made the so-called Bloomberg speech, pledging to hold an 'in/out' referendum by the end of 2017 on the UK's membership of the EU. In June 2013 Cameron argued that moves by **Eurosceptics** to bring about the UK's departure from the EU would not serve the national interest. However, Cameron increasingly found himself at odds with many of his Conservative Party backbenchers, especially after the emergence of UKIP as the largest British party at the 2014 EP elections. In the general election held in May 2015 the Conservatives secured a majority and formed a single-party administration, again led by Cameron. In January 2016 Cameron negotiated a series of concessions from the EU at a meeting of the **European Council** in Brussels. The promised in/out referendum on EU membership was subsequently scheduled for 23 June, with voters offered the option of continuing membership of the EU (on terms that would take into account the recently negotiated concessions), or leaving the bloc altogether. Amid an often fractious and divisive contest, in which Cameron was a strong advocate of the 'Remain' (pro-EU) camp, he and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, attracted criticism for what opponents in the 'Leave' camp called 'Project Fear'. Leave supporters suggested that Cameron and Osborne were making excessively pessimistic economic forecasts in the event of an eventual British exit from the EU, in an attempt to persuade voters that a vote to leave the EU would be catastrophic. As it transpired, Cameron was unable to persuade a majority of the British electorate to vote to remain in the EU, and within hours of the result being announced (with 51.9% of the 72.2% of the electorate who participated voting to leave the EU), on 24 June Cameron announced his intention to resign. Theresa May was appointed leader of the party in July, and subsequently Prime Minister. Cameron would be remembered, in the short term at least, as the figure that (unintentionally) facilitated the UK's exit from the EU.

CANDIDATE COUNTRIES was the term adopted by the Helsinki **summit meeting** of the **European Council** in December 1999 to refer to those countries involved in **accession negotiations** launched in February 2000. At the time, the term covered the 10 **applicant countries** from **Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey**. With the recent **enlargements** of the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004, on 1 January 2007 and on 1 July 2013, the number now stands at five: **Albania, Serbia,**

Montenegro, Turkey and **North Macedonia**. In addition to adopting the term ‘candidate countries’, the European Council in 2000 introduced the term **potential candidate state** to describe other countries in the **Western Balkans** that aspire to membership. These are **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (which made a formal application for membership of the EU in February 2016) and **Kosovo**.

CAP: See **Common Agricultural Policy**

CARBON TAX is a tax imposed on the carbon content of fuels and is a form of carbon pricing. The idea of a carbon tax at the EU level first arose in the form of a proposed energy tax presented by the **European Commission** in the early 1990s. The idea constituted part of the campaign to reduce **atmospheric pollution**. It emerged as a principal element of the European Commission’s efforts to develop an **energy policy** that would be closely linked to EU **environmental policy**. The tax would involve a levy on petroleum produced within the European Union (EU) as well as upon the fuel and carbon content of all non-renewable fuel. The tax was seen as part of the EU’s acceptance of the agreement at the **United Nations** Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the end of the century. The proposal found support among the traditional ‘leader’ member states on environmental policy (the **Netherlands**, **Germany** and **Denmark**), which sought EU-wide measures to match taxes already in place at the national level, but it provoked strong opposition from the poorer member states, as well as from energy-intensive industries. Concerns were often expressed that the imposition of a carbon tax may lead some firms to relocate to other countries where no such taxes exist, having a negative impact on employment. An **Emissions Trading Scheme** (ETS) was launched in January 2005, obliging companies that exceed agreed carbon dioxide emissions to buy extra allowances from more efficient companies or incur considerable fines. The ETS is currently in its third trading phase, which runs between 2021 and 2030. In 2009 a significant revision was approved, strengthening and harmonizing the system. In July 2015 the Commission proposed another revision of the ETS to bring it into greater alignment with updates to the 2030 climate and energy policy framework. In July 2020 the Commission launched public consultations on initiatives on the use of taxation to help meet the EU’s climate goals, such as a new possible carbon tax.

CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) was the financial assistance programme dedicated to the **Western Balkans** as part of the **Stabilization and Association Process** launched in 1999. It replaced the OBNOVA programme and involved total funding to the

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region of €4,560m. in 2000–06. From 1 January 2007 CARDS was replaced by the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**.

CARTELS: See: **Competition Policy; Transport Policy**

CASE LAW: See **Court of Justice; Law; Legislation**

CASSIS DE DIJON is the popular name of an important ruling (Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein) by the **Court of Justice**. The Court ruled in 1979 that, where a product is manufactured and legally on sale in one member state, another member state cannot prohibit its import and sale, except on grounds of its constituting a risk to public health. The product in question was a French fruit liqueur, and its importer into the Federal Republic of **Germany** (West Germany) had appealed to the Court of Justice against a decision by the German courts to ban its import. The West German case rested on the argument that, under the national spirits monopoly, potable spirits had to contain at least 25% by volume of wine spirits to be marketable in the country: the product in question, *Cassis de Dijon*, had less than 20% by volume of wine spirits. In rejecting the West German argument, the Court delivered a decisive legal precedent for the European Communities (EC) in its affirmation of the unconstitutionality of national legislation and technical regulations in relation to intra-EC trade. It enabled the **European Commission** to develop the principle of **mutual recognition** as an important instrument of **harmonization** and the development of the **internal market**. The ruling was subsequently applied to a wide range of products, and its essence was formally incorporated into the **Treaty of Rome**.

CATALAN INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM of 1 October 2017 refers to the attempt by semi-autonomous Catalonia to gain independence from **Spain**. The bid for independence had been approved by the Parliament of Catalonia, although it was declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Spain following the Spanish Government's intervention. The High Court of Justice gave orders for the referendum to be prevented, allowing for the intervention of the National Police and Civil Guard on election day. The turnout on the day was 43%, with the majority (92%) voting for independence. According to the Catalan administration some 700,000 votes were left uncast due to the intervention of the National Police. (Although those not in support of independence were widely considered less likely to have turned out to vote.) Although the police force of Catalonia refused to prevent people from voting, the clash between the National Police and voters resulted in injuries to both civilians and police officers. Human rights organizations criticized the National Police for violence, while the aftermath of the vote further underscored the deep divisions within Spain, leading to a constitutional crisis.

Carles Puigdemont, President of Catalonia, was adamant that the results were valid; Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy eventually sought the approval of the Senate to dismiss Puigdemont, and dissolved the Catalan parliament. Shortly afterwards, Puigdemont left Spain for **Belgium**, following charges of rebellion, sedition and the misuse of public funds in pursuit of the independence referendum. The European Union (EU) attracted criticism for apparently ignoring the violence against civilians, although **European Commission** President Jean-Claude Juncker, speaking for the EU, noted that the situation was an internal issue.

CCP: See **Common Commercial Policy**

CCT: See **Common External Tariff**

CDP: See **Common Defence Policy**

The **CECCHINI REPORT** of 1988 gave the **European Commission** powerful ammunition in its quest to introduce a range of practical measures that would ensure the effective operation of the **internal market** by 1992. Requested by the Commission, the report was compiled by a committee of experts under the chairmanship of Paolo Cecchini, and published in 16 large volumes, with a summary presentation also published as *The European Challenge 1992—The Benefits of a Single Community*. The committee consulted both economic and financial data collections and analyses, as well as other official and academic studies. It also interviewed some 11,000 companies across the European Communities (EC). The result was an extensive listing and costing of the obstacles—national practices, regulations and standards—that prevented the realization of the objective of **freedom of movement** contained in the **Treaty of Rome**. The report concluded that the cost of these obstacles was about €200,000m., or some 5% of the EC gross domestic product. Although it was accepted by the EC, not all authorities agreed with its findings.

CEDEFOP: See **European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training**

CEE: See **Central and Eastern Europe**

CEFTA: See **Central European Free Trade Area**

CELAD: See **European Committee to Combat Drugs**

CELEX

CELEX stands for *Communitatis Europae Lex*, an inter-institutional database for European Union (EU) law, compiled by the **Legal Service** of the **European Commission**. Established in 1971, it contains details of, and provides an information service on, treaties, legal agreements resulting from the external relationships of the EU, all secondary **legislation**, case law and **Court of Justice** rulings, and questions and answers in the **European Parliament**.

CEN is the acronym of the European Committee for Standardization (Comité Européen de Normalisation), a body of experts based in **Brussels** that was established in 1961 to assist in the advancement of the **industrial policy** and research and development policy of the European Communities. Funded by the **European Commission**, it was given a general remit to prepare European standards across a whole range of products, processes and appliances, as well as in the field of information technology. The variety of systems of national standards employed by the member states was believed to be a barrier to the effective **implementation** of the **internal market**. A number of smaller states were concerned that **France**, **Germany** and the **United Kingdom** would dominate the process of integrating the national standards, as they collectively produced some 85% of them. Around 2,000 subjects have been covered by CEN. The field of electrotechnical standardization is the brief of a parallel committee, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (**CENELEC**).

CENELEC, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique), is an expert body based in **Brussels** and funded by the **European Commission**, the role of which is to prepare European technical standards across a range of products and appliances as well as in the field of information technology. Its work is regarded as important for both the research and development policy and the **industrial policy** of the European Union. Its work is similar to that of the European Committee for Standardization (**CEN**).

CENTRAL AMERICA: See **South and Central America**

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (CEE), as far as the European Union (EU) is concerned, comprises 11 countries: **Bulgaria**, **Croatia**, the **Czech Republic** (Czechia), **Estonia**, **Hungary**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Poland**, **Romania**, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia**. In terms of their current standing within the EU, there are some divergences. While EU members Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are happy to pursue deeper integration, including membership of the **eurozone** and **Schengen Area**, Poland and Hungary are more reluctant. Moreover, Poland and Hungary have increasingly come into conflict with EU norms and obligations to promote the rule of law, as their Governments move

towards more illiberal politics. Both countries view further integration sceptically. In the Czech Republic, while there is less enthusiasm within the citizenry about deepened integration, the political elites are generally somewhat keener. Nevertheless, the leadership of Andrej Babiš opposed eurozone membership.

The **CENTRAL EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA** (CEFTA) agreement entered into force in 1993, agreed on by the so-called **Visegrad group** of countries (Czechoslovakia—now the **Czech Republic** or Czechia, and **Slovakia**—along with **Hungary** and **Poland**), with **Slovenia** and **Romania** joining them in 1996 and 1997, respectively. **Bulgaria** joined the association in 1999, followed by **Croatia** in 2003 and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYRM—now **North Macedonia**) in 2006. The agreement led to the establishment of free trade in industrial goods between the nine countries. Although free trade is an important goal in itself, the main purpose behind CEFTA has always been to facilitate integration with the **European Union** (EU) and enhance the prospects of the participant countries obtaining EU membership. Indeed, five of CEFTA's members joined the EU on 1 May 2004, and two more on 1 January 2007, thus reducing the membership of CEFTA to just two countries, Croatia and the FYRM. In December 2006 CEFTA was therefore extended to include **Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia** and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of **Kosovo**. Croatia left CEFTA when it became the 28th member of the EU in July 2013.

CERIF stands for Common European Research Information Format. It is a facility established in 1991 to enable the member states to exchange information on research projects as a prelude to a planned network of European research databases.

CERN is the acronym of the European Organization for Nuclear Research, a transnational research institution founded in 1954 and based in Geneva, **Switzerland**. CERN is a pure, as opposed to an applied, research institute, focusing upon the theoretical basis of nuclear and particle physics. Twenty-two nations, including 19 member states of the European Union (the other two being **Norway** and **Switzerland**), as well as Israel, are members, and the **European Commission** acts as an observer. CERN maintains links with the **European Atomic Energy Community**.

CET: See **Common External Tariff**

CFP: See **Common Fisheries Policy**

CFR

CFR: See **Charter of Fundamental Rights**

CFSP: See **Common Foreign and Security Policy**

CHAPTER is the term denoting a subdivision of a **Title** in a European Treaty. A Chapter may in turn be subdivided into **Sections**.

CHARTER FOR A NEW EUROPE: See **Charter of Paris for a New Europe**

The **CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** (CFR) was proclaimed by the Presidents of the **European Commission**, the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** at the Nice **summit meeting** of the **European Council** in December 2000. It should not be confused with either the **European Convention on Human Rights** (ECHR) adopted by the **Council of Europe** in 1950 or the **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**, otherwise known as the Social Charter, adopted in 1989. These two documents did, however, inspire some of the content of the CFR. Its existence owes much to the increased awareness of fundamental rights within the European Union (EU) and the desire of the EU to promote such, whether internally through, for example, **citizenship**, or externally through the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**.

The text of the CFR comprises seven chapters covering Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizen's Rights, Justice and General Provisions. These contain a total of 54 **articles** setting out individual rights such as those to life, liberty and freedom, education, non-discrimination, good administration, and a fair trial. As such, therefore, it presents in a single document the existing rights and freedoms enjoyed by EU citizens whether through the **European treaties** or through the ECHR or the Social Charter. Indeed, no new rights were created. All the same, the member states were not willing at the time to make the CFR a legally binding document. However, they accepted the proposal of the **European Convention** to include it in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. This was only possible, however, after a number of additional clauses had been inserted clarifying the interpretation and application of the rights contained in the CFR. Further clarifications and a partial **opt-out** for the **United Kingdom** were negotiated as part of the **inter-governmental conference** of 2007 that led to agreement on the **Treaty of Lisbon** which, upon **ratification**, made the CFR legally binding on the member states and the EU's institutions when implementing EU law. As part of this process, the CFR was duly signed and proclaimed again by the Presidents of the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament on 12 December 2007. The Charter became legally

binding on member states upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009.

CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS

is the official title of the original document that later became known as the Social Charter. It originated in the review of progress towards the target of completing the **internal market** by the end of 1992, in which the **European Council** referred to the equal importance of developing the social aspects of the single market. The **European Commission** subsequently drew up a set of proposals for the introduction of a European Communities (EC) charter of fundamental social rights. The European Council at its **Strasbourg** summit approved a modified version of these proposals in December 1989, although British opposition meant that only 11 of the 12 member states signed the document. Thereafter, the Social Charter figured prominently in the discussions leading up to the **Treaty on European Union**, but persistent British opposition prevented it from being included in the treaty. Instead a Social Chapter, complete with an **opt-out** arrangement for the **United Kingdom**, was agreed allowing the 11 to proceed with measures, notably on **health and safety** and worker consultation, to implement the Charter. The Labour Government elected to power in the UK in May 1997 agreed to sign the Charter shortly after taking office. Following this, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** removed the opt-out clause and incorporated the Social Chapter in the revised **Treaty of Rome**.

The Charter set out to codify in general terms what the EC had already begun to do in the social sector, as well as introducing some new proposals. In emphasizing that the single internal market must benefit workers as well as employers, the Charter set out a code of practice that dealt with living and working conditions, **freedom of movement** of labour, collective bargaining, training, equal opportunities, gender equality, measures to protect underprivileged groups, and safety and health protection. Much of this was already the subject of EC **directives** and **regulations**. The Commission wanted a further **harmonization** of practices that would bring them to the level of the best national practices currently in existence, and stressed the appropriateness of EC action where the desired goals could be more easily achieved at the EC, rather than the national, level. Since the Charter's adoption, many of the rights of workers contained in it have been incorporated into the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** proclaimed in 2000.

The **CHARTER OF PARIS FOR A NEW EUROPE**, often referred to simply as the Charter of Paris, was a document signed at the meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (see **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**) in Paris, **France**, in November 1990. The signatories, including the European Communities' member states, declared that 'the era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended', and

CHASSE GARDÉE

committed themselves to the promotion and defence of democracy, **human rights** and a free market economy. The Charter has often been held to mark the formal end of the **Cold War**.

CHASSE GARDÉE is a phrase ('protected competition') that has been employed within the European Union (EU) by opponents of too great a movement towards free trade. It refers to a belief that the EU's ability to survive economically in the context of international competition depends upon the provision of a protected domestic market for EU companies.

CHEQUERS PLAN is the name of the agreement negotiated between British Prime Minister **Theresa May** and her cabinet in July 2018. The plan put forth the **United Kingdom's** vision for its relations with the European Union (EU) after its intended departure in March 2019. It proposed a common rulebook for all goods, allowing harmonization of the UK with EU rules. It also called for a joint institutional framework to interpret UK and EU agreements. While UK courts have jurisdiction in the UK, and EU courts in the EU, it was agreed that UK courts would consider EU case law, although the **Court of Justice** would not be able to resolve disputes between the UK and the EU. The plan further proposed a 'combined customs territory' that would allow the UK to charge EU tariffs for goods destined for the EU, while giving the UK the ability to set and apply its own domestic tariffs. Under this plan, **freedom of movement** would end, and a new mobility framework was proposed to negotiate the movement of UK and EU citizens within each other's territories. These proposals were mainly interpreted as constituting a 'soft' Brexit, although they were criticized by some leading **Brexiters**, leading to the resignations of both Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union David Davis and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs **Boris Johnson**. The EU rejected the proposals as unwieldy and as posing a potential threat to the integrity of the **single market** and they were abandoned.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC GROUP: See **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)**

CIS: See **Commonwealth of Independent States**

The **CITIZENS' INITIATIVE** was introduced as a new means of public participation in European Union (EU) policymaking as part of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. It enables EU citizens to bring forward ideas for the **European Commission** to consider as policy proposals when 1m. people have signed a petition.

CITIZENS' RIGHTS are determined and guaranteed by the provisions of the **Treaty of Rome** and others of the **European treaties**. However, the treaties only deal with rights in terms of general principles and in specific, mainly economic, areas. A second source of citizens' rights, again only in specific areas, has been the rulings of the **Court of Justice** in the context of its interpretation of the treaties. These cases have been concerned primarily with the principle of equality between citizens within a single member state, especially for minority groups. In the 1980s the European Communities (EC) began to emphasize citizens' rights as part of their promotion of awareness of, and loyalty to, the EC at the level of the individual. This was one of the objectives of the 1984 **Committee for a People's Europe**, but **implementation** of its proposals was slow. The **Treaty on European Union** attempted to expand the rights already enjoyed by individuals into a broader notion of **citizenship**. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** continued to build on this idea, and focused further attention on the citizen's rights. A new **Article** permits the **Council of the European Union** to act, by unanimity, in cases of **discrimination** based on sex, race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Member states signing the treaty also agreed to eliminate inequalities between men and women; to protect citizens against misuse of data held by EC institutions; and to maintain and establish co-operation in areas of public health, the environment and sustainability, and development and consumer protection. The Treaty of Amsterdam, moreover, incorporated the **protocol** on social policy (see **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**) into the revised Treaty of Rome. At Nice, in December 2000, the rights of citizens were prominent with the proclamation of the **Charter of Fundamental Rights**, which contains a section dedicated to citizens' rights. Citizens' rights were also a focus of **Brexit** negotiations.

CITIZENSHIP is a concept that remained undeveloped within the European Communities (EC) until the **intergovernmental conferences** of 1991 that preceded the **Maastricht summit**. While certain individual rights were provided by the **Treaty of Rome**, they were based essentially upon the economic objectives set by the treaty. While these rights were strengthened by rulings of the **Court of Justice**, they were limited in number and scope, and did not in any way provide a condition of citizenship. This lacuna in EC thinking was directly addressed by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), which attempted to formalize and develop the concept of citizenship beyond the economic rights of workers. The aim of introducing and defining European Union (EU) citizenship was part of the ambition to make the EU more democratic and to instil identity with, and commitment to, the EU in its inhabitants. However, it was not totally clear what citizenship was or what it involved. There were no references to the duties of citizens and, since the EU did not at the time have **legal personality**, citizenship appeared to lie within the EC **pillar**, which was the only part of the EU in which the Court of

CIVIL PROTECTION

Justice, as the guarantor of rights, had jurisdiction. With the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the situation changed, and the EU gained legal personality. In addition, the TEU reaffirmed that **sovereignty** rested with the member states, thus accepting that questions of nationality and citizenship should be decided at the national level. Even though EU citizenship is therefore indirect, its establishment was not accepted unanimously. There were fears, particularly among **Euroceptics**, that European institutions would use the introduction of a formalized citizenship to reduce further the freedom of the states, with the long-term aim of EU citizenship superseding national citizenship. Under the 2006 **budget**, citizenship emerged as a new, albeit very small, category of expenditure. Initiatives under this heading included efforts to combat health threats from animal diseases such as bird flu, **Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy** (BSE) and foot and mouth disease. Under the provisions of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** (TFEU) citizens have the right to move to and freely live in other EU states; have the right to vote in, and stand as candidates to, the **European Parliament** (EP) and local elections; are protected by the diplomatic and consular authorities of other EU states; and have the right to petition the EP and to complain to the European **Ombudsman**. Other rights bestowed on EU citizens include: the right to contact and receive a response from any EU institution in any one of the official languages; the right to access documents from the EU institutions (under certain conditions) and the right of equal access to the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new form of public participation for EU citizens in the form of the **Citizens' Initiative**. Citizenship Reports are adopted every three years. The report is the product of wide-ranging consultations and considers ways further to reinforce citizenship, but also identifies obstacles to be overcome to enhance the principle of EU citizenship.

CIVIL PROTECTION is a relatively recent area of European Union (EU) competence, contained in the **Treaty of Lisbon**. It envisages the EU encouraging co-operation between member states to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against natural or manmade disasters within the EU.

CMEA: See **Council for Mutual Economic Assistance**

CN: See **Combined Nomenclature**

COAL: See **European Coal and Steel Community**

COCOLAF: See **Advisory Committee for the Co-ordination of Fraud Prevention**

CO-DECISION PROCEDURE: See **Ordinary Legislative Procedure**

The **COHESION FUND** was established by the **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** in 1993 as part of the European Communities' cohesion policy. It is a financial instrument available to finance transport infrastructure and environmental programmes in member states with a gross national income (GNI) per head of less than 90% of the European Union (EU) average. The Fund was not designated as a structural fund, but was linked directly to the move towards **economic and monetary union (EMU)** and was designed to ease the fiscal problems experienced by the poorer member states as they tried to meet the excessive deficit criteria for EMU membership. Originally, only the four poorest countries in the EU-15—**Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland**—were eligible for support from the Fund. Member state governments agreed to support this fund with annual commitment appropriations amounting to €2,615m. for each of the first four years, €2,515m. for 2004 and 2005, and, finally, €2,510m. for 2006. If a member state became ineligible, it was always intended that the available resources would be reduced accordingly. Exactly how the overall resources of the Fund are allocated among the member states is determined by a series of criteria that considers member state population and area, overall GNI per head and socioeconomic factors. The original financial allocation provided Spain with 61%–63.5% of the fund; Greece with 16%–18%; Ireland with 2%–6%; and Portugal with 16%–18%. It should be noted that the total amount that member states could receive from the Cohesion Fund each year (including any monies under structural funds) was not permitted to exceed 4% of their gross domestic product (GDP). In 2006 the Cohesion Fund was substantially increased to provide €6,000m. for some 200 environmental and transport projects to assist the regions in the less prosperous member states to comply with environmental standards. The budget for 2014–20 provided for the Cohesion Fund to provide funding of some €63,400m., with the level of support and the national contribution adjusted according to the level of development: less developed regions were defined as those with levels of GDP amounting to less than 75% of the EU average; transition regions were those with GDP of between 75% and 90% of the EU average; and more developed regions had GDP of more than 90% of the EU average. The Cohesion Fund for 2014–20 was targeted at specific objectives and these included trans-European networks and environmental issues relating to renewable energies, energy efficiency, developing rail networks and strengthening public transport. Monies under the Cohesion Fund were available to the following states: **Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia**. The financial assistance of the Cohesion Fund can be suspended by a decision of the Council of the EU (taken by **qualified majority voting**) if a member state records an excessive budget deficit (commonly above 3% of GDP, as stipulated by the

Stability and Growth Pact), and if it has not resolved the situation or has not taken the appropriate action eventually to do so.

In 2021–27 the Cohesion Fund was continuing to support member countries with a gross national income (GNI) per head, measured in terms of purchasing power standard and calculated on the basis of EU figures for 2015–17, of less than 90% of average GNI per head for the EU27 over the same reference period. Cohesion policy was simplified for 2021–27, and the level of support and the national contribution have been adjusted according to the level of development: less developed regions are defined as those with GDP per capita that is less than 75% of the EU average; transition regions are those with GDP of between 75% and 100% of the EU average; and more developed regions have GDP of more than 100% of the EU average. In response to the **COVID-19** pandemic, in April 2020 the **European Commission** introduced the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus, which involved the redirection of cohesion funding to areas most in need. In late May this was supplemented with the proposal of REACT EU, which was to provide targeted crisis response and recovery measures by supplementing proposed cohesion funding for 2021–27. REACT EU was allocated some €47,500m. (in 2018 prices) in 2021–27 through the EU's **Next Generation EU** recovery instrument. The EU's long-term budget for 2021–27 provided for cohesion funding of some €42,556m. (in 2018 prices). See also **regional policy**.

COHESION POLICY: See **Structural and Cohesion Funds**

COLD WAR is a term that was first used in the late 1940s to describe the competition and tension that arose soon after the end of the Second World War, especially in Europe, between the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) and its East European satellites on the one side and the **USA** and its Western associates on the other. Relations between the two sides were definitively frozen by 1948, as illustrated by the Berlin Airlift (1948–49), with the imposition of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe being matched by a series of US commitments to Western Europe through the Truman Doctrine, the **Marshall Plan** and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO). The Cold War made impossible the pan-European alliance envisaged by some in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and ensured that any movement towards integration would be confined to Western Europe. It further strengthened US support for European integration. The fear of Soviet intentions also gave a powerful impetus within Western Europe to efforts at collaboration and integration for the sake of self-preservation, and to the feeling that the Federal Republic of **Germany** (West Germany), itself a product of the Cold War, must be thoroughly integrated with the rest of Western Europe. The US military protection guaranteed by NATO allowed the European Communities (EC) to develop without having to be overly concerned

with political and defence requirements. However, the EC's later attempts, in the 1970s, to develop **European political co-operation** (EPC) were in part a response to the bipolarity engendered by the Cold War and the result of a desire to secure a distinctive Western European voice within it. While the necessity of preserving the US commitment limited the extent of EPC to the political and economic aspects of security, the end of the Cold War (as marked by the signing of the **Charter of Paris for a New Europe** in 1990) meant that the EC could feel less reliant upon US views, and less obliged to take account of them, and begin to consider developing their own **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. The Cold War between the 'superpowers' shaped and provided the backdrop to European political and security developments for over 40 years, and on occasions it seemed that the rivalries, as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the deployment of US cruise missiles in West Germany in the early 1980s, would lead to war. Ultimately the economic and political costs of the Cold War led both the USA under Ronald Reagan and the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev to re-evaluate their positions. It caused the latter to commence his policies of *perestroika* (reform) and *glasnost* (openness), which gave rise to the 'revolutions' in Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989, the breaching of the Berlin Wall and the fall from power of Eastern Europe's communist systems. The USSR was not immune to these processes and began to fragment in 1991. Its collapse signalled the end of the Cold War.

COLUMBUS is the name of the **European Space Agency's** research laboratory, forming part of the international space station. Originally linked to the Hermes space shuttle project, the project to produce Columbus began in 1988. Columbus launched in February 2008.

COM DOCUMENTS are part of the official working documents of the **European Commission**. They are documents prepared by the **Directorates-General** and submitted to the **Secretariat-General** for placement on the agenda of Commission meetings. They consist of proposals for **legislation**, policy discussion papers, and reports on the implementation of policies.

COMBINED NOMENCLATURE (CN) is the goods nomenclature created by the European Communities. Established in 1988, it replaced two previous systems: the **common external tariff** (CET) nomenclature and the Nomenclature of Goods for the External Trade Statistics of the Community and Statistics of Trade between member states (NIMEXE). The CN is published annually as a stand-alone Regulation in the *Official Journal of the European Union* (OJ).

COMECON: See **Council for Mutual Economic Assistance**

COMEXT

COMEXT is a databank of external trade statistics produced by the Statistical Office of the European Union (**Eurostat**).

COMITOLOGY: See **Committee Procedure**

COMMISSION: See **European Commission**

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION is the official title of the **European Commission**.

COMMISSION PRESIDENT: See **European Commission**

COMMISSIONER: See **European Commission**

COMMITTEE FOR A PEOPLE'S EUROPE is the name of a committee established by the **European Council** at the June 1984 **Fontainebleau summit**. Its aim was to create an entry point for engagement with the **European Union** at individual level and to improve the image of the European Community to citizens. The Committee was composed of personal representatives of the heads of government, and was chaired by Pietro Adonnino, a **Member of the European Parliament** (MEP) for **Italy**. The Committee produced two reports, often referred to as the Adonnino Reports. Both contained a series of recommendations based on the Committee's brief, as well as proposals for measures to improve the rights and freedoms of European Communities (EC) citizens, and both were approved in principle by the European Council.

The first report was submitted in March 1985. It recommended the immediate **implementation** of a number of specific measures relating to the simplification of border crossing formalities, duty-free allowances, tax exemption for books and magazines, the taxation of trans-frontier workers, rights of residence, and the reciprocal recognition of equivalent diplomas and other forms of professional qualifications. Several of these proposals were incorporated into the longer second report presented in June 1985. This report listed longer-term targets relating to **citizens' rights**, **cultural policy**, youth exchange schemes and education policy, **sport** and strengthening the image of Europe. It urged, for example, greater use to be made of the **European anthem**, **European flag** and **European passport**, as well as the introduction of special postage stamps. The European Commission drafted legislative proposals on most of the Committee's recommendations in 1986 and 1987. Some of the proposals with direct relevance to the **internal market** were incorporated into the **Single European Act**, which also referred to social justice. The more political and general rights were eventually to be incorporated into those

provisions of the **Treaty on European Union** that related to **citizenship**; others were the theme of specific EC programmes. People's Europe was not so much a programme as a set of unco-ordinated initiatives. The fact that over one-half of European Union (EU) citizens surveyed claimed never to have considered themselves European indicates that in some ways the People's Europe concept has had little effect on national identity. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** further emphasized the desire of the EU to move closer to the people by introducing new social measures. These included measures to combat unemployment, to extend **citizens' rights**, to expand the role of the **European Parliament**, and to encourage greater involvement of **national parliaments**; measures that emphasize the principle of **subsidiarity**; and measures making public access to information relating to the European institutions easier, with a view to ensuring greater **openness** and **accountability** within the EU.

COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNORS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS

was a body established in 1964. It was essentially a consultative body, charged with overseeing and commenting on monetary developments. However, because it consisted of the heads of the central banks of the member states, its opinions had considerable influence. It provided technical and managerial advice and assistance for the operation of the **European Monetary System**, and was central to the planning and institutional development of **economic and monetary union** (EMU) from January 1999. The Committee elected its own President on an annual basis, without any principle of rotation by state. It met on a monthly basis at the headquarters of the **Bank for International Settlements** in Basel, **Switzerland**. The Committee ceased to exist on the establishment of the **European Monetary Institute** in January 1994 (the start of stage two of EMU), although the governors of the central banks of the member states were to play an important role in the Governing Council of the **European Central Bank** and in the **European System of Central Banks**.

The **COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES** (COREPER) consists formally of the heads of the delegation, or **Permanent Representation**, which each member state maintains in **Brussels**, but the term COREPER is also used to refer to the totality of the delegations and their various committees and subcommittees. The members of COREPER, the Permanent Representatives, have senior ambassadorial status. COREPER's task, which expanded enormously as the European Communities (EC) extended the range and volume of their activities, acts as both service agent and 'gatekeeper' for the **Council of the European Union**. Supported by diplomatic and bureaucratic personnel, it prepares the agenda for Council meetings. If the members of COREPER, who receive their instructions from their own national capitals, are able to reach unanimous agreement on a particular issue, the proposal is given an 'A' category on the Council agenda. This means that

the Council approves the proposal without discussion. Where COREPER finds it impossible to reach a consensus, the issue is referred back for discussion and possible resolution. More generally, COREPER holds frequent meetings to review and consider the details of all proposals for EC **legislation**, in order to seek a common position acceptable to all national governments, upon which it could make recommendations to the Council of the European Union.

The workload of COREPER has increased to the extent that the Permanent Representatives do not always attend its meetings. Deputies, who meet as COREPER I, handle much of the agenda evaluation, while the ambassadors' committee is known as COREPER II. By tradition, COREPER does not discuss agricultural questions: these are the province of the **Special Committee on Agriculture**. The centrality of COREPER to the decision-making process had been the subject of much criticism, notably from the **European Parliament**, particularly on the grounds that it both reinforced the role of national governments and lacked **accountability** within the institutional framework. However, its existence was given formal recognition in the **Treaty on European Union**: previously, its authority was based only on the Rules of Procedure of the Council of the European Union.

The **COMMITTEE OF PROFESSIONAL AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS** (COPA) is based in **Brussels** and is a transnational federation of farming unions and associations, which supplements the activities of the national agricultural unions by lobbying in the various institutions of the European Union (EU) for farming interests. COPA was created in 1958 and established its secretariat in Brussels a year later. In 1962 COPA merged with European Agricultural Cooperatives (COGECA). COPA comprises 60 organizations from across the EU and 36 partner organizations from other states such as **Iceland, Norway, Switzerland** and **Turkey**. It represents some 13m. farmers and 38,000 co-operatives. COPA pulls together representatives from the various agricultural production sectors and the EU institutions to discuss matters concerning the agricultural sector. COPA leaders maintain a regular contact with the Directorate-General and, especially, the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development. Its influence has been far in excess of the importance of farmers in European society and to the economy. COPA concerns itself primarily with the operations of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP), discussions on reforming the CAP and wider agricultural trade issues. COPA lobbies the **European Commission**, the national governments and the **European Parliament**.

The **COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS** (CoR) was established by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), thereby formalizing a grouping that had emerged in the late 1980s. It was recognition of the fact that many regional political authorities in the European Communities (EC) had established their

own liaison offices in **Brussels**. It was intended, in keeping with the principle of **subsidiarity**, to involve representatives of elected local and regional authorities in EC decision making in an advisory capacity. After the European Union (EU) was enlarged to 28 member states on 1 July 2013, the Committee was expanded to comprise 353 members appointed by the Council for terms of five years on the proposals of member state governments and an equal number of alternates; it elects its own officers. It was reduced to 350 members in January 2015, according to the stipulations of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The President is Apostolos Tzitzikostas. The Bureau is the ruling body of the CoR and comprises some 60 members—the President, the First Vice-President, the Vice-Presidents, the Presidents of the four CoR political groups and other members. In general, the Bureau meets on seven occasions throughout the year and is responsible for drawing up the Committee's annual work programme. Following the **United Kingdom's** withdrawal from the EU, the CoR comprises 329 members.

The **European Commission**, the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** must consult the CoR as directed by the treaties or when they believe an opinion from it would be useful. The areas upon which the Committee must, according to the Treaty on European Union, be consulted are: economic and social cohesion; **Trans-European Networks** in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy; public health; education and youth; and culture. It was also given the right to issue opinions on matters that have been referred to the **European Economic and Social Committee**, where it feels regional issues are involved. The regions represented by the Committee's members do not correspond rigidly to any single level of **Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics** (NUTS) regions.

Under the terms of the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, the range of areas on which the Committee must be consulted was extended to include aspects of employment policy, **social policy**, **environmental policy** and vocational training. None the less, the CoR's impact has been relatively modest. It has proved difficult to maintain a common purpose in a committee with such a disparate membership. Instead, many regions have opted to utilize the CoR as an avenue to pursue their particular interests and gain access to the European Communities' decision makers. The **Treaty of Nice** in February 2001 established an overall ceiling of 350 for CoR membership. Significantly, the Treaty of Nice linked membership of the CoR to holding a regional or local authority mandate, with membership of the CoR lapsing simultaneously with the ending of an elected mandate. The final declaration of a Committee conference convened in Salamanca, **Spain**, in September 2001 included a proposal that the Committee be given the status of an institution in its own right, with the power to bring cases of alleged infringement of subsidiarity before the **Court of Justice**. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 the role of the CoR was further strengthened. The treaty obliged the Commission to consult with local and regional authorities across the EU and also with the CoR. This ensures that both local and regional

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

representatives are actively involved at a very early stage of policy proposals and pre-legislation activities. The Treaty of Lisbon also added other policy areas to the CoR's remit. These included: **civil protection**, climate change, energy and services of general interest. For the first time, the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that the European Parliament must consult the CoR.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE or 'comitology' is a name given to the process of decision making and its scrutiny within committees of the **European Commission**. It describes a process whereby the Commission consults with a series of specialist advisory and other committees when seeking to draft and implement European Union (EU) law. Under Article 291 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**, it is the task of the Commission to implement **legislation**. The nature of the committees, which are made up of national bureaucrats, technical experts and representatives of interest groups, varies: some are management committees, with executive powers, whereas others are only advisory. The latter do, however, allow access to decision making and can be highly influential.

There were previously three types of committee. These were the **advisory committees**, the management committees and the regulatory committees. A fourth, the regulatory and scrutiny committee, was created in 2006. All have different powers when it comes to decision making. All are chaired by the Commission and enable the Commission to establish a dialogue with national administrations before adopting implementation measures. The Commission ensures that they reflect as far as possible the situation in each country in question.

Procedures that govern relations between the Commission and the committees are based on models set out in a Council Decision (Comitology Decision) of 13 July 1987. However, this initial decision was modernized by the Council Decision of 28 June 1999, to take into account treaty changes and the enhanced powers of the **European Parliament (EP)** under co-decision, and also to respond to increasing criticism that the system was too complicated.

The 1999 Decision ensured that the EP could watch over the implementation of legislative instruments adopted under the **co-decision procedure**. In cases where legislation came under this procedure, the EP could express its disapproval of measures proposed by the Commission or, where appropriate, by the Council, which, in the EP's opinion, go beyond the implementing powers provided for in the legislation.

Lastly, several innovations in the latest council decision enhance the **transparency** of the committee system to the benefit of the EP and the general public: committee documents were to be more readily accessible to the citizen (the arrangements are the same as those applying to Commission documents); committee documents were also to be recorded in a public register; and, since 2000, the Commission has published an annual report giving a summary of committee activities during the previous year.

In 2006 the committee procedure underwent significant reform, when it placed the EP and the Council on an equal footing. This decision was the outcome of an initiative of the EP's Constitutional Affairs Committee and was agreed under the Austrian Presidency (of 2006). The EP was given the right to block individual Commission comitology decisions where the original legislation was adopted by both the EP and the Council under the co-decision procedure. This newer Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny was another major development for the EP, but it occurred only under co-decision and when powers had been conferred upon the Commission to implement measures, and was subject to a strict timetable.

Pressure for reform of the comitology procedure intensified as critics argued that it was too complicated. Following the terms of Article 290 of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, new rules were introduced from 1 March 2010 (and agreed by the **Council of the European Union** in February 2011) to change how this procedure worked and effectively further enhanced the role of both the Commission and the EP. Under the previous system, member state governments were able to block a Commission proposal by a simple majority. The new procedure only allows member state governments to do so if they can reach a qualified majority. The regulation also confers a right of scrutiny on both the EP and the Council. These institutions can now inform the Commission at any time if they believe the Commission has exceeded its powers. The Commission is then obliged to review the draft act and decide whether to maintain it, amend it or withdraw it. In short, the Commission is obliged to respond to objections, although these are not commonplace.

The **COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY** (CAP) is one of the obligations imposed on the European Communities (EC) by the **Treaty of Rome**. It represents one of the oldest and most established European Union (EU) policy responsibilities. Agriculture has long been deemed a special area of economic activity. Rural areas make up over 90% of the EU's territory and account for approximately 50% of its population. **Enlargement** increased the total farming population to some 7m. The enlargement process also added a further 38m. ha of land to the 130m. ha that existed in the **Fifteen**. Agriculture and forestry are the main land users and play a fundamental role in the management of natural resources in rural areas and in determining the rural landscape. The Commission argues that agriculture makes an important contribution to the EU's overall prosperity and estimates that the agri-food sector (including beverages) accounts for some 14% of total EU manufacturing output. None the less, the CAP has remained an issue of controversy although it has changed fundamentally since the early 1990s.

The original **Six** members of the EC agreed, in January 1962, on the principles of a common market for agriculture based upon five objectives set down in Article 33 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 39 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**): an increase in agricultural

productivity; a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; stabilized markets; guaranteed regular supplies of agricultural products; and a guarantee of reasonable prices to consumers. The 1962 agreement was an interim arrangement due to expire at the end of 1965, and the need for the EC to finalize the financial arrangements concerning the reform of agriculture in the various member states was one factor contributing to the **empty chair crisis**. In 1968 the framework for the CAP was described in detail in the **Manholt Plan**. However, only a diluted version of the Plan was finally adopted by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) in 1972.

The CAP was established with three main components: a single market for agricultural products, with common prices; community preference with a **common external tariff** (CET) and levies on agricultural imports from outside the EC; and common financial solidarity or responsibility. A further element, the development of which remained at a very basic stage, was the restructuring of European agriculture. Common prices for agricultural products were introduced between 1962 and 1967.

In addition to protecting farmers within the EU, the CAP has sought to help European agriculture to compete on world markets. It guaranteed the payment of export subsidies or **restitutions**, whereby exporters of EU agricultural produce would receive refunds to cover the difference between the lower prices at which they had to sell on the world markets and the high EU prices at which they had to purchase produce. During the 1970s and the 1980s, higher agricultural prices, as determined by the Council of the European Union, encouraged over-production and moves to more intensive farming, which had a negative impact on the environment, failed to improve the incomes of the smallest farmers and consumed ever more of the **European Economic Community's** limited **budget**. The highest levels of over-production occurred in dairy farming, which, although producing only one-fifth of EC total agricultural produce, had by 1980 come to absorb some two-fifths of CAP financial support. Cereal and sugar cultivators were other major over-producers.

The core of the CAP was the guaranteed price system, administered through the **European Agricultural Guarantee Fund** (EAGF), which replaced the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund in 2007. Prices were determined each year by the EU agricultural ministers. Prices fixed under the CAP were invariably higher than those prevailing on world markets. The price support mechanism operated in four different ways, covering almost the whole of the EU's agricultural output. Most produce enjoyed full CAP protection, with guaranteed support and sale prices, and with intervention buying if market prices fell below the levels fixed in the annual review. Some 25% of production, including eggs, poultry, pork, quality wines and some minor cereals, fruit and vegetables, was protected only against lower-priced imports. Most remaining products enjoyed direct **subsidies** to strike a balance between consumer prices and adequate income for the affected EU farmers. The domination of the guaranteed price system meant that, of the original

aims of the Treaty of Rome, the CAP greatly improved agricultural production, self-sufficiency and prosperity. This, however, came at the expense of the fifth aim. The CAP consumed almost one-half of the annual budget, and of this amount some 95% was taken up by the guarantee system. The CAP has moved away from supporting product prices to supporting farmers' incomes and rural development.

The CAP was unpopular with non-EU countries. The **USA** and other efficient and traditional exporters of food were critical of its protectionist nature, as well as of the practice of **dumping** its stored surplus produce at reduced prices, which, they argued, distorted world trade. There was also a widespread opinion among developing countries that EU agricultural policy had been detrimental to an effective development of their own agriculture. Internal criticism of the CAP was generally less marked, except in the **United Kingdom**, where the costs of the CAP were seen as being directly related to the level of its own net budget contribution; this was a consequence in part of its own agricultural structure and its policy of importing large quantities of food from outside the EU. Moreover, the CAP appeared to contravene the broader EU **development aid** support, since the subsidies attached to it undercut agriculture in many developing countries relying on the sale of agricultural produce.

By the early 1980s the European Commission had accepted the need for restraints on agricultural expenditure. It was agreed at the 1984 **Fontainebleau summit** that CAP expenditure should increase at a lower rate than that of the budget as a whole. International currency instability over the next few years frustrated this objective, although **guarantee thresholds** and **quota restrictions** were introduced for some products in 1984 and 1986, and in 1988 it was agreed to introduce **stabilizers** for most products. It was also agreed in 1988 that the future annual growth of agricultural expenditure should not exceed 74% of the increase in total gross national product of the EC member states. These measures contributed to a reduction in the share of the budget consumed by the CAP, but in the early 1990s the problem intensified again with the re-emergence of surpluses and because CAP protectionism had become a major issue which threatened to prevent a satisfactory conclusion to the **Uruguay Round** negotiations on international trade. In June 1992 the Commission agreed on a new programme of reforms, which involved a further reduction of guaranteed prices for some products, a shift from subsidies for production to income support for producers, a considerable extension of the **set-aside scheme**, the encouragement of less intensive and more environmentally friendly farming methods, and opportunities for early retirement.

In March 1999 the **European Council**, in Berlin, **Germany**, agreed on reforms to the CAP. Certain intervention prices (for example, for cereals and beef) were to be reduced in stages, although intervention prices for dairy produce were not to be lowered until 2005. The aim of the reforms was to limit spending on the CAP while supporting farmers with direct income

support. However, the accord reached did not go as far as the pro-reform member states (which included **Denmark**, **Sweden** and the UK) wished, and exceeded budgetary stabilization limits. Moreover, the source of the problem remained to be tackled—and would entail a radical overhaul of agricultural policy and a changed political climate. This was especially necessary by the end of the 1990s, as the eastward expansion of the EU from 2004 incorporated states with large agricultural sectors by Western European standards, which were generally inefficient.

The Agenda 2000 programme aimed to reshape the CAP and prepare the rural sectors of the EU for enlargement and integration. In 2002 the European Commission tabled a mid-term review of the CAP, which expressed the opinion that public expenditure for the farming sector must be better justified. The review aimed to free farmers from excessive bureaucracy, encouraging them to produce at high standards for the highest market return rather than for the sake of the maximum possible subsidy. To achieve these objectives the Commission proposed to cut the link between production and direct payments; to make those payments conditional on the appliance and maintenance of environmental, food safety, **animal welfare** and occupational safety standards; to increase EU support for rural development; to introduce a new farming audit system; and to adopt new rural development measures to improve quality production, food safety and animal welfare and to cover the cost of the farming audit.

As for the market policy that remained an essential pillar of the CAP, the Commission proposed to bring to a close the process of cereal reforms, notably with a 5% reduction in the intervention price and a new border protection system. Like all previous reforms of the CAP (e.g. the Mansholt Plan in 1968 and the MacSharry Plan in 1991), these radical proposals had to be approved by the member states. At a meeting of EU ministers of agriculture in **Luxembourg** in June 2003, agreement was reached on what amounted to a fundamental reform of the CAP, and spending levels were determined for 2007 to 2013. The Council and the accession states ratified the compromise agreement in September. Production-linked subsidies were to be replaced by a Single Farm Payment, and linked to environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. Obligatory decoupling was only partial for beef, cereal and mutton, with production still accounting for as much as 25% of payments for cereals and as much as 40% for beef. Overall, however, 90% of payments would no longer be linked to production. The agreement contained a commitment to reduce all payments above €5,000 a year by 3% in 2005, by 4% in 2006 and by 5% in 2007. Increased resources were to be directed towards rural development projects, protecting the environment and improvements to food quality; organic farmers and those offering high-quality produce with special guarantees were to receive grants of up to €3,000 a year for five years. Under the principle of 'modulation', an increasing percentage of direct farm subsidies was retained by individual member states to finance rural development measures. The equivalent of at least 80% of the funds gathered in each member state

(90% in Germany) was to be spent in that country. Implementation of the CAP reforms agreed in June 2003 commenced on 1 January 2005.

Meanwhile, in April 2004 the EU Council of Ministers of Agriculture reached agreement for CAP reform of the olive oil, cotton, hops and tobacco sectors. The principle of decoupling aid from production was to be extended to these commodities. A significant share of the existing production-linked payments was to be transferred to the Single Farm Payment (which was provided independently of production), although production-linked subsidies were permitted of up to 60% for tobacco, 40% for olive oil, 35% for cotton and 25% for hops. Moreover, full decoupling in the tobacco sector was to be introduced progressively over the four years to 2010 and rural development aid was to finance conversion to other crops in tobacco-producing areas. The remaining production aid for olive oil was to be directed at maintaining olive groves with environmental or social value.

In September 2006 the **Court of Justice** annulled the CAP provisions on cotton, proposing a slightly revised reform of the support scheme in November 2007. The new proposal maintained the support arrangements agreed in 2004 (i.e. production-linked subsidies of up to 35%), but provided for additional funding for support measures in cotton-producing regions and the creation of a 'label of origin' to enhance the promotion of EU cotton.

The EU finally agreed on reforms to the sugar industry in November 2005, following a **World Trade Organization** (WTO) ruling that the existing level of subsidy breached legal limits. The reforms, implemented from July 2006, included the gradual reduction of the internal EU market price (which was three times the international price for the commodity in 2005) by 36% by 2009, and direct aid payments of €6,300m. over the four years of the phased introduction of the reforms to EU sugar producers as compensation. The proposals were criticized by **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs), as they would not help to create a sustainable international sugar market, and by ACP countries, which claimed the measures would adversely affect their economies. A fundamental element in the reform of the EU sugar sector was the establishment of a restructuring fund, financed by sugar producers, to ease the transition to greater **competitiveness**. Amendments to the sugar-restructuring scheme were adopted in October 2007 in an attempt to encourage greater participation and, by the conclusion of the reform period in early 2009, some 5.8m. tons of sugar quota had been renounced.

At the **Doha Round** of the WTO in Hong Kong in December 2005, agreement was reached on the elimination of export subsidies on farm goods by the end of 2013, three years later than the date sought by the USA and developing countries. A new regulation laying down specific rules concerning the fruit and vegetables sector was adopted in September 2007 and entered into force in January 2008. Notable reforms included: the integration of the sector into the Single Farm Payment scheme; the requirement that producer organizations allocate at least 10% of their annual expenditure to environmental concerns; an increase in EU funding for the promotion of fruit and

vegetable consumption and for organic production; and the abolition of export subsidies for fruit and vegetables. In April 2008 agriculture ministers adopted a new regulation on the reform of the wine sector. The regulation provided, *inter alia*, for the inclusion of the sector in the Single Farm Payment scheme, while distillation subsidies were to be gradually withdrawn by 2012, releasing funds for measures such as wine promotion in third countries and the modernization of vineyards and cellars. In addition, the regulation provided for the introduction of a voluntary scheme, under which wine producers were to receive subsidies over a three-year period, with the aim of removing surplus and uncompetitive wine from the market.

In May 2008 the European Commission proposed a number of **regulations** to reform and simplify the CAP further in 2009–13, including additional reductions in production-linked payments and increased funding for rural development. In November 2008 the European Council reached agreement on the proposed reforms, which raised the rate of decoupling in those countries that maintained the link between subsidy and production; provided for reform of the dairy sector; abolished the set-aside scheme from 2009; and provided for payments to farms qualifying for subsidies of at least €5,000 a year to be reduced gradually, so that by 2012 10% of funds (compared with the existing 5%) would be transferred to the rural development budget (large-scale farms would be required to transfer a greater proportion of funds). Milk quotas were to be increased by 1% per year in 2009–13, before their eventual expiry in 2015.

As a result of a severe decline in dairy prices from 2008, in June 2009 the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development established a High Level Experts' Group on Milk (HLG), comprising representatives of EU member states, and chaired by the Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development. The HLG identified significant problems in the supply chain, and in September 2010 its proposals for addressing these were endorsed by the Council's Presidency. The Dairy Package was formally approved by the **European Parliament** (EP) in February 2012 and was to remain in effect until mid-2020.

In November 2010 the European Commission launched the consultation process on further reform of the CAP, based on the results of large-scale public debate on the issue of CAP reform, which had been summarized at a conference held in **Brussels** in July. The two existing pillars of the CAP, comprising direct annual payments and market measures, on the one hand, and flexible rural development measures, on the other, were to be retained. The existing, two-tier system of direct payments was to be reviewed, removing the CAP's reliance on outdated reference criteria, calculated on production volumes in 2000–02, prior to the expansion of the EU. In October 2011 the Commission presented its full set of legal proposals that were designed not only to make the CAP a more competitive and sustainable economic system but also to assist the continued vibrancy of rural areas. Political agreement on the future reform of the CAP was reached between the European Commission,

the Council and the EP in late June 2013 (with the new arrangements coming into force from 1 January 2014, following their formal adoption by the EP and the Council). In December 2013, following approval by the Parliament in the previous month, the Council formally adopted four basic regulations for the reformed CAP, and the transition arrangements for its implementation from 2014 (although some elements did not come into operation until 2015). The regulations provided for the administration of the CAP to be simplified, and transparency increased. The budget for agricultural research and innovation was to be increased two-fold, supported by the creation of a new European Innovation Partnership. Direct payments were to be distributed more equitably: by 2019 no single member state was to receive less than 75% of the EU average; only practising farmers would be eligible for income support, and incentives were to be introduced for younger farmers to enter the sector (some 65% of farmers were at least 55 years of age). Sugar quotas were to be removed by the end of 2017. Improved tools for managing economic crises were to be introduced: the Commission would be able to intervene temporarily to manage the volume of agricultural products in the market; a ‘crisis reserve’ was to be established; and farmers were to be encouraged to take part in risk-prevention schemes. A ‘greening’ component was to be introduced, to reward environmental competitiveness by directing up to 30% of the value of direct payments towards encouraging better use of natural resources, through crop diversification; the preservation of grassland; and the conservation of 5% (potentially rising to 7%) of areas of ecological interest from 2018 (or the introduction of measures deemed to be of equivalent environmental worth). By 2014 spending on agriculture still accounted for some 41% of the EU budget, the two largest headings being the **European Agricultural Guarantee Fund** (EAGF) and the **European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development** (EAFRD). In October 2016 the Commission published a draft Omnibus Regulation, as part of the review process for the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2014–20, predominantly comprising technical proposals to facilitate CAP policy, in an effort to improve the means of targeting funds and increasing competitiveness. The proposals aimed to benefit, in particular, younger farmers, by facilitating access to investment capital.

In December 2020 a CAP budget for 2021–27 was approved. A total budget of some €386,600m. was allocated for the CAP (boosted by a contribution from the EU’s newly agreed **European Recovery Instrument**). The implementation of the proposed reforms to the CAP, including efforts to improve sustainability as part of the EU’s new environmental strategy, the **European Green Deal**, were postponed until 1 January 2023, owing to ongoing negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council. A transitional regulation provided for existing CAP measures to remain in place until that time. On 25 June 2021 the EP, the Council and the Commission reached provisional political agreement on reform of the CAP for 2023–27.

COMMON CARRIER LEGISLATION refers to European Union **legislation** that requires transmission systems to carry energy between any third-party supplier and the consumer at a reasonable tariff.

The **COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY** (CCP—often referred to as the EU Trade Policy) is at the core of European Union (EU) external relations and has been in place since the **customs union** of the European Communities (EC) was established in the late 1960s. It is the aim of the CCP under Article 206 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)** to contribute to the harmonious development of world trade, to work for the progressive abolition of restrictions in international trade and on foreign direct investment and to secure the lowering of customs duties. The CCP results from EU competence to regulate non-member state access to the single European market. The CCP therefore confers on the EC, via Article 133 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 207 of the TFEU), so-called ‘treaty making powers’. This means that tariff and trade agreements are no longer conducted by the member states, but by the EU. Agreements are negotiated by the **European Commission** under the supervision of the Article 207 Committee (formerly 133 Committee) and formally adopted by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), by a **qualified majority** and by the **European Parliament** (EP). Indeed, it is the European Commission that represents the EU and its member states in both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, such as those conducted within the framework of the former **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT) and the **World Trade Organization**. Responsibility for conducting multilateral trade negotiations rests with the Commission and specifically its Directorate-General for Trade. The principal objectives behind EU trade policy centre on the goals of securing and maintaining a competitive global trading system as well as opening up new markets through trade agreements.

Member states have a presence at these meetings, but the Commission is the body that is heavily involved in discussions. It conducts its negotiations in consultation with the Article 207 Committee, the members of which are determined by the Council. The Commission must report at regular intervals to this Committee and to the EP on the progress of negotiations. In those policy areas where the EU holds exclusive responsibility (e.g. agriculture and fisheries) the Commission negotiates directly on behalf of the Council. External trade policy is identified as one of the EU’s exclusive competences under the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The Lisbon Treaty is also significant because under its terms (Article 207 of the TFEU) both the European Parliament and the Council using the **ordinary legislative procedure** adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing the CCP. Most agreements involve granting non-member states preferential access to the customs union and **single market** through an increase in or abolition of quotas, or a lowering of the **common external tariff**. However, GATT rules dictated that most

agreements must involve the creation of a free trade area or a customs union within a reasonable period of time and cover substantially all goods. This is true of various **free trade agreements** concluded on the basis of Article 207 (formerly 133) and trade arrangements contained in **association agreements**. Traditionally, the CCP has covered mainly trade in goods, although the EU has tended to be highly protective of its own agricultural markets and therefore access here has been less liberal. With the **Treaty of Nice**, the coverage of the CCP was extended to include trade in services. In this area and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, the Council acts (under Article 207) by **unanimity**. It also acts unanimously in relation to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, in the areas of social, educational and health services, and in relation to transport agreements.

COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF (CCT): See **Common External Tariff**

COMMON DEFENCE, perhaps in the form of a common European army, is a long-term aspiration of the European Union and is asserted in the **Treaty on European Union** as the extension of a **common defence policy**.

A **COMMON DEFENCE POLICY (CDP)** has been the goal of the European Union (EU) since the **Treaty on European Union** was signed in 1992. Originally, it was to be pursued as an extension of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and in co-operation with **Western European Union**, but the gradual transfer of this organization's functions to the EU from the late 1990s meant that the CDP developed very much within the framework of the EU, notably as part of the **Common Security and Defence Policy**.

The **COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF (CET)**, also known as the common customs tariff (CCT), is a term that refers to an essential element of any **customs union**, and an integral part of the **Treaty of Rome**. A common external tariff, imposed on goods entering any member state from outside the European Union (EU), was first introduced in the early 1960s, based on an average of the customs levies previously exacted by the member states, although with some downward adjustment. The CET was subsequently further lowered from around 10% to less than 5%, in accordance with the EU's acceptance of decisions on tariff barriers and international trade as part of the former **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**. Certain exceptions have been permitted. The **Council of the European Union** may reduce or waive the CET for a member state where domestic production of the goods being imported cannot meet demand. The **European Commission** may do the same where there is a general shortage of that product within the EU.

The **COMMON FISHERIES POLICY** (CFP) was provided for by the **Treaty of Rome**. The first proposals for a CFP were not, however, made until 1966, and it was not until 1970 that the **Six** committed themselves to such a policy. The Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) adopted a limited scheme according to the principle of free access for all European Union (EU) fishermen within EU waters. The scheme, modelled on the principles of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP), envisaged price support mechanisms and protection for the **European Communities** (EC) market, with measures to ensure equal competition within the market, modernization of the industry, and **harmonization**, if necessary, by intervention, of national policies.

These proposals were adopted by the Six at the same time that they were negotiating terms of entry to the EC with **Denmark, Ireland, Norway** and the **United Kingdom**. All the applicant states had important fishing interests, and the EC plan was, to some extent, perceived and resented by those states as a stratagem to rush through a common policy that, while it might benefit the Six, did not necessarily take into account their own interests. The fisheries issue is widely believed to have been a factor in the Norwegian rejection of membership, at the referendum of 1972. The EC eventually negotiated a compromise agreement with the other three applicant states, whereby each member state could, as an interim measure until 1982, restrict entry within a zone of six nautical miles (11.1 km) around its shores, or 12 miles in certain areas, to fishing vessels that had traditionally operated within those limits.

The scheme never worked satisfactorily, either in terms of national interests or in encouraging the preservation of fishing stocks. A major disruptive factor was the extension in the 1970s by many countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean, but particularly by **Iceland**, of an exclusive fishing zone to 200 nautical miles, an action that was subsequently endorsed by the **United Nations** Convention on the Law of the Sea. Deep-sea vessels from the EC were excluded from many of their traditional fishing grounds. They were obliged, if they were not to be forced out of business, to concentrate in EC waters. While the EC also adopted a 200-mile limit in 1977, this did little to obviate the fierce competition within the zone between national fleets, and the inevitable overfishing that followed.

After much disagreement, a common fisheries policy was adopted in 1983. Its two central elements related to access to stocks and their preservation. As far as access was concerned, it endorsed the principle of all waters being open to all EC fishermen within a 200-mile limit of EC shores (which is inevitably less in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas). However, individual member states were permitted to retain an exclusion zone of up to 12 miles, within which fishing rights were restricted to their own fleets, and to vessels from other member states that hitherto had possessed traditional rights of access.

The central concept of conservation is the **total allowable catch** (TAC). Each year the Council of the European Union agrees on TACs for different species. The TAC is the total amount of that species permitted to be caught in

EU waters, and each member state is allotted a quota within each TAC, often only after long and acrimonious bargaining. The operation of the TAC system through the surveillance and inspection policies and practices of the member states is monitored by a body of inspectors answerable to the **European Commission**. However, problems of verification and enforcement have persisted. Other conservation measures not only relate to the extent of fishing in certain areas, governed by the system of EC licences, but also regulate the size of fish that may be caught, and the type and size of mesh that may be used. Any member state may introduce further conservation measures within its own zone, as long as these do not discriminate against other vessels from the EU.

Other CFP provisions have been modelled on the CAP. The Council of the European Union has set guide prices for all categories of fish on an annual basis and the EC provided compensation for catches that had to be withdrawn from the market, setting a withdrawal price of between 70% and 90% of the guide price. If both guide and withdrawal prices exceeded world prices, a system of refunds to exporters would apply, along the lines of CAP **restitutions**, to maintain the income of the fishing industry. By contrast, when catches in the EU were insufficient to meet market demand, customs duties on imports could be suspended. By the early 1990s quota controls and limited stocks had fallen below demand, with the shortfall being made up by imports. The volume of cheaper imports deflated price levels, obliging the EU to introduce a system of minimum prices in 1993.

The European Commission also set common marketing standards and principles on, for example, the size, weight, quality and packaging of fish. The **implementation** of these standards was the responsibility of the member states, but the Commission monitors them regularly. The CFP was also charged with providing some limited financial assistance to the industry to help with the modernization and restructuring of fishing fleets, but the funds available to it were historically very modest, rather less than 1% of the EC **budget**. The basic problem faced by the CFP was that the objective of reducing overfishing and preserving fish stocks tended to increase the relative capacity of the fishing fleet, and reductions in capacity were strenuously resisted by member states. In 1991 the Council of Ministers introduced the first of a series of measures intended to address this problem, and in late 1992 it agreed to establish a **Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance** (FIFG) as part of the **structural and cohesion funds**. The **European Fisheries Fund** (EFF) replaced the FIFG in January 2007. In 1994 EU fisheries ministers agreed on a revision of the CFP, allowing for the integration of **Spain** and **Portugal** into the CFP by 1 January 1996. Moreover, in 1998 the Council agreed a ban on fishing using drift nets from January 2002. However, the issues of equal access, capacity and overfishing persisted.

In December 2002 the EU fisheries ministers met in **Brussels** to decide on the reform of the CFP. Ministers agreed on three major issues: the need to reform the CFP; the adoption of urgent recovery measures for some cod stocks that were in imminent danger of collapse; and the establishment of

TACs and quotas for 2003, including substantial reductions for a number of threatened stocks. In general, the objectives of the CFP were reviewed to focus more on the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources—based on sound scientific advice and on the precautionary approach to fisheries management—on the one hand, and on sustainable aquaculture on the other.

The Council accepted the necessity of a more long-term approach to fisheries management, involving the setting of multi-annual recovery plans for stocks outside safe biological limits and of multi-annual management plans for other stocks. It also endorsed a simpler system for limiting the fishing capacity of the EU fleet in order to reach a better match with available resources. To this end, it agreed to replace the former system of Multi-annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs), generally regarded as ineffective, with a new system that was designed to give more responsibility to the member states to achieve a better balance between the fishing capacity of their fleets and the available resources.

Many EU fishermen did not welcome the plans. To compensate for the continuing decline of the EU fishing fleet, the EU instigated a series of socioeconomic measures. These included the provision of aid from member states to fishermen and vessel owners who had temporarily to stop their fishing activity. Aid was also increased to support the retraining of fishermen to help them convert to professional activities outside the fisheries sector, while allowing them to continue fishing on a part-time basis. The new measures entered into force on 1 January 2003. They replaced the basic rules governing the CFP since 1993 and substantially amended the Regulation on structural assistance in the fisheries sector through the FIFG. A new Regulation establishing an emergency fund to encourage the decommissioning of vessels (the so-called ‘Scrapping Fund’) was also adopted.

In view of the high risk of collapse of a number of cod stocks and the difficulty of controlling compliance with low catch limits, scientists from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the Scientific, Technical, Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) recommended in 2003 a moratorium on the fisheries involved in overfishing. Aware of the potential economic and social impact of such measures on fishing communities, the Commission proposed, rather than a moratorium, substantially reduced fishing possibilities for a number of stocks (primarily cod), as well as improved measures to ensure their proper implementation. Accordingly, the TAC reductions were less severe than had been initially proposed.

Poland is the main fishing nation among the 10 EU member states that acceded in 2004. Fishing subsequently proved a particularly sensitive issue for **Croatia** in its efforts to join the EU. There were a number of disagreements between the Commission and the Croatian Government over the latter’s attempt to protect a part of the Adriatic. The Polish Government also expressed its concerns over the EU’s cod fishing quotas, and there were numerous impasses between Poland and the Commission, and Poland took the issue before the Court of First Instance (now **General Court**).

In December 2007 the Council agreed further to reduce cod quotas, by between 9% and 18%, and to reduce the number of days that could be spent at sea by fishermen. The deal was a compromise and a smaller reduction in quotas than the Commission had wanted (25%). Ministers also agreed to make quota cuts for other fish, such as blue whiting, herring and plaice. Environmentalists were highly critical of the agreement, as were fishermen's associations.

Confronted with growing opposition from both the fishing industry and the wider public, in May 2009 the Council opted to initiate measures radically to overhaul the operation of the CFP. The moves towards a new approach to fishing were endorsed by all member states and welcomed by the industry in general. The Commission published its draft proposals for the reform of the CFP in July 2011. The proposals provided for returning fish stocks to sustainable levels by 2015, using an ecosystem approach based on scientific advice. The proposals also aimed to provide consumers with a stable, secure and healthy food supply while ending the dependence on subsidies and creating new employment opportunities in coastal areas; to eliminate 'discards' (unwanted fish or other marine organisms that are dumped overboard, having been caught unintentionally); and to provide for the establishment of clear targets and timetables to prevent overfishing. The Commission's new framework for fisheries policy formed the basis for discussions between the Council and the **European Parliament** (EP). The Commission welcomed the agreement reached between the Council and the EP in May 2013. The agreement was later validated at the second reading, and the new CFP entered into operation on 1 January 2014. The increased support for small-scale fisheries introduced by the reforms was welcomed by many fishing communities as, from 2022, it would enable member state governments to extend exclusive fishing rights for their own fleets within 12 nautical miles of the coastline. The European Commission adopted regulations in September 2016 that facilitated the implementation of two directives: the Marine Strategy Framework applied to the North Sea, where new fishing bans would apply to a marine protected area in Swedish waters and to some Natura 2000 sites in Danish waters; while the Habitats and Birds Directives applied to Danish Natura 2000 sites in the Baltic Sea and replaced Regulation (EU) 2015/1778. The new measures sought to protect reefs, sea-pens and burrowing fauna. The protection measures also prohibit fishing with bottom-trawling gears, and in some cases, all types of fishing.

In December 2011 the Commission proposed a new fund, the **European Maritime and Fisheries Fund** (EMFF), for 2014–20. This new fund, replacing the EFF, was primarily designed to deliver the ambitious goals of the proposed CFP reforms, but it was also aimed at ensuring that fishermen accepted the need for sustainable fishing and providing fishing communities with greater opportunities to diversify into other economic areas and secure more jobs. The EMFF proved rather contentious, but political agreement between the EP, the Commission and the Council was finally agreed in

January 2014. The EMFF provided for a budget of €6,500m. (approximately 1% of the overall EU budget) for 2014–20. The EMFF is designed to provide financial support to fishermen, fish farmers and coastal communities. There were three thematic objectives over this period: promoting employment and labour mobility; enhancing the **competitiveness** of fisheries and aquaculture; and protecting the environment and securing greater resource efficiency. The largest beneficiaries of the EMFF for 2014–20 were Spain (€1,160m.), **France** (€588m.) and **Italy** (€537m.).

After British voters elected to leave the EU in a national referendum in June 2016 (see **Brexit**), it remained to be seen how the CFP would be affected by the exit of the UK from the bloc (and the provisions of EU fishing policy) following the expiry of the transition period that followed the UK's official departure from the EU on 31 January 2020. Members of the fishing industry in the UK suggested that local fishing communities would eventually thrive, once the UK reasserted control over its 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and guaranteed itself a greater share of local catching grounds than it was entitled to under the CFP. In January 2019 (amid efforts by the UK Government to secure ratification of a **withdrawal agreement** setting terms for that country's departure from the EU), the Commission adopted two temporary, contingency proposals to help limit the impact of a so-called no deal Brexit on EU fisheries. The first proposal sought to enable those employed in fishing activity in EU member countries to receive compensation from the EMFF for any short-term cessation of that activity resulting from a possible closure of UK waters to EU boats should the UK leave the EU without an agreement having been approved. The second proposal sought to enable the EU to grant access to EU waters to UK fishing vessels for a fixed period of time, provided that EU boats were permitted access to UK waters in return.

In early December 2020 the Council reached informal agreement on the replacement of the EMF with a new European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) for 2021–27, with funding amounting to some €6,100m. in current prices. The majority of funding was to be used for the management of fisheries (with a particular focus on small-scale, coastal fisheries), the promotion of aquaculture and fishing fleets, while the remainder was to provide for other measures, including scientific advice, monitoring, and maritime surveillance and security.

Meanwhile, following the UK's official departure from the EU, bilateral negotiations took place during 2020 to determine issues including access to fisheries, for implementation from the beginning of 2021. The final trade and co-operation agreement, with effect, provisionally, from 1 January 2021, provided for 25% of EU fishing rights in UK waters to be transferred to the British fishing fleet over the course of a five-year adjustment period, which concludes at the end of June 2026. Under the terms of the agreement, EU access to UK waters was to be reduced by 15% in the first year and by 2.5 percentage points in each subsequent year. Access to UK waters was to be subject to re-negotiation at the end of the adjustment period.

The **COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY** (CFSP) was one of the three **pillars** forming the European Union (EU) created by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU). The **intergovernmental conference** of 1990 that prepared drafts on political union for the **Maastricht summit** had as one of its briefs the task of considering collective action by the member states in the post-**Cold War** era. In part, this came from a desire that the European Communities (EC) should develop an international role more commensurate with their economic standing. It was felt that **European political co-operation** (EPC) was no longer adequate, a view underlined by the different national positions in relation to the Gulf War in 1991. The CFSP became the successor to EPC. Not being part of the EC, the CFSP was not subject to normal EC **decision-making** procedures: direction was given by the **European Council**, not the **European Commission**. With the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, the Secretary-General of the Council acted also as the **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**, and in this capacity assisted the Presidency of the EU and was responsible for policy planning and monitoring international developments. The actions of the CFSP were also not subject to scrutiny by the **Court of Justice**. With the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, some aspects of the CFSP changed. However, despite abandonment of the EU's pillar structure, the CFSP remains essentially intergovernmental in character.

The objectives of the CFSP are to safeguard the common values, interests and security of the EU, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, and to promote international co-operation, democracy, the rule of law and respect for **human rights**. While the European Council is free to define how the CFSP is to be implemented, the TEU defines the member states' duty, first to pursue a practice of 'systematic co-operation' through information, consultation and policy co-ordination, and second to adopt 'common positions' and 'joint action' when dealing with CFSP matters. The CFSP also includes 'the eventual framing of a **common defence policy**, which might in time lead to a common defence'. Originally, it was accepted that, until such a position could be reached, the now-defunct **Western European Union** (WEU) would act for the EU where defence implications arose. However, the EU subsequently took a more prominent role in military matters, as seen in the development of a **European Security and Defence Policy** (ESDP) and the creation of a **European rapid reaction force**. This has not been without its problems, given concerns over the impact that such developments might have on the role of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) and consequently on the effectiveness of that body.

That there were difficulties in implementing a CFSP was recognized in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which encouraged the adoption of **common strategies**, facilitated decision making through the introduction of **constructive abstention** and encouraged closer co-operation with WEU. Thereafter, the **Treaty of Nice** downplayed relations with WEU and removed the requirement for all the member states to co-operate on CFSP matters, through the

introduction of a modified definition of **enhanced co-operation**. This was followed in 2003 by the adoption of a **European security strategy** (ESS). Various reforms were subsequently agreed as part of the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. These included the creation of a **Union Minister for Foreign Affairs** and a **President of the European Council**, the establishment of a **European External Action Service** (EEAS), greater use of **qualified majority voting** and **permanent structured co-operation** in defence matters. The non-**ratification** of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe threatened these, although most were subsequently carried forward into the Treaty of Lisbon. In July 2016 the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Federica Mogherini, launched a new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, or the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), superseding the ESS.

COMMON MARKET is a popular alternative name for the **European Economic Community** and, later, for the European Communities (EC) and the European Union (EU). It summarizes the primary economic objectives of the **Treaty of Rome**, a goal that originally was to be achieved by 1970. In the 1960s it was a relatively neutral term, but it later acquired some political connotations, often being used in preference to the term European Communities by those who rejected any notion of political integration, insisting that the common market should be the only ambition of the EC.

The **COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY** (CSDP) succeeded the **European Security and Defence Policy** (ESDP), emerging from the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) and European Union (EU) efforts to assume a greater role in military and defence matters since the late 1990s. It thus represents progress towards establishing a **common defence policy** and ultimately a **common defence** for the EU. As part of the ESDP, the EU assumed greater responsibility for the so-called **Petersberg tasks**—humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping activities and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking—and established a **European rapid reaction force** of 60,000 persons, as well as **battlegroups**, to carry out the full range of them at short notice. In addition, institutional structures have been put in place, notably the **European Union Military Committee** and the European Union Military Staff. These provide military expertise and support to the ESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. Closer links have also been developed with the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), but the conflict in Iraq in early 2003 clearly laid bare the differences and disagreements among the members of both the EU and NATO on security issues. In an attempt to give greater strategic direction to the ESDP, the **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**, Javier Solana,

subsequently devised a **European security strategy** (ESS) for the EU, superseded by the Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (European Union Global Strategy) in 2016. The **European Council** formally adopted the ESS in December 2003. Further initiatives designed to promote the development of the ESDP were agreed as part of the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and subsequently included in the **Treaty of Lisbon**. These include **permanent structured co-operation**, further development of the **European Defence Agency**, and the introduction of a mutual assistance clause in the event of a member state being the victim of armed aggression on its territory. The Treaty of Lisbon also renamed the ESDP as the CSDP. In a speech in September 2016 **European Commission** President Jean-Claude Juncker called for the creation of a joint command centre for EU military missions in an effort eventually to create a single European military force, and urged closer co-operation between national armed forces of member states. He claimed that no single member state army could effectively deal with the security challenges facing Europe, ranging from Islamist militia operating near the EU's southern borders, in Libya or the **Syrian Arab Republic**, to a resurgent and more assertive **Russian Federation**. Juncker envisaged a force to complement NATO, although Eastern European countries interpreted such a command as undermining co-operation with NATO. In March 2017 EU member states agreed to establish a **Brussels**-based command centre, with an initial intended focus on operations in Africa.

COMMON STRATEGIES are an instrument for implementing the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP), which were introduced by the 1997 **Treaty of Amsterdam**. Article 21 of the **Treaty on European Union** lays down the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, which are decided by the European Council. The same body also determines whether to introduce common strategies in areas where the member states share important interests in common. A common strategy defines aims, objectives and timetables involved and, more importantly, outlines the means to be made available by the European Union and the member states in order to realize them. Common strategies are then implemented by the Council, through the adoption of joint actions and common positions and the recommendation of common strategies to the European Council.

The **COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES** (CIS) is a loose association of most of the former constituent republics of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR). It was established in December 1991 and in September 1993 agreed a framework that would serve as the basis of an economic union. The CIS was the focus of much attention from the European Union in terms of political co-operation and economic aid and agreements.

COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: See **European Communications Policy**

COMMUNITARIZATION is a term used to describe the transfer of competences to the European Communities **pillar** of the European Union.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE FOR RECONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT AND STABILIZATION: See **CARDS**

COMMUNITY METHOD was a term used to describe policymaking procedures undertaken through community institutions, as opposed to those carried out through intergovernmental structures and mechanisms. The **Treaty of Lisbon** abolished the previous 'pillar' structure, creating the European Union (EU), with decisions primarily to be taken in accordance with the so-called **ordinary legislative procedure**.

The **COMMUNITY PLANT VARIETY OFFICE** (CPVO) was established in April 1995 and has been located in Angers, **France**, since 1996. The CPVO is a decentralized agency of the European Union (EU), and implements and applies an EU scheme to allow intellectual property rights to be granted for plant varieties. These rights are valid throughout the EU.

COMMUNITY PREFERENCE was a term referring to the situation within the **common agricultural policy** when the price of domestic agricultural products fell below that of imported products.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT FRAMEWORKS: See **Structural and Cohesion Funds**

The **COMPANY LAW STATUTE** has long been a contentious issue among European Union (EU) member states. The original **European Commission** proposal dates back to 1975 and was an attempt to facilitate the establishment of new multinational companies across the European Communities (EC). The proposal encountered immediate opposition, largely as a result of its focus on **workers' rights**, and was promptly abandoned. A second proposal in 1989, which suggested that companies might choose to adopt a company statute in return for certain tax incentives, proved equally contentious. All issues relating to the rights and interests of the labour force can only be decided upon by unanimity in the **Council of the European Union**. These proposals were particularly unacceptable to the German Government, which insisted that a European company law statute must contain a

requirement for workers' representatives to sit on supervisory boards and to be consulted on all aspects of workforce-related decision making, in keeping with the German national model.

However, pressure for a European company law statute intensified following the **European Council's** Nice declaration in favour of harmonizing company law across the EU. Nevertheless, the Council still needed to address concerns among the member states and some doubts expressed by the **European Parliament**. The latter was anxious to ensure that **legislation** in the area of workers' rights should be subject to the **co-decision procedure** and continued to press the case for greater protection of workers' rights within any European company statute.

Finally, however, after some 30 years of debate, on 8 October 2001 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (or Societas Europaea, SE) was adopted. Member states had to adopt the laws, **regulations** and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by 8 October 2004 (the date on which the European Company Statute, or ECS, Regulation, which is directly applicable in the member states, came into force), or ensure by then that management and labour introduced the required provisions by agreement.

The ECS Regulation gave companies the option of forming a European Company (SE), able to operate on a Europe-wide basis and be governed by EU law directly applicable in all member states (rather than national law). The Directive lay down the employee involvement provisions to apply to SEs, providing for negotiations between management and employees' representatives in each SE on the arrangements to apply, with a set of back-up statutory 'standard rules' where no agreement could be reached. Involvement constitutes the information and consultation of employees and, in some cases, board-level participation. The adoption of the ECS was a highly significant development in both EU company law and social policy.

COMPETENCE is a term that described the authority of the European Communities to undertake specific activities. The authority was usually based upon an **Article** of one of the **Founding Treaties**.

COMPETITION POLICY is crucial to the creation of a successful **single market**. It would have been counter-productive to dismantle trade barriers between the member states if private industry had been free and able to engage in **cartel**-like restrictions on competition and undermine the advantages of opening up the markets in the first place. Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, the force of competition is to be welcomed as it unleashes dynamic effects that can be transformed into greater efficiencies, innovation and, ultimately, lower prices for the consumer. Overall, competition policy describes the objective of striking a balance between the imposition, by **legislation**, of necessary restrictions upon unbridled economic competition, and the

elimination of harmful restrictive practices that prevent a coherent integration of markets. As such, it formed an essential part of both the **Treaty of Paris** and the **Treaty of Rome**. The original competition rules were contained in Articles 85–94, but these were renumbered under the **Treaty of Amsterdam** in 1999 to run from Article 81 to Article 90. The **Treaty of Lisbon** renumbered the articles again, so that they run from 101 to 110 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**.

The European Union (EU) competition rules extend over five substantial policy areas. The first of these addresses the endemic cartels and restrictive practices (such as price-fixing and market-sharing agreements). Cartel policy has emerged as the core activity in terms of staff, time and resources and is the most developed aspect of policy. The malignant threat posed by cartels to both the business environment and the consumer was recognized under Article 101, which prohibits all agreements ‘which may affect trade between member states and which have as their object, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market’. Framed in very general terms, it is designed to catch and prohibit (paragraph 2) all agreements that restrict the spirit of free competition. Some types of anti-competitive agreement are entitled to exemptions if they improve the production or distribution of goods, promote technical and economic progress or ensure that consumers reap considerable benefits. The second policy area centres on merger control and the **European Commission’s** power to prohibit mergers. **Merger policy** (originally omitted in the Treaty of Rome) was added as a belated weapon to the Commission’s arsenal in 1990 after the member states bowed to the wishes of the Commission and demands from the business community for a level playing field and a single point of entry for assessing EU mergers. In effect, this regulation bestowed a Community dimension on the Commission’s responsibility for all mergers that exceeded specified thresholds. The Commission’s handling of mergers has drawn almost universal praise from industry as the European competition regulator has been able to process merger notifications speedily.

The third and fourth principal aspects of EU competition policy focus, respectively, on monopolies that abuse their dominant position in the marketplace (under Article 102) and on efforts to inject greater competition into the public utility sectors such as telecommunications and energy (under Article 106).

All these four areas bring the Commission into direct dealings with the business world, but uniquely the fifth area, which centres on the granting of state subsidies, involves direct contact with member state governments and has proven the most contentious aspect of the EU competition brief. State aid (**subsidies**) has featured as an aspect of government–industry relations to varying degrees across Western Europe since 1945. It has often been justified as an essential aspect of government-driven industrial policy and has been designed to secure employment, particularly in peripheral and economically depressed regions, to respond to issues of national prestige, or to create European champions.

The European Commission (and particularly the **Directorate-General—DG—**for Competition) was entrusted with the task of ensuring that the member states and companies conform to the provisions of the treaty. In this policy field the Commission operates as an autonomous and quasi-judicial policymaking institution, largely free from interference from either the **Council of Ministers** or the **European Parliament** in day-to-day decision making. The member states simply delegated responsibility for all competition issues to the Commission, and competition policy became one of the few exclusive competences (see Treaty of Lisbon) of European governance.

The Commission's decisions on competition policy are subject to review only by the European courts. While the Commission's powers were first established in 1962 (under Regulation 17), until the mid-1980s competition policy was a relatively low priority. Subsequently, as a result of a shift in economic philosophy (towards neoliberalism), the accumulation of case law and the involvement of a succession of dynamic and forceful personalities, there was enormous growth in the role and prominence of competition policy. This policy area represents one of the best examples of supranational regulation. The competition regime in relation to Articles 101 and 102 was 'modernized' through the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, which replaced the original procedural 'bible' encapsulated by Regulation 17.

The Commission has the authority to act, either on its own initiative, or upon receipt of complaints from member states, companies or individuals, without reference to the **Council of the European Union**, concerning possible infringements of EU rules. Its powers to investigate alleged breaches of competition policy are very wide. In the first stage of investigation, its inspectors are entitled to visit companies without prior warning, to see any documents they wish, and to retain photographic evidence. The national authorities are contacted in advance for assistance. The Commission is also allowed, under Regulation 1/2003, to conduct home searches. The second stage of the process is a series of hearings with the company concerned and other competitors. On the basis of the evidence and depositions, the Commission then issues its verdict. If it finds against the company, it has the right to demand a change of policy, impose a fine or combine both courses of action. The level of fine can be substantial in order to deter anti-competitive practices (for example, **Apple Inc.** was initially found liable to a substantial fine in 2016), reflecting the Commission's growing determination to tackle anti-competitive activities. Cartels also became a principal focus of anti-trust regulators worldwide. Companies that have been found guilty by the Commission of infringing EU competition rules have the right of appeal to the **General Court** and then to the **Court of Justice**. The decision of the latter is final, in appeals against either the verdict or the size of the financial penalty. The Commission usually investigates several hundred cases of alleged infringements each year. Through the multitude of appeals against Commission decisions that have come before them, the European Courts have built up a substantial body of case law.

Competition policy rules apply to both private and publicly owned companies, and to nationalized industries. Companies that are negotiating or contemplating an agreement that may not satisfy the treaty provisions are obliged to inform the European Commission of their intentions. In addition, companies have the right to apply to the Commission for either a 'negative clearance', which recognizes that there is no threat to competition policy, or an 'exemption', which may be granted if the company or companies can demonstrate that, competition rules notwithstanding, a restrictive agreement should nevertheless be permitted on the grounds that it will provide substantial public benefits. With the **internal market** programme, which did not specifically deal with competition policy, the Commission also devoted considerably more attention to **public procurement**.

The European Commission may use its discretion to grant exemptions on the grounds mentioned above, or where the effect on free competition would be minimal. In particular, it has sought to balance a strict application of competition policy with its concern for the viability of small companies. Because it has wished to encourage co-operation between small companies, the Commission has outlined several categories of agreement that it may be prepared to exempt from a general ban: small-scale agreements in cases where turnover is less than €200m. and the market share less than 5%; agreements in various areas such as research and development and the exchange of information; and those that are essentially franchising or sub-contractual. The Commission is also prepared to be flexible where companies are confronted with adverse economic conditions and a sustained decline in demand. In such circumstances, companies may be permitted to collaborate in co-ordinating an orderly reduction in the resulting over-capacity.

The European Commission also monitors government activity. This has been a difficult task, because of the tendency of governments to shield their own companies from competition through a variety of techniques and mechanisms, which may or may not amount to state aid. The Commission is, however, willing to accept exceptions to the general ban on state subsidies that might distort competition. Member states wishing to provide aid to companies are expected to inform the Commission of their intentions. If the Commission rejects the plan, and if the latter goes ahead, it has the authority to demand the repayment of unauthorized subsidies, and even to impose fines on recalcitrant member states. Categories of state aid that have been exempted from the general rules include grants to areas afflicted by a natural disaster and aid to economically depressed regions that is designed to assist the development of new forms of economic activity. The Commission has also issued guidelines governing state aid to industries severely affected by recession, but has insisted that such aid must have a specific purpose and fixed duration, and be regarded as totally exceptional. The Court of Justice may, in the last resort, resolve disputes with member states about state aid. Competition policy does not necessarily apply to goods imported into the EU, where several bilateral or

international agreements exist, and where some products have been affected by voluntary export restraints.

An International Competition Network (ICN) was established in October 2001 as an informal forum for competition authorities from around the world to discuss the function of competition policy and its enforcement. Progress was more pronounced in respect of merger investigations than in cartel cases.

One more recent, important piece of legislation is Directive (EU) 2019/1, which empowers competition authorities at national level to enforce competition policy more effectively, and to help improve uniformity throughout the EU.

COMPETITIVENESS was the focus of the **European Commission's** 1994 **White Paper** on Growth, Competitiveness and **Employment**. This paper presented guidelines for pursuing a policy of global competitiveness. The policy comprised four objectives: provision for assistance to those European firms seeking to adapt to the new globalized economy; the ability for firms to exploit the competitive advantages associated with the rapid move to a knowledge-based economy; the ability to foster and promote sustainable industrial development; and the need to reduce the time differential between the pace of change in supply and the corresponding adjustments in demand. The White Paper's recommendations informed negotiations on the new title on employment introduced by the 1997 **Treaty of Amsterdam**. Competitiveness emerged as a highly salient theme in both the Commission and the **Council of the European Union**. Its significance was illustrated in the **Lisbon agenda** and in changed priorities in the annual **budget**. The theme remains a core aspect of planning and features regularly as a goal in EU communications.

A **COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY WITH AFRICA** was launched in March 2020 as the basis for a new mode of engagement between the EU and African countries. The Comprehensive Strategy was to be underpinned by five priorities including: a partnership for green transition and energy access; a partnership for digital transformation; a partnership for sustainable growth and jobs; a partnership for peace and security governance; and a partnership on migration and mobility. Although the EU views the new strategy as a path to reorientating Africa-EU relations towards a more productive future, some observers in civil society remained sceptical. According to critics, these five areas, although framed as areas of mutual interest, flowed principally from the EU's own priority areas rather than from mutually considered priorities.

COMPULSORY EXPENDITURE is related to the budgetary decision-making procedure of the European Union (EU). Prior to the **Treaty of Lisbon**, during the negotiations surrounding the annual budgetary process, a distinction was made between compulsory and **non-compulsory expenditure**. This mattered because the distinction determined the ability of the

CONCILIATION COMMITTEE

European Parliament (EP) to influence outcomes. The EP had a decision-making role in relation to non-compulsory expenditure, while the **Council of the European Union** had a similar role in relation to compulsory expenditure. The distinction between the two types of expenditure has led to tensions between the Council and the EP. According to the old Article 272 (prior to the Treaty of Lisbon amendments), compulsory expenditure referred to spending on those policies arising directly out of the **founding treaties** and their amendments. The major item of cost has traditionally been the **common agricultural policy** (CAP). In reviewing the annual draft budget submitted to it by the Council of the European Union, the EP had been allowed to modify only the proposals on non-compulsory expenditure. It should be noted that, in a major shift of policy, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced significant changes regarding the financial and budgetary procedures of the EU. It shortened the annual budgetary policymaking procedure, confirmed existing practices of working within the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** (MFF) and abolished the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, and provided for practically full parity between the EP and the Council over EU expenditure items. This enabled, for example, the EP to be involved fully in discussions and decisions over the running of the CAP.

A **CONCILIATION COMMITTEE** is a committee established at the third reading as part of the **ordinary legislative procedure**. It is composed equally of members of the **Council of the European Union** from each member state, or their representatives, and an equal number of representatives of the **European Parliament** (EP). The committee is co-chaired by the President of the EP and the President of the Council. If the Council and the EP cannot reach agreement on a proposed piece of legislation during its second reading, the proposal is referred to the Conciliation Committee, in order to approve a joint text that is acceptable to all sides and may subsequently be adopted by the Council and the EP. The **European Commission** participates in the Committee's proceedings, initiating proposals to overcome any impasse between the Council and the EP's representatives. Indeed, the most meaningful negotiations occur in the so-called **trialogue** between all three institutions. The draft joint text has to be adopted within six weeks (subject to a possible two-week extension) of the date on which the Committee was convened. It must be adopted by an absolute majority of the votes cast in the EP and by **qualified majority voting** in the Council. If either of the institutions rejects the proposal, it is considered not to have been adopted.

CONDITIONALITY is widely used in the context of European Union (EU) external relations and **enlargement**. It entails the EU making closer ties or **development aid** conditional on non-member states meeting certain political, if not economic, conditions. The conditionality underpinning enlargement is based on **applicant countries** meeting the so-called **Copenhagen**

criteria adopted in 1993. Once a country is a member of the EU, conditionality is still relevant. Since the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, member states that do not respect principles of liberty, democracy, respect for **human rights** and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law may have certain of their rights under the **European treaties** suspended. Conditionality tied to aid requires recipient countries of EU development aid to spend in very specific ways as agreed by, and in accordance with, EU norms and rules.

CONECCS: See **Interest Groups; Lobbying**

The **CONFEDERAL GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN UNITED LEFT/NORDIC GREEN LEFT** (GUE/NGL) is one of the **political groups** in the **European Parliament** (EP). Prior to the 1994 elections it was known as the Group for the European Unitarian Left (GUE) and was one of the two communist groups that emerged in 1989 following a division of the original Communists and Allies group. Originally dominated by the Italian communists, GUE had a more Eurocommunist profile than the former French-dominated Left Unity group. When the **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs) from **Denmark, Finland** and **Sweden** joined it in 1995, the group changed its name again. The group is opposed to neoliberalism and highly critical of business and capital. At the 2014 EP elections the group secured 52 seats (compared with 35 in 2009). In the 2019 elections, however, it secured 41 seats. The group is currently led by Manon Aubry (**France**) and Martin Schirdewan (**Germany**). The largest national delegations represented within the GUE/NGL group in the 2019–24 Parliament come from Germany, France, **Greece** and **Spain**. The parliamentary group supports the construction of a new vision of European co-operation and is particularly keen to tackle the **democratic deficit** and promote ecology. GUE can be described as a **Eurosceptic** party although its members display various levels of Euro-scepticism. Given the political background and leanings of GUE members, the group is opposed to the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) and seeks greater development of the **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe** (OSCE). The group also campaigns for better job and educational opportunities and places considerable emphasis on social solidarity, securing peace and pursuing sustainable economic development.

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE): See **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

CONFERENCES OF THE PARLIAMENTS: See **Assizes**

CONGRESS OF EUROPE was the name of the first post-war European gathering, held in The Hague in May 1948. It was organized by the **International Committee of the Movements for European Unity** and was attended by several hundred delegates from 16 countries, as well as by observers from the **USA** and Canada. Most political groupings, except those at the extremes, were represented, and many leading political figures attended. The major absentee was a strong delegation from the British Labour Party, in power at the time in the **United Kingdom**, which had dismissed the Congress as a body of ‘unrepresentative interests’. The Congress sought the establishment of a European assembly, a charter of **human rights** and a European court. It demanded that the European states ‘transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources’. Few practical measures were adopted, but it did agree to the formation of a **European Movement**. The latter, responding to a request from Paul-Henri Spaak, the Prime Minister of **Belgium**, produced a memorandum that contained the first draft for what would become the **Council of Europe**.

The **CONNECTING EUROPE FACILITY** (CEF) is an important European Union (EU) funding instrument for the stimulation of growth, employment and competitiveness by means of targeted investment in infrastructure throughout Europe. CEF investment connects the EU’s digital, energy and transport sectors.

There is no formal **CONSTITUTION** of the European Union (EU), although the **European treaties** are regarded as providing the constitutional framework of the EU, and the **Court of Justice** has referred to the **Treaty of Rome** as being the ‘Constitutional Charter’ of the European Communities. However, the issue of whether the EU should have a constitution was placed on the agenda of the **European Convention** launched in February 2002. This produced a **draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, which subsequently formed the focus of negotiations in an **intergovernmental conference**, convened in October 2003 and resulted in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. Although this was formally abandoned as a text, much of its content found its way into the **Treaty of Lisbon**, leading to claims that this was the ‘EU Constitution’ in all but name.

CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY is the term often used to describe the outcome of the **intergovernmental conference** launched in October 2003. (See **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**.)

CONSTITUTIVE TREATIES: See **Founding Treaties**

CONSTRUCTIVE ABSTENTION is employed during consideration of matters of **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and allows decisions requiring unanimity within the **Council of the European Union** to be taken without the express support of all member states. Abstentions do not count as votes in opposition to a proposal.

The **CONSULTATION PROCEDURE** is the oldest and simplest of all decision-making procedures in the European Communities: the **Council of the European Union** has only to consult the **European Parliament** when adopting **legislation** proposed by the **European Commission**. Although the consultation procedure is still used for legislation adopted as part of the **common agricultural policy**, for example, most **decisions** within the European Union are now adopted under the **Ordinary Legislative Procedure**. (See also **Co-operation Procedure**.)

The **CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY** was established in 1951 as a part of the now defunct **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC). It was charged with advising the High Authority, the executive of the ECSC, on all aspects of the operation of the ECSC and of the national coal and steel industries. The Committee assumed a similar role in relation to the **European Commission** following the merger of the executives of the European Communities in 1967. Composed of representatives of producers, employees and consumers, it had a purely advisory and consultative role, with no decision-making authority.

The **CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF SOCIAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES** was an advisory body attached to the **European Commission** and was consulted on issues of regional development. Its role was taken over by the **Committee of the Regions**.

The **CONSUMER COMMITTEE**: See **European Consumer Consultative Group**

CONSUMER CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL: See **European Consumer Consultative Group**

CONSUMER POLICY was not mentioned in the **Treaty of Rome**. Although consumer interests and the **European Parliament** pressed for a consumer policy for several years, action was not taken until the Paris summit of the heads of government in 1972. Agreement was reached on the establishment within the **European Commission** of a section, later upgraded to a

Directorate-General (DG), DG-XI, for consumer and environmental protection, a Consumer Consultative Committee (later the Consumer Consultative Council, or CCC, then the **Consumer Committee**, and subsequently the **European Consumer Consultative Group**, or ECCG) and a Consumer Policy Service (which later became DG-XXIV, for consumer policy and health protection). In April 1975 the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) launched a consumer information and protection programme which established five fundamental consumer rights: safeguards against risks to health and safety; economic justice; redress for damages; consultation; and information and education. These rights were to be the basis of specific measures of consumer protection. Although consumer policy was strengthened in 1983, when the national ministers responsible for consumer affairs began to meet regularly within the Council of Ministers, the bulk of consumer protection **legislation** was not adopted until after the launch of the Third Consumer Programme of 1986. The action was part of the effort to prepare for the **single market**, and the **Single European Act** incorporated consumer policy within the treaty framework. A firm legal basis for consumer policy was created via the **Treaty on European Union**.

The Commission adopted a Consumer Policy Strategy (2007–13) in March 2007. In terms of priorities, the Commission aimed to increase consumer confidence in the single market (by establishing a uniform regulatory environment); to strengthen the individual consumer's position and rights in the marketplace; and to seek to ensure that consumers' concerns were incorporated into all European Union policies. A European Commission Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers was created in 2010. The Consumer Policy Strategy was succeeded by a new European Consumer Agenda (drawn up and agreed in 2012), which sought to build directly on the former and began to enter into force in 2014. The Agenda aimed to maximize consumer participation and trust in the marketplace. Essentially, EU consumer policy aims to value the consumer, and seeks to guarantee that consumers are provided with certain rights as buyers and entitles them to a high level of protection and support. A New Consumer Agenda was launched in November 2020, to take into account the EU's modern focus on green and digital priorities.

CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: See **European Convention**

CONVERGENCE is a term used to describe the objective of encouraging the economies of the member states to develop in the same way, especially with regard to inflation, deficits and interest rates. It emerged during the arguments in the 1980s for an **internal market**, and later was applied to the declared objective of **economic and monetary union** by 1999. In a wider context, it has also been used to explain why a number of other policy areas,

such as **competition policy**, have been aligned at both the national and European Union levels.

CONVERGENCE CRITERIA for progression to stage three of **economic and monetary union** (EMU) were established by the **Treaty on European Union**. The four criteria were: an avoidance of excessive government deficits (i.e. an annual deficit of no more than 3% of gross domestic product—GDP, and no more than 60% of GDP for stock of government debt); a rate of inflation no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of that of the three best-performing member states; exchange rate stability within the **European Monetary System** over the two previous years, without devaluation; and long-term interest rates to be within two percentage points of the average in the three member states with the lowest inflation rates in the European Union. However, economic difficulties were such that few states met the convergence criteria. Consequently, a less strict interpretation of the criteria was applied, and in 1998 it was declared that, of those member states wishing to participate in EMU, **Greece** had failed to meet the convergence criteria.

CO-OPERATION refers more specifically to intergovernmental co-operation, a process of collaboration by the member states, with the intention of securing agreement on objectives and strategies without the involvement of supranational institutions. It is the opposite of the **community method**.

CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS are similar to (but less comprehensive than) **association agreements**, which aim to promote intensive economic co-operation. Co-operation agreements have been concluded since the mid-1970s by the European Communities with many countries outside Europe, as well as being, before 1991, the favoured form of relationship with Eastern European countries. After 1989 many Central and Eastern European countries preferred to seek **Europe agreements**, the new form of association agreement being offered to them. Successor states to the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) were offered **partnership and co-operation agreements**.

The **CO-OPERATION PROCEDURE** was introduced by the **Single European Act** in 1987 as a means of enhancing the role of the **European Parliament** in EC **decision making**. With the subsequent emergence of and increased recourse to the **co-decision procedure**, its use was soon limited to certain **decisions** in the area of **economic and monetary union**. It was eventually abandoned entirely with the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

COPA: See **Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations**

COPENHAGEN CRITERIA

The **COPENHAGEN CRITERIA**, or **accession criteria**, are the conditions that countries of **Central and Eastern Europe** must meet if they are to be admitted to the European Union (EU). They were adopted in the Danish capital at the **Copenhagen summit** of the **European Council** in June 1993, and require those countries seeking to join the EU to possess stable institutions which guarantee democracy; to respect the rule of law and human and minority rights; to possess a functioning market economy able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces; and to be capable of meeting the obligations of membership (i.e. adherence to the *acquis communautaire* as well as the *finalité politique* of the EU).

Two **COPENHAGEN SUMMITS** of the **European Council** met in the Danish capital specifically to discuss the eastward **enlargement** of the European Union (EU). The first met in 1993 and established the **Copenhagen criteria** for EU membership, while the second, convened in December 2002, formally approved the accession of the first 10 **candidate countries** to the EU. The states were: **Cyprus**, the **Czech Republic**, **Estonia**, **Hungary**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Malta**, **Poland**, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia**. Following the successful outcome of the second Copenhagen summit the **Treaty of Accession** was signed, and the 10 states joined the EU on 1 May 2004.

COR: See **Committee of the Regions**

CORDIS stands for Community Research and Development Information Service. It provides a database and summary information on all current research projects within the European Union.

CORE EUROPE refers to the notion that a group of states within the European Union would opt to forge closer economic, political and military links between themselves, if some of the other states showed a degree of reluctance to pursue the policy agenda of a core group. The concept of core Europe was usually understood to mean **France**, **Germany** and the **Benelux** states, that is, all the original members of the **European Coal and Steel Community** except **Italy**.

COREPER: See **Committee of Permanent Representatives**

CO-RESPONSIBILITY LEVIES were introduced in 1986 and, along with the later **stabilizers**, were seen as a means of attempting to halt the open-ended **subsidies** on production and the huge surpluses that the guaranteed price support system had imposed upon the **common agricultural policy**. The levies were set to come into operation whenever predetermined

production quantities for a product were exceeded, making them, in effect, a tax on excess output. Many people argued that the levies had been set at too low a level to be properly effective.

COREU (Correspondance Européenne) is a secure communications system that connects all the ministries of foreign affairs of the European Union (EU) member states. The objective of this link is to improve and foster co-operation in the development of the EU's **Common Foreign and Security Policy**.

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE: See **COVID-19**

COSAC is the acronym for Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires, the gathering, every six months, of **Members of the European Parliament** and members of the European Union affairs committees of **national parliaments**.

COSI is the acronym for the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security, created by the **Council** under the terms of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** (TFEU) to facilitate co-operation on internal security within the European Union (EU). The rationale for this committee stems from Article 71 of the TFEU. COSI comprises high-level representatives from each EU member country's Ministry of the Interior and/or Justice, as well as officials from the **European Commission** and the **European External Action Service**. Delegates from **Europol**, **Eurojust**, **FRONTEX**, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and other associated agencies may also, on occasion, attend meetings as observers. COSI co-ordinates activities relating to, *inter alia*, policy and customs co-operation, external border protection and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. COSI is also responsible for informing the Council, the **European Parliament** and **national parliaments** about its activities. COSI is mandated to help the Council in accordance with the so-called 'Solidarity Clause' contained within Article 222 of the TFEU, which pledges that the EU will use all the tools at its disposal to assist a member state that becomes the target of a terrorist attack or suffers a disaster, whether natural or manmade. Responsibility for preparing legislative acts pertaining to any of the above issues remains with the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** (COREPER) rather than COSI.

COST is an intergovernmental framework for European Co-operation in Science and Technology, which provides funding to complement nationally funded research at the European level. COST was established in 1970 with a membership of 19 countries, which increased to 25 countries in 1994,

including all the member states of the European Union (EU). By 2007 it had 35 members. It is a framework for the preparation and implementation of European projects relating to applied scientific research. It plays a vital role in building a European Research Area (ERA) and seeks to complement the activities of the **Research Framework Programmes** and to facilitate the mobility of researchers across Europe. COST aims to establish scientific excellence in areas that include: biomedicine and molecular biosciences; food and agriculture; forests, their products and services; materials, physics and nanosciences; and transport and urban development. COST projects have a duration of four years, to stimulate research and innovation, as well as career progression. Each project is individually negotiated by those states that wish to participate in it. Several collaborative projects have been pursued in areas such as information technology, **telecommunications**, transport, oceanography, metallurgy and materials science, meteorology, agriculture, food technology, environmental protection and medical research and health. (See also **EUREKA**.)

COSTA V ENEL the name of an important case in which the **Court of Justice**, in 1964, established the **primacy of European Community law** and confirmed that it could not be overruled.

The **COTONOU AGREEMENT** was signed in June 2000 by the European Union (EU) and the **ACP** (African, Caribbean and Pacific) **states** (all ACP members signed except Cuba) and superseded the fourth **Lomé Convention** (1990–2000). It provided longer-term (20-year) support for the ACP-EU relationship, to be developed on the basis of five interdependent pillars: comprehensive political dialogue; the enhanced participation of civil society in partnership affairs; a strengthened focus on poverty reduction; a new framework for economic and trade co-operation; and a reform of financial co-operation. The Agreement therefore placed greater emphasis on establishing and maintaining good governance in the ACP states. It also envisaged the establishment of an ACP-EU free trade area, and committed €13,500m. in aid for the first five years of the Agreement. These funds were directed at poverty reduction and at encouraging non-state sectors to participate in the development process. The Agreement was also notable for its insistence that respect for **human rights**, democratic principles and the rule of law should form the core criteria for aid policy decisions. From a practical perspective, the Agreement could be revisited every five years, as could the aid **protocols**, which were bound to a similar timetable. Progress was reviewed on an annual basis. Negotiations to revise the Cotonou Agreement were initiated in May 2004 and concluded in February 2005. The political dimension of the Agreement was broadly strengthened and a reference to co-operation in counter-terrorism and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was included. The revised Cotonou Agreement was signed on 24 June. The

second revised Cotonou Agreement was formally signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 2010, and entered into effect, on a provisional basis, on 1 November. This revised Agreement placed an emphasis on the importance of regional integration among ACP states (fostering co-operation, peace and security, and promoting growth) and on the relevance of the **African Union** as a partner in ACP-EU relations. It also sought to promote conflict resolution and, for the first time, recognized the global challenge of climate change and the need for the ACP states to address some of the concerns surrounding this pressing issue. The revised Agreement also took into account other urgent problems and realities for the ACP states (including HIV/AIDS and food security). From its perspective, the EU displayed a strong interest in developing contacts and relations with a broad range of actors in the ACP states—national and local parliaments, civil society and the private sector. Negotiations commenced in the second half of 2018 on a successor to the Cotonou Agreement, which was due to expire in February 2020 (subsequently extended). A ‘Post-Cotonou Agreement’ was initialled on 15 April 2021.

The **COUNCIL OF THE BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION** (CCBE) is the officially recognized representative organization for the legal profession in the European Union and the **European Economic Area**.

The **COUNCIL OF EUROPE**, which should not be confused with either the **Council of the European Union** or the **European Council**, was formed in 1949 as Western Europe’s first post-war political organization. Its Statute was signed as the Treaty of Westminster by 10 states, and permanent offices were provided for the organization in **Strasbourg, France**. The Council has established other offices with specific functions and responsibilities in cities across Europe. For example, the Council of Europe Development Bank is located in the French capital, Paris, and the Centre for Modern Languages is situated in Graz in **Austria**. In addition, the Council has placed heavy emphasis on youth and operates a European Youth Centre from Budapest, **Hungary**. As an organization the Council of Europe is well resourced and maintains offices in Paris and in other European capital cities. The Council’s declared objective was to achieve ‘a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress’. These objectives were to be secured through ‘discussions of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of **human rights** and fundamental freedoms’. Its membership grew until, by the 1980s, it incorporated all the non-communist states of Europe.

The Council consists of two main bodies: a Committee of Ministers and an Assembly. With each state having one vote and a veto, the Committee of

Ministers is essentially an intergovernmental conference of foreign ministers from all member states, meeting twice yearly. Chairmanships of the Committee of Ministers are held for six months, in alphabetical order, and the current running order is as follows: **Italy** (November 2021–May 2022), **Ireland** (May–November 2022) and **Iceland** (November 2022–May 2023). Since 1952 the practice of deputies (usually diplomats) representing the ministers has been normal for all but the most symbolic meetings. In relaying decisions to the member states, the Committee is allowed only to make recommendations. States are not obliged to accept decisions of the Council of Europe.

Similarly, the Assembly, renamed the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) in 1974, is essentially a discussion chamber, with hardly any substantive powers (and it should not be confused with the **European Parliament**). It comprises national parliamentarians from all 47 member states, who elect a President for a three-year term (which is renewable). The Assembly appoints members as *rapporteurs*, with the mandate to prepare parliamentary reports on specific subjects, which cover a multitude of areas and most recently, rendition flights, the abolition of the death penalty in Europe and, of course, regular reports on the **human rights** situation across Europe. Ever since its first session in 1949, the majority of the delegates, who are appointed by their national parliaments, have been strong supporters of European integration. The fact that it has shared a common home in **Strasbourg** with the European Parliament has helped this commitment. However, the Assembly can only put recommendations forward to the Committee of Ministers, which can, and often does, ignore or reject them.

The Council of Europe has produced about 200 conventions and agreements, most of which have been accepted by almost all the member states. Its greatest achievement, perhaps, was to secure agreement on a **European Convention on Human Rights** in 1950, with a concomitant **European Commission of Human Rights** and a **European Court of Human Rights**, both of which operate under the aegis of the Council. Much of the Council of Europe's success has been in the less politically contentious cultural field. It sponsored, for example, the European Cultural Convention in 1954 and a European Social Charter in 1961. In 1960 it was awarded the social and cultural responsibilities that **Western European Union** had been granted by the **Treaty of Brussels**.

In the 1950s it also sought to achieve some form of policy co-ordination in agriculture, civil aviation and transport. However, by itself the Council could not advance European integration much beyond such symbolic actions as seating the Assembly delegates in alphabetical order rather than by nationality. The **United Kingdom** and the Scandinavian states were firmly opposed to it becoming anything more than an intergovernmental deliberative body. After the early 1950s it was overtaken by the developments that led to the establishment of the European Communities (EC). Although its major historical significance was that it was the first European organization of a political nature, its later importance was two-fold. It was the European organization with the

broadest membership, albeit limited to democracies, a claim that was later challenged by the formation of the **Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe**. Also, because of its broad membership, it remained important as a forum where a wide range of ideas and views could be expressed, and as a central clearing-house for co-operation and co-ordination, receiving and discussing annual reports from a wide range of European and other international organizations and agencies, including the EC. The ending of the **Cold War** offered the Council an opportunity to expand its membership, and in the early 1990s most of the Central and Eastern European countries and the western republics of the former **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR—for example, the **Russian Federation**) either joined the Council or at least applied for membership. The Council's 47 members include all of the member states of the EU.

The **COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION** was frequently referred to as the Council of Ministers, and prior to 1993 its full official title was the Council of Ministers of the European Communities (EC). It should not be confused with either the **Council of Europe** or the **European Council**, although it is closely related to the latter. The Council of the European Union shares executive responsibility in the European Union (EU) with the **European Commission**. Whereas the Commission represents and defends general European and EU interests, the Council essentially represents the interests of the individual member states. It began with the **Treaty of Rome**, as the main decision-making institution, although, in later treaties, it has become a co-legislator with the **European Parliament** in most policy areas. The membership of the Council consists of ministerial representatives of the member states. Its meetings are serviced by officials from its own secretariat, the existence of which was formally acknowledged only in the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), and one or more Commissioners, depending on the topics listed on its agenda for the day, may also attend them. The Council's headquarters are in the **Europa building** in **Brussels**, but on three occasions each year (in April, June and October) the Council meets in **Luxembourg**. This is a legacy of the merger of the executives of the EC in 1967: the executive High Authority of the **European Coal and Steel Community** had been based in Luxembourg. Council meetings are normally held in private, although there have been some sessions where elements of the proceedings have been televised. Moreover, spokespersons for each of the member governments hold extensive and detailed press briefings after each Council session.

The Council of the European Union has no fixed membership other than permitting one representative from each member state. In purely legal terms there is only one Council, but its actual composition changes depending on the policy area in question. There are, in effect, a range of different Council formats, some of which can even meet simultaneously in parallel sessions.

Some meet more often than others, and this reflects the greater salience of some policy areas. The composition of each Council is determined by a particular policy agenda: if, for example, the topic to be discussed is agriculture, the Council consists of the national ministers with responsibility for agriculture; if the agenda is to deal with **consumer policy**, it will be the national ministers responsible for consumer affairs who are in attendance, and so on. When the EU **budget** is to be discussed, the national ministers of finance form the Council. The four most important formats of the Council, which meet monthly, are those dealing with General Affairs (covering a range of policy issues, such as negotiations on EU enlargement, and budgetary and administrative issues), Foreign Affairs, Economic and Financial Affairs, and Agriculture and Fisheries. Other formats cover co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs; Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; Environment; and finally, Education, Youth, Culture and Sport.

The Council of the European Union is a core legislative element of the EU. While the **right of initiative** for most **legislation** lies with the European Commission, it is only the Council that, after some involvement of the European Parliament (EP) and consultation with one or more **advisory committees** and agencies, is empowered to adopt proposals and so legislate for the EU. Other responsibilities include the obligation, in conjunction with the EP, to adopt the EU budget, and the power of appointment to other EU institutions, including the Commission.

To aid it in its tasks, the Council has its own secretariat in Brussels. Central to this are the delegations or **Permanent Representations** that each member state maintains in Brussels. The **Committee of Permanent Representatives** (COREPER) has the task of ensuring that issues awaiting a decision by the Council have been thoroughly discussed and analysed by Council staff. When COREPER reaches agreement on proposals, the Council normally adopts these without discussion. On all other issues the Council reaches its decision by voting. The Treaty of Rome and its amendments define the way in which the Council votes on issues. Depending upon the issue under discussion, a proposal may be adopted by **majority voting**, by **qualified majority voting**, or unanimously. The incidence and importance of decision making by simple majority is negligible, and it is used only for a few minor questions, usually of a procedural nature.

The Treaty of Rome anticipated that, after an initial transitional period, qualified majority voting would become more usual, with **unanimity** restricted to a few issues of major importance. The **empty chair crisis** of 1965 and the **Luxembourg Compromise** of 1966 disrupted this plan. The use of qualified majorities remained limited, with the Council preferring not to jeopardize unanimity by pushing issues to a vote. This made for slow progress. Almost all the reviews of EC practices conducted after the mid-1970s commented adversely on the slowness of decision making, and recommended a greater use of majority voting; this was finally introduced by the **Single**

European Act. The creation of the EU and its extensive **enlargement** in the early years of the 21st century forced further re-examination of the decision-making process. In fact, the TEU, the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, the **Treaty of Nice** and the **Treaty of Lisbon** all extended the use of qualified majority voting to new areas of policy. The Treaty of Lisbon also provided for the eventual transition to a form of **double majority voting**.

The task of directing the Council in its various functions falls to its President. Member states hold the **Council Presidency** in rotation, the position shifting from state to state every six months. The member state currently holding the Presidency is responsible during those six months for organizing the business of the Council, in conjunction with the secretariat. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the situation changed somewhat (see below). Although each member state holding the Presidency will hope to advance its own priority issues, by convention, the President is expected to be a neutral arbiter, securing, by compromise and bargaining, Council agreement on as many issues as possible.

As a result of measures introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council plays a more active role in **employment** affairs by encouraging member states to exchange information and best practice in this field. Its role in protecting **citizens' rights** was also expanded, a new **Article** permitting the Council to take action, by **unanimity**, in cases of **discrimination**. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam also increased the powers of the EP at the expense of the Council, by strengthening the **co-decision procedure**, granting the EP full co-legislative powers in a number of policy areas. The Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon have extended the areas in which the Council can take decisions using qualified majority voting, although unanimity is still required in core areas such as taxation and in constitutional matters. Attempts to speed up the EU's reaction in times of international crisis have also been introduced as part of reforms to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP). In situations in which member states have common foreign policy interests, the Council of the European Union is to decide by consensus the principles and strategies to be employed in joint actions. If the Council of the European Union cannot reach agreement, the final decision on EU foreign policy actions is to be taken by the European Council. For member states not opposed to proposed actions but not prepared to participate directly, there is the '**constructive abstention**' option. The Treaty of Lisbon has sought to enable the EU to speak with a single voice on foreign policy issues through the enhanced role of the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**. According to the Treaty of Lisbon the role of High Representative combines three different functions: the High Representative is the Council's representative on foreign policy issues, the President of the Foreign Affairs Council, and serves as a Vice-President of the Commission. In terms of fulfilling their duties, the High Representative is supported by a policy planning and early warning unit and by the **European External Action Service**. Reflecting

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

developments within the CFSP, a **European Union Military Committee** was also established within the Council.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: See **Council of the European Union**

The **COUNCIL PRESIDENCY** rotates in a predetermined sequence (until 1995 it was arranged alphabetically) among the members of the European Union (EU). Each member state holds the Presidency for a period of six months and can influence the focus of its Presidency and attempt to steer policy agendas accordingly. However, it is extremely difficult to carry through specific **legislation** in this short period. Moreover, there were concerns that this mode of organization would not be productive in an enlarged EU. Hence, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** envisaged three changes: team presidencies comprising three member states and lasting 18 months; a **President of the European Council** in office for two and a half years; and a **Union Minister for Foreign Affairs** chairing Council meetings dealing with foreign affairs. These changes were carried forward into the **Treaty of Lisbon**, although the term of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs was abandoned in favour of **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**. The forthcoming Presidencies are: France in January–June 2022, the **Czech Republic** in July–December 2022 and Sweden in January–June 2023.

The **COUNCIL SECRETARIAT** (officially the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union) is a professional civil service that forms part of the Eurocracy residing in Brussels. The Council Secretariat is considerably smaller than the **European Commission** and currently comprises approximately 3,000 staff from all EU member states. The purpose of the Council Secretariat is essentially to draft the six-month legislative programme for each **Council Presidency**, providing legal service, briefing government ministers on salient EU issues, preparing the agenda for Council meetings and drafting Council meetings minutes. In terms of structure, the Council Secretariat mirrors the Commission in so far as it is divided into **Directorates-General**, although along very different lines. The Council Secretariat comprises several Directorates-General, together with a legal service and a private office for the Secretary-General. The Directorates-General handle administration in the following areas: agriculture, fisheries, social affairs and health; foreign affairs, enlargement and **civil protection**; justice and home affairs; environment, education, transport and energy; communication and information; and economic affairs and competitiveness. The legal service exists to represent the Council before the courts. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** provided for the Council Secretary-General to become **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy** and a Deputy Secretary-General

assuming responsibility for the Secretariat. This development meant that the role of the Secretary-General changed from civil servant to high-ranking politician. The **Treaty of Lisbon** reversed this situation. The current Secretary-General of the Council Secretariat is **Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen**. It should be noted that the respective Secretariats of **Western European Union** and the **Schengen Agreement** were merged into the Council Secretariat. The Council Secretariat has become an active participant in the design of policy formulation, especially in the realm of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the **Common Security and Defence Policy**. Many people are engaged on foreign policy issues within the Secretariat's Directorates, and the Secretariat also hosts the European Union Military Staff. Since January 2007 the Council Secretariat has functioned with its own independent Operations Centre.

COUNCIL TRADE POLICY COMMITTEE, as the Article 133 Committee (formerly the Article 113 Committee) became known under the **Treaty of Lisbon**, consists of representatives of European Union member states. It assists the **European Commission** in trade negotiations with non-member states and within the **World Trade Organization**.

COURT OF AUDITORS: See **European Court of Auditors**

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE: See **General Court**

The **COURT OF JUSTICE** of the European Union (also known as the European Court of Justice), based in **Luxembourg**, was, until the establishment of the Court of First Instance (now the **General Court**), the only court of the former European Communities (EC). The Court of Justice is charged with ensuring that the operation of the European Union (EU) concurs with the provisions of the **founding treaties** and their amendments. It has no hierarchical links with the courts of the different legal systems of the member states, and has no jurisdiction over the application and interpretation of purely national laws by the national courts, except insofar as those laws conflict with EU law, which takes precedence over them. Within its area of competence, the Court is supreme: there is no appeal against its rulings.

The **pillar** structure that was introduced under the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) was abolished by the **Treaty of Lisbon**. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the entire court system of the EU is now known as the Court of Justice of the European Union, and it comprises the Court of Justice and the **General Court** (in September 2016 the Civil Service Tribunal merged with the General Court, and its seven judges became part of the merged institution). The Court of Justice is concerned primarily with EU law. Although the pillar structure has been abolished, the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**

(CFSP) remains subject to special rules and specific procedures and, thus, the Court's rulemaking powers in this area are curtailed.

The Court is composed of one judge from each member state, so that all of the EU's national legal systems are represented. Even after the EU's **enlargement** to 28 member states in July 2013, there was still one judge per member state. For the sake of efficiency, however, the Court may sit as a 'Grand Chamber' of just 13 judges or in Chambers of three or four judges instead of in a plenary session attended by all the judges. There are also a minimum of eight **Advocates-General**. These have similar privileges to judges, but act more as consultants and advisers than as referees. Members of the Court have to be individuals 'whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence'. Although it is the member governments who formally submit nominations to the Court, appointment is made by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**). Judges and Advocates-General are appointed for renewable six-year terms of office, with one-half of the Court being renewed every three years. The judges elect the President of the Court from among their own members, for a renewable three-year term.

The Court meets both in plenary sessions and in smaller subdivisions called Chambers. The latter enable the Court to carry a larger case load at any one time. Important cases, including virtually all those brought by an EU institution or by a member state, are heard in plenary session, where eight judges constitute a quorum. Other cases are referred to a Chamber, of which there are six. Any Chamber is free to request that a case currently before it should be transferred to the full Court when it considers that the case merits the fullest possible hearing.

In its various guises, the Court hears three different types of case: opinions, referrals and disputes. The least contentious are opinions, which refer to opinions given by the Court on international agreements to which the EU is party. Referrals describe preliminary rulings by the Court on cases brought before it from national court systems. When a point of EU law is raised in a case before a national court, the point at issue is referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, because EU law takes precedence over national law. The national court must take this into account in hearing the case before it. Referrals have been an important way in which the Court has been able to ensure that EU law is applied uniformly across all the member states. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the preliminary ruling procedure has been extended to acts of EU bodies, offices or agencies. It also introduces a provision that requires the Court of Justice to act with the minimum of delay when dealing with preliminary rulings. The Court of Justice can also review acts of the **European Council**. Most cases involve disputes, and the Court is largely reactive. There are four main types of dispute: those between the EU and member states; between member states; between EU institutions; and between individuals or corporate bodies (including EU employees) and the EU. Any of

these categories can initiate Court proceedings. In the case of an individual, they must be able to demonstrate a direct personal interest in the case and its outcome. Under the terms of the TEU, disputes between individuals and the EU were made the responsibility of the Court of First Instance, which now has jurisdiction in this fourth area of disputes.

When the Court first receives a written complaint, it has to establish whether the charge falls within its remit and within the time limits stipulated by the treaties. If it decides in the affirmative, the written charge is sent to the defendant, who has one month in which to make a rebuttal. The plaintiff is then granted an additional month in which a response may be made to the defendant's statement. Finally, the defendant has a further month in which to prepare an additional response. Once this process is completed, the case, if not settled out of court, moves to the stage of a formal hearing. The responsibility for a case belongs to a judge rapporteur, who is appointed by the President of the Court. The judge rapporteur, after studying all the documents, sends a preliminary report to the Court, which must then decide whether to hold a preliminary inquiry, which could involve a request for further documentation and/or the need for the two sides in the case to give oral testimony before the Court. It is at this point that the Court decides whether to hear the case in plenary session or to refer it to one of the Chambers. The President of the Court sets a date for the public hearing. The conduct of the public hearing follows normal legal convention: plaintiff and defendant present their arguments and call witnesses; the judges and the Advocate-General appointed to the case carry out cross-questioning. The Advocate-General acts as a public prosecutor of the kind found in many European legal systems. The Court does not give its verdict immediately upon the conclusion of the public hearing. A further hearing is held some weeks later at which the Advocate-General reviews the oral and written evidence and proposes a verdict. The opinion of the Advocate-General is not final, but in the majority of cases it is a good indication of the likely decision of the Court. If, during their consideration of the evidence, the judges feel they need more information or explanation, they may extend the hearing. Finally, the Court delivers its verdict at a public hearing. Unanimity is not required, and judgments are reached by majority vote. Normally, the case will be heard by an uneven number of judges: where this is not the case and there is no majority, a decision is reached by eliminating the vote of the most junior judge. Judgments are nevertheless collective, to emphasize the independence of the Court from both other EU institutions and national governments. Voting is secret, and the voting record of any individual judge is not known.

Apart from EU employees, the largest number of cases have related to agriculture and the **common agricultural policy**, followed by those concerning the **customs union, freedom of movement, competition policy** and **workers' rights**. Individuals and companies, mostly protesting against EC regulations, have brought the majority of actions, although a significant number have been directed against member states. The **European**

Commission has been the most vigorous plaintiff, as well as being the most common defendant. Cases brought by one EC institution against another have been comparatively rare, but the Council of Ministers and the **European Parliament** (EP) have, on occasion, brought each other before the Court. The TEU increased the ability of the EP to bring cases before the Court. Member states have initiated actions less frequently. They have often, however, been the subject of actions brought by the Commission, when the latter alleged failure to carry out their obligations. The country most involved in legal action has been **Italy**, most notably as a defendant, owing mainly to its tardiness in implementing EU **legislation**, but also as the state that has initiated the most actions. The TEU remedied a previous deficiency by giving the Court powers of enforcement (usually fines) against member states that do not conform to its judgments.

The Court has become one of the most important EC institutions, playing a vital role in consolidating and harmonizing the EU. In the cases brought before it both by the Commission and by individuals, it has made a significant contribution towards ensuring that member states and their governments acknowledge the superiority of EU law and honour their EU obligations.

COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: See Court of Justice and General Court

COVID-19 or coronavirus disease is the disease associated with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), the 2019 novel coronavirus. SARS-CoV-2 was a new virus strain within the class of coronaviruses, which was discovered in 2019. COVID-19 has been categorized by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a pandemic. By late November 2021 there had been some 257m. COVID-19 infections worldwide, and over 5.1m. fatalities. Although the virus is known to have originated in the People's Republic of China, Europe was the epicentre of the pandemic during the first half of 2020, with France recording the first European case in January. The socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 has been significant, causing what is widely considered to be the largest global recession since the 1930s. On 9 January 2020 the EU's Directorate-General for Health and Safety launched its Early Warning Response System (EWRS) in response to reports of a new respiratory infection emerging in China, in order to enable member states to share information on response measures. Shortly afterwards, the EU's civilian protection mechanism was used to repatriate EU citizens, first from China, and subsequently from elsewhere. By the end of the month the EU was funding research into the new coronavirus with funds of some €10m. through its research and innovation programme **Horizon 2020**. The EU also supported other countries in their response to COVID-19. For example, the EU co-financed the delivery of more than 25 metric tons of personal protective equipment (PPE) to China, while member states together had contributed

another 30 tons by February. The EU's external response focused on boosting global preparedness, prevention and constraint, with the **European Commission** announcing a new aid package worth €232m. In March 2020 the Commission began stockpiling medical equipment to support member states. Furthermore, the Commission announced a proposal to activate the general 'escape clause' permitting a temporary departure from the strictures of the **Stability and Growth Pact** to allow member states to undertake the necessary measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, even if the implementation of such measures resulted in the violation of budgetary requirements under the European fiscal framework. Since the beginning of the pandemic the Commission has sought to support efforts to mitigate the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19, with the economic impact being potentially worse than that of the global economic and financial crisis from 2008. In July 2020 EU leaders reached agreement on a recovery fund known as **Next Generation EU** (subject to approval by the **European Parliament**) to help revive Europe as it emerges from the COVID-19 crisis, in addition to a final agreement on the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2021–27.

Meanwhile, in June 2020 the Commission launched a European vaccine strategy for the development, manufacture and distribution of vaccines to inoculate against COVID-19. The Commission utilized emergency funds to seek vaccine supplies for EU member states through advance purchase agreements with prospective vaccine manufacturers. Vaccination against COVID-19 began throughout the EU on 27 December. In mid-January 2021 the Commission adopted a Communication urging member countries to accelerate the distribution of vaccines throughout the EU. By early 2021 four vaccines had been approved by the EU's medical regulator.

By late 2021 rates of infection throughout Europe remained significant, with renewed restrictions introduced in several EU member states in November, and COVID-19 continued to have a detrimental impact on social progress. Notably, during periods of lockdown in 2020–21 women had been forced to take on more caring responsibilities, reinforcing traditional gender roles, while xenophobia and racism had been experienced by people of Chinese and East Asian descent across the world, including in Europe. (Similarly, racism against people of African heritage in China had peaked during the pandemic.) Another impact of COVID-19 has been the prevalence of misinformation or disinformation. The EU institutions have issued guidance on how to combat false narratives and conspiracy theories with facts.

CREATIVE EUROPE entered into effect in January 2014, as the successor to the Culture and **MEDIA** programmes. Creative Europe was allocated a budget of some €1,460m. for 2014–20 (representing a 9% increase in spending, in real terms, compared with 2007–13), and sought to stimulate employment in the cultural and creative industries. Creative Europe included two sub-programmes: first a programme on culture to support culture sector initiatives

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(such as cross-border co-operation and networking) and a second MEDIA section on audiovisual initiatives. In terms of **audiovisual policy** and **media policy**, the MEDIA strand was to support the worldwide distribution of European films as well as to make it easier for those involved in the sector to enhance cross-border activities. The Commission was to allocate some €900m. to the cinema and audiovisual sector by 2020, with increased support for European culture, cinema, music, literature, performing arts and heritage and related activities. Events and activities (such as the **European Capital of Culture** and heritage days) as well as a series of European prizes (such as the prize for contemporary architecture and the EU prize for literature) have received support from Creative Europe. The programme was renewed for 2021–27, with a budget of €1,842m., in current prices, plus an additional €600m. in 2018 prices.

CREEPING COMPETENCE is a phrase that has been used, mainly by critics of further integration, to refer to the extension of the role and powers of the supranational institutions at the expense of the member states, usually through a more expansive interpretation of the treaties and their amendments.

CREST: See **Scientific and Technical Research Committee**

CROATIA, a country of some 4.5m. people, emerged as an independent European state following its secession from the **Yugoslav** federation in 1991. This successful move to independence was due in large part to **Germany's** unilateral decision to recognize the new state, even though Croatia's action aroused Serbian animosity and led to a short and bitter war with the Serbian minority in Croatia from 1991 to 1995, which included the bombardment of the historic city of Dubrovnik. Initially, Croatia was beset by severe problems, which were epitomized by economic stagnation and a high rate of unemployment (which had soared to 20% by 2000) and by the stubbornness and style of authoritarian nationalism created under the President, Franjo Tudjman, who died in 1999. In 2000 the new Government was determined to bring Croatia into the European mainstream, and signalled its intention to reform the economy and to apply for membership of the European Union (EU). In October 2001 it signed a **stabilization and association agreement** with the EU, which subsequently entered into force on 1 February 2005. By early 2003 it had made sufficient economic and political progress to apply formally for EU membership, becoming the second former Yugoslav republic, after **Slovenia**, to do so. In June 2004, following a positive *avis* from the **European Commission**, the **European Council** conferred candidate country status on Croatia and announced that **accession negotiations** would be opened in 2005. Croatia's failure to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or to hand over General Ante

Gotovina, who had been accused of ordering the killing of more than 100 ethnic Serbs and expelling 150,000 in 1995, meant that the planned opening of negotiations in early 2005 was postponed. Only following confirmation from the ICTY chief prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, that Croatia was now fully cooperating with the ICTY did the EU's member states agree to open negotiations in early October 2005. The decision was somewhat controversial and was widely seen as part of a deal that allowed **Austria** to abandon its opposition to the opening of accession negotiations with **Turkey**.

With Gotovina finally captured and handed over to the ICTY in December 2005, the EU opened substantive negotiations. It also adopted a revised **accession partnership** and allocated Croatia €140m. pre-accession financial assistance for the year. A further €141m. was allocated for 2007 under the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**. By the end of February 2010 30 out of 35 negotiating chapters had been opened and 17 closed. Progress could have been quicker had Slovenia not vetoed negotiations for much of 2009 over a bilateral dispute concerning territorial waters. In June 2011 the EU confirmed that Croatia had complied with the requirements of the final outstanding negotiating chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, thereby allowing the country's accession to the Union. The Croatian Government officially signed the EU **Treaty of Accession** in December. Croatia's membership of the EU was submitted for approval at a national referendum in January 2012, when it was endorsed by some 66.3% of the votes cast (with a participation rate of only about 44%). Croatia became the 28th member state of the EU on 1 July 2013. Croatia had already joined the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (in April 2009). Unlike **Bulgaria** and **Romania**, which sent appointed observers to the **European Parliament** (EP) from the time of their accession in January 2007 until the EP elections of June 2009, Croatia held elections to the EP in April 2013 to elect its 12 deputies (the number of which was reduced to 11 upon the restructuring of the EP at the elections in May 2014).

An escalation in refugee arrivals during 2015, caused by flight, in particular, from the ongoing civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, precipitated a regional crisis in Central and South-Eastern Europe. In mid-September the Hungarian Government sealed its border with **Serbia**, causing migrants, often seeking asylum in Western Europe, to divert their route via Croatia. In mid-September the Croatian authorities closed seven of Croatia's eight border crossings with Serbia; although Croatia reopened two main border crossings later that month. In mid-October **Hungary** also closed its border with Croatia. Slovenia's erection of a razor wire fence on its border with western Croatia in late December prompted the Croatian Government to submit a complaint to the **European Commission** on the grounds that the fence endangered wildlife. In December the Commission launched legal action against Croatia (and four other countries) for failing to register migrants adequately. According to EU data, by March 2018 22 refugees had been relocated to Croatia from **Italy** and 60 from **Greece**, and a further 76 Syrian refugees had been resettled

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under the so-called EU-Turkey Statement. Croatian border officials were also accused of violence against migrants.

In July 2020 EU ministers of finance confirmed that Croatia had fulfilled the economic criteria for admission to the **exchange rate mechanism**, a prerequisite for **euro** adoption, although it remained uncertain when Croatia might be expected to adopt the euro as its national currency.

CROCODILE GROUP is the name of an action group founded in July 1980 by Altiero Spinelli and other **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs) who wished to persuade the new, directly elected **European Parliament** (EP) to develop a plan for a radical reform of the European Communities and a grand strategy for an all-embracing European union. The name derived from the restaurant in **Strasbourg** where the Group first met. The Group met at frequent intervals to plan strategy and formulate proposals, and circulated newsletters to all MEPs. Its principal argument was that the EP had a duty to consider constitutional reforms and to compile a draft that would be transmitted to the proper constitutional authorities in the member states for **ratification**. By 1981 it had won the support of a substantial number of MEPs, and the EP voted to establish an Institutional Committee to deliberate on the topic. This process resulted in the **draft Treaty establishing the European Union**.

CSCE: See **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

CSDP: See **Common Security and Defence Policy**

CSF (Community Support Frameworks): See **Structural and Cohesion Funds**

CULTURAL POLICY was for a long time a relatively undeveloped aspect of the European Union's (EU) policy remit. The EU had supported the initiatives of the **Council of Europe**, which had always been active in seeking to protect and develop the European cultural heritage. It was the rapid advance of technological developments in the 1980s that pushed the EU into greater activity, and the **European Commission** began to define the outlines of a cultural policy. Most of its efforts have been concentrated upon film and television (see **Media Policy**). It has also focused upon free trade in cultural goods, improving the working conditions and prospects of artists, encouraging a wider audience for cultural activities, and preserving the architectural heritage of the EU. It has emphasized the **freedom of movement** of both artists and their products throughout the EU, although it is agreed that 'national art treasures' should be excluded from these general provisions. Such treasures,

however, have to be strictly defined. The EU has attempted to seek greater **harmonization** in various areas, including national copyright laws, public subsidies, resale rights and royalties. Several activities have been sponsored: the EU Youth and Baroque Orchestras; the translation of contemporary literature, especially from the minority languages of the EU; a European Film Festival (held in a different city each year); and the European Theatre in Milan, **Italy**, and Paris, **France**. The most widely known initiative, perhaps, is the designation each year, beginning with Athens, **Greece**, in 1985, of a different city as European City of Culture (renamed the **European Capital of Culture** in 1999). One of the more contentious policy initiatives was the 1991 Television without Frontiers Directive (see **Media Policy**), which attempted to protect EU television producers against non-European programmes. Since 1982 grants, as well as loans from the **European Investment Bank**, have been advanced for architectural preservation and restoration, and have benefited more than 30 sites that are deemed to be of significance for the EU as a whole or that are located in poorer and undeveloped regions of the EU. A more concerted effort linking these activities was launched in a four-year Action Programme in 1988, and in 1991 the **Treaty on European Union** made specific references to cultural policy. A Culture 2000 framework programme was proposed in 1998 to cover the period 2000–04. This operated in three main areas: **legislation** favourable to culture, the cultural dimension of existing policies, and culture and external relations. It superseded the Kaleidoscope, **ARIANE** and Raphael programmes. In January 2005 the Commission adopted Decision 2005/56/EC setting up a new **Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency** (EACEA). This agency, which began operations in January 2006, took over responsibility for the management of certain parts of the EU's programmes in the education, culture and audiovisual fields. Two subsequent programmes succeeded the Culture 2000 programme. Its main aim was to promote a 'common cultural area' inclusive of cultural diversity and common cultural heritage, with a view to encouraging the emergence of European citizenship. The **Creative Europe** programme entered into effect in January 2014 as the successor to the Culture and MEDIA programmes. In June 2016 the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy announced a new Strategy for International Cultural Relations, to promote cultural co-operation between countries in order to encourage freedom of expression, mutual understanding and respect for the EU's fundamental values. (See also **Audiovisual Policy**.)

The **CUSTOMS 2020** Programme was a customs co-operation programme running from 1 January 2014 until the end of 2020. It succeeded the Customs 2013 programme (2008–13), and had a larger budget, of some €547m. The programme aimed to support co-operation between customs authorities within the European Union, with the aim of securing improved efficiency and

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avoiding mismatches that hinder the functioning of the customs union. A new customs programme has been approved for 2021–27.

CUSTOMS DUTIES are those taxes levied by states at their border upon imports into their territory. The **Treaty of Rome** committed the member states to ‘the elimination, as between member states, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect’. The removal of internal duties and restrictions, and the imposition of a **common external tariff** (CET), constitutes a **customs union**. Customs duties on goods imported from outside the European Union (EU) are collected by the member states in accordance with the CET, but they are regarded as part of EU **own resources** and are a source of **revenue** for the EU **budget**.

CUSTOMS UNION is the name of an economic structure whereby a group of states agree to belong to a single tariff area, where there are no **customs duties** on goods circulating within the union, but where there is a **common external tariff** (CET) levied on all imports into the union. The **Treaty of Rome** created a precise timetable for the establishment of a customs union, which was largely completed by July 1968. New members of the European Communities (EC) were granted a short transitional period of adjustment in which to comply with the full requirements of a customs union. The CET was introduced in the 1960s, but its level was determined by the terms of the several accords with the now superseded GATT (**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**), to which the European Union (EU) member states individually and collectively were party. It was generally accepted that a customs union would not be sufficient to bring about the original EC goal of a **common market**, but it was not until the late 1980s that the EC began to consider seriously the problem of non-customs obstacles to the establishment of a common **internal market**. Certain non-member states—for example, **Turkey**—signed agreements with the EU whereby they were incorporated into the customs union.

CYPRUS became a member of the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004. Prior to this, it concluded an **association agreement** with the former European Community (EC) in 1972. The intention was that the agreement would prepare the way for a full **customs union** between Cyprus and the EC. Developments proved to be much slower than originally anticipated, and were complicated by the de facto partition of the island after the invasion of northern Cyprus by **Turkey** in 1974. The EC refused to deal with the administration of the Turkish-controlled sector of the island. In 1987 Cyprus concluded a customs union agreement with the EC, which included arrangements concerning agriculture. The customs union was to come into force in stages over a

10-year period. In 1990, however, Cyprus applied for full membership of the EC. Given the wish of Turkey also to become a member, this created a dilemma for the EC. The **European Commission** published its *avis* in 1993, and indicated that, if partition was not ended, the EC would consider negotiating only with the Greek Cypriot Government. Following this *avis*, in 1995 the **European Council** decided that negotiations with Cyprus would begin six months after the end of the **intergovernmental conference** which was held in 1996–97. Formal negotiations began in March 1998 and were concluded in December 2002. Although some member states still had reservations about admitting a divided island into the European Union (EU), the signing of the **Treaty of Accession** in April 2003 committed the EU to admitting Cyprus irrespective of the political situation on the island. Nevertheless, the prospect of membership did lead to improved relations between the two parts of the island, notably in 2003 when travel restrictions were substantially eased. Subsequently, and despite the breakdown of earlier UN-brokered talks, efforts were made during the months leading up to membership on 1 May 2004 to secure agreement on the reunification of the island so that it could join the EU as a single political entity. Although an agreement was reached, it failed to gain the approval of Greek Cypriots in a referendum in April 2004. As a result, only the southern half of the island became part of the EU the following month.

Cyprus ratified the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in June 2005, but efforts, including those originating from the **United Nations**, to end the division of the island have stalled. At elections in 2006 a majority of Greek Cypriot voters backed the ruling coalition's opposition to reunification, which angered Turkey. Relations between Cyprus and Turkey remained strained. The Turkish Government stated in June 2006 that it was not prepared to open its ports and airports to Cyprus so long as the Turkish Cypriots in the north of the island remained isolated. In response, Cyprus vowed to block the EU's ongoing talks with Turkey until the ports and airports were opened. In practice the blockage was not total. It nevertheless showed how much influence a small state could wield within the EU. Frustration within the EU with Cyprus's attempts to block negotiations with Turkey did not prevent agreement being reached in 2007 on Cyprus joining the **eurozone** and adopting the **euro** from 1 January 2008. In March 2013 eurozone Ministers of Finance approved lending of some €10,000m. to Cyprus, contingent on the country's imposition of a levy on selected bank deposits.

Meanwhile, Demetris Christofias won the presidential election in 2008 and pledged to recommence negotiations regarding reunification of the island. Although contact was quickly re-established with the then leader of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Ali Talat, progress was very slow. The President elected in February 2013, Nikos Anastasiades, pledged to continue reunification talks, which accelerated after the election of Mustafa Akıncı as President of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) in April 2015. The new Turkish Cypriot leader was known to be in favour of intensifying bilateral efforts to reach a permanent settlement and achieve a peaceful, unified Cyprus;

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Turkish recognition of Cyprus was a key issue in need of resolution before Turkey could hope to accede to full membership of the EU. In January 2017 Anastasiades and Akıncı held UN-sponsored direct discussions in Geneva, **Switzerland**. These discussions were followed in the same month by an international conference on Cyprus. However, talks collapsed in July. A UN Security Council Resolution adopted in late January 2019 proposed the establishment of a mechanism to permit the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to engage in direct communication and co-operation, in order to promote understanding and facilitate the possibility of a resolution to the long dispute. In November 2020 informal talks between Anastasiades and TRNC President Ersin Tatar took place. In late April 2021 an informal summit on the Cyprus issue took place in Geneva between the island's two communities and the foreign ministers of **Greece, Turkey** and the **United Kingdom**, in an effort to find areas of common interest that would enable substantive negotiations to resume. Nevertheless, this objective was not achieved.

The **CZECH REPUBLIC** (Czechia) signed a **Europe agreement** with the European Community (EC) in 1993, whereby the EC accepted in principle the possibility of membership. This accord superseded the earlier Europe agreement signed between the EC and the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (Czechoslovakia) in 1991. The first agreement had become obsolete in January 1993 with the creation of two separate states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. There existed a strong body of opinion that the Czech Republic's application could not be considered until the European Union (EU) had been consolidated, and the **European Free Trade Association** states admitted. In 1997 the Czech Republic's 1996 application to join the EU was considered favourably, and **accession negotiations** began in March 1998. The country was deemed to have completed the necessary economic and institutional reforms. The application was considered by the **European Commission** to be integral to its Agenda 2000 'for a stronger and wider Europe' initiative, although it noted that investment would be needed to transpose EC rules on agriculture, the environment and energy, and that administrative reforms would be required to 'provide the country with the structures it needs for effective application and enforcement of the full body of Community law.' Although the Czech Republic had long been considered among the best placed of the **candidate countries** to join the EU, this did not prevent the Commission from criticizing its preparations for membership. However, the Czech Republic completed accession negotiations with the EU in December 2002. Following its signing in April 2003, the **Treaty of Accession** was approved in a national referendum held in June 2003. The rate of participation by the electorate was 55.2%, 77.3% of whom favoured membership. The Czech Republic joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Relations between the Czech Government and the EU were on occasion tense given the **Euroseptic** views of the then Czech President, Václav Klaus.

The Czech Republic became part of the EU's **Schengen Area** in December 2007 and assumed the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union** in January 2009. At the outset, the Czech Republic was keen to develop closer EU-US relations and also to establish ever better links with the countries of the **Western Balkans**. Both houses of parliament ratified the **Treaty of Lisbon**, but the process of final **ratification** required presidential assent. Klaus had long expressed his opposition to the Treaty of Lisbon and resisted giving his approval for as long as possible, but he eventually signed once the Irish Government had successfully carried out its second referendum on the treaty, after the German courts had not found it to be in conflict with the German Constitution, and after the Polish President had signed it. The Czech Republic was the last EU member state to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon, in November 2009. A subsequent example of Czech Euroscepticism and the Czech authorities' strong resistance to any moves that deepen EU integration was provided by the Czech Government's refusal to sign the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (**Fiscal Compact**) in March 2012.

Miloš Zeman was elected President in early 2013. Pre-term legislative elections took place in late 2013, and a new Government was formed under Bohuslav Sobotka of the Czech Social Democrat Party. Subsequently, in a reversal of previous policy, in March 2014 the Czech Government agreed to accede to the Fiscal Compact (subject to legislative approval). The Czech Republic opposed the proposals by the EU in September 2015 for quotas for the mandatory relocation of refugees, to manage the inflow of asylum seekers entering the bloc (see **Migration and Asylum Policy**). President Zeman publicly criticized the quota scheme, stating that the ultimate decision on who to allow into the Czech Republic should rest with the Czech Government, amid protests in that country against hosting migrants from Muslim countries. He used incendiary language, for example asserting that the majority of Czech Roma were unadaptable and lazy, leading to subsequent accusations of racism. In mid-2017 the EU announced that it was to commence legal action against the Czech Republic and two other countries, in response to their refusal to implement the quota scheme. In late 2017 the populist ANO (YES) party, led by billionaire Andrej Babiš, won parliamentary elections on an anti-immigration and financial responsibility platform. Babiš's Government was plagued with uncertainty. Initially, most parties refused to join his cabinet due to corruption charges against him. Eventually, with communist support, in mid-2018 Babiš was able to receive legislative support for a minority administration. Meanwhile, Zeman also returned for a second term of office in early 2018.

After the Government announced its intention to seek the long-delayed adoption of the Fiscal Compact, it was ratified by the Czech Chamber of Deputies in November 2018, and by the Senate in December. President Zeman finally signed the Fiscal Compact on 6 March 2019. Meanwhile, anti-Government protests intensified further in late May when the European Commission published a preliminary report accusing Babiš of breaking conflict

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of interest rules. As premier, Babiš had participated in **decision making** at the EU and national level relating to **subsidies** that his companies received. Large demonstrations took place in Prague in June—reported to be among the largest since the fall of communism in 1989—but Babiš survived a parliamentary vote of confidence in June 2019. On 1 December it was reported that an audit by the European Commission had concluded that a potential conflict of interest remained between Babiš’s position as Prime Minister and his business interests. In October 2020 a European Commission audit review upheld the conclusions reached in the 2019 audit that Babiš had breached national and EU conflict of interest legislation. Meanwhile, in early April 2020 the European **Court of Justice** ruled that the Czech Republic, **Hungary** and **Poland** had violated the law by refusing to fulfil their obligations under the EU’s migrant relocation scheme. A new Czech government was to be formed following elections in October 2021.

HELENA DALLI (1962–) is the Commissioner responsible for Equality in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, which took office in December 2019. A politician from **Malta**, she has served in various national ministerial roles since 2013. As a politician, she has advocated for a wider ranging equality and human rights framework in Malta, which advocated for the inclusion of transgender and intersex people. Dalli holds a doctorate in Political Sociology and has also been an academic at the University of Malta.

DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES were the subject of several European Communities (EC) **directives** regulating the classification, use, labelling and marketing of many products deemed to be potentially dangerous. These directives covered, *inter alia*, asbestos, glues, paints, pesticides and solvents. EC directives also controlled the production and distribution of **pharmaceuticals**. The **European Atomic Energy Community** (EAEC) and the **Joint Research Centre** have handled nuclear-related matters. In 1981 the EC adopted a scheme for the rapid exchange of information between the appropriate national authorities about accidents and risks to **health and safety** that arise from the use of potentially dangerous products, and a system of monitoring accidents caused by consumer goods was subsequently introduced. (See also **Consumer Policy**.)

DAVIGNON REPORT is the name usually given to a document that was a product of the **Hague summit** held in the **Netherlands** in December 1969, when the heads of government agreed to return to the theme of political integration. The summit charged ministers for foreign affairs with the responsibility of studying ‘the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of **enlargement**’. Mindful perhaps of the arguments that this had caused in the past, the leaders did not try to be specific as to which route such political progress might follow. The foreign ministers opted for a compromise solution in order to achieve agreement. The conclusions were presented in a report compiled by Etienne Davignon (1932–), political director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of **Belgium**. The Davignon Report of 1970 accepted that political integration should ideally

begin in a policy sphere where the **member states**, both current and projected, already possess an identifiable common interest, and recommended that it should be in the co-ordination of foreign policy ‘that the first concrete efforts should be made to show the world that Europe has a political vocation’. The report included several specific recommendations: a regular consultation process of meetings of the foreign ministers, backed by a support group, a Political Committee, formed by the political directors of the national foreign ministries; ongoing liaison between the then European Communities (EC) ambassadors in foreign capitals; and the issuing, by the EC states, of common instructions on certain matters to their ambassadors abroad. The report was widely welcomed, and its main recommendations were put into effect more or less immediately. The first ministerial meeting under the new regime was held in Munich, **Germany**, in November 1970, and the EC made their first joint policy declaration, on the Middle East, the following May. The process was judged a success, and a second Davignon Report in 1973 recommended its continuation. This second report stressed the non-binding aspects of political co-operation: its aims were ‘to ensure a better mutual understanding of the major problems of international politics through regular information and consultation; to promote the **harmonization** of views and the co-ordination of positions; to attempt to achieve a common approach to specific cases’. The Davignon Reports were the basis of what came to be known as **European political co-operation**.

DE: See **Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)**

DECISION MAKING in the European Union is often considered complex, malleable and even incomprehensible. In a 1995 report the **European Commission** itself identified 29 different decision-making procedures. The key to understanding the decision-making processes lies within the **founding treaties** and subsequent **regulations**. The **decisions** can be classified loosely into different category headings: constitutional decisions (concern the **European Council**); legislative decisions (concern the Commission, the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** (EP) and are subject to either **consultation**, **co-decision** or consent procedures); **trade** policy decisions (Council and Commission); **competition policy** decisions (Commission and courts); **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (concerns primarily the member states, as did **justice and home affairs** issues falling under the former pillar III); and finally, decisions relating to the **budget** (which fall to the EP and the Council). Recent treaty changes have sought to simplify procedures and create more effective and efficient decision making. The **Treaty of Lisbon** created a new **double majority voting** system in the Council and made co-decision, which is now rebranded as the ‘**ordinary legislative procedure**’, the default decision-making procedure.

DECISIONS are one of three different types of **legal instrument** that the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union** are empowered to issue. Decisions by either the Commission or the Council are binding upon the member states; they may be addressed to named individuals or enterprises. Decisions can be made by the European Union (EU) executives on the basis of the direct authority they possess under the terms of the **Treaty of Rome** and its amendments, or on the basis of earlier **regulations** or **directives**. (See also **Law; Opinions; Recommendations; Resolutions.**)

A **DECLARATION**, as far as the **European treaties** are concerned, is a political statement issued by one or more member states or the **intergovernmental conference** clarifying provisions of a treaty or outcomes of the negotiations. Of lesser status than a **protocol**, it has limited judicial force; its main purpose is to express the intention of the signatories. Declarations are also often issued following meetings of the **European Council**. The deliberations are usually produced in the form of ‘conclusions of the Presidency’ and supplemented by declarations containing more detailed information on certain points of substance.

A **DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AREA** or Agreement (DCFTA) has been the goal of negotiations between the European Union (EU) and various countries involved in the **European Neighbourhood Policy**. A DCFTA differs from a free trade area in that it involves not only the removal of tariff barriers and quotas, but also the adoption by the EU’s partners of EU laws and standards. They include provisions on the facilitation of customs procedures, measures to prevent fraud and tools for trade defence. Such rules seek to ensure that trade is liberalized as fully as possible, but also include precautions so that preferential treatment only applies to certain goods. A bilateral dispute settlement procedure aims to ensure that any issues of contention are resolved quickly and easily.

DEEPENING refers to the process of European integration. From its early incarnation as a **customs union** and through its steady evolution to a **common market** and now the **eurozone**, the European Union (EU) has aspired to ‘ever closer union’ among the peoples of Europe. Since the **Treaty of Paris**, the EU’s competence, policy remit and powers have steadily increased. The debate on deepening usually occurs alongside that of widening (**enlargement**) and there is a generally held view that the successive rounds of enlargement (in 2004, 2007 and 2013), coupled with the prospect of further enlargement in the future, necessitated further deepening, or the EU would become a weaker entity, as it would be increasingly difficult to reach agreement on important **decisions**. Such thinking was part of the rationale behind the **Laeken Declaration** on the Future of the European Union, the

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establishment of the **European Convention** and the convening of a further **intergovernmental conference** in 2003, which led to the adoption of the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in June 2004 and the subsequent adoption of its replacement, the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

DEFENCE: See **Common Defence Policy; Common Security and Defence Policy**

DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS were conceived as a means of ensuring producers a fair price for their products and labour when the costs of the latter were higher than the prices for produce obtainable on the free market. At times when market prices have been too low to cover the costs of production, compensation has been given to the producer in the form of **subsidies**. Deficiency payments have been employed in the **common agricultural policy** as an integral part of the price guarantee system.

DELORS I is a name (after the President of the **European Commission** in 1985–95, Jacques Delors) that was given to a set of ambitious budgetary measures put forward in February 1987 by the European Commission, as a response to the continued difficulties in funding European Communities (EC) operations (see **budget**). The collection of reforms was intended to enable the EC to realize the aim of implementing an **internal market** by the end of 1992. It outlined four objectives: an increase in EC **revenue**; firmer budgetary discipline; reforms and stricter control of the **common agricultural policy** in order to release more funds for other initiatives, especially in the field of **research and technological development (RTD) policy**; and increased resources for the **structural and cohesion funds** and the policy of **cohesion**. The proposed measures proved controversial among the 12 member states. Three meetings of the **European Council** were necessary before agreement on the reforms could be reached at a special European Council meeting in **Brussels** in February 1988 under the German Presidency. The 1988 deal established the first of the multi-annual **financial perspectives**, which ran from 1988 to 1992, and saw an effective doubling of the money devoted to the structural funds for **Greece, Ireland, Portugal** and **Spain**. With the agreement secure, the Commission felt able to turn its attention to the issue of **economic and monetary union**.

DELORS II is the popular name of a set of budgetary measures proposed by the **European Commission** in February 1992 (and named after the French President of the European Commission in 1985–95, Jacques Delors). It sought a one-third increase in European Communities (EC) **revenue** in order to cover the additional costs imposed by the **Treaty on European Union**, in particular those incurred by the objectives of **cohesion**, improving the

competitiveness of EC industry, and greater foreign policy obligations, while still maintaining budgetary discipline and reflecting the ability and willingness of **member states** to pay. The proposals' progress was hindered by the difficulties surrounding **ratification** of the treaty, and final agreement upon a revised version was not reached until late 1992 at the meeting of the **European Council** in Edinburgh, the **United Kingdom**, in December.

The **DELORS PLAN** is the popular name (after the President of the **European Commission** in 1985–95, Jacques Delors) of a report on **economic and monetary union** (EMU) published in April 1989. The official title is the Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union. The report was the work of a committee appointed by the **European Council**. Mainly composed of the central bank governors, it was chaired by Jacques Delors and outlined a sequence of three stages, with EMU to be achieved by the end of the 20th century. The first stage involved consolidating the achievement of free movement of capital, and closer monetary and macroeconomic co-operation between the member states and their central banks. The second stage comprised a new system of European central banks, before the **implementation** of full EMU. The European Council, despite British objections, agreed in December 1989 that an **intergovernmental conference** would consider the treaty changes necessary for implementation of the Plan. The conclusions were presented at the **Maastricht summit**, and the relevant provisions in the **Treaty on European Union** on EMU largely followed the structure of the Delors Plan.

DEMANDEUR is the French term often used to refer to a state requesting something (e.g. increased **structural and cohesion fund** receipts) from the European Union.

DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT is a term that has frequently been applied to procedures and structures relating to the European Union (EU) over the past few decades. It refers to the belief that there is a lack of proper democratic and parliamentary supervision and **accountability** in the EU's decision-making procedures. The lack arose from the diminution of national **sovereignty** and the relative inability of national legislatures, owing to legal restraints and pressure of time, to monitor both the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union**, and because the **European Parliament** (EP) had insufficient authority to fill the gap.

As European integration progressed, the question of democratic legitimacy became increasingly sensitive. The more recent treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon) triggered the inclusion of the principle of democratic legitimacy within the institutional system by reinforcing the powers of

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Parliament with regard to the appointment and control of the Commission and successively extending the scope of the **co-decision procedure**.

The **Treaty of Amsterdam**, for example, sought to address this problem by expanding the areas in which the EP participates under the co-decision procedure. Members of member state **national parliaments** may also be able to play a greater role in EU **decision making**, since the treaty included a **protocol** stipulating that, in the area of **justice and home affairs**, there must be a six-week interval between the tabling of a legislative proposal and its appearance on the Council's agenda. This meant that national members of parliament could participate more directly in EU **decisions**. The Conference of European Affairs Committees of national parliaments of the member states was also encouraged to provide its views on **subsidiarity**, justice and security, and fundamental rights and freedoms. In addition, the EU institutions were opened to public scrutiny, with easier access to the documents of the European Commission, and to the voting results of the Council of the European Union, where decisions have legal effect. Institutional design and inter-institutional relationships formed a core rationale behind the **Treaty of Nice**, which was agreed in December 2000 and came into force on 1 February 2003. It re-examined such issues as the use of **qualified majority voting** in the Council, allocation of seats in the EP and the extension of the co-decision procedure in an effort to inject greater accountability and **transparency** in the decision-making processes. More innovative measures for reducing the democratic deficit were contained in the **Treaty of Lisbon**. Indeed, measures to enhance democratic equality and improve both representative and participatory democracy included stronger powers for the EP through the extension of co-decision to almost all policy areas (especially agriculture and the **budget**), a stronger role for national parliaments in scrutinizing EU **legislation** (and provision for a 'yellow card' in respect of Commission proposals), the creation of a **President of the European Council**, the opening up of Council meetings to the public and the possibility of a citizens' petition. How far such issues could really reduce notions of a democratic deficit was debatable, and some have urged increased direct participation of the electorate, for example, in the election of the Commission President.

DENMARK is a constitutional monarchy, currently under Queen Margrethe II. Denmark historically had a particularly difficult relationship with the European Communities (EC), as its citizens have twice (in 1992 and 2000) voted against participation in further stages of European integration, namely **ratification** of the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) and adoption of the single European currency (**euro**). This reflects a tradition of rather marked Euro-scepticism encouraged by a history of notable maritime achievement and longstanding trade links with the **USA**. Originally Denmark declined in the 1940s and 1950s to participate in any integrative venture that went beyond intergovernmental co-operation. In 1960 it became a founder member of the

European Free Trade Association. However, it reversed its position as a consequence of the British decision to apply for EC membership, and submitted its own application in 1961, and a re-application in 1967. Denmark was not willing, primarily on economic grounds, to join the EC without the **United Kingdom**, although it was informed that it was not affected by the veto on British membership. Discussions on accession were resumed in 1970, and the Danish Folketing (parliament) passed the Enabling Act ratifying the **Treaty of Accession** in September 1972. Because the parliamentary majority was slightly less than the five-sixths' majority constitutionally required to approve any delegation of national sovereignty, a referendum had to be held. In October the referendum resulted in a vote of 63.3% in favour of EC entry. Denmark formally acceded to the EC on 1 January 1973.

One of the wealthiest member states, Denmark has been a net beneficiary of the **common agricultural policy** and has benefited from the **single market**. It has strongly supported a more comprehensive and rigorous **environmental policy** and **workers' rights**, but has remained outside moves towards the single currency and **economic and monetary union**, and expressed doubts about a **common defence policy**. With the exception of the UK (which formally left the EU in January 2020), Denmark was the least enthusiastic member on the issue of closer political integration. Its policy within and towards the EC/EU has been generally based upon a strict constructionist interpretation of the **founding treaties** and their amendments. Because, from the 1970s, relatively weak minority coalition governments governed the country, the Danish Folketing acquired a decisive voice in European affairs. The Folketing initially rejected the **Single European Act** (SEA); the Prime Minister attempted to bypass the opposition by scheduling a referendum for February 1986 before which he made it clear that Denmark's continuing membership of the EC was at stake. Even so, the referendum resulted in only a small majority (56.2%) in favour of ratifying the SEA. Denmark's doubts returned in the aftermath of the **Maastricht summit**. While the Government endorsed the TEU, ratification was rejected by a small majority in a referendum held in 1992, a result which threw the EC into disarray. The result was significant because it was the first of several popular expressions of discontent within the EC over the pace of integration, indicating that there were limits to how far governments could proceed without paying attention to their electorates. More specifically, crisis meetings had to be held to maintain the momentum of integration and resolve the Danish problem. At the **Edinburgh summit** of 1992 Denmark was granted a number of exemptions, or **opt-outs**, from provisions of the TEU. A small majority, in a further referendum, subsequently approved the new conditions in 1993. In 1998 a referendum narrowly endorsed the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, which contains **protocols** relating to Denmark and its decision to opt out of certain provisions of the treaty. The Danish Government decided not to hold a referendum on the **Treaty of Lisbon**, and the Folketing ratified the treaty in 2008.

A Liberal, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, replaced Helle Thorning-Schmidt following a general election in June 2015. Against a background of unprecedented levels of immigration into the EU (almost 70,000 foreign nationals arrived in Denmark in the 12 months to the end of June 2015), and under pressure from the far-right Dansk Folkeparti, Rasmussen's administration enacted legislation in September in an attempt to dissuade refugees and migrants from travelling to Denmark, by reducing the welfare benefits made available to new arrivals by as much as 50%. In October the Government tightened the eligibility criteria for Danish citizenship. At a national referendum in December voters rejected, by 53.1% to 46.9%, a proposal to convert Denmark's existing full opt-out on home and justice affairs directives of the **European Commission**, into an opt-out with a case-by-case opt-in, similar to that held by **Ireland** and the UK. Denmark's exemption made it increasingly difficult for the country to participate fully in the EU's law enforcement agency, **Europol**. Controversial legislation to confiscate money from refugees arriving with more than 10,000 kroner, and certain valuable items, was approved by the legislature in January 2016. In the same month the Government was accused by the European Commission of violating the terms of the **Schengen Agreement**, when it introduced temporary controls along its border with **Germany**. Rasmussen claimed that Denmark had been compelled to adopt these measures following **Sweden's** imposition of border controls at the Øresund bridge (connecting the two Scandinavian countries), in an attempt to limit the flow of unauthorized asylum seekers. Popular support for Denmark's continuing membership of the EU increased sharply in the wake of the UK's referendum vote to leave in June 2016, countering fears that Denmark might be tempted to hold a similar referendum. Between 2017 and 2018 the Danish Government adopted a particularly hardline stance with respect to Muslims, *inter alia*, effectively banning the *burqa* in public spaces and requiring children living in predominantly immigrant areas to spend 25 hours a week away from their parents to learn 'Danish values'. Following legislative elections in June 2019, the leader of the Socialdemokratiet (Social Democrats), Mette Frederiksen, became Denmark's youngest Prime Minister after her party adopted a more liberal approach to immigration and formed a minority Government with the support of three other parties.

DEP is the acronym for a European Depository Library, where holdings of European Union documents are less complete than those in a **European Documentation Centre** (EDC). A DEP is intended primarily for use by the general public.

DEREGULATION has a specific meaning within the European Union. It refers not just to the ending of unnecessary rules inhibiting the working of the economy or to the reduction of government interference, but also more

directly to all those measures intended to remove restrictions to **trade** as part of the implementation of the **single market**.

DEROGATION is a term that refers to a decision by the European Union (EU) to exempt one or more **member states** from the provisions of a **directive**; it may apply to the whole or part of a directive or **regulation**. Member states that feel that their situation constitutes special circumstances may apply to the **European Commission** for a derogation, subject to agreement by the **European Council**. In principle, derogations are meant to be temporary, to permit a member state time in which to adapt itself to EU requirements more gradually. In practice, derogations sometimes continue indefinitely. Derogations have been most widely granted to new member states for periods of five or 10 years under the terms of the relevant **treaty of accession**.

DÉTENTE is a term first used in the mid-1950s to describe a lessening of the tensions between East and West during the **Cold War**. The term is a highly subjective one: while the hostility of the late 1940s and early 1950s may not have been repeated, the two sides never ceased entirely their competition and rivalry. The importance of détente, for European integration, lies less in its questionable reality than in the perception by Europe of a lessening of international tension. This perception allowed Western Europe to rely less heavily upon the **USA** and perhaps permitted the member states of the European Communities (EC) to concentrate more upon their own plans and development. The changes in **Central and Eastern Europe** after 1989 may have created a new sense of détente, but they also persuaded many that the EC should develop their own **Common Foreign and Security Policy**.

DEVELOPMENT AID has come from the **budget** of the European Union (EU), the **European Development Fund** (EDF), and the **European Investment Bank** (EIB) and falls into several different categories. First, there has been the aid provided to the **African, Caribbean and Pacific** (ACP) **states** (79 countries) under the terms of the **Cotonou Agreement** and previously the **Lomé Conventions**. Over time the EU has also concluded agreements with a number of countries in **Asia** and **South and Central America**, which incorporate provisions for development aid. Similar help has been given to the **Maghreb states** and to the **Mashreq states**, as well as to Israel, under **protocols** in the agreements signed between these countries and the EU. A further element of aid is food and emergency provision forwarded to countries requesting EU assistance in coping with severe food shortages or the aftermath of natural disasters. This form of assistance has mainly been given to African and Asian countries (although in July 1989 the then European Communities agriculture ministers agreed to provide food aid to **Poland** as

part of what became known as operation **PHARE**). In 1992 the **European Commission** created the European Community Humanitarian Office (**ECHO**) to help provide emergency relief to the former **Yugoslavia**. The amount of development aid provided by the EU has been substantial as a proportion of gross national product. The EU is the world's largest donor of humanitarian aid. Collectively, the **ACP states** consumed the largest amount of aid, although, because of their number, the funds were distributed rather thinly among them. The largest element of aid to ACP states comprised grants from the EDF and low-interest loans from the EIB, together comprising just over two-thirds of EU assistance in this area. EU development aid policy has not been entirely disinterested. Food aid has been a means of reducing EU surpluses, while the aid programmes have benefited EU companies and enterprises, which have won most of the contracts awarded under the programmes. The European Commission's Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development (DEVCO) had responsibility for administering and developing EU policies in this area. Amid a move towards the establishment of a relationship with developing countries that was a 'partnership of equals' (as opposed to a donor-recipient relationship), in January 2021 DEVCO was renamed the Directorate-General for International Partnerships.

DEVELOPMENT POLICY in the European Union (EU) seeks to reduce and ultimately to eradicate poverty in the developing countries and to promote sustainable development, peace and security as well as a stable and democratic political environment in the EU's partner countries. This particular theme has grown in importance as a priority for the **European Commission** and has been developed considerably since 2000.

The central EU institution in this policy area remains the Commission, and specifically the **Directorate-General** (DG) for International Co-operation and Development (DEVCO) and (from January 2021) its successor, the Directorate-General for International Partnerships. It was charged with the role of initiating and formulating the EU's development co-operation policy for all developing countries as defined in Title XX of the **Treaty establishing the European Community**, and with co-ordinating relations with the sub-Saharan **African, Caribbean and Pacific** (ACP) **states** and the **Overseas Countries and Territories** (OCTs). The **Cotonou Agreement** provided the framework for a 20-year partnership for **development aid** to the 79 ACP countries, funded mainly by the **European Development Fund**. Support for DG DEVCO also came through specified budget lines in terms of the EU **budget**; it prepared strategies for co-operation with ACP countries and OCTs, and also monitored their **implementation**.

In fulfilling its role, the DG for International Partnerships and its previous incarnations has worked in close collaboration and interaction with other services of the European Commission, in particular the EuropeAid Co-operation Office, the European Community Humanitarian Office (**ECHO**), and the

Directorates-General for External Relations, Trade, Economic and Financial Affairs, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Transport, Energy and Justice and Home Affairs. It has been committed to strong co-ordination and complementarity between the Commission, the EU member states and organizations such as the World Bank, regional development banks, the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development** and the **United Nations** system. The DG has worked in partnership with government, civil society, and the economic and social spheres, including the private sector in ACP countries and other developing countries.

The European Commission published a European Consensus on Development in 2005. This document identified a number of shared values, goals and commitments that the EU and its member states were tasked with implementing. These came under the headings of reducing poverty, promoting development based on Europe's democratic values (i.e. **human rights**, democracy, rule of law, good governance and social justice) and assisting the countries of the developing world in designing their own national strategies. In the 2010s EU aid accounted for over 50% of all development aid worldwide, of which more than one-half went to Africa.

In October 2011 the Commission presented its Agenda for Change, which aimed to produce a more strategic EU approach to reducing poverty. EU assistance was focused on two main themes: first, human rights, democracy and good governance, and, second, inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. The DG Development and Co-operation—EuropeAid (an amalgamation of DG Development and DG EuropeAid) was created in January 2011 with responsibility for designing EU development policies and delivering aid through a number of programmes worldwide. It was hoped that having one DG would provide greater coherence to EU development strategy by providing a single contact point. The remit of the DG was considerable and included promoting good governance, human and economic development, fighting hunger and preserving natural resources. In 2015 it was superseded by the DG for International Co-operation and Development—DEVCO, and in 2021 by the DG for International Partnerships. In recent years, scholars and activists have noted that the EU's development policy has been straying from its broader remit of poverty reduction and human rights promotion to a reliance on military resources and ideologies that negate that remit. This has been especially visible in the case of the **migration crisis**.

DG: See **Directorates-General**

DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION: See **À La Carte Europe**

The **DIGITAL AGENDA FOR EUROPE** was established as one of seven principal initiatives of the **European Commission's Europe 2020** strategy. It

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sought to exploit the economic and social potential of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), in particular the internet, to promote innovation and economic growth, through the creation of a **Digital Single Market**. The Commission identified seven principal objectives: the creation of a new single, online market; improved standards and interoperability; enhanced trust and security for internet users; improved access to fast internet speeds; research and innovation; digital literacy; and using ICT to address issues of importance to society, e.g. mitigating rising health costs and digitizing the European Union (EU)'s cultural heritage. The Digital Europe programme for 2021–27 was to invest in strategic digital initiatives such as high-performance computing, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. It was to work in tandem with other programmes, notably **Horizon Europe** and the infrastructure-related **Connecting Europe Facility**, in supporting 'digital transformation'. The Digital Europe programme was to receive funding of some €6,761m. in 2021–27 (in 2018 prices).

DIGITAL EUROPE: See Digital Agenda for Europe

The **DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET** was agreed by the **European Commission** in March 2015. The Digital Single Market comprises 16 specific initiatives, built around three themes. The themes comprise: improved access to digital goods and services across Europe, for both consumers and commercial enterprises; the development of an infrastructural environment conducive to the evolution of both digital networks and innovative services; and stimulating potential for growth in the digital economy and society. It was envisaged that the successful implementation of the Digital Single Market could add €415,000m. per year to the EU economy, and lead to the creation of employment and improved public services. An annual Europe's Digital Progress Report, published by the Commission, evaluates progress in the digital policies of member states. A new copyright regulation and directive for the Digital Single Market were agreed in February 2019, and approved by the **European Parliament** in March.

LUIGI DI MAIO (1986–) was Deputy Prime Minister of **Italy** and Minister for Economic Development, Labour and Social Policies from June 2018 until August 2019. He was subsequently reappointed to the new Government formed by Giuseppe Conte in September 2019, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. He was also the leader of coalition government partner **Movimento 5 Stelle** (Five Star Movement) between September 2017 and January 2020. Prior to his appointment to government in 2018, he was the youngest ever Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the Italian parliament. Following Conte's resignation in February

2021, Di Maio was reappointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Government led by **Mario Draghi**.

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION abroad was not initially formally maintained by the European Union (EU), although the **European Commission** had External Delegations in most countries and to international organizations. Collaboration between ambassadors of the EU states was developed as part of **European political co-operation**, and member states began to agree to share embassies and missions. The EU also had its own non-diplomatic representation in several international economic forums, such as the **World Trade Organization** (formerly the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**). Many states have diplomatic representatives accredited to the EU, giving the latter a partial diplomatic status. These are often the countries' ambassadors to **Belgium**. (See also **Permanent mission**; **Permanent representation**.) With the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the EU's external representation was increased with the creation of a **European External Action Service**.

DIRECT EFFECT, together with primacy, is one of the fundamental legal principles underpinning European Communities (EC) **law**. Essentially, by interpreting the **Treaty of Rome** as having established individual rights that had to be protected at member state level, the **Court of Justice** established the doctrine of direct effect. As a result, a mechanism was created for individuals and institutions to challenge the compatibility of national law with EC law. Thenceforth the Court of Justice could be invoked in national policy debates and, more importantly, any national laws that were deemed to run contrary to EC law had to be set aside.

DIRECT ELECTIONS to the **European Parliament** (EP) were provided for by the **Treaty of Rome**. The Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) declined for some time to initiate the legislation for direct elections, despite considerable agitation by the EP, which even threatened to take the Council to the **Court of Justice** for failing to honour its treaty obligations. The first direct elections were eventually held in June 1979, and have subsequently taken place at five-year intervals. Despite a widespread belief that there should be electoral **harmonization** across the member states, it has proved impossible to reach an agreement on either a single day for the election or a common electoral system, although all now use varying systems of proportional representation. The elections are spread over several days because states prefer to hold them on the day traditionally used for national elections (Sunday in most countries, Thursday in the others). Counting of votes does not begin until polls have closed in all member states. Each member state has also been free to decide upon its own electoral system: this is usually the same as, or is based upon, that used for the election of the national

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legislature. The lists of candidates submitted by the competing political parties are national lists in most countries. However, in **Belgium, Germany, Italy** and **Spain**, as well as **Finland**, regional party lists were employed, so that the region became, in effect, a kind of constituency. (See also **Political groups**.) The elections of June 2004 were the first European elections to include the 10 new member states from **Central and Eastern Europe** and the Mediterranean. The overall rate of voter participation across the European Union (EU) was some 45%. The elections to the eighth EP in May 2014 recorded a turnout of 42.6%. Turnout increased to 50.6% for the elections to the ninth EP in May 2019.

DIRECTIVES are one of three different types of **legal instrument** that the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union** are empowered to issue for the adoption of **legislation**. A directive is the most common form of European Union legislation. Directives are binding upon all member states, but take the form of general instructions on the goal to be achieved, while leaving the way in which it will be attained to the discretion of each member state. The conditions of a directive are normally met by the member states introducing national legislation in conformity with EU stipulations. (See also **Decisions; Law; Opinions; Recommendations; Regulations; Resolutions**.)

The **DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EUROPEAN CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS (ECHO)** is a division of the **European Commission**. This office, originally established in 1992, is based in **Brussels** has provided emergency **humanitarian assistance** and food aid throughout the world. ECHO aims to meet the immediate needs of victims of mostly manmade disasters worldwide, in such areas as assisting displaced persons, and health, sanitary and mine-clearance programmes.

DIRECTORATES-GENERAL (DGs) are the principal bureaucratic ‘ministries’ or departments of the **European Commission**, to which they are responsible. The General Secretariat of the **Council of the European Union** and the **Secretariat-General** of the **European Parliament** also have DGs, but these are fewer in number, have fewer powers and are generally less well known. The duty of the DGs of the European Commission is to carry out, or to ensure that the member states carry out, European Union (EU) policy, and to administer allocations from the **budget** to different policy areas and the **structural and cohesion funds**. They are, in turn, divided into Directorates and Units. Each DG is expected to serve and advise the Commission through the Commissioner or Commissioners who hold the portfolios for its areas of responsibility. Appointment of staff to the DGs is by competition and merit, although the allocation of posts has to ensure a fair distribution between

nationals of the member states. In addition, as far as possible, it is usual for the Director-General in charge of a given DG and any relevant Commissioners not to be of the same nationality.

The number of DGs has altered over the years as new ones have been created and others have been merged. Until the late 1990s they were usually identified by number (e.g. DG IV) but, since reorganization in 2000, they are now identified by their policy area. The titles of the DGs are susceptible to change, but in 2019–24 they were named as follows: Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI); Budget (BUDG); Climate Action (CLIMA); Communication (COMM); Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CONNECT); Competition (COMP); Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS); International Co-operation and Development (DEVCO), renamed the DG for International Partnerships in January 2021; Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN); Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (EAC); Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL); Energy (ENER); Environment (ENV); **Eurostat**; Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA); Migration and Home Affairs (HOME); European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO); Human Resources and Security (HR); Informatics (DIGIT); Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW); Interpretation (SCIC); Joint Research Centre (JRC); Justice and Consumers (JUST); Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE); Mobility and Transport (MOVE); European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR); Regional and Urban Policy (REGIO); Research and Innovation (RTD); Health and Food Safety (SANTE); Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD); Trade (TRADE); and Translation (DGT). Given the uneven degree of EC development in different policy areas, DGs have been far from equal in size.

The DGs are complemented by European Commission service departments and agencies, which carry out specialized functions. The service departments include the Secretariat-General (SG); the Data Protection Officer (DPO); Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO); **Legal Service** (SJ); the Internal Audit Service (IAS); the **European Anti-Fraud Office** (OLAF); European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO); European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC); Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI); Historical Archives Service; Infrastructure and Logistics in Brussels (OIB); Infrastructure and Logistics in Luxembourg (OIL); Library and e-Resources Centre; the **Publications Office**; and the Structural Reform Service (SRSS). A few other agencies of the Commission are based in centres throughout the EU. The current Commission took office on 1 December 2019.

DISABILITY POLICY in the European Union has three main areas of focus: co-operation between the **European Commission** and the member states; the full participation of people with disabilities; and ensuring disability issues are fully recognized in policy formulation (particularly with regard to

DISCRIMINATION

employment). Ongoing EU activities relating to disability include dialogue with the European Disability Forum and a European Day of Disabled People, which takes place in December each year. A disability action plan for 2004–10 aimed to enhance the economic and social integration of people with disabilities. In November 2010 the Commission launched the EU Disability Strategy 2010–20. The strategy sought, *inter alia*, to: improve accessibility to goods and services for people with disabilities, and to consider a European Accessibility Act; help disabled people to exercise their right to vote; use the European Platform Against Poverty to reduce the risk of poverty; ensure that the European Social Fund offered ongoing support to disability-related projects; carry out data collection with the aim of improving opportunities for the employment of disabled people; develop policies to ensure inclusive education; facilitate the mutual recognition of disability cards and related entitlements throughout Europe; and promote the rights of people with disabilities through the EU's external activities. In 2021 the EU announced a new Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for 2021–30.

DISCRIMINATION can refer to the application of restrictive **trade** practices by one member state at the expense of goods and companies from other member states. Equally, it has long been used within the European Communities (EC) to refer to inequitable treatment between individuals based on nationality and, with regard to pay, sex. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** demanded that the EC take measures to combat discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

The **DOHA ROUND** was the most recent round in a series of trade negotiations that commenced in the late 1940s. These rounds were designed to work towards a system of more liberalized trade rules and, in more recent times, ones that were fairer to developing countries. This latest trade round was agreed after arduous negotiations during 9–13 November 2001 in Qatar. It resulted in some far-reaching decisions on the future development of the **World Trade Organization** (WTO); these included the launch of a new round of trade negotiations—the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)—comprising both further trade liberalization and new rulemaking, underpinned by commitments substantially to strengthen assistance to developing countries. It also sought to assist developing countries to implement the existing WTO agreements. In addition, the meeting approved the long-awaited waiver from WTO rules of the **Cotonou Agreement** between the European Union (EU) and **African, Caribbean and Pacific states**.

Each trade round was not a new set of rules, principles or procedures for global trade, but rather a catch-all term for the intense discussions aiming to result in such rules. The last successful attempt, the **Uruguay Round**, ran from 1986 to 1993, before the WTO itself was formed in 1995. Attempts to set up a Seattle Round foundered under the weight of international protests

and economic tension in 1999. The initial deal in Doha merely helped to set the agenda for a new set of trade talks, which commenced in 2002. The fact that 142 countries were able to conclude a trade deal in Doha was greeted as a triumph by governments and commentators around the world. The result was a clear success, given that the gulfs separating various trade blocs were wide. However, Doha was preliminary to a deal, rather than a deal in itself. The main issues dealt with at Doha included the liberalization of agricultural trade; the opening up of the financial services market; the general reduction of tariff barriers; rules on **subsidies** for steel and textiles; the dispute settlement system; new ‘greener’ rules for trade; the labelling of and copyright protection for drinks; and the relaxation of controls on drug manufacturing. It quickly became evident that reaching a deal was going to be extremely difficult.

In September 2003, in Cancún, Mexico, a summit took place that sought to make progress on agreement on the Doha Round, and concentrated on four main areas: agriculture, industrial goods, trade in services, and a new customs code. However, these talks failed; a new alliance of developing nations emerged that refused to sign a proposed agreement which they felt favoured the richer WTO members. A deal was finally reached, however, in Geneva, **Switzerland**, in August 2004. This deal opened the way for full negotiations to start. However, the next WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005 broke up without any agreement being reached. The WTO operates through consensus, and the entire experience of the Doha Round illustrated how difficult it was to attain. The Doha Round was characterized by the more active participation (than in earlier rounds) of the developing countries, but their involvement further complicated negotiations. Agriculture proved to be the substantial point of contention. Discussions on agriculture had centred on three main aspects—market access, levels of domestic support and export competition policies—but clear division between the players prevented any chance of a deal. It should be noted that the EU had agreed in 2005 to eradicate all agricultural export **subsidies** by 2013. The most problematic point of the discussions centred on the support that the richer nations give to their farmers. Other issues included the USA’s unwillingness to reduce its domestic subsidies to agriculture, concerns about the openness of the EU agricultural markets and a reticence from emerging economies such as Brazil and India to allow better access to their own markets. Within the EU, **France** remained one of the most vocal opponents of plans to reduce tariffs. Further unsuccessful rounds of negotiations took place in Potsdam, **Germany**, in 2007, and in Geneva, in 2008. In December 2013 the so-called Bali Ministerial Declaration was adopted, which addressed bureaucratic matters relating to commerce, but the future of the Doha Round appeared uncertain. Some argued that the collapse of the Doha Round and multilateral negotiations might reinforce the growing trend towards regionalism.

VALDIS DOMBROVSKIS (1971–) was appointed Executive Vice-President of the **European Commission** and Commissioner responsible for An Economy that Works for People in the Commission for 2019–24, led by **Ursula von der Leyen**. Following the resignation of Irish Commissioner **Phil Hogan**, Dombrovskis was appointed as Commissioner for Trade. In 2014 Dombrovskis was the Latvian nomination to the Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker, in which he was named Vice-President of the Commission for the Euro and Social Dialogue. Dombrovskis took his first degree in Physics at the University of Latvia before taking another at Rīga Technical University. He also holds two Master's degrees in Physics and Customs and Tax Administration, respectively. On completing his studies, he joined the Bank of Latvia in 2001. Dombrovskis served as Minister of Finance (2002–04), and subsequently served as a **Member of the European Parliament** (EP), before becoming Prime Minister (2009–14). He resigned as Prime Minister after a supermarket building collapsed in the Latvian capital, killing more than 50 people, in 2013. He founded the political party Vienotība (Unity) in 2011, which is affiliated to the **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)**. Dombrovskis had additional responsibility for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union in 2016–20, following the resignation of British Commissioner Jonathan Hill in June 2016, in the wake of the **United Kingdom's** referendum vote in favour of a departure from the EU.

DOMINANT FIRM ABUSE is dealt with under Article 102 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** on **competition policy** and refers to companies that enjoy a hegemonic market position for particular products. It is not monopolies in themselves that are problematic or the focus of attention, but rather those holding a monopoly that use it to try to undermine competition by attempting to eject competitors from the market through the imposition of unfair pricing regimes or by deliberately imposing restrictions on the distributors of their own goods. Article 102 has been more severely limited in operation than the more widely used Article 101, which targets **cartels**, but the **European Commission** has upheld the tenets of the treaty, and its charges, when cases have proceeded to such an advanced stage, have usually been supported by the **Court of Justice** and the Court of First Instance (now **General Court**).

DOOGE COMMITTEE, also known as the Committee on Institutions, is the name of an ad hoc group of 'personal representatives' of the heads of government, which the **European Council** agreed to establish at its **Fontainebleau summit** in June 1984. The task of the group was to examine the possibility of institutional reform of the European Communities (EC) in the light of the **draft Treaty establishing the European Union** issued by the **European Parliament** (EP). Chaired by James Dooge of **Ireland**, the Committee was intended to conduct a preliminary exploration of the positions of the heads of

government in order to determine the extent to which there existed common ground for further integration. It issued a preliminary report in December 1984, and its final report was presented for discussion at the **Milan summit** of the Council in June 1985. The Committee stated that its overall aim was to turn the EC into a ‘true political entity with the power to take **decisions** in the name of all citizens by a democratic process’. It outlined the following themes of institutional reform: strengthening both the **European Commission** and the EP—the former to be made more independent and streamlined, with only one Commissioner per country, the latter to be given joint decision-making authority with the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**); simplifying **decision making** in the Council of Ministers by restricting the requirement of unanimity to proposals for new areas of EC action and to applications for EC membership; and allotting a strategic role to the European Council, which, meeting twice instead of three times each year, should concern itself with diplomatic and external affairs, and not the daily routine of the EC.

There were several disagreements over the report at the Milan summit, with the non-founding member states all expressing reservations about some sections of the report. In general, however, its major recommendations were not rejected outright. The Committee had also suggested that a special **inter-governmental conference** be established to consider its ideas and construct a reform package from all the reports and initiatives delivered over the previous few years. This proposal was also accepted at the Milan summit, although **Denmark, Greece** and the **United Kingdom** voted against it. The inter-governmental conference prepared the way for the **Single European Act**.

DOUBLE MAJORITY VOTING is a system of voting that, under the **Treaty of Lisbon**, replaced **qualified majority voting** (QMV) in the **Council of the European Union** from 1 November 2014. Originally envisaged in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, the double majority voting system allows decisions to be taken provided they have the support of 55% of member states representing 65% of the population of the European Union (EU). The measure being adopted also has to command the support of at least 15 member states. In certain areas of **justice and home affairs**, the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and economic and monetary policy, where the Council does not act on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, a measure requires the support of 72% of member states representing 65% of the EU’s population. A blocking minority needs to include at least four member states. Owing to the uncompromising position adopted by **Poland** in the 2007 **intergovernmental conference**, until 31 March 2017 member states retained the right to request that a decision be adopted using the existing QMV system. At Poland’s insistence, a modified version of the **Ioannina Compromise** was also available during this period and after. The double

majority voting system was expected to facilitate decision making and make the process easier to understand.

The **DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE** was drawn up by the **European Convention** under the chairpersonship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It brought together the existing **Treaty on European Union** and the **Treaty of Rome** to create a 'constitution' for the European Union (EU). In addition, the draft contained a variety of policy and institutional innovations and reforms. All this was brought together via four parts. The first, *inter alia*, set out the objectives of the EU, established EU **citizens' rights**, defined the EU's **competences**, presented the EU's **institutions**, determined how the EU should exercise its competences, established mechanisms for **enhanced co-operation**, outlined the EU's **budget**, and determined the mechanisms for accession. The second part incorporated the **Charter of Fundamental Rights**. The third part then outlined in much greater detail the policies (e.g. **economic and monetary union, social policy**) and functioning (e.g. **decision making**) of the EU. The fourth part contained 'general and final provisions' and was followed by a number of **protocols** and **declarations**.

Following its adoption on the basis of 'consensus' by the European Convention in June and July 2003, the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was submitted to the **European Council**, which welcomed it as 'a good basis' for starting negotiations on a **Constitutional Treaty**. These negotiations began with the launch of an **intergovernmental conference** (IGC) in October 2003, which was scheduled to complete its work prior to the **enlargement** of the EU on 1 May 2004. Although broad agreement existed on adopting the structure of the European Convention's draft Treaty as the basis for the 'Constitutional Treaty', some of its provisions proved unacceptable to certain member states, as was evident at the **Brussels** European Council in 2003 when **Spain** and **Poland** rejected replacement of the existing system of **qualified majority voting** in the Council with a system based on dual majority of member states and population. This meant that the timetable for the IGC was somewhat disrupted, with negotiations continuing until June 2004 when agreement on the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** was finally reached.

DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION is the name of a document prepared by the **European Parliament** (EP) under the direction of Altiero Spinelli. An EP Institutional Committee began drafting the document in 1981. The Draft Treaty originated in the work of the **Crocodile Group** (a group of **Members of the European Parliament**—MEPs—who first met in the *Crocodile* restaurant in **Strasbourg**) and sought to revive the European project. Spinelli believed that following the first **direct elections** to the EP in 1979 the MEPs were now in a position (in terms of legitimacy) to

re-examine the original three treaties establishing the European Communities (EC) in the 1950s. Moreover, it was generally felt that a new treaty was needed to reorder the European institutions and to expand the policy remit. This document proposed greater powers for the **European Commission** and EP, and a severe reduction of the **member states'** right of veto on proposed policies. The Commission, which would supervise the implementation of the new Treaty establishing a European Union, would become the sole EC executive, accountable to the EP and a weakened Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**). The EP would have an independent revenue-raising responsibility and share budgetary powers with the downgraded Council, which was to be only a legislative body, renamed the Council of the Union. The EP approved the Draft Treaty in February 1984 but no action was taken on it directly by either the Council of Ministers or the **European Council**, owing to the sensitivity of many of its suggestions. However, several of its ideas were taken up by the **Dooge Committee** on institutional reform, and subsequently influenced the new integration initiatives of the late 1980s and 1990s.

MARIO DRAGHI (1947–) has been the Prime Minister of **Italy** since February 2021. An economist and former banker, he was appointed Governor of the central bank of Italy in January 2006 and succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet as the third President of the **European Central Bank** (ECB) in November 2011. In July Draghi, while announcing a new bond-buying scheme to assist the Spanish and Italian positions in the markets, stated that his office would do everything possible to protect the **euro** in its existing form. In September Draghi announced that the governing council of the ECB had approved a new plan for the introduction of outright monetary transactions (OMT). The OMT would allow the ECB to purchase, in unlimited quantities, the short-term bonds of member countries of the **eurozone** seeking financial assistance from the European Union's emergency funding mechanisms, and thereby protect the long-term future of the euro. In September 2014 Draghi announced that the ECB was to cut its main rate of interest to 0.05%, and announced that the ECB was to introduce asset-buying measures. The news was widely welcomed by investors, although the ECB reportedly remained divided internally. In January 2015 Draghi announced a new programme of stimulus measures, including an asset-purchasing programme, which was to run for at least 18 months. In March 2016 he increased the value of the ECB's asset-purchasing scheme from some €60,000m. a month to €80,000m., and announced that the scheme would be extended until 2017, while reducing the main interest rate from 0.05% to zero, although he announced that no further cuts were planned. In July 2019 **Christine Lagarde** was nominated to replace Draghi at the head of the ECB from 1 November, upon the expiry of his term of office.

DUAL MANDATE refers to those politicians who were members both of the **European Parliament** (EP) and of a **national parliament**. Before **direct elections** to the EP were introduced in 1979 the double mandate was the norm, as **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs) were selected from within the ranks of their own national parliaments. From 1979, however, double mandates became less common, as parties tended to discourage, and in some cases refuse to allow, their members to sit in both the EP and their national parliament simultaneously. However, many still existed. Indeed, it was also possible to speak of a triple mandate as some individuals sat in the EP, their national parliament and a regional assembly. The major concern surrounding double (and triple) mandates centred on the degree to which such members could adequately master their individual briefs and represent the electorate at both (or all three) levels. This situation caused general dissatisfaction. A proposal by European Union member state governments to abolish dual membership of the EP and **national parliaments** was approved by MEPs in 2003 (399 votes in favour of this motion, 111 against with 25 abstentions). The proposal formed part of a number of changes to the 1976 Act on the election of members of the EP. The abolition of the dual mandate took effect at the 2004 elections to the EP (although former member the **United Kingdom** negotiated an exemption until the June 2009 EP elections).

DUBLIN FOUNDATION: See **European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions**

The **DUBLIN REGULATION** was adopted in 2013, and entered into force in January 2014, replacing the Dublin II Regulation of 2003. The Dublin II Regulation had replaced the Dublin Convention on Asylum, a document outlining common formal arrangements relating to asylum throughout the European Union. It was initially conceived in response to worries that the **single market** and the **freedom of movement** it entailed would attract large numbers of economic asylum seekers, especially from Eastern Europe. The Convention was signed by member states in June 1990 (with the exception of **Denmark**, which signed a year later), but the slow pace of the **ratification** process in many member states delayed its introduction. In 2016, in response to what became commonly known as the **European migration crisis**, the European Commission proposed reforming the Dublin Regulation (Dublin IV Regulation proposal). The Dublin Regulation had been intended to prevent the same individual from making multiple asylum claims, by asserting that asylum applications were to be the responsibility of the state in which a claim for asylum was first made, and by establishing that refugees should claim asylum in the first EU member state reached. The Regulation stipulates that should an individual be refused asylum in one member state, they may not then seek asylum in another signatory state. However, following the unprecedented upsurge in the number of migrants reaching countries such as **Greece**,

Italy and **Hungary** in 2015, the countries of arrival struggled to register all of the migrants passing through their borders. In August **Germany**, under Chancellor **Angela Merkel**, offered voluntarily to assume responsibility for processing asylum applications from individuals fleeing the civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**. Although the measure was intended to alleviate the crisis, it led to chaotic scenes throughout Europe, with, for example, the largest railway station in the Hungarian capital, Budapest, becoming overwhelmed with refugees trying to reach Germany. In July 2017 the **Court of Justice** upheld the terms of the Dublin Regulation, in a case brought by **Austria** and **Slovenia**, declaring its terms remained valid despite the difficulties experienced during the European migration crisis from 2015, and effectively confirming the right of EU member states to deport migrants to their initial point of entry within the EU. (See also **Migration and Asylum Policy**; **Immigration Policy**.)

DUMPING is the selling of produce at greatly reduced, below-cost prices, and such practices by any member state within the European Union (EU) are banned. The **European Commission** has the authority to permit the affected member states to take appropriate protective measures if the offending country does not heed its recommendations and warnings. One difficulty is that national perceptions of what constitutes dumping can vary, because of different rates and costs of production, and on occasion this has led to disputes between member states. The Commission can also act by imposing anti-dumping duties where it believes that other countries are engaged in dumping within the EU. By contrast, the policy of disposing of surplus agricultural produce (accumulated under the intervention element of the **common agricultural policy**) at greatly reduced prices abroad was often claimed by other countries with a major agricultural export industry to constitute a dumping practice.

DUNKIRK TREATY: See **Treaty of Dunkirk**

E

eEUROPE: See **Information Society**

E-NUMBERS are pan-European code numbers identifying a range of food additives. Their use is demanded by various **directives**.

EACEA: See **Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency**

EAEC: See **European Atomic Energy Community**

EAGGF: See **European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund**

EaP: See **Eastern Partnership**

EAP: See **Environmental Action Programme**

EASA (EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY): See **Air Transport Policy**

EAST GERMANY: See **Germany**

The **EASTERN PARTNERSHIP** (EaP) between the European Union (EU) and its eastern neighbours—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, **Moldova** and **Ukraine**—was launched at a dedicated summit in Prague, the **Czech Republic** (Czechia), in May 2009 as part of EU efforts to respond to the wish of most of these countries for closer ties. The EaP is part of the **European Neighbourhood Policy** and is aimed at strengthening relations through increased bilateral co-operation, new **association agreements**, **deep and comprehensive free trade areas**, visa facilitation and liberalization, and co-operation on energy security matters, notably security of supply to the EU. Multilateral co-operation was also envisaged, and heads of government and

state were expected to meet every two years. Belarus suspended its participation in the Eastern Partnership in mid-2021.

EBA: See **European Banking Authority**

EBN: See **European Business and Innovation Centre Network**

EBRD: See **European Bank for Reconstruction and Development**

EBU: See **European Broadcasting Union**

EC: See **European Communities; European Community**; under the **Treaty of Lisbon**, this term was replaced by the term **European Union**.

ECA: See **European Court of Auditors**

ECB: See **European Central Bank**

ECCG: See **Consumer Committee**

ECDC: See **European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control**

ECDIN: See **Environmental Chemicals Data Information Network**

ECE: See **Economic Commission for Europe**

ECFIN: See **Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers**

ECHO: See **Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations**

ECISS: See **European Committee for Iron and Steel Standards**

ECLAS: See **FIND-eR**

ECOIN is the acronym of the European Core Inventory of Chemicals.

ECOLABEL

ECOLABEL was designed as a means of promoting products with a reduced environmental impact and of providing consumers with accurate information about the product. Regulation No. 1980/2000 replaced the earlier 1992 regulation on a European Communities Ecolabel award scheme. Certain categories were excluded from the Regulation's scope, including **foodstuffs**, beverages and pharmaceutical products.

The **ECO-MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT SCHEME** (EMAS) of the European Communities is a 1993 initiative to promote responsible environmental management in industry. (An existing regulation—No. 1836/93—was replaced by Regulation No. 761/2001). Participation in the scheme is voluntary. The objective of EMAS is to promote continuous improvement in the environmental achievements of all European organizations, while providing the public and interested parties with any relevant information.

The **ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** (ECFIN, also Ecofin) is one of the most important formats of the **Council of the European Union** (alongside the General Council, the Foreign Affairs Council and the Special Council for Agriculture) through which specific policy areas are addressed. ECFIN is the name given to the regular meetings of the economic and finance ministers of the member states, which are held, on average, once a month. The ministers, who also meet in the **Economic and Financial Committee**, discuss both broad and more detailed issues of economic management. The informal **Eurogroup** group of ministers of finance of the member states participating in the **eurozone** discuss issues pertaining to **economic and monetary union**.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE is the name of an institution created as part of the development of **economic and monetary union** (EMU). It was first instituted at the start of the third and final stage of EMU on 1 January 1999 as a replacement for the Monetary Committee, although it was not charged with reviewing the monetary situation in the European Communities. The committee comprises senior individuals from member state finance ministries and representatives from the **European Central Bank**. The Treaty charged it with monitoring the economic situation in the European Union and reporting to and advising the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union**. The President of the Economic and Financial Committee also serves as President of the Eurogroup Working Group, which prepares dossiers for approval by the **Eurogroup**. Despite its largely advisory function, the Committee is highly influential, given its policy remit over EMU.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY is mentioned in the **Treaty of Rome**, which obligates the member states to co-operate with each other in planning their economic policies. Since the establishment of the European Communities (EC), the member states have broadly followed similar economic policies, but this typically owed less to co-ordination of effort and more to common reactions to worldwide problems and trends in the international economy. The **European Commission** issued annual economic reports, which included recommendations, but its advice and suggestions were not binding upon the member states. Broad questions of economic policy were discussed by the **European Council** and were a concern of what became the **Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers**. Further co-operation was achieved through the regular meetings of the consultative **Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks**. These consultation exercises together constituted a reasonable level of co-operation, but they fell short of the level of co-ordination anticipated by the Treaty of Rome. Only in two areas was the EC able to wield a significant influence upon economic policy. The first was the raising of loans on behalf of member states through a variety of instruments: the **European Investment Bank**, the **European Coal and Steel Community**, the **European Atomic Energy Community** and the New Community Instrument. The other, prior to **economic and monetary union** (EMU), was the ability to limit exchange-rate fluctuations through the **exchange rate mechanism** of the **European Monetary System**. More generally, however, EC authority and the EC **budget** were too limited to have any kind of decisive impact upon macroeconomic policy analogous to that wielded by national governments. These deficiencies explain the interest in EMU. The details and timetable for EMU set down by the **Treaty on European Union** were intended to provide the EC with a common economic and financial policy by 1999. Eleven member states were ready to participate as planned by this date, but the reality of four member states (**Greece, Denmark, Sweden** and the **United Kingdom**) not taking part in EMU imposed some limitations on that objective. Greece entered EMU in 2001, but **referenda** in Denmark and Sweden resulted in votes against participation, while the UK formally departed the EU in January 2020. At 2021 19 states were participating in EMU. The EU's policy on economic governance seeks to identify, prevent and resolve economic trends considered to present a risk to growth and to individual member state economies.

Amid the significant curtailment of consumer and economic activity throughout the EU owing to the **COVID-19** pandemic, on 18 March 2020 the ECB announced a temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, a new asset-purchasing scheme worth €750,000m. (increased to €1,350,000m. on 4 June), and a commitment to protect the eurozone. Additional emergency measures were agreed by eurozone ministers of finance in April, together with the proposed establishment of a specialized COVID-19 instrument to support the release of aid. In late May proposals for a large-scale recovery plan for Europe were put forward by the Commission. A €750,000m. temporary

recovery instrument, **Next Generation EU**, was proposed. Next Generation EU, in conjunction with agreement on a strengthened **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2021–27 to support the creation of a so-called Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), was to provide funding to be distributed by means of grants and loans. This would facilitate the provision of significant financial support for public investment and reforms to increase the resilience of EU economies, and to develop preparedness for future economic and social challenges. The RRF gives the EU unprecedented borrowing and spending powers to support the countries most affected by COVID-19. In reality, the RPF gives a more significant role to EU institutions in the management of member states' macroeconomic affairs.

Meanwhile, it was envisaged that REACT EU would provide targeted crisis response and recovery measures by supplementing proposed cohesion funding for 2021–27, through the provision of some €55,000m. In addition, the Commission proposed increased funding for the so-called Just Transition Mechanism (a €100,000m. fund suggested in January 2020 as part of the environment-orientated **European Green Deal** Investment Plan) and the **European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development**. Other measures were put forward to stimulate the economy by facilitating investment through the establishment of a Solvency Support Instrument, an expansion of the **InvestEU** facility and the introduction of a new Strategic Investment Facility. EU leaders reached agreement on the financing of the EU recovery fund on 21 July. The **European Parliament** and the Council reached political agreement on Next Generation EU in November; it was adopted in mid-December. In February 2021 the Council adopted a regulation establishing the RRF.

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU) was on the European Communities (EC) agenda from 1969, when the **Six** agreed to the principle at the **Hague summit** in the **Netherlands** and set 1980 as the completion date for full EMU. The **Werner Report** of 1970 established a timetable for the programme. The plans for EMU were effectively destroyed by the severe decline and general turmoil in the international economic climate of the 1970s. The member states became more introspective in their economic policies, and the idea of EMU by the end of the decade was abandoned. All that survived was the **European Monetary Co-operation Fund**. The **European Monetary System**, launched in 1979, was not a replacement for EMU, though it did constitute a step in that direction. The next step towards EMU was precipitated by the plans for a single market that comprised the substance of the **Single European Act**. Although this treaty did not describe EMU as an immediate objective it did refer to the idea in the preamble to the treaty, which Jacques Delors pushed forward and presented to the Hanover meeting of the **European Council** in June 1988. The European Council agreed to

establish a committee, chaired by Delors, to examine the idea and benefits of realizing EMU.

EMU was revived formally in June 1989, when the European Council accepted the proposals of the **Delors Plan**, which envisaged a three-stage movement towards the goal, with the first stage, the involvement of all member states in the **exchange rate mechanism** (ERM), to begin in July 1990. In Rome (**Italy**) in October 1990 the Council endorsed January 1994 as the beginning of the second stage of a more intensive economic and monetary co-ordination in anticipation of the creation of a **European Central Bank** (ECB) and single currency. An **intergovernmental conference** of EC finance ministers began in December 1990. Its deliberations were synchronous with those on closer political integration, and EMU became therefore a major theme of the **Maastricht summit** and the consequent **Treaty on European Union**. The Treaty provisions relating to EMU broadly followed the outline of the Delors Plan, confirming January 1994 as the date for commencement of closer co-ordination, and preparing for the establishment of a **European Monetary Institute**, which would assume some responsibility from the **Council of the European Union** for monitoring how national policies and budget deficits were conforming to guidelines. The final stage of EMU was set for January 1999, with a **European System of Central Banks** along with the ECB, and with the **European Currency Unit** (ECU) initially intended to become the single currency of the European Union (EU); however, it was decided in 1995 that the new single currency would be the **euro**, which was to replace the ECU on a one-for-one basis.

Participation in the third stage depended upon individual member states meeting the following **convergence criteria**: a high degree of price stability measured by an inflation rate no higher than 1.5% above the average of that of the three best performing member states; a budget deficit no greater than 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and a governmental debt no greater than 60% of GDP; staying within the permissible fluctuation limits of the ERM for at least two years without any realignment or devaluation; and interest rates no more than 2% higher than the three best-performing member states in terms of price stability. However, it was agreed that EMU would begin in 1999 regardless of how many states had met the criteria. Economic and monetary conditions in the 1990s threatened the achievement of EMU. Turmoil and speculation on the money markets in 1992 and 1993 put the ERM under extreme pressure, revealing that the EMU plans and the ERM took little account of the real strength of national currencies.

The **United Kingdom** and **Italy** were forced to leave the ERM, and many other countries' currencies were devalued. The ERM survived only by extending the permissible fluctuation limits to such an extent that what resulted was almost a system of floating currencies. Equally important was the recession in Western Europe. The economic difficulties were such that by 1994 very few states met the convergence criteria. However, a much less strict interpretation of the criteria was eventually applied, and in 1998 it was

declared that, of those member states that wished to be part of EMU, only **Greece** had failed to meet the criteria. **Denmark**, **Sweden** and the UK had already decided not to join in the venture, which was launched in January 1999 after the inauguration of the ECB and the launch of the euro. Greece joined the initial 11 member states in 2001, leaving only Denmark, Sweden and the UK outside the **eurozone**. Full EMU for participating states took place in 2002, when national notes and coins were replaced by the euro. **Ireland** was the first EU member state successfully to replace its former national currency, in early February 2002. As regards the states that joined the EU on 1 May 2004, after accession **Slovenia's** application was successful and the country became the 13th to adopt the euro, on 1 January 2007. **Malta** and **Cyprus** both adopted the euro on 1 January 2008. **Slovakia** joined the eurozone on 1 January 2009 and **Estonia** adopted the euro on 1 January 2011. **Latvia** adopted the euro in January 2014, and **Lithuania** became the 19th EU member state to adopt the euro in January 2015.

The 10th anniversary of the launch of EMU in 2009 seemed an occasion for modest self-congratulation on the part of the EU. The euro had been introduced, the ECB had established its credibility as a force for monetary stability, and EMU was attracting new members. However, the concurrent economic and financial crisis laid bare a number of important structural weaknesses, notably the absence of EU-level tools for effective economic governance, and the unavoidable fact that in the eurozone some member states were running excessive deficits. The euro constituted only a monetary union and not an economic union. The euro had functioned well in the boom years, but deteriorating economic circumstances tested its stability and durability in 2010. Greece became the focal point. As the economic situation in Greece worsened in early 2010, the Greek Government introduced an austerity programme, which was greeted with public opposition. The German Government sought to maintain the stability of the euro by co-ordinating substantial loans to Greece, but did not dispel the doubts of its critics about the longer-term prospects for the euro and particularly the future of certain states within the eurozone. Ensuing problems in **Ireland**, **Portugal** and **Spain**, by early 2012, intensified criticism of the euro regarding its suitability and desirability for all current participant states. A banking crisis in Cyprus in early 2013 once again raised issues about the euro, but disaster was averted when European leaders, the International Monetary Fund and the ECB agreed to grant the country bailout funding of €10,000m. to help ease its difficulties. Overall, however, stability subsequently increased within the euro system. Nevertheless, the election of a new, far-left Government in Greece in early 2015 led to new fears of instability, and negotiations on the terms of Greece's bailout programme with the EU took place throughout the first half of the year, culminating in August in political agreement on new lending arrangements. Meanwhile, in an effort to prevent further instability in the European banking sector and to avoid any repetition of events and future public bailouts, the European Commission moved towards a **banking union** within the

eurozone. The main components of the banking union are the **single rule-book**, the **single supervisory mechanism** and the **single resolution mechanism**. These mechanisms, designed to strengthen EMU, were approved, and in late 2014 the ECB became responsible for the supervision of Europe's largest banks.

In mid-2015 the Presidents of the **European Commission**, the European Council, the **European Parliament**, the informal **Eurogroup** of eurozone ministers of finance and the ECB published a report on completing EMU (known as the 'Five Presidents' Report'). The report comprised a planned programme of reform to secure the objective of full economic, financial, fiscal and political union, in three stages, by 2025. At the beginning of July 2015 the Commission launched Stage 1 ('deepening by doing') of the process of completing EMU. In November the Commission proposed the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which, it was envisaged, would serve as the third 'pillar' of the banking union by means of a three-stage process: the introduction of a reinsurance scheme over a period of three years, a subsequent four-year co-insurance scheme and, finally, full insurance. The Commission also published a communication, 'Towards the completion of the Banking Union', which proposed improved economic governance, together with the creation of national Competitiveness Boards and a European Fiscal Board, in an advisory role, as well as a more integrated external representation of the eurozone at international financial institutions, in particular the IMF. In March 2017 the leaders of the EU member states and of the principal EU institutions signed the Rome Declaration, in the Italian capital, committing themselves to the completion of EMU. In December 2019 the eurozone heads of state and of government endorsed plans to reform the **European Stability Mechanism**.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: See **European Economic and Social Committee**

The **ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (ECE)** is a regional agency of the **United Nations** established in 1947. Until the formation of the **Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe**, it was the only European body that allowed the states of both Eastern and Western Europe an opportunity to meet on a regular basis. It concerned itself primarily with the exchange of information and development of ideas in non-contentious areas, especially relating to environmental problems.

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (EPAs) have been concluded by the European Union (EU) with a number of **African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)** countries and regions. This followed the **World Trade Organization's (WTO)** ruling that the 2000 **Cotonou Agreement**

contravened its rules. The bilateral agreements, the first of which were concluded in 2007, provide for the liberalization of trade and were designed to support regional integration among ACP countries and foster their 'smooth and gradual integration ... into the world economy, particularly by helping create larger ACP regional markets, thereby contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction'. EPAs were expected to be extended to cover service sector liberalization and rules governing foreign direct investment. Critics of EPAs contend that the requirement for reciprocal trade liberalization damaged the economic development of the ACP countries and that, in its haste to conclude the agreements by the WTO deadline of 31 January 2007, the EU did little to ensure that they promoted regional integration, particularly in Africa. EPAs were intended to be negotiated regionally for West Africa; Central Africa; Eastern and Southern Africa; the East African Community; the South African Development Community Group; the Caribbean; and the Pacific.

The EU states that EPAs help to support the implementation of an Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, which was initiated in September 2018, and that they are also important tools in the economic and trade elements of the EU's **Comprehensive Strategy with Africa**; EPAs also contribute to the African Continental Free Trade Area. By mid-2021 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were implementing an EPA.

ECOSOC: See **European Economic and Social Committee**

ECSAS: See **European Community Studies Associations**

ECSC: See **European Coal and Steel Community**

ECTC: See **European Counter Terrorism Centre**

ECTS stands for the European Communities course credit transfer system, established as part of the European Community action scheme for the mobility of university students (**Erasmus**).

ECU is the acronym used to refer to the European Currency Unit. The ECU was introduced in 1979 as a central element of the **European Monetary System** (EMS), as a common artificial currency unit supporting the **exchange rate mechanism** (ERM) of the EMS. It replaced the **European Unit of Account** (EUA). Although not all the member states participated in the ERM, all subscribed to the ECU. Its value was based upon a weighted 'basket' of currencies. Each currency received a different weighting in the basket, with the allocation of weights being subject to regular review. The weights (in

percentages) for each national currency were frozen as follows in November 1993 under the terms of the **Treaty on European Union (TEU)**: **Germany** 32.0; **France** 20.4; the **United Kingdom** 11.2; the **Netherlands** 10.0; **Italy** 8.5; **Belgium** 8.2; **Spain** 4.5; **Denmark** 2.7; **Ireland** 1.1; **Portugal** 0.7; **Greece** 0.5; **Luxembourg** 0.3. (The currencies of **Austria**, **Finland** and **Sweden** were not represented.) The US dollar was used as a reference point. The specified amounts of the national currencies were converted into dollars, and added together to give the value of the ECU, which could then be translated back into national currencies and used for transactions. The central rate of the ECU was used to calculate bilateral central rates for each pair of European Union (EU) currencies. The **European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF)** supported the ECU. The EMCF was established as a reserve fund into which the countries participating in the basket had to place 20% of both their gold and dollar reserves. It established itself as an accepted currency in international money markets, widely used in international Eurobond issues, as well as in commercial transactions, loans, bank deposits and cheques. Internally, it became a book-keeping device. It was also originally conceived to evolve into the single currency of the EU once full **economic and monetary union (EMU)** was established. This was confirmed by the TEU, which set completion of the third and final stage of EMU for 1997–99, at which point the ECU would replace the national currencies of participating member states. However, at a **European Council** meeting in Dublin, Ireland, in 1995, it was decided that the ECU would be replaced by the **euro** on 1 January 1999 on a one-for-one basis. The euro became the new currency unit within the newly established **eurozone**, and replaced the national currencies of the 11 member states participating in EMU at that stage.

ED: European Democratic Group. See **Group of the European People's Party**

EDA: See **European Defence Agency**

EDC: See **European Defence Community**

EDCs: See **European Documentation Centres**

EDD: See **Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities**

EDF: See **European Development Fund**

EDINBURGH SUMMIT

The **EDINBURGH SUMMIT** of the **European Council** in 1992 took place in the Scottish city of Edinburgh, the **United Kingdom**, in the aftermath of the Danish electorate's rejection of the **Treaty on European Union**. It saw the **European Council** agree on a number of exemptions, or **opt-outs**, for **Denmark** as well as issuing a statement that sought to clarify the principle of **subsidiarity** and emphasize the European Union's commitment to **transparency** and greater **openness**.

The **EDUCATION, AUDIOVISUAL AND CULTURE EXECUTIVE AGENCY** (EACEA) was established in January 2006. It is based in **Brussels** and seeks to co-ordinate and implement existing EU-funded programmes in the areas of education and training, citizenship and youth policy, as well as schemes that focus on audiovisual and cultural themes. Although it possesses its own legal identity, the EACEA reports directly to the **European Commission**. The EACEA is particularly charged with managing funding opportunities and networks in the fields of education and training.

EDUCATION INFORMATION NETWORK IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: See **EURYDICE**

EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND YOUTH POLICY was originally largely excluded from the **Treaty of Rome**, other than in a reference to the reciprocal recognition by the member states of diplomas, professional qualifications and vocational training. The European Communities long accepted that national traditions and practices in education were both important and too complex or sensitive to be easily standardized. Initiatives to foster member state co-operation on educational matters began to materialize in the 1970s in a series of non-binding **resolutions**. The **Single European Act** emphasized the need for a European dimension in this area. This manifested itself in a 1988 resolution urging all member states to integrate the European dimension into the school curriculum. Education was first recognized as a policy competence when Articles 149 and 150 were inserted into the Treaty of Rome by the **Treaty on European Union**. These—now Articles 165–166 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**—spoke of 'the development of quality education by encouraging co-operation ... with a view to developing the European dimension in education' and envisaged, for example, the teaching of member state **languages** in other European Union (EU) states, plans to encourage greater mobility of students and teachers, and efforts to develop educational exchanges and establish distance-learning programmes.

The **Treaty of Amsterdam** altered nothing substantial, but did determine that measures relating to education and vocational training were to be adopted under **co-decision procedures**. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon did not change

the provisions on the role of the EU in education and training at all. Education policy in the EU continues to confine itself to stressing the need for closer collaboration and mutual understanding, and continues to take the form of **recommendations** to member states, rather than binding **legislation**. States have been urged to improve training opportunities for, and the cultural integration of, migrant workers; to co-operate in higher education; and to improve the quality and extent of the teaching of EU languages. The few **directives** that have been issued relate to **freedom of movement** in jobs and professions. Three main education and vocational training programmes were introduced in 1985: Socrates, to encourage student mobility; Leonardo (da Vinci), to promote access to vocational training and lifelong learning, training exchanges and cross-border projects, and to foster innovation and entrepreneurship, improve the quality of training and make it easier to obtain and use vocational training and skills in other European countries; and Youth for Europe, which aimed to facilitate the mobility of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. In addition, the Tempus programme, launched in 1990, encouraged exchanges in higher education between the EU and the states of **Central and Eastern Europe**. The Tempus programme was extended in 2004 to enable students from around the world (the so-called Tempus Mundus) to study in the EU. These programmes were open to people of all ages because lifelong learning and building a Europe of knowledge know no age barriers. In addition, under the Socrates programme, more than 10,000 schools benefited each year from Lingua, to promote the learning of languages, particularly lesser-used languages, and Minerva, to apply new technologies in education.

The oldest and probably the most well-known sub-programme established under the Socrates umbrella was **Erasmus**. It devoted more than €100m. annually to grants for students and teachers to spend time at higher education establishments in other European countries. Some 4,000 institutions in 33 countries were involved in the programme. By 2007, more than 2.2m. students had been able to study in another country. From 2007 Erasmus and Leonardo were incorporated into the new Lifelong Learning Programme 2007–13, which replaced the Socrates and eLearning programmes (which expired at the end of 2006). (See also **European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training; European schools; European University Institute**.) Other sub-programmes within the Lifelong Learning Programme included Grundtvig, for adult learners and their teachers, to develop European teaching materials and networks and short teaching exchanges, the **Jean Monnet** Programme, which supported institutions and actions in favour of European integration, and Comenius, for schools and their teachers. The Lifelong Learning Programme remained the flagship policy in the education field and offered opportunities for a wide range of educational programmes for people from early childhood until old age. It provided €7,000m. in funding over its duration. From 2014 the **European Commission's** priorities within the field of education and vocational training were encapsulated in the new

Erasmus+ programme, which ran until 2020. The overall programme was allocated a budget of €14,774m. for 2014–20 and sought to enable some 5m. EU citizens to experience training, youth educational schemes and educational provision in other states. Erasmus+ has been renewed for 2021–27.

The Commission's activities in education and training are designed to improve the quality of learning systems across the EU and to provide greater opportunities for people. The Commission co-operates with member states to improve policies and exchange best practices and continues to fund a range of education-based programmes. Co-operation between the Commission and the national authorities in the education and training arena intensified following the European Council's adoption of the **Lisbon agenda** in 2000. Indeed, as part of this strategy the Commission launched the 'Education and Training 2010' programme in 2002. This programme led to a number of initiatives to support lifelong learning and included the European Qualifications Framework (EQF), which is essentially a framework of main competences that every EU citizen should possess in today's knowledge society.

The Education and Training 2010 programme also supported the Bologna Process and greater co-operation and coherence in the provision of university education and the creation of a European Higher Education Area. Even more importantly, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology was established in an effort to foster greater cross-European research and education. It is seen as a European counterpart to the world-renowned Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The successor programme to Education and Training 2010 was formally approved in 2009, as the framework structure 'Education and Training 2020', with the primary objectives of providing lifelong learning, better-quality education and the provision of basic skills such as literacy and numeracy, and improving the appeal of mathematics, science and technology; fostering social cohesion, active citizenship, and the development of job-specific skills throughout citizens' lifetimes; and supporting creativity, innovation, digital competence and entrepreneurship.

In November 2017 the Commission presented proposals for the creation of a European Education Area (EEA) by 2025. It also sought to complement member states' individual education and culture policy through an increased focus on EU culture. The EEA was to be built, *inter alia*, upon the concepts of mobility for all, expanding upon the principles of initiatives such as Erasmus+; and the mutual recognition of academic diplomas and school leaving certificates, together with the new, so-called Sorbonne process, which would build on the Bologna process to improve language skills, with a new target for school-leavers to have a working knowledge of two languages in addition to their native language. As part of a European Agenda for Culture, in November 2018 a Work Plan for Culture in 2019–22 was adopted. The Work Plan identified five priorities for cultural co-operation: sustainability; cohesion and well-being; supporting artists, cultural and creative professionals and European content; gender equality; and international cultural relations. In September

2020 the Commission published a new communication, which established guidelines for achieving the EEA as scheduled.

EEA: See **European Economic Area**

EEA: See **European Environment Agency**

EEAS: See **European External Action Service**

EEC: See **European Economic Community**

EEIG: See **European Economic Interest Grouping**

EESC: See **European Economic and Social Committee**

EFA: See **European Free Alliance**

EFDA: See **European Fusion Development Agreement**

EFDD: See **Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy** group

EFSD: See **European Financial Stability Facility**

EFSD: See **European Financial Stabilization Mechanism**

EFTA: See **European Free Trade Association**

The **EHIC**, or European health insurance card, replaced the E111 form from January 2006, and entitles its holders to reduced-cost, or sometimes free, medical treatment should it become necessary when they are staying in another EU member state, a member of the **European Economic Area** (EEA—**Iceland**, **Liechtenstein** and **Norway**) or **Switzerland**. The EHIC is normally valid for three to five years. The card provides access to state-provided medical treatment only, and specifically does not cover those who are intent on travelling to one of the states listed above solely for the purpose of receiving medical treatment.

EIB: See **European Investment Bank**

EIF

EIF: See **European Investment Fund**

EIGE: See **European Institute for Gender Equality**

EINECS: See **European Inventory of Existing Chemical Substances**

EIS: See **Schengen Information System**

EJN: See **European Judicial Network in Criminal Matters**

ELDR: See **Group of the European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party**

ELECTIONS: See **Direct Elections**

ELECTRICITY has been considered by the European Union (EU) in the context of its overall **energy policy**. The first programme concerning electricity was drawn up by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) in 1974, and updated in 1980 and 1986. The 1986 review defined objectives for the period up to 1995. It urged continuation of the policy of reducing the reliance of electricity generation on petroleum, which was to constitute less than 15% of total electricity generation by 1995. It further suggested that by 1995 some 40% of electricity generation should be nuclear-based, rising to 50% by 2000. Owing to subsequent concerns about the safety and costs of nuclear energy, these projections became less realistic.

Electricity policy forms a core element of the EU's pursuit of a **single market** for energy. In the case of electricity, its objective is to ensure the free movement of electricity while improving security of supply and the **competitiveness** of this particular sector. In 1997 a **directive** (96/92/EC) concerning common rules for the single market in electricity came into force. In June 2002 the European Council confirmed amended target dates for the complete two-stage liberalization of the markets: opening up by July 2004 for non-domestic users and by July 2007 for domestic users. The European Regulators Group for electricity and gas (ERGEG) was established in November 2003 to act as an advisory group of independent national regulatory authorities to assist the **European Commission** in consolidating the single market for electricity and gas. In early 2006 the ERGEG launched a regional initiative, which created three gas and seven electricity zones within the EU. The initiative focused on removing barriers to market integration at a regional level, in order to facilitate the creation of a single competitive market. In 2011 ERGEG was

superseded by the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators (ACER), based in Ljubljana, **Slovenia**.

In October 2005 the EU signed a treaty establishing an Energy Community, which entered into force in July 2006 and extended the EU's internal energy market to South-Eastern Europe and further afield (contracting parties to the treaty comprise **Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia** and **Ukraine**). Armenia, Georgia, **Norway** and **Turkey** have been admitted as observers. The treaty, which aimed to facilitate the creation of an integrated pan-European market for electricity and gas, required the signatories to adopt EU energy regulations. The treaty provided for the liberalization of electricity and gas markets within participating countries by 2008 for non-domestic users, and by 2015 for domestic users. The World Bank estimated that this extension of the single European market for electricity and gas would lead to investment of €21,000m. in energy infrastructure in South-Eastern Europe over 15 years.

In June 2009 the Council formally adopted a new liberalization agreement for the EU's gas and electricity markets, the Third Energy Package (the Second Energy Package had been agreed in 2003), which entered into force in March 2011 and which established common rules for the single market in gas and electricity; included regulations on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks and the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity; and provided for the establishment of ACER.

In February 2015 the Commission adopted a strategy paper on the so-called Energy Union, which included plans to overhaul the electricity market, and to this end a Consultation was launched in July. In November 2018 the Commission published 'A Clean Planet for All', a new strategy for the development of a climate-neutral economy by 2050. With regard to the electricity market, an interconnection target of 15% by 2030 was introduced (compared with 10% by 2020). See also **European Green Deal**.

ÉLYSÉE TREATY: See **Treaty of Friendship**

EMA: See **European Medicines Agency**

EMAS: See **Eco-Management and Audit Scheme**

EMCDDA: See **European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction**

EMCF: See **European Monetary Co-operation Fund**

EMEA: See **Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area**

EMEP

EMEP is the acronym of a co-operative programme set up in 1986 to monitor and evaluate the transmission of air pollutants over long distances.

EMFTA: See **Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area**

EMI: See **European Monetary Institute**

The **EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME** or (ETS) was the first, and remains the largest, emissions trading scheme worldwide. The ETS commenced in 2005 and formed an integral aspect of European Union (EU) environmental and climate change policy. It covers more than 11,000 factories and power stations across all EU member states (and also **Iceland, Liechtenstein** and **Norway**). The installations that are regulated by the ETS are together responsible for some 40% of the EU's total emissions of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases. The ETS has been organized into distinct time phases. The first ran from 2005–07, and the second (2008–12) coincided with the commitments agreed at Kyoto (Japan). The third trading period started in January 2013 and continued until 2020. This period (during which the EU sought to achieve a 21% reduction in greenhouse gases) introduced significant changes. Notably, an EU-wide cap on emissions replaced the national targets hitherto in place. Auctioning (as opposed to free allocation), became the default method for the allocation of allowances; by 2013 over 40% of allowances were auctioned, and this proportion increased annually. In order to deal with a surplus of emission allowances, which had accumulated in the ETS since 2009 (principally owing to an unanticipated reduction in emissions during the economic crisis, together with imports of international credits), various measures were introduced. In January 2019, as a long-term solution, a new market stability reserve commenced operations in an effort to improve the resilience of the ETS to significant shocks by allowing excess allowances to be transferred to the reserve, thereby amending the supply of allowances for auction.

As part of the **European Green Deal**, a revised EU ETS Directive applies during the fourth phase of the ETS, in 2021–30, in order to achieve by 2030 the EU's overall reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions; areas of industry covered by the ETS were required to reduce emissions by 43%, in comparison with 2005 levels.

EMP: See **Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

EMPLOYMENT was the focus of a **title** inserted into the **Treaty of Rome** (Articles 125–130—now Articles 145–150 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**) by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. The promotion of

employment ranks as one of the European Union's objectives and as a matter of common concern. Member states are encouraged to co-ordinate their employment strategies in moves to combat high unemployment, although there are no plans for a common employment policy. Under the terms of the Treaty, the **European Council** conducts an annual review of the state of employment, and the **Council of the European Union** plays a more active role in employment affairs by encouraging the exchange of information in this field between member states. This objective was reinforced at the **Luxembourg** jobs summit, an extraordinary European Council meeting convened in November 1997 where it was decided to develop a **European Employment Strategy** built on thematic priorities. Every year member states draw up national action plans for employment, which are assessed by the Council of the European Union and the **European Commission** prior to the publication of a joint employment report. An **Employment Committee** was established to oversee the co-ordination of the employment strategies of the member states.

The European Commission has its own specific **Directorate-General** (DG) for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion that seeks to stimulate more and better jobs, secure better working conditions and promote social inclusion and non-discrimination and equality between men and women. This DG works closely with national authorities, social partners and other relevant actors, and addresses the challenges that confront the working environment, such as the impact of recession and an ageing population. (See also **Disability Policy**; **Social Policy**.) In April 2012, amid high rates of unemployment throughout the EU, the Commission launched a new Employment Package. In December of the same year a Youth Employment Package was announced for 2014–20. Given the substantial and adverse economic impact of the **COVID-19** crisis from early 2020 (which resulted in a contraction of the **eurozone** economy by some 6% in 2020), an increased risk of unemployment was anticipated. As well as the package of support measures introduced by **Next Generation EU**, in May 2020 the EU introduced the Instrument for Temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE), to provide funding to member states of up to €100,000m., covering some of the costs involved in national short-time work schemes until 31 December 2022 by issuing social bonds (and with the possibility of extension). By March 2021 some €75,500m. had been disbursed to a total of 17 member states.

The **EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE** (EMCO) was established in 2000 by a decision of the **Council of the European Union**, under Article 150 of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The EMCO functions as the main advisory committee for ministers responsible for employment and social affairs, and works within the policy framework of the European Employment Strategy. It comprises two sub-groups: the policy analysis group, which provides evidence-based advice to strengthen the EMCO's work and discussions, and the indicators group,

EMPTY CHAIR CRISIS

which undertakes technical work relating to the indicators used to monitor EU strategy on employment.

EMPTY CHAIR CRISIS refers to the period of seven months after June 1965, when **France** boycotted meetings of the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) and the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** (COREPER), although it continued to send junior representatives to some sessions in order for minor routine business to be carried out. This effectively paralysed the European Communities (EC). The French protest was over the EC timetable for the increased use of **qualified majority voting** in the Council of Ministers after January 1966 and over a collection of proposals from the **European Commission**. These included the finalization of the financial regulations for the **common agricultural policy** (of which France was in favour), as well as more powers for the **European Parliament**—especially in relation to the **budget**—and an independent source of **revenue** for the Commission (both of which proposals France opposed). The crisis was resolved by a compromise, which was largely to France's advantage. The most important element of the resolution was the **Luxembourg Compromise**, which, although maintaining the principle of majority voting, extended to member states the right to use a veto in the Council of Ministers if they believed that their national interests were being compromised. This agreement among the **Six** undermined the prestige of the Commission and impaired the EC's political development for nearly 20 years, until the **Single European Act**.

EMS: See **European Monetary System**

EMSA: See **European Maritime Safety Agency**

EMU: See **Economic and Monetary Union**

ENERGY POLICY has been a rather problematic area for the European Communities (EC), as it touches on sensitive national concerns. Two of the initial Communities (the **European Coal and Steel Community** and the **European Atomic Energy Community**) dealt with energy. A first attempt at co-ordinating member states' energy policy (to secure fair competition, low process and freedom of choice for the consumer) occurred in a **protocol** on Energy in 1964, but progress was limited. A further, unsuccessful effort was made in 1968. The difficulties were revealed by the different national responses to the petroleum crisis of 1973. In 1974 a **European Commission** energy programme was accepted by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) and subsequently served as the basis for discussions on

energy policy. It was revised in 1980, and again in 1986. The original priority was to reduce dependence on petroleum, especially on supplies from politically volatile regions. Within 10 years, petroleum imports had been reduced by one-half, owing to increased efficiency, the successful exploitation of North Sea petroleum and a diversification of energy sources.

The 1986 revision of energy policy set priority targets until 1995. As far as the supply and use of energy were concerned, it urged that petroleum imports be held at a level below one-third of total EC energy consumption, with greater reliance upon **coal** and nuclear energy, the latter to supply 40% of EC needs by 1995. The programme confirmed the importance of maintaining a contingency supply of fuel reserves equal to 30 days' consumption at power stations (and 90 days' consumption in the case of petroleum stocks), and of increased flexibility and co-operation between the member states.

There were potential conflicts between energy needs and environmental protection, and a growing objection to nuclear power. In the 1990s there were three major aspects to energy policy. First, as a consequence of the **internal market**, there was a new emphasis upon a single energy market. This would entail liberalization of gas and electricity markets by removing the dominance of state monopolies by 2000. The European Commission issued several **directives**: on price **transparency**, the transit of energy and the development of energy infrastructures. The EC also took the lead in the establishment in 1991 of a **European Energy Charter** linking Western with Eastern Europe. Later, in 1996, the Commission would establish as part of its **Mediterranean policy** a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum to assist in the development of co-operation projects. Finally, the Commission linked the development of energy more closely with **environmental policy**. The major symbol of this commitment was the proposal for a **carbon tax**.

Given its potential importance, it is surprising that only limited reference was made to energy in the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU): it referred only to the existence of EC powers in the area of energy and the need for the development of European energy infrastructures. Moreover, although it was agreed that the possibility of incorporating energy into the treaty basis of the EU would be reviewed by an **intergovernmental conference** at the end of 1996 considering possible revisions of the Treaty, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** went no further than the TEU. In 1995 the European Commission published a **White Paper** on energy policy, prioritizing security of supply and improved **competitiveness** of European businesses, and emphasizing environmental constraints. Following this, in 1997 the Commission proposed a framework programme for the energy sector, which, following approval by the Council of the European Union in December 1998, covered the period 1998–2002. The objective of this programme was to guarantee the coherence and efficiency of EC energy policy by bringing together all ongoing energy actions and programmes across all EC policies. The Commission was charged with reviewing the **implementation** of this framework on an annual basis. In November 2000 the Commission launched a **Green Paper** on the security of energy

supply. This aimed to ensure a supply of energy to consumers at reasonable prices while maintaining the competitiveness of the sector and respecting both the environment and sustainable development. It resulted in the Intelligent Energy—Europe initiative.

Money was allocated for energy research in the EU's Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (2002–06). The Lisbon **summit meeting** of the **European Council** in March 2000 urged the creation of a genuine single market for energy, and in March 2001 the Commission responded by adopting a series of measures to open up the gas and **electricity** markets completely by the end of 2005. In the past, national gas and electricity markets were separate 'islands' within the EU, where supply and distribution were controlled by monopolies. To facilitate further developments the Commission established two new consultative bodies: the Electricity Regulatory Forum of Florence and the Gas Regulatory Forum of Madrid. In September 2002 the Commission, increasingly aware of the EU's heavy reliance and dependence on external supplies of petroleum and gas, adopted two directive proposals that were designed to maintain the security of EU energy sources at affordable prices. By 2004 all businesses were free to choose their own suppliers of gas and electricity, and consumers followed suit by 2007. For their part, all suppliers received guarantees under single energy market rules that they could have access to the distribution grid and pipeline networks of other EU countries and that they would pay a fair price for access. Energy policy has often provoked controversy at the EU level. Nevertheless, the dependence of many EU states on foreign-owned energy sources is undeniable. The dangers of such dependency were apparent when the Russian Federation threatened to suspend all gas supplies to **Ukraine** in January 2006 and thereby disrupt gas supplies to Western Europe via Ukraine.

The **Twenty-Five** relied on imports for 50.5% of their energy needs. The figures relating to oil and gas requirements were higher, at 80.2% and 54.5%, respectively. The European Council recognized the rather grim realities of the situation when it settled on an action plan for energy policy in March 2007. This programme ran from 2007 and sought to improve energy efficiency and save up to 20% of energy consumption by 2020. It simultaneously wanted to increase the amount of renewable energy and raise the share of biofuels.

In November 2010 the Commission adopted the communication 'Energy 2020: a strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy'. This strategy sought to define the energy challenges for Europe over the next decade and to determine how best to meet these challenges. This communication was followed by the first ever special European Council summit on energy, which took place in February 2011. The summit made clear an intention to promote investment in renewable energy, and sustainable low-carbon technologies; to accelerate the full liberalization of energy markets, in order to bring them into accordance with EU law; to improve adherence to the 2020 energy-efficiency target of 20% (which aimed to reduce the use of greenhouse gases by 20%, to increase the proportion of renewable energy used to 20%, and to improve

overall energy efficiency by 20% by 2020); and to investigate the potential extraction and use of unconventional fossil fuel sources, such as shale gas and oil shale, favoured, in particular, by **Poland**.

In March 2013 the European Commission adopted a Green Paper on a ‘2030 framework for climate and energy policies’. This framework aimed to build on earlier programmes and aspired to a competitive, low-carbon economy by 2050. The new framework raised a number of issues, such as the type, nature and level of climate and energy targets; and how energy systems could be used to facilitate EU competitiveness. In October 2014 EU member states agreed on the final ‘2030 framework for climate and energy’, which included EU-wide targets and policy objectives for the period 2020–30, in order to help the EU to achieve a more competitive, secure and sustainable energy system, and to meet its long-term greenhouse gas reductions target for 2050. A principal pillar of this was ‘decarbonization’—the shift from traditional fuel sources, such as coal, oil and gas, towards low-carbon technologies. Targets for the EU for 2030 included a 40% cut in greenhouse gas emissions compared with 1990 levels; renewable energy consumption to increase to at least 27% of total energy consumption by 2030; and energy savings of at least 27% by 2030, compared with the level of usage recorded in 2014. Policies for 2030 proposed by the Commission included a reformed **emissions trading scheme**; new indicators for the competitiveness and security of the energy system, such as price differences with major trading partners; diversification of supply; and increased interconnection capacity between EU member states.

The crisis in Ukraine from early 2014 again focused attention on Europe’s overdependence on Russian energy supplies. In May the Commission announced a new Energy Security Strategy, and in February 2015 the Commission adopted a strategy paper on the so-called Energy Union, which sought to reduce dependence on single suppliers and, through increased transparency, facilitate agreements with non-EU countries. It also sought to promote an environmentally sustainable, low-carbon economy; and to improve competitiveness and energy efficiency, with increased liberalization. In June 2018 the Commission, the **European Parliament** and the Council reached political agreement on the governance of the Energy Union. According to the Commission’s fourth report on the State of the Energy Union, adopted in April 2019, the EU had delivered its concept of an Energy Union strategy to ensure that reasonably priced, stable, competitive and environmentally sustainable energy was available throughout Europe.

In November 2018 the Commission published ‘A Clean Planet for All’ as a long-term strategy for the creation of a climate-neutral economy by 2050. The new strategy was agreed prior to the 24th UN Climate Change Conference (Conference of the Parties) held in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018. Energy targets for implementation by 2030 were revised, and a binding renewable energy target of at least 32% was introduced, together with an energy efficiency target of at least 32.5%, subject to possible revision upwards in 2023. In December 2019 as part of the **European Green Deal**, the EU

ENERGY TAX

confirmed plans to achieve ‘climate neutrality’ by 2050, through the creation of an economy with net zero greenhouse gas emissions. In mid-2020 the Commission adopted new strategies for both the integration of energy systems and investment in clean hydrogen technologies. It was planned that the contribution of renewable hydrogen to EU energy production would increase from less than 2% in 2018 to 13%–14% by 2050. In September 2020 the Commission published a communication on its ambitions for climate neutrality, confirming an emissions reduction target of 55% by 2030.

ENERGY TAX: See **Carbon Tax**

ENGRENAGE is a term that comes from a French expression meaning ‘getting caught up in the gears’. It relates closely to the ‘**Monnet method**’ of integration, whereby individuals, governments, **interest groups** and European Union institutions, having embarked on a particular course of action, find themselves compelled to take additional measures that deepen European integration.

ENHANCED CO-OPERATION was substantially overhauled at the **intergovernmental conference** convened in Nice, **France**, in December 2000, specifically by listing in a single provision the 10 conditions necessary to establish enhanced co-operation. Although the essential characteristics of this instrument (whereby enhanced co-operation should only be taken as a measure of last resort) were not changed significantly, there were some notable alterations. For example, the minimum number of member states required to establish enhanced co-operation was designated as eight, rather than a majority, thus facilitating use of enhanced co-operation on the **enlargement** of the European Union (EU).

In pillar I (the European Communities) and in pillar III (**police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**) the possibility of opposing enhanced co-operation (by employing a veto) was removed. With regard to pillar II on the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP), the deliberations in Nice made it possible to establish enhanced co-operation for the implementation of joint action or a common position, except for matters pertaining to defence. Authorization for enhanced co-operation rests with the **Council of the European Union**, and the Council is to decide by **qualified majority voting** (QMV). Member states are entitled to ask the Council to adopt a decision by unanimity if they are convinced that an issue is of particular importance. When enhanced co-operation concerns an area determined by the **co-decision procedure**, the consent of the **European Parliament** is required. With the **ratification** of the **Treaty of Lisbon** there have been a number of significant changes concerning enhanced co-operation (that were originally contained in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**).

First, the minimum number of states needed for enhanced co-operation has changed, from eight to one-third of the total membership (nine). Second, the launching of enhanced co-operation no longer requires unanimity, but QMV. The exception here is in relation to the CFSP, where unanimity is still necessary. And third, in those policy areas where the Council acts by unanimity, member states participating in enhanced co-operation are now able to use QMV and to introduce co-decision when adopting measures other than those that have either military or defence implications. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon provided for a further form of enhanced co-operation—**permanent structured co-operation**—under the **Common Security and Defence Policy**.

Enhanced co-operation has proven difficult to establish. Member states supportive of a particular measure were generally unwilling to isolate member states that were opposed. However, two notable enhanced co-operation measures were launched, relating to cross-border divorce (2010) and the adoption of an **EU Patent** (2011).

ENLARGEMENT is a general term used to describe the process of admission of new states into the European Union (EU). The procedures for enlargement were contained in Article 49 of the **Treaty on European Union**. All applicants for membership must possess a democratic form of government, respect the principles on which the EU is based (i.e. liberty, democracy, respect for **human rights** and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law), and be prepared to accept not only the provisions of the **European treaties**, but also the *acquis communautaire*, the accumulated **legislation** of the EU. Because of the last-mentioned requirement and the desire of both member states and applicants to protect their own interests as much as possible, negotiations tend to be complex and protracted. The **European Commission** undertakes an analysis of each country's application, focusing on both the economic situation and the political stability of each state. Thereafter, the Commission presents its *avis* to the **Council of the European Union**, where a decision on the applicant will be made. If negotiations are successful and an **accession treaty** is signed, this must be ratified by the **national parliaments** of the acceding states, by all the **member states** and, since the **Single European Act**, also by the **European Parliament** (EP).

The first round of enlargement included applications in 1961–62, and again in 1967. Applications were from **Denmark, Ireland, Norway** and the **United Kingdom**. On each occasion, **France** vetoed the British application, and the other three applicants chose not to pursue the matter further without the UK. The applications were renewed in 1970, leading to the signing of Treaties of Accession in 1972. As a result of a national referendum, Norway declined to join. The other three states became full members of the European Communities (EC) on 1 January 1973. The second and third rounds involved **Greece, Portugal** and **Spain**, all of which applied for membership after

establishing a democratic form of government in the mid-1970s. Greece formally became a member on 1 January 1981, followed by Portugal and Spain on 1 January 1986.

The EC decision to create an **internal market** was a matter of concern to the **European Free Trade Association** states, most of which between 1989 and 1992 eventually submitted formal applications for membership. Negotiations with **Austria, Finland**, Norway and **Sweden** were concluded in 1994, with membership offered subject to **ratification**. Following another national referendum, Norway again declined membership, but the other three states joined the EU on 1 January 1995.

After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, most of the newly democratized states indicated an interest in seeking membership in the medium term. The EC's response was that this would be limited in the first instance to members of the **Visegrad Group**, namely **Hungary, Poland** and the former Czechoslovakia (see the **Czech Republic** or Czechia and **Slovakia**). Other applicant states included **Turkey** in 1987, and **Cyprus** and **Malta** in 1990. These applications initially met with considerable resistance within the EU even though the countries had all signed **association agreements**. However, in 1996 the **European Council** decided that **accession negotiations** with Cyprus would begin six months after the conclusion of the 1996 **intergovernmental conference**.

By this time the EU had also received applications for membership from the 10 Central and Eastern European countries with which **Europe agreements** had already been signed: Hungary, Poland, **Romania**, Slovakia, **Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria**, the Czech Republic and **Slovenia**. This block of applications constituted the largest enlargement of the EU to date and also the most difficult, given the economic challenges facing the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe**. As a result, the EU progressed with the applications cautiously. In 1997 the European Commission, using the **accession criteria** established in 1993 at the **Copenhagen summit**, assessed each country's ability to fulfil membership obligations, and recommended that accession negotiations begin with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Negotiations with these five countries (plus Cyprus) began in March 1998. Meanwhile, the other applicants were included in an 'inclusive and evaluative' accession process, and would have to wait until late 1999 before they, along with Malta—which had renewed its application for membership in 1998—were recommended for negotiations. Following the recommendation, the European Council, meeting in Helsinki, **Finland**, in December 1999, decided to open negotiations in 2000. Moreover, it conferred on all the applicant states, including Turkey, the status of **candidate country**.

The completion of accession negotiations required the closure of 35 chapters, most of which deal with particular areas of the *acquis communautaire* (e.g. **competition policy**, the **common agricultural policy**, **telecommunications policy** and **energy policy**). In the case of 10 candidate countries—Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,

Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia—the then 31 chapters were finally closed in December 2002. This paved the way for the EU to enlarge to 25 member states on 1 May 2004. As a consequence, the EU underwent its greatest enlargement to become a union covering another third of the European continent and comprising nearly 500m. people.

Prior to the 2004 enlargement, each of the candidate countries, as well as the member states, had to ratify the **Treaty of Accession** signed on 16 April 2003. Nine candidate countries—the exception being Cyprus—successfully held **referenda** on EU membership between March and September 2003. At the same time, negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania continued, with the EU committing itself to realizing the two countries' goal of membership in 2007. This it did, although consideration was given to delaying accession by one year, owing to concerns over judicial reform and corruption. Turkey, meanwhile, continues to present a more problematic case, although negotiations on membership opened in October 2005. The prospects for Turkish accession, however, remain unlikely (see below).

Enlargement has not been straightforward. From the mid-1990s the EU sought to reform its most significant areas of expenditure—the **common agricultural policy** (CAP) and the **structural and cohesion funds**—as well as its **institutions**. Prior to the 2004 enlargement the EU provided pre-accession assistance to the candidate countries. This included €1,500m. annually under the **PHARE** programme; €1,000m. annually under the **instrument for structural policies for pre-accession**; and €540m. annually under the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Regional Development. Less progress was initially made on institutional reform. Measures introduced by the **Treaty of Amsterdam** prepared the EU only marginally for future enlargement, by avoiding any significant changes to the institutions so as to enable them to cope with the extra demands that would be placed on them. However, the following reforms were introduced as a result: a limit was placed on the size of the EP; the **co-decision procedure** was simplified; and agreement was reached on greater use of **qualified majority voting** (QMV) in the Council of the European Union, to ensure that decision making was not slowed down unduly. In **protocols** attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam references were made to the fact that each member state would have only one Commissioner after enlargement: the larger member states were previously entitled to have two Commissioners each. The Treaty also promised that a further review of the institutions was to take place if the EU grew to more than 20 member states. The whole array of institutional issues relating to enlargement was tackled more fully by the **Treaty of Nice**, agreed by the Governments of the 15 existing member states in December 2000. This reformed the Commission, the **Court of Justice** and the Court of First Instance (now **General Court**); extended QMV; re-allocated votes in the Council of the European Union; and agreed the distribution of votes and seats in an enlarged EU of 27 members. Yet concerns that the reforms were insufficient to ensure that a substantially enlarged EU could function smoothly

persisted. The result was the **European Convention's** reform proposals contained in the **draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. Many of these appeared in subsequent **Treaty of Lisbon**.

With Bulgaria and Romania joining the EU on 1 January 2007 the fifth enlargement was completed. **Croatia** became a member of the EU in July 2013. A range of countries still aspire to EU membership. In 2004 the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (now **North Macedonia**) applied for membership, as did **Montenegro** in 2008 and **Albania, Iceland** and **Serbia** in 2009. Iceland opened negotiations in July 2010 (although they were suspended in mid-2013); Montenegro commenced talks in June 2012. In June 2013 the Council officially endorsed the opening of talks on accession with Serbia, and these commenced in January 2014. In June the European Council granted Albania candidate status, but the initiation of negotiations on membership with Albania and North Macedonia was blocked at a European Council summit in October 2019 (see below).

Concerns have been expressed that the EU does not have sufficient '**integration capacity**' to admit more states, although the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon assuaged immediate concerns over admitting a small number. The EU is certainly supporting, through the **Stabilization and Association Process**, the **European partnerships**, the **accession partnerships** and the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**, the efforts of countries wishing to join. However, popular support within the EU for further enlargement is far from universal. The Turkish accession bid is controversial. Accession negotiations were opened, but progress was slow, and in November 2016 the European Parliament approved a non-binding resolution supporting the suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey, owing to concerns over human rights and the rule of law following the suppression of an attempted coup in July. In mid-December the European Council confirmed that negotiations would not be launched in any new policy areas while the ongoing political situation in Turkey prevailed. Meanwhile, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** submitted a formal application for membership of the EU in February 2016. EU officials welcomed the initiative. They, nevertheless, indicated that significant reforms were necessary before membership could be considered. The prospects for the accession of other countries from the **Western Balkans** initially depended very much on their own domestic reform efforts, especially with regard to the rule of law and the eradication of corruption. However, in mid-2019 Johannes Hahn, the European Commissioner responsible for enlargement negotiations, warned that the EU's credibility in the region risked being undermined if it failed to reward the reforms undertaken by Albania and North Macedonia. Many observers warned that the failure to commence negotiations with those two countries (principally owing to objections by France), which had originally been anticipated in June 2019, could lead to increased support for nationalists in the region. The opening of membership negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia finally received EU approval in March 2020, although by late 2021 talks had yet to commence.

ENTERPRISE POLICY aims to ensure that the European Union (EU) helps to stimulate a climate in which enterprise, industry and innovation flourish. Enterprise is crucial to the EU's economic growth and the EU hopes to foster and encourage innovative business practices that will create jobs and promote growth. Enterprise policy was designed at European Communities (EC) level to meet the requirements of the entire business community (whether large or small businesses) and its environment. Article 157 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Article 173 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**) provides the legal basis for enterprise policy. Historically, work on enterprise policy has consisted of three key areas: **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs), innovation and **competitiveness**, and making the most of opportunities and benefits arising from the single market. The level of EC interest in all three aspects was evident from the number of action programmes and **Green** and **White Papers** dedicated to these matters over the last two decades.

Support for SMEs dates back to 1983 and the adoption of the first EC action programme to assist their development. The business community currently places considerable emphasis on the notion of promoting innovation. In 1995 the **European Commission** produced a Green Paper on this subject, and this led in 1996 to the first action programme for innovation in Europe. In April 2000 the Commission produced a communication on the challenges ahead for enterprise policy, which envisaged an 'Enterprise Europe'. In 2012 the EU renewed its programme on industrial policy, 'A Stronger European industry for Growth and Economic Recovery', with a focus on SMEs and entrepreneurship. In April 2016 the Commission adopted a new communication on 'Digitising European Industry', as part of the strategy for the creation of a **Digital Single Market**, which was initiated in 2015. The Start-up and Scale-up Initiative, proposed by the Commission in November 2016, seeks to encourage the creation of industrial start-ups in the EU (as opposed to so-called third countries) through simplified taxation measures, improved access to financing and proposed amendments to legislation on insolvency, to facilitate restructuring. In September 2017 the Commission published proposals for a renewed industrial policy strategy, entitled 'Investing in a Smart, Innovative and Sustainable Industry'. In March 2020 the Commission proposed an 'industrial strategy for a globally competitive, green and digital Europe', as part of the new **European Green Deal**. (See also **Employment, Industrial Policy**.)

The first **ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PROGRAMME** (EAP) of the European Communities (EC) was introduced in 1973. The sixth EAP was proposed by the **European Commission** in January 2001 and adopted by the **European Parliament** (EP) and the **European Council** in July 2002. The programme covered the period 2002–12 and was an integral element of **environmental policy**. The sixth EAP expired on 30 June 2012 and a

seventh EAP was agreed in June 2013, to direct environmental policy until 2020. The eighth EAP for 2021–27 was concentrating on six principal objectives: working to achieve the 2030 reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions and to attain ‘climate neutrality’ by 2050; developing adaptive capacity and resilience, and limiting vulnerability to climate change; adapting a so-called regenerative growth model, removing the link between economic growth and resource use, and moving instead towards the evolution of a ‘circular’ economy; aiming for a ‘zero pollution’ strategy (with regard to air, water and soil), and working to protect health; protecting and restoring biodiversity and natural resources (air, water, soil, and related ecosystems); and reducing the adverse environmental impact of production and consumption (with respect, in particular, to energy, industry, infrastructure, mobility and food).

The **ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS DATA INFORMATION NETWORK** (ECDIN) is a database that also contains the **European Inventory of Existing Chemical Substances** (EINECS).

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY was not specifically mentioned or provided for in the **Treaty of Rome**. The **Single European Act** gave the European Communities (EC) competence, and this was extended into a policy remit by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU). The objectives are those that the EC has pursued for some time. The aim of EC environmental policy has been to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment and to protect people’s health. The TEU added another dimension: the promotion of measures for dealing with global environmental problems. The concept of sustainable development was enshrined in the **Treaty of Amsterdam** as one of the EC’s objectives. Moreover, environmental protection requirements were given greater emphasis in other EC policies, and especially in relation to the single market. Significantly, the treaty also simplified decision making by allowing **co-decision procedure** to replace **co-operation procedure** where the latter had applied to certain parts of environmental policymaking.

EC activity in the area of environment policy first commenced in the early 1970s, when specific environmental problems were incorporated into a series of five-year programmes for dealing with generalized issues of environmental enhancement and protection. The main policy principles were defined in the first **Environmental Action Programme** (EAP): the polluter must pay the costs of repair to the environment; prevention of environmental damage is preferable to remedial measures; and all EC initiatives in all policy areas must take their likely effect upon the environment into account. The TEU further stressed the precautionary principle and the need for environment policy to take into account the regional economic diversity of the European Union (EU).

Environmental policy has become increasingly significant for the EU. Activity has concentrated on six broad problem areas: **water; atmospheric**

pollution; noise; chemical products; waste disposal; and the preservation and restoration of natural habitats and the conservation of wildlife. Several directives deal with the pollution of all forms of water and with relevant quality standards, and the EC/EU have participated in international conventions dealing with the reduction of pollution in international waterways and rivers. Other directives cover the discharge of pollutants into the atmosphere from industrial plants, and exhaust emissions from motor vehicles. Maximum noise levels have been established for a range of machinery and household equipment. Chemical products have been subject to regulation since 1967. A **European Inventory of Existing Chemical Substances** (EINECS) was established in 1986. The EC committed themselves to reducing chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by 85% by 2000, and in 1993 the **European Commission** proposed the elimination of hydrochlorofluorocarbons by 2014. To protect natural habitats and conserve wildlife, a number of directives relate to the preservation of species and to scientific experiments on animals. Funds have been provided for the preservation of natural habitats, and the EC signed several international conventions on the conservation of wildlife. EC/EU **legislation** also covers the dangers posed by radiation. Following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the former **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1986, maximum levels of radiation contamination in **foodstuffs** were set.

As part of the EC's efforts to promote awareness of environmental issues and encourage companies to do likewise, an **eco-management and audit scheme** (EMAS) was set up in 1995. Participation is voluntary and involves industrial companies undergoing an independent audit of their environmental performance. In the area of transport, harmful emissions from road vehicles were to be reduced by 60%–70% by 2010, and measures were agreed to lower the allowable limits for certain chemical substances in petrol and diesel fuel by 2000. Leaded petrol was phased out, for most vehicles, by 2000. There has also been legislation concerning the protection of groundwater resources, waste disposal in landfill sites, genetically engineered foods, and trade in endangered species.

The fourth EAP (1987–92) increased EC activity, conferring stronger powers on the European Commission, including the right to take member states to the **Court of Justice** for non-compliance with environmental legislation. In 1990 the decision was taken to set up a **European Environment Agency** (EEA) and a special environment fund, **LIFE**. The EC also agreed, in principle, to introduce a **carbon tax**. The importance of these measures and programmes was reiterated in the fifth EAP (1993–2000), which also stressed that EC activity must be more anticipatory, less devoted to problem-solving, and focus more on the causes of environmental problems as part of a commitment to 'sustainable development'. The sixth EAP (2002–12) was guided by the fifth programme. Four areas were given particular emphasis: climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment and health, management of natural resources and waste. It also identified explicitly the measures needed to

implement successfully the EU's sustainable development strategy, which had been given much wider prominence following the adoption of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy in 2001.

An initiative launched in January 2004, deriving from the priorities of the sixth EAP, envisaged a 'Thematic Strategy on the Urban Environment'. This communication from the Commission sought to identify the problems and challenges experienced by urban areas. Environmental problems are a global concern, and there were high-profile conferences at the international level (Rio de Janeiro, 1992; Kyoto, 1997; and The Hague, 2000) to address the issues of ozone depletion and global warming. The **Fifteen** (EU15), at the time of the **ratification** of the Kyoto **Protocol**, agreed to reduce their emissions to 8% below the base year's level (usually 1990) by 2012. According to the Commission, the **Twenty-Five** (EU25) succeeded in bringing about a 7.3% reduction in emissions between 1990 and 2004; US emissions rose by 15.8% over the same reporting period.

The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in early 2005. By September 2011 a total of 191 countries had signed and ratified the protocol, although certain emerging economies, such as the People's Republic of China and India, were exempt (at least temporarily) from the obligations to reduce emissions. In December Canada formally withdrew from the Protocol. The **USA** was the only major country not to agree to the terms of Kyoto. However, it should be noted that some US federal states moved towards the adoption of Kyoto's emission standards. This international dimension has enabled the EU to establish a global presence in the field of environmental policy (a position that led it into dispute with the USA).

In 2007 the **G-8** committed itself to agreeing a successor to Kyoto by the end of 2012. The USA agreed to participate, despite some reservations, along with both Canada and **Japan**, although all three states opposed EU demands for cuts of 25%–40% by 2020.

A special UN-sponsored conference on climate change took place in Copenhagen, **Denmark**, in December 2009. However, divisions were apparent among the delegates at the **Copenhagen Summit**. Although a deal was reached to reduce emissions and to raise finance to assist developing countries to reduce emissions, many commentators argued that the summit had produced limited results, especially as the agreement was not legally binding.

In June 2013 agreement was reached between the European Commission, the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** on the seventh EAP for 2014–20, 'Living well, within the limits of our planet'. The new EAP entered into force in January 2014, focusing on three principal thematic goals: the protection of nature and improvements in ecological resilience; increased sustainable, resource-efficient, low-carbon growth; and addressing environmental health risks. The programme also sought to improve the sustainability of EU cities, and to help the EU to address more effectively international environmental and climate challenges. The revised LIFE programme, which entered into effect in January 2014, had a budget of some

€3,400m. In December 2016 the European Parliament and the Council signed into law a new National Emissions Directive, which strengthened limits on five principal pollutants, with effect from 31 December. The new Directive sought to reduce pollution-related ill health by almost 50% by 2030.

A UN Climate Change Conference was held in Paris, **France**, in November–December 2015, at which 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate agreement. The adopted plan aimed to avoid significant climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Before and during the Paris conference, countries and trading blocs submitted comprehensive national climate action plans to the UN, detailing their intended nationally determined contributions (INDC). The EU was one of the leaders of international efforts toward securing a global climate deal. Following the limited efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of agreement at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, the EU had built a broad coalition of developed and developing countries in favour of adopting ambitious targets, which shaped the outcome of the Paris conference. In March 2015 the EU was the first major economy to submit its INDC to the new agreement. It was already taking steps to implement its new target of reducing emissions by at least 40% (now 55%) by 2030, compared with their 1990 level. Notably, however, in mid-2017 US President **Donald Trump** (who took office in January) announced his intention to withdraw the USA from the Paris agreement. Trump's decision was reversed by the new US Administration of Joe Biden in early 2021.

In September 2019 then President-elect of the European Commission, **Ursula von der Leyen**, announced plans to introduce a new role of Commissioner for the European Green Deal, with the aim of creating a climate-neutral Europe. **Frans Timmermans** was nominated to the role. A new LIFE programme for 2021–27 was to help protect the environment and mitigate climate change, and to support a transition to 'clean' energy in order to help the EU to meet its environmental objectives and its efforts to become 'climate neutral' by 2050. See also **Environmental Action Programme** for details of the eighth EAP for 2021–27, and **European Green Deal**.

EP: See **European Parliament**

EPAs: See **Economic Partnership Agreements**

EPC: See **European Political Co-operation**

EPP: See **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)**

EPPO: See **European Public Prosecutor's Office**

EPU: See **European Payments Union**

EQUAL PAY policy was laid down in Article 141 of the **Treaty of Rome**, and it appears in Article 157 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**. While it refers specifically to gender discrimination, obliging the member states to ‘ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work’, the Article has been taken to refer to equality in general. A series of **directives** between 1975 and 1986 enabled those who consider themselves to be discriminated against to take their case, without fear of dismissal or reprisal, to a national tribunal. Where there is a difference of opinion over the meaning of **EU law**, the question may be referred to the **Court of Justice**, the rulings of which are binding on all national bodies. In March 2021 the **European Commission** proposed a new directive on pay transparency to ensure that EU citizens received equal pay for equal work and to strengthen both transparency over pay and EU enforcement mechanisms.

ERAC: See **European Research Area Committee**

ERASMUS/ERASMUS+ succeeded Erasmus, which stood for European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, a programme established in 1987 with the purpose of encouraging students to spend an integral part of their studies at a university in another country of the European Communities (EC). This programme of student mobility was widened to include **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA) countries in 1991 and countries from **Central and Eastern Europe** as well as **Cyprus** in 1998. The students’ home universities recognized the periods of study abroad by means of a course credit transfer scheme. The original goal was that some 10% of the EC student population would be participants in the scheme by 1992. Despite the problems created by linguistic diversity and different national systems of higher education, Erasmus proved a success. Its popularity increased the costs of the programme at a time when EC expenditure came under closer scrutiny, leading to pressure for the target figure to be reduced to 5% of the student population. Erasmus encompassed more than just student mobility, containing chapters on: teacher exchanges; joint preparation of courses; intensive programmes (such as summer schools); and thematic networks on a subject area or a specific platform for analysis and discussion of a European theme. Erasmus became part of the Socrates programme in 1995. In 2007 the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP) 2007–13 replaced the Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, and eLearning programmes. Erasmus was one of the six sub-programmes supported under the LLP. The LLP was replaced by an Erasmus Charter for Higher Education, as part of the European Union (EU) programme for education, training, youth and sports (under the Erasmus+ programme).

The purpose of the Erasmus+ scheme was to create a single integrated programme bringing together the LLP, Grundtvig, Leonardo, Comenius, Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus, Tempus and Youth in Action programmes within a more streamlined architecture to supply greater focus, effectiveness and simplification of the various schemes and objectives. Some €14,774m. were allocated for Erasmus+ in 2014–20, representing some 40% in additional funding compared with 2007–13. The programme set itself ambitious targets and aspired to engage the participation of some 2m. university students and 650,000 vocational learners in exchanges, to get an additional 600,000 young people participating in youth exchanges and some 800,000 teachers, education staff and youth workers establishing and engaging with exchange programmes. It also aimed to secure greater mobility by opening the scheme beyond EU/**European Economic Area** member states, and was developing an international dimension. Overall, the programme was designed to support some 4m. people by giving them support to study, train, work or volunteer abroad. Erasmus+ was renewed for 2021–27, with a budget of €24,574m. in current prices (€21,708m. in 2018 prices). Erasmus+ operates in 38 countries (the EU member states, as well as **Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland** and **Turkey**).

ERDF: See **European Regional Development Fund**

ERM, ERM-II: See **Exchange Rate Mechanism**

ESA: See **European Space Agency**

ESA: See **European System of Integrated Economic Accounts**

ESC: See **European Economic and Social Committee**

ESCB: See **European System of Central Banks**

ESF: See **European Social Fund**

ESFS: See **European System of Financial Supervision**

ESM: See **European Stability Mechanism**

ESRO: See **European Space Research Organization**

ESTI is the European Solar Test Installation at Ispra, the **Joint Research Centre** (JRC) establishment in **Italy**.

ESTONIA joined the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004. It is one of the smallest member states, with a population of some 1.3m. Following the collapse of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in the early 1990s, the Baltic states of **Estonia**, Latvia and **Lithuania** immediately began to develop closer links with Western Europe and particularly the EU. The EU responded by providing technical (see **PHARE**) and financial assistance to Estonia. Relations with Estonia progressed swiftly from a **free trade agreement** to a **Europe agreement**, and then to preparations for eventual EU membership. Estonia applied for membership in November 1995 and participated in the first phase of **accession negotiations**, which began in March 1998. Negotiations were completed in December 2002, the outcome being approved by popular referendum nine months later. With a rate of participation by the electorate of just over 64%, two-thirds (66.8%) of voters supported accession. Estonia opted to approve the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** through the normal parliamentary process rather than holding a referendum, and the Government was determined to press on with **ratification**, even after events in **France** and the **Netherlands**. Estonia duly became the 15th country in the EU to complete the parliamentary stage of ratifying the draft European Constitution in May 2006. The text was approved by 73 votes in favour, with one vote against in the 101-seat parliament. Estonia became part of the EU's **Schengen Area** in December 2007. The Commission approved Estonia's application to join the **euro** after it judged that the country easily fulfilled the target criteria, and Estonia became a member of the **eurozone** from 1 January 2011. Estonia is widely considered to be the most digitally advanced country within the EU, with 99% of its public services delivered online.

ETF: See **European Training Foundation**

ETS: See **Emissions Trading Scheme EU**

ETSI is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, set up in 1987 to harmonize European technological specifications and standards in the field of **telecommunications**. ETSI aims to harmonize standards in the European Union through the development of mandatory norms known as 'common technical regulations'. The Institute is based at the Sophia Antipolis technology park near Nice, **France**.

ETUC: See **European Trade Union Confederation**

EU: See **European Union**

EU4HEALTH: See **Health Policy**

EU FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES: See **Research Framework Programme**

EU PATENT: See **Unitary Patent Convention**

EU WHOISWHO is the official directory of managers and services in the various European Union (EU) institutions, bodies and agencies, accessible online and in e-book and paper form.

EUA: See **European Unit of Account**

EUI: See **European University Institute**

EUMC: See **European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia**

EUMETSAT is the European Operational Satellite Agency for Monitoring Weather, Climate and the Environment. It was established in 1986 and operates a system of meteorological satellites that monitor the atmosphere and ocean and land surfaces throughout the year. EUMETSAT formalized the cooperation between the national meteorological institutions, which began with the launch of the first European meteorological satellite in 1977, and took over the operational programme agreed upon in 1981. The information collected on the climate is passed to the National Meteorological services of the organization's members and affiliated members. At 2020 26 European Union (EU) member states belonged to EUMETSAT, which has 30 members in total and does not have formal links with the EU. Funded by the national authorities, EUMETSAT works in conjunction with the **European Space Agency** (ESA).

EURATEX is the European Apparel and Textile Confederation. It represents the European textiles and clothing industry on matters of common interest—that is 186,000 mainly small and medium-sized companies across the European Union (EU), employing some 1.8m. workers. Its main objective is to promote the interests of its members while taking into account the institutional framework of the EU and its international obligations. It resulted from the merger of various textiles and clothing organizations, including the Co-ordinating

EURATOM

Committee for the Textile Industries in the EEC (Comitextil) in 1994. Euratex is based in **Brussels, Belgium**, close to the principal EU institutions and seeks to engage with the **European Commission**, the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** in all matters relating to the textiles industry. It has interests in various parts of the Commission's work and organization including trade, the environment, education, training, research and development, innovation and industry.

EURATOM: See **European Atomic Energy Community**

EUREKA is the acronym of the European Research Co-ordination Agency, a body established in 1985 in **Brussels, Belgium**. It originated in an initiative by President François Mitterrand of **France** to establish a programme of non-military **research and technological development** that would keep the European Communities (EC) at the forefront in these fields. EUREKA was intended to be responsible for a European Programme for High Technology Research and Development agreed to by several European countries, including non-EC states. EUREKA is not an EU programme but an intergovernmental initiative of which the EU is a member. EUREKA is more a sponsor of projects than a programme, and in that sense, it overlaps with the activities of the European Co-operation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research (**COST**) programme. It has launched well over 100 separate transnational collaborative projects in a diverse number of fields, including factory automation, ceramic turbines, computers, lasers and robotics. It raises most of its funding from private sources or on the capital markets, since the EU and the member states of the Union make only relatively small contributions to its budget. To complement the activities of EUREKA, the **European Commission** has created its own **research framework programmes** to foster research, and in 2000 it established the European Research Area (ERA) as a means of encouraging industry to invest more in research.

EURISTOTE is an online directory of university theses and studies on the theme of European integration.

EUR-LEX is a European Union (EU) database containing the contents of the *Official Journal of the European Union* (OJ). It includes all **legislation** in force, along with the treaties, proposals for legislation, and recent judgments of the **Court of Justice**. EUR-Lex is available online (in all the official languages of the EU), and is updated daily.

The **EURO** (€) was adopted in 1995 as the name of the common currency of the European Union (EU) and was to replace the **European Currency Unit**

on a one-for-one basis at the start of **economic and monetary union** (EMU). By 1998, however, only 11 member states (the Euro-11) had agreed to proceed with EMU and adopt the euro on 1 January 1999. (**Greece** did not meet the **convergence criteria** at that time, although it joined in 2001, while **Denmark, Sweden** and the **United Kingdom** decided not to join.) On 1 January 1999 the conversion rates of the national currencies of the participating member states against the euro were fixed, and a single monetary policy implemented by the new **European Central Bank** (ECB) and the **European System of Central Banks** (ESCB).

The movement towards EMU and a single currency in the EU was slow. However, pressure from business and financial sectors within the EU forced governments to co-operate and to harmonize their approach to introducing a common currency. **Belgium** was the first member state to announce that its government departments would change to the euro. In all participant member states there was a transition period between 1999 and 2002 (by which time euro banknotes and coins were to have been introduced), during which national budgets were drawn up in national currencies, but payments by government departments were made in euros. From 1999 businesses were able to make social security contributions and pay taxes in euros. They were also able to establish capital in euros. Moreover, in participating member states, with the exception of **Germany**, tax returns were accepted in euros, and in most participating states people were also able to pay their taxes, including income tax, in euros. Financial markets were also to use the euro.

The three member states remaining outside the **eurozone** were to continue to work towards EMU. In 1998 Denmark retained the position it held during the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) debate in 1992, remaining firmly opposed to the idea and the practice of the single currency. Despite broad support from government and business circles, the people of Denmark voted against Danish adoption of the euro by a narrow margin in 2000. Sweden held a referendum in September 2003, as a result of which it, too, elected not to join the eurozone. The British Government, although realizing that British business would participate in the eurozone to an extent, remained cautious about full participation and, combined with considerable public opposition to the euro, postponed indefinitely any plans for a referendum on the issue. **Slovenia** adopted the euro in January 2007 followed by **Cyprus** and **Malta** in January 2008. Following a positive recommendation from the **European Commission**, **Slovakia** joined the eurozone in January 2009. **Estonia** and **Latvia** adopted the euro in January 2011 and January 2014, respectively. **Lithuania** acceded to the eurozone in January 2015, bringing the number of EU member states using the euro to 19. The euro is also the sole currency in a number of small non-EU states, such as Andorra, **Kosovo**, Monaco, **Montenegro**, San Marino and Vatican City.

The euro entered its most turbulent phase from early 2010 when the financial difficulties and levels of debt in some states led several eurozone countries (most notably Greece, **Ireland**, **Portugal** and **Spain**) to introduce

stringent austerity programmes, which in turn led speculators to gamble on the stability of the euro and to test the determination of other eurozone states (most notably Germany) to come to the defence of these states. Among the emergency measures adopted were the **European Financial Stabilization Mechanism** and a **European Financial Stability Facility**. Subsequently plans were agreed for a more substantial **European Stability Mechanism** (ESM). For the first time serious doubts were raised about the durability of the euro in the context of the lack of a genuine economic policy across the EU and demands for some countries to be decoupled from the eurozone, notably Greece. Subsequent bailouts awarded to both Ireland and Portugal, and more specifically the crisis surrounding Greece's state finances, amid growing fears from 2011 about the country's ability to avoid default on its mounting debts, underlined the challenges confronting the eurozone in maintaining a single currency for the participating member states. Cyprus received a bailout in 2013, and a new programme of lending was agreed with Greece in 2015. By the end of the decade the euro had demonstrated its increased resilience, but additional reforms were recommended by both the ECB and political leaders in order to safeguard its future.

The **EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL** (EAPC) is the forum in which members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) meet on a regular basis with representatives of European non-NATO countries and Asian countries on the European periphery to discuss political and security-related issues and develop co-operation in a wide range of areas. It replaced the **North Atlantic Co-operation Council** in 1997.

EUROBAROMETER is the name of a series of public opinion polls carried out and published on a biannual basis throughout all the member states of the European Union (EU) since 1973. The operation is the responsibility of **Eurostat**. A diverse range of topics is covered by the questionnaires used for polling purposes. These include questions on knowledge of the EU institutions, questions on the availability of information on the EU and questions on a range of EU policies. As well as providing profiles of the European population, the **European Commission** and its agencies use the Eurobarometers for planning purposes.

EUROBONDS were controversially proposed by the **European Commission** in November 2011 as a means of combating the European sovereign debt crisis. Government bonds are issued in euros by the states comprising the **eurozone**. The use of eurobonds would enable funds to be lent to the eurozone as a bloc, which would then have the facility to release funds to individual indebted governments, which would, thereby, secure access to lending with improved repayment terms, as they would benefit from the credit ratings

of other, financially stronger, member states. However, the issue was a highly sensitive one and the German Government under **Angela Merkel** remained resolutely opposed to the issuing of Eurobonds. The 2012 assertion by the President of the **European Central Bank**, **Mario Draghi**, that the bank would do whatever was required to stabilize the **euro** led to the proposal becoming dormant.

EUROCODES are common codes for the European construction industry, which are intended to standardize and replace the different national specifications for materials, skills and personnel.

EUROCONTROL: See **European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation**

EURO COOP: See **European Consumer Consultative Group**

EUROCORPS is the name given to an integrated transnational military unit formally inaugurated in November 1992 following agreement at the 59th Franco-German summit in La Rochelle, **France**, in May 1992. Its origins lay in a joint Franco-German brigade formed in 1987. Its supporters argued that it could become the nucleus of a European army at the centre of a reconstructed **Western European Union** (WEU), and therefore a central element of security in the European Union (EU). In July 1993 **Belgium** indicated that it would join the Eurocorps. **Spain** agreed to contribute troops to the force in December 1993 and Luxembourg joined in May 1996. Based in **Strasbourg**, the Eurocorps became operational in November 1995. From May 1995 two new WEU bodies complemented it: Euroforce (based in Florence, **Italy**) and Euromarforce (a maritime force serving the Mediterranean), constituted by France, Italy, **Portugal** and Spain. After Eurocorps' establishment, the EU gradually took over many of the roles of WEU as part of the development of a **European Security and Defence Policy** (ESDP). Hence, in June 1999, at the Cologne meeting of the **European Council**, it was announced that Eurocorps would be put at the disposal of the EU for crisis response operations. It was subsequently decided that Eurocorps would become part of the **European Rapid Reaction Force**, a process that began in June 2001. Five countries participate in Eurocorps: Belgium, France, **Germany**, Luxembourg and Spain. There are also six associated states: **Austria**, **Greece**, Italy, **Poland**, **Romania** and **Turkey**. The **Treaty of Lisbon** gave legality to Eurocorps and formally identified it as part of the EU's **Common Security and Defence Policy**.

EUROCRAT

EUROCRAT is a colloquial term used to describe a bureaucrat or administrator employed by the European Union.

EUROFER: See **European Steel Association**

The **EUROGROUP** is the informal council of ministers of finance and of the economy of the 19 member states participating in **economic and monetary union**. It held its first meeting in Luxembourg in June 1998. The group was conceived as a forum for policy co-ordination rather than **decision making**, which continued under the aegis of what is now the **Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers**, the monthly meetings of the finance ministers of full member states of the European Union.

EUROIZATION refers to the process whereby non-participants in **economic and monetary union** link their national currencies to the **euro** (€). Examples include **Montenegro** and **Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

EUROJUST is a European Union body charged with promoting co-operation among authorities in the member states dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organized crimes. Established in 2002, it comprises a representative from each of the member states. (See also **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**.)

A **EURO-MEDITERRANEAN FREE TRADE AREA** has been a long-term goal of the **Euro-Mediterranean partnership**. Based on the idea of the **European Economic Area**, this was a key element of the European Union's **Mediterranean policy**.

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC AREA: See **Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area**

The **EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP** (EUROMED) lies at the heart of the **Mediterranean policy** of the European Union (EU). Often referred to as the **Barcelona Process**, EUROMED was launched in 1995 with the involvement of the member states of the EU and 16 non-member states in the Mediterranean region: **Albania**, Algeria, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Monaco, **Montenegro**, **Morocco**, the Palestinian Territories, the **Syrian Arab Republic**, Tunisia and **Turkey**. The three main components of the partnership are: political and security partnership; economic and financial partnership; and partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. Agreements have been

concluded in a range of specific policy areas such as energy, the environment, media and migration. EUROMED was effectively re-launched in 2008 with the establishment of a **Union for the Mediterranean**. See also **MEDA**.

EURONORMS or ENs, were originally standards produced by the **European Coal and Steel Community** covering the quality, dimensions, tolerances and methods of testing of steel, as well as providing a glossary of terms. The term was later also used for more general European standards set by **CEN** and **Cenelec**.

EUR-OP: See **Publications Office of the European Union**

EUROPA is the name of the main **European Commission** internet information site (europa.eu), which provides information on the institutions and activities of the European Union.

The **EUROPA BUILDING** in **Brussels, Belgium**, has been the home of the **European Council** and **Council of the European Union** since 2017. It is a multi-storey, lantern-shaped building, which has been adopted as part of the official logo of its resident institutions. According to the EU's website, the logo is intended, like the building, to evoke concepts of unity, continuity, diversity, the heart and light. The Europa building is connected by means of two skyways and a service tunnel to the adjacent **Justus Lipsius** building, which provides additional office space, and was the former home of the European Council and the Council of the European Union.

The **EUROPE 2020** strategy was launched by the **European Commission** in March 2010 to succeed the Lisbon agenda for growth and jobs. The 10-year strategy was designed to help steer the **European Union** (EU) economy through and out of the economic crisis, encouraging growth and fostering innovation. It sought to achieve more sustainable growth and a low-carbon economy. It set a number of specific targets, with aims that included seeing 75% of the population (people aged between 20 and 64 years) in work, getting 3% of EU gross domestic product put into research and development, and removing 20m. more people from the risk of poverty. To this end, the strategy envisaged a series of initiatives that included a new agenda for skills and jobs, the pursuit of a digital agenda (i.e. access to the internet for all), greater student and young professional mobility across Europe, and an EU platform against poverty. The **European Council** approved the Commission's strategy in March 2010.

EUROPE AGREEMENTS

EUROPE AGREEMENTS were types of **association agreement** and were concluded by the European Communities with countries in **Central and Eastern Europe** (CEE) subsequent to the latter's democratization after 1989. The first such agreements were signed in December 1991, and by mid-1995 agreements existed with nine countries (**Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania** and **Slovakia**). A further agreement was signed with **Slovenia** in June 1996, which came into effect in early 1999. Each agreement provided for free trade in industrial goods, political dialogue, wide-ranging co-operation and legislative **harmonization**. Bilateral institutions were also established to manage the association created. After concluding Europe agreements, each of the CEE countries went on to apply for membership of the European Union (EU). All except Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 May 2004; those two countries joined on 1 January 2007. When devising **stabilization and association agreements** for the countries of the **Western Balkans**, the **European Commission** drew heavily on the structure and content of the Europe agreements.

EUROPE BY SATELLITE (EbS) was launched in 1995 to provide EU-related audiovisual information online and via satellite to those in the media industry.

EUROPE DAY refers to 9 May 1950, the day when Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, presented **Jean Monnet's** proposal for the creation of a new European institution that became the **European Coal and Steel Community**. This date marks the birth of what is now known as the European Union (EU), and 9 May is observed as Europe Day. The day is marked at EU level by activities and festivities that are aimed to enhance the relationship between the EU and its citizens. Nevertheless, the date goes largely unnoticed. (See also **Schuman Plan**.)

EUROPE OF DEMOCRACIES AND DIVERSITIES was a group comprising a number of anti-European Union parties in the **European Parliament**. Formally known as the Europe of Nations group after the 1994 elections, it regrouped and renamed itself the Europe of Democracies and Diversities Group after the 1999 elections. Some 16 **Members of the European Parliament** belonged to the group. In 2004 the group was re-formed as the **Independence and Democracy Group** (ID).

EUROPE OF FREEDOM AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY (EFDD) group was a **political group** within the **European Parliament** (EP). The EFDD was originally established as the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) in 2009, but amended its name in mid-2014. The EFDD effectively replaced the **Independence and Democracy Group**, which collapsed when

it failed to return enough **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs) at the 2009 elections. Due to this loss it was not allowed to form a political group within the EP. Under existing EP rules, 25 MEPs are required from at least seven member states to form a political group. Membership of the EFD was a little fluid at the outset, but by March 2012 the group comprised 34 MEPs. After the 2014 EP elections the EFDD group emerged as the sixth-largest force in the parliament. The two largest national parties within the EFDD were the **UK Independence Party** (UKIP) and the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) from Italy. The President of the populist EFDD was former UKIP leader Nigel Farage (later leader of the **Brexit Party**). According to its political platform, the EFDD was committed to the principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation among nation states and but opposed any further European integration. In December 2018 Farage and others withdrew from UKIP over the controversial leadership of Gerard Batten. Batten consequently left the EFDD, along with the remaining UKIP MEPs. Following elections to the EP in May 2019, the EFDD failed to register as a political group for the ninth parliamentary term.

The **EUROPE OF NATIONS AND FREEDOM** (ENF) was a political group in the European Parliament (EP). Established in June 2015 and led by the Front National leader Marine Le Pen (of France) and the Dutch politician Marcel de Graaff, the ENF was a far-right, nationalist grouping. In mid-2017 Marine Le Pen left the EP, following her election as a member of the French parliament. At late 2018 it comprised 35 members from **Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland** and the **United Kingdom**. The group sought increased sovereignty for EU member states and opposed mass immigration. Following elections to the EP in May 2019, the ENF was replaced for the ninth parliament by the **Identity and Democracy** group.

EUROPE OF THE REGIONS is a phrase that came into common usage in the late 1980s. Those who wished local and regional authorities to have a greater input into the European Communities used this phrase. Many of them already maintained liaison offices in **Brussels, Belgium**. The establishment of the **Committee of the Regions** under the **Treaty on European Union** acknowledged its importance.

The **EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK** (EU-OSHA) is a decentralized European Union agency, established in 1996 to promote the exchange of information and co-operation on measures dealing with **health and safety** at work. It is located in Bilbao, **Spain**. EU-OSHA has played a central role in the EU's strategy for health and safety at work, and aims to reduce the number of work-related injuries and to work

EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION

with governments, employers and workers to promote a risk-prevention culture, to collect and analyse new scientific statistics on risks at work, to share information and disseminate examples of good practice. EU-OSHA was strongly in support of smoke-free workplaces and many EU member states implemented strong anti-smoking legislation. With the arrival of the **COVID-19** pandemic in 2020, EU-OSHA provided online guidance on working safely in workplaces.

EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION: See **Migration and Asylum Policy; European migration crisis; Immigration Policy**

EUROPEAN AGENDA ON SECURITY: See **Security Union Strategy**

The **EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL FUND FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT** (EAFRD) was created in September 2005 and entered into operation at the beginning of 2007. It replaced the Guidance Section of the **European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund** (which previously financed the **Common Agricultural Policy**—CAP) and the rural development measures previously financed under the Guarantee section. It was made responsible for the single financial contribution under the CAP to rural development programmes. In 2014–20 the EAFRD contributed to the overall **Europe 2020** strategy through the promotion of sustainable rural development, in line with other CAP instruments, cohesion policy and the **Common Fisheries Policy**. The EAFRD's budget for 2021–27 was set at €85,350m., in 2018 prices, including €7,500m. from **Next Generation EU** to help to respond to issues introduced by the **COVID-19** pandemic. See also the **European Agricultural Guarantee Fund** (EAGF).

The **EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL GUARANTEE FUND** (EAGF), together with the **European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development** (EAFRD), replaced the Guarantee Section of the **European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund** (EAGFF) on 1 January 2007. The EAGF forms the largest part of the European Union's budget heading within the category of sustainable development and growth: natural resources. It was given responsibility for, *inter alia*, the provision of direct payments to farmers under the **Common Agricultural Policy**, finance for the export of agricultural products to third countries, and intervention measures to regulate agricultural markets. Under the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2021–27, the EAGF was allocated funding of some €258,594m., in 2018 prices.

The **EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL GUIDANCE AND GUARANTEE FUND** (EAGGF): See the **European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development** and the **European Agricultural Guarantee Fund** (EAGF)

The **EUROPEAN ANTHEM** adopted by both the European Union in 1986 and the **Council of Europe** in 1972 for use on ceremonial occasions, consists of the words of Schiller's *Ode to Joy* as set to music in the final movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. The **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** had been due to give it formal status, but the idea was abandoned during the negotiations that led to the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

The **EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE** (OLAF), an independent office within the **European Commission**, has, since June 1999, been responsible for combating fraud against the European Union (EU) **budget**, corruption and serious misconduct within the EU institutions, as well as transnational organized crime and any fraud or illegal activity prejudicial to the budget. OLAF was established in April 1999 and replaced UCLAF (the Task Force for the Co-ordination of Fraud Prevention), created in 1988. In contrast to its predecessor, OLAF is empowered to examine the management and the financing of all of the EU's institutions (not just the European Commission). It also supports the EU institutions in the development and implementation of anti-fraud legislation. OLAF fell under the responsibility of the Commissioner in charge of Budget and Human Resources. A Director-General of OLAF is appointed by agreement between the **European Parliament**, the Commission and the **Council of the European Union**. The current Director-General, appointed in 2018, is **Ville Itälä**. In 2010–20 OLAF completed some 2,200 case investigations, which recommended the recovery of around €7,500m. for the EU budget.

EUROPEAN AREA OF EDUCATION: See **European Education Area**

EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS, RESEARCH AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES AGENCY: See **European Defence Agency**

The **EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT** (EAW) allows a person to be transferred from one member state to another without the judiciary having to go through a formal extradition procedure, where a person is wanted for criminal prosecution or for a custodial sentence. The Council Framework decision on a European Arrest Warrant was agreed on 13 June 2002 and came into force in January 2004. This law has been modified subsequently, but has been judged an overall success. After it became operational, there was a

notable rise in the number of requests, from some 3,000 in 2004 to 10,400 in 2013.

The **EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY** (EAEC) is also known by its acronym Euratom. One of several sectoral organizations conceived by **Jean Monnet**, the EAEC was established in 1957 at the same time as the **European Economic Community**. With the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, it was the only remaining 'community'. The aims of the EAEC are defined as promoting research and disseminating technical information; establishing uniform safety standards; facilitating investment and the establishment of the necessary basic installations for the development of nuclear energy; ensuring a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels; preventing the improper use of fissile materials; exercising the right of ownership over fissile materials (mainly uranium and plutonium); developing wide commercial outlets; and working for progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EAEC experienced many problems, being from the outset overshadowed by other developments in the emerging European Union (EU). Technical problems, costs and worries about nuclear safety hindered its work, and the EAEC found it difficult to control and direct national developments.

However, over the years EU **energy policy** placed considerable emphasis on nuclear energy. In seeking to facilitate nuclear research, the **European Commission** has the right to insist that national programmes are co-ordinated in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. It also undertakes regular reviews of nuclear research and indicates areas of possible future research. It was under the aegis of the EAEC that the **Joint Research Centres** and the **Joint European Torus** were established. Beyond research, the EAEC may also help states to acquire nuclear ores and materials: supply policy is administered through the EAEC Supply Agency. While bound by the obligations of professional secrecy, the Commission is entitled to receive details of all relevant patents sought or obtained in the member states. In certain circumstances, it may seek licences to use them through a compulsory purchase order, although this would probably be impossible to implement without the consent of the member state concerned. There have also been several initiatives on **health and safety** standards for workers in the industry. The task of the routine monitoring of nuclear installations is, however, the responsibility of the member states.

From its inception the EAEC was considered the least significant of the founding communities, and its identity and sense of autonomy essentially disappeared following its merger with the European Communities executives in 1967 (see **Merger Treaty**). The EU continues to rely on nuclear energy for around 25% of its electricity production. As part of the process of **Brexit**, the **United Kingdom** was required to leave Euratom, membership of which requires compliance with the jurisdiction of the **Court of Justice**.

EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY (EASA): See Air Transport Policy

The **EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT** (EBRD) was established as a body, the purpose of which was initially to provide aid for countries in **Central and Eastern Europe** that had adopted a democratic form of government and had managed the transition towards stable market economies. A proposal from the French President, François Mitterrand, for the creation of such a body to assist these regions was accepted in December 1989 by the **European Council in Strasbourg**, which also agreed to the participation of other Western countries (something that had not been part of the original French proposal). The EBRD was sited in London, the **United Kingdom**, and its first President was Jacques Attali, a close associate of Mitterrand. The bank began operations in March 1991 with a membership of European and other countries belonging to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the **European Communities** (EC, now the European Union, EU) and the **European Investment Bank** (EIB). The EC took a 51% stake in the enterprise, which set out to help eligible countries with market transition, privatization programmes, direct investment and environmental rehabilitation. In 1992 participation was extended to the successor states of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR). It was affected by scandal in 1993 when it was disclosed that it had spent more on furnishing its headquarters in London and on expense accounts than it had advanced in loans. In addition, there was a strong view that its establishment had been primarily a political gesture, since it could not provide anything the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD—World Bank) did not already make available. Attali was replaced by Jacques de Larosière (1993–98). It was under the latter's tenure that the EBRD secured international credibility and began to see returns from its investments in Central and Eastern Europe. The EBRD has a subscribed capital totalling some €29,800m. and a triple-A credit rating. The EBRD played a significant role in the redevelopment of many countries, including the former Soviet states and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as countries in North Africa. In 2006 the EBRD signalled that from 2010 it intended to shift funding away from the countries of the Baltic region and Central Europe and instead towards Armenia, Kazakhstan, the **Russian Federation, Ukraine** and Uzbekistan. The EBRD now provides financing for banks, industries and businesses. As well as stimulating economic transformation, the EBRD has promoted political change, with loans conditional on guarantees that countries apply the principles of multi-party democracy and are openly pluralist. By 2021 a total of 70 countries (as well as the EU and the EIB) had placed capital subscriptions with the EBRD and the EBRD was working in more than 30 countries in Europe, Central Asia and the Mediterranean. Suma Chakrabarti

became President of the EBRD in 2012, and he was re-elected for a second four-year term in 2016–20. Odile Renaud-Basso was elected to succeed him.

The **EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY** (EBA) was established in January 2011 as part of the **European System of Financial Supervision** (ESFS). It was designed to exist as an independent European Union (EU) authority tasked with maintaining financial stability in the EU and to this end ensuring effective and constant prudential regulation across the entire European banking sector. The EBA took over all the former responsibilities and tasks of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors. Its main task was to help establish a European **single rulebook** for the banking industry, as well as to identify the potential risks and vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector. The Chairperson of the EBA is tasked with representing the EBA externally, and is responsible for chairing the EBA's meetings and preparing the work of its board of advisers. The EBA's Executive Director is responsible for implementing the EBA's annual work programme and preparing the work of the management board. The current Chairman is José Manuel Campa, who was appointed for a five-year term in March 2019.

EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD: See **FRONTEX**

The **EUROPEAN BROADCASTING UNION** (EBU) is an international federation of broadcasting organizations formed in 1950 and based in Geneva, **Switzerland**. It has 69 members, which represent 115 organizations based in 56 countries. The EBU has encouraged collaboration and development within European broadcasting, especially in terms of increasing the European content of programming, but it has no authority over national broadcasting networks. It has collaborated with the **European Commission** on several initiatives. Its most recognizable broadcast, outside sport, is the annual Eurovision Song Contest.

The **EUROPEAN BUSINESS AND INNOVATION CENTRE NETWORK** (EBN) is a **European Commission** initiative to encourage **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs), and to ensure that they are able to benefit from European Union **competition policy** and the **single market**. It is essentially an advisory body that disseminates information on innovations and ideas to companies. (See also **Invest Europe**; and **Business and Innovation Centres**.)

The **EUROPEAN CAPITAL OF CULTURE**, which was known as the European City of Culture until 1999, is one of the best-known examples of the fledgling cultural policy of the European Communities (EC). The

programme dates from 1985 and is now funded as part of the EU's **cultural policy**. It has become one of most sought-after titles among cities across Europe. Cities are given a subsidy by the **European Commission** and were formerly chosen by member states. A new selection procedure was adopted in 2005, in order to enable the new member states to participate. Since 2009 there have been two annual capitals of culture from member states. Rijeka (**Croatia**) and Galway (**Ireland**) were selected as the capitals of culture for 2020 (extended into 2021 owing to the impact of the **COVID-19** pandemic). From 2021 cities from both candidate countries and potential candidate countries are eligible to be designated as a capital of culture. The upcoming capitals of culture for 2022 are Kaunas (**Lithuania**) and Esch (**Luxembourg**).

The **EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK** (ECB) has long been held to be essential to **economic and monetary union** (EMU) as a body with powers to issue the European single currency (the **euro**) and control monetary policy for the 19 members of the **eurozone**. At its core the ECB is tasked with managing the euro and safeguarding price stability. Its origins lie in the **Treaty on European Union**, which confirmed that the ECB would come into operation at the beginning of the third stage of EMU, between 1997 and 1999. A **European Monetary Institute** (EMI) preceded the ECB. In 1993 it was agreed that the ECB would be located in Frankfurt am Main, **Germany**, and it was formally established in June 1998. The first President, appointed for a period of eight years, was Wim Duisenberg. He was replaced in July 2003 by Jean-Claude Trichet, formerly Governor of the Banque de France, who was, in turn, succeeded by **Mario Draghi**, the erstwhile Governor of the Bank of Italy, in November 2011. In mid-2019 **Christine Lagarde** was nominated to become the new Governor of the ECB from November.

Prior to the launching of stage three of EMU in January 1999 the ECB's capital was just under €4,000m. The national central banks of the member states are the only subscribers to and holders of the ECB's capital. The ECB Governing Council initially set the percentage shares of the national central banks of the member states in the ECB's capital in June 1998 (based on the member states' respective shares in the gross domestic product and population of the European Communities). They were subsequently revised, with effect from 1 January 2004 and were revised again following the 2004, 2007 and 2013 **enlargements** of the European Union (EU). According to the ECB, at 29 December 2020 the contributions of the national central banks of eurozone member states to the ECB's capital were as follows: **Austria** 2.3804; **Belgium** 2.9630; **Cyprus** 0.1750; **Estonia** 0.2291; **Finland** 1.4939; **France** 16.6108; **Germany** 21.4394; **Greece** 2.0117; **Ireland** 1.3772; **Italy** 13.8165; **Latvia** 0.3169; **Lithuania** 0.4707; **Luxembourg** 0.2679; **Malta** 0.0853; the **Netherlands** 4.7662; **Portugal** 1.9035; **Slovakia** 0.9314; **Slovenia** 0.3916 and **Spain** 9.6981.

The 25-member Governing Council of the ECB is the main **decision-making** body of the Eurosystem. It comprises all the members of the Executive Board of the ECB, as well as the governors and/or presidents of all the national central banks where the euro has been adopted. The Governing Council takes the most important and strategically significant decisions for the Eurosystem. When taking decisions on monetary policy and on other tasks of the Eurosystem, the members of the Governing Council are expected to act with mind to the overall economy in a fully independent capacity.

The Governing Council meets twice a month, usually on the first and third Thursday. Interest rate decisions are normally discussed at the first meeting of the month only. The President of the EU Council/**Eurogroup** and a member of the **European Commission** are entitled to attend these meetings, but they do not have a vote. A simple majority determines votes and where a tie occurs, the President has the casting vote. Although the proceedings of the meetings are confidential, the Governing Council makes the outcome of its deliberations public, primarily those about setting the key interest rates. The number of staff of the ECB totalled around 2,650 in 2016. Notably, its members come from all countries of the EU. In the early days, the EMI and the ECB recruited many staff from the national central banks of the EU member states, but now the ECB also attracts staff members from other sectors. Under the terms of the **Treaty of Lisbon** (Article 13) the ECB was upgraded to the status of an EU institution. A new, purpose-built headquarters in Frankfurt was completed in late 2014, and opened in March 2015. From November 2014 the ECB assumed a central role in supervising banks within the eurozone under the new rules of the **banking union**, as part of the **Single Supervisory Mechanism**.

On 12 March 2020, in response to the economic disruption caused throughout the EU by the **COVID-19** pandemic, the ECB announced an expansion of its programme of quantitative easing, through, *inter alia*, €120,000m. of additional bond purchases, together with the provision of more favourable rates of interest for banks. Following a more significant curtailment of consumer and economic activity throughout EU member states amid the spread of the pandemic, on 18 March the ECB announced the launch of a temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, a new asset-purchasing scheme worth €750,000m. (increased to €1,350,000m. on 4 June and to €1,850,000m. on 10 December), together with a commitment to protect the eurozone.

The **EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL** (ECDC) became operational in May 2005, in Stockholm, **Sweden**. The ECDC enables the EU to share its disease control expertise more effectively and allows multinational investigation teams to be drawn up effectively. The first European conference on vaccination and immunization, Eurovaccine 2009, was organized and funded by the ECDC, and convened in

Sweden in December 2009; further conferences took place thereafter. Meanwhile, during 2006–08 the EU member states, and **Iceland** and **Norway**, implemented the Vaccine European New Integrated Collaboration Effort (VENICE) project, which aimed to broaden knowledge and best practice on vaccination; VENICE II was launched in December 2008 to cover 2009–13 and VENICE III came into force in December 2013. In 2020–21 the ECDC was monitoring the novel coronavirus disease (**COVID-19**), which was first recorded in the People’s Republic of China at the end of 2019.

The **EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING** (Cedefop) is a service agency of the **European Commission**, established in 1975. Originally located in Berlin, Cedefop relocated to Thessaloníki, **Greece**, in 1995. It is charged with the task of encouraging the development of vocational and in-service training for adults, and of standardizing national qualifications. It assists the Commission in the preparation of European Union training programmes. A council, consisting of representatives from the national governments, employers, trade unions and the Commission, directs its work. Cedefop is closely involved with the **European Training Foundation**, with **Eurostat** and with the Lifelong Learning Programme.

EUROPEAN CITY OF CULTURE: See **European Capital of Culture**

The **EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY** (ECSC) was the body that emerged from the **Schuman Plan**. It was established by the **Treaty of Paris** of 18 April 1951, which was effective from 23 July 1952 until 23 July 2002 when the ECSC was disbanded. One of the greatest difficulties during the negotiations between **France** and West **Germany** centred on the scope and content of the **competition policy** provisions and, specifically, French demands for further German decartelization, but agreement was finally reached. Formed by the **Six** European states (**Belgium**, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, **Italy**, **Luxembourg** and the **Netherlands**) that later went on to create the **European Economic Community** (EEC) and the **European Atomic Energy Community** (EAEC or Euratom), the ECSC had as its general objective the fostering of ‘economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living’ in the member states through the development of a common market in coal and steel. The common market would commence after a transitional period of five years.

The ECSC’s historic importance lies in the fact that it was the first European organization to embrace **supranationalism**. This was represented by the executive High Authority, which was complemented as an executive by a Council of Ministers. Its indirectly elected Assembly, though possessing only advisory powers, was the first European assembly with a legally guaranteed

basis. The other institutions of the ECSC were a **Court of Justice** as a final arbiter of the Treaty of Paris, and a Consultative Committee of representatives of national interest groups. This institutional framework was the model used later for the EEC.

The ECSC presided over a large expansion in output in the 1950s, although this was as much the result of world economic conditions as of the ECSC. However, it failed to cope satisfactorily with a major crisis in the coal industry in 1959 and to overcome the many barriers to the establishment of a common market. Moreover, it did not by itself make much progress towards political integration. One of its major problems was that it was difficult to achieve co-ordination and integration in only one economic sector; it was difficult, if not impossible, to isolate coal and steel from the national economies in general. This was a major reason for the switch by the Six from **sectoral integration** to the broader EEC.

With the establishment of the EEC and Euratom, the ECSC lost all its independent institutions except for its two executive bodies. In 1967 these were merged with those of the other two European Communities (EC). The ECSC continued, however, to have a semi-independent existence, with its own source of revenue, derived from a direct levy upon coal and steel producers, and its own budget out of which it financed development and restructuring plans for the industries. It also set prices and supervised production levels in the coal and steel industries. Much of its activity had to be devoted to helping remedy the severe social and economic consequences of the reduction in the workforces of both industries through early retirement schemes, retraining and redeployment, especially in those regions where these industries had traditionally dominated the local economy. The **European Commission** inherited the powers of the old High Authority over the coal and steel industries, powers that were much more substantial than in most policy areas of the EC, and used them to the extent of seeking the declaration of a state of manifest crisis, which gave the Commission even greater powers of direction and punishment. A state of manifest crisis was declared in the steel industry between 1980 and 1988.

The **EUROPEAN COMMISSION**, officially known as the Commission of the European Union (after the **Treaty of Lisbon**), was established as one of the two executive institutions of the European Communities (EC). As opposed to the then Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), which represents the member states, the Commission has been regarded as both the European, or supranational, and the administrative arm of the European Union (EU) executive. The term refers to the collectivity of, first, the College of Commissioners (in 2019–24, for example, numbering 27, including the executive head of the institution), and second, the administrative apparatus that serves them. The Commission employed a workforce of some 32,000 people in 2020. These were mainly based in **Brussels**, but some were

in **Luxembourg**, in EU offices in member states, or in delegations to non-member countries. Others, primarily engaged in scientific projects, are located in centres throughout the EU.

Under the treaty base, the Commission was charged with bringing policy proposals forward and it holds the monopoly on policy initiation. It is also charged with operating as the ‘guardian of the treaties’. In terms of supervision, the Commission was given a general responsibility to ensure that other EU institutions and the member states fulfilled those tasks and provisions assigned to them under the **founding treaties**. It had a duty to ensure that **decisions** taken by the Council and, increasingly the norm after 2009, by the Council and the **European Parliament** (EP) under the **co-decision procedure**, are carried out, or adhered to, by the member states. Most EU **legislation** is implemented, not at the EU level, but at the national level, and the Commission has a duty to see that legislation is implemented correctly and on time. If implementation does not occur, the Commission is empowered to bring the recalcitrant states before the judges of the **Court of Justice**, where fines can be levied against the states in question. In addition to these general areas of constitutional obligation, the Commission came to enjoy further and significant autonomous authority in the operation of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP) and **competition policy**. A further area of autonomy lay, after the 1967 **Merger Treaty**, in its inheritance of the substantial decision-making powers of the previous High Authority of the **European Coal and Steel Community**, which gave it the right to act without regard to the Council of Ministers.

These ‘constitutional’ powers do not give a complete picture of the overall role acquired by the European Commission since 1957. The extent of its activities, along with its unelected nature, has made it the most controversial of the EU institutions. The **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) made few constitutional changes to the Commission’s role. Some of those changes recognized an extension of its competence, while others perhaps indicated a reduction in its independence (see below) as the powers of the EP were extended and the European Council became more of an agenda setter. Moreover, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** stipulated that the EP must formally approve the President of the Commission. The Treaty also enhanced the authority of the President as the Commission prepared to review its organization and procedures prior to **enlargement**.

The Commission is also responsible for the financial management of the EU. It prepares the preliminary draft annual **budget** that must be submitted to both the Council of the European Union and the EP for approval and adoption. It is further responsible for the administration of the budget and the allocation of money from the budget to the **structural and cohesion funds**, other programmes and salaries. The TEU imposed more stringent controls and **accountability** on the Commission. An additional responsibility is the representation of the EU abroad. It is the Commission that negotiates international agreements on behalf of the EU. Finally, the Commission has become widely

regarded as the body that deals with the problems and issues that other EU institutions cannot or will not tackle. An activist Commission can seek to utilize this role to maintain the momentum of integration as has occurred in the past, for example, in relation to both the **single market** and the **single currency** initiatives.

The Commissioners meet formally, as the College of Commissioners, once a week to discuss an agenda that has been prepared in advance. Additional and sometimes more informal meetings can be held to discuss general questions of European development, or more specific problems. If a majority of Commissioners are present, a meeting is considered to be quorate and a simple majority takes decisions. Once the Commission has taken a decision, however, its members are expected to abide by the principle of collective responsibility.

On assuming office, each Commissioner has to take an oath of loyalty to the EU, swearing that they will serve EU interests exclusively, and will not seek or take instructions from any national government or other body. Commissioners are appointed for a five-year term, which is renewable. The fact that about one-half are not reappointed for a further term suggests that Commissioners who act more independently than their governments might wish do not receive a further nomination. Most Commissioners have previously been national politicians, and normally belong to the party, or one of the parties, making up the government that submits their nomination. A few have previously been university academics, bureaucrats, industrialists or trade union leaders. There is no means of dismissal other than by a collective vote of censure in the EP. Since 1995 terms of office for Commissioners have begun after the election of the EP and typically coincided with the duration of the Parliament. Since 2004 each member state has been entitled to nominate one Commissioner, so that there is one Commissioner for each member state.

Each Commissioner has a portfolio, which usually consists of several areas of policy responsibility, and which may not correspond exactly to the fields of activity of the **Directorates-General** (DGs) and the special services that together constitute the administrative arm of the EU. While the relevant sections of the bureaucracy report directly to the appropriate Commissioners, the latter have adopted the French practice of employing **Cabinets**, a group of personally appointed advisers and aides answerable solely to their Commissioner, providing him or her with assistance and liaising with other Commissioners and the various parts of the administration.

The EP can dismiss the Commission en bloc through a vote of censure. In January 1999 the EP's Socialist group (see **Group of the Party of European Socialists**) presented a censure motion, in order to ensure the Commission's accountability in the face of allegations of fraud, financial mismanagement and nepotism. Although a compromise deal ensured that the motion was defeated, concessions won by the EP during the dispute were widely felt to mark a significant reduction in the extent of the Commission's perceived autonomy. This was reinforced two months later, when an independent report into the allegations found considerable evidence of incompetence and corruption and,

while detailing charges against several Commissioners, also judged the Commission to be collectively responsible for a ‘dysfunctional’ political environment, marked by a culture of evasion and an absence of leadership. In March 1999, for the first time in its history, the Commission resigned en masse. The Commissioners retained their positions and exercised limited duties until a new Commission was appointed. The Treaty of Nice made a further significant alteration to rules pertaining to the **nomination procedure** for the Commission. Under its terms, the nomination of the President became a matter for the European Council acting by **qualified majority**, rather than unanimity. The Treaty of Nice increased the Commission President’s powers to allow him or her to decide on how the Commission is structured internally; to enable him or her to allocate portfolios, and if necessary, to reassign policy portfolios; and to enable him or her to demand the resignation of an individual Commissioner.

From 2014, under the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon, the heads of state and of government of the EU member states have nominated an individual for the post of Commission President. The EP must then elect the nominee by majority vote; if the Parliament fails to elect the nominated candidate, a new candidate must be nominated within a period of one month. The governments of member states then nominate the other members of the Commission, who must be approved by the EP. In the performance of their duties, the members of the Commission are forbidden to seek or accept instructions from any government or other body, or to engage in any other paid or unpaid professional activity. Each member state is entitled to put forward one candidate as its prospective Commissioner. The Commissioners are nominated by the national governments but, since the **Treaty of Nice**, only after intensive consultation with the Commission President, who is chosen first and who will determine the policy portfolio for each Commissioner. Formally, governments submit nominations for approval by the Council of the European Union, but in practice each Commissioner-designate must appear before the EP to answer questions about his or her aims and objectives over the next five years. The EP must take a vote to approve all of the Commissioners. Strong opposition within the EP in respect of the competence of some individuals is increasingly sufficient to compel a Commissioner-designate to stand aside.

Before the TEU, the President of the European Commission was appointed by the Council of Ministers for a two-year term, but in practice this was automatically extended to four years, with Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors serving even longer. Former Presidents of the Commission and the years of their appointment are as follows: Walter Hallstein 1958; Jean Rey 1967; Franco Maria Malfatti 1970; Sacco Mansholt (see **Mansholt Plan**) 1972; François-Xavier Ortoli 1973; Roy Jenkins 1977; Gaston Thorn 1981; Jacques Delors 1985; Jacques Santer 1995; Romano Prodi 1999. The **European Council** appointed José Manuel Durão Barroso as President in 2004 and again in 2009, and the EP subsequently approved this appointment. As mentioned above, the EP had been given the right to elect the Commission president and

the EP signalled its selection of Jean-Claude Juncker, a former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, as its choice for the new Commission President (2014–19), following the success of the **European People's Party** at the 2014 EP elections. The EP's support for Juncker presented a challenge to the **European Council's** traditional role of choosing the Commission president (see **Spitzenkandidaten process**). The European Council subsequently endorsed the EP's candidate in June 2014; 26 member states agreed to the selection of Juncker, with only the Prime Ministers of **Hungary (Viktor Orbán)** and the UK (**David Cameron**) voting against him. The EP formally approved Juncker in July. The EP and the European Council endorsed the Commission selected by Juncker in late October, and the Juncker Commission took office on 1 November. Juncker added some innovation in terms of structure to his Commission by allocating the Commissioners to clusters of activities and responsibilities. Thus, new 'Project Teams' were created, each headed by a Vice-President, and falling under the headings of: a connected **digital single market**; a deeper and fairer economic and monetary union; a new boost for jobs, growth and investment; a resilient energy union with a forward-looking climate change policy; and a stronger global actor.

A new Commission took office on 1 December 2019, led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, who became its first female President; von der Leyen had been formally nominated for the role by the European Council in early July, and was approved by the EP in mid-July.

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION: See CENELEC

The **EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR IRON AND STEEL STANDARDS** (ECISS) is a body established in 1986 that replaced an Iron and Steel Nomenclature and Co-ordinating Committee. Its purpose was to replace national iron and steel standards with common European standards.

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION: See CEN

The **EUROPEAN COMMITTEE TO COMBAT DRUGS** (CELAD) was a group within the **TREVI** framework established in December 1989. The idea originated with French President François Mitterrand, who wanted to tackle the growing drugs problem in Europe. It was intended to follow up work carried out since 1971 by the so-called Pompidou Group of the **Council of Europe** on the promotion of collaborative measures within the European Communities (EC) and between the EC and other states and international organizations on drugs-related problems and issues, especially the illegal traffic in drugs, the monitoring of drugs that have a potential for being misused, and the prevention of the laundering of money gained from drug-trafficking. The

Pompidou initiative had been purely intergovernmental, and outside the EC framework. Mitterrand's idea envisaged a specific EC angle, greater political co-ordination among the member states and a role for the Commission. Mitterrand's proposal led to the creation of the ad hoc European Committee to Combat Drugs group (CELAD) as a first step in this direction. Agreement on the **Treaty on European Union** (1991) provided the first references to drugs in the European Union (EU) treaty base and led to the creation of the **European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction** (EMCDDA) in 1994.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC) is a term that described the unified body that resulted from the merger in 1967 of the administrative networks of the **European Economic Community** (EEC), the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC) and the **European Atomic Energy Community** (EAEC or Euratom). The term was also formerly used to describe collectively the signatories of the three Communities' **founding treaties** and their territories. The singular of the term (European Community) was widely used as an alternative for both meanings.

The main institutions of the EC were the **European Commission**, the **Council of the European Union** (known as the Council of Ministers until November 1993), the **European Parliament** and the **Court of Justice**. Under the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), signed in 1992, the EC institutions became one of the then three **pillars** of the broader European Union (EU). Although European Union was subsequently the preferred term for the collective member states, it nevertheless remained correct to refer to the relevant institutions as the EC and to the law made by the Court of Justice as EC law.

Following the first **enlargement** beyond the original **Six** member states, the EC expanded progressively and by January 2007 had **Twenty-Seven** member states (and the EU had **Twenty-Eight** members upon the accession of **Croatia** in 2013 and prior to **Brexit**). The **Treaty of Lisbon** replaced all references to the European Communities in favour of the term European Union. The EC as such ceased to exist, although Euratom continued to operate as the last remaining 'community'.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC) was the often-used singular of the term **European Communities**. Following **ratification** of the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), it also became the official title of the **European Economic Community** (EEC). The **Treaty of Lisbon** replaced all references to the EC in favour of the term **European Union**. With the Treaty of Lisbon's entry into force, the EC ceased to exist.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACTION SCHEME FOR THE MOBILITY OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS: See **ERASMUS**

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF CONSUMER CO-OPERATIVES: See **European Consumer Consultative Group**

EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE: See **Company Law Statute**

The **EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVES AND REFORMISTS GROUP** (ECR) was established as a **political group** within the **European Parliament** (EP) in June 2009. It is considered a moderately **Eurosceptic** party. The group owes its origins primarily to the British Conservative Party under **David Cameron**, who carried out his earlier promise to withdraw his **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs) from what he considered the more 'Eurofederalist' stance of the **Group of the European People's Party**. Following elections to the EP in May 2019, the ECR held 62 of the total of 751 seats. Its membership was dominated by the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice Party), which accounted for 26 MEPs. The leaders of the ECR group are Raffaele Fitto and Ryszard Legutko.

The **EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUSION ENERGY (EUROfusion)** was established by the **European Commission** in October 2014, superseding the **European Fusion Development Agreement**. Twenty-nine research organizations and universities from 26 EU member states, plus Switzerland, signed the EUROfusion consortium agreement in that year, with the objective of realizing fusion electricity by 2050. EUROfusion superseded the European Fusion Development Agreement, which itself succeeded **Joint European Torus**, one of the world's largest fusion experiments, in 2000.

EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION: See **Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe**

The **EUROPEAN CONSUMER CONSULTATIVE GROUP** (ECCG) was established, as the Consumer Committee, in 1995 as a successor to the Consumers' Consultative Council (CCC), a body that had been established as the Consumer Consultative Committee in 1973. The CCC had been active in forwarding opinions and proposals for action to the Commission. However, by 1995 it had 48 members, which meant that it found it difficult to co-ordinate the views of its disparate membership. A Consumer Committee, appointed by the **European Commission**, and consisting of 20 members, therefore replaced it. The Consumer Committee was rebranded the European

Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) in October 2003 and is the Commission's preferred forum for engaging with consumer organizations. It meets in **Brussels, Belgium**, four times per year. Membership is made up of one member from each of the European Consumers' Organization (BEUC), the European Association for the Co-ordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation (ANEC), the Confederation of Family Organizations in the European Union (COFACE), the European Community of Consumer Cooperatives (Euro Coop), the **European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)** and the Institut Européen Interrégional de la Consommation (IEIC—a grouping of regional bodies concerned with consumer affairs), together with two observers from **Iceland** and **Norway**, and representatives from member states. A senior official from the **Directorate-General** in charge of consumer policy chairs meetings. The Commission consults the ECCG, an advisory body, on proposed initiatives that may have a bearing on consumer interests.

EUROPEAN CONSUMERS' ORGANIZATION (BEUC): See **European Consumer Consultative Group**

The **EUROPEAN CONVENTION**, formally the **Convention on the Future of Europe**, and not to be confused with the **European Convention on Human Rights**, was launched on 28 February 2002 under the leadership of the former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It brought together representatives of the heads of governments and of the parliaments of the member states and the **candidate countries**, and representatives from the **European Commission** and the **European Parliament**, as well as a number of observers. In total there were 207 participants (including alternates) whose task was to debate the issues raised by the **Laeken Declaration** and formulate an agenda for the **intergovernmental conference (IGC)** that began work in October 2003.

The Convention was modelled on that which successfully drafted the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** in 2000, and was a response to growing concerns about popular perceptions of the remoteness of IGCs. Supporters of the Convention believed that it was more likely than an IGC to reach decisions on the future of the European Union (EU) that would accurately reflect the concerns and wishes of EU citizens. While this may have been a key assumption behind the launching of the Convention, the deliberations of the 207 participants failed to generate much popular interest. The same was generally true of the Convention's output, the **draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, which was adopted 'by consensus' in June and July 2003 and forwarded to the **European Council**.

The **EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS**, the full title of which is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms, is a document sponsored in 1950 by the **Council of Europe**. It represents an unprecedented system of international protection for **human rights** and enables individuals to apply to the courts for the enforcement of their rights. It came into operation in 1953. All the member states of the European Union (EU) are signatories to the Convention and, in accepting it, the EU has also accepted the role and predominance in this area of the associated **European Court of Human Rights**. The EU drew up its own **Charter of Fundamental Rights**, which was proclaimed in 2000. The **Treaty of Lisbon**, like the abandoned **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, contains a provision committing the EU to accede to the Convention.

EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH: See COST

EUROPEAN COUNCIL is the name used to describe meetings of the heads of state or government of European Union (EU) member states, their foreign ministers, and senior officials of the **European Commission**. It should not be confused with the **Council of Europe**, which is an entirely unrelated body, nor should it be identified too closely with the **Council of the European Union**. The **Treaty of Rome** made no provision for the existence of the European Council, and this created some lack of clarity about its constitutional position in, and relationship to, the European Communities (EC). The Treaty had stipulated the Council of Ministers (see Council of the European Union) as the only executive body in the EC representing the national governments. No provision was made for meetings of the heads of state or government, and the latter at first seemingly paid little attention to EC affairs, meeting on only three occasions during the first decade. The problems of the 1960s and the **Luxembourg Compromise** suggested that if the member states were serious about membership of the EC, then the heads of government, who ultimately controlled the Council of Ministers, should become more directly involved, particularly in order to give a strategic purpose to the EC on a range of issues where the normal institutional framework could not proceed without the consent of the national governments.

Four ad hoc **summit meetings** were held between 1969 and 1974. At the fourth, in Paris, **France**, the government leaders accepted 'the need for an overall approach to the internal problems in achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe'; they agreed that they should meet on a regular basis under the rubric of the European Council. **Enlargement** of the EU from 2004 prompted consideration of establishing a **President of the European Council** who would hold office for two-and-a-half years.

Before the **ratification** of the **Single European Act** (SEA), the European Council had no legal recognition within the EC. This suited the interests of the member states, since the more informal atmosphere gave them freedom to

discuss broad questions of politics and policy without the pressure of having to come to a decision. The European Council became the only EC institution where such broad-ranging discussions could occur.

Meetings are not attended by large numbers of national officials and advisers. Only the foreign ministers accompany their leaders. The only other participants are the President of the European Commission, one of the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary-General. The European Council gatherings also provide an opportunity for informal discussion of more sensitive topics outside the scheduled plenary sessions.

The European Council became central to the EU. Its emergence confirmed that nothing could be achieved unless the member states were in agreement, and almost all major advances from the mid-1980s occurred as a result of European Council agreement on their desirability. However, its presence has sometimes hindered effective decision making at lower EU levels. Because ultimate authority rests with the government leaders, they have often been expected to resolve relatively minor issues, which other agencies were competent, but either unwilling or unable, to deal with.

The position of the European Council within the EC was acknowledged and regularized by the SEA. It is another version of the Council of the European Union, albeit the most senior. When the European Council takes policy **decisions** that conform to the constitutional requirements of the **founding treaties**, they have the force of EU **legislation**. More generally, European Council agreements are framed as general principles or a broad consensus on future action, which are then passed on to the European Commission and the Council of the European Union for further research, discussion and possible adoption. The **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) strengthened the role of the European Council further. It was directly responsible for two former **pillars** of the EU: the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) and **justice and home affairs** (JHA). It is also the body to which changes in **economic and monetary union** (EMU) are reported and which puts forward further guidelines for EMU. The European Council's decisions have normally been taken on the basis of **unanimity**, although a vote has sometimes been employed to overcome the resistance of one or two member states. In 2002 new rules governing the organization and proceedings of the European Council were adopted to ensure its effective functioning in the new EU of **Twenty-Seven**. These effectively limited the duration of the meetings to two days, enhanced the preparatory role of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, limited the size of each meeting and, as with formations of the Council of the European Union, strengthened the role of the Presidency as Chair.

In practice, all formal meetings of the European Council were held in Brussels from the second half of 2003. Meetings of the European Council typically take place four times a year (although additional meetings can be scheduled). The **Treaty of Lisbon** finally provided for the election by **qualified majority** of a President of the European Council to give greater

EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT

coherence and direction to EU initiatives. This post lasts for a period of two-and-a-half years with the possibility of one further term. The European Council thereby became a fully fledged EU institution, although it did not gain any new powers. It was initially headed by Herman Van Rompuy (in office in 2009–14). On 1 December 2014 **Donald Tusk** replaced Van Rompuy as President; Tusk was re-elected in March 2017. Tusk's term expired at the end of November 2019. In early July of that year the European Council elected Belgian Prime Minister **Charles Michel** to become the President of the European Council from 1 December 2019 to 31 May 2022.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENT: see **President of the European Council**

The **EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CENTRE** (ECTC) was established as a department within **Europol** in January 2016, based in The Hague, the **Netherlands**. After lethal terrorist attacks in Paris, **France** in 2015 (which remained a target for acts of terrorism, together with other EU member states), in November 2015 EU justice and home affairs ministers urged the **European Commission** to augment its counter-terrorism capability. The ECTC was intended to become an enhanced centralized source of information for member states, to facilitate improved information-sharing and operational co-ordination between national law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism. The ECTC was to have a focus on identifying and halting sources of terrorist financing, online terrorist propaganda and extremist material, and illegal arms trafficking, and prosecuting individuals considered liable to carry out terrorist attacks. Manuel Navarrete Paniagua, a senior Spanish Guardia Civil officer who accumulated substantial counter-terrorism experience during his time at Europol, was appointed as the Director of the ECTC. At January 2018 the ECTC comprised 81 members of staff and 14 experts seconded from member states.

The **EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS** (ECA) was established in 1977, under the 1975 Treaty of **Brussels**. The European Court of Auditors scrutinizes the accounts of European Union (EU) institutions and any agencies handling EU funds in order to verify that they possess satisfactory financial management, with all revenue having been legally received and all expenditure properly accounted for. The Court is based in Luxembourg and publishes an annual report providing details of its activities and findings, which is presented to the **European Parliament** (EP) and the **Council of the European Union**. The EP analyses this annual report and needs to decide whether or not to approve the way in which the **European Commission** has handled the budget. Cases of fraud and other financial irregularities are passed to OLAF (the **European Anti-Fraud Office**).

The Court may, either on its own initiative or at the request of another EU institution, prepare other, more specific reports. The Court has in the past drawn attention to the existence of wasteful expenditure in several policy areas, and on a few occasions has found evidence of financial mismanagement. Its role has been important in forcing the EU institutions to improve their procedures and introduce more effective financial regimes. The **Treaty on European Union** elevated the Court to the status of an EU institution, with the consequent implications on legality and **decision-making** authority. Its status was further enhanced by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, which aimed to ensure better financial management of EU monies by introducing measures to curtail fraud, by extending the ECA's auditing powers to the then second and third **pillars**, and by giving it an additional right to refer cases to the **Court of Justice**. The ECA provides and audits all of the EU's revenue and expenditure. It examines accounts and produces a sound annual financial management plan. It also provides the EP and the Council of the European Union with a statement of assurance.

The membership of the Court consists of one individual from each member state, and the ECA has a total staff of around 1,000. Appointments to the Court are made by the Council of the European Union for renewable six-year terms and by **qualified majority voting** on the basis of a list drawn up in accordance with proposals made by each member state. In practice, however, the Council simply endorses the candidates put forward by the member states. In making the appointments, the Council must normally select individuals who belong to, or have had experience of, the external audit departments of their own national administration. Exceptionally, individuals with other special qualifications may also be eligible for appointment. The Court elects its President from among its own members, for a renewable term of three years. In 2016 Klaus-Heiner Lehne succeeded Vítor Manuel da Silva Caldeira as President; his term was renewed in 2019.

The **EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS**, which is based in **Strasbourg**, operates under the aegis of the **Council of Europe**. It hears cases concerning individuals and practices in those states that are party to the **European Convention on Human Rights**. Individuals or the **European Commission of Human Rights** may bring cases to the Court. All the member states of the European Union (EU) have ratified the Convention, and the EU has accepted the jurisdiction of this court in the sphere of **human rights**.

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: See **Court of Justice**

EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT: See **ECU**

The **EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY** (EDA) was established in July 2004 to support member states' efforts to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain and improve the **Common Security and Defence Policy**. The EDA's principal functions relate to defence capabilities development; armaments co-operation; the European defence technological and industrial base and defence equipment market; and research and technology. It also provides a forum for defence ministers to meet. All the EU member states, with the exception of **Denmark**, participate in the EDA.

The **EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY** (EDC) was an initiative based on the 1950 Plevin Plan (named after a former French premier, René Plevin). It was established by a treaty signed in Paris, in May 1952, by representatives of the **Six** states that had formed the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC). Attempts to persuade other European countries to join the venture failed. The origins of the EDC lay in the evaluation by the **USA**, as a result of the Korean War, of its global commitments, and in US demands for greater European support for the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), either by increased expenditure or through the rearmament of the Federal Republic of **Germany** (FRG—West Germany). However, no state was willing to consider increased expenditure, and none, apart from the FRG, really desired West German rearmament. The EDC was a device to permit rearmament without a separate and independent West German military contingent under national command. It also served a European purpose, being viewed as a further sectoral advance towards integration, with an institutional framework modelled upon that of the ECSC. Unlike the ECSC, however, it was not to be a partnership of equals: more restrictions would be placed upon the FRG.

The proposal provoked a great deal of opposition throughout the Six, but especially in **France**. No French government, fearing defeat, dared for some time to submit the treaty to a parliamentary vote. The French legislature finally defeated it on a technicality in August 1954, and the EDC project was abandoned. West German rearmament nevertheless took place on a national basis within NATO, supervised, at least implicitly, by the newly created but virtually non-existent **Western European Union** (WEU). At the same time, the collapse of the EDC was widely regarded as a major reverse for European integration. (See also **European Political Community**.)

EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE: See **Group of the European Democratic Alliance**

EUROPEAN DEPOSITORY LIBRARIES: See **DEP**

The **EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND** (EDF) was established under the terms of the First Yaoundé Convention of 1963, and was retained in the subsequent **Lomé Conventions** between the European Communities (EC) and the **African, Caribbean and Pacific** (ACP) states. It was set up to provide grants to the ACP states for development programmes, focusing after 1984 on rural and agricultural projects, and on broad integrated development programmes. As the member states were signatories of the 1963 Convention in their own right, and as they wished to control spending in this area, the EDF was not included in the development section of the European Union (EU) **budget**. Under the **Cotonou Agreement**, the EDF for 2008–13 was allocated €22,682m., of which €21,966m. was for the ACP countries. (See also **Development Aid**.) In 2011 the **European Commission** put forward a number of new proposals that would determine the future direction of the EDF. In negotiating the 11th EDF the Commission sought to maintain the EDF as a separate fund outside the EU budget; to increase the overall amount by some 13%, to €30,300m.; and to improve the democratic scrutiny of the EDF. In the agreement for the new **financial perspective** (2014–20) some €6,500m. was allocated towards the 11th EDF. In 2021–27 spending previously allocated to ACP countries by means of the EDF was integrated into spending under the category of Neighbourhood and the World. A new funding instrument was established, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)—‘Global Europe’, with an overall budget of €79,500m. in current prices.

EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION CENTRES (EDCs) are information centres that contain European Union (EU) documentation. Their function is to stimulate the development of European studies in academic institutions and to provide an information service on the EU to the public. They are usually based in university libraries, and can also be found in non-EU countries. (See also **Europe Direct Information Network**.)

The **EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE** (EESC), which was also known by the alternative acronyms of ESC and ECOSOC, is not to be confused with the **United Nations** Economic and Social Council, which also uses the abbreviation ECOSOC. It was one of the main European Communities (EC) bodies set up by the **Treaty of Rome**. It was established as a non-political body that enables those active in economic and social fields to voice opinions on EC policy formulation. It has a purely advisory function, but the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union** are mandated to consult it on a wide range of issues before they can arrive at a **decision**. The **Single European Act** and the **Treaty on European Union** extended the areas on which it had to be consulted (to environmental and regional issues). In practice, both the Council and the Commission have consulted the EESC on a number of other non-mandatory topics, though they do

not always heed its advice. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** also allows for the EESC to be consulted by the **European Parliament**. The **Treaty of Lisbon** reinforced the position of the EESC in the overall EU architecture as a bridge between civil society and the European Union (EU) institutions. It gave the EESC the right to be consulted by the Commission on a new range of policy areas, such as sport, research and energy. The treaty also strengthens the EESC's consultative role vis-à-vis the European Parliament.

Its membership, which is drawn from national interest groups throughout the member states, increased from 222 to 317 with **enlargement** on 1 May 2004, and to 344 after the arrival of **Bulgaria** and **Romania** on 1 January 2007. Members are appointed for a five-year renewable term. After **Croatia** joined the EU on 1 July 2013 the EESC expanded to 353 members. In the enlarged body, until late 2015, **Germany, France, Italy** and the **United Kingdom** each had 24 members; **Spain** and **Poland** 21 each; Romania had 15; **Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria** and **Sweden** had 12 each; Croatia, **Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania** and **Slovakia** nine each; **Estonia, Latvia** and **Slovenia** seven each; **Cyprus** and **Luxembourg** six each; and **Malta** five. The membership was then reduced to 350 with Estonia's representation reduced to six members, and those of Cyprus and Luxembourg reduced to five. With the departure of the UK, the number of members totalled 329 in 2021. The President from October 2020 is Christa Schweng. Each national delegation consists of three separate categories: workers, employers and a miscellany of other groups such as farmers, consumers and the self-employed. Members are nominated by national governments, normally after consultation with the major national interest groups, and appointed by the Council of the European Union. The Committee elects its own chair for a period of two years, and it is conventional for the role to rotate between the three categories of membership. Participation in the EESC is a part-time commitment, and appointees are expected to be granted time off from their employment to attend meetings. Much of its work is done in specialized working groups, which correspond to the major policy concerns of the EU. The groups provide draft opinions for approval in a plenary session of the Committee. The EESC can be divided into six main areas of interest and activity. These relate to agriculture, rural development and the environment; **economic and monetary union** and economic and social cohesion; **employment**, social affairs and **citizenship**; external relations; the **single market**, production and consumption; and finally, transport, energy, infrastructure and the **information society**. The EESC has often been divided between left and right, between workers and employers, on many social and economic questions. How effective it has been in directly influencing proposed EU **legislation** is debatable. Both the Commission and the Council have often sidelined its relevance, as the former prefers to deal directly with sectoral organizations.

The EESC's influence has waned to a large degree, as many of the groups it seeks to represent have established more direct means to influence policy formulation. Nevertheless, it still has an important role in the formal EU policy-making process. Both the Commission and the Council are obliged to consult the EESC in certain cases. Later treaties from the **Single European Act** onwards have extended the range of issues that must be referred to the Committee, in particular new policy areas such as regional and **environmental policy**. The EESC can also adopt its own opinions. On average the EESC delivers 170 advisory documents and opinions a year (of which about 15% are issued on its own initiative). All opinions are forwarded to the EU's main decision-making institutions and are published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

The **EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA** (EEA) is a trading area agreed upon in 1991 by the European Communities (EC) and members of the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA). It was a consequence of fears by the EFTA countries that the development of the **internal market** might negatively affect their own economies. In 1989 they agreed upon a joint approach to the EC, using the phrase European Economic Space to describe the kind of structured partnership they wanted. Negotiations began in June 1990, and were completed by November 1991, largely upon EC terms, with an agreement on participation in the internal market. **Ratification** was delayed because of a query by the **Court of Justice** (ECJ) about the constitutional compatibility with the **founding treaties** of the proposed arbitration procedures. This led to the EFTA states having to create their own EFTA court and greater powers being placed in the hands of the ECJ. A referendum in **Switzerland** in 1992 rejected involvement in the EEA, and it came into existence without Swiss participation in January 1994. Although **Liechtenstein** had voted to join the EEA in a referendum held one week after the Swiss vote, the nature of its **customs union** with Switzerland made participation in the EEA problematic. When a number of necessary modifications had been made to the customs union, Liechtenstein voted again to join the EEA, in a second referendum held in April 1995. By this time, the EEA had lost three of its EFTA members, **Austria**, Finland and Sweden having joined the **European Union** (EU) on 1 January 1995. Indeed, from a positive perspective the EEA helped pave the way for their accession. However, the departure of these countries from EFTA turned the EEA into a rather more minor economic arrangement than the one originally envisaged. Despite expectations to the contrary, the EEA has survived and continues to expand its scope. It has therefore provided an adequate basis for relations between the EU and three of the most economically developed European non-EU states (**Iceland**, **Liechtenstein** and **Norway**).

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC) was the official title of the organization established by the **Treaty of Rome** in 1958. The administrative network of the EEC was formally merged with that of the **European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)** and the **European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)** in July 1967, after which the three bodies were collectively known as the European Communities or European Community (EC), although the abbreviation EEC remained in common usage, somewhat erroneously, to describe the Communities collectively. It also often carried a political connotation, being used by people who wished to emphasize that the EC should remain an economic organization without any implications of political union. The **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** confirmed that the EEC would in future be referred to as the European Community, and the founding Treaty of Rome was amended accordingly. The **Treaty of Lisbon** replaced the term European Community with the term **European Union**.

The **EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPING (EEIG)** is an arrangement established to enable European companies to collaborate more effectively on possible joint projects and enterprises. These EEIGs are not companies, but vehicles to allow individual companies to work together. They are legal entities in their own right and there are specific rules pertaining to their creation. The EEIG falls under the European Union's (EU) single market strategy and is designed to create more competitive consortia. One example of an EEIG is **Airbus**. Another is the creation of the Franco-German television channel *Arte*. An EEIG provides a legal structure for companies of different member states to link their activities while retaining economic and legal independence. Several thousand EEIGs were established in a variety of areas. The Regie initiative promotes EEIGs.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE: See **European Economic Area**

A **EUROPEAN EDUCATION AREA** or European Area of Education was proposed by the **European Commission** in November 2017. It was envisaged that the European Education Area would be created by 2025, in order to encourage an increased focus on EU culture, to complement member states' own domestic policies. The planned European Area of Education was to be based on: mobility for all, building on the success of initiatives such as **Erasmus+** (with the aim of increasing participation two-fold by 2025), together with the introduction of an EU student card, to ease storage of and access to individuals' academic data; the mutual recognition of academic diplomas and school leaving certificates together with a new, so-called Sorbonne process; improving language skills, with a new target for school-leavers to have a working knowledge of two languages in addition to their first language by 2025; the promotion of learning throughout adult life, in order to increase the

proportion of people engaging in lifelong learning to a target of 25% by 2025; the introduction of a new Digital Education Action Plan, encouraging innovative, digital training; supporting teachers by increasing participation in EU initiatives such as Erasmus+ and the eTwinning online platform; creating a network of universities to facilitate cross-border co-operation and competition, as well as establishing a School of European and Transnational Governance in Florence, **Italy**; investing in education with EU investment and by setting a target for member states to invest 5% of gross domestic product in education; preserving European cultural heritage and identity with a new European Agenda for Culture; and increasing the European focus of Euronews, established in 1993 by European public broadcasters.

The **EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY** refers to an annual agreement by the **European Council** on a series of guidelines setting out common priorities and individual objectives for member states' **employment** policies. The overall aims included creating jobs, improving job quality, making it easier for people to balance the demands of work and personal life, promoting active ageing and ensuring that race, gender or disabilities do not limit opportunities for employment in the formal economy.

Each EU government produced its own annual action plan describing how it was putting the guidelines into practice. Progress was measured against some 100 indicators, ranging from basic economic figures (e.g. gross domestic product growth and unemployment levels) to the availability of career breaks and childcare. The European Employment Strategy subsequently constituted part of the **Europe 2020** growth strategy.

EUROPEAN ENERGY CHARTER is the name of a document inspired by the European Communities (EC) and signed at The Hague in December 1991 by 38 countries. Its purpose was to make European energy supplies more secure by linking the natural resources of Eastern Europe with the West through a grid of supply lines. In return, Eastern Europe would receive investment from Western countries, and the EC proposed to extend the Organization of the Promotion of Energy Technology (OPET) scheme for the international transfer of energy-efficient and environmentally friendly technologies to Eastern Europe and the **Commonwealth of Independent States** (CIS). A further objective was to strengthen the Eastern democracies by easing their balance of payments problems, and to offer the **Russian Federation** an alternative to membership of the petroleum producers' **cartel**, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The wider aim of the Charter was the creation of a legally binding document, the Energy Charter Treaty. This Treaty aimed to enhance East-West industrial co-operation through legal guarantees concerning investments, transit and trade. In December 1994 all signatories of the 1991 agreement, with the exception of Canada and the **USA**, signed the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol.

EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY

There are 66 signatory states (plus the EU and **Euratom**), including all EU members, most European countries, including Russia, and the **USA**. In May 2015 72 countries plus the EU, Euratom and the Economic Community of West African States signed the International Energy Charter, a document based on the European Energy Charter and intended to make global energy supplies more secure, at a ministerial conference hosted by the Government of the **Netherlands**.

The **EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY** (EEA) was established in May 1990 by the European Communities (EC) to collect and disseminate detailed information on environmental questions and problems, including air quality, water quality, state of the soil, land use, waste management, noise emissions and coastal erosion. Membership of this body is also open to non-European Union (EU) states. **France** blocked its inauguration because of its dispute with the EC over the future permanent location of the **European Parliament** and controversy over the siting of other European agencies. In November 1993, however, it was agreed that the EEA would be located in Copenhagen, **Denmark**. The agency was the first EU body to have members from the 13 **candidate** states. Membership totals 32 countries, comprising the EU member states plus **Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland** and **Turkey**.

The **EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE** (EEAS) was formally established in December 2010 following the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon** in December 2009. The EEAS can be viewed as an embryonic European Union (EU) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which seeks to work in close co-operation with the diplomatic services of the EU member states. It assists the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** and was staffed by a mix of officials from the **European Commission**, the **Council Secretariat** and seconded diplomats from the member states. The first High Representative was Baroness Catherine Ashton, who was replaced in late 2014 by Federica Mogherini. In July 2016 Mogherini presented a new EU Global Strategy, which acknowledged the changing security environment and sought to increase the efficacy of the EEAS in responding to issues such as energy security, migration, environmental concerns and terrorism. The Global Strategy stated that when united the joint resources of EU member states were 'unparalleled', thereby providing enormous potential for the EEAS to contribute to peace and security both regionally and worldwide. It superseded the **European Security Strategy**. In July 2019 **Josep Borrell Fontelles** was nominated by the **European Council** as the new High Representative; he took up the position on 1 December.

The **EUROPEAN FEDERALIST MOVEMENT** was the main proponent of the federalist ideal for Europe from the 1950s. Altiero Spinelli, who largely inspired it, led the movement until 1962. It had little impact upon European developments, although, owing to Spinelli, some of its ideas entered the **draft Treaty establishing the European Union**.

The **EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY** (EFSF) was established to provide emergency financial assistance to member states of the **eurozone** encountering financial difficulties. Agreed by eurozone member states in May 2010, it subsequently issued loans to **Ireland** and **Portugal**. EFSF loans were originally supported by eurozone member states (€440,000m.), the **European Financial Stabilization Mechanism** (€60,000m.) and the **International Monetary Fund** (€250,000m.). The permanent **European Stability Mechanism** (ESM) largely superseded the temporary EFSF. The EFSF was placed under the management of ESM personnel, and although not accepting new country programmes, the Facility remained active for financing existing loans.

The **EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILIZATION MECHANISM** (EFSM) was established as an emergency funding mechanism, allowing the **European Commission** to raise funds, up to a total of €60,000m., from financial markets to assist, via loan or credit guarantee, European Union (EU) member states experiencing or approaching serious financial difficulties. In raising funds, the European Commission has used the EU **budget** as collateral. The EFSM was activated for loans issued to both Ireland and Portugal in 2011–14. From 2013 members of the **eurozone** in need of financial assistance were able to make use of the new, permanent institution, the **European Stability Mechanism**. The EFSM programme, managed by the Commission, remained available for specific tasks (such as bridging loans). For example, in July 2015 the EFSM was used to provide short-term lending of €7,160m. to Greece.

The **EUROPEAN FISHERIES FUND** (EFF) replaced the **Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance** (FIFG) on 1 January 2007. The scheme ran for the duration of the financial perspective to 2013 and had a budget of some €4,300m. The fund had many echoes of its predecessor. The EFF targeted five priority areas: the adaptation of the European Union (EU) fishing fleet; aquaculture, inland fishing, and processing and marketing of the products of fishing and aquaculture; measures of collective benefit; sustainable development of fisheries areas; and technical assistance to facilitate the delivery of aid. As before, the fund sought to help the fisheries communities most affected by the changes by assisting them to diversify where possible. The fund existed to facilitate and support the major objectives of the **common fisheries policy**

EUROPEAN FLAG

(CFP). This included, in particular, the sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources and achieving a stable balance between these resources and the capacity of the EU fishing fleet, as well as strengthening the **competitiveness** and viability of operators in the sector and fostering the sustainable development of fisheries areas.

Implementation of the fund was considerably simplified. Whereas FIG support for fisheries was divided among different programmes in a member state, there was a single EFF programme for each member state. A **European Maritime and Fisheries Fund** replaced the EFF from January 2014.

A **EUROPEAN FLAG** was adopted by the European Communities (EC) in 1986. Its design is a crown of 12 five-pointed stars set against an azure background. It is the same flag as that used by the **Council of Europe** since 1955; hence it was merely coincidental that the number of stars on the flag corresponded to the membership of the EC from 1986 to 1994. The stars were placed in a circle to represent the union of the European states. The flag is flown over the European Union (EU) headquarters in **Brussels, Belgium**, and is otherwise used at national and international meetings and ceremonies where the EU is represented.

The **EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY** (EFSA) was established in Parma, **Italy**, in 2002 following various concerns over food safety in the 1990s, notably BSE (see **Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy**). Its purpose is to provide independent scientific advice on all matters linked to food and feed safety, including animal health and welfare, and plant protection. It also provides scientific advice on nutrition in relation to EU **legislation**. (See also **Foodstuffs**.)

EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS (Eurofound) is the name of a **European Commission** agency established in 1975 and now based in Dublin, **Ireland**. It holds a broad mandate to provide information, advice and expertise—on the living and working environment of employees, industrial relations and managing change in Europe—for principal actors in the field of European Union (EU) **social policy**. Given the deteriorating economic situation following the onset of the global recession in 2008, Eurofound was particularly keen to place emphasis on measures to help create jobs and increase **competitiveness**, initiatives to help the young, and moves to reduce poverty and social exclusion. Eurofound appreciates that public sector reform will be a major issue to be dealt with over the next decade. The Foundation is staffed by representatives of the Commission, the member states and employers' and employees' organizations.

The **EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE** (EFA/ALE) forms part of the **Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance** in the **European Parliament**. It is made up of representatives of 'stateless nations' such as Catalonia (officially part of **Spain**).

The **EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION** (EFTA) was established by the **Stockholm Convention** of 4 January 1960. It consisted of seven states—**Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland** and the **United Kingdom**—which were unwilling or, for various reasons, unable to accept the supranational and **common market** principles of the **Treaty of Rome** and the **European Economic Community** (EEC). EFTA's objectives were limited to securing a gradual elimination of **tariffs** on trade in most industrial goods between its members. It did not have an agricultural policy or any kind of **common external tariff** (CET), and its institutional structure was to be limited to a Council of Ministers which would meet only two or three times a year, although a council of heads of national delegations was to meet every two weeks. It brought together a disparate group of countries, which had reached consensus on two principal issues. First, they agreed on a rejection of the sequence of events postulated by the Treaty of Rome, apart from the establishment of a free trade area. Second, they believed that some form of unity would place them in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the EEC compared with the position they would be in if each country separately attempted to negotiate some accommodation with it.

Within its limited terms of reference, EFTA established its free trade area fairly quickly. After the late 1960s, it collaborated quite closely with the European Communities (EC). When **Denmark** and the UK joined the EC in 1973, they left EFTA. The remaining EFTA states, which now also included **Iceland** and **Liechtenstein**, with **Finland** as an associate, negotiated a series of **free trade agreements** with the EC, which came into force in 1973. With some variations from country to country, these agreements provided for the gradual introduction of free trade in industrial goods (but not in agriculture). The relationship was the province of a joint EC-EFTA executive committee meeting twice yearly. While the EFTA states avoided the obligations of full EC membership, the disadvantage was that they were not party to EC **decisions**, many of which had an important effect upon their own economies. The arrangement, however, worked quite well, and by the 1980s EFTA had moved very close to the EC in its economic practices.

In the late 1980s the EFTA states reviewed their situation in the light of the **Single European Act** and the EC decision to establish an **internal market**. In 1989 the creation of a broad European Economic Space was proposed, which, after protracted negotiations, came into being, albeit without Switzerland's participation, as the **European Economic Area** (EEA) in 1994. However, the EFTA states began to conclude that even EEA membership would leave them at a disadvantage and thus **Austria**, Finland, Norway and

EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL

Sweden all applied for membership of the EC. In January 1995 Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the European Union (EU), Norway having withdrawn its application following a referendum result that rejected EU membership. EFTA was left as a rump (comprising Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). The Association has nevertheless survived.

The **EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL** encapsulates the aspiration of the European Union (EU) to turn the **EU27** into a low-carbon economy while maintaining a high quality of life and a prosperous economic bloc. A communication published by the **European Commission** in December 2019 pledged to bring about carbon neutrality by 2050, and to reduce carbon emissions to 50%–55% of 1990 levels by 2030. In January 2020 the Commission presented an Investment Plan for the European Green Deal, together with a Just Transition Fund (with funding of €7,500m. in 2021–27 in 2018 prices, together with funding of €10,000m. under **Next Generation EU**) to provide targeted support to ensure the measures adopted were equitable. In early March 2020 the Commission proposed a European Climate Law, and a public consultation on a European Climate Pact was opened. Overall, the European Green Deal involves an emphasis on cleaner air and water, and better health to build the EU as a global power. The green deal is an ambitious plan for a complete overhaul of Europe's economy, from how energy is generated to how food is produced. It is a commitment to the environment and a recognition of the devastating impact of climate change. It relies on science and technological innovation, but also on political will, in addition to increased regulation and legislation. Over the life of the European Commission led by **Ursula von der Leyen** during 2019–24 the Green Deal is to be mainstreamed to ensure that all the EU does and proposes is reflective of its goals. This will require the support of wealthier states to less wealthy states. For example, Eastern European countries have been offered incentives to decrease their dependency on fossil fuels. **Frans Timmermans** is responsible for this portfolio. Inevitably, the Green Deal is projected to be hugely expensive to implement.

The **EUROPEAN GROUP ON ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES** (EGE) was established in 1998 to advise the **European Commission** on ethical aspects of science and technology. An independent and multidisciplinary group, the EGE has provided opinions on a range of issues, including human embryo research, doping in sport, human stem cell research, clinical research in developing countries and genetic testing in the workplace.

The **EUROPEAN HEALTH UNION** was initiated by the **European Commission** on 11 November 2020 in an effort to bolster the EU's health

security framework and by adopting a new regulation on serious cross-border threats to health. The improved health security framework sought to improve readiness at both the EU and national levels to deal with new threats to health, to improve data reporting on indicators relating to health systems (for example, information about the availability of hospital beds or about intensive care capacity), and to strengthen health surveillance, with the use of advanced technologies. Moreover, the mandates of both the **European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control** and the **European Medicines Agency** were to be strengthened to enable them to provide increased support to both the Commission and to member states.

EUROPEAN INFORMATION SYSTEM: See **Schengen Information System**

The **EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR GENDER EQUALITY** (EIGE) is an autonomous body of the **European Union** (EU) established in 2007 in **Brussels, Belgium**, to promote and monitor progress towards **gender equality** (equality between men and women) in all areas of EU and national policies. The EIGE is now based in Vilnius, **Lithuania**. The EIGE is responsible for producing and maintaining the Gender Equality Index, and raising citizens' awareness about gender equality within the Union. In other words, it is a European gender equality knowledge centre. EIGE's main mechanism for ensuring gender equality is through the strategy of **gender mainstreaming**.

The **EUROPEAN INVENTORY OF EXISTING CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES** (EINECS) is a programme set up by the **European Commission** in 1986 as a response to widespread alarm about the hazards to both individuals and the environment of many chemical products. The inventory, which forms part of the **Environmental Chemicals Data Information Network**, is intended to record all commercially available chemical products. The Commission uses it to evaluate and control their application, and in the formulation of **consumer policy, environmental policy and health and safety** policy.

The **EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK** (EIB) was set up by the **Treaty of Rome** as a separate and autonomous institution within the European Communities. Based in **Luxembourg**, the EIB was designed to be a bank for the financing of capital investment that would benefit the process of European Union (EU) integration. In sum, the EIB finances viable capital projects and borrows on the world's financial markets to finance its projects. The EIB has evolved since 1958 in both importance and stature and today is the world's largest bank of its kind. The member states are the basic members of the Bank, collectively subscribing to its capital. The EIB has regional offices throughout

Europe, as well as in other parts of the world (including Egypt, **Morocco**, South Africa, **Turkey** and Tunisia). The EIB disbursed some €48,100m. in 2019.

The ultimate decision-making body of the EIB is the Board of Governors, normally consisting of the finance ministers of the member states. The Board of Governors normally meets only once a year. Supervision of the daily operations of the Bank is performed by a part-time Board of Directors, composed of nominees from the member states and from the **European Commission**. The management of operations is the responsibility of a Management Committee composed of the Bank's President and eight Vice-Presidents, nominated by the Board of Directors and appointed by the Board of Governors for renewable six-year terms. Werner Hoyer was appointed as the seventh President of the EIB on 1 January 2012, and took office for a second term on 1 January 2018.

In addition to its subscription capital, the EIB raises funds on the international capital markets, where it enjoys the highest possible credit rating. Its bonds are regularly rated 'AAA' by the leading rating agencies. As it works on a non-profit basis the EIB can pass on to projects the excellent conditions obtained as an AAA borrower. The EIB has three general aims: to assist less developed regions, to help to modernize the economy of the EU, and to support projects that are of interest to more than one member state. It provides fixed-rate loans, usually for periods of between five and 12 years (but up to 20 years for infrastructural projects), and occasionally also guarantees loans and credit.

National governments, regional authorities and companies may all apply for EIB loans or guarantees. The EIB never provides all the funding for a project. It considers only large-scale projects, and normally advances up to 50% of the projected costs. The balance has to be met by loans from other sources, the applicant's own resources or state assistance. Some 5% of EIB activity was devoted to external aid programmes. The Bank publishes an annual report of its operations, with details of the projects it has funded. With a level of lending approaching that of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD—World Bank), it arguably constitutes the most successful of the funds available from the EU. After 1994 it administered a **European Investment Fund** (EIF), which was intended to promote economic growth and reduce unemployment through the provision of financial aid for major infrastructural projects, and for capital investments by smaller companies.

In 2008–09 the EIB increased its lending activities in the light of the financial crisis. Particular emphasis in recent years has been placed on supporting **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs), environmental sustainability and **cohesion** and convergence. Its lending mandates are based on EU external co-operation arrangements and were classified under the headings of Enlargement countries, **European Free Trade Association** countries, Mediterranean neighbourhood, EU Eastern Neighbours, **ACP states** and South Africa, and countries in Central Asia, and Asia and Latin America.

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT FUND (EIF) is the name of a body proposed by the **European Council** in 1992, as part of a collection of measures designed to combat the economic depression prevalent in the early 1990s, with the objective of providing additional aid for transnational infrastructural projects. The Fund was established in 1994 by the **European Investment Bank (EIB)**, the European Union (EU), represented by the **European Commission**, and a group of 76 banks and financial institutions from throughout the EU. Its main task was to provide financial institutions with infrastructure and **small and medium-sized enterprise (SME)** guarantees. The EIB subscribed 40% of the EIF's capital. The Fund assists SMEs and provides guarantees for the long-term financing of European infrastructure projects. The EIF became operational in 1995 and commenced its involvement in venture capital in 1997, as part of the **European Commission's** 'Growth and Employment' initiative. In June 2000 the EIF's statutes were restructured and its shareholding structure was modified (with the EIB becoming the majority shareholder) so as to endorse the role of the EIF as the exclusive vehicle for venture capital of the EIB. The EIF is active in the member states of the EU as well as in countries that have applied to become members.

The **EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS** was established in 2001 as part of the European Union's activities in the area of **justice and home affairs** following the **Tampere summit** of the **European Council**. The network consists of representatives of the member states' judicial and administrative authorities and meets several times each year to exchange information and experience and promote co-operation in the areas of civil and commercial law. In 2013 a new European e-justice portal was opened, with the aim of making it easier for EU citizens to find out about information on justice systems throughout the EU and how to access these systems. The website contains information for businesses and legal practitioners. Materials are provided in 24 languages on themes such as going to court, legal aid, the rights of victims, costs and legal training.

The **EUROPEAN JUDICIAL NETWORK IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (EJN)** was established in 1998 and plays a major role in the European Union's efforts to promote **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**. It brings together experts from the member states dealing with criminal matters and has a Secretariat in The Hague linked to that of **Eurojust**.

The **EUROPEAN MARITIME AND FISHERIES FUND (EMFF)** came into existence in January 2014. It replaced the **European Fisheries Fund**. This fund initially aimed to assist the fishing community in the **financial perspective** that ran from 2014–20. The EMFF represented the social dimension of the newly reformed **Common Fisheries Policy** and focused

EUROPEAN MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY

specifically on the development of sustainable fishing and aquaculture and sought to secure and stimulate employment in coastal areas. It was designed to help fishermen in their transition to sustainable fishing and aimed to support coastal communities diversify into new areas of economic activity. Some €6,500m. was allocated to the EMFF for the period between 2014 and 2020. The EMFF was renewed for the new financial perspective running from 2021–27 as the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund, with funding of €6,100m., in current prices.

The **EUROPEAN MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY** (EMSA) was created in 2002 to promote an improved maritime safety system within the European Union. One of the factors leading to the creation of the EMSA was the response to the environmental and economic damage caused by two major oil spills (Erika in 1999 and Prestige in 2002). The Agency moved to Lisbon, **Portugal**, from **Brussels, Belgium**, in 2006. It seeks to remind European Governments of the need to invest in better preparation for large-scale oil spills, as well as reducing the risk of maritime accidents, marine pollution from ships and the loss of human lives at sea.

The **EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY** (EMA) was established as a decentralized agency of the European Communities by the **Council of the European Union**. Originally located in London, **United Kingdom**, it began operations in 1995 as the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (it was renamed as above in 2004). It is responsible for the licensing of all human and veterinary medicinal products in the European Union (EU), and for monitoring their efficacy. Once a **pharmaceuticals** company has obtained a licence, it may sell its products anywhere in the EU, in an arrangement that has brought to an end member states' former protective practices in the interests of their own companies. However, national regulatory bodies continue to operate and provide an alternative means for approving new drugs in the EU. The EMA has relocated to the **Netherlands**, owing to **Brexit**.

A **EUROPEAN MIGRANT SMUGGLING CENTRE** (EMSC) was established in February 2016, under **Europol**. It is tasked with supporting European Union (EU) member states in combating immigration ostensibly facilitated by criminal organizations and individuals. In this context, immigration is positioned as a criminal threat. Robert Crepinko was appointed to lead the EMSC.

The **EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS** arose from 2015, when some 1.35m. people travelled to European Union (EU) member states in an effort to claim asylum (with over 3,700 reported to have died crossing the

Mediterranean Sea in 2016 and 2,512 estimated deaths in the first half of 2017). This figure was more than twice the 626,000 applications for asylum recorded in 2014; some 434,160 applications were made in 2013. Principal countries of origin for asylum seekers in 2015–16 included the **Syrian Arab Republic**, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other countries, such as Libya, **Kosovo**, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria and Somalia, with many migrants seeking refuge from domestic conflict and instability, and others moving to seek economic opportunities. Some EU countries were more severely affected than others by the unprecedented numbers of migrants arriving at their borders, with some particularly exposed, such as **Greece**, which received more than 1m. arrivals of migrants and refugees in 2015; meanwhile, **Denmark, Ireland, Sweden** and former member the **United Kingdom** had negotiated exemptions from fundamental aspects of EU **immigration policy**. In August German Chancellor **Angela Merkel** announced that **Germany** would accept asylum applicants from Syria, which was deeply mired in civil conflict, irrespective of their initial point of entry into the EU (in contravention of the **Dublin Regulation**), and offered Syrian refugees permanent leave to remain in Germany. As a result, huge numbers of people began to cross Europe to reach Germany—some 800,000 were estimated to have arrived in 2015.

The refugee crisis challenged the functioning of the **Schengen Area** of free movement, as large-scale flows of migrants and refugees led some countries to reimpose border controls, and several member states (including **Austria, Hungary**, Denmark and Sweden) erected fences to dissuade immigrants. The continued viability of the **Schengen Agreement** was also questioned by those who feared that free movement and a lack of security checks risked undermining security and represented a contributory factor in terrorist attacks, such as those in Paris, **France**, in November 2015, as a result of which 130 people were killed by assailants linked to the so-called **Islamic State** organization, some of whom had reportedly travelled to fight in the civil war in Syria and subsequently returned to France and **Belgium** without being detained.

In March 2016 the EU reached an agreement with **Turkey**, which provided for undocumented asylum seekers who had not made an asylum application at their initial point of entry into the EU (usually Greece) to be returned to that country; the EU agreed to accept the same number of legitimately registered asylum seekers from Turkey's refugee camps—a so-called 'one in, one out' scheme. The Turkish Government pledged to increase efforts to prevent sea crossings, which witnessed a degree of success: less than 10,000 refugees travelled from Turkey to the EU in June–September 2016. In return, the EU announced that it would accelerate progress towards visa liberalization for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU and made available funding of up to €6,000m. by 2018, to help Turkey manage the crisis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees expressed concern about the agreement, particularly the risks faced by asylum claimants in Greece and Turkey who might not receive necessary protection while in transit. Furthermore, migrant arrivals in **Italy** from North Africa had increased as the crossing from Turkey

to Greece became less attractive for undocumented asylum seekers. Similar deals to that agreed with Turkey were instigated with five countries under the **Migration Partnership Framework**.

There was opposition in some member states, such as the members of the **Visegrad Group** (the **Czech Republic**—Czechia, **Hungary**, **Poland** and **Slovakia**), to the imposition of mandatory quotas for the resettlement of refugees, on the grounds that member states should have ultimate control over the admission of asylum seekers into their territory, and amid popular protests in some countries about hosting refugees from Islamic countries. An increase in support for populist parties across the Union was also widely linked to the migration crisis.

In June 2018 EU leaders concluded a tentative agreement that provided for migrants initially to be sent to centres across the EU and for the eventual creation of so-called disembarkation platforms outside EU borders, mainly in African countries. The agreement was seen as a significant achievement within the EU, especially for countries such as **Italy** and **Spain**, which felt they had disproportionately borne the brunt of large-scale migration to the bloc. The deal also somewhat appeased critics within Germany of Angela Merkel's approach thus far to the so-called migration crisis.

Relations between the EU were strained in February 2020, after Turkey suspended application of the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement, announcing that it would open the passage for migrants to traverse its borders with Europe. In April 2020 the **European Court of Justice** ruled that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had violated the law by refusing to fulfil their obligations under the EU's migrant relocation scheme. See also **Migration and Asylum Policy**.

EUROPEAN MONETARY AGREEMENT: See **European Payments Union**

The **EUROPEAN MONETARY CO-OPERATION FUND** (EMCF) was established in 1973. By the end of that decade it was the only survivor of plans made in the early 1970s for **economic and monetary union** (EMU). In 1979 it was incorporated into the **European Monetary System** (EMS), where it was the reserve fund that supported the European Currency Unit (**ECU**). Member states participating in the basket of currencies that determined the value of the ECU were required to deposit 20% of both their gold and dollar reserves with the Fund. The EMCF was used to regulate the interventions made on the exchange markets by the central banks of the member states to support the **exchange rate mechanism** of the EMS, and it kept account of short-term borrowings used to support currencies. Its most important credit facility was its Very Short-Term Financing Facility (VSTF), which permitted borrowing by the central banks, with the proviso that credit must be settled

within 45 days. The **European Monetary Institute** superseded it in January 1994, at the beginning of stage two of EMU.

The **EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE** (EMI) was established under the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) and superseded the **European Monetary Co-operation Fund**. Its operations began with the commencement of stage two of **economic and monetary union** (EMU) and were completed shortly before stage three was launched on 1 January 1999. The EMI's role was to facilitate closer co-operation between the central banks of the member states, co-ordinate monetary policies, monitor the **European Monetary System** and eventually advise the **European Council** as to whether the conditions for stage three of EMU had been met. Located in Frankfurt am Main, **Germany**, it was the forerunner of the **European Central Bank** (ECB), which effectively replaced it in 1998.

The **EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM** (EMS) constituted the second attempt by the European Communities (EC) to secure some form of monetary co-operation after the failure of the plans of 1970 for **economic and monetary union** (EMU). The EMS, established in 1979, was a more limited and practical attempt to secure, in the first instance, a zone of monetary stability in Western Europe. The core of the EMS was the **exchange rate mechanism** (ERM), which linked the currencies of the participating member states and limited the amount by which each currency was permitted to fluctuate against its counterparts. If a currency went beyond these limits, the central banks, with the help of the **European Monetary Co-operation Fund**, intervened in the exchange markets, selling or buying as the case might be, to maintain the currency within the agreed limits. A central rate was calculated for each currency on the basis of the central rate of the European Currency Unit (**ECU**), a notional EC currency that existed alongside the national currencies. Special arrangements existed to provide help for countries that experienced short-term difficulties. Where a currency persistently had difficulty in staying within its agreed limits, the EMS made provision for its realignment.

The EMS had some considerable success in the 1980s. It was widely credited with contributing to the decline in inflation levels and to the increasing economic **convergence** of the member states. While the EMS was not a replacement for EMU, as it was unable to impose economic policy restraints upon the states, by the late 1980s it was widely felt that conditions were more appropriate for the EC to move on to full EMU. One weakness was that not all the member states were members of the ERM. The plans for EMU contained in the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) were disrupted during the currency crises of 1992–93, with the **United Kingdom** and **Italy** leaving the ERM, which itself greatly extended the permissible limits of currency fluctuation. While these events may have delayed the EMU programme, they did not seriously affect the existence of the EMS, which remained essentially an

instrument of co-operation in monetary policy until the formal establishment of EMU.

EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION (EMCDDA) is the name of a decentralized EU agency that resulted from the growing recognition by European leaders of the dangers of drugs and drug addiction. The **Treaty on European Union** provided the first references in the European Union treaty base to drugs. The EMCDDA was established in 1994 and subsequently secured greater European co-operation in this area under **CELAD**. The Centre opened in September 1995 and is located in Lisbon, **Portugal**. At the heart of its work is the promotion of scientific excellence. The data that the EMCDDA collects on drugs are passed to it from the relevant national authorities. Although much of its work is primarily focused on Europe, the EMCDDA also works with partners in other parts of the world to exchange information and gather expertise.

The **EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE ON RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA (EUMC)** was established by the European Union (EU) in 1997 to study and review the extent and development of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Europe, and to report its findings to the EU. The EUMC works with the **Council of Europe**, the **United Nations** and other international organizations. It established a European Racism and Xenophobia Information Network (RAXEN), which collected statistics on racist incidents and passed them to the EUMC. The EUMC then used the materials gathered to construct a European database for conducting research and disseminating information on racism and how to combat it. The EUMC set up a series of 'Round Table' discussions on racism and launched some of its own research initiatives. In December 2003 the European Council opted to extend the remit of the EUMC and converted it into a new **European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)**, which became fully operational in 2008.

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT is the name of an influential pressure group working for integration in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It was founded at the **Congress of Europe** of 1948. It was the Movement that drew up the first draft of what was to become the **Council of Europe**. Its influence faded after the early 1950s, but it remained active in supporting schemes for further political integration. With a membership that covers most European countries, it has come to act more as an umbrella organization, disseminating information to all groups, associations and institutions with an interest in European affairs, and liaising between them.

EUROPEAN NATO refers superficially to all members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** except the **USA** and Canada. It

more precisely refers to the original European NATO membership of 1949, including **France**, despite the latter's partial membership of NATO, and with the addition of **Germany**. It is a descriptive expression rather than a specific subgroup within NATO, and has often been used in the context of the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

The **EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY** (ENP) was conceived as an initiative to redefine relations with neighbouring regions (i.e. Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean, but not **South-Eastern Europe** or the **Russian Federation**), following **enlargement** in 2004 and 2007. It aimed to 'reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border co-operation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours ... [and to] anchor the EU's offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform'. There were 16 ENP countries. These contained an agenda of political and economic reforms with short- and medium-term priorities. Plans were agreed with Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, **Moldova**, **Morocco**, the Palestinian Authority (now Palestinian Territories), Tunisia and **Ukraine**. Belarus, Libya and the **Syrian Arab Republic** remained outside most of the ENP's scope, while Russia had 'special status'. The ENP was designed to cover increased trade relations, involvement in the EU's **single market**, and co-operation on justice and home affairs, energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation, and social policy. 'Enhanced Agreements' were also envisaged and would involve more political dialogue, a free trade area and strengthened co-operation in these areas. Financial assistance worth almost €11,200m. was allocated through a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the period 2007–13. From 2014 the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) replaced the ENPI. EU membership, however, was not envisaged as part of either the Action Plans or the ENP more generally.

The ENP attracted criticism from the EU's neighbours and others for lacking 'added value' compared with their existing relations and for being an essentially EU-imposed policy. In 2006 the **European Commission** published a set of proposals entitled 'Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy'. One year later it reported progress in developing the ENP, noting financial allocations under a Governance Facility, the establishment of a Neighbourhood Investment Facility, the launching of a regional dimension for the eastern neighbours through a new EU Black Sea Synergy initiative, and the opening up of EU programmes and agencies to ENP partners. The EU appeared nevertheless to be responding to criticism, by ensuring greater differentiation between partners, by allowing those more advanced in terms of

political and economic reform and capacity to benefit from closer, upgraded relations, possibly through individual **deep and comprehensive free trade area** agreements, as well as improved mobility arrangements, enhanced political dialogue and greater participation in EU programmes. The EU also envisaged playing a greater role in conflict resolution.

In 2008 **Sweden** and **Portugal** proposed an **Eastern partnership** for the eastern European states, which included an offer of 'more profound integration'. This followed proposals for a **Union for the Mediterranean** from the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. The Eastern partnership was eventually launched in May 2009. In 2010–11 the Commission undertook a routine review of the functioning of the ENP. This coincided with the so-called **Arab Spring** (the spring uprisings of revolutionary demonstrations and protests throughout several Middle Eastern and North African countries) in 2011, and the final report proposed a 'new response to a changing neighbourhood', comprising, *inter alia*, greater support for political reforms, enhanced EU involvement in solving protracted crises, increased support for economic and social development, visa facilitation measures, strengthened trade ties and more effective regional partnerships within the ENP. The Commission also proposed increasing financial assistance and advocated greater use of **conditionality**. Co-operation, improved market access and financial assistance would only be provided if political and economic reform programmes were implemented. A review of the ENP commenced in 2015, taking into account the increased security concerns that had emerged since the Arab Spring and the threat of terrorism following the rise of **Islamic State**, as well as the effect on **Turkey** and countries in the **Middle East** and **North Africa**, and EU member states to the south and east of the bloc, notably **Greece**, **Italy** and in South-Eastern Europe more generally, of the **European migration crisis**. In November 2015 a joint statement by the European Commission and the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** on the future of the ENP proposed that a revised ENP should build on the new **European Agenda on Security**, to help combat terrorism and radicalization, to prevent organized cross-border crime, to ameliorate judicial co-operation, and to tackle so-called cybercrime, in conformity with international law.

The **EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION**, commonly known as **Eurocontrol**, is an international organization, which seeks to ensure safe and seamless air traffic management across Europe. Founded in 1960, Eurocontrol has 41 member states, and its headquarters are located in **Brussels, Belgium**. Although Eurocontrol is not a European Union (EU) agency, the Union delegated elements of its Single European Sky regulations (see **Air Transport Policy**) to Eurocontrol, thereby making it the central organization for co-ordination and planning of air traffic control throughout Europe. The EU is a Eurocontrol signatory, and all EU member states are also members of Eurocontrol. The organization co-operates

with national authorities, air navigation service providers, users of both civil and military airspace, airports and other aviation industry organizations.

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES: See **EUMETSAT**

EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH: See **CERN**

The **EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT** (EP) originated in the advisory Assembly of the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC). With the establishment of the **European Economic Community** (EEC) and the **European Atomic Energy Community** (EAEC or Euratom) in 1958, one Parliamentary Assembly was created to serve all three Communities, with a membership of 142. The composition of the EP has changed repeatedly to reflect the waves of **enlargement**. Membership, for example, increased to 626 by January 1995, to 732 by June 2004 and after January 2007 increased further to 785 (to incorporate the accession of **Bulgaria** and **Romania**). The number of seats was altered again for the June 2009 EP elections, when candidates from across the 27 member states contested 736 places. With the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the number was temporarily increased to 754 for the period to 2014. In April 2013 **Croatia** (in advance of its accession to the EU on 1 July) held elections to the EP to elect 12 representatives to serve until 2014. The Treaty of Lisbon provided for 751 Members of the **European Parliament** (MEPs) thereafter. In January 2018 the parliamentary committee on constitutional affairs voted to redistribute 27 of the 73 seats occupied by British EP members after **Brexit** (which took place on 31 January 2020). The overall number of seats in the EP was thereby reduced to 705. The remaining 46 seats would remain unfilled, but could potentially be used by acceding member states.

Members were initially appointed by the **national parliaments** from among their own members, although the **Treaty of Rome** had called for the introduction of **direct elections**. The first direct elections to the EP took place in 1979. The powers of the Parliament were defined as the supervision of both the **European Commission** and the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), and participation in the legislative and **budget** processes. Essentially, however, it was allotted a secondary position in the institutional framework, being more of an advisory and consultative body than a genuine decision-making body.

From the outset, the Assembly (as it was then called), which was firmly in favour of rapid moves towards political union, was dissatisfied with its secondary role, campaigning for greater influence and authority. In 1962 it took the symbolic step of calling itself the European Parliament: although this was

accepted by the European Commission (but not by the Council of Ministers), the EP was given a legal basis only in the **Single European Act** (SEA) of 1987. The EP also asserted a right to meet whenever it wished, circumventing the Treaty of Rome's provisions for an annual session by simply dividing the latter into several segments of time, spanning the whole calendar year. Some slight increases in powers were granted by the 1970 **Treaty of Luxembourg**, with a further modest rise in budgetary influence in 1975, when the EP was given the right to reject the budget in its entirety with effect from 1977. The SEA, the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), the **Treaty of Amsterdam** and the **Treaty of Nice** extended the EP's competences further by introducing the **co-operation procedure** and assent procedure under the SEA and introducing the **co-decision procedure** under the TEU (extending the latter under both the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties).

Although the EP must approve **accession treaties** and **association agreements**, it traditionally plays no active role in their negotiations. The EP is the single major EU institution that has been gradually gaining power in terms of its involvement with EU decision making (e.g. through co-decision) with every successive treaty change.

The EP's representative character has attracted criticism. Since 1979 the EP has been elected at five-yearly intervals. There is no standard electoral system across all the member states, although all states now use some form of proportional representation. Electorates tend to use the elections to express a verdict on their national governments and domestic problems: there has never been a true European election fought on exactly the same day by a series of European political parties running on a common manifesto. Furthermore, electorates tend to have only a vague perception of the EP, often seeing it as secondary to their own national legislatures. The fact that EP plenary sessions had often been attended by less than one-half of its members has not helped its cause, although this is changing.

The TEU strengthened the EP's right of scrutiny and supervision. The EP was given a formal right to establish committees of inquiry, to appoint an **Ombudsman** from among its members to investigate complaints of maladministration in EC institutions, and to be consulted on the nomination of a new President of the European Commission and to ratify the choice of President and members of the Commission. Furthermore, in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EP had formally to approve the appointment of the President of the Commission. These powers came in addition to its right to put both oral and written questions to the Commission, a right it has taken seriously.

The EP has substantial budgetary powers, where it shares authority with the Council of the European Union. It must approve the budget: if it fails to do so, EU **expenditure** is frozen at the previous year's level, with only one-12th of the budgetary expenditure approved for the previous year being available each month until the issue is resolved. The EP's freedom of action is substantially greater on **non-compulsory expenditure**. However, while it can

block a budget, it cannot substitute one of its own. The EP was to be provided with further powers under the proposed **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. Essentially, this would have extended the use of co-decision and, significantly, given the EP greater say over both the final settlement of the **budget** and the **common agricultural policy**. These changes, along with others contained in the abandoned Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, were built into the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the EP's powers in relation to the budget by removing the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. The Treaty also contained a clause that stated that the selection of the Commission president should be filled 'taking into account' the outcome of the European elections. This phrase transformed the EP's role in the entire process. Rather than limiting the EP's role to either approving or rejecting the European Council's choice for president, this treaty alteration enabled the EP effectively to announce its candidates for the position of Commission president. The **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)** (EPP) had agreed upon the nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker as its candidate prior to the 2014 EP elections and pushed its claim after the EPP's emergence as the largest party. The European Council found itself in a reactive position, and opted to approve the Juncker candidacy in June 2014, despite opposition from the Governments of the UK and Hungary. The EP formally adopted the Juncker candidacy in July, and approved the Juncker Commission on 22 October; it took office on 1 November. (See **Spitzenkandidaten Process**.)

Members of the Commission and its bureaucracy attend meetings of the various EP committees. The EP has the right to submit questions to the Council of the European Union, which responds through ministers of the member state currently holding the Council Presidency, who attend EP plenary sessions to deliver the Council's replies. Since 1981 the head of government occupying the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union** attends the EP after each European Council **summit meeting** to report on its proceedings. The EP's most severe power—to censure and thus collectively dismiss the Commission—requires a two-thirds' majority of the votes cast, which must also be a majority of the total EP membership; there is no power to dismiss an individual Commissioner. A censure motion was initiated in January 1999 following allegations of financial and other irregularities against the European Commission, and although a compromise deal ensured that the motion was defeated, the concessions won by the EP during that dispute were felt to represent an important shift in the balance of power from Commission to Parliament.

The role of the EP was further enhanced by the TEU's introduction of a **co-decision procedure**, which builds upon the co-operation procedure introduced by the SEA. While these decision-making procedures make the legislative process highly complex, they broadly follow five phases. The Commission first presents a proposal to both the Council of the European

Union and the EP. The EP is entitled to give an opinion that must be considered by the Council. A suitably revised version approved by **qualified majority voting** is returned to the EP and, if the EP rejects the common position proposed by the Council, the issue is referred to a **Conciliation Committee**, which may result in approval, rejection or further amendment. Amendments can lead to a repetition of the evaluation process by the Council and EP. The procedure gives the EP a decision-making role and a potential power of veto. The procedure applies only to those **articles** of the treaty that specifically refer to its use. The co-operation procedure introduced by the SEA applies to other policy areas, mostly in the area of **economic and monetary union**: under the co-operation procedure, where the Council rejects an EP opinion, it must give a reasoned common position that will become law unless the EP proposes amendments. The Council can override such amendments only by a unanimous vote.

The Treaty of Amsterdam simplified the decision-making process, while extending the EP's powers. Co-decision between the Council and the EP was extended into a wider range of policy areas, and the EP may be consulted in decisions taken by unanimity in Council. International agreements, treaty decisions and the accession of new member states all require the consent of the EP. The Treaty also calls for the EP to establish a formal code of conduct by which to regulate its members. On **ratification**, the Treaty of Nice was to introduce a new distribution of seats in the EP. With the exception of **Germany** and Luxembourg, the arrangements envisaged a reduction in the number of seats allocated to the **fifteen** member states at that time. This was deemed necessary for an enlarged EU.

Elections to the eighth EP took place in May 2014, and the centre right emerged with the most MEPs. These elections also recorded the highest number of **Eurosceptic** MEPs (from both the populist left and populist/**far right** political spectrums) in the history of the EP. These elections may have been the largest in the EU's history and the best example of transnational democracy in action, but only 43% of the total eligible electorate in the EU cast their vote—the lowest ever turnout in EP elections. Within the overall low turnout, there were wide discrepancies at the national level. **Belgium** recorded a turnout of 90%, and **Luxembourg** 86%. Although turnout increased in both **France** (42%) and Germany (48%) from the 2009 figures (41% and 43%, respectively), turnout was much lower in many of the newest member states from **Central and Eastern Europe**. Turnout fell sharply in **Latvia**, from 54% in 2009 to 30% in 2014, and fell in the **Czech Republic** from 28% in 2009 to 18% in 2014. The lowest turnout was recorded in **Slovakia** (13%), which by the time of its third EP elections had never attracted more than a 20% turnout. Arguably most disappointing was the turnout of 25% in the newest EU member state, Croatia. Turnout in the UK increased slightly from 35% in 2009 to 36% in 2014. The lowest ever recorded turnout in the UK was 24% in 1999. Most of the 751 MEPs opted to belong to one of

the eight **political groups** within the EP. The remainder were unattached to any group.

At the elections to the ninth EP in May 2019, the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) emerged as the most successful political group, with 182 of the 751 seats. Turnout overall was increased, at 51%. In Germany turnout increased to 61%, and in Spain it was also 61%, compared with 44% in 2014. Turnout increased significantly in Romania, too, where it was 51% in 2019, compared with 32% in 2014. The EP normally meets for one week each month (except in August), with further meetings in March and October when agricultural prices and the budget are considered. Most of its work is done in its 20 specialized committees, which correspond to different policy areas and European Commission agencies. Committee memberships are determined by the **political groups** in proportion to the number of seats they occupy in the EP. MEPs sit not by nationality, but in transnational political groups, which have official recognition and receive administrative expenses. MEPs who choose not to belong to a political group are each entitled to serve on one committee. Each committee appoints a *rapporteur*, who draws up the programme for discussion and prepares drafts for resolution by the committee, which are then presented to the full EP. The MEPs elect a president who serves for a two-and-a-half year term. The EP President is **David-Maria Sassoli**, who replaced Antonio Tajani in July 2019.

In all its functions the effectiveness of the EP is diminished by two structural conditions. The first is the fact that it conducts its business in 24 officially recognized **languages**, with all the costs and consequences of translating its oral and written business. The second condition is that its operations are dispersed across three member states. Plenary sessions continue to be held mainly in **Strasbourg, France**. Most committees meet in **Brussels, Belgium**, in order to be close to the executive centre of the EU; some plenary sessions are also held there. By contrast, much of the supporting secretariat is located in Luxembourg, and must move to Brussels or Strasbourg, along with the necessary documentation and paraphernalia, for EP sessions. France and Luxembourg have resisted the EP's efforts to relocate all its operations to Brussels, and in 1992 and 1997 it was confirmed that the present arrangements would remain until the member states could unanimously agree upon a change.

EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIPS were launched in 2003 and first adopted in 2004 by the European Union (EU) for the countries of the **Western Balkans**. They are similar to **accession partnerships** in that they identify short- and medium-term priorities that the countries need to address in order to integrate with the EU. It is envisaged that the successful fulfilment of the priorities will equip the countries with the institutional and legislative framework and administrative capacity required for a functioning democracy and market economy. It should also assist their progress towards EU membership.

EUROPEAN PASSPORT

A **EUROPEAN PASSPORT** was first proposed in 1974. In 1981 the member states agreed upon the size and layout of a common format burgundy-coloured passport that would be marked 'European Community'. It was due to be introduced in January 1985. While only three member states met the deadline, all began to comply over the next few years. European passports were marked 'European Union' from 1995.

EUROPEAN PATENT: See **Unitary Patent Convention**

The **EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION** (EPU) was established in 1950 under the auspices of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). It was intended to tackle the problem of reciprocal credits and facilitate multilateral trade once the **Marshall Plan** had come to an end. The EPU proved to be highly successful, and in 1959 was replaced by a broader European Monetary Agreement, which fulfilled the same purpose. It contributed to the ability of the **Six** to co-operate economically in the 1950s, and it was used by the **European Economic Community** (EEC) during the latter's first year of operation.

EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: See **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)**

EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE: See **Europol**

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY was the name of a concept that arose out of the attempts to establish the **European Defence Community** (EDC) in the early 1950s; it was based on the view that a common defence structure ideally required a correspondingly unified foreign policy. It involved only the **Six** countries that had established the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC) and had committed themselves to the EDC. The unratified EDC treaty required its proposed Common Assembly to study ways of establishing federal institutions. The ECSC Assembly was transformed into an ad hoc EDC Assembly to consider a more wide-ranging political co-operation than could be provided by the ECSC and EDC. The Assembly began its work in September 1952 and reported six months later in favour of a European Political Community that would go beyond **sectoral integration** and form the basis of a comprehensive political federation to which the ECSC and EDC would be subordinated. A draft treaty, with a proposed institutional structure based upon the ECSC model, was drawn up in March 1953. However, the EDC treaty had still not been ratified by any state when the Political Community treaty was published. Despite the significant implications of the proposed European Political Community, it was the subject of very little

debate; its fate was totally dependent upon the EDC. The important arguments of the time concerned the EDC treaty, the **ratification** or rejection of which would determine the fate of the European Political Community. The refusal of **France** to ratify the EDC treaty in August 1954 effectively meant the abandonment of the draft Political Community treaty.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION (EPC), also known by the acronym POCO, was more of a concept than a structure. It was a term used to describe co-operation in foreign policy and foreign affairs by the member states of the European Communities (EC). Its origins lay in the **Davignon Report** of 1970, and its objectives were to ensure a better mutual understanding of international problems and issues among the member states through a regular process of consultation and exchange of information, to work towards a **harmonization** of views and a co-ordination of foreign policy positions, and, where appropriate, to attempt to establish a common EC position. The first ministerial meeting under EPC took place in 1970 and the first joint statement, on the **Middle East**, was issued in May 1971.

EPC was not based on the **founding treaties**, and its development occurred outside the institutional framework of the EC. It developed as an essentially intergovernmental operation involving close and continuing liaison between the national foreign ministries, with an ongoing consultation process involving ambassadors from the EC states to foreign countries and the **United Nations** (UN), and the issuing of common instructions by the foreign ministries to their diplomatic representatives abroad. Three major types of initiative emerged from EPC. The first was the practice for the EC, wherever possible, to have a single representation and single position in international meetings: the country occupying the Presidency of the Council of Ministers normally presented the EC position (see **Council of the European Union**). In particular, great efforts were made to ensure that the member states agreed upon a common position on issues in the UN General Assembly. The second element of EPC involved the adoption of common policy statements and initiatives by the **European Council**, occasionally leading to action towards developing a common policy position. Finally, the most specific outcome of EPC was agreement to impose common economic **sanctions** on named countries.

The **Single European Act** regularized the position of EPC within the EC framework, committing the member states to 'endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy'. It also provided EPC with a small secretariat in **Brussels, Belgium**, and made it responsible for the political and economic aspects of a security policy. Despite its intergovernmental character and the non-binding nature of its agreements, EPC proved to be a successful operation, although it was far from constituting a European foreign policy. It was the changing nature of world politics after 1989, as much as the desire for further integration, which led the EC to reconsider EPC. With the **Treaty on**

European Union (TEU), EPC was replaced by the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP).

EUROPEAN PROGRAMME FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: See **EUREKA**

A **EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE** (EPPO) was originally envisaged in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and is provided for under Article 86 of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. This Treaty provides for a significant increase of European Union (EU) engagement in the field of criminal justice, and the possibility of establishing an EPPO for 'investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment ... the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests'. Its powers can be extended, by unanimity, to include 'serious crime having a cross-border dimension'. In particular, the EPPO is intended to investigate fraud against the EU budget beyond the powers of national agencies that have no jurisdiction outside their own countries. The regulation establishing the EPPO under enhanced co-operation was adopted and entered into force in late 2017. The EPPO is expected to work closely with **Europol**, and may eventually move towards tackling cross-border crime. **Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Poland** and **Sweden** do not participate in the EPPO, but they could choose to do so in the future, with the exception of Denmark (which has an **opt-out** of the area of freedom, security and justice). Despite efforts fully to institutionalize the EPPO, there was a lack of agreement on who the Chief Prosecutor should be, and by August 2019 no agreement between the **European Council** and **European Parliament**. There were two main candidates: Laura Kövesi of **Romania** was supported by the EP, and Jean-François Bohnert of **France** was supported by the European Council. Neither was supported by their respective national Government for the position. In October Kövesi was confirmed as European Chief Prosecutor. The EPPO commenced operations in June 2021.

The **EUROPEAN RAPID REACTION FORCE** (ERRF) was formed in 1999–2003 to support the European Union's (EU) efforts to move beyond a **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and establish a **European Security and Defence Policy** (now **Common Security and Defence Policy**). Technically, the ERRF was not a standing force. Instead, it was based on commitments from the member states to ensure that the EU had at its disposal an ERRF of 60,000 troops that could be mobilized at 60 days' notice (the Helsinki Headline Goal). It had a resource of some 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels on which the EU could draw. The ERRF was deployed in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (now **North Macedonia**—Operation Concordia) and the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (Operation Artemis). Following the development of the ERRF, the concept of **battlegroups** was adopted and developed.

EUROPEAN RECOVERY INSTRUMENT: See **Next Generation EU**

EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME: See **Marshall Plan**

The **EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND** (ERDF), more commonly referred to as cohesion policy, is one of the four **structural and cohesion funds**. It was established in 1975 and is the central element of efforts by the European Union (EU) to develop an effective **regional policy**. It is run by a Regional Fund Committee, structured along the lines of the **Management Committees** of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP), and a Regional Policy Committee consisting of two representatives from each member state and the **European Commission**, with a chairperson elected from among the government representatives, and with a secretariat provided by the Commission.

The bulk of ERDF **expenditure** is devoted to specific projects for regional infrastructural developments proposed by the member states, including grants to enterprises as well as for public works. Although only national governments may bid for support from the Fund, these projects often originate from regional and local authorities, other public bodies, or private companies. Financial assistance from the ERDF is mainly focused on: supporting **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs); promoting productive investment; and improving infrastructure and further local development. One of its principal aims is to create **employment** by fostering competitive and sustainable development.

The ERDF is also used to support EU programmes proposed by the Commission, often relating to two or more regions, and may also be used to support national programmes deemed to be of benefit for the EU as a whole. Each member state must submit a list of the programmes and projects for which it is seeking support. The Regional Policy Committee evaluates national programmes and some major individual projects. The Regional Fund Committee may take decisions on smaller projects. To be considered by the ERDF, national programmes must receive Commission endorsement. They must be located in those regions that the member state has designated as being eligible for support under its own regional aid schemes; they must be consistent with EU objectives; and they must appear to be economically worthwhile. The ERDF operates under the principle of **additionality**, providing a maximum of 50% of the costs, with the member state having to fund the remainder.

Originally, ERDF resources did not go exclusively to the poorest regions of the European Communities (EC). Each member state was allocated a

percentage quota of the Fund, against which it could bid for support. This provided aid for the weakest regions in each country, no matter how healthy they might be in the context of the EC as a whole. The quota system was a constant source of contention among the member states. A limited non-quota element (totalling only 5%), to be utilized by the European Commission for its own programmes, was added in 1979, and in 1985 quotas were abandoned in favour of a percentile range of the ERDF budget being allocated to each member state; the range indicates the maximum and minimum levels of support a state can receive, provided that an appropriate number of eligible programmes submitted receive endorsement.

In 1987 the Commission introduced a five-year budgetary package to cover all EC expenditure. As part of this the Commission proposed the reform of, and increased resources for, the structural funds in the period from 1988 to 1992. This so-called proposal, which became known as **Delors I**, was supported at a special **European Council summit meeting in Brussels** in 1988. Under the agreement reached, EC structural spending rose from 15% to 31% of total expenditure. Jacques Delors, then President of the Commission, described the European Council's decision as a 'second Marshall Plan'. The 1988 reform radically revised structural policy by introducing a number of new principles (**additionality**; partnership; programming; and concentration) and identified five priority objective areas (development of lagging regions under objective 1; conversion of regions facing industrial decline under objective 2; combating long-term unemployment under objective 3; combating youth unemployment under objective 4; and development of rural areas under objective 5).

In 1992 the Commission proposed an ambitious new five-year budgetary package (**Delors II**) to the European Council. In December the European Council agreed to double EC assistance to the least prosperous regions. The decision again reflected pressure from the four poorest states (**Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain**) and the willingness of **Germany** (albeit more reluctant post-unification in 1990) largely to finance it. When **Austria, Finland and Sweden** joined the EU in 1995 a new objective was created to help low population density regions (objective 6). By 1999 **structural and cohesion funds** made up more than one-third of the EU budget.

In 2003 (prior to enlargement in 2004) spending on the EU's structural operations (including the **Cohesion Fund**) accounted for 34.3% of the EU budget (€33,164m.). Financial assistance was concentrated on the neediest areas and to this end the number of objective areas was reduced from seven to three and redefined. The bulk of the funds available was designated for the new objective 1 areas (i.e. towards the development and structural adjustment of the least-developed regions), the poorest EU areas, which consisted mainly of eastern regions of Germany, and **Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal**.

Negotiations for the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** (MFF) for 2007–13 commenced in early 2004 and agreement was reached at the end of 2005. The operations and aims of the structural and cohesion policy for that

financing period were altered, and the new policy focused its attention on three themes: **convergence**, regional **competitiveness** and **employment**, and territorial co-operation. The vast majority of the funds available were focused on the first aim, of convergence. Some €283,000m. was directed here and was met by the ERDF, the **European Social Fund** and the **Cohesion Fund**. In 2012 the European Commission began the process of framing a new ERDF for the new financial perspective, for 2014–20. Final agreement was reached on the MFF in late 2013. The ERDF now forms the largest category of the EU budget, ‘Smart and Inclusive Growth’. Some 33.3% of the EU’s annual budget for 2014 was directed towards economic, social and territorial cohesion. During 2014–20 it was estimated that a reformed cohesion policy would invest some €366,800m. in Europe’s regions, cities and the real economy. This policy represented the EU’s principal investment tool for delivering the objectives of the **Europe 2020** programme, in terms of creating economic growth jobs and reducing poverty and social exclusion. Plans provided for small and medium-sized enterprises to be assisted by doubling the financial resources available to them under the ERDF (from €70,000m. to €140,000m. over the seven-year period).

For the financial perspective 2021–27, the European Council of July 2020 concluded that (under investment for jobs and growth) member states with more developed economies were to allocate at least 85% of their total ERDF resources, other than for technical assistance, to so-called smart or green objectives. The MFF for 2021–21 allocated some €200,360m. to the ERDF, in 2018 prices.

The **EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA COMMITTEE** (ERAC) replaced the Scientific and Technical Research Committee (CREST) in May 2010. CREST was founded in the early 1970s as an **advisory committee** to the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union**, composed of scientific experts. The Committee is usually consulted on its opinions about proposals and funding for scientific research programmes. It meets on a regular basis, and also reviews progress reports on ongoing research programmes.

EUROPEAN RESEARCH CO-ORDINATION AGENCY: See **EUREKA**

EUROPEAN RIGHT (DR) was the name of one of the cross-national **political groups** in the **European Parliament** (EP) until 1994. It was formed after the 1984 **direct elections** by extreme right-wing and neo-Fascist groups. Because of the political attitudes of its members, the DR was the most isolated group in the EP, with no other group willing to be associated with it: indeed, in 1984 other political groups strove to avoid having to be seated

beside it. Its share of the vote dwindled over subsequent years to such an extent that it was represented neither in the 1999–2004 parliament nor in the sixth one (2004–09). However, the prospects for the **far right** in the EP seemed to have changed after the 2009 elections, when a number of far-right individuals were returned as **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs). The creation of a new Alliance of European National Movements, which included members from the British National Party, the French Front National (FN) and the Hungarian Jobbik party seemed to signal closer cooperation. However, this alliance was not recognized as a political group within the EP, as it did not meet the necessary numbers (25) and had insufficient transnational membership (members must come from at least seven EU member states). Rivalries between the members ensured that the grouping was practically defunct by the end of 2012. Although the BNP lost its two seats at the 2014 EP elections, both the FN and Jobbik performed well. The FN emerged as the largest party in **France**, capturing nearly 25% of the votes and winning 24 seats, while Jobbik retained its three seats, with almost 15% of the votes. Other smaller extreme-right parties such as the German National Democratic Party and **Greece's** Golden Dawn also won seats (one and three seats, respectively) at the 2014 EP elections. A new far-right grouping emerged in the EP in mid-2015, the **Europe of Nations and Freedom**, which was replaced by **Identity and Democracy** for the ninth parliamentary term in 2019.

The **EUROPEAN ROUND TABLE OF INDUSTRIALISTS** (ERT) is an influential **Brussels**-based organization that seeks to promote the interests of business in the strategic thinking of the European Union (EU) and in particular the **European Commission**. It was established in 1983 and comprises some 50 chief executives of the largest firms across the EU. These include representatives, for example, from **Germany** (e.g. Siemens, Daimler and BASF), from **France** (e.g. Orange, Renault and Total) and from **Italy** (e.g. CIR and Eni). ERT members strongly endorse the benefits of European economic integration and the role of business within it. Notably, they believe that a dynamic, wealth-producing industrial sector benefits society as a whole. Membership is personal and not corporate, but it is by invitation only. The ERT is funded by multinational firms and maintains some 10 personnel in Brussels. In terms of sectoral areas, the ERT has taken a particular interest in information technology and lifelong learning skills. It was highly influential in the development of plans to complete the **single market** and to promote **Trans-European Networks**. (See also **interest groups**.) The ERT strongly encourages the promotion of the **Lisbon agenda**, but also recognizes that European industry cannot flourish unless it is competitive with other businesses around the world. The prevailing economic and social policy framework is, the ERT argues, crucially important and must be flexible enough to adapt to changes in global conditions. ERT constantly demands policies that provide

flexibility and enable European companies to build and improve their competitive strengths. In 2018 Carl-Henric Svanberg became the chairperson of the ERT.

EUROPEAN SCHOOLS have been established by the **European Commission** in several countries. They are intended primarily for the children of European Union (EU) employees; in particular, those working in a member state other than their own. Subject to the availability of space, they are open to other pupils. The schools (of which there were 18 in 2018–19, with a total of around 27,000 pupils) seek to provide a European education by offering an international syllabus in which tuition is given in several EU **languages**. The syllabus leads to the European Baccalaureate, a recognized system of academic attainment that allows for entry to universities. An intergovernmental committee, on which the Commission is also represented, appoints the head teachers. Each national government appoints a proportion of the other teaching staff.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY (ESDI) is often used to describe the goal of increased co-operation within the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) between its European members, particularly after 1994. Such co-operation was designed to complement the development of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** of the European Union. More recently, efforts to develop a **European Security and Defence Policy** have promoted the ESDI.

The **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY** (ESDP): See **Common Security and Defence Policy** (CSDP)

A **EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY** (ESS) entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ and devised by the European Union (EU)’s **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**, Javier Solana, was adopted by the **European Council** in December 2003. The strategy sought to guide the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the **European Security and Defence Policy**. It comprised three main objectives: addressing threats posed by terrorism, nuclear proliferation and regional conflicts; building security in the EU’s neighbourhood; and establishing an international order based on effective multilateralism. It committed the EU to greater activity in realizing these objectives, an enhancement of capabilities, greater coherence, and increased co-operation with other parties (e.g. the **USA** and the **Russian Federation**). The security and defence provisions of the Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, or the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), superseded the ESS.

EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: See **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**

The **EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND** (ESF) was established as required by the **Treaty of Rome** in order for the European Communities (EC) to develop 'employment opportunities for workers', to raise their standard of living, and to make 'the employment of workers easier', especially by 'increasing their geographical and occupational mobility within the Community'. From its inception in 1960, therefore, the ESF was concerned with the specific field of **employment** and training rather than with broad issues of general social welfare. During the 1960s the Fund's operations were limited, being confined mainly to the retraining of workers made redundant by structural economic change. With the dramatic increase in unemployment after 1973, the role of the Fund was redefined and enhanced in terms of retraining, redeployment and the provision of vocational training for young people. Persisting high levels of unemployment, and budgetary restrictions, obliged the ESF to narrow its priorities, and it refocused its activities on retraining and the development of employment skills among young people, with particular attention paid to the long-term unemployed and women. In 1988 it was agreed that 75% of ESF resources would be spent on projects for people under 25 years of age. These funds included substantial amounts spent on the (now-defunct) Programme for the Vocational Training of Young People and their Preparation for Adult and Working Life (PETRA) and EUROFORM initiatives. In addition, the ESF was obliged to focus more intensively on the most economically disadvantaged regions of the EC.

In 1999 the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** adopted a new regulation laying down general provisions on, and the three new objectives for, the structural funds. The regulation provided for action in five general areas of social policy. These include: the development of active labour market policies to combat unemployment; the promotion of equal opportunities for all in terms of access to the market and particularly for those at risk from social exclusion; the promotion of vocational training; the promotion of a skilled, well-trained and flexible workforce; and specific measures to improve access to the labour market, especially for women. These objectives were in line with the European Union (EU) strategy and guidelines on employment.

ESF resources are available for both large- and small-scale projects proposed or accepted by a member state. It operates under the principle of **additionality**, normally providing only 50% of the projected costs of a scheme, the balance having to be met by the member state. In poor regions that have been given absolute priority status, the ESF contribution is permitted to rise to 75%. A small proportion (some 5%) of ESF expenditure is reserved for other more general purposes or special operations defined by the **European Commission**, which typically involve contributions from several EU sources combined

into an integrated programme. The ESF is managed by a Social Fund Committee, and consumes some 8%–10% of the EU **budget**. Funds are directed towards initiatives that develop human resources, secure better integration in the workplace and ensure equality between the sexes. The ESF has also been seeking to ensure that Europe's companies are better equipped to meet global challenges. For the period 2007–13, some €75,000m. was directed to the ESF. The Commission places an emphasis on increasing the adaptability of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs. Lifelong learning, for example, is deemed to be an integral aspect of this drive. The ESF was considered a core element of the **Europe 2020** strategy. The Fund's main themes were carried forward into the financial perspective for 2014–20. This financial period enabled the EU to provide for some €960,000m. in commitments and some €908,400m. in payments. The creation of jobs remains a priority. Some €70,000m. (i.e. €10,000m. per year over the financial framework from 2014–20) was allocated to the ESF. A new ESF+ was introduced for 2021–27, with funding of €87,995m., in 2018 prices.

The **EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CORPS** was announced in September 2016 by the President of the **European Commission**, Jean-Claude Juncker, as an initiative to offer opportunities for young adults, aged between 18 and 30 years, to take part in employment or volunteer work of benefit to communities throughout Europe. The initial phase of the initiative was launched in December; phase 2 was scheduled for implementation during 2018–20, and phase 3 was envisaged for 2021–27. The ESC, which had a budget of €376.5m. for 2018–20, sought to provide opportunities for some 100,000 young Europeans to engage in the initiative by 2020.

The **EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY** (ESA) was established in 1975. It represents a consortium of countries that produce the **ARIANE** rocket used to send commercial satellites into space. Its origins lie with the inadequacies of the first collaborative European organization for space research, the **European Space Research Organization** (ESRO), and its re-evaluation by a European Space Conference. Negotiations between 1971 and 1973 produced an agreement to establish ESA as a replacement for ESRO. ESA's 22 member states are **Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic** (Czechia), **Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland** and the **United Kingdom**. Canada is an associated member and participates in certain ESA projects. ESA is an independent European agency that employs more than 2,000 people and has its headquarters in Paris as well as other centres such as ESTEC, the European Space Research and Technology Centre. ESTEC is the design hub for most ESA spacecraft and technology development, and is situated in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. ESA is governed by a Council, which comprises members from

each of the ESA member states. ESA does not form part of the European Union (EU). There are, however, close ties between the two bodies and they are linked by a common aim: to strengthen Europe and benefit its citizens.

ESA is funded by its member countries, and its objective is 'to provide and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, co-operation among European states in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications'. ESA has been active in satellite development, and in 1984 adopted the long-term Horizon 2000 programme to work towards manned European space flight. The Horizon 2000 Plus extension programme, covering 2005–16, was initiated in 1994 for the inclusion of projects using new technologies and for participation in future international space activities. A further programme, Cosmic Vision 2015–25, was announced in 2005. In December 2012 ESA signed an agreement with the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to provide a service module for the Orion spacecraft's exploration mission in 2017. In September 2014 ESA signed a co-operation agreement with Sierra Nevada Corporation of the USA on the Dream Chaser project, for the creation of an unmanned, reusable cargo spacecraft. ESA's total budget for 2021 amounted to some €6,490m., and some 2,200 employees worked for the agency globally in 2018. (See also **EUMETSAT**.)

ESA's ties with the EU have developed considerably because of the increasing role of space in strengthening Europe's political and economic role. The necessity of ensuring Europe's guaranteed access to space is becoming ever more apparent as satellites are used to improve communications and navigation, monitor the environment, strengthen technology and increase scientific knowledge. To this end, ESA has also set up a liaison office in **Brussels, Belgium**, to facilitate relations between the two organizations. Joint initiatives include Galileo, a European global navigation satellite system, and the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security suite of services, formerly known as GMES and now known as Copernicus, as well as the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), the first pan-European satellite navigation system, which extends the US Global Positioning System (GPS), and is suitable for use in challenging navigational situations in which safety is critical (for example, guiding boats through narrow channels). In April 2009 ownership of EGNOS was transferred to the European Commission. In October the European Commission announced the launch of the free EGNOS Open Service.

In May 2007 the EU adopted a formal European Space Policy, which had been drafted by the **European Commission** and the Director-General of ESA. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the role of ESA as a research and development space agency. In October of that year the first EU-ESA International Conference on Human Space Exploration was held, in Prague, the Czech Republic.

In October 2016 a new Space Strategy for Europe was announced by the Commission, which aimed, *inter alia*, to encourage Galileo to be utilized by

mobile devices and to increase connectivity in remote locations; to facilitate access to satellite data by companies, in order to develop new services and applications; to encourage private investment for relevant new businesses; and to support the development of industrial space hubs in European regions. The EU and ESA signed a declaration on a joint European space policy, demonstrating the importance to both institutions of close co-operation on space.

The **EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION** (ESRO) was a multi-purpose organization established in 1961 with the participation of 10 European countries. It was intended both to carry out scientific research and to design and develop European satellites built on a collaborative basis by its members. During its existence, it was beset with disputes between scientists, and arguments over both projects and costs between the participating countries. It became the core of the **European Space Agency** established in 1975.

The **EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM** (ESM) is a permanent intergovernmental crisis mechanism designed to safeguard the financial stability of the **eurozone**. It is based on the temporary funding programme, the **European Financial Stability Facility** (EFSF), which it replaced (together with the temporary **European Financial Stabilization Mechanism**—EFSM) on 27 September 2012 when the **Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism** entered into force. The EFSF and the EFSM were, however, to continue to handle the money transfers and programme monitoring for the previously approved bailout loans to **Ireland, Portugal and Greece**. The ESM has total subscribed capital of €704,800m. (including €80,550m. in paid-up capital). Members of the eurozone can apply for bailouts from the ESM if they are in financial difficulty or their financial sector is a stability threat that requires recapitalization. Such applications are dependent, however, on two factors: the member state having first signed a memorandum of understanding outlining the requisite reforms to be undertaken to restore financial stability; and the member state having ratified the European Fiscal Compact. By April 2013 the ESM had approved two Financial Assistance Facility Agreements—€141,000m. for the recapitalization of **Spain's** banks and €9,000m. in disbursements to **Cyprus** for a combined sovereign state bailout programme and financial sector recapitalization programme. The ESM has its headquarters in **Luxembourg**, has a staff of about 70 and is headed by a Managing Director, who holds this position for five years. In August 2015 the ESM Board of Governors approved a memorandum of understanding with Greece, which pledged to carry out reforms concentrating on four principal objectives: fiscal sustainability; financial stability; growth, competitiveness and investment; and public administration. The ESM provided financial assistance to Greece over a three-year period, amounting to some €61,900m. In December 2019 eurozone heads of state and of government endorsed plans to reform the ESM. On 27 January and 8 February 2021 the 19 ESM member states signed an

agreement amending the ESM Treaty. The reformed treaty was to enter into force following ratification by all signatory states. The revised ESM was to serve as a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (under the **Single Resolution Mechanism**), and play an enhanced role in new economic adjustment programmes, as well as crisis prevention. In addition, the process of applying for ESM precautionary credit lines was to be simplified.

EUROPEAN STANDARDS COMMITTEE: See **CEN**

The **EUROPEAN STEEL ASSOCIATION** (EUROFER) brings together all the steel companies and national steel federations from across Europe to promote the interests of stainless steel. The steel industry still represents a sizeable sector for the European economy and as a world leader employs about 330,000 people across the EU, producing an average 197m. metric tons of steel each year. It had an annual revenue of some €170,000m. EUROFER was created in 1976 and is based in **Brussels**. The initiative was taken by the **European Commission**, which hoped that such a body would be able to deal more decisively with a continuing crisis caused by decreasing demand for steel, poor productivity, an under-utilization of capacity, and the reluctance of national governments to accept mass redundancies. EUROFER was meant to work for a rationalization of the industry, assisted by the Commission, through reductions in output, to bring productivity and capacity more in line with demand. It had some limited success, but its voluntary nature could not persuade national governments always to follow its guidelines, nor could it prevent individual companies from taking unilateral action. EUROFER continues to promote co-operation among national federations and companies in all matters concerning the development of the European steel industry. It organizes conferences and seeks to influence EU developments. It also represents the common interests of its members vis-à-vis third parties, notably the EU institutions and other international organizations.

The **EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS** (ESCB) came into existence in 1998 once the date for the third and final stage of **economic and monetary union** (EMU) had been set. It coexists with the **European Central Bank** (ECB), having the responsibility of maintaining price stability, defining and implementing a common monetary policy, and supervising the foreign reserves and foreign exchange operations of the member states. It consists of the national central banks of the **European Union** member states, along with the ECB, although those member states not participating in EMU are unable to take part in **decision making** in this area. The ESCB should not be confused with the **Eurosystem**.

The **EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION** (ESFS) was established in 2011 to supervise the EU's financial sector. Founded primarily to respond to the ongoing financial crisis, the ESFS comprises three supervisory bodies: the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA); the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); and the **European Banking Authority**. The main task of the ESFS is to improve the functioning of the **single market** by ensuring appropriate, efficient and harmonized European regulation.

The **EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF INTEGRATED ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS** (ESA) was established to assist in the development of a European information system in connection with the **single market**. This was to be compatible with the System of National Accounts (SNA), which was to be used to monitor the development of **economic and monetary union** (EMU).

EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ORGANIZATION: See **EUTELSAT**

The **EUROPEAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION** (ETUC) was created in 1973 and gave itself the task of promoting and defending the interests of working people throughout the European Union (EU). The ETUC has become the major overarching organization for member states' national trade unions, and for union federations outside the EU. The ETUC comprises 88 national trade union confederations from 37 countries in Europe, and 10 federations representing European industry, resulting in a total membership of some 60m. people. Other trade union structures such as Eurocadres (the Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff) and EFREP/FERPA (European Federation of Retired and Elderly Persons) operate under the auspices of the ETUC. In addition, the ETUC co-ordinates the activities of the 44 Interregional Trade Union Councils (IRTUCs), which organize trade union co-operation at cross-border level. Based in **Brussels**, Belgium, the ETUC is represented on several EU committees and organizations, and is generally recognized as a body with a legitimate interest in EU affairs. The ETUC is recognized by the EU, by the **Council of Europe** and by the **European Free Trade Association** as the only representative cross-sectoral trade union organization at European level.

The ETUC exists to represent workers in Europe. It strives to promote the 'European Social Model', which the ETUC believes should embody a society combining sustainable economic growth with ever-improving living and working standards, full employment, social protection, equal opportunities and social inclusion. The ETUC campaigns constantly for the EU to have a strong social dimension. It has developed close relations with the **European**

Parliament, has membership of a number of advisory bodies and consults other social partners. The ETUC has been particularly active in supporting EU initiatives on **workers' rights**, notably the **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**, but less active in seeking to promote industrial development. Under the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU, as amended by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**) the ETUC is recognized as one of the three 'social partners', alongside industry associations such as **BUSINESSEUROPE** (formerly the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe, or UNICE), with which the **European Commission** negotiates draft social and economic **legislation**. The ETUC has played a key role in helping to formulate principal parts of EC/EU legislation, for example the European Works Councils Directive of 1994 and the Information and Consultation Directive of 2002. More recently it has also been active in organizing a number of high-profile demonstrations or action days to coincide with **summit meetings** or to protest about the impact of policies that threaten to undermine the 'European Social Model'.

The **EUROPEAN TRAINING FOUNDATION** (ETF) was established by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) in 1990. The ETF, which is based in Turin, **Italy**, and has a staff of some 130, is open also to states outside the European Union (EU). Its aims are to develop vocational training and retraining, and to channel aid to training and lifelong learning projects, particularly those concerning Eastern Europe, and especially the **candidate countries**. It was responsible for co-ordinating EU higher education programmes in the accession states of **Central and Eastern Europe**. (See also **European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training**.)

EUROPEAN TREATIES is a term used to refer to the combination of **founding treaties** (see **Treaty of Paris**; **Treaty of Rome**), **accession treaties** and amending treaties (e.g. the **Single European Act**, **Treaty on European Union**, **Treaty of Amsterdam** and **Treaty of Nice**), which make up the treaty base of the European Union (EU). The **Treaty of Lisbon** entered into force on 1 December 2009 and also renamed the **Treaty establishing the European Community**—one of the Treaties of Rome—as the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**.

EUROPEAN UNION (EU) is the name of the body established in 1993 by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), although its exact status was not fully and clearly defined by the treaty. It had a notional structure consisting of three **pillars**. At the centre was pillar I, which comprised the European Communities (EC). Two pillars of intergovernmental co-operation complemented this: **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (pillar II) and

justice and home affairs (pillar III). This pillar structure enhanced the powers of the **European Council**, whose role encompassed all the components of the EU. The supranational institutions, meanwhile, concerned themselves mainly with matters covered by pillar I. Hence, the **European Commission** had only a limited role in pillars II and III. The same was also true of the **Court of Justice** and the **European Parliament**. While the EU is a political entity that seeks to improve and deepen the relationships between the member states, and claims to have its own **citizenship**, it nevertheless accepts the principle of **subsidiarity** and recognizes national identity. In addition, it was not described by the TEU as a fixed structure, but as a 'new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union'. Further timetables and targets were therefore established, most of which were reviewed by an **inter-governmental conference** (IGC) in 1996. This produced the **Treaty of Amsterdam** which reformed elements of each of the EU's three pillars, notably pillar III, various activities of which were 'communitarized' (i.e. moved to the first supranational pillar) and whose title was consequently changed to **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**. Further reforms were introduced via the **Treaty of Nice** in 2003. The future shape of the EU was a key focus of debates within the **European Convention** in 2002–03 and the subsequent IGC launched in October 2003. The resulting **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** never entered into force, however. Its replacement, the **Treaty of Lisbon**, which came into force on 1 December 2009, further reformed the EU, removed all references to the EC in favour of the EU and formally abandoned the pillar structure.

The **EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** (FRA) was established in Vienna, **Austria**, in March 2007 as the successor to the **European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia** (EUMC). It became fully operational in 2008. The aims of the Agency are to provide assistance and expertise to the EU and its member states when implementing EU **legislation** on fundamental rights; and to produce objective, reliable and comparable data on racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. The FRA produces an annual report for the **European Parliament** in which it charts its activities and achievements. It also assumed responsibility for the RAXEN network (an information-gathering network of experts in the field of racism and xenophobia in the EU member states).

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT CO-OPERATION: See **EUROPOL**

EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY (EUGS) was shorthand for the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, which was adopted in June 2016 as the new EU foreign policy

doctrine. It replaced the **European Security Strategy** (ESS) and sought to chart a bolder foreign policy plan for the **European Union**. The legacy of the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** until 2019, Federica Mogherini, the EUGS intended to bring greater coherence, cohesion and effectiveness to EU foreign policy in theory and in practice while facilitating greater defence integration among member states.

The **EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE** was formerly known as the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, and is a decentralized European Union agency responsible for the **harmonization** of intellectual property rights, **trademarks** and design rights across the member states. It was established in 1994, and is located in Alicante, **Spain**.

EUROPEAN UNION LAW is a generic term to describe all the law produced by the European Union (EU). Prior to the **Treaty of Lisbon** and the abolition of the EU's 'community' **pillar**, there was, according to some, a need to distinguish between, on the one hand, the law of the supranational European Communities (EC) and the *acquis communautaire*—EC law—and, on the other, the law that was created under the EU's two intergovernmental pillars covering the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**.

The **EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COMMITTEE** (EUMC) was created in 2000 as part of the development of the European Union's **European Security and Defence Policy**. The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states, who are represented on a regular basis by their permanent military representatives in **Brussels**, Belgium. The EUMC gives military advice to the **Political and Security Committee** and to the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**. It also oversees the European Union Military Staff.

The **EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE** (SatCen) was established in 2002 to replace the Western European Union Satellite Centre. Situated in Torrejón de Ardoz in **Spain**, it is responsible for producing satellite imagery to aid decision making in the field of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**, notably where crisis monitoring and conflict prevention are concerned. Although the SatCen is autonomous in its daily operations, the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** is responsible for the Centre's operational direction.

The **EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGIC APPROACH TO WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY** was adopted in December 2018 as a framework

to support the **European Union** in implementing the global normative framework, Women, Peace and Security (WPS). The EU Strategic Approach to WPS provides a blueprint for the holistic integration of gender perspectives in the EU's foreign and security policies. It prioritizes **gender mainstreaming** and creating the space for the participation of women in peace and security.

EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATIONS (ECSAs) are nationally based academic organizations that support research on all aspects of the European integration process. The activities of the European associations are co-ordinated through ECSA-Europe, an umbrella organization largely funded by the **European Commission**. ECSA-Europe seeks to promote teaching and university research on European integration; to develop co-operation among its members; to encourage and manage transnational programmes of research and technical assistance; to foster networks of academic co-operation; and to disseminate information on university activities, especially through use of the internet.

The **EUROPEAN UNIT OF ACCOUNT** (EUA) was the bookkeeping device introduced by the European Communities (EC) for recording the relative value of payments into and from EC accounts. In 1981 it was replaced by the **ECU**, which, in turn, was replaced by the **euro** in 1999.

EUROPEAN UNITARIAN LEFT: See **Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left**

The **EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE** (EUI) was founded in 1976 as part of the European Communities (EC) policy of encouraging co-operation in higher education. Based in Florence, **Italy**, the EUI is an establishment for research and training in postgraduate and post-doctoral education, offering programmes in economics, history and civilization, law, and political and social sciences. Entry for students is competitive. Those accepted on the programmes are funded by their national governments and are expected to have some competence in more than one **language** of the European Union (EU). Staff appointments, made on the basis of open competition, are funded by the EU and are for fixed terms of between three and seven years. The EUI is the depository for the historical archives of the EU institutions.

The **EUROPEAN VOLUNTARY SERVICE** (EVS) programme, which was piloted in 1996, enabled young people between the ages of 18 and 30 years to participate in voluntary work (for a period of two to 12 months) within other member states of the European Union. EVS formed part of the Youth in Action Programme for 2007 to 2013, which had a total budget of

EUROPEAN WOMEN'S LOBBY

€885m. From 2014 the EVS was incorporated into the **Erasmus+** programme.

EUROPEAN WOMEN'S LOBBY (EWL) is a feminist, women's rights umbrella organization that represents over 2,000 organizations in the member states of the European Union (EU) and in candidate countries, and 19 European-wide organizations representing the diversity of women and girls in Europe. EWL was formed following support from the **European Commission** for a **Brussels**-based secretariat in **Belgium**. It serves as a bridge between the EU institutions and women's organizations.

The **EUROPEAN YOUTH FORUM** is the name of a body established in 1996 to advise and aid the **European Commission** on policy issues that concern young people. In 2019 the Forum consisted of 41 national youth councils and 65 international youth **non-governmental organizations** from across Europe. The Forum's impact has been limited, not least because, by its very nature, there is a lack of continuity in its membership.

EUROPEANIZATION (or arguably, and more accurately, EUization) is a popular theme of academic research and is used most often to describe and assess the impact that the European Union (EU) exerts on both member states and non-member states, notably in terms of domestic legislation, policy priorities and administrative structures. Discussions of Europeanization can be measured by looking at the EU's impact on public policies, politics and the public. It affects much more than just member state governments, and can be applied to a whole range of non-governmental actors who have likewise adjusted their activities and responses to EU structures and activities. The term remains fashionable in contemporary academic literature, but it is often a disputed concept.

The **EUROPLUS PACT** (or the **Competitiveness** act) was adopted by the European Council in March 2011. The original idea behind this pact came from the Governments of **France** and **Germany**. It was designed as a more credible and stringent successor to the **Stability and Growth Pact**, the rules of which some member states had been able to flout. It sought to improve the fiscal strengths and competitiveness of the **eurozone** members, and contained four broad goals: fostering competitiveness; improving employment; securing sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability. It also referred to a fifth and much more problematic issue, tax policy co-ordination.

EUROPOL (formerly the European Police Office) is now officially known as the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Co-operation, and was

first conceived under the terms of the **Treaty on European Union**. Its objective is to help create a safer Europe for all EU citizens. To this end, Europol supports national police activities in the member states, as an integral element of **justice and home affairs**, especially in combating drug trafficking, fraud and terrorism. The Convention establishing the agency was signed in June 1995, but Europol only became fully operational on 1 July 1999 (although the Europol Drugs Unit was already in operation by this time). From January 2002 its mandate was extended to include all serious forms of international crime. The largest threats to internal security are posed by acts of terrorism, international drug trafficking, money laundering, organized fraud, counterfeiting of the **euro**, people smuggling, and the increasing occurrence of cybercrime. Europol is based in The Hague, the **Netherlands**, and has a staff of some 800, including about 150 Europol liaison officers (ELOs) seconded from the member state enforcement agencies. Europol covers all EU member states, but it also works in conjunction with other countries, from **Albania** and Australia to the **Russian Federation** and **Turkey**, to tackle effectively cross-border and international crime. The directorate of Europol is appointed by the **Council of the European Union** and the Executive Director since May 2018 is Catherine De Bolle, the former Commissioner-General of the Belgian Federal Police. Europol participates in some 500 cross-border investigations each year, resulting in an annual caseload of about 9,000 cases. According to Europol, its endeavours have helped to dismantle or disable many criminal and terrorist networks. In 2016 a new **European Counter Terrorism Centre** was established as a body overseen by Europol, in response to an upsurge in terrorist activity, notably attacks in **France** in 2015. Similarly, a **European Migrant Smuggling Centre** was established in early 2016 in response to the so-called **European migration crisis**. A new Europol regulation entered into force with effect from 1 May 2017, amending its name and strengthening its capabilities in combating crime.

EUROSCEPTIC(S) is a term used to describe those who oppose attempts by the European Union (EU) to introduce further integration. Their preference is for intergovernmental and free trade co-operation only. However, the term is a rather loose concept and Eurosceptics can be divided into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variants. The former oppose all steps towards European integration—past, present and future—and normally advocate their country’s **withdrawal** from the EU. In contrast, ‘soft’ Eurosceptics object to certain aspects of the EU, usually relating to policy competences that they would prefer to repatriate. Although opposition to the activities and aims of the EU can be traced back to the very early days of European Communities (EC) membership in many states, Euroscepticism emerged as a feature of British politics in the late 1980s, especially under the final years of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership. Subsequently, conservative opposition to the Maastricht Treaty (see **Treaty on European Union**) caused difficulties for the Government of John Major and

EUROSTAT

continued to cast shadows over the administrations of Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair. The **United Kingdom**'s Eurosceptic movement achieved its most notable success in the history of the EU in June 2016, when the British electorate voted in favour of leaving the bloc (see **Brexit**). Euroscepticism was not confined to the UK: there has been strong evidence of similar tendencies in many other EU states such as, for example, in **France** with the **Rassemblement National**, and in **Germany** with the **Alternative für Deutschland**. Euroscepticism (both 'soft' and 'hard') remains a significant force in the European Parliament.

EUROSTAT is the abbreviated and popularized form of the Statistical Office of the European Union (EU). It is a Directorate-General of the **European Commission**, and is responsible for the collection and publication of statistics covering the whole range of the economic and social affairs of the European Union. Although the information is intended in the first instance for use by the Commission and its administration, its documentation is publicly available, both online and in printed form. The statistical database (available online) is divided into nine themes: general and regional statistics; economy and finance; population and social conditions; industry, trade and services; agriculture, forestry and fisheries; international trade; transport; environment and energy; and science, technology and digital society. These themes are themselves subdivided into various domains of information. The database comprises more than 100m. items of social and economic statistical data covering the EU member states, and, in some cases, the **USA**, **Japan** and other main economic partners, including countries that have applied for membership of the EU. Eurostat is located in **Luxembourg**. In January 2017 Mariana Kotzeva was appointed as Director-General of Eurostat, in an acting capacity, and was subsequently confirmed in the role.

The **EURO SUMMIT** comprises the heads of state or of government of the **eurozone** member states, the President of the Euro Summit and President of the **European Council** and the President of the **European Commission**. It seeks to give guidance on the co-ordination of economic policy throughout the eurozone in order to enable **economic and monetary union** to run as smoothly as possible. The first Euro Summit took place in October 2008, in response to the incipient economic and financial crisis in Europe. Under the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, commonly known as the **Fiscal Compact**, Euro Summit meetings now take place at least twice a year, and are organized taking into account rules of procedure adopted in March 2013.

The **EUROSYSTEM** is the **eurozone**'s monetary authority, and comprises the **European Central Bank** (ECB) and the central banks of the member

states participating in the eurozone. The principal goal of the Eurosystem is maintaining price stability, and it is also concerned with financial stability and financial integration. The Eurosystem should not be confused with the **European System of Central Banks**.

The **EUROZONE**, also called the euro area and sometimes more informally referred to as **euroland**, consists of those 19 member states that are full participants in **economic and monetary union**, have adopted the **euro** and are subject to the new rules established under the **banking union**.

EURYDICE is the commonly used name for the Education Information Network in the European Union (EU). It was established in 1980 and was one of the European Communities' first forays into both information technology and the development of collaboration in **education, vocational training and youth policy**. The Eurydice network became one of the strategic mechanisms run by the European Commission with the member states to support co-operation in the field of education. The networked information service is based upon databanks of educational statistics, and is available for use by the **European Commission** and national education officials. At 2021 the Eurydice network consisted of 40 national units based in 37 countries (EU member states, **Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey**). It is co-ordinated and managed by the EU Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency in **Brussels, Belgium**, which drafts its studies and provides a range of online resources. Since 2014 Eurydice has formed part of the **Erasmus+** programme.

EUTELSAT is the acronym of the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization, an intergovernmental organization that was established in 1977. The aim of Eutelsat was to foster collaboration in the development of a European communications satellite system, and in the co-ordination and implementation of requirements relating to satellites being developed by the **European Space Agency**. It was designed to operate a satellite-based telecommunications system infrastructure for Europe. Eutelsat launched its first satellite in 1983 and became the world's third largest satellite operator (in terms of revenue). Although created to meet the needs of Western Europe's demand for satellite communications, Eutelsat's interests extend across all Europe, into Africa and the Middle East, and into large parts of Asia and the Americas. Eutelsat has no direct links with the European Union (EU), although all the EU member states are represented. In the wider context of telecommunications liberalization, Eutelsat was restructured in 2001 as a private company incorporated under French law and now it markets its services through a

EVCA

network of partners who include leading telecommunications operators and service providers.

EVCA: See **Invest Europe**

EVS: See **European Voluntary Service**

The **EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM** (ERM), along with the **ECU**, was one of the core components of the **European Monetary System** (EMS) established in 1979. It was the central instrument by which the EMS sought to stabilize and limit currency fluctuations. Under the ERM, a currency received a central exchange rate against the ECU, the value of which was derived from a basket of currencies. From these central rates, a grid of cross-parities was constructed, within which bilateral central rates were calculated for each pair of currencies participating in the ERM. For each currency there was a permissible range of fluctuation around these central rates, as well as a divergence indicator (a threshold point that indicated that the margins of permissible fluctuation were in danger of being breached). The permissible range was set at $\pm 2.25\%$, with a broader range of $\pm 6.0\%$ for some currencies. The divergence indicator was 75% of this range. Normally, a currency would have reached the divergence threshold before it hit its bilateral limit, but because each currency had a different weighting in the ECU basket, this was not always the case. When the limit for a currency was breached or its divergence indicator triggered, the central banks of the affected states intervened in the exchange markets to keep the currency within the prescribed limits. The **European Monetary Co-operation Fund** (EMCF) supported the banks, which supplied short-term credit facilities, but the national authorities could also have been required to take appropriate domestic measures to correct the situation, such as changing interest rates or adopting an incomes policy. Where it proved persistently difficult to hold a currency within its permissible range, mechanisms were available for realigning its central rate. There were 12 exchange rate realignments between 1979 and 1989.

The ERM was credited with contributing to the much lower levels of currency fluctuation in the 1980s, and to the increasing economic **convergence** of the member states. Its weakness was that not all the member states were part of it. **Greece** stayed outside the ERM until 1998; **Spain** joined the wider band in 1989, as did the **United Kingdom** in 1990 and **Portugal** in 1992. The 1989 **Delors Plan** saw the ERM as an integral element of **economic and monetary union** (EMU). It called for all member states to join the ERM as an essential condition for the first of three stages of progress towards full EMU. Partly because of the incorporation of the ERM into the EMU timetable, and partly because of the interpretation of the ERM's previous success, it became a more rigid mechanism after 1990, the

scope for adjustments—at least without causing a crisis in the system—being greatly reduced. A more rigid system, however, tended to discount the substantial variations in national economic performance. Moreover, it also discounted currency strengths, as they were perceived by the international money markets. The Danish referendum result rejecting the **Treaty on European Union** in 1992 was a catalyst for great anxiety and uncertainties in the exchange markets, compounded by the dominance within the ERM of **Germany**, which, confronted with the escalating costs of reunification, was pursuing a strong domestic anti-inflation policy. The consequent high German interest rates forced other ERM members to pursue similar policies, leading to severe economic problems in several countries. In September 1992 a wave of speculation was unleashed against ERM currencies. Despite massive central bank intervention, there were several involuntary devaluations, and **Italy** and the UK withdrew from the ERM. Further speculative pressure in August 1993, especially against the French franc, resulted, after much acrimony, in an extension of the broad range of permissible fluctuation to such a degree that, with only Germany and the Netherlands agreeing to stay within the narrow band, the ERM effectively ceased to be a regulatory mechanism. These episodes cast severe doubts on the viability of the timetable for EMU. **Austria** joined the ERM in January 1995 and a further realignment of exchange rates took place in March 1995, when the Spanish peseta was devalued by 7% and the Portuguese escudo by 3.5% in relation to other currencies. **Finland** joined the ERM in October 1996, and Italy re-joined in November of that year. Greece entered the ERM in March 1998.

The need for the ERM, in its original form, ended when the final stage of EMU started on 1 January 1999 (with 11 of the member states taking part—**Denmark**, Greece, **Sweden** and the UK did not participate, although Greece subsequently met the **convergence criteria** and took part in EMU from 2001) and when the **euro** was introduced as a single currency. However, the ERM was to continue, as ERM II, from 1 January 1999, to regulate the relationship between the euro and the currencies of member states remaining outside EMU, although some of the non-participating member states indicated they would not take part in ERM II. Countries that have not adopted the euro are expected to participate for at least two years in ERM II before joining the eurozone. A currency in ERM II is allowed to float within a range of $\pm 15\%$ with respect to a central rate against the euro. Denmark, **Bulgaria** and **Croatia** are members of ERM II. Former members of ERM II that have since joined the eurozone are Greece, **Slovenia**, **Cyprus**, **Estonia**, **Malta**, **Slovakia**, **Latvia** and **Lithuania**.

EXCHANGE RATES: See **Bretton Woods**; **Exchange Rate Mechanism**; **European Monetary System**; **Snake**

EXCISE DUTIES

EXCISE DUTIES: See **Competition Policy; Harmonization; Single Market; White Paper**

EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS between companies have been banned under the European Union's **competition policy**. The ban covers exclusive purchasing agreements on a wide variety of products, several kinds of exclusive distribution agreements, including **market sharing** and **price-fixing agreements**, and the use of **patents** and **trademarks**.

EXPENDITURE relates to the **budget** of the European Union (EU). The budget itself is made up from the EU's **own resources**, and is expected to fund both the policies pursued by the EU, and administrative running costs. The budget in 2020 was divided into six separate headings and most planned expenditure was directed towards the two principal areas of smart and inclusive growth and sustainable growth: natural resources (including agricultural expenditure, rural development, environment and climate action, and fisheries). There were also four further budget categories, namely: security and citizenship; Global Europe; administration; and special instruments. The **European Court of Auditors** is responsible for ensuring that all EU expenditure has taken place legally.

The draft **EXTERNAL FRONTIERS CONVENTION** proposed determining controls on the crossing of the European Union's (EU) external borders by nationals of non-member states, thereby facilitating the implementation of common EU policies on visas and **immigration**. The draft was eventually abandoned because of **Spain's** desire for Gibraltar to be excluded from the Convention. (See also **Schengen Agreement, Visa Policy**.)

EXTERNAL RELATIONS is a collective term which describes the formal bilateral and multilateral trading agreements made by the European Union (EU) with third countries, for example: **association agreements, co-operation agreements, Europe agreements, partnership and co-operation agreements** and the **Cotonou Agreement**. It also refers to attempts by the member states to develop, outside the institutional structures of the EU, a common set of foreign policies through **European political co-operation** and the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**.

The **FACTORTAME JUDGMENT** of 1990 (*R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd*) was an important verdict by the **Court of Justice**, confirming that national legislation in conflict with European Communities law must be suspended. More specifically, the Court ruled that a member state cannot be liable unless it can be established that the state has severely and deliberately disregarded EU **law**. In order to determine this the following criteria have to be considered: the clarity and precision of the **directive**; the level of discretion left to the member state to implement the directive; whether damages were intentional and whether the failure to implement EU law can be explained by other extenuating circumstances.

The **FAR RIGHT** resurfaced as an element within the seventh **European Parliament** (EP) (2009–14) following a series of electoral gains across the European Union (EU), but especially in **Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands** and the **United Kingdom**. Such parties had generally campaigned on a range of issues, advocating explicitly anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic policies (leading to **Islamophobia**), maintaining ardent opposition to Turkish accession and stressing uncompromising nationalist positions, which included the **withdrawal** of their respective countries from the EU.

In October 2009 a number of nationalist and far-right parties, including the Hungarian, anti-immigration Jobbik, attempted to foster a closer working relationship among elements of the far right in Europe through the creation of a new Alliance of European National Movements (Alliance Européenne des Mouvements Nationaux—AEMN). However, the AEMN could not be recognized as a formal political group within the EP as it fell far short of meeting the necessary numbers (**25 Members of the European Parliament**—MEPs) and had insufficient transnational membership (members must come from at least seven EU member states). The AEMN rejected all attempts to create a European ‘superstate’, demanded strong, pro-family policies and sought to fight against the destructive effects of **globalization**. As differences between the national delegations grew, the more unworkable the AEMN became, and it had collapsed by the beginning of 2013 following the decision of Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French Front National (FN), to sever contacts with the British National Party (BNP). Although the BNP lost its two

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EP seats at the 2014 EP elections, both the FN and Jobbik performed well. The FN emerged as the largest party in **France**, capturing nearly 25% of the vote and winning 23 seats, while Jobbik retained its three seats with almost 15% of the vote. Other, smaller extreme-right parties such as the German National Democratic Party and **Greece's** Golden Dawn also won seats (one and three seats, respectively) at the elections to the eighth EP. A new far-right grouping in the EP emerged in mid-2015, known as the **Europe of Nations and Freedom** (ENF).

For the elections to the ninth EP in May 2019 Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini of Italy's **Lega** announced plans for a large far-right **political group**, with the co-operation of other far-right parties. The **Identity and Democracy** group replaced the ENF, securing 73 of the 751 seats in the EP, and becoming the fifth largest political group. The far right controlled some 10% of the seats in the ninth EP, compared with around 5% in the eighth EP.

The **FAROE ISLANDS** have internal autonomy under Danish sovereignty (see **Denmark**). The parliament of the Islands opposed entry into the European Communities (EC). After extensive negotiations, mainly over fishing rights, an agreement was reached in January 1972. The Islands were granted special status, with the option of applying for full membership by the end of 1975. The Islands, however, have continued to reject membership, and participate only in free trade arrangements with the European Union (EU). Thus, common EU policies do not apply to the Faroe Islands.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: See **Germany**

FEDERALISM is a system of government whereby different levels of authority (usually national and regional) exercise responsibility for particular areas, and maintain their own institutions, and the specific powers of which are constitutionally guaranteed. The term has been used loosely (and confusingly) in the context of the European Union (EU) to describe the result of both centralization and decentralization. **Euro sceptics** have used the term to criticize what they see as an undue concentration of power at the supranational level of the EU institutions, while others see federalism as the way of preventing such a concentration. In discussions of the **European Council**, it has been used vaguely to refer both to the acquisition of more authority by the supranational institutions and to decentralization, with respect not only to the member states, but also beyond them to the regions. However, by themselves, concepts such as **subsidiarity** do not fully represent a proper federal structure.

FEOGA: See **European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund**

ELISE FERREIRA (1955–) is the Commissioner responsible for Cohesion and Reforms in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** from December 2019. An academic and politician from **Portugal**, Ferreira previously served as a socialist **member of the European Parliament** in 2004–19, and as the Vice-Governor of the Central Bank of Portugal.

FIFTEEN (EU15), or Europe of the Fifteen, is a term sometimes used to describe the membership of the European Union after January 1995, when **Austria**, **Finland** and **Sweden** joined the existing **Twelve** member states.

FIFTH DIRECTIVE is the name of the first of several major **European Commission** initiatives relating to the structure of industrial companies and the protection of **workers' rights**. The Directive was proposed in 1972, and its target was those limited companies in the European Communities with a payroll of more than 500 workers. The Directive established conditions for the structure of such companies which, modelled to some extent on the experience of the Federal Republic of **Germany** (West Germany), would entail obligatory worker representation on supervisory boards. It encountered strong opposition from employers' organizations and some member states and failed to gain the necessary unanimous approval in the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**). The idea of worker representation was eventually incorporated into the **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers** (the Social Charter) and the Social Chapter.

FINALITÉ POLITIQUE is a term used to describe the possible end goals and structure of the European Union. Beyond the references to an 'ever closer union' in the **Treaty of Rome** and the **Treaty on European Union**, there is nothing specific written in the treaties regarding this *finalité politique*, although discussions on a **constitution**, particularly in the context of the **Laeken Declaration**, have led to increased pressure to define it. For many, however, the current situation where the *finalité politique* is left undefined is attractive, since it allows for greater flexibility within the process of European integration.

The **FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT FOR FISHERIES GUIDANCE** (FIFG) was established in 1992 and was the main instrument whereby the European Union (EU) afforded aid to the fisheries sector under the **common fisheries policy** (CFP). It ran until December 2006. It aimed to support the CFP and, in pursuance of that objective, it sought to help to achieve lasting balance between fish stocks and fishing; to strengthen the **competitiveness** of operating structures and develop economically viable firms in the sector; to improve supplies and enhance the commercial value of fishery and aquaculture products; and to help revitalize areas dependent on fisheries and aquaculture. It

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advocated a restructuring of the industry and encouraged a reduction in fishing in EU waters, the decommissioning of vessels, establishment of joint ventures with foreign investors, and increasing competitiveness and assistance for the aquaculture industry, while also promoting economic and social cohesion. FIFG support was available for building and modernizing vessels, and for the aquaculture sector and for the creation of protected coastal areas. Port facilities, processing, marketing and promotional operations were also eligible for funding. In addition, the private sector, through the producers' organizations, could apply for funding for various measures relating to the management of the resource and/or fishing effort. Finally, financial contributions to redundancy payments and pensions for fishermen retiring early were also made. The **European Fisheries Fund** (EFF) replaced the FIFG in January 2007. The establishment of the EFF aimed to heighten the competitiveness of the sector and its longer-term viability. The programme ran until the end of 2013 and had a budget of some €4,304m.; it was succeeded by a new **European Maritime and Fisheries Fund** (EMFF) from 2014. The EMFF was designed to achieve the above-mentioned objectives of the CFP and was structured around four broad pillars: Smart, Green Fisheries; Smart, Green Aquaculture; Sustainable Development of Fisheries Areas; and an Integrated Maritime Policy. This last pillar was the most innovative and centred on marine spatial planning and integrated coastal zone management.

FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES are the multi-annual **budget** programmes of the European Union (EU). The first, often referred to as the **Delors I** package, covered the period 1988–92 and was adopted in 1987 in an attempt to limit the annual wrangling over the budget between what is now the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** (EP) and provide a firmer foundation for medium-term policy planning. The second financial perspective, the so-called **Delors II** package, covered the years 1993–99. A further perspective was agreed at the Berlin **summit meeting** of the **European Council** in March 1999 and was designed to finance **enlargement**. It was to cover the period until 2006. Each financial perspective is accompanied by an **inter-institutional agreement**, an understanding between the **European Commission**, the Council of the European Union and the EP, by which they commit themselves in advance to observing agreed limits on the main budgetary priorities and establish a framework for EU **expenditure** in the form of the financial perspective over a particular time period. In other words, the financial perspective shows the maximum amount and the composition of foreseeable EU expenditure. The main categories of EU expenditure are divided into headings; each of these headings carries an amount of commitment appropriations for each year. The headings for the financial perspective for 2021–27 are: (i) single market, innovation and digital; (ii) cohesion, resilience and values (including economic, social and territorial cohesion and resilience and values); (iii) natural resources and environment

(including market-related expenditure and direct payments); (iv) migration and border management; (v) security and defence; (vi) neighbourhood and the world; and (vii) European public administration (including institutional administrative expenditure). Negotiations among the member state governments for each new financial perspective can be contentious. The new financial perspective for 2021–27, worth €1,074,300m. (at 2018 prices), was agreed in July 2020. Political agreement on the MFF for 2021–27 was reached between the EP and the Council on 10 November 2020, and it was adopted in mid-December.

FINANCIAL POLICY: See **Economic and Financial Policy**

FIND-ER is an online search instrument. It replaced ECLAS, the **European Commission's** online library system, in December 2017.

FINLAND emerged as the most pro-European Union (EU) member state within Scandinavia and, unlike both **Denmark** and **Sweden**, signed up as one of the initial members of the **euro**. This identity with the EU and the wider Europe reflects Finland's somewhat troubled history, when its geographical position between both the **Russian Federation** and Sweden often curtailed the independence of this smaller state. In the immediate post-war period, for example, Finland was restricted in its relationships with other Western European countries by the Finno-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which had been signed with the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1948. This in effect forced Finland to pursue a foreign policy based on neutrality, making its government wary of participation in any organization that the USSR might interpret as violating the terms of the treaty. Hence, for a number of years Finland played a minimal role in Western European developments. In the early 1960s it did not approach the European Communities (EC), as did the other Nordic states, for some form of association. Moreover, it became only an associate member of the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA). However, it later joined the EFTA states in seeking some form of closer co-operation with the EC. The signing of a **free trade agreement** was delayed until 1973, again because of arguments over whether it violated Finland's neutrality, and doubts about its acceptability to the USSR. The Agreement came into force in January 1974 with an accelerated rate of tariff reductions, to synchronize the date for implementation with that for the other EFTA states. Finland became a full member of EFTA in 1986, and in the more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1980s and with the collapse of the USSR felt able to join the other EFTA states in negotiations with the EC over a **European Economic Area**. In 1992, after much discussion, it formally submitted an application to join the EC. Negotiations were completed by 1994 and endorsed by a popular referendum, allowing Finland

to join the EU on 1 January 1995. Finland remains the only Nordic EU member to have adopted the **euro** as its national currency.

The **FISCAL COMPACT**, formally the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, was signed by all of the European Union (EU) member states on 2 March 2012, with the exception of the **Czech Republic** and the **United Kingdom**. The Fiscal Compact entered into force on 1 January 2013 for the 16 member states that had completed the **ratification** process prior to this date. For those member states that subsequently ratified the document, the Compact was to enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of ratification instruments. The Fiscal Compact, which is essentially a more stringent version and extension of the **Stability and Growth Pact**, is designed to ensure improved financial discipline within the EU and especially within the **eurozone**. To this end, it stipulates that within one year of the Compact entering into force for it each signatory state has to introduce in primary law a so-called ‘deficit brake’ requiring the national budget to be in balance (i.e. with a deficit equivalent to less than 3% of gross domestic product—GDP) or in surplus, and for the annual structural deficit to be no greater than 0.5% or 1.0% of GDP (depending on a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio). In addition, a ‘debt brake’ has to be legally implemented according to which the general government debt will not exceed 60% of GDP; if the debt is above this limit the member state is obliged to reduce it by at least one-20th each year. A breach of the agreed ceilings could result in a fine (of up to 0.1% of the offending member state’s GDP) from the **Court of Justice**. The Fiscal Compact also reinforces commitments to improved economic and fiscal governance contained in existing agreements and legislation, notably the revised Stability and Growth Pact and the so-called ‘six pack’ of legislative measures designed to enforce budgetary discipline through, for example, increased budgetary surveillance. The Compact also provides for at least two summits per year of heads of government and state from the member countries of the eurozone; non-eurozone signatories are permitted to attend at least one of these summits. The Fiscal Compact is not formally part of EU law, but an intergovernmental document. Only member states that have completed ratification of the Fiscal Compact are eligible for access to financial assistance from the **European Stability Mechanism**. By July 2014 25 of the EU member states (19 eurozone members and six non-eurozone members) had ratified the Fiscal Compact. **Croatia**, the newest EU member state, ratified the Fiscal Compact in March 2018, and the Czech Republic finally did so in late 2018.

On 23 March 2020, in response to the **COVID-19** crisis, EU member states made the decision temporarily to suspend the Stability and Growth Pact by implementing a so-called escape clause, in order to enable additional spending to mitigate the severe economic impact of the pandemic.

FISHERIES: See **Common Fisheries Policy; North Atlantic Fisheries Organization**

FLANKING MEASURES is a term used in the European Union to describe measures or actions that are intended to support the implementation and objectives of a specific common policy or programme, but are not integral to it. The term is most often used in the context of the **single market**. Among the most prominent flanking measures are those concerning **economic and monetary union, competition policy, social policy** and **environmental policy**.

FLEXIBILITY is a term used to describe the effects of different approaches to integration, such as **multi-speed Europe, à la carte Europe** and **two-speed Europe**. It is also used to describe the effects of the mechanisms for **enhanced co-operation** introduced by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**.

The **FONTAINEBLEAU SUMMIT** of the **European Council**, held in **France** in June 1984, dealt conclusively with several major issues that had hindered the development of the European Communities (EC) for a number of years. A recurrent issue since the election of Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister in 1979 had been the **United Kingdom's** contribution to the EC **budget**. Agreement was formally reached on the UK's budgetary position and on raising the limit of **value-added tax** contributions to the EC budget to avoid threatened insolvency; limits were placed upon **common agricultural policy** spending, and the way was opened for the entry into the EC of **Portugal** and **Spain**. By resolving such issues and authorizing the establishment of a **Committee for a People's Europe** and the **Dooge Committee**, the summit contributed to the EC's subsequent progress towards further integration.

FOOD AID: See **Development Aid**

The **FOOD FRAUD NETWORK** (FFN) was established in the wake of a scandal after it emerged in January–February 2013 that unregulated horsemeat had been used covertly in processed meat products widely supplied throughout Europe. In March the European Commissioner responsible for Health Policy, Antonio Borg, announced a five-point plan, which identified actions to be implemented over the short, medium and longer term in order to rectify shortcomings in the EU's food supply chain. The actions related to the following areas: food fraud; food testing; rules pertaining to the monitoring and issuing of horse passports (with which all horses are issued); official controls, implementation and penalties; and source of origin labelling. In May the

FOODSTUFFS

Commission proposed new legislation to update and strengthen the agri-food chain, in an effort to improve food safety. In July the FFN was launched, comprising food fraud contact points in each of the EU member states, as well as **Iceland, Norway and Switzerland**. The FFN provides cross-border administrative support and co-operation, on issues pertaining to financially motivated violations of legislation on food, and subsequently began to examine potential food fraud cases and to act as a forum for discussion regarding the prioritization of action at the supranational level on food fraud.

FOODSTUFFS are the subject of several European Union **directives** intended to protect the **health and safety** of consumers and strengthen **consumer policy**. The directives govern the manufacturing, labelling and marketing of foodstuffs. Their provisions include: the publication of listings of permitted substances and additives along with the requisite purity standards; **regulations** governing the production of a range of foodstuffs; the fixing of maximum permitted levels for pesticide residues in fruit, vegetable and oil products; and regulations specifying that a list of ingredients and their quantities, as well as a 'best before' date, must be included on the labelling of foodstuffs. In addition, a general ban has been placed upon the use of animal growth promoters containing substances that might generate adverse hormonal or other side effects. The **European Parliament** in 2002 proposed stricter labelling regulations for foodstuffs containing genetically modified ingredients; these new regulations came into effect in April 2004. Following a proposal in the **European Commission's** 2000 **White Paper** on food safety, a **European Food Safety Authority** was created in 2002. New legislation on food labelling came into effect in December 2014, and the application of the legislation was obligatory from December 2016. The new rules aimed to provide consumers with more transparent and comprehensive information on the content and composition of pre-packaged food.

FOREIGN POLICY: See **Common Foreign and Security Policy; European Political Co-operation**

FORESTRY emerged as a salient area of environmental concerns. The European Union is home to some 5% of the world's forests and about 42% of the total land area of the EU is covered by forests or woodland. Although the design and implementation of forestry policy is very much a member state competence and most states have developed their own established forestry policy, the issue does, none the less, resonate at EU level. Forestry policy emerges in wider EU discussions about, for example, biodiversity, climate change, sources of clean water, energy and public amenities. Accordingly, the issue of forestry has been the subject of several EU initiatives designed to combine the economic development of the forestry industry with measures for

environmental protection and conservation. The initiatives were first brought together in the Forestry Sectoral Research and Technology (FOREST) action programme of 1990. This was later absorbed into AIR in 1991, and then into FAIR, which was subsequently subsumed into the quality of life and management of living resources programme. In 1999 the **Council of the European Union** adopted a **resolution** on a Forestry Strategy for the EU, which focused on sustainable forest management and the multifunctional role of forests. Following a review of this strategy in 2005, the Commission adopted an EU Forest Action Plan in 2006, followed by a **Green Paper** on forest protection and information in 2010. The EU dedicates funds to forest conservation and management projects in less developed countries. In September 2013 the **European Commission** adopted a communication on a new forest strategy. In July 2019 the Commission adopted a communication on ‘Stepping up EU Action to Protect and Restore the World’s Forests’.

FORTRESS EUROPE is a term popularized in the 1980s and early 1990s that summarizes the concerns expressed by politicians and economists in several countries about some of the possible consequences of the **internal market** including the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Then it referred to fears that while the European Union would have free trade within its borders, it might adopt a more protectionist attitude towards imports from the rest of the world. In more recent years, the term has become associated with the stringency of border controls and **immigration policies** in the member states, whereby as internal **freedom of movement** has become realized within the EU, physical and metaphorical walls have been erected to keep those outside of Europe out. It has been suggested, then, that the phenomena of Fortress Europe were at least partly to blame for the **European migration crisis** of 2015–16.

FOUCHET PLAN is the name commonly given to the outcome of a proposal by President Charles de Gaulle of **France** in 1961 that the **Six** members of the **European Economic Community** (EEC) should explore ways of achieving a ‘Union of States’. A committee, headed by Christian Fouchet of France, considered the matter and produced a draft treaty in November 1961. A modified second version was produced the following year. The components of the Plan included a council of heads of government or of foreign ministers where decisions would be taken only by unanimous agreement, a permanent intergovernmental secretariat and four permanent intergovernmental committees to take responsibility for the policy fields of foreign affairs, defence, commerce and cultural affairs. The scheme was opposed by most of the other five states, especially the **Netherlands**. The Plan represented a considerable shift in direction from that envisaged by the **Treaty of Rome**, and in addition the smaller states wished first to settle the question of **enlargement**, particularly the possible entry into the EEC of the **United Kingdom**. With France unable

to generate support among its partners, the Plan was abandoned in 1963. A truncated version survived in the form of the 1963 **Treaty of Friendship** between France and the Federal Republic of **Germany** (West Germany).

FOUNDING TREATIES is a phrase, like ‘constitutive treaties’, which refers to the four documents that established the European Communities and the European Union: the **Treaty of Paris** of 1951 establishing the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC), the two treaties of 1957 (see **Treaty of Rome**) establishing the **European Atomic Energy Community** (EAEC or Euratom) and the **European Economic Community** (EEC), and the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) of 1992. The founding treaties have all been amended by, among others, the **Single European Act**, the TEU, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** and the **Treaty of Nice**. The founding treaties and the amending treaties are increasingly referred to as the **European treaties**. If it had been ratified, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** would have replaced the Treaty of Rome and the TEU. Its replacement, the **Treaty of Lisbon**, amended the founding treaties and renamed the **Treaty establishing the European Community** as the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**.

FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES: See **Research Framework Programmes**.

FRANCE has been one of the most prominent supporters of European integration since 1948. It provided a location for the **Council of Europe** in 1949. The **European Coal and Steel Community** was initially conceived by **Jean Monnet** and was realized by Robert Schuman. France was a founder member of the European Communities (EC), and its involvement in their development has been such that French governments have taken an almost proprietorial interest in the EC. Their actions had important consequences for the EC, even if not always to their benefit. The policies of President Charles de Gaulle (1959–69), for example, profoundly altered the nature of the EC and delayed its **enlargement**. His successor, Georges Pompidou (1969–74), opened the way to enlargement in return for obtaining the kind of **common agricultural policy** (CAP) that France wanted. President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–81) proposed the **European Council** and co-sponsored the **European Monetary System**. The tradition was maintained by François Mitterrand (1981–95), who campaigned strongly for further intensive integration, and by Jacques Chirac (1995–2007). In 2000 the French Presidency of the European Council was responsible for bringing about the conclusion, albeit unsatisfactory, of the 2000 **intergovernmental conference** and the adoption of the **Treaty of Nice**.

France benefited economically from the EC, above all from the CAP. Just as the EC provided the Federal Republic of **Germany** (FRG—West Germany) with an outlet for its export-orientated industry, so it gave France a larger market for its large and variegated agriculture, although by the 1980s some French products faced severe competition from cheaper Mediterranean produce. On the whole, the French attitude towards the EC was highly utilitarian, and governments were prepared to emphasize national interests should this seem advisable for domestic political and economic reasons. Nevertheless, its political influence within the EC was great. To some extent, this was due to its close relationship with the FRG. The EC served one basic purpose of French foreign policy: to influence, even perhaps control, the FRG. That reason decreased in importance after German reunification. In particular, the currency crises of 1992–93 indicated that the two countries had different economic concerns. In the 1990s there emerged a stronger anti-integration mood, as exemplified by the results of the 1992 referendum on the **Treaty on European Union**. This was held by President Mitterrand to emphasize France's European commitment, but he narrowly escaped a humiliating defeat, because government policy, intended to enable the country to meet the criteria for participation in **economic and monetary union**, had contributed to high levels of unemployment. His successor, Jacques Chirac, proved less fortunate when in May 2005 the French people (with a rate of participation of 70%) rejected (by 55% to 45%) the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. The final outcome owed much to a variety of concerns over issues such as the 2004 enlargement, the next wave of enlargement, a British economic blueprint being imposed on the European Union, and some dissatisfaction with Chirac's decade-long rule. Nicolas Sarkozy succeeded Chirac in May 2007. Sarkozy initially emerged as one of the most dynamic and flamboyant of the incumbent European leaders and as someone who was determined to reform and revive France's economic model, but he raised some concerns in his first six months of office over comments on both **competition policy** and the future of the **common fisheries policy**. France successfully completed **ratification** of the **Treaty of Lisbon** without holding a referendum. It was also noticeable that relations with Germany on European affairs and strategies reverted to the cordiality of the Helmut Schmidt/Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Kohl/Mitterrand periods. However, François Hollande replaced Sarkozy following the latter's bid for a second term as French President in May 2012. Hollande's presidency coincided with perceptions by some observers of a cooling in relations between Germany and France. After what was largely deemed a tumultuous term of office, Hollande chose not to run for another term, and in May 2017 newcomer **Emmanuel Macron** became the new President of France. Macron has advocated improved relations with the Russian Federation, and a broad policy of multilateralism. Relations between Macron and German Federal Chancellor **Angela Merkel** appeared strained at times, but amid the **COVID-19** crisis in 2020, relations appeared to revive significantly, with the joint proposal in mid-May by France

and Germany of the large-scale recovery plan that became known as **Next Generation EU**.

FRANCO-GERMAN MIXED BRIGADE: See **Eurocorps**

FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP: See **Treaty of Friendship**

The **FRANCOVICH JUDGMENT** is the common name of a case (*Francovich et al. v Italy*) heard by the **Court of Justice** in 1992. The Italian Government was accused of not implementing European Communities rules. Specifically, it had failed to implement Directive 80/987/EEC, which seeks to protect employees in cases of insolvency, despite several reminders from the Commission. A worker named Francovich duly opted to initiate legal proceedings against the Italian Government for his lost pension rights when his company became insolvent. In finding against **Italy**, the Court established the principle that individuals could appeal against the non-implementation of European Union law by member states on the grounds that their individual rights had been infringed. It also confirmed that member states found guilty could be deemed liable and fined.

FRAUD rose to prominence on the political agenda of the European Communities (EC) in the 1990s. In particular, there were growing concerns about the amount of the EC **budget** that was being lost through fraud, concerns that were often reinforced by the annual reports of the **Court of Auditors** and criticisms coming from the **European Parliament**. On top of these came the allegations of corruption that led to the downfall of the **European Commission** under President Jacques Santer in 1999. Early concerns led to the creation in 1994 of an **Advisory Committee for the Co-ordination of Fraud Prevention**, which was followed in 1999 by the establishment of a **European Anti-Fraud Office** (OLAF) within the Commission. Beyond combating fraud within the institutions and policies of the European Union, much attention has also been focused since the early 1990s on the need to counter cross-border fraud. Hence, combating fraud features as one of the activities to be pursued as part of policy on **justice and home affairs**. Concerns about fraud have also been instrumental in the drive to create a **European Public Prosecutor's Office**.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS have been signed (or are currently under negotiation) by the European Union (EU), with many countries and regions, including European countries that, at the time of signing, were not applicants for membership. The agreements provide for a phased introduction of

industrial free trade. Some examples include agreements signed as part of the **European Free Trade Association**, and the EU's free trade agreement with South Africa. There are provisional regional free trade agreements between the EU and countries in Africa and Central America, among others provided through **Economic Partnership Agreements**. In the wake of **Brexit**, the **United Kingdom** negotiated a free trade agreement with the EU.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT lies at the heart of the objectives outlined in the **Treaty of Rome**, which required the abolition of barriers to the 'freedom of movement for persons, services and capital'. Frontier formalities and checks, different indirect tax rates, government appointive, contractual and procurement policies, and the national basis of many professional qualifications all effectively hindered the establishment of free movement. While some slight progress was taken towards removing the barriers, a significant impetus was not achieved until the decision to establish the **internal market** was made. The principle was reconfirmed and formally applied to goods by the **Treaty on European Union**, but the objective had still not been fully realized by the late 1990s. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** attempted to make improvements in this field by setting a timetable of five years within which an **area of freedom, justice and security** should be established. Common rules on **immigration, asylum and visa policy** were intended to promote greater freedom of movement between the member states. International crime was to be dealt with through improved co-operation between national police forces and customs authorities, and through the work of **Europol**. Moreover, the **Schengen Agreement** was incorporated into the treaties, although **Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania** and the **United Kingdom** remained outside the **Schengen Area**. The principle of freedom of movement became particularly controversial during the **European migration crisis** of 2015–16, when the movement of large numbers of migrants and asylum seekers along what became known as the Western Balkan route towards western and northern Europe prompted several member states to close their borders or to erect fences closing their borders with other European Union (EU) member states, effectively temporarily suspending their participation in the Schengen arrangement. Although the UK was outside the Schengen Area, the issue of freedom of movement became a topic of debate both prior to and after that country's referendum vote in June 2016 in favour of leaving the EU, as some British nationals voted to leave the Union in an attempt to halt inward migration by economic migrants from other EU member states, particularly from Central and Eastern Europe.

From March 2020, in response to the **COVID-19** pandemic, EU leaders agreed to impose temporary restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU from most non-member countries. Temporary border controls were also introduced by Schengen countries in response to the pandemic. In October a Council recommendation was adopted introducing a co-ordinated approach to

FRONTEX

the introduction of restrictions on free movement imposed in response to the ongoing pandemic.

FRONTEX (formally the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) is a European Union (EU) agency based in Warsaw, **Poland**. It was established in 2004, as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders, to co-ordinate co-operation between EU member states on external border security issues. Its tasks included risk analysis, co-ordination of operational co-operation in the field of external border management and assistance in the training of national border guards, research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders, technical and operational assistance at external borders, and support for member states in organizing joint return operations. It also pursued co-operation with non-member states to improve border security, and worked closely with the border control authorities of non-EU/**Schengen Area** countries, in particular countries that had been identified as a source or transit route for irregular migration, in order to ensure compliance with the EU's external relations policy. In September 2015, during his first State of the Union address, and amid the deepening **European migration crisis**, the President of the **European Commission**, Jean-Claude Juncker, called for FRONTEX to be strengthened and better funded in order to become a 'fully operational' border and coast guard. In December the Commission presented legislative proposals for the establishment of a new European Border and Coast Guard, building on FRONTEX as part of the **European Agenda on Migration**. The proposals, which sought to ensure improved management of migration, increased internal security, and the safeguarding of the principle of freedom of movement, were formally adopted in September 2016 and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was officially launched in October of that year.

FUNCTIONALISM is an early theory of integration on which **neo-functionalism** draws. It holds that the creation of international agencies is the consequence of a shared need among states for technocratic management of policy.

G-7: The G-7 is officially the title of meetings between the finance ministers of Canada, **France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom** and the **USA**, a practice that was established in Tokyo, Japan, in May 1986. The term is also used more generally to describe the summit meetings of the heads of government of the same seven countries, which began at Rambouillet, France, in 1975 (although Canada did not become involved in the G-7 process until some months after the initial meeting). The European Union (EU) holds all the privileges and obligations of membership of the G-7, but does not have the right to host or chair a summit. The EU is represented at G-7 summits by the President of the **European Commission** and by the President of the **European Council**. Leaders of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) and, later, the **Russian Federation** were invited to attend the summits after 1991. Russia demanded equal representation and became a full member in 2002, thereby creating the G-8. Originally intended to discuss common economic problems, after 1989 the summit agendas became ever more political in tone and have sought to tackle issues such as trade with developing countries, global poverty, the environment, and, increasingly since 2008, the issue of taxation. In recent years these meetings of the world's richest countries have increasingly become a target for protesters to express their anger at politicians over issues such as the environment and capitalism. In March 2014 Russia was excluded from the G-8, owing to the controversy over its role in the secession of Crimea from **Ukraine**; the G-8 therefore reverted to its previous name, the G-7.

G-8: See **G-7**

MARIYA GABRIEL (1979–) is Commissioner responsible for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** since December 2019. She had been the Commissioner responsible for Digital Economy and Society in the Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker during 2017–19. Gabriel replaced Kristalina Georgieva as the Commissioner from Bulgaria. Prior to holding this role, Gabriel was a **Member of the European Parliament** (MEP) from 2009, belonging to the **Group of the European People's Party**. As MEP Gabriel held particular

GATT

interests in EU enlargement and **gender equality**, advocating the inclusion of women in all aspects of political life.

GATT: See **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**

GDPR: See **General Data Protection Regulation**

The **GENDER ACTION PLAN (GAP III)**, also known as the Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in External Action 2021–25 is the European Union (EU)'s framework for promoting gender equality globally. GAP III is intended for integration into the EU's development cooperation via the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument—'Global Europe' (NDICI). GAP III favours synergy across all EU initiatives including the Strategic Approach on Women, Peace and Security agenda. GAP III further aims to ensure coherence between the EU's internal and external policies and thus complements the Union's **Gender Equality Strategy** of 2020.

GAP III builds on previous plans, although it presents a more expansive notion of gender and demands more of EU institutions. For example, in addition to reinforcing the necessity of **gender mainstreaming** in EU external relations, GAP III also introduces the notion of intersectionality to acknowledge the ways in which gender intersects with other systems of oppression based on disability, ethnic background, race, and sexuality. GAP III pushes for a transformative approach, which not only seeks equality, but also to address the gender power dynamics and structures that support subordination based on gender and other minoritized characteristics.

GENDER EQUALITY is considered a foundational value of the European Union (EU) and it was first enshrined in the **equal pay** for equal work principle within the **Treaty of Rome**. It is the notion that men and women ought to be treated equally, while also acknowledging that women, in particular, are often confronted with discrimination in all spheres of society. To advance gender equality, the EU uses a three-pronged approach, including equal treatment legislation; **gender mainstreaming**, and specific measures for the advancement of women (promotion of **women's rights**). Although many EU member states show advancements in gender equality, there are still challenges within the Union. In 2010–15 the **European Commission** held the 'Strategy for Equality between Women and Men' as a guiding framework for advancing gender equality. It was succeeded by the 'Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality' for 2016–19, which was published in December 2015. This strategy was especially committed to tackling gender-based violence and supporting victims both within and outside the EU. In March 2020 the Commission published its Gender Equality Strategy for 2020–25. Additionally, in

relation to the EU's foreign policy, there are two frameworks to guide security and development. The first is the Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security agenda, and the second is the **Gender Action Plan (GAP) III**. The **European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)** assists EU institutions and member states in the collection, analysis and dissemination of objective, reliable and comparable information and data on equality between women and men.

The **GENDER EQUALITY STRATEGY** is a five-year strategy launched on 5 March 2020. The strategy is a renewed commitment to the European Union (EU)'s foundational idea of gender equality and specifically seeks to combat gender-based violence and promote a gender-equal economy, equality in decision making, participation in society and **gender mainstreaming**. The 2020–25 strategy builds on previous instruments with more precise proposals for integrating a gender perspective into all the internal work of the EU.

GENDER MAINSTREAMING was first advocated as a strategy for attaining **gender equality** at the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, the People's Republic of China, in 1995. It is intended to integrate a gender perspective into all European Union (EU) policy domains. It was first brought to the fore of EU policy processes by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. Gender mainstreaming is understood in this context as the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures and spending programmes so that they achieve favourable, even if differentiated, outcomes for both men and women (so-called gender-responsive content). Gender mainstreaming advocates for gender representation, ensuring both men and women have equal and substantive influence in policy processes. It is the strategy for gender equality most advocated by international organizations and the **European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)**.

The **GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT)** was a convention signed in 1947 by 23 countries (although the number of contracting parties subsequently increased to several times that number), and maintained as a specialized agency of the **United Nations**. Its intention was to secure a pattern of free trade in the post-war world. GATT's objectives were to work towards an orderly framework for international trade, through the elimination of unilateral actions by states and the gradual reduction of tariff barriers. The organization was based upon the principle of non-discrimination: trade advantages offered by one country to another had to be extended to all. There were, however, many exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination. The **Treaty of Rome** specified that the European Communities (EC) should represent the member states and their interests in external trade affairs and negotiations. Accordingly, the **European Commission** represented the

GENERAL COURT

member states in all GATT rounds of negotiations after the **Kennedy Round** of the 1960s. While GATT was generally successful, the later negotiations were highly contentious as the agenda extended from manufactured products to cover, for example, agriculture, copyright and services. The **Uruguay Round** of negotiations of 1986–94 was dominated by arguments between the EC and the **USA**, which had been highly critical of what it perceived as EC protectionism in a variety of areas, particularly in relation to the **common agricultural policy** (CAP). **France's** objections to lowering protection for its farmers caused considerable tension and the US Government threatened to walk away from the entire round unless the CAP was tackled. This position found sympathy among some EC member states, including the **United Kingdom**. The Blair House Agreement of November 1992 between the EC and the USA greatly limited financial assistance to EC farmers and antagonized France. The French Government threatened to boycott the discussions until France secured concessions at a special EC **summit meeting** in December 1992. Negotiations on a successor to GATT were completed in 1993, and on 1 January 1995 the **World Trade Organization** was established.

The **GENERAL COURT** was formerly known as the Court of First Instance (CFI) and, after the **Treaty of Lisbon**, known as the General Court, and is an innovation of the late 1980s. Under the **Treaty of Rome**, the **Court of Justice** was made responsible for cases brought against the European Communities (EC) by their employees. These cases involved such issues as recruitment, promotion, salaries and disciplinary measures. They were, to a large degree, responsible for the increasing volume of work with which the Court had to cope, accounting for almost one-half of the cases heard. In order to reduce the Court's burden, by removing from its competence minor cases, including those involving EC staff that could easily be handled by a lower court, the **Single European Act** created the CFI. Composed of one judge from each member state, but chosen by common accord, the new Court began to operate in September 1989. Its role and status were further enhanced by the **Treaty on European Union** in 1991, but only after the **Treaty of Nice** was it instituted as a genuine court of first instance. Prior to this, it was competent primarily for cases relating to **competition policy** and the **European Coal and Steel Community**. Many other cases went directly to the Court of Justice, bypassing the CFI. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the CFI was rebranded as the General Court on 30 November 2009. The treaty also introduced the term Court of Justice of the European Union to describe the entire court system of the European Union (EU), comprising the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. The General Court, which is based in **Luxembourg**, deals with a range of cases covering, *inter alia*, actions for annulment of EU **legislation** and actions for failure to act by an EU institution. In all cases, appeals against its decisions can be directed to the Court of Justice on grounds of its lack of jurisdiction over a case or its

misinterpretation of precedents. The General Court is divided into nine chambers, each of which consists of three or four judges; the Court includes at least one judge from each member state. In December 2015 the **Council of the European Union** adopted a regulation reforming the General Court. During the first stage of reform, the number of judges was to increase by 12, and in September 2016 the Civil Service Tribunal merged with the General Court, with its seven judges becoming part of the merged institution. Additional judges were appointed in 2019, with the aim of bringing the total number of judges to two per member state (prior to that there had been 46 judges). The President of the General Court is Marc van der Woude, a jurist from the **Netherlands**.

The **GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION** (GDPR) is a regulation in EU law aimed at data protection and the protection of privacy for everyone within the **European Union** (EU) and the **European Economic Area** (EEA). Its central aim is to ensure that individuals have as much control over their own personal data as possible. The GDPR was approved and adopted by the **European Parliament** in April 2016, and came into force on 25 May 2018. The GDPR, which updated and replaced the Data Protection Directive of 1995, was expected significantly to reduce ‘spam’ (unsolicited) e-mails, by requiring companies worldwide, *inter alia*, to obtain the consent of individuals in EU member states before contacting them via e-mail, or to risk substantial fines.

The **GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**: See **Council Secretariat**

PAOLO GENTILONI (1954–) is an Italian politician and former Prime Minister of **Italy** who currently holds the role of Commissioner responsible for the Economy in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula Von der Leyen** since December 2019. He was born in Rome, and is a graduate in political science from the Sapienza University of Rome. His interest in politics was demonstrated early, and Gentiloni was a former member of the Student Movement and subsequently the Worker’s Movement for Socialism. He was elected to the Italian parliament for the first time in the 2001 general election and went on to serve as Minister for Communications in the Government of Romano Prodi in 2006–08, and as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Matteo Renzi (succeeding Federica Mogherini who had left the post to become the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**). In December 2016, following the defeat of the Italian constitutional referendum initiated by Renzi, the Italian President, Sergio Mattarella, asked Gentiloni to form a new Government; he remained in office until mid-2018.

GERMANY was occupied after its military defeat in 1945 by the four victors: **France**, the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**, the **United Kingdom** and the **USA**. Each of these states administered a part of Germany. The original intention was to demilitarize and re-educate the German people before returning the reins of power to a German government. The onset of the **Cold War** between the USSR and the USA led to the division of Europe and the division of Germany in 1949. From then until October 1990 two separate countries, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG—West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR—East Germany), existed in Germany. The FRG was a founder member of the European Communities (EC), and one of the most Europe-orientated of the member states, although there was not necessarily a strong correlation between this commitment and West German influence within the EC. German influence in the EC/European Union (EU) has been significant, although historically it has tended to focus on monetary and economic affairs rather than political issues. It was the largest and richest member state, with the strongest economy and manufacturing system, and after 1979 its currency dominated the **European Monetary System**. In the 1950s West German commitment to European integration was seen by then German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer not only as a means of access to important markets for its export-orientated economy, but also as a central element of his strategy to link the FRG firmly in a Western alliance, rehabilitating it in the eyes of its neighbours and allaying fears of a possible future resurgence of German militarism. Adenauer also saw European integration as being based upon a Franco-German rapprochement, even if this meant that the FRG would, because of post-war realities, be the junior partner. The rapprochement was formally acknowledged in the 1963 **Treaty of Friendship**.

It was not until the 1970s that the FRG began to seek to exert a political influence in the EC more commensurate with its economic strength. Its support was tempered by an evaluation of the consequences of EC policies for West German national interests. Between 1974 and 1982 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was particularly concerned, in a period of general economic downturn, about the cost of EC initiatives. His successor, the longest serving post-war German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl (1982–98), was a more unreserved supporter of further integration, and active in the initiatives of the 1980s—the **internal market, economic and monetary union (EMU)** and moves towards deeper political integration—which culminated in the **Treaty on European Union**.

The GDR had been given access to the EC for its products as a result of the **Ostpolitik** treaties, and upon German reunification automatically became part of the EC. The reunited Germany was subsequently the largest unit in the EC by an even greater margin, and Kohl increased the pressure for political union. His reasoning was much the same as that of Adenauer: the reduction of German sovereignty within a political Europe would also reduce fears abroad of German power and limit the effect of potential German nationalism.

Nevertheless, there was resistance in Germany to Kohl's commitment to European union, especially over the adoption of a single European currency. However, the coalition governments under Gerhard Schröder (1998–2002; 2002–05) maintained Germany's pro-EU stance and saw German entry into EMU in January 1999. Both houses of the German parliament endorsed the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in May 2005. In the Bundestag (lower house) some 569 votes were cast in favour of the treaty with only 23 against. In the latter part of 2005 **Angela Merkel** was elected the first female German Chancellor; she headed a 'grand coalition' Government between the Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU—Christian Democratic Union) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD—Social Democratic Party of Germany). Merkel is largely credited with being responsible for both securing agreement on the budgetary settlement for the period 2007–13 and doing most of the groundwork prior to agreement in the **European Council** on the **Treaty of Lisbon**. Merkel has emerged as one of Europe's most substantial political personalities and successfully ran for re-election as Chancellor in the latter part of 2009. On this occasion the CDU, as it had hoped, was able to remove the 'problematic constraints' of the grand coalition with the SPD by disbanding it and entered instead into a coalition with the smaller Free Democratic Party. Merkel was also centrally involved in the appointment of her fellow Christian Democrat, the Belgian Herman Van Rompuy, as the first **President of the European Council** under the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon. In addition, Merkel was at the forefront of plans financially to address the perilous state of the Greek economy from 2010 as a means of stabilizing the **euro**. Merkel's efforts at safeguarding the stability of the **eurozone** and the future of the euro led directly to her key role in the drawing up of the 2012 **Fiscal Compact** (part of the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union). In October 2013 Merkel was re-elected as German Chancellor at the head of a grand coalition between her Christian Democrats/Christian Social Union and the Social Democrats. By that time she had earned the reputation of being perhaps the most influential politician in the EU.

In August 2015 Merkel aroused controversy by temporarily opening the German borders and announcing that Germany was willing to accept applications for asylum from Syrian refugees, irrespective of their initial point of entry into the EU (in contravention of the **Dublin Regulation**). Hundreds of thousands of people subsequently began to travel across Europe in order to reach Germany, with some 800,000 estimated to have arrived in 2015. The wave of migration led to the re-imposition of border controls and the erection of fences by a number of member states, including **Austria, Hungary, Denmark** and **Sweden**.

In late September 2017 Merkel was re-elected as Chancellor, albeit with a weakened mandate. Merkel was to step down in 2021. At the federal elections to the Bundestag in September 2021, the SPD won 206 seats (an increase of 53 seats), while Merkel's CDU/CSU lost 50 seats to secure 196 seats. Bündnis

GLOBALIZATION

90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens) was third-placed with 118 seats (an increase of 51 seats) and the Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) also increased its representation, by 12 seats, to 92. The far-right **Alternative für Deutschland** (AfD—Alternative for Germany) won 83 seats. The rival candidates for the chancellorship, Olaf Scholz of the SPD and Armin Laschet of the CDU/CSU, each of whom was seeking to form a viable coalition, began preliminary talks with other parties, although negotiations were expected to take some time.

GLOBALIZATION is one of the major challenges facing the European Union (EU). The phenomenon refers to a process of economic integration on a global level. The main characteristics and driving forces behind globalization are: the liberalization of international trade (through the **World Trade Organization**—WTO) and capital movements; developing technological progress and the advance of the **information society**; and the process of **deregulation**. These factors combined together stimulate international trade by removing barriers and promoting new forms of technology. Many EU policy areas have a global dimension, such as trade policy, **competition policy**, **environmental policy** and the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. Some regard globalization with alarm and question the democratic credentials, accountability and legitimacy of some of these forums, such as the WTO. Well-co-ordinated anti-capitalist protest movements have taken place at gatherings of the WTO and, on occasion, at meetings of the **European Council**.

GOLDEN TRIANGLE is a phrase that has often been used to describe what is commonly perceived to be the economic centre and motivating force of the European Union, an area bounded by Paris (**France**), the German Ruhr area and Milan (**Italy**).

The **GONZÁLEZ GROUP** was a **reflection** group established in December 2008 with the goal of identifying how best the European Union (EU) can ‘more effectively anticipate and meet challenges in the longer term horizon of 2020 to 2030’. Chaired by Felipe González Márquez, the 12-member group submitted its report to the European Council on 8 May 2010 during the **euro** crisis. The report—*Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities*—urged courageous leadership to address a range of challenges that the EU would face over the next 20 years to 2030. The challenges covered financial governance, social rights, education, research, migration and demographic change, foreign and security policy, and the engagement of EU citizens with the ‘European project’.

The **GOVERNANCE WHITE PAPER** was launched by the **European Commission** in mid-2001 and sought to open up a debate on the nature and workings of European governance, and essentially contained a set of recommendations on how to enhance and open up democracy in the European Union (EU). The paper considered how it might be possible to inject the EU institutions with greater legitimacy among the citizens of the EU. Two points should be made about it. First, the timing (late July) was unfortunate and restricted its impact in the media. Second, there was a degree of confusion as to the meaning of the term ‘governance’ across the member states (the word does not exist in some languages). Together these ensured less attention in the media for what amounted to the beginnings of a serious and far-reaching debate. On assuming the presidency of the European Commission in September 1999, Romano Prodi had placed considerable emphasis on the concept of governance and identified new forms of European governance as one of his four strategic priorities. Definitions of governance vary widely, but the European Commission adopted its own distinctive definition of the term governance, which it equated to the rules, processes and practices that affect how powers are exercised at the European level. It identified five principles of good governance, namely **openness**, participation, **accountability**, effectiveness and coherence. These five principles were supposed to reinforce those of **subsidiarity** and **proportionality**. The White Paper was followed by a public consultation that ended in March 2002 and the Commission pledged to report back with its conclusions by the end of that calendar year. Its findings were to be used to provide a firm basis for further inter-institutional co-operation on reforming European governance within the constraints imposed by the existing **founding treaties**.

The Governance White Paper was inevitably interwoven with and has formed part of the ‘future of Europe’ debate, and it was expected that both would inform and pave the way for further institutional changes at the **inter-governmental conference** (IGC) scheduled for 2004. The Commission, bound by the **Laeken Declaration**, was actively involved with the **European Convention** preceding the IGC and used this White Paper as its reference point.

GRAND CHAMBERS are an innovation of the **Treaty of Nice**. They are composed of the President and Vice-President of the **Court of Justice** and 13 other judges.

GREECE is a parliamentary republic and was one of the first countries to approach the **European Economic Community** (EEC) for some form of association in the late 1950s. An **association agreement** was signed in July 1961 and entered into force in November 1962. A **customs union** was to have been introduced gradually over a period of 10 years, but, in order to aid the development of Greek industry, a transitional period of 22 years was to

have been applied to most Greek industrial goods. The EEC also agreed to provide loans to **Greece** during the first five years of the Agreement. The association was soon, however, frozen following the military coup of April 1967 in Greece, its provisions not being reactivated until the restoration of a civilian democratic regime in July 1974. Six months later, the new Greek Government notified the European Communities (EC) that it wished to apply for full membership, with similar transitional arrangements to those that had been part of the first **enlargement** process. The association agreement was restored in December 1974, and a formal application to join the EC submitted in June 1975. Negotiations took four years, and the **Treaty of Accession** was signed in Athens in May 1979, with **ratification** occurring the following month. Greece became the 10th member of the EC in January 1981.

After its electoral victory in October 1981 a new left-wing Government criticized the terms of membership accepted by its conservative predecessor for creating and exacerbating economic problems in Greece, and demanded a special status that, based upon a renegotiation of the terms, would take account of what was claimed to be the very different nature of the Greek economy. In 1983 the **European Council** recognized Greece's 'special problems', and negotiations culminated in several concessions to Greece and the adoption in 1985 of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. Greece had earlier indicated that its acceptance of the entry of **Portugal** and **Spain** was conditional upon a satisfactory resolution of its complaints.

As one of the poorer members of the European Union (EU), Greece has been a major beneficiary of EU programmes. More or less the whole country has priority status for the **structural and cohesion funds**, and it is a major recipient of the **cohesion policy**, in the form of the **Cohesion Fund**. Greece's attitude towards the EU, especially in terms of foreign policy, was more openly influenced by national interest than that of most member states, and this occasionally caused some irritation among its partners. This national interest often emerged over relations with **Turkey** and Cyprus. Greece joined the **exchange rate mechanism** (ERM) in March 1998. However, Greece's inability to meet the criteria for **economic and monetary union** (EMU) was not in doubt, and in 1998 it was the only member state wishing to participate in EMU that was excluded from doing so. This did not dilute Greek determination to join, and the country acceded to EMU in 2001. Greece ratified the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in April 2005. The document was backed by 268 votes in the 300-member parliament. Only 17 legislators voted against, while another 15 abstained. The New Democracy (ND) party, led by Kostas Karamanlis, took control of government from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) following elections in March 2004. However, the party was returned to power by a much narrower margin in September 2007.

The Greek Conservative Government fared badly at the **European Parliament** (EP) 2009 elections, while the polls brought renewed success for both the Socialist and Communist parties. The Greek results ran very much against

the general trend of the EP elections, which saw rising support for the centre-right. This national trend was confirmed when PASOK (under the leadership of George Papandreou) won the national elections in October and brought the five-year Conservative administration to an end. The new Government soon found itself confronting a severe economic crisis and was compelled to introduce austerity programmes to tackle the huge level of government debt. In so doing, it triggered social unrest and impacted on the stability of the **euro**. In April 2010 the Greek Government was offered a three-year financial rescue package by the EU, the **European Central Bank** (ECB) and the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) 'troika' (totalling some €110,000m.) to assist it in its efforts at restoring confidence abroad and support at home. The sense of crisis was such, however, that many analysts were convinced that Greece would eventually default on its debt and come under increasing pressure to leave the eurozone. The economic situation deteriorated further in 2011 as political tensions and anger intensified as unemployment soared. The EU, the ECB and the IMF offered Greece a second bailout loan, worth €130,000m., in October on the condition that the country implemented further austerity measures and agreed to a restructuring of its debt. Papandreou resigned as Prime Minister in November to make way for a new national unity government. The second bailout was ratified by all parties (with a number of additional preconditions) in February 2012 and was activated the following month. After an indecisive general election in May failed to lead to the formation of a new government, fresh elections were scheduled for 17 June. At the polls the conservative ND party, led by Antonis Samaras, won a narrow majority of seats and entered into a coalition government with PASOK and the Democratic Left. Samaras' party was pro-euro and fully supported the bailout programme.

However, Greek politics had undergone a major change as the 2012 elections heralded the rise of a new political force, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA). SYRIZA had been a marginal actor in 2007, when it had secured only 5% of the vote, but, under the leadership of the charismatic Alexis Tsipras, it had emerged as the second largest party in Greece by June 2012 (with just under 27% of the vote). SYRIZA was opposed to the austerity programme and rejected a request to join a coalition government. By mid-2013 it was estimated that Greece had received a total of some €210,000m. as part of its bailout package from the troika. SYRIZA won nearly 27% of the Greek vote at the 2014 EP elections, placing it ahead of ND (which secured nearly 23%). SYRIZA's popularity continued to grow in 2014, and at national elections on 25 January 2015 SYRIZA was the winning party (with 36.3% of the votes), pushing ND firmly into second place (with 27.8%). Tsipras was sworn in as Prime Minister on 26 January, heading the first radical left administration in over 50 years. Tsipras initially aimed to renegotiate the terms of Greece's bailout agreement and to create some 300,000 new jobs, but encountered strong opposition from within the eurozone, and fears that Greece might be compelled to abandon the euro, leading the Government to dilute its pledges on the economy. Negotiations on the terms of Greece's

bailout programme with the EU took place throughout the first half of the year. At the end of June, amid bank closures and default on a loan repayment to the IMF, Greece's imminent exit from the eurozone appeared increasingly likely. However, in July tentative agreement was reached between the Greek Government and the EU to negotiate a new lending arrangement, and in mid-August the Board of Governors of the **European Stability Mechanism** (ESM) approved new lending to Greece, worth €86,000m. over a period of three years. A Memorandum of Understanding with Greece was also adopted, according to which the Greek Government agreed to implement further widespread economic reforms. Amid internal conflict within SYRIZA over the adoption of austerity measures, Alexis Tsipras announced his resignation on 20 August. New legislative elections were held on 20 September, and a Tsipras-led Government was again appointed; Tsipras welcomed the results of the elections as a validation of the new bailout arrangement.

Meanwhile, from the early months of 2015 Greece experienced a major refugee crisis, as large numbers of asylum seekers, many fleeing civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, embarked on dangerous sea voyages in order to reach the Greek islands. By the end of June 2015 arrivals of seaborne migrants on the Aegean islands exceeded the total number for the whole of 2014. The Greek state did not have the capacity to respond satisfactorily, and some other EU members were reluctant to share responsibility. In March 2016 an EU-Turkey agreement was reached, providing for the return of undocumented migrants crossing into the territory of **Greece** and considered not to be in immediate need of international protection; the EU pledged to accept an officially documented Syrian refugee from inside Turkey for each migrant returned to that country. By June the European Commission reported that the number of migrants travelling between Turkey and Greece had declined significantly. Prior to the implementation of the agreement, around 1,740 migrants were crossing the Aegean Sea to Greek territory each day. From the beginning of May, average daily arrivals reportedly numbered some 47. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of migrants who arrived in Greece during 2016 fell to 173,208 (compared with 856,723 in 2015).

In August 2018 Greece successfully exited its bailout programme with the EU. SYRIZA attracted reduced support in regional and local elections and in the elections to the EP in the first half of 2019, following nationalist criticism of the implementation in February of an agreement that had resolved the decades-long 'name dispute' with newly renamed neighbouring country **North Macedonia**. Tsipras announced his resignation in June. Following legislative elections in July, SYRIZA was removed from power by the conservative ND under Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

GREEN GROUP: See **Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance**

A **GREEN PAPER** is a **European Commission** document that is intended to stimulate public debate and launch a process of consultation at European level on a particular topic. The Commission produces some 10 Green Papers every year. These consultations may then lead to a **White Paper** (e.g. **Governance White Paper**), which translates the conclusions of the debate into practical proposals for European Union action.

GREENLAND, a Danish colony since 1721, was incorporated into **Denmark** in 1953. It became part of the European Communities (EC) in 1973, even though in the 1972 Danish referendum some 70% of Greenland's electorate opposed membership. In 1978 Denmark accepted home rule for Greenland, and the enabling legislation included a provision for Greenland to withdraw from the EC if it wished. A narrow majority in favour of **withdrawal** (53%) was recorded in a 1982 referendum on the issue (fishing was a major issue) and Denmark, still responsible for Greenland's foreign affairs, requested that the **European Commission** revise the treaties to permit withdrawal and the inclusion of Greenland among the **Overseas Countries and Territories** (OCTs). Agreement on the final terms was reached in February 1985, with OCT status being conceded to the island. Greenland thus gained preferential access to EC markets; furthermore, all Greenlanders are recognized as European Union (EU) citizens. However, Greenland's withdrawal from the European Community deprived it of EC **development aid**. This loss was compensated for by the revenue from the granting of fishing rights for Greenlandic waters to EU member states. Greenland, the EU and Denmark signed a new partnership agreement in June 2006, allowing Greenland to resume receiving its EU subsidy in return for EU control over policies such as scientific research and climate change. At 2021 Greenland and the **United Kingdom** (see **Brexit**) were the only territories to have left the EU. Economic ties between Greenland and the EU remained strong. Some political and business leaders in Greenland suggested that the country may eventually opt to apply for full EU membership.

GREXIT is a term that was reportedly coined by economists in 2012, amid the economic and financial crisis in **Greece**, by combining the two words 'Greek' and 'exit'. It refers to the potential departure of Greece from the **eurozone**, which seemed increasingly likely at several points in the early to mid-2010s, most recently in mid-2015.

The **GROUP FOR A EUROPE OF DEMOCRACIES AND DIVERSITIES** (EDD) was a former **political group** in the **European Parliament** (EP). Its members favoured 'a stable and democratic Europe of Nation States' and were not in favour of further European integration and centralization. In 2002 the group had 18 members in the EP, from four countries (**Denmark**,

France, the **Netherlands** and the **United Kingdom**). The group represented a varying **Eurosceptic** voice in the EP and re-formed as the **Independence and Democracy Group** in June 2004. This group, which included the **UK Independence Party** (UKIP), was deeply Eurosceptic, rejected the **Treaty of Lisbon** and all moves towards a federal superstate, and many members openly called for their own country's withdrawal from the European Union (EU). With only 21 members (13 of them from UKIP), it fell short of the **25 Members of the European Parliament** needed to maintain a political group within the EP after the 2009 elections. The ethos and views of the EDD and the Independence and Democracy Group quickly found a new home within the **Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy** group.

The **GROUP OF THE ALLIANCE OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE** (ALDE) was formed in July 2004 following the 2004 **European Parliament** (EP) elections. In 2007 this new group (which essentially emerged from the **Group of the European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party**) had **104 Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs), who were drawn from 22 of the member states. After the 2009 elections the number of ALDE MEPs declined to 84 (from 19 member states) and it fell further to 67 following the May 2014 EP elections. By late 2018 the ALDE group consisted of 68 MEPs. Traditionally, ALDE was one of the most vocal groups in favour of **European Union** (EU) integration and sought European solutions to many common challenges and problems. It was a firm supporter of the European single market and an advocate of neoliberalism and greater competition. Its interests were presented in a 10-point programme that espoused, among other things, the need for the EU to: bridge the gap between its economic and political dimensions and be able to speak with one voice on the international stage; secure greater democratization of its functioning; demand the protection of all minorities; aspire to a common economic policy; and aim to make itself the world leader in environmental protection and ensure that **globalization** is effective and beneficial. In mid-2019, for the ninth session of the EP, ALDE was succeeded by a new grouping, **Renew Europe**.

GROUP OF EIGHT: See **G-8**

The **GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE** (RDE) was a former **political group** in the **European Parliament**. It was established in 1973 (as the Progressive Democratic Group), largely as an arrangement of convenience, by the French Gaullist party (known as the Union des Démocrates until 1976, as the Rassemblement pour la République from then until 2002, and as the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire since then) and the nationalist Irish party Fianna Fáil, neither of which regarded any

of the other available political groups as a natural home. While there were strains within the RDE, a common position was found in several policy areas, including agricultural, regional and social policy. In mid-1995 the RDE merged with Forza Europa to form what would become the **Union for Europe of the Nations Group**.

The **GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC AND REFORM PARTY (ELDR)** was one of the oldest **political groups** in the **European Parliament (EP)**. In 2002 it was the third largest group in the EP, containing 53 **Members of the European Parliament**, although the Group was considerably smaller than the **Group of the Party of European Socialists** and the **Group of the European People's Party**. The ELDR historically played a pivotal role between these two larger forces. Generally centrist in orientation, it experienced strains between its left- and right-wing elements, which reduced its cohesion and effectiveness. The arrival of the Nordic centre parties in the ELDR increased group heterogeneity. Throughout its existence the ELDR remained fully committed to deeper European Union integration. Following the 2004 European elections, the ELDR was replaced by the **Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe**.

The **GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) (EPP)** is the formal name adopted by the **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats** after the 2009 elections to the **European Parliament (EP)** when the British Conservative Party and other European Democrat parties left to form the **European Conservatives and Reformists Group**. Despite these departures, the EPP remained the largest group within the EP after the 2009 elections, and retained its position as largest group after the elections held in 2014 and 2019. In 2019 182 EPP **Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)** were elected to the EP (compared with 221 in 2014). The EPP is a centre-right group that supports the process of European integration. The group seeks to advance the goal of a more competitive and democratic Europe.

The **GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS (EPP-ED)** united Christian Democrat, Conservative and other mainstream centre and centre-right political forces from across the 27-member European Union until the 2009 elections to the **European Parliament (EP)**. The EPP-ED Group had its origins in the Group of the European People's Party (EPP), which was one of the first transnational **political groups** to emerge in the European Parliament. Christian Democrats had dominated the assembly from 1951 through to 1975 and, in anticipation of the introduction of **direct elections**,

GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN UNITARIAN LEFT

in 1976 they formed the EPP, self-consciously constituting a party rather than a federation of national groups. The EPP was strongly committed to European integration, desiring more powers to be given to the supranational institutions, and favoured a federalist structure for Europe. While broadly Christian Democrat and moderate centre-right in orientation, it contained both progressive and conservative strands, which were not always exactly consistent with national delegations. From 1979 it was generally one of the two largest political groups in the EP, and in 1992 it also absorbed the European Democratic Group (ED). Following the 1999 elections, it became the largest group, with 233 **Members of the European Parliament**. The results of the 2004 EP elections guaranteed the EPP-ED its relative majority with some 268 seats (out of 732), although by April 2006 this had declined to 264. Following the accession of **Bulgaria** and **Romania** in January 2007 membership increased again, to 278. The group remained the largest parliamentary group, and was the only one with deputies from all 27 member states of the Union at that time. Given its size, it was arguably in the best position to influence the EP's political agenda. Its strength was reflected in the fact that, from 1999, the EPP-ED Group was on the winning side of more votes than any other group in the EP's monthly plenary sessions. The size of this party also ensured that EPP-ED group members held a range of principal positions within the Parliament. For example, in the sixth Parliament (2004–09), its members held the chairmanships of nine of the EP's 22 committees or subcommittees, seven of its 14 vice-presidencies and three of its five quaestorships. Within the parliamentary committees, EPP-ED group members were well placed to secure the right to author the EP's position on important draft **legislation** and other major reports. Moreover, the Group secured more of these rapporteurships, on more important subjects, than any other group.

GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN UNITARIAN LEFT: See Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left

The **GROUP OF THE GREENS/EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE** (or EFA) in the **European Parliament** (EP) was formed in July 1999, and is made up of two main groups—Greens and environmentalists on the one hand, and representatives of 'stateless nations' (i.e. Wales, Scotland and the Basque region) or regions on the other. This group first emerged after the 1984 **direct elections** when nine representatives of national Green parties were elected to the EP. Under EP rules, however, this was an insufficient number to be recognized as a separate **political group**, and consequently the Green representatives joined with a heterogeneous collection of other **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs) to form the Rainbow Group. The Green Group did not become a separate political group until 1989, following a significant increase in membership. It has continued to evolve. The Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the EP is the product of the political will of

two separate and progressive European political families to co-operate in order to strengthen their mutual political interests in the EP. The group has since established itself as one of the main voices within the Parliament. It has been an increasingly cohesive force and has focused its energies on environmental protection, the decentralization of power and gender equality. It is generally positively disposed today towards the European integration process. Following the May 2014 EP elections, it had 50 MEPs from 17 member states. In the 2019 elections, it increased its share of MEPs, with 74 elected from 16 member states; the majority were from **Germany**. The Group's Bureau (or executive) is made up of nine members. Unlike all the other groups in the EP, the Greens/EFA have a co-presidency, i.e. two co-Presidents, always one male and one female. The two current co-Presidents are Ska Keller and Philippe Lamberts. There are five Vice-Presidents.

The **GROUP OF THE PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS (PSE)** was the name of one of the **political groups** in the **European Parliament (EP)** before it was renamed the Socialist Group in the European Parliament in 2004 and the **Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament** in 2009. Between 1973 and the late 1990s the PSE was consistently the largest group in the EP. In terms of representation, the PSE became the second major political group following the 1999 EP elections when it secured 181 **Members of the European Parliament**.

The **GROUP OF THE PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF SOCIALISTS AND DEMOCRATS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (S&D)** is the name adopted by the former Socialist Group in the **European Parliament (EP)**—see **Group of the Party of European Socialists**) after the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. Despite the common political background of its representatives, the group (under its different nomenclatures over the years) has often been divided by major ideological and policy issues. While it permits free votes in debates, it makes great efforts to develop a common position on as many issues as possible, by means of pre-committee caucuses and working parties. The political group brings together the social democratic and socialist parties across the European Union (EU). The largest national groups within the political group traditionally came from the Social Democratic Party in **Germany**, the French and Spanish Socialist Parties (and, until **Brexit**, the Labour Party in the **United Kingdom**). The S&D supports closer integration, particularly in the environmental and social fields. It campaigns on environmental issues, calls for social justice and reasonable minimum wages and supported the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The political group remained the second largest group (behind the **European People's Party**) in the EP after the May 2014 elections. The EP for 2014–19 had 189 S&D **Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)** at September 2018. The group had an MEP

GROUP OF SEVEN

from each of the EU member states. Following the 2019 elections, however, the total number of S&D MEPs elected decreased to 154. The S&D nevertheless remains the second largest grouping in the EP. The largest national delegation in the EP came from **Italy** (31 MEPs). The Chair of the S&D group is Iratxe García Pérez, a Spanish MEP, who assumed the position in June 2019. García Pérez is a member of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party). The S&D group is a major force and its input to, and support of, the legislative work of the EP is indispensable. Its activities are co-ordinated by the Bureau, which comprises the Group Chairman, nine Vice-Chairs and the Treasurer. The S&D group strongly advocates its support for an inclusive European society based on the principles of freedom, equality, solidarity, diversity and fairness. The group remains pro-European in outlook and seeks to build a more democratic Europe, with a better future for everyone and one where the EU can be seen to connect with the public. Combating unemployment remains a principal objective of the S&D.

GROUP OF SEVEN: See **G-7**

GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: See **Political Groups**

GUARANTEE THRESHOLDS were introduced in 1986 as a means of limiting the open-ended nature of production **subsidies** in the **common agricultural policy** that had been a consequence of the guaranteed price system. With the imposition of guarantee thresholds on agricultural products, an upper limit was placed upon automatic financial support, with no subsidies given for production that exceeds the thresholds.

GUE/NGL: See **Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left**

GUIDE PRICES or target prices refers to prices offered to farmers for beef and veal under the **common agricultural policy**. Guide prices have also applied under the **common fisheries policy**.

The first **GULF WAR** occurred in early 1991 when a **USA**-led coalition of states attacked Iraq. The origins of this international crisis date to August 1990 when Saddam Hussain, the Iraqi President, launched an invasion of Kuwait. At this point in the development of the European Union (EU), plans were being laid in the **intergovernmental conferences** that resulted in the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU). The Gulf War was significant as it focused the attention of member states on the issue of whether the EU should have some form of political role and even a military role. This would have been a major

step in EU integration. The **European Defence Community** project of the early 1950s had proved just how controversial this area was, and little had changed some 40 years later. The Gulf War and the conflicts in **Yugoslavia** in the early 1990s could not persuade the governments of the member states to allow the EU a substantial military role. However, the TEU began the process, albeit tentatively. Throughout the 1990s doubts still lingered, principally in the USA, regarding Iraq's military capabilities and intentions and these were fuelled by Saddam Hussain's efforts to block several United Nations-backed searches for weapons of mass destruction. Frustrated and angered by Iraq's defiance, the US Government under George W. Bush, with the diplomatic and military support of the Governments of the **United Kingdom, Spain** and **Poland**, finally launched a second **Iraq War** in March 2003. Saddam Hussain's regime was overthrown, to the detriment of the UK's relations with both **France** and **Germany**, which strongly opposed the war.

GYMNICH MEETINGS is a term that refers to specialist ministerial meetings that are held in conjunction with the **summit meetings** of the **European Council**. They are designed to be informal and private sessions without any detailed agenda, in order to permit ministers to consider longer-term issues and problems without being pressurized to reach a decision. The name derives from Schloss Gymnich in **Germany**, where the first such gathering was held.

H

HAGUE CONGRESS: See **Congress of Europe**

The **HAGUE SUMMIT** of December 1969 was only the third summit meeting of the **Six** since the **Treaty of Rome**, and the first since the French vetoes on British membership of the European Communities (EC) and the **empty chair crisis**. The newly elected French President, Georges Pompidou, took the initiative in calling for a summit meeting that would address directly the several problems and issues facing the Six. The summit opened the way to the **enlargement** of the EC; it established guidelines for the consolidation and development of common policies; and it reaffirmed political union as the ultimate objective of the EC. More specifically, it endorsed proposals for the financing of the **common agricultural policy**, for extending the budgetary powers of the **European Parliament**, for full **economic and monetary union** to be reached by 1980, and for the development of closer political coordination. It heralded the new style of **decision making** focusing on strategic leadership from heads of government and state (later institutionalized through the **European Council**), which would characterize the EC after 1970.

JOHANNES HAHN (1957–) was named as Commissioner for Budget and Administration in the new **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, which took office in December 2019. Hahn had served in previous Commissions, in both 2010–14 and 2014–19. Hahn was born in Vienna, **Austria**, and studied law and then philosophy at the city’s university. He is a member of the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP—Austrian People’s Party) and, prior to becoming a European Commissioner, he was the Minister for Science and Research in the Austrian Government.

HARD CORE: See **Core Europe**

HARMONIZATION is a term used to describe the process whereby national policies and standards are brought more closely in line with one another. To many, it is synonymous with **approximation**, although legally

speaking it involves a greater degree of integration. The harmonization and approximation of **legislation** are central to the concept of the single **market**. Legislative harmonization and approximation with the *acquis communautaire* also feature as an obligation placed on non-member states in their relations with the European Union.

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT: See **European Council; Summit Meetings**

HEALTH AND SAFETY, particularly with regard to the provision of satisfactory conditions for workers at their place of employment, have been a longstanding concern of the European Union (EU), as was reconfirmed in the **Treaty on European Union**. General policy initiation in the area of health and safety is the responsibility of two **European Commission** agencies, the Advisory Committee on Safety and Health at Work and the **European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions**. Health and safety also figure prominently in EU **consumer policy** and **environmental policy**. As a result of the **Single European Act**, **directives** and **regulations** on health and safety required only a **qualified majority vote** in the **Council of the European Union**. The EU is committed to ensuring that health protection is incorporated into its policies, and to working to improve public health, prevent illness and remove dangers to both physical and mental health.

The **HEALTH POLICY** competences of the European Union (EU) have been mainly focused on incentive and co-operation measures. The EU does not have the capacity to organize health care provision independently, so the majority of its efforts were restricted to co-ordinating and enhancing national policies on health awareness and health protection. This led to campaigns on AIDS, cancer and drug dependence. In October 2007 the **European Commission** presented a **White Paper** ‘Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU’. The three main objectives specified in the document were: fostering good health in an ageing Europe, protecting citizens from health threats, and supporting dynamic health systems and new technologies. A new health programme for 2014–20, ‘Health for Growth’, entered into effect in March 2014, with a total budget of €449.4m. The four principal aims of the programme focused on the development of new and sustainable health systems; facilitating access to improved, safer health care; the promotion of health and the prevention of disease; and protection from cross-border health risks. In response to the challenges presented by the **COVID-19** crisis from 2020, the EU agreed a new health programme for 2021–27, EU4Health. EU4Health was to provide funding to EU member states, health organizations and non-governmental organizations to invest in preventative measures, crisis

HELSINKI FINAL ACT

preparedness, the acquisition of essential medicines and medical supplies, and efforts to improve health in the long term. EU4Health's programme for 2021–27 was formally established in March 2021, with funding of €2,446m. in current prices. In addition, a new **European Health Union** was launched by the Commission on 11 November 2020.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: See **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

HIGH AUTHORITY: See **European Coal and Steel Community**

The **HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY** was a post created under the terms of the **Treaty of Amsterdam** to provide a higher profile for the European Union's (EU) **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP). The **Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union** acted as the High Representative and, drawing on the French acronym for the CFSP, was often referred to as Monsieur or Madame PESC. The High Representative, along with the European Commissioner responsible for external relations and the representative of the **Council Presidency**, constituted the EU's **Troika**, which represented the EU internationally. The first High Representative was Javier Solana. He was expected to become the first **Union Minister for Foreign Affairs**, once the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** was ratified. However, non-ratification of the treaty meant that the post was never created. Instead, the **Treaty of Lisbon** provided for the upgrading and cumbersome renaming of the post as **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**.

The **HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY** superseded the role of **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**, under the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The renaming of the post was accompanied by new powers. The first post-holder was Baroness Catherine Ashton, who was appointed by the **European Council** in late 2009 and held office until November 2014. At the end of August Federica Mogherini, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was named as the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. She took office on 1 November. **Josep Borrell Fontelles** was appointed as the new High Representative for 2019–24. The High Representative chairs meetings of the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) dealing with foreign affairs. He is also, *ex officio*, a Vice-President of the **European Commission**. The main responsibilities of the High Representative are to conduct and develop the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) and the **European**

Security and Defence Policy, with assistance in fulfilling these tasks from a **European External Action Service**. The creation of this dual responsibility post was designed to provide greater coherence and prominence to the role of the European Union (EU) in international affairs, although there was some concern over whether the High Representative's role in representing the EU had the potential to lead to conflict with that of the **President of the European Council**, who is also responsible for the external representation of the EU on issues concerning the CFSP.

PHIL HOGAN (1960–) was nominated in 2014 as the Irish Commissioner to the **European Commission** led by Jean-Claude Juncker. In September Juncker named Hogan as Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development. He took up the post 1 November 2014. Hogan was born in Kilkenny, **Ireland**, and graduated with a degree in Economics and Geography from University College Cork in 1981. He was elected to the Irish legislature for the first time in 1989. In 2002 he stood unsuccessfully for the leadership of Fine Gael, losing to Enda Kenny. Prior to his appointment to the Commission, Hogan held the position of Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government in Ireland in 2011–14. In September 2019 Hogan was named as Commissioner for Trade in the new Commission led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, which took office on 1 December. However, Hogan resigned from his position in August 2020, after being accused of breaching the **COVID-19** restrictions in place in Ireland.

HORIZON EUROPE succeeded its predecessor, **Horizon 2020**, from 1 January 2021. In July 2020 Horizon Europe was allocated funding of €76,400m. for 2021–27 (in 2018 prices). Horizon Europe introduced a new European Innovation Council to support innovation by means of two funding instruments, one directed at the early, research stages of the process, and the other for development.

HORIZON 2020 was an €80,000m. European Union (EU) research and innovation programme running from 2014–20. The budget was 30% higher than for its immediate predecessor, Framework Programme 7. Co-ordinated by the **European Commission**, it brought all of the EU's research and innovation funding for this period under one umbrella. The programme comprised three main parts: some €24,600m. was allocated to the European Research Council, which provides funds to university and scientific researchers; a further €17,900m. was allocated to secure European industry's leadership in innovation; and around €31,700m. was made available for other leading issues and concerns such as health and demographic change, secure, clean and efficient energy, smart, green and integrated transport, and climate action. Horizon 2020 was one manifestation of the EU's determination and drive to

establish and foster greater growth opportunities in Europe. It planned to fund some 65,000 researchers under its Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions and a new European Institute of Innovation and Technology sought to develop closer links between the worlds of higher education and business and to foster specialized postgraduate training. Horizon 2020 was succeeded by **Horizon Europe** for 2021–27.

WERNER HOYER (1951–) assumed his current post as the seventh President of the **European Investment Bank** in January 2012. Hoyer was born in Wuppertal, **Germany**, and read economics at the University of Cologne. Following his attainment of a doctorate, he commenced his professional career as a senior research assistant/lecturer at the University of Cologne, specializing in international economics before being elected to the (West) German parliament in 1987 as a member of the Free Democratic Party (which he had joined in 1972). Hoyer served in Helmut Kohl's fifth and final administration as the Minister for State at the Foreign Office (1994–98) and held the same position in **Angela Merkel's** second administration during 2009–11.

HUMAN RIGHTS have become an increasingly important issue in debates over the role and future of the European Union (EU) since reference to respect for fundamental rights was included in the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) in 1993 and later expanded by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, which declared the EU to be founded on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The rights themselves are not explicitly listed anywhere in the EU's treaty base. Instead, reference is made to the **European Convention on Human Rights** (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) adopted by the **Council of Europe** in 1950, and to the constitutional traditions of the member states. This did not prevent the drawing up in 2000 of a **Charter of Fundamental Rights** of the EU. Nor has it prevented the EU in its external relations from making respect for human rights a precondition for closer ties and, indeed, membership. The EU has not, however, signed the European Convention on Human Rights, the **Court of Justice** ruling in 1996 that it did not have the competence to do so.

That human rights enjoy an increasingly higher profile in the EU is underlined by the fact that a member state's suspected breach of them may be investigated. Ultimately its voting rights, as well as other rights deriving from the TEU and **Treaty of Rome**, may be suspended where a serious and persistent breach is confirmed.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE is an area in which the European Union is active as part of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. Activities involving humanitarian assistance take place under the aegis of the

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). Formal recognition of the EU's involvement in humanitarian assistance work appeared in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and is now contained in the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

HUNGARY indicated, soon after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, that it wished for a closer relationship with, and eventual membership of, the European Communities (EC) once it had adapted its economy to market conditions. A **Europe agreement** was signed in 1991, and the EC accepted in principle the possibility of membership, although not for a number of years. Hungary submitted a formal application for membership in March 1994. It was recognized as one of the best-placed applicants for membership and was invited to open **accession negotiations** in March 1998. These were concluded in December 2002 and in the following April almost 84% of those participating in a referendum opted for accession to the European Union (EU). The Hungarian Government welcomed the result and duly signed the **Treaty of Accession** on 16 April 2003. Following its entry into the EU on 1 May 2004, Hungary became the second country to ratify the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, with a parliamentary vote (304 votes to 9) in December 2004. It was the first member state to ratify the **Treaty of Lisbon** in December 2007, the same month that the country became part of the EU's **Schengen Area**. Hungary held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the first time in January–June 2011. Relations between the EU and the Governments of **Viktor Orbán**, the leader of the centre-right party Fidesz, which came to power as the head of a coalition following the general election in April 2010, have been increasingly strained. The Hungarian Prime Minister, and Fidesz, have systematically tightened state control over the media, the judiciary and banks, including through the implementation of highly controversial constitutional amendments in March 2013. Orbán's Government has increasingly acquired various media outlets to exert control over information in the country. In August EU **development aid** to Hungary was temporarily suspended over alleged failings in the country's financial management and control systems (although there was no evidence of fraud, according to the **European Commission**). Following Fidesz's win at the national elections held in May 2014, Orbán formed his third administration. Since then, Orbán has been displaying a more **Eurosceptic** disposition with regard to many aspects of EU policy and policy priorities, with increasingly nationalistic and indeed xenophobic rhetoric.

Amid what became widely known as the **European migration crisis**, in June 2015 the Hungarian Government's response to incoming refugees, predominantly from the Syrian Arab Republic, was to construct a razor wire fence along its border with **Serbia**, as a way of keeping refugees out. The fence was completed in September 2015 and resulted in Hungary effectively closing its border. Although Hungary's new 'wall' met with disapproval from

the Commission and other EU member states, the Hungarian Government argued that on joining the **Schengen Area** of free movement it had taken on an obligation to protect the EU's external borders. Although EU member countries have a duty to protect the welfare of refugees, Hungary argued that it was not the first safe country that the asylum seekers had passed through: most had landed in **Greece**, itself a member of both the EU and the Schengen Area, and had reached Hungary only because Greece had failed in its obligations under the **Dublin Regulation**. Hungary held a referendum in early October 2016 seeking popular support for its opposition to the EU's plans for the mandatory imposition of refugee quotas on member states (except for those with exemptions), without approval from the national legislature; however, the referendum was invalidated by a low rate of participation by the electorate. In mid-2017 the EU announced that it was to launch **infringement procedures** against Hungary, the **Czech Republic** (Czechia) and **Poland**, in response to the refusal by the three countries to accept the arrival of mandatory quotas of immigrants under a relocation plan for immigrants who had entered the EU by way of Italy or Greece since mid-2015.

The Hungarian Government promoted a Higher Education Law that specifically targeted the Central European University, and its founder the philanthropist George Soros. Orbán claimed that Soros had an agenda to bring more Muslims into the EU, as a counterpoint to what he considers Europe, engaging simultaneously in anti-Semitic and Islamophobic rhetoric. Following Orbán's landslide re-election in April 2018, in June the legislature approved (despite an appeal by the **Council of Europe**) new, so-called Stop Soros legislation, effectively criminalizing the provision of assistance to those seeking asylum or residency in Hungary, including immigrants arriving there via a neighbouring country. In addition to individuals, the legislation was also applicable to legal representatives and civil society organizations, and many observers considered it to undermine international **human rights** law. In September the **European Parliament** (EP) voted in favour of launching sanctions proceedings against Hungary under Article 7 of the **Treaty on European Union**, owing to what it deemed to be the systemic threat posed to democracy and the rule of law in the country. However, Poland subsequently confirmed that it would oppose the introduction of sanctions against Hungary, meaning that there was no prospect of their approval, owing to the need for unanimity.

The Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)—EPP, the principal centre-right grouping in the EP, voted to suspend Fidesz's voting rights within the group, pending a review of the party's compliance with the EPP's democratic standards. In addition to numerous policy differences, the suspension of the party had been provoked by a series of posters suggesting that the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and Soros were threatening national security through their pro-immigration policies (Fidesz left the EPP in March 2021). Nevertheless, in the EP elections in May 2019 the rate of participation by the electorate, at 43.4%, was the highest ever

recorded nationally in elections to the EP. In early April 2020 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the **Czech Republic**, Hungary and **Poland** had violated the law by refusing to fulfil their obligations under the EU's migrant relocation scheme. In November Hungary (and Poland) vetoed the adoption of the EU's new long-term budget, incorporating post-pandemic recovery funds, owing to objections to a new mechanism that would link the disbursement of EU funds to the observance of rule of law criteria by member states. Following intensive negotiations, an agreement was reached on 10 December, under which Hungary and Poland agreed to withdraw their vetoes, with implementation of the mechanism to be deferred until the ECJ had ruled on its legality (after which it would apply retroactively from 1 January 2021). On 11 March 2021 Hungary and Poland formally submitted a legal challenge at the ECJ against the proposed new mechanism.

I

ICELAND played little part in European developments during the first two decades following the Second World War. It joined the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA) only in March 1970. The following November it began talks with the European Communities (EC) along with the other non-applicant EFTA states, and formal negotiations began the following year. These were hindered by Iceland's unilateral decision in 1972 to expand its territorial fishing limits to 50 nautical miles (93 km). Although a **free trade agreement** was ratified in February 1973, the EC insisted that a satisfactory settlement of the fishing dispute had to be reached before Iceland would be allowed to obtain the full benefits of the Agreement, and an acceptable compromise was not reached until July 1976. After this, there were no significant qualitative changes in the relationship with the EC until the late 1980s, when discussions, followed by negotiations, on the **European Economic Area** (EEA) began. This arrangement satisfied Iceland's desire for access to the **internal market**. Hence, unlike most of its EFTA partners, Iceland did not apply for EC membership. Successive Icelandic governments remained rather sceptical on the subject of European Union (EU) entry. This attitude did not, however, prevent relations with the EU from developing further. Iceland, along with **Norway**, negotiated participation in the **Schengen Agreement** and regularly associated itself with EU positions adopted as part of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. The economic and financial turmoil unleashed in late 2008 had a heavy impact on Iceland, where banks had severely overstretched themselves on capital and bond markets. The crisis and ensuing 'credit crunch' shook the economic and political infrastructure of Iceland to its core, toppled the Government and led Iceland to consider for the first time the possibility of EU membership. A new, centre-left (Social Democrats and Greens) coalition Government, formed after elections in April 2009, was determined to bring the issue before parliament for debate. In July, after intense debate, the Icelandic parliament voted in favour (33 votes to 28, with two abstentions) of initiating the process for EU membership. The application, submitted later that month, was generally welcomed within the EU, although it was clear that accession was not a foregone conclusion. Iceland opened **accession negotiations** in July 2010, but these proved to be far more protracted than had been assumed, despite Iceland's already close integration with the EU through the EEA. Popular support in Iceland for

membership began to decline following the application, raising the question of whether any successfully negotiated **accession treaty** would be passed in a referendum. Following the defeat of the incumbent Government in legislative elections in April 2013, a new centre-right, Eurosceptic administration came to power. In June the Government confirmed that it was suspending the EU application process.

The **IDENTITY AND DEMOCRACY** group (ID) political group was launched for the ninth session of the **European Parliament** (EP), which runs from 2019–24. It was established in June 2019, succeeding the **Europe of Nations and Freedom** group, and its members secured 73 of the 751 seats in the EP. ID is the fifth largest political group in the EP. It is a far-right **Euro-sceptic** grouping that includes **Legia** and the **Alternative für Deutschland** parties, among others.

The **IDENTITY, TRADITION AND SOVEREIGNTY GROUP** (ITS) **political group** emerged in the sixth **European Parliament** (EP, 2004–09). It was established in January 2007 and had 23 members, thereby just surpassing the minimum requirement at that date (of 20) for an EP political group. It largely owed its creation to the arrival of Bulgarian (one) and Romanian (six) **Members of the European Parliament** after accession on 1 January 2007. The ITS was a rather loose-knit group which belonged to the right of the party spectrum and included Jean-Marie Le Pen, together with five other members of the French Front National, and Alessandra Mussolini. The group highlighted a number of core values including the recognition of national interests, sovereignties, identities and differences; a commitment to Christian values, heritage, culture and the traditions of European civilization; a commitment to the traditional family as the natural unit within society; and strident opposition to a unitary and bureaucratic European superstate. It also espoused strong views on immigration and objected to Turkish accession to the European Union. The ITS represented another **Euro-sceptic** voice in the EP. This group was always volatile and had been created through political opportunity. It disintegrated in November 2007 after Alessandra Mussolini was deemed to have made disparaging remarks about Romanians, whereupon the members from the Greater Romania Party withdrew from the ITS. This reduction in membership caused the disqualification of the ITS from its short-lived recognition as an official EP political group.

IFOP is the acronym (from Instrument Financier d'Orientation de la Pêche) of a financial guidance instrument for fisheries that was established in 1994 and ran until 2006. It controlled the financing of adaptation and modernization of fisheries structures within the ambit of the **structural and cohesion funds**.

IGC: See **Intergovernmental Conference**

IMMIGRATION POLICY was a low priority for the European Communities (EC) until the 1980s, and member states were free to pursue their own policies. A more structured approach began to emerge after the creation of **TREVI** (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme, Violence Internationale), and an ad hoc Group on Immigration was established in 1986 to work for greater co-operation on improving controls at the external borders of the EC and on the granting of visas. Although the political changes in **Central and Eastern Europe** after 1989 contributed to greater immigration pressure, the member states were reluctant to relinquish total control of immigration policy to the EC. Under the **Treaty on European Union**, only visas became a **competence** of the EC, immigration being incorporated into the then intergovernmental **pillar** of **justice and home affairs**. Closer co-operation in immigration policies was also a feature of the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, which conferred powers on the European Union (EU) in areas of migration and asylum.

At the 1999 Tampere **European Council**, the member states set out the four principal areas for the development of a common policy on asylum and immigration. These were: a solid partnership with the countries of origin; the establishment of a common European asylum system; fair treatment of third-country nationals; and a more efficient management of migration flows. In 2000 and 2001 the European Commission proposed several new measures that would facilitate the development of a common policy on asylum and migration. For example, the Commission proposed a directive on family reunification and another on the status of third-country nationals who have been long-term residents. In addition, the **Council of the European Union** adopted **directives** on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third-country nationals and on harmonizing financial penalties imposed on carriers transporting into the EU third-country nationals lacking the documents necessary for admission. To assist the member states in their examination of immigration, the Council established the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) in 1992. In December 2009 the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** decided to abolish CIREFI and to transfer its activities to **FRONTEX** and the Working Party on Frontiers.

By the beginning of 2004 the issue of immigration had emerged as a major theme, primarily linked to the implications of the **enlargement** of the EU in May. Given public attitudes and the successes of extreme right-wing political movements in parts of Europe, most member states, with the notable exceptions of **Ireland** and the **United Kingdom**, decided to impose restrictions on the free movement of people from **Central and Eastern Europe**. The 2004 Hague programme reiterated the Tampere objectives. Immigration policy in the EU further developed as member states sought to secure greater intra-European

co-operation on the issue of a common asylum and immigration policy. In June 2008 the European Commission published a communication on 10 common principles for the effective working of a common immigration policy for Europe. The Single Permit Directive, which was adopted in December 2011, created a set of rights for non-EU workers legally residing in an EU member state. The previous month the Commission had launched an EU Immigration Portal, providing clear information on migration procedures and migrant employment rights.

A directive adopted in November 2003 permitted third-country nationals who have been resident in the EU for a period of five years to be granted the status of long-term residents. The Blue Card Directive was adopted in 2009, regulating conditions for entry and residence of highly qualified workers from outside the EU and establishing an EU-wide permit for such workers; the UK, Ireland and Denmark were exempt from the provisions of the directive. In May 2016 the Parliament and the Council adopted a new directive regulating conditions for admission and residency for nationals from non-EU countries entering the EU for educational, research and training purposes (again, the UK, Ireland and Denmark were exempt).

Immigration became a key issue during the campaign of the ‘Leave’ side prior to the referendum on membership of the EU that took place in the UK on 23 June 2016, arguing that a vote in favour of **Brexit** was the only way for the UK fully to control its borders. See also **Migration and Asylum Policy; European Migration Crisis**.

IMPLEMENTATION is a crucial aspect of the process of European integration. As the European Union (EU) has evolved, so the body of laws and commitments aimed at establishing a genuine **single market** has expanded. These laws have to be adhered to at national level, such as, for example, **environmental policy** and **competition policy**, if the project is to operate effectively and efficiently. However, this is not unproblematic, as member states may seek to delay or resist implementation for a variety of reasons, ranging from a dislike of a particular piece of **legislation** to a lack of sufficient technical expertise to apply EU rules. Implementation centres on the following three broad areas: transposition of EU law into national law; the application of EU law by the relevant national authorities; and the enforcement of EU law, including penalties for non-compliance. The **European Commission** has general responsibility for all implementation issues but, given its limited resources, it relies heavily on other specialized agencies (e.g. the **European Medicines Agency**) or on complaints from the wider public to inform it of cases of non-implementation. In order both to embarrass non-compliant member states and accelerate implementation relating to the completion of the single market, the **Directorate-General** responsible for the single market initiated an internal market scoreboard to reveal the degree of implementation in each of the member states. This sort of **transparency** seems to work, but

continues to reveal the existence of numerous infringements. Many questions remain over the ability of the **candidate countries** to implement the full *acquis communautaire* on joining the EU. Derogations or transitional periods are likely to be granted. Overall, the Commission does very little in the way of direct implementation and is much more concerned with indirect implementation, i.e. ensuring that the member states carefully transpose EU laws into national laws. One of its few areas of direct implementation is competition policy.

The **INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRACY GROUP** (ID) is a former **political group**. It was established in July 2004 following the 2004 **European Parliament** (EP) elections. It incorporated European Union (EU) critics, **Eurosceptics** and Eurorealists. It emerged following the rebranding of the former **Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities** (EDD) within the EP. The new group was numerically considerably stronger than the EDD, and in the 2004–09 Parliament initially had 37 deputies (from nine member states) as opposed to 17 (from four) in the 1999–2004 Parliament. In 2006, however, the delegation from **Italy** (Lega Nord—Northern League—now **Lega**) left the group, reducing the number of deputies to 24. The largest political party within the group was the **UK Independence Party** (UKIP), with 10 members, while other representatives were drawn from the **Czech Republic** (one), **Denmark** (one), **France** (three), **Greece** (one), **Ireland** (one), the **Netherlands** (two), **Poland** (three) and **Sweden** (two). The group was co-chaired by Jens-Peter Bonde, a Danish **Member of the European Parliament** (MEP), and Nigel Farage, a British MEP, and was essentially a marriage of convenience between two factions that had combined to fight and prevent the **ratification** of the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. However, they had differing perspectives on the process of European integration. One, a more moderate wing, sought greater **transparency** in terms of EU **decision making** and certainly did not advocate leaving the EU, while the second sought nothing less than **withdrawal** from the EU. National groups, such as the June Movement in Denmark and the French Mouvement pour la France, represented elements of the former position, while UKIP was the best example of and the largest force in the latter group. Although at the 2009 elections UKIP secured 13 seats, ID fell short of winning enough support and sufficient MEPs to obtain group status within the existing EP.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY was not developed by the European Communities (EC) in any comprehensive or integrated form, although the **European Commission** launched a discussion paper dealing with a general EC industrial policy in November 1990. This new emphasis represented nothing less than a complete transformation in Commission thinking as it moved away markedly from espousing direct intervention in the economy to seeking to stimulate European industrial **competitiveness**. The change was later reflected in the

restructuring of the Commission in 2000 that saw the former **Directorate-General** (DG) III (Industry) being rebranded as DG Enterprise. Indeed, industrial policy was rebranded as **enterprise policy**. However, from 2014 the Directorate-General became known as the DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. The **Treaty on European Union** in 1993 provided industry with its own specific **article** in the **Treaty of Rome** (Article 157, now Article 173 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**). This requires the member states to secure the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of European Union (EU) industry. The EU is empowered to take special measures to stimulate the sector, but only provided these measures do not interfere with or distort competition. In 1995 the Commission presented an action programme that contained four major priority areas to strengthen industrial competitiveness. These were: solidifying the **single market**; encouraging **research and technological development**; promoting the **information society**; and promoting industrial co-operation. Collectively, however, EU enterprise policy, research and development policy, **regional policy**, **social policy**, **competition policy**, **workers' rights**, **energy policy**, **transport policy** and **environmental policy** can be said to constitute an industrial policy. The basic concern has been to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of any industry within a free-market ethos. Apart from policies aimed at specifically targeted industries such as coal and steel, further general objectives have been industrial development in the poorer regions of the EU, a restructuring of traditional, declining industries (including retraining for those workers needing to be redeployed), and the encouragement of transnational collaboration in new technology-orientated industries.

Innovation and entrepreneurship have emerged as central tenets of enterprise policy. The **European Commission** is the focal point for ensuring that innovation policy is coherent and cohesive across the EU, for benchmarking performance, for disseminating best practice, and for highlighting lessons to be learned from any failure of the market economy that might justify state intervention. In October 2010 as part of the **Europe 2020** strategy, the Commission adopted a communication on industrial policy. This document set out a strategy that aimed to encourage growth and the creation of jobs by maintaining and supporting a strong, diversified and competitive industrial base in Europe offering well-paid jobs while becoming more resource-efficient.

The EU's **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs), which number more than 20m., are already the backbone of EU industry (representing around 99% of all EU enterprises and accounting for some 67% of employment), and are the main focus of proactive enterprise policies based on applying the principle 'think small first'. To this end, specific programmes have been devised to ensure that SMEs participate in EU-funded research and innovation projects. The rules on state aid (see **subsidies**) and other forms of funding are more generous for SMEs than for large firms. Entrepreneurs and SMEs, in particular, can obtain help in finding partners through the Enterprise

Europe Network in more than 50 countries. This network, which was launched in 2008, is part-funded by the Commission.

Through its Entrepreneurship Action Plan, which was published in 2004, the Commission sought to promote an entrepreneurial mindset, encouraging more people to set up businesses, helping those businesses grow and become more competitive, improving the flow of finance and creating a more SME-friendly regulatory and administrative environment. Indeed, the EU granted some €90m. annually from 2001 to 2005 for SME-orientated projects in the EU and three **candidate countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey**. Money was provided, for example, to facilitate the participation of European SMEs in a knowledge-based, internationalized economy and to give business easier access to networks such as the Euro Info Centres (which are, however, now closed down) in more than 40 countries. In June 2008 the Small Business Act for Europe was adopted by the European Commission, which, for the first time, put in place a comprehensive SME policy framework for the EU and its member states. In addition, in November 2011 the Commission presented a new approach to ensure that the EU responded better to the requirements of small businesses. Henceforth, the Commission would attempt wherever possible to exempt micro-enterprises from EU **legislation** or introduce special regimes so as to minimize the regulatory onus on them.

Enterprise policy is co-ordinated closely with other policies, in particular the **single market**, research and innovation and information society policy. Conversely, when the EU is formulating policy on trade, education and training, or the environment, the business impacts are taken into account.

A new programme, COSME, for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, was implemented in 2014–20, with a budget of some €2,300m. COSME aimed to support SMEs by facilitating access to finance and to markets; providing support to entrepreneurs; and helping to ensure favourable conditions for the conception and growth of businesses.

In April 2016 the European Commission adopted a communication on ‘Digitising European Industry’ as part of the creation of a **Digital Single Market** as part of the **Digital Agenda for Europe**. The Start-up and Scale-up Initiative, proposed in November 2016, aimed to encourage the creation of industrial start-ups in the EU through simplified taxation measures, access to financing and amendments to legislation on insolvency, to facilitate restructuring. In September 2017 the Commission published proposals for a new industrial policy strategy, ‘Investing in a Smart, Innovative and Sustainable Industry’. A so-called Industry 2030 High Level Industrial Roundtable, comprising 20 experts, was established by the Commission in December 2017 in order to provide independent advice on EU industrial policy; in mid-2019 the grouping provided its final report, setting out recommendations in ‘A Vision for Industry until 2030’. In March 2020 the Commission proposed a new ‘industrial strategy for a globally competitive, green and Digital Europe’, as part of the newly conceived **European Green Deal**.

The **INFORMATION SOCIETY** was promoted from 1984 through a number of research and development programmes in the fields of information technology. Maintaining and improving international **competitiveness** is an important element of the information society programmes, one of the earliest of which was the European strategic programme for research and development in information technology (ESPRIT). At the end of the 1990s the latest technological developments (notably, the internet) required a fresh impetus, which culminated in the 1999 Commission communication on ‘eEurope—An information society for all’. An eEurope Action Plan was adopted at the 2000 Feira **summit meeting** of the **European Council**. The Commission’s eEurope 2002 Action Plan identified a series of targets, which included securing a cheaper, faster and more secure internet; greater investment in people and skills; and finding ways to stimulate the use of the internet. The eEurope 2005 Action Plan was launched at the 2002 Seville summit of the European Council in Spain. In 2006 the Commission published the i2010 eGovernment Action Plan as part of the EU’s i2010 strategy (launched in 2005), which aimed to stimulate the development of the digital economy in Europe. In order to foster an open and competitive **single market** for the information society and the media, the primary objective of i2010 was to establish a Single European Information Space. In March 2010 the European Commission launched the **Europe 2020** strategy, which established the **Digital Agenda for Europe** as one of seven principal initiatives. The Digital Agenda for Europe replaced the i2010 initiative, and sought to utilize and develop the economic and social potential of ICT resources. (See also **Digital Single Market**.)

The importance of the information society cannot be overestimated as it has had a significant effect on certain areas of EU public policy and, for example, has accelerated the liberalization of the **telecommunications** sector. The EU’s policy for the information society comprised the following four pillars: telecommunications policy; support to bring about technological development in information and communication technologies; creating the necessary conditions to ensure competitiveness exists; and promoting transport, telecommunications and energy networks. The **Connecting Europe Facility** (CEF) made available funds totalling some €1,000m. in 2014–20, for investment in areas including Digital Service Infrastructures and a number of broadband projects. For 2021–27 the CEF was allocated funding of some €1,832m. (in 2018 prices) for digital projects. In December 2020 the Commission proposed a new Digital Services Act (which aimed to make online users feel safe and to ensure accountability for internet service providers) and Digital Markets Act (for equitable, open digital markets).

INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURES relate specifically to the **implementation** of European Union (EU) laws. The **Treaty of Rome** charged the **European Commission** with the responsibility of ensuring that all laws and rules are applied. In its guise as guardian of the treaties, the Commission can

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initiate infringement proceedings under Article 226 (now Article 258 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**) against a member state for failure to do so. The Commission becomes aware of infringement by various means, as anyone residing in the EU or outside can lodge a complaint with the Commission against a member state on any issue that is deemed to be inconsistent with EU law. If the Commission decides to take the issue any further, the Commission in the first instance may wish to bring the infringement to an end after presenting a letter of formal notice to the member state government concerned. This reasoned opinion alerts that member state to the details of the infringement and asks the country to comply with EU law. If the state in question declines to end the infringement or ignores the letter, the Commission can then take the case to the **Court of Justice**. The **Treaty on European Union** gave the Courts the authority to levy fines against states infringing EU law. The Commission is also empowered under Regulation 1/2003 (an updated version of Regulation 17/62) to take action against a private company or a series of private companies for infringing the **competition policy** rules. This has led to the imposition of ever more substantial fines on the companies concerned. The majority of infringement cases were opened in areas relating to: the **single market**, **industrial policy**, entrepreneurship, **small and medium-sized enterprises**, and **environmental policy**. In October 2020 the Commission notably launched infringement procedures against former member state the **United Kingdom** (see **Withdrawal Agreement**). The Commission has also launched infringement procedures against current member states the **Czech Republic**, **Hungary** and **Poland**.

INLAND WATERWAYS form an essential part of the transport network of much of the European Union (EU), especially for raw materials and industrial products. It is estimated that more than 37,000 km of waterways connect hundreds of towns and cities across the EU. Some 20 member states have inland waterways and 12 have interconnected waterways. The attraction of inland waterways as a means of transport has been growing in recent years in terms of reducing congestion on roads and railways and has also been pursued on account of the lower environmental costs (lower air and noise pollution) associated with this means of travel. This form of transport is also considered attractive as a means of transporting dangerous substances since waterway travel is safer than other modes. In 1976 the member states agreed to recognize, on a reciprocal basis, each other's decisions on the navigability and control of inland waterways. The type and technical specifications of commercial craft permitted to use the waterways have been subject to EU **regulations** since 1982, and the **European Commission** has continued to work towards broader international co-operation throughout the whole of Europe. Inland Navigation Europe is an independent organization, which acts as a platform for national and regional waterway managers and promotion bureaux within the EU.

INNER CORE is an expression used to refer to a group of member states that may wish to pursue deeper integration at a much quicker pace than would find agreement among all member states, where **unanimity** is required. The concept is an old one and can be traced back to discussions on differentiated integration that have surfaced since the founding of the European Communities. (See also **enhanced co-operation; flexibility; variable geometry**.)

INSTITUTIONS in the context of the European Union (EU) are the central decision-making bodies of the organization. They possess a special status in EU treaties and practice. The **Treaty of Lisbon** identified seven main EU institutions. These are the **Council of the European Union**, the **European Central Bank**, the **European Council**, the **European Commission**, the **European Parliament**, the **European Court of Justice** and the **European Court of Auditors**.

The **INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE** (IcSP) replaced the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in March 2014. The IfS had, in turn, replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in 2007. After the launch of the IfS, the **European Commission** considerably intensified its work in the area of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding, and the instrument financed a large number of crisis response projects worldwide. An innovative part of it was the Peace-building Partnership, which was created to deepen the dialogue between civil society and the institutions of the **European Union** (EU). The IfS also enabled the EU to help build long-term international, regional and national capacity to address pervasive transregional and global threats.

The **INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE** (IPA) was launched at the beginning of 2007 (to run until the end of 2013) and replaced earlier pre-accession financial support programmes such as **PHARE**, **SAPARD**, **ISPA** (the **Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession**) and **CARDS**. It was aimed at providing pre-accession assistance in five areas—transition assistance and institution building, cross-border co-operation, regional development, human resource development and rural development—and was available to countries of the **Western Balkans**, **Turkey** and **Iceland**. It was succeeded by IPA II; IPA III runs in 2021–27.

The **INSTRUMENT FOR STRUCTURAL POLICIES FOR PRE-ACCESSION** (ISPA) was a European Communities initiative to strengthen the infrastructure of the **candidate countries** of **Central and Eastern Europe** in order to prepare them for membership of the European Union (EU). The ISPA operated in the area of transport and the environment. It was agreed by the Council of the European Union in June 1999 and stemmed

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directly from the **European Commission's** Agenda 2000 communication. The programme was scheduled to run from 2000 to 2006 and had an annual budget of €1,040m. for its duration. Financial assistance was granted to environmental projects that enabled the recipients to meet existing EU environmental standards and to initiatives in the transport sector that fostered **Trans-European Networks**. Between 2000 and the end of 2006 the Commission allocated some €1,040m. each year to ISPA projects. On accession to the EU a country automatically lost its entitlement to support under the ISPA. From 1 January 2007 the **instrument for pre-accession assistance** replaced the ISPA.

INSURANCE was identified by the **European Commission** in its 1985 **White Paper** on the **internal market** as one of the professional services that should be open to **freedom of movement** throughout the European Communities. While considerable liberalization has occurred, several national obstacles still hinder the emergence of a common insurance market and relatively little cross-border insurance business is carried out outside the field of large commercial risks.

INTEGRATION CAPACITY is, alongside the **accession criteria**, one of the criteria governing the **enlargement** of the European Union (EU). It relates to the institutional, financial and political ability of the EU to take in new members. Although as a term it only gained prominence following the EU's 2004 enlargement, questions about the EU's capacity to enlarge have always been present on the EU's agenda as part of the so-called '**widening** versus **deepening**' debate.

INTEGRATION THEORY refers to explanations, primarily produced by social scientists, to explain the logic and factors behind the European integration process. There now exists a huge and ever-expanding literature on European integration, but there is no single meta-theory that explains the entire process. These theories are intended to provide a better understanding of how the European Union (EU) works and how it has evolved. The distinction between the different integration theories often rest on specific assumptions. Over the years, some theories have come to dominate more than others. **Neofunctionalism** is considered one of the main theories of European integration, as developed by the political scientist Ernst Haas. **Intergovernmentalism** is another dominant approach that assumes the primacy of member states of the EU in **decision making** and, therefore, integration. **Liberal intergovernmentalism**, proposed by Andrew Moravcsik, develops intergovernmentalism by highlighting the incorporation of the liberal model of preference formation wherein national governments will bargain through institutions to promote their preferences. New Institutionalism, developed

outside the field of EU integration and EU studies more generally, has nevertheless been applied significantly to advance understanding of European integration. Through its three key strands, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism, new institutionalism contends that institutions understood as a system of rules, norms and preferences are important for understanding the function and processes of the EU.

While the majority of these theories focus on the institutions of the EU and the member states, the assumptions of these approaches are being challenged by a number of mid-range theories or approaches to EU integration and public policy studies that come under the headings of, for example, policy network analysis, multi-level governance and constructivism. Additionally, scholars such as Catherine Hoskyns and Annica Kronsell have introduced feminist theoretical approaches to broaden the relevance of the dominant theories and introduce new dimensions to the assumptions made about integration in Europe.

INTELLIGENT ENERGY EUROPE (IEE) was a support programme for non-technological actions in the field of energy (i.e. energy efficiency and renewable energy sources). It was intended to support the European Union's policies on energy as well as sustainable development. IEE had funding of some €730m. to cover the period 2007–13. From 2014 **Horizon 2020** funded the activities supported by IEE.

INTERACTIVE TERMINOLOGY FOR EUROPE (IATE) is the inter-institutional terminology database of the European Union (EU). The project was launched in 1999 and became operational throughout the EU in 2004. IATE incorporates all of the existing terminology databases of the EU's translation services into one inter-institutional database, and contains approximately 8.7m. multilingual entries in the 24 official languages.

INTEREST GROUPS seek to influence the European Union (EU) public policy process by forging close relations with the principal institutional actors, primarily the **European Commission** and, increasingly, the **European Parliament (EP)** since the **Treaty on European Union** and the arrival of the **co-decision procedure**; and also, to a lesser extent, the **Court of Justice**. The **Council of the European Union** cannot be lobbied directly and thus interest groups focus their attention on their national capitals. However, interest groups form a vital part of policy development, although their significance varies from group to group and from policy area to policy area. Some, such as the **European Round Table of Industrialists**, are clearly influential and have easy access to the institutions. Interest groups were a feature of European Communities (EC) business activity from the very outset. Given the EC's original economic activities, the first groups to establish themselves in **Brussels, Belgium**, were representatives from the business

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community (**BUSINESSEUROPE**, formerly the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe) and the agricultural community (**Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations**). By the end of the 1970s trade unions and other new movements such as environmentalists had established a presence. Their influence was initially limited until the **Single European Act** and later treaties transformed **decision making** by enhancing the power of the EP and sought to establish a genuine **internal market** requiring EC-wide rules. By the late 1980s there was a noticeable expansion in the formation of interest groups. The emphasis on regions (see **Committee of the Regions; Europe of the Regions**) from the late 1980s added another dimension and led to the establishment of many offices representing sub-national authorities. The Commission established a database, CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society), of around 1,000 organizations working at EU level, covering approximately 100 branches of activity. (See also **lobbying**.)

An **INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE** (IGC) is the set of negotiations between the governments of the member states launched with a view to amending the **founding treaties**. The IGC provides a forum through which the European Communities (EC), or more specifically the **European Council**, has chosen to explore in detail new organizational and other infra-structural initiatives. They have become key events in the integration project and are used to seek agreement on **resolutions** approved in principle by the Council, and to plan their details. There have been seven major IGCs in the history of the European Union (EU) and five of these have occurred since the **Single European Act** was negotiated in the mid-1980s. The most important were the two conferences that began in 1990 to discuss **economic and monetary union** and **political union**, which formed the basis of the **Treaty on European Union**. Two further conferences on the future political integration of the EU were held in 1996 and 2000, and the measures suggested at these IGCs were formalized respectively in 1997 in the **Treaty of Amsterdam** and in 2000 in the **Treaty of Nice**. Following the December 2001 Laeken **summit meeting**, a new means for discussing and debating the future structure and powers of the EU—the **European Convention**—was launched. This allowed the views of a much wider range of interested parties to be brought together in preparation for the IGC that began its work in October 2003. This produced the (unratified) **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. A notable IGC was launched in July 2007 and produced the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The IGC is characterized by, among other things, the exceptionally detailed mandate for its work agreed by the European Council.

INTERGOVERNMENTALISM relates primarily to one approach of academic discourse on European **integration theory**. It assumes the supremacy of national governments in the integration process and in treaty design, and

downplays the role of the supranational institutions, the **European Commission**, the **European Parliament** and the **Court of Justice**, and other actors (e.g. the business community).

INTERIM AGREEMENTS are often concluded by the European Union (EU) to implement the trade provisions of international agreements that contain a mixture of EU and member state competences, such as **partnership and co-operation agreements** and **Europe agreements**, pending the **ratification** of such agreements.

INTER-INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS are agreements made between the **Council of the European Union**, the **European Commission** and the **European Parliament** (EP) in order to run the European Union more efficiently. They involve a range of legal, organizational and budgetary arrangements. The most widely known are the Inter-institutional Agreements on the **budget** in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2006, which determined levels of **expenditure** on multi-annual spending programmes. In March 2016 a new Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, reached between the three legislative institutions, was adopted by the EP, providing for the EP and the Council to be, hitherto, consulted on the withdrawal of legislative proposals.

INTERNAL MARKET: See **Single Market**

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE MOVEMENTS FOR EUROPEAN UNITY was the name of an umbrella organization founded in December 1947 to co-ordinate and act as a link between the several bodies and the 1948 **Congress of Europe**.

The **INTERNATIONAL RUHR AUTHORITY** (IRA) was an agency established in April 1949 to supervise coal and steel production in the Ruhr region of **Germany**. It was intended to ensure that the Ruhr's resources in the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG—West Germany) would not be used for aggressive purposes. As an alternative to keeping the FRG under military control, **France** had seen the IRA as a means of maintaining influence over German policy. The IRA was abandoned in 1950 as being unworkable. Its failure was one factor that made France look favourably upon the **Schuman Plan** as an alternative means of influencing German coal and steel production.

INTERREG is the name of a **structural and cohesion funds** initiative, which was launched in 1989 with the aim of assisting border areas of the

INTERVENTION PRICE

European Union (EU) to overcome problems of development caused by their relative isolation either within a national economy or within the EU as a whole. It is financed solely through the **European Regional Development Fund**. Interreg II was introduced in 1994 to encourage transnational spatial planning. Interreg III covered the period 2000–06; it was designed to strengthen economic and social cohesion throughout the EU. It aimed to do this through the promotion of balanced development of the Continent through cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation. It placed particular emphasis on integrating remote regions and those that share external borders with **candidate countries** of **Central and Eastern Europe**. In 2007–13 some €7,800m. was allocated to the Interreg programme, distilled into three main areas of activity: cross-border co-operation, transnational co-operation (with 13 specific geographical programmes) and interregional co-operation (with no specific geographical boundaries for participation). The predominant theme of this phase was to strengthen and deepen cross-border co-operation, especially with regard to encouraging entrepreneurship and the development of **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs), supporting links between rural and urban areas, promoting collaboration in health, culture and education, and sharing infrastructures (for example, in terms of waste management, energy systems and tourism). From 2014 Interreg became known as Interreg Europe, with a budget of €10,100m.; the budget for 2021–27 is some €8,000m.

INTERVENTION PRICE was the lynchpin of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP), as a price support mechanism ensuring that if a product could not be sold at an agreed price then it would go into ‘intervention’ and be purchased and stored by the European Union. Intervention prices are effectively fixed prices for farm commodities and the minimum prices guaranteed to producers for their commodities. Should market prices fall below this level, an Intervention Agency purchased produce at the guaranteed price. Intervention prices declined in importance, following significant reforms.

The **INVESTEU** Fund was conceived in 2020 in response to the **COVID-19** crisis as an investment support programme to stimulate the ailing European economy, replacing other financial instruments. With an initial allocation of €2,800m. for 2021–27 (in 2018 prices), plus funding under **Next Generation EU** of €5,600m., it was intended to provide long-term funding and to support European Union (EU) policy objectives in the recovery from the new economic and social crisis by mobilizing both public and private investment.

INVEST EUROPE was established as the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) in 1983. The EVCA was intended to promote the discussion and study of the management and investment of

venture capital. Supported by the **European Commission**, EVCA had as its broader aim to develop a European capital market. Projects developed under EVCA received a maximum of 30% funding from the European Union (EU), and were required, ideally, to complement other EU policies and programmes. Invest Europe now represents the largest association of private capital providers worldwide. (See also **European Business and Innovation Centre Network**.)

INVESTITURE is a term that refers to the process of conferring authority on the **European Commission** to act as a governmental body for the European Union. Because both the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** must now approve the membership of the Commission, the term ‘double investiture’ is used. (See **nomination procedure**.)

The **INVESTMENT SECURITIES DIRECTIVE** of 1989, introduced in 1993, is a **directive** designed to permit a company authorized in one **member state** to offer its services throughout the European Union without the need to acquire further authorization. It also set standards for solvency and the protection of investors.

INWARD INVESTMENT refers to the establishment of operations within the European Union (EU) by non-EU companies. The potential of the large EU market, the **common external tariff** and, more recently, the **single market** and the **European Economic Area** have encouraged multinational companies to invest within the EU. On the whole, inward investment has been welcomed despite concerns that it might encourage over-capacity or weaken indigenous industries. To ensure that plants owned by external investors do not simply assemble components produced outside the EU, the EU has ruled that 60% of the manufactured product of such operations, measured by ex-factory prices, must be locally made.

The **IOANNINA COMPROMISE** takes its name from an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Ioannina, **Greece**, in March 1994, where political agreement was reached on the operation of **qualified majority voting** (QMV) rules to be applied within the **Council of the European Union** after the 1995 **enlargement** of the European Union (EU). With enlargement, the number of votes under QMV required to block a proposal—the ‘blocking minority’—was set to increase from 23 to 26. The **United Kingdom** and **Spain** objected strongly and argued that the blocking minority should remain at 23. The agreed compromise stated that if members of the Council representing a total of between 23 and 25 votes indicated their desire to oppose the adoption of a decision by a qualified majority, the Council would do all in its power to reach a satisfactory conclusion that could be adopted by at least 65

votes. The compromise was essentially a device for the British Government to preserve its dignity, and the compromise in effect had little practical impact on EU **decision making**. A declaration annexed to the **Treaty of Amsterdam** extended the compromise until enlargement in 2004. With the new QMV rules agreed in the **Treaty of Nice**, it was anticipated that the Ioannina Compromise would be consigned to history. However, a new variant was adopted with the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. It owed its existence to the insistence of **Poland** during the 2007 **intergovernmental conference** that it be compensated for the replacement of the—for Poland, very favourable—QMV provisions that had been introduced by the Treaty of Nice with the Treaty of Lisbon's less favourable **double majority** voting system. A new version of the Ioannina Compromise came into effect from November 2014, incorporating changes to the blocking minority threshold for EU member states wishing to demand the re-examination of EU **decisions** that they did not approve of; however, the previous weighting rules could continue to be applied on request until March 2017.

IPA: See Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

The second **IRAQ WAR**, which commenced in March 2003, clearly revealed the sensitivities and difficulties within the European Union (EU) regarding efforts to create a **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. EU member states were deeply divided on the US invasion of Iraq and (leaving aside the four neutral countries—**Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden**) can be grouped into two camps. The first group supported the US attempt to remove President Saddam Hussain from power and included, among others, **Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom** and a number of the newest member states in **Central and Eastern Europe**. In contrast, the Governments of both **France and Germany** resolutely criticized the US move and led Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of State for Defense, to talk of 'new' and 'old' Europe. Although the Hussain regime was swiftly defeated, all subsequent efforts to restore civil order and bring democracy to Iraq proved much harder to achieve. Sovereignty was transferred to an interim Government in June 2004, and six months later Iraqis voted in their country's first multi-party elections in 50 years. Saddam Hussain was put on trial in 2005 for crimes against humanity. He was found guilty and was executed in December 2006. The security situation did not improve. On the ground, the US-led coalition forces faced armed rebellions and guerrilla-style attacks. They lost over 4,000 personnel in the process. Insurgents targeted civilians, Iraqi security forces and international agencies and suicide attacks became a regular reality and led to many thousands of civilian fatalities, and the dangers of the country spilling into full-scale civil war were not diminished. At the end of 2007 the UK handed over security of Basra province to Iraqi forces and effectively marked the end of nearly five years of British control of southern Iraq. During 2008–

09 the violence abated as the security situation improved and there was notable progress in the ‘Iraqization’ of the governance of the country. The remaining US-led coalition forces ceased combat operations in 2010 and the final 50,000 US troops, who had stayed on in Iraq in an advisory capacity, had all withdrawn by the end of 2011. In May 2012 the EU and Iraq signed a **Partnership and Co-operation Agreement**. In August 2014 the European Council expressed dismay at the worsening security situation in Iraq and the **Syrian Arab Republic**, and the concomitant rise of the extremist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (subsequently renamed **Islamic State**).

IRELAND did not become involved in most immediate post-war European developments (**European Coal and Steel Community, European Defence Community, European Economic Community** and **Euratom**), in part because of its neutral status, which itself in some ways reflected a very nationalistic and inward-looking focus in the late 1940s and 1950s. It also did not participate in the development of multilateral trading agreements, and became associated with the **European Free Trade Association** only in December 1965 through signing a free trade area agreement with the **United Kingdom**. Its application to join the European Communities (EC) was closely related with that of the UK, because of the strong economic links between the two countries. Its application was submitted several days before the original British application, but French President Charles De Gaulle’s opposition to the latter ensured that the other membership applications, from **Ireland, Denmark** and **Norway**, ultimately failed. All four states were subsequently accepted to join the EC in January 1973 but Norway opted not to do so following the narrow rejection of membership in a **referendum**. Ireland has generally been a supporter of more economic and political integration, and the Irish electorate endorsed the **Single European Act**, the **Treaty on European Union** and the **Treaty of Amsterdam** in referenda. At least prior to 2004, Ireland was the greatest single net beneficiary of the **common agricultural policy** and the **structural funds**, which significantly helped to boost the Irish economy. The economic success of Ireland ensured that the country easily met the economic criteria to join **economic and monetary union**, and also meant that Ireland lost objective 1 status in relation to structural funds after 2006 (see **European Regional Development Fund**).

Interestingly, in the 1990s Ireland had one of the worst records among the member states on the implementation of EC **directives**. However, **Eurobarometer** frequently revealed Ireland to be one of the most pro-European Union (EU) member states, despite the much-publicized rejection of the **Treaty of Nice** in a referendum in June 2001. However, in a second referendum on the Nice Treaty, held in October 2002, the majority (some 62.9%) of those who participated supported the treaty, and thus paved the way for the **enlargement** of the EU. Nevertheless, the turnout for the referendum was still regarded as problematic, since only 48.5% of the electorate opted to vote.

Ireland was the only EU member state to hold a referendum on the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The outcome of the vote on 12 June 2008 was a victory for the treaty's opponents: 53.4% voted 'no' and 46.6% 'yes'. Given the relatively high turnout (53%), an early post-vote assumption was that there could be no second referendum as there had been with the Treaty of Nice. However, the Government greeted the result with disappointment. The Irish vote initially threatened to force the formal abandonment of the Treaty of Lisbon, which, in turn, could potentially have marginalized Ireland politically within the EU. After much deliberation on why the result had been a 'no', the former Irish Government under Brian Cowen finally agreed to hold a second referendum in the latter part of 2009, once it had secured some 'guarantees' from the **European Council**—most notably on retaining an Irish Commissioner and safeguarding neutrality—and thereby addressing 'no' voters' concerns. The onset of economic recession seemed to have refocused peoples' minds, and opinion polls from early 2009 displayed a turnaround in views and indicated a 'yes' vote. Despite growing public dissatisfaction with the Irish Government and its junior coalition partner, the Green Party, which led to heavy defeats for both parties at the local and **European Parliament** elections in June 2009, two-thirds of voters (67.1%) endorsed the Treaty of Lisbon in a second referendum which was held in October 2009. The electorate ultimately held the Cowen Government responsible for the economic difficulties that befell Ireland after 2008, and it was voted out of office on 25 February 2011 as Fianna Fáil experienced its worst election results since the founding of the Irish state. A coalition Government, comprising Fine Gael and the Labour Party, was appointed under the premiership of the leader of Fine Gael, Enda Kenny. On assuming power, Kenny stated that one of his top priorities was to renegotiate the terms of the €85,000m. bailout that had been agreed between the Irish Government and the **European Central Bank** and the International Monetary Fund in November 2010. This aspiration proved rather optimistic and **Angela Merkel** and Herman Van Rompuy expressed certain reservations about any such move. Kenny participated in discussions with his peers over the terms of the **Fiscal Compact** in the latter half of 2011 and signed the agreement in March 2012. It was decided to schedule a referendum on this treaty and on the Government's approach towards resolving the ongoing financial crisis. At the end of May 60.3% of those who participated in the referendum (around 50% of the electorate) voted in favour of the Government ratifying the Fiscal Compact. Ireland was the sole EU member state to hold a referendum on the treaty. The ratification process was completed by Ireland in December. After the UK's vote in favour of **Brexit** in June 2016 the Irish border issue (see **Backstop**) became prominent in exit negotiations. There were concerns that the Irish economy would suffer should the UK leave the EU without a functional **withdrawal agreement** or without reaching an agreement with the EU on its future trading relationship following the transition period that followed the UK's official withdrawal from the EU in January 2020 (the so-called no deal scenario). Although the UK eventually reached an

agreement on trade and co-operation with the EU, during 2021 there were increasing tensions over the implementation of the Ireland/**Northern Ireland Protocol** governing trade relations between EU member states, notably Ireland, and the UK, including Northern Ireland. The Irish Prime Minister since June 2020 is Micheál Martin.

IRISH REPUBLIC: See **Ireland**

ISDN stands for Integrated Services Digital Network. In 1989 the European Communities launched an initiative to raise the international **competitiveness** of the EC **telecommunications** industries through the provision of a range of compatible and harmonized services.

ISLAMIC STATE, an extremist Islamist militant organization, was formerly known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In August 2014 the European Council expressed dismay at the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the **Syrian Arab Republic**, caused by the declaration, in June, of an Islamic caliphate over parts of the two countries' territories by Islamic State, amid widespread human rights violations carried out against Christians and other minorities. The **European Council** noted that the ongoing civil conflict in Syria had facilitated the emergence of Islamic State, which it recognized as a threat to security in Europe, and announced its intention to co-operate with the **USA** and other countries in order to counter the threat posed by it and other organizations deemed to pose a terrorist threat. In December the new **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Federica Mogherini, attended the first meeting of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State, which was held in **Brussels, Belgium**. The Global Coalition reported that between September 2014 and April 2018 Islamic State lost 107,575 sq km of territory.

During 2015–17 several terrorist attacks took place in European Union (EU) member states, which caused fatalities and were attributed to supporters of Islamic State. In March 2016 suicide bombers claiming allegiance to Islamic State killed 35 people in attacks at Brussels international airport, and on an underground train in the city centre, in an apparently symbolic assault on Brussels as the heart of the EU. A new **European Counter Terrorism Centre** had been established in January, as part of **Europol**. In May a special envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief was appointed, in an advisory role, to the **European Commission**, with an initial mandate of one year. The establishment of the role followed the adoption, in February, of a **European Parliament** resolution condemning the mass murder of religious minorities in Iraq and Syria by Islamic State, and sought to help to protect religious freedom in the context of the EU's programmes with countries outside the Union.

ISLAMOPHOBIA

ISLAMOPHOBIA is a specific form of anti-Muslim racism directed at people who are or are perceived to be Muslim, and is an ongoing challenge to the European project. Islamophobia is often characterised by direct physical and social attacks on individuals and communities. The rise in Islamophobia in recent times can be linked to incidents of jihadist terrorist violence in Europe; the rise of extreme right-wing politics; and the **European migration crisis**. Since 2015 a European Islamophobia Report (EIR) has been produced to document and analyse ‘trends in the spread of Islamophobia’ in Europe. Its main finding has been that incidents of Islamophobia have been linked to rhetoric fuelled by mass media, and have been demonstrated to undermine human rights and democracy.

The **ISOGLUCOSE CASE** relates to a 1980 ruling by the **Court of Justice**. This case represented one of the Court’s landmark decisions in the development of the European Union. The case centred on a complaint brought to the Court by the **European Parliament** (EP) with specific reference to the **consultation procedure**. Although this procedure recognized the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) as the sole decision maker, the **founding treaties** implied that the Council could only make legislative **decisions** once it had received the EP’s opinion. In this particular instance, the Council had proceeded without waiting for the EP’s response, which in this case went against the Council’s decision. In *Isoglucose*, the Court upheld the EP’s right to be consulted, and this marginally strengthened the EP’s political position within the European Communities. Although following the case the EP still had few powers, this ruling enabled the EP to delay the Council in its decision making.

ISPA: See **Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession**

The **ISTANBUL CONVENTION**, also known as the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, is a human rights treaty of the **Council of Europe** that came into force in 2014. It is considered to be the first legally binding international instrument on preventing and combating violence against women and girls. By late 2021 all EU member states had signed the Convention, and 21 had ratified it. However, **Poland** has expressed its intention to withdraw from the international treaty.

ISTC is the acronym for the International Science and Technology Centre, which was established in the Russian capital in 1994 in order to encourage scientists and engineers previously involved with weapons and warfare research in the former **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) to co-operate

and to collaborate for peaceful purposes with their counterparts in the **USA**, **Japan** and the European Union.

VILLE ITÄLÄ (1959–), a former Finnish Minister of the Interior, is the current Director-General of the **European Anti-Fraud Office** (OLAF). Itälä has a Master's in Law from Turku University, Finland, and a Master's in Law with court training from the Vehmaa District Court in Finland. Prior to joining OLAF in 2018, Itälä was a member of the **European Court of Auditors** and the **European Parliament**.

ITALY was one of the founder members of the European Communities (EC) and has generally been a supporter of the principle of economic and political integration. Since 1957 it has favoured **supranationalism**, arguing for reforms that would strengthen the **European Commission** and the **European Parliament**. In 1986 it initially refused to sign the **Single European Act** as a protest against the inadequate nature of its proposed reforms. While the richer, more industrialized northern regions of the country benefited substantially from EC membership, the poorer south has remained relatively impoverished, despite the infusion of substantial EC funding. Nevertheless, Italy was the subject of the greatest number of complaints against a member state (some one-third of the total) brought before the **Court of Justice**. The principal reason was the cumbersome nature of the Italian parliament, which made approval of any legislation a lengthy process, and most charges related to Italy's failure to apply **directives** within specified deadlines. Popular antipathy in Italy to the old political elites and parties, which were the subject of numerous national corruption charges after 1990, led to a new style of government that was more critical of the EC, the European Union (EU) and their objectives. In addition, speculative pressure in 1992 forced Italy to leave the **exchange rate mechanism** (ERM). The country re-entered the ERM in November 1996, and Italy was one of 11 member states to embrace **economic and monetary union** in January 1999.

The return of Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister in 2001 added controversy to the EU-Italian relationship, as Berlusconi's unconventional style of leadership raised tensions with other heads of government. Italy became the first of the founding states of the EU to ratify the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** by parliamentary vote in April 2005. Berlusconi's premiership came to an end in May 2006 after his narrow defeat by Romano Prodi, in national elections. Prodi's tenure as Prime Minister, however, in the tradition of Italian post-war politics, was short-lived. He lost a vote of confidence in the Senate in January 2008 and immediately tendered his resignation as Prime Minister. Early elections were held, and a new right-of-centre Government under Berlusconi was formed in April 2008. The Berlusconi Government's popularity with the electorate continued and in the 2009 EP elections it outscored the centre-left, capturing 42% of the vote. It repeated its

success in the regional elections of April 2010, but experienced a decline in support in a series of regional and local elections in 2011. Following the loss of his party's parliamentary majority and the continuing decline in the country's financial situation, Berlusconi stood down as Prime Minister in November. He was replaced by Mario Monti, a renowned economist and former EU commissioner, who appointed a cabinet of technocrats tasked with tackling the economic crisis. At the parliamentary elections held in February 2013 Monti's party fell short of securing even 10% of the vote. After two months of impasse, Enrico Letta, the deputy leader of the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), was appointed Prime Minister, at the head of a new 'grand coalition' Government in April. Within 10 months Letta's position had become increasingly difficult and an internal challenge to his leadership by Matteo Renzi culminated in Letta's resignation and the creation of a new Government under Renzi in February 2014. Following a failed constitutional reform referendum campaign, Matteo Renzi left office in December 2016, ushering in the premiership of **Paolo Gentiloni**, a member of the Democratic Party. In June 2018 he was replaced, in turn, by Giuseppe Conte, at the head of the coalition administration including the populist **Movimento 5 Stelle** (M5S—Five Star Movement) and **Lega**.

In September 2019 a new Government was sworn in comprising the M5S, the Partito Democratico (PD—Democratic Party) and independents, following the collapse of the previous coalition. Conte, an independent, had tendered the Government's resignation in late August, blaming the political crisis on Lega leader and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, who had announced the end of the coalition earlier that month and demanded a general election, in a move widely interpreted as an attempt to capitalize on Lega's growing popularity in opinion polls. Instead, the M5S and the PD agreed to form a new Government under Conte, with former Deputy Prime Minister and M5S leader **Luigi Di Maio** as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. Following Conte's resignation in February 2021, a new Government was formed under **Mario Draghi**.

ITER stands for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (although this full title is no longer used), an international co-operation project comprising the member states of the **European Atomic Energy Community** (EAEC or Euratom), plus **Japan**, the **USA**, India, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and the **Russian Federation**. Completion of the nuclear fusion reactor, which is being built in Cadarache, **France**, is scheduled for 2025. The financial perspective for 2021–27 envisaged available funds for ITER of €5,000m., in 2018 prices. (See also **European Consortium for the Development of Fusion Energy**.)

ITS: See the **Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group**

JAPAN has been regarded by the European Union (EU) as a major economic competitor, and perhaps also as an example to the EU, especially in terms of new technological industries. Much of EU **research and technological development policy** has been determined by the perceived need to compensate for the advantage that Japan is believed to hold. More generally, in the past trade relations between the EU and Japan were fraught. The main reason was the large trade deficit that the EU incurred with Japan in the 1990s, although the deficit narrowed considerably owing to a significant decline in Japan's share of total EU imports. By 2010 Japan accounted for 3.2% of the exports of the **Twenty-Seven** (EU27)—compared with 9.3% in 2000—and 4.3% of EU27 imports, and was the EU27's sixth most important trading partner. Japanese exports were concentrated in a few important consumer fields, such as cars, electronics and computers. Japan has traditionally been slow to ease the entry of imports to its domestic market by relaxing or removing a range of non-tariff barriers. However, the **European Commission** regulated the entry of several Japanese products and passed several anti-**dumping** measures. In addition, member states imposed a number of restrictions on Japanese imports: the best known, perhaps, were the so-called voluntary agreements limiting the volume of imports of Japanese cars. Nevertheless, many Japanese companies invested in the EU. In addition to the long-established bilateral negotiations and contacts on economic issues, a political dialogue between the EU and Japan also existed, dating back to a 1991 declaration, and was gradually developed through the holding of an annual summit meeting. In 2001 a joint EU-Japan action plan entitled 'Shaping our Common Future' was adopted. In March 2013 Japan and the EU agreed to commence negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a Strategic Partnership Agreement; the first round of talks was held in Brussels in April. In July 2017 the two sides reached agreement, in principle, on the terms of the two agreements, in what the Commission described as the most significant bilateral trade agreement agreed by the EU. The EPA entered into force from 1 February 2019, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement provisionally entered into force on the same day. In September Japan signed an infrastructure agreement with the EU, as part of the EU's plans to increase connectivity (in the context of digital, energy and transport networks) between EU member states and Asia.

JEREMIE (JOINT EUROPEAN RESOURCES FOR MICRO TO MEDIUM ENTERPRISES) was established in 2007 as an initiative from the **European Commission**, the **European Investment Bank** and the **European Investment Fund** to enable European Union member states and regions to use part of their **structural and cohesion funds** to obtain a set of financial instruments specifically designed to support micro and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The initiative sought to contribute to growth and employment in line with the revised **Lisbon Agenda**.

JHA: See **Justice and Home Affairs**

JICS: See **Joint Interpreting and Conference Service**

YLVA JOHANSSON (1964–) serves as the European Commissioner with responsibility for Home Affairs in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** since December 2019. The role puts her in charge of the internal security of the EU, as well as matters of migration and asylum. Johansson has served in various capacities as a government minister in **Sweden**, most recently as Minister for Employment.

BORIS JOHNSON (1964–) became the Prime Minister of the **United Kingdom** and leader of the Conservative Party in July 2019. Born Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, in New York, USA, to British parents, he was educated at the elite institutions of Eton College and Oxford University in the UK. In addition to being the Member of Parliament for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (2015–) he is a former Mayor of London (2008–16) and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2016–18). Prior to this, Johnson represented the constituency of Henley in 2001–08. Boris Johnson began his career as a journalist and was the editor of the right-leaning *Spectator* magazine in 1999–2005. Johnson was one of the leading figures in the **Brexit** campaign and has remained an ardent **Brexiteer**. He, with others, resigned from the Government in July 2018 in protest against the Government's policy on Brexit. Representing part of a new wave of populist world leaders, prior to his appointment as Prime Minister Johnson had been accused of using racist, sexist and homophobic language. A libertarian, in negotiating Brexit with the EU, both before the UK's official exit and during the subsequent transition period, Johnson became notorious for brinkmanship, attracting both praise and opprobrium.

JOINT ACTIONS are among the measures that can be adopted by the **Council of the European Union** under the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP). They commit the member states and are normally

adopted unanimously. However, joint actions may in certain circumstances be adopted by a **qualified majority vote**. In all cases, the objectives of a joint action, its scope, the means to be made available to the European Union, and the conditions governing implementation, must be laid down.

JOINT EUROPEAN TORUS (JET) was one of the principal operations of the nuclear policy of the European Communities. Established in 1978, based at Culham in the **United Kingdom**, and built and funded by the **European Commission**, JET was the central institute for all Western European research into nuclear fusion. Some non-member states also participated in the project (**Japan**, the **USA** and countries of the former **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**). JET was one of only four such centres in the world, and its objective was to develop nuclear fusion as a safer, cleaner, more efficient and economic source of energy than a nuclear fission reactor. It maintained links with similar institutes in other parts of the world. In 2000 the European Fusion Development Agreement took over JET's operations. In October 2014 the Commission officially launched the **European Consortium for the Development of Fusion Energy (EUROfusion)**, superseding the European Fusion Development Agreement and incorporating 29 bilateral association agreements between the Commission and research institutions. (See also **ITER**.)

JOINT INTERPRETING AND CONFERENCE SERVICE (JICS), or Service Commun Interprétation–Conférences (SCIC), is a language service established by the European Union (EU) as an agency of the **European Commission** in 1985. In addition to providing appropriate support to EU institutions, one of its objectives is to assist in the training of conference interpreters. The JICS has now been restyled as the **Directorate-General** for Interpretation.

The **JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE (JRC)** is an organization established under the **European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)**. Directed by the **European Commission**, but relying for much of its funding on individual contracts, it is, in fact, a collection of seven institutes based in Geel (**Belgium**), Karlsruhe (**Germany**), Ispra (**Italy**), Petten (**Netherlands**) and Seville (**Spain**). The Directorate-General of the JRC is located in **Brussels**, Belgium. While nuclear research and development remain major concerns of the institutes, their research efforts have diversified to incorporate safety standards and measurements, systems engineering, safety technology, information technology, electronics, environmental protection, food and drug analysis, and space applications.

VĚRA JOUROVÁ (1964–) is Vice-President and Commissioner responsible for Values and Transparency in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula**

von der Leyen from December 2019. Representing the **Czech Republic** (Czechia), in 2014–19 she was the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality in the Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker. Jourová took a Master's degree in Theory and Culture at Charles University in Prague before working in regional administration. She developed an expertise in European Union (EU) regional policy as Head of the Regional Department of Development of Vysočina region in 2001–03, before becoming deputy minister for regional development (2003–06) and working as an independent consultant specializing in EU accession in the Western Balkans from 2006–13. Prior to her appointment to the Commission Jourová was elected to the Czech legislature in October 2013 and became the Minister for Regional Development in January 2014.

JRC: See **Joint Research Centre**

JUDGES: See **General Court; Court of Justice**

JUDICIAL PANELS may be established by the **Council of the European Union** to exercise judicial competence in specific areas. The **Treaty of Nice** introduced provisions for the panels in an attempt to speed up legal proceedings. Explicit reference was made to establishing a judicial panel for cases brought by European Union personnel.

JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS (JHA) was the title given to the then intergovernmental third **pillar** of the European Union (EU) when it was established by the **Treaty on European Union** in 1993. The origins of the pillar can be found in the co-operation on anti-terrorism measures and external border security being undertaken by the member states under the umbrella of **TREVI** (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme, Violence Internationale). Faced with increasing problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s in these and other areas such as asylum, immigration, drug trafficking and fraud, many of the member states were persuaded that something more formal and structured than TREVI was desirable. A further factor was the difficulties faced by the countries that had signed the **Schengen Agreement** in their efforts to agree on a **harmonization** of policies. While the provisions for JHA often simply gave a more formal recognition to already well-established co-operative procedures, the socioeconomic environment in the mid-1990s and difficulties in the operation of the pillar pushed the member states towards consideration of a less intergovernmental approach to JHA co-operation. Nevertheless, several member states were not prepared to consider incorporating JHA fully into the EU institutional structure, and this resistance inevitably placed limits upon its scope for action. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** transformed JHA by transferring a number of areas under the third pillar to the **Treaty of Rome**, and hence to

the first, supranational, pillar of the EU as part of its aim of creating an **area of freedom, security and justice**. At the same time, pillar III was renamed **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters** to reflect more precisely the areas of activity left for intergovernmental co-operation. (See also **Tampere summit**.) These residual issues were collapsed into the supranational activities of the EU with the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon** and the abandonment of the pillar structure.

JUSTICIABLE means that, under the terms of the **European treaties**, a matter under dispute can be submitted to the **Court of Justice** or the **General Court** for resolution.

The **JUSTUS LIPSIUS** building in **Brussels, Belgium**, was the home of the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Council** until they were relocated to the new **Europa building** in 2017. The Justus Lipsius building is situated opposite the **Berlaymont** building, which is the home of the **European Commission**. Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) was a humanist and classical scholar.

K

KALININGRAD, formerly known as Königsberg, was part of German East Prussia until the territory was annexed by the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1946. The territory offered the USSR direct access to the Baltic Sea and was one of the most militarized places in Europe during the **Cold War**. However, the dissolution of the USSR in the early 1990s transformed the Kaliningrad region into what was effectively a Russian exclave that was cut off geographically from Russia by **Lithuania**, **Latvia** and Belarus, and whose economic situation has been desperate for much of the time since. In 1992 it was declared a 'free economic zone' in the hope of attracting foreign investment. The **enlargement** of the European Union (EU) and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** to include **Poland** and Lithuania heightened fears that the exclave could become completely isolated. Hence, the Russian Government was keen to ensure land access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania and the EU rejected its initial proposal of a closed land corridor during **accession negotiations**. Instead, agreement was reached in 2002 on introducing special transit arrangements for citizens of the **Russian Federation** from 1 July 2003.

KENNEDY ROUND, named after President John F. Kennedy of the **USA**, was the name given to the sixth series of negotiations (1964–67) on tariff reductions held by the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT). It was the first series of GATT talks where the **European Commission** was the sole representative of the European Communities (EC), according to the terms of the **Treaty of Rome**, which stipulated that the EC were to represent the member states in issues of external trade. As a result of the discussions, the EC **common external tariff** was reduced, on average, by some 35%.

The **KIRCHBERG DECLARATION** dates from May 1994, when it was issued by the leaders of **Western European Union** (WEU). Essentially it established categories of WEU membership. The four categories listed were: full members, which were members of both the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) and the European Union (EU), such as **Germany**; associate members, which were members only of NATO and not the EU; associate partners, which were members of neither NATO nor the EU; and finally, observers, such as **Ireland**, which were members of the EU but not of NATO.

KOSOVO was formerly an autonomous region within **Serbia** and, before that, **Yugoslavia**. Following a three-year conflict in 1996–99 between Serbian and Yugoslav forces and the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) launched air strikes against Yugoslav forces in the region in an attempt to force a political settlement to the conflict. The Yugoslav and Serbian leaderships eventually accepted the presence of a NATO-led peacekeeping force—KFOR—in Kosovo. Over the next nine years, Kosovo was administered by the **United Nations** (UN), and pressure for independence grew within the province, culminating in a declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. This was strongly opposed by Serbia and by the **Russian Federation**. Within the European Union (EU), opinion on recognizing the newly independent state was divided, although most member states moved quickly to recognition. The EU also assumed responsibility from the UN for the administration and security of Kosovo, deploying a mission of some 1,800 international administrators, lawyers, judges and police (subsequently increased to 2,000) under the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) in an attempt to ensure the functioning of the new state. Kosovo was gradually being integrated with the EU as part of both the **Stabilization and Association Process** and the EU's more general approach to the **Western Balkans**. However, the process is complicated by the fact that five EU member states—**Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia** and **Spain**—have so far refused to recognize Kosovo's independence and continue to consider it a breakaway province of Serbia. Following a diplomatic rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013 in June the EU indicated its intention to commence negotiations with Kosovo on a **Stabilization and Association Agreement** (SAA). These began in October, and were concluded in May 2014; the SAA was initialled by both sides in July, and entered into force in April 2016. Meanwhile, in August 2015 the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Federica Mogherini, announced that the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia had signed four agreements, which represented some degree of progress in the normalization of relations. Subsequent progress was limited, although agreements on 'economic normalization' were signed by both sides in September 2020.

STELLA KYRIAKIDES (1956–) is a psychologist and conservative Cypriot politician who currently serves as the Commissioner responsible for Health and Food Safety in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** that took office in December 2019. Since March 2020 she has also led a special task force co-ordinating the EU's response to **COVID-19**. She previously served as the third female President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the **Council of Europe**.

L

The **LAEKEN DECLARATION** on the Future of the European Union was adopted by the **European Council** at its **summit meeting** in Laeken, **Belgium**, on 15 December 2001. The Declaration followed a similar Declaration on the Future of the Union adopted a year earlier at the same time as the **Treaty of Nice** and was significant for the issues it raised for consideration by the **European Convention**, which was launched in late February 2002. The Laeken Declaration begins by identifying the two significant challenges facing Europe: the need to bring the European Union (EU) closer to its citizens; and defining the role for the EU in a fast-changing globalized world. It then proceeds to raise more than 50 questions and issues for the Convention to address. These include a better division and definition of the EU's competences; **simplification** of treaties and legislative measures; the need for more democracy, **transparency** and efficiency; and steps towards a **constitution** for the EU.

CHRISTINE LAGARDE (1956–) was appointed as the President of the **European Central Bank** (ECB) on 1 November 2019, and was previously Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, replacing Dominique Strauss-Kahn in July 2011. Lagarde was born in Paris and studied law at university in the French capital before taking a Master's degree in English and political science at the Institute of Political Studies in Aix-en-Provence, **France**. After graduation she was admitted into the French legal profession. She started working for a major US law company (Baker & McKenzie) in 1981, where she specialized in antitrust and labour law. She rose rapidly through the firm and became a partner in 1987, the head of its European division in 1995 and its first female chair in 1999. She left Baker & McKenzie in 2005 to become Minister of Foreign Trade in the French Government of the centre-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire. Under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, Lagarde served as Minister of Agriculture (for a month) and then Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry. In 2019 Lagarde emerged as the main contender for President of the ECB. She was nominated to the position by the **European Council** on 2 July 2019. Once confirmed in the role, she became the first woman to hold the position of President in the history of the ECB.

The **LAMFALUSSY PROCESS** refers to a novel approach to the process of European **legislation** and regulation. It originated in February 2001, when a ‘Group of Wise Men’ headed by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy presented a Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets to the **Council of the European Union**. The report provided a clear and coherent argument calling for a change in European legislative and regulatory structures. Essentially, the authors of the report identified the economic benefits of further financial market integration in Europe, highlighted the key factors slowing down that integration process and arrived at the conclusion that the then existing regulatory system was unable to cope with the accelerating pace of market change. To overcome and reduce the deficiencies, the Group agreed upon what has become known as the Lamfalussy process. It is a four-level approach to lawmaking, based partially on procedures existing (but not widely used before in the area of financial markets) in the European Union (EU) constitutional framework, and partially on experience in member states, but also partially new and innovative. According to the Lamfalussy proposals, financial markets legislation and regulation should usefully involve the following four levels: framework principles to be decided by normal EU legislative procedures, i.e. in co-decision between Council and Parliament (see **European Parliament**) upon a proposal by the Commission (see **European Commission**); **implementation** legislation by the Commission upon proposal by the newly established Council of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in consultation with member states through an EU Securities Committee; intense co-operation and networking between securities regulators in the CESR to ensure consistent and equivalent transposition of level I and II legislation; and strengthened enforcement, basically through Commission action, but with co-operation from member states, regulators, and the private sector. In the area of securities markets legislation, the Lamfalussy process was applied for the first time for the new **Directives** on Market Abuse and on Prospectuses. The first impressions were mixed; it appeared that not all of the parties involved had fully understood (or fully appreciated) the mechanics as intended by the ‘Wise Men’. Proposals have been made to extend the application of the Lamfalussy process beyond securities markets into other financial areas (notably banking, insurance and investment funds).

LANGUAGES are both an indication of the diversity of the European Union (EU) and a barrier to effective integration. Prior to **enlargement** in 2004, the EU had 11 official languages: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. With 10 countries joining, a further nine languages became official languages of the EU: Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian. The total was thus raised to 20. In May 2005 the EU officially recognized the Irish language as a working language in the Union. Irish thus became the 21st language to be given such recognition by the EU. Prior to this

LATIN AMERICA

development Irish had been recognized as a treaty language only. From January 2007 Bulgarian and Romanian also became official working languages, bringing the overall total to 23; this total increased again, to 24, following the accession of **Croatia** to the EU in July 2013. Any one official language may be used in EU meetings; all official documents from all EU institutions need to be translated into all languages; and simultaneous interpreting between all languages is provided for most EU meetings (e.g. of the **European Council**, the **Council of the European Union**, the **Court of Justice** and the **European Parliament**).

The cost of translation is considerable, there being more than 500 different translation combinations, but arguably necessary if the EU's citizens are to be able to understand the **decisions** and laws that affect them. Within the **European Commission**, costs are reduced since the administration has traditionally conducted most of its daily business in English and French. Other institutions have yet to follow suit to the same extent although many committees do conduct their business in either English or French.

LATIN AMERICA: See **South and Central America**

LATVIA regained its independence from the then **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1991. Soon thereafter it began negotiations with the European Communities on a **free trade agreement**, which was concluded in 1994. However, by the time the subsequently negotiated **Europe agreement** was signed in 1995, attention was focusing on an application for membership of the European Union (EU), which was duly submitted on 27 October 1995. Although the **European Commission's avis** in 1997 was supportive of Latvia's desire to join the EU, it did not recommend **accession negotiations**, primarily because of concerns over insufficient progress in economic reform. Instead, Latvia had to wait for the Helsinki **summit meeting** of the **European Council** in December 1999 before being invited to negotiate membership. Despite coming late to accession negotiations, Latvia was among the **candidate countries** that concluded negotiations at the **Copenhagen summit** in December 2002. The Latvian electorate subsequently endorsed the terms of accession in a referendum in September 2003. With a turnout of 72.5%, more than 67% voted in favour of EU membership. Latvia joined the EU in May 2004 and a year later approved (by parliamentary vote) the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. The country became part of the EU's **Schengen Area** in December 2007. The Latvian Parliament approved the **Treaty of Lisbon** in early 2008. In March 2013 Latvia submitted an application to adopt the **euro** as its official currency. The European Commission approved the application in July, and Latvia was admitted to the **eurozone** in January 2014, when it also joined the **European Banking Authority** and the **Single Supervisory Mechanism**.

LAW in the context of the European Union (EU) derives originally from the provisions of the **Treaty of Rome** (1957), according to which EU law takes precedence over national law. EU law today stems from a series of treaties, **legislation** and court rulings. There are basically three sources of EU law, which can be identified as primary law, secondary law and supplementary law. Primary law relates directly to the EU treaty base, and specifically the **Treaty on the European Union** and the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**. Secondary law comprises legal instruments based on these treaties and refers to the **regulations** and **directives**. Such law originates from initiatives taken by the **European Commission**, and is in most cases today adopted by the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** through the use of the **Ordinary Legislative Procedure** as established under the **Treaty of Lisbon** (2007). Supplementary law relates primarily to the body of case law that has been developed by the **Court of Justice** since the 1950s.

LDR: See **Group of the European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party**

LEGA (previously Lega Nord, the Northern League) is an Italian political party. The party was founded in 1991 as a regionalist party championing the north of **Italy**. It has subsequently become known for its right-wing **populism**, promotion of anti-immigration policies and is a **Eurosceptic** party. In 2013 Matteo Salvini became its leader. Following Lega's strong performance in the 2018 national elections, it entered a governing coalition in 2018–19 with the **Movimento 5 Stelle** (Five Star Movement), with Salvini serving as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. In early August 2019 the alliance between Lega and M5S was dissolved, in a move that Salvini hoped would prompt new elections and a Lega victory. However, a new coalition agreement led to the formation of a new Government under Giuseppe Conte in September 2019, which excluded Lega. Lega forms part of the Government established in early 2021 under **Mario Draghi**. Lega belongs to the **Identity and Democracy** far-right political grouping within the **European Parliament** (EP), having won 28 of Italy's 73 seats in the 2019 EP elections.

The **LEGAL INSTRUMENTS** of the European Union include **directives**, **regulations** and **decisions**. The **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** envisaged their replacement with a new range of instruments: European Laws and European Framework Laws, European Regulations and European Decisions. This was one of the few substantive elements of the treaty not carried forward into the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

LEGAL PERSONALITY is a concept that means that a body has the right under international law to take autonomous actions rather than relying upon governments to act on its behalf. The **Treaty of Rome** conferred legal personality upon the European Community (EC). This meant that the EC could act in law as an independent party, enter into legally binding agreements, and be subject to constitutional legal proceedings. The legal personality of the EC was distinct from that of the member states. By contrast, the **Treaty on European Union** did not explicitly confer legal personality on the European Union (EU). The fact that agreements could be and were concluded in the name of the EU strengthened the argument that the EU did in practice have legal personality. Had it entered into force, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** would have resolved the situation by conferring legal personality on the EU. Legal personality for the EU has since been established with the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

The **LEGAL SERVICE** is a service of the **European Commission**. Its major task is to prepare and evaluate, from a legal perspective, European Union (EU) **legislation**; it also represents the Commission in all court cases. The Legal Service has to ensure that all legislation, before being printed in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, has the same precise legal meaning in all EU **languages**. The **Council of the European Union** also has a Legal Service, which advises the **Council Secretariat** and the **Council Presidency**.

LEGISLATION is enacted by complex procedures in the European Union (EU). The **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** (EP) or the **European Commission** are empowered to issue three different kinds of legislation: **regulations**, **directives** and **decisions**. The **Court of Justice** institutes a fourth source of legislation: rulings given by the Court on the cases that come before it constitute a body of case law which affects the interpretation and **implementation** of European Communities (EC) and national **law**. In addition, there is so-called **soft law**.

The EU equivalent of national legislation is the combination of regulations and directives. The first stage of both lies with the Commission, which has the **right of initiative**. If adopted by the Council, the Commission's proposal becomes either a regulation or a directive. The distinction between the two is important. Regulations are more rigorous, the highest form of legislation. They are fairly detailed instructions, applicable throughout the EU, and directly binding upon all member states. Directives are also binding, but take the form of general instructions on the goal to be achieved, while leaving the way in which it will be attained to the discretion of each member state. The conditions of a directive are normally met by the member states introducing national legislation in conformity with EU stipulations.

Decisions by either the Commission or the Council are also binding upon the member states; they may be addressed to named individuals or enterprises. Decisions can be made by either of the EU executives on the basis of the direct authority they possess under the terms of the **Treaty of Rome** and its amendments, or on the basis of earlier regulations or directives. (Decisions made according to the provisions of the **Treaty of Paris** were slightly different: they were binding in their entirety upon member states and were thus more similar to regulations.)

Under the Treaty of Rome and its amendments, the Commission and the Council can also issue **recommendations**, which, like **opinions**, and in contrast to the pronouncements described above, do not constitute instructions but merely express an EU preference that member states are free to ignore. (However, recommendations made under the Treaty of Paris were binding as to the final result, but not the means to achieve it, rather like EU directives.)

Whereas originally decisions to adopt EC legislation involved either the Commission or the Council, the EP now has a significant role to play. In 1987 the **Single European Act** introduced the **co-operation procedure**, which allowed the EP to table amendments to and reject proposed legislation. It also made **ratification of association agreements** and **accession treaties** conditional on the assent of the EP. This was followed in 1993 by the introduction via the **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** of the **co-decision procedure**, along with a requirement that the Council and the EP jointly adopt certain legislative proposals. Since the TEU, the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, the **Treaty of Nice** and the **Treaty of Lisbon** have all extended use of the **ordinary legislative procedure** (formerly co-decision) and the consent (formerly assent) procedure, thus further enhancing the EP's role in the legislative process.

The **LEGITIMACY** of the European Communities (EC) prior to the early 1990s was hardly challenged thanks to the **permissive consensus** that surrounded the European integration project. Since then, and in particular since the establishment of the European Union (EU), the legitimacy of the EC and the EU has been increasingly challenged. This has been evident in the criticisms coming not just from politicians, but also from the citizens of the EU, as evidenced by the **ratification crises** surrounding the **Treaty on European Union** and the **Treaty of Nice**, and the low and falling turnout of voters in **European Parliament** elections. Major concerns focus on the perceived inability of the EU to deliver benefits to the people and to solve problems; lack of popular identification with and support for the EU; the alleged intrusiveness of the EU as it increasingly touches on areas traditionally viewed as being the preserve of national governments; and concern over the direction in which the integration project is heading. The question of how to remedy the declining legitimacy of the EU, as well as associated problems concerning the

LENIENCY NOTICES

EU's **democratic deficit**, informed many of the issues on the agenda of the **European Convention** launched in February 2002.

JANEZ LENARČIČ (1967–) is a Slovenian lawyer and career civil servant who is currently the Commissioner responsible for Crisis Management in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, which was installed in December 2019. He is a former Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights at the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**. He has also served as **Slovenia's** Permanent Representative to the European Union.

LENIENCY NOTICES were first introduced by the Commission in 1996 in relation to its handling of **competition policy**. The Directorate-General for Competition revised its leniency procedures in 2002 and again in 2006. The Commission devised its leniency initiative as a means to persuade and entice **cartel** members to break rank and supply the Commission with full details of a particular cartel's operations and management. A firm that does so can be given full immunity from any fine that the Commission imposes on the cartel. Cartels are by nature often unstable, and such an inducement to reveal wrongdoing can prove attractive and lead to more cartels being uncovered.

LEVIES: See **Budget**; **Common Agricultural Policy**; **Own Resources**

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM is one of the most prominent approaches to understanding the major decisions in the history of the European Union. In contrast to **neo-functionalism**, it focuses on national preferences, interstate bargaining and institutional delegation. As a consequence, it tends to downplay the significance of geostrategic factors, ideology and supranational institutions in **decision making**.

LIBERALIZATION refers, in the context of the European Union, to the process of establishing the **single market** by eliminating unnecessary obstacles and restraints to trade.

LIECHTENSTEIN is the fourth smallest country in Europe. It developed a customs union and common currency (the Swiss franc) with **Switzerland** in 1923, and therefore enjoyed a close relationship with the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA) after that organization was formed in 1960, but only became a full member of EFTA in 1991. In December 1992 Liechtenstein voted in favour of the **European Economic Area** (EEA), one week after participation in the latter had been rejected by a Swiss referendum. The vote seemed to indicate that Liechtenstein saw the EEA as a way of preserving

its prosperity and of becoming more politically independent of Switzerland. However, full membership of the EEA could not be realized until the 1923 agreement with Switzerland had been modified. When the necessary adjustments to the customs union had been completed, membership of the EEA was endorsed by 55.9% of the vote in a further referendum held on 9 April 1995. Liechtenstein signed the **Schengen Agreement** in February 2008 and became part of the **Schengen Area** in December 2011. Despite close ties with the European Union (EU), Liechtenstein has expressed scant interest in joining, not least because membership would most likely necessitate changes to its position on taxation, an issue that resulted in tense relations with a number of EU member states, notably **Germany**.

LIFE is the name of the European Union's (EU) funding instrument for environmental and nature conservation projects. LIFE was agreed and commenced in 1992. There have been four completed phases of the programme—LIFE I (1992–95), LIFE II (1996–99), LIFE III (2000–06) and LIFE+ (2007–13), and the programme for 2014–20 finishes at the end of 2020. Its objectives have been to provide financial aid for environmental activities, to support the implementation of various aspects of **environmental policy**, and to aid the EU in meeting the obligations of international environmental agreements and conventions to which it is a signatory. LIFE was also charged with the supervision of various EU environment programmes and replaced a number of earlier programmes. LIFE III began in January 2000 with an initial budget of €640m., and was originally scheduled to end in December 2004. However, the programme was extended until the end of 2006 with the provision of an additional €317m. of funding. The LIFE+ programme was agreed by the EU Environment Council meeting in Luxembourg in June 2006 and entered into force in 2007. LIFE+ ran from 2007–13 and comprised three main themes: LIFE+ Nature and Biodiversity (and the conservation of natural habitats); LIFE+ Environment Policy and Governance (to promote new innovative methods and techniques to aid EU environmental policy); and LIFE+ Information and Communication. The programme has been administered by the **European Commission**. To cover the period from 2014 to 2020, the Commission adopted a new multi-annual work programme in April 2014 including two LIFE sub-programmes (environment and climate action). The LIFE programme was renewed for the 2021–27 **financial perspective**, with funding of €4,812m. in 2018 prices.

The **LISBON AGENDA** (or 2010 strategy) was the product of a special **European Council** held in the city of Lisbon, **Portugal**, in March 2000. It was decided on that occasion to set the European Union (EU) a 10-year strategic goal of becoming 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustaining and encouraging economic growth with more and better jobs (some 20m. more jobs) and greater social

cohesion'. To this end, the Council established a series of targets, which included raising the employment rate and increasing the number of women in employment. Various mechanisms were subsequently developed to enable these goals to be achieved in areas such as **employment**, innovation, enterprise, liberalization and the environment.

Progress was reviewed on an annual basis and, where necessary, updated. In retrospect, these targets were over-ambitious. They were agreed at a time of growing economic and business confidence, but by 2005 it was clear that the EU was far from being a beacon of economic growth. In fact, growth rates in **France, Germany** and **Italy** had been disappointing. Rather than improving, in many European countries the economic outlook had instead deteriorated. In France and Germany, for example, unemployment was around 10%. Overall, the EU was struggling to compete with the **USA**, and European leaders were increasingly aware of the acute dangers and challenges to EU economic success that were presented by the rapidly growing competition from the Asian economies. The EU leaders realized that something had to be done to secure EU economic **competitiveness**, but also recognized some of the difficulties in trying to push for liberalization and greater economic reform. One of the clearest illustrations of such difficulties was revealed by the resistance to the EU's drive to open up the services market and, particularly, the fate of the **Bolkestein Directive** in 2005. The EU leaders agreed their determination to pursue the Lisbon objectives in early 2005, but scaled back their ambitious targets. In March 2010 the Commission launched the successor programme, **Europe 2020**.

LISBON TREATY: See **Treaty of Lisbon**

LITHUANIA, like its Baltic neighbours, **Estonia** and **Latvia**, regained its independence from the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1991. It then proceeded to conclude a **free trade agreement** (1994) and a **Europe agreement** (1995) with the European Union (EU) before applying to join the EU in December 1995. In its *avis* on the application, the **European Commission** expressed concern about the economic preparedness of Lithuania for membership. Consequently, Lithuania was not included among the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe** invited to open **accession negotiations** in early 1998. It did, however, start negotiations two years later, following a positive regular report from the Commission in October 1999 and an invitation to negotiate from the Helsinki **European Council** in December 1999. Although a latecomer to negotiations, by mid-2002 Lithuania had completed negotiations on more than two-thirds of the 31 negotiating chapters. As anticipated, the remaining chapters were closed by the time of the **Copenhagen summit** of the European Council in December. Lithuania therefore joined nine other **candidate countries** in signing the **Accession Treaty** in April 2003. In the following month, of the 63.4% of the electorate

who participated in a referendum, 91.1% voted in favour of joining the EU. Lithuania joined the EU on 1 May 2004, and in November 2004 became the first EU member state successfully to ratify the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. In March 2006 Lithuania applied to join the **eurozone**, seeking membership from 1 January 2007. In the event, this target proved just too ambitious, as the Lithuanian Government was unable to stabilize the country's inflation rate. The country did, however, become part of the EU's **Schengen Area** in December 2007. Successive governments remained firmly committed to joining the euro. Estonia was the first of the three **Baltic states** to join the eurozone in 2011. Latvia's application to join the single currency was successful and in January 2014 Latvia became the 18th EU member state to accede to the eurozone. Successive Lithuanian governments had sought euro membership since 2004. The Lithuanian Government reapplied for membership of the euro in the first half of 2014 and both the European Commission and the **European Central Bank** approved its application in early June. The European Council and the **European Parliament** endorsed the application and Lithuania adopted the euro, thereby becoming the 19th member of the **eurozone**, in January 2015.

LOBBYING of major institutions of the European Communities (EC) and the European Union (EU), such as the **European Commission** and the **European Parliament**, has grown dramatically since the mid-1980s, primarily as a consequence of the increase in the amount of **legislation** emanating from the EC and EU. In addition, a range of regional interests are represented in **Brussels, Belgium**, seeking to gain influence over the decision-making process. (See also **interest groups**.)

The **LOMÉ CONVENTIONS** is the title of a series of agreements named after the capital of Togo. Until the entry into force of the **Cotonou Agreement**, the Convention was the central element of the European Communities' (EC) relations with developing countries. It derived from a commitment in the original **Treaty of Rome** to develop a relationship between the original **Six** members of the **European Economic Community** (EEC) and their former colonies, in order to promote the interests of the latter and 'to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire'. The first agreements towards these ends were the Yaoundé Convention agreements of 1963 and 1969. The First Lomé Convention (Lomé I), signed in 1975, was an extension of the Yaoundé Convention to involve the EC more formally in development activities in more countries. The recipient states, some of which already had agreements with the EC, were known as the **African, Caribbean and Pacific** (ACP) **states**. Three further agreements under the Lomé Convention were signed in 1979, 1984 and 1989. Lomé I was designed to provide a new framework for co-operation, taking into account the varying needs of the developing ACP countries. The Second Lomé

LUXEMBOURG

Convention entered into force on 1 January 1981 and the Third Lomé Convention on 1 March 1985 (trade provisions) and 1 May 1986 (aid). The Fourth Lomé Convention was signed in December 1989: its trade provisions entered into force on 1 March 1990, and the remainder entered into force in September 1991. The Lomé Convention created a legal framework for bilateral co-operation, and a series of joint institutions were made responsible for supervising the operation of the Convention and the **implementation** of its programmes: these were the ACP-European Union (EU) Council of Ministers, a Committee of Ambassadors and a Joint Assembly of representatives from the ACP states and the **European Parliament**. In 2000, meeting in Cotonou, Benin, heads of state and of government of the EU and ACP countries concluded a 20-year partnership accord. The EU-ACP Partnership Agreement, known as the Cotonou Agreement, entered into force on 1 April 2003 (although many of its provisions had been applicable for a transitional period since August 2000), following ratification by the EU member states and more than the requisite two-thirds of the ACP countries.

LUXEMBOURG participates with **Belgium** and the **Netherlands** in the **Benelux** Union and was a founder member of the European Communities (EC). Currently one of the smallest member states, and one that has always been exposed to external influences, it has perhaps had fewer reservations than most about diminution of national sovereignty and independence. Its governments have been strong supporters of initiatives for further integration, especially those relating to institutional reform, and several of its statesmen have figured prominently in the development of the EC. Several European institutions are based in Luxembourg rather than in **Brussels**: the **Court of Justice**, the **General Court**, the **Court of Auditors**, the **European Investment Bank** and part of the **European Commission's** staff, as well as part of the **European Parliament's**. Luxembourg was also the headquarters of the **European Coal and Steel Community** before 1967. Luxembourg has been one of the most pro-European Union member states and was determined to go ahead as planned with its referendum on the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in July 2005 even after the rejections in **France** and the **Netherlands**. A majority—56.5%—of Luxembourg's voters approved the draft constitution, and the then Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who had threatened to resign in the case of a 'no' vote, claimed the treaty had been resurrected by the vote. Luxembourg ratified the **Treaty of Lisbon** in May 2008. Juncker resigned as Prime Minister in December 2013 after some 18 years in office. He was succeeded by Xavier Bettel. Juncker succeeded José Manuel Durão Barroso as President of the European Commission in 2014, becoming the third person from Luxembourg to hold the post.

The **LUXEMBOURG COMPROMISE** is the name of the agreement reached by the **Six** in January 1966 that resolved the **empty chair crisis**

between **France** and the five other member states. It was essentially acquiescence to French demands regarding **supranationalism**, and it specifically dealt with the operation of the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) and the permissible use of **qualified majority voting** (QMV). In essence, the Six agreed to accept the right of any member state to veto proposals before the Council of Ministers whenever it believed its own national interests might be adversely affected.

The Compromise decisively altered the direction of the European Communities (EC) and the balance of power within it. It reduced the importance of the **European Commission**, emphasized the centrality of the member governments and delayed the completion of the **common market**. Despite all the rhetoric and initiatives for closer integration, it set the tone for EC developments until the mid-1980s. This is despite the fact that, as a document outside the framework of the treaties, the Compromise possesses no legal force.

The widespread feeling that the Compromise was nevertheless hindering European developments was one of the factors that persuaded the member states to include institutional reform in the **Single European Act** (SEA) of 1986. By reducing the number and kinds of issues requiring unanimous approval in the Council of Ministers, the SEA succeeded in limiting the potential impact of the Luxembourg Compromise in the future. However, neither the SEA nor the subsequent **Treaty on European Union** disposed of or regularized the Compromise. Nevertheless, owing in part to a change in the rules of procedure of the Council, scant use of the Compromise was subsequently made and many authorities contended that it was obsolete. However, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** introduced what was sometimes referred to as a Luxembourg Compromise Mark II, with **decisions** taken by QMV as part of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**.

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The **MAASTRICHT SUMMIT**, held in the town of that name in the **Netherlands** in December 1991, was one of the most decisive meetings of the **European Council**. It had been preceded by two **intergovernmental conferences** on political and monetary union. These provided the agenda of the **European Council**, which, after much and often acrimonious discussion, agreed upon a fundamental revision of the **Treaty of Rome** in the form of the **Treaty on European Union**.

MAASTRICHT TREATY: See **Treaty on European Union**

EMMANUEL MACRON (1977–) has been the President of **France** since May 2017, succeeding Socialist President François Hollande. Macron is the founder and leader of the centrist political party *La République En Marche*, which was established in 2016. The party fielded candidates for the first time during the June 2017 legislative elections and achieved a majority. Macron is considered a newcomer to the French political landscape and he is its youngest ever President. Prior to becoming President, Macron worked as an investment banker, but also served as Minister of the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs (2014–16) under the prime ministership of Manuel Valls, and as Deputy Secretary-General in the Office of the President (2012–14). Macron is a philosophy graduate of Paris Nanterre University, and completed his Master's degree in Public Administration at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) before graduation from the prestigious *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (ENA) in 2004.

The **MAGHREB STATES** of Algeria, **Morocco** and Tunisia signed a collective bilateral trade and aid agreement with the European Communities (EC) in 1976, covering financial, industrial and technical affairs. The agreement allowed duty-free access to the EC for most industrial products from these states and special concessions for some of their agricultural produce. An **association agreement** was signed between the European Union (EU) and Tunisia in 1995, with Morocco in 1996 and with Algeria in 2002. The states also had access to EU **development aid**, and a new financial arrangement was

negotiated in 1991. The so-called Agadir Agreement on the establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean Nations, including Morocco and Tunisia, was signed in February 2004 and came into force in March 2007. In December 2011 the Council of the EU agreed that negotiations could commence towards Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) with Morocco and Tunisia. Negotiations with Morocco were initiated in March 2013 but were later suspended; talks with Tunisia commenced in October 2015.

MAJORITY VOTING is one of the ways in which **decisions** may be taken in the **Council of the European Union**. Simple majorities apply only to a limited number of minor issues, usually dealing with procedural matters. It is unlikely that the member states would accept it as the normal mode of **decision making**. Member states do, however, accept the use of **Qualified Majority Voting**.

MALTA initially played little part in the European integration process. It gained independence from the **United Kingdom** in 1964, joined the **Council of Europe** in 1965, and in 1970 concluded an **association agreement** with the European Communities (EC). The agreement was regarded by the EC as another element of their **Mediterranean policy**, and constituted a progressive move towards a **customs union**. Owing to domestic politics, however, little came out of the relationship. In July 1990 Malta formally applied for EC membership, receiving a favourable *avis* in 1993, but in 1996 the incoming Labour Government decided to freeze the country's application. A change of government in 1998 led Malta to revive its application, and in February 1999 the **European Commission** recommended that **accession negotiations** should begin, alongside those taking place with certain countries of **Central and Eastern Europe** and with Cyprus. Of all the **candidate countries**, Malta was often judged to be the one applicant state that was most likely to reject membership, and the outcome proved a difficult one to predict to the very end, as the country seemed evenly split on the issue. On 8 March 2003 91% of the Maltese electorate participated in a referendum on membership of the European Union (EU). The final result showed that 53.6% of those who participated in the referendum supported accession, while 46.4% voted against. This vote was further endorsed a month later when the pro-EU Nationalist Party defeated the Labour Party in a general election. This paved the way for Malta to join the EU (as the smallest member state, with some 380,000 citizens) in May 2004. Malta's accession to the EU posed very few policy-related problems. In June 2006 it was agreed that Malta would join the **eurozone** and adopt the **euro**, which it did on 1 January 2008. The previous month it joined the EU's **Schengen Area**. Malta's parliament unanimously ratified the **Treaty of Lisbon** in January 2008. Maltese Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi argued that the treaty was in Malta's interests and would

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

provide Malta with an additional seat in the **European Parliament**. The Labour Party was returned to power in Malta, under the leadership of Joseph Muscat, after its victory in the general election of March 2013; Muscat remained in post following legislative elections in mid-2017. He resigned in late 2019, and was replaced as Prime Minister by Robert Abela.

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES, set up in 1962, are part of the structure of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP). The remit of the CAP is so broad, with varying economic and climatic conditions affecting different products that it has been divided according to product. Each commodity has its own Management Committee, composed of national government officials. The role of the Management Committees is to assist the **European Commission** in formulating **regulations** for the **implementation** of **decisions** made by the **Council of the European Union**, in order to achieve a uniform application of decisions that nevertheless takes account of different national circumstances. The Committees are also responsible for fixing levels of export refunds and import levies. Their opinions are not binding on the Commission but, if a Committee rejects a Commission proposal, the proposal must be presented to the Council for consideration.

MANSHOLT PLAN is the name of the document that was the origin of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP). Named after the Dutch statesman Sicco Mansholt, in its final version of 1968 it gave equal importance to price guarantees and to a restructuring and modernization of agriculture. Prior to this, the vast majority of agricultural expenditure was being directed towards price support rather than modernization schemes. The plan accepted that rationalization would incur heavy short-term costs, and proposed an extensive programme of compensation. In the longer term, it suggested that rationalization would produce a more cost-effective agriculture, so limiting the amount of **expenditure** required for price guarantees. The agricultural sector protested at the plans, and there were large demonstrations in **Brussels**. The CAP outline adopted by the European Communities (EC) in 1972 was a moderated version of the Mansholt Plan. It gave a greatly reduced emphasis to structural reform, an emphasis that disappeared almost completely when the policy began to operate. At the time, farming organizations almost everywhere in the EC rejected the plan, and Mansholt was much reviled by farmers.

A **MARKET ACCESS STRATEGY** was devised by the **European Commission** in 1996 as a means of promoting European Union (EU) exports. It aimed to provide information for businesses regarding trade policy questions, to improve access for EU exporters to other markets and to increase the efficiency of EU **trade** policy.

MARKET-SHARING AGREEMENTS are banned by the **European Commission** on the grounds that they run contrary to the rules of European Union (EU) **competition policy**, and particularly to Article 81 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Article 101 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**), which targets restrictive agreements and **cartels**. Cartels remain an endemic feature of European business activity. The Commission, particularly since the early 1990s, has endeavoured to combat these agreements through the levying of fines on companies engaged in such practices.

The **MARSHALL PLAN** or the European Recovery Programme, named after US Secretary of State George Marshall (1880–1959), was an extensive programme of US aid to assist and stimulate economic reconstruction and recovery in Europe after the Second World War. It came into operation in 1948 and brought both economic and military stability and facilitated the reconstruction of Western Europe. The **USA** insisted that the allocation and operation of priorities had to be a European responsibility. The result was the formation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (now the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**). The Marshall Plan played an instrumental role in promoting European integration, which indirectly can be said to have inspired the Schuman Declaration (see **Schuman Plan**). Reconciliation was an integral aspect of US foreign policy towards Western Europe, particularly given the onset of the **Cold War** in the late 1940s. By the time the Plan ended in 1952, some US \$17,000m. had been given to Western Europe, to the latter's considerable financial and psychological benefit, as well as providing Western Europe with experience in inter-governmental co-operation.

MASHREQ STATES is a term used to describe Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the **Syrian Arab Republic**, with which the European Communities (EC) signed a collective bilateral trade and aid agreement in 1977. In addition to granting **development aid**, the agreement allowed the Mashreq states to export several manufactured products to the EC duty free. A further collection of financial aid measures was negotiated in 1991. An Association Agreement with Jordan was signed in November 1997 and entered into force in May 2002. The so-called Agadir Agreement on the establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean Nations, including Egypt and Jordan, was signed in February 2004 and came into force in March 2007. An interim EU Association Agreement with Lebanon was signed in June 2002, and entered into force in April 2006. Protracted negotiations on an Association Agreement with Syria were concluded in October 2004, and a revised version of the Agreement was initialled in December 2008. In May 2011 the EU announced that co-operation with Syria was to be suspended, owing to the violent suppression of anti-Government protests there from March and subsequent civil conflict. In December the Council of the EU agreed that

negotiations could commence towards Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) with Egypt and Jordan.

HERESA MAY (1956–) was the Prime Minister of the **United Kingdom** and leader of the Conservative Party until her departure from both positions in July 2019. She studied at Oxford University, and was employed at the Bank of England, before embarking on a political career, becoming British Secretary of State for Home Affairs in 2010–16. May took office as the UK's second female Prime Minister in mid-July 2016 (the first was fellow Conservative Margaret Thatcher), in succession to **David Cameron**, who resigned following the UK's referendum vote, on 23 June, in favour of leaving the European Union (EU), also known as **Brexit**. May, who had campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU, was regarded as a pragmatist (notably stating 'Brexit means Brexit'). In March 2017 May invoked **Article 50** of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. In the following month May called an early general election, which resulted in a hung parliament. May was forced to broker a deal with Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party to support her minority Government.

Following the 2017 general election, Theresa May's Government came under increasing pressure from both **Brexiters** and **Remainers** for its lack of a viable plan for a post-Brexit UK. In mid-2018 May negotiated the **Chequers Plan** with her cabinet, solidifying the UK's negotiating position with the EU on a range of policy issues. However, following what seemed like uneasy agreement on the Chequers Plan, two leading Brexiters, David Davis, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs **Boris Johnson** resigned from the cabinet.

Despite negotiating a **withdrawal agreement** with the EU, subsequent attempts to secure parliamentary approval for the agreement in the UK failed, with particular controversy surrounding the **backstop**. The impasse in Parliament and May's failure to secure support for the withdrawal agreement ultimately led to her resignation in June 2019. In July she was succeeded by Boris Johnson.

MEDA was the acronym for a Mediterranean Special programme (launched in 1996 and amended in 2000 as MEDA II) that aimed to introduce financial and technical measures in parallel with economic and social structural reforms in the **Euro-Mediterranean partnership**. It was modelled on the aid programmes **PHARE** and **Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States** (TACIS). The MEDA programme replaced all the bilateral **protocols** between the European Union (EU) and the so-called MED-12 non-EU member Mediterranean states (Algeria, **Cyprus**, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, **Malta**, **Morocco**, the Palestinian Authority (Palestinian Territories), the **Syrian Arab Republic**, Tunisia and **Turkey**). MEDA was designed to support the economic transition in those Mediterranean non-EU member states and aimed for the establishment of a **Euro-Mediterranean**

free trade area by promoting reforms that encouraged small and medium-sized businesses, opened up markets, and promoted private investment and industrial co-operation. It also supported the wider participation of civil society, the improvement of social and educational services, the upgrading of economic infrastructure and the protection of the environment, and placed emphasis on the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. Both MEDA programmes encouraged regional co-operation.

MEDIA POLICY, or at least that element that relates to film and television, represents one area of **cultural policy** where the European Union (EU) has been notably active. While the **European Commission** aims to encourage co-operation within the EU, it has also been restrictive in seeking to control the effect on Europe of direct broadcasting by satellite and cable networks. The first draft **directive** in 1985 established a plan for the adoption by the member states of the television standards sponsored by the **European Broadcasting Union**, their immediate use in direct satellite broadcasting, and their gradual introduction into both cable and ground transmitter systems. This plan later encountered difficulties. A second and controversial directive, Television Without Frontiers, came into force in 1991. This was designed to ensure increasing co-ordination in broadcasting, and required member states to ensure that a specified and substantial proportion of their national production and broadcast programmes was of European origin. In May 2005 the Commission urged EU member states to accelerate the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting, and set a target of 2012 for shutting down analogue services. The modernized Television without Frontiers directive, renamed the Audiovisual Media Services without Frontiers directive, was adopted by the **European Parliament** (EP) in November 2007, with legislation to be implemented by member states by December 2009. In March 2010 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a directive on Audiovisual Media Services, with the aim of implementing a cross-border framework for audiovisual media services, thereby strengthening the EU's market for both production and distribution, and ensuring fair competition. In February 2017 the EU agreed new rules permitting consumers from EU member states to access digital culture and entertainment services online throughout the Union, as part of efforts to modernize EU digital copyright rules as part of the **Digital Single Market** strategy, adopted in May 2015. A new copyright regulation and directive for the Digital Single Market were agreed in February 2019, and approved by the EP in March.

MEDITERRANEAN POLICY, sometimes known as the **Euro-Mediterranean Partnership** (EUROMED or EMP), is a term which is normally used to describe not a policy in the sense of a coherent integrated programme, but the varied collection of trade agreements that the European Union (EU) has signed with almost all the states that border the Mediterranean Sea, as well

MEDITERRANEAN UNION

as various educational, economic and scientific initiatives that have the Mediterranean as their focus. A **European Commission** initiative of 1994 envisaged the creation of a **Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area**, which would include the **Maghreb** and **Mashreq** countries, Israel, the Palestinian Territories and **Turkey**. Despite the initial enthusiasm accompanying the 1995 **Barcelona Declaration** that launched the process and laid the seeds for **MEDA**, there remained a great degree of scepticism as to how effective the EU's policy towards these Mediterranean countries would be. Some progress was made in developing a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership and a further enhancement of relations resulted from the French-inspired **Union for the Mediterranean** (UfM) initiative, which was launched in July 2008. The UfM seeks to secure peace and prosperity within the region, including addressing pressing issues such as regional unrest, immigration and pollution.

MEDITERRANEAN UNION: See **Union for the Mediterranean**

MEMBER STATES is a term that is used to refer to the countries that comprise the European Union (EU). These are **Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain** and **Sweden**. The **United Kingdom** officially left the EU on 31 January 2020 (see **Brexit**).

MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (MEPs) are elected for fixed five-year terms. The first direct elections occurred in 1979. In the **European Parliament** (EP), MEPs sit in transnational **political groups**, not by national party affiliations or in delegations, although a minority of MEPs prefer to sit as non-aligned independents. For a long time, MEPs were paid the same salary as the national parliamentary representatives in their own country, and there was therefore a substantial range in salary levels. This has now changed. All MEPs, however, have always received the same level of European Communities/Union resources, including allowances for research, secretarial assistance and travel. In the past many MEPs held a **dual mandate**, but could only draw on their salary and expenses as an MEP or as a member of their **national parliament**, but not as both. The dual mandate system has been phased out gradually. Over the last two decades the number of MEPs has altered to reflect EU **enlargement** and to keep the EP manageable as an institution (1999: 626; 2004: 732; 2007: 785; 2009: 736; 2014: 751; 2019: 751, until the departure of the **United Kingdom**, when the number was reduced to 705). In January 2018 the parliamentary committee on constitutional affairs voted to redistribute 27 of the 73 seats occupied by British members of the EP after the UK's departure from the EU. The remaining 46 seats remained

unfilled, but could potentially be used in the future by newly acceding member states.

MEPs: See **Members of the European Parliament**

MERGER POLICY became a leading aspect of European Union (EU) **competition policy**. However, it was omitted completely from the **Treaty of Rome**. The concept of a European merger control regime was first proposed by the **European Commission** as a draft **regulation** in 1973. Its aim was to give the Commission the ability to approve in advance any proposed transnational mergers, leaving the member states with the responsibility of policing mergers within their own territories. The Commission initiative and three subsequent efforts all failed to find any substantial favour within the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**). Finally, however, a renewed proposal was submitted in 1987, approved in 1989 and came into force in September 1990. The regulation owed much to growing demands from the business community for an integrated policy with regard to merger rules at the European level, thus avoiding the existing confusions and discrepancies in approach to mergers across the EU. Their demands were also vindicated by the business restructuring that was taking place prior to 1992 and the **internal market** initiative. The regulation required that all proposed mergers of companies with an aggregate world turnover of €5,000m., where at least two of the companies involved had a turnover within the EU of more than €250m. (unless they each realized more than two-thirds of their European turnover in one member state), and where the merger was likely to affect EU **competition policy**, should be submitted to the Commission for assessment and approval. As such, the regulation was designed to cover only the largest mergers, some 50 to 60 a year in the early years. Proposed mergers that fell below these levels, which constituted the majority of cases, remained the responsibility of the national authorities.

The number of proposed mergers notified to the Commission increased during the 1990s, so that by the end of that decade almost five times the number were being processed than at the outset. The Commission adopted a far-reaching reform of merger policy in December 2002, leading in turn to a new merger regulation that was agreed by the Council (for Economic and Monetary Affairs) in January 2004. The new merger regulation came into force on 1 May. The new package of reforms included guidelines on the assessment of mergers between competing firms and the Commission. The Commission had already introduced a set of best practices on the conduct of merger investigations, including the appointment of a chief economist in merger cases, which were designed to streamline **decision making** and to make it more transparent.

MERGER TREATY is the name often given to the treaty that formally integrated the executives of the **European Atomic Energy Community**, the **European Coal and Steel Community** and the **European Economic Community** (EEC). While technically there were still three **European Communities**, it became commonplace thereafter to refer to them collectively as the **European Community**. The Treaty created a single **European Commission** and a single Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), and was signed on 8 April 1965, coming into effect on 1 July 1967.

ANGELA MERKEL (1954–) was elected in November 2005 as **Germany's** first female Federal Chancellor. It should also be noted that she is the first citizen of the former German Democratic Republic (1949–90) to lead post-unification Germany (although she was born in Hamburg). In political terms, Merkel's rise was meteoric. She was a protégée of Helmut Kohl in the early 1990s and thereafter made a rapid advance through the ranks of the Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU—Christian Democratic Union) before being chosen to contest the 2005 federal elections as the CDU's candidate for Chancellor. At the September 2005 elections Merkel's CDU/CSU (Christian Social Union) polled 35.2% of the vote, while the rival Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD—Social Democratic Party of Germany) obtained 34.2%. After weeks of speculation, Merkel led the CDU/CSU into a 'Grand Coalition' with the SPD. This arrangement supplied Merkel with the Chancellorship, and it was the second time (the first occurred in 1966–69) in post-war German history that the two largest parties had formed a coalition government. The product of such negotiations had its critics, and some predicted a short history. Yet, in the event, it worked well.

Merkel emerged as a high-profile individual and, in terms of foreign policy, was generally given the credit for enabling the **Council of the European Union** to secure agreement on the European Union (EU) **budget** and the financing arrangements for 2007–13. Merkel used the German Presidency of the Council in the first half of 2007 to advance a number of ambitious targets. The most important was her determination to revive the debate on the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and the necessity of agreeing some form of charter on EU **decision making** before the next **European Parliament** (EP) elections in June 2009. Merkel succeeded and presented the text of a draft mandate (which very much determined the content of the **Treaty of Lisbon**) at the concluding **European Council summit meeting**). The 2009 EP elections, when Merkel's CDU/CSU party comfortably beat the Social Democrats into second place, served as a barometer for support for the Government in the run-up to the 2009 federal elections. Merkel successfully ran again as the CDU candidate for Chancellor in the federal elections of September 2009. The election results gave the CDU/CSU a strong victory over its former grand coalition partner, the SPD, which was easily pushed into

second place. Nevertheless, the percentage of the votes for both the CDU/CSU and the SPD was down, at 33.4% and 27.2%, respectively, and Merkel's CDU/CSU received its lowest share of the vote since 1949. The election results enabled Merkel to form a new coalition with the Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party—FDP), which had captured over 14% of the votes cast, their largest share in the party's history. Merkel's second administration was immediately beset with clashes between the governing parties over policy priorities, which damaged the Chancellor's popularity and reputation at home at the beginning of 2010. However, in European affairs, Merkel was much more successful. She was instrumental in the appointment of Herman Van Rompuy as the first **President of the European Council**. She is viewed as having played a crucial role in managing the **eurozone** crisis from 2010, although her most trenchant critics accused her of a lack of decisiveness and of acting in **Germany's**, as opposed to the EU's, interests, accusations she strongly denied. She was a principal architect of the **Fiscal Compact** (of the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union), which was signed in March 2012. Merkel attracted some popular resentment in southern Europe for her insistence on austerity conditions for emergency assistance. However, the sense of strong leadership improved her personal ratings at home. At a general election in September 2013 the CDU/CSU obtained 41.5% of the votes, securing 311 seats in the Bundestag (five seats short of an overall majority). Support for the FDP collapsed: the party won no seats (previously having held 93). A new Eurosceptic party, **Alternative für Deutschland** (AfD—Alternative for Germany), secured 4.7% of the votes but failed to secure representation in the federal parliament, as it had narrowly failed to reach the 5% threshold. Talks on a new 'grand coalition' between the CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats were concluded in October 2013 and paved the way for Merkel's third administration. Merkel's CDU/CSU topped the polls at the 2014 EP elections with 36% of the votes. Merkel had earned the reputation of being possibly the most influential politician in the EU, and largely succeeded in smoothing over frictions between the centre-right and centre-left components of her Government; none the less, Merkel continued to attract some criticism outside Germany for her uncompromising stance towards **Greece** during negotiations in 2015.

Controversially, in August 2015 Merkel announced that Germany would accept asylum applicants from the **Syrian Arab Republic**, irrespective of their initial point of entry into the EU, and that they would have permanent leave to remain in the country. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of people began to travel across Europe in an effort to reach Germany—some 800,000 were estimated to have arrived in 2015. It also subsequently led to the reimposition of border controls and the erection of fences by a number of member states, including **Austria, Hungary, Denmark** and **Sweden**. US President Barack Obama responded positively to Merkel's announcement, describing the measure to be 'on the right side of history'. In federal elections

MESSINA CONFERENCE

in September 2017 Merkel won a fourth term of office, although with a weakened mandate. Notably, the AfD achieved legislative representation as the third largest party. Merkel announced that she would not seek re-election in 2021, and by October of that year negotiations were taking place on the composition of a new government following federal elections in September.

The **MESSINA CONFERENCE** was the meeting of the foreign ministers of the **Six**, held in the Italian city of that name in June 1955. Its aim was to consider new initiatives in integration after the failure of the proposals for a **European Defence Community** and **European Political Community**. An invitation to participate officially was extended to the **United Kingdom**, but was not accepted. The ministers agreed to begin ‘a fresh advance towards the building of Europe’ and to create a market that was ‘free from all customs duties and all quantitative restrictions’. They also proposed a pooling of information and work on the uses of nuclear energy. The meeting established an intergovernmental committee, headed by Paul-Henri Spaak of **Belgium**, which was to consider and elaborate upon the proposals before submitting its report. The conference was the first stage of the process that culminated in the two **Treaties of Rome**. They established the **European Economic Community** and the **European Atomic Energy Community**.

JÖRG MEUTHEN (1961–) is a German politician and economist, and spokesperson for the **Alternative für Deutschland** (AfD—Alternative for Germany). Meuthen has been a member of parliament since March 2016.

MFA: See **Multifibre Arrangement**

CHARLES MICHEL (1975–), the Prime Minister of **Belgium** in 2014–19, succeeded **Donald Tusk** as **President of the European Council** on 1 December 2019. In December 2018 the Belgian Government collapsed amid discord over migration policy. Michel tendered his resignation, but remained in office in a caretaker capacity. In early July 2019, shortly after the subsequent legislative elections, the European Council voted to appoint Michel as its President. Michel is the son of Louis Michel, a prominent Belgian politician (and a former member of the **European Parliament** and a former member of the **European Commission**, with responsibility for Humanitarian Aid and Development).

The **MIDDLE EAST** has, since the early 1970s, been a region that has attracted the attention of the European Communities/Union. It was, for example, the focus of early attempts to forge closer foreign policy co-ordination among member states through **European political co-operation**. Trade

agreements have also been signed with countries in the region, many of which have since been replaced by new arrangements agreed as part of the European Union's efforts to promote a **Euro-Mediterranean partnership** that includes the Middle East. See also **European Neighbourhood Policy; Mediterranean Policy; Union for the Mediterranean.**

MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY did not formally exist for the European Communities (EC) before 1989, although matters relating to asylum had been discussed more informally within the **TREVI** process. The member states, except **Denmark**, signed the Dublin Convention on Asylum (later **Dublin Regulation**) in June 1990. Partly in response to growing unrest in the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) and **Yugoslavia**, the member states agreed in June 1991 to establish a Quick Reaction Consultation Centre to deal with sudden and large-scale immigration pressures. After 1991 asylum procedures were generally tightened, and grants of asylum more restricted. Asylum and immigration policy were principal issues raised at the **Tampere summit** of the **European Council** in 1999, which urged the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Between 1999 and 2005 the European Union (EU) established the CEAS and succeeded in passing a number of legislative acts that sought to harmonize minimum standards in the area of asylum, covering such issues as reception conditions for asylum seekers, qualifications for becoming a refugee and asylum procedures. Agreement was also reached on the Dublin Regulation that determined (when difficulties arose) which state held responsibility for dealing with asylum cases. As a means of further developing policy, the **European Commission** produced a **Green Paper** on Asylum Policy in 2007 and adopted its Policy Plan on Asylum in June 2008. The priorities of the CEAS were making refinements to the existing legislation regarding reception and asylum procedures to secure further alignment; the creation of a European Support Office to facilitate European co-operation; and finding means to provide greater solidarity and responsibility among member states on asylum policy. A revised Asylum Procedures Directive, adopted in mid-2013, aimed specifically to provide fairer, faster and better decisions. Better attention was also to be paid to those asylum seekers with special needs and greater protection for unaccompanied minors and victims of torture. The revised Directive was fully implemented throughout the EU from July 2015. Other important legislation adopted in 2013 included the Reception Conditions Directive, which replaced a 2003 directive establishing minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers. Meanwhile, a revised European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) regulation enabled law enforcement agencies to use the EU database containing the fingerprints of all asylum seekers to detect or investigate serious crimes, including murder and acts of terrorism.

An Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was established to operate during 2014–20, with a budget of €3,137m. The AMIF worked

alongside the International Security Fund (ISF), and focused on four principal objectives: strengthening the common European asylum system by ensuring the uniform application of EU legislation; facilitating legal migration to EU member states in compliance with labour market requirements, and assisting with the integration of non-EU nationals; implementing fair, sustainable and effective return strategies, while working to combat illegal migration; and ensuring that those EU member states most severely affected by migration and asylum issues can benefit from solidarity from other EU member states. Increased funding for search and rescue missions was announced, and in May 2015 the Commission published a new European Agenda on Migration, which incorporated proposals for the compulsory relocation within the EU of up to 20,000 refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. This plan encountered some opposition, as did proposals to redistribute up to 40,000 asylum applicants from Greece and Italy to other member states over a period of two years. In July the Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed to implement the European Agenda on Migration.

In September 2015, as the entry of migrants into the bloc increased significantly amid what became commonly known as the **European migration crisis**, the Commission sought to introduce further emergency measures, including proposals to relocate an additional 120,000 migrants, primarily from **Greece** and **Italy** (the countries most affected by unauthorized border crossings and applications for asylum), over a three-year period, to the rest of the EU (although Denmark, **Ireland** and the **United Kingdom** had exemptions). Distribution was to be calculated according to a key, which was to take into account factors such as the prevailing rate of gross domestic product per head, with richer states taking more than their poorer counterparts. It was agreed that 6,000 asylum applicants per month would be relocated from **Greece** and **Italy** to other EU member states; the Commission's proposals were supported by the **European Parliament** (EP) and adopted by the **Council of the European Union** in late September 2015.

Amid the huge burdens falling on Greece and Italy and the unwillingness of some member states to accept relocated asylum applicants, in 2016 the Commission formulated proposals to create a stronger Common European Asylum System, with common procedures and maximum harmonization, while presenting options to reform the Dublin Regulation. In April member states were presented with further proposals for reform, including the award of increased funding and resources to 'frontline' states. The European Asylum Support Office, based in **Malta**, was henceforth to be given a much greater role in monitoring the system and its effects.

In March 2016 the EU reached an agreement with **Turkey** (the so-called EU-Turkey Statement), which provided for undocumented asylum seekers who had not made an asylum application at their initial point of entry into the EU (usually Greece) to be returned to that country; the EU was to accept the same number of legitimately registered asylum seekers from Turkey's refugee camps—a so-called 'one in, one out' scheme. This plan did indeed reduce the

flow of refugees from Turkey to Greece. By mid-June some 511 refugees from the **Syrian Arab Republic** had been resettled from Turkey to the EU, while 462 migrants who had not made asylum applications in Greece were returned to Turkey. These were very small numbers, given the estimates of more than 2m. displaced Syrians within Turkey by that time. The Turkish Government pledged to increase efforts to prevent sea crossings, which witnessed more success: 9,250 refugees travelled from Turkey to the EU in June–September, a decline of over 90%. In return, the EU announced that it would accelerate progress towards visa liberalization for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU and made available funding of €6,000m. by 2018, to help Turkey manage the crisis. The **United Nations** High Commissioner for Refugees expressed concern about the agreement, particularly the risks faced by asylum claimants in Greece and Turkey who might not receive necessary protection while in transit. Furthermore, migrant arrivals in Italy from North Africa had increased as the crossing from Turkey to Greece became less attractive for undocumented asylum seekers. In June 2016 the Commission announced proposals for the establishment of a new **Migration Partnership Framework** (MPF) to mobilize and focus EU action and resources on managing migration. The EU proposed to realize partnerships with key third countries of origin and transit, and identified a number of ‘priority countries’, including Jordan, Lebanon and Nigeria. Building on the European Agenda on Migration, the priorities included saving lives at sea, increasing the rate of repatriation of undocumented migrants, enabling migrants and refugees to remain closer to home and, in the long term, helping third countries’ development in order to address the root causes of irregular migration.

Concerns about the free movement of migrants and asylum seekers were also a key factor in the British vote in June 2016 to leave the EU (see **Brexit**), despite the UK having an opt-out from the obligation to receive asylum seekers under the Commission’s quota programme.

In June 2018, during a summit meeting of EU leaders, a new agreement was reached, providing for the ‘burden sharing’ of migrants, which had been a source of tension between member states. Implementation of the agreement would allow other member states to lift some of the burden from Italy and **Spain**, and made provision for the voluntary creation of centres for processing asylum claims throughout the EU. The agreement also called for the foundation for a new external migration management facility, to be funded by the EU’s long-term budget.

A progress report on the European Agenda on Migration, published in October 2019, noted that the number of irregular border crossings into the EU had declined significantly, to some 150,000 in 2018, which was the lowest figure to be recorded over a five-year period. The EU acknowledged that co-operation with non-member states had been particularly important in achieving this, and made direct reference to the EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016. However, in contravention of the EU–Turkey Statement, at the end of February 2020 the Turkish Government announced that it would cease to

MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

control its borders with the EU and opened the passage for migrants (following an escalation of the conflict in Syria, and an air strike that killed more than 30 Turkish soldiers). In late March the EP's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs urged the evacuation of tens of thousands of migrants from the Greek islands as a preventive measure to avoid a large number of deaths from the spread of **COVID-19**. In September the Commission published proposals for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, in an effort to resolve the impasse that had arisen around the implementation of migration policy. The AMIF was renewed for 2021–27 as the **Asylum and Migration Fund** (AMF).

The **MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK** (MPF) was an initiative launched in June 2016 by the **European Commission** as a means of managing the **European Migration Crisis**. MPFs aim to structure the European Union's (EU) relationship with third countries, many of them in Africa, to stem the flow of immigrants into the EU. By 2017 agreements had been signed with Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, identified as significant countries in terms of both origin and the transit of migrants. Under the MPF, these countries were not only encouraged to stop their citizens from making the journey to Europe, but were also obliged to ensure citizens of other countries did not make use of them as transit points. Moreover, these countries were obliged to receive citizens deported by the EU member states. As part of the MPF, a Trust Fund for Africa was established, following the Valletta summit on Migration, held in November 2015 in **Malta**, in order to discuss migration with African leaders.

The **MILAN SUMMIT** held in **Italy** in June 1985 proved to be one of the more decisive sessions of the **European Council**. The Council was to consider the report from the **Dooge Committee** on institutional reform of the European Communities (EC) and the report from the **Committee for a People's Europe**, both of which had been commissioned at the 1984 **Fontainebleau summit**, as well as the decision at the Council's previous session in **Brussels, Belgium**, to establish a detailed timetable for the completion of an **internal market**. It was perhaps the first summit to be dominated by discussions on a comprehensive overhaul of the EC as established primarily by the **Treaty of Rome** almost 30 years earlier. In a way that was quite unprecedented for the European Council, which hitherto had always proceeded according to the principle of **unanimity**, a vote was called for on the establishment of an **intergovernmental conference** to discuss institutional reform; only a simple majority was needed. **Denmark, Greece** and the **United Kingdom** were outvoted by the other seven member states and subsequently agreed to participate in the conference, which led, some six months later, to the **Single European Act**. At the time, the Milan summit seemed more of a failure than a success as it had clearly revealed a degree of opposition from Denmark, **Greece** and the UK towards any deeper integration. In

retrospect, it is now recognized as a watershed in the history of European integration and one that relaunched the European integration project.

The United Nations' (UN) **MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS** (MDGs) were the eight development objectives agreed by UN members at the Millennium Summit in 2000, which expired at the end of 2015. The goals, which included targets to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, to achieve universal primary education, to promote **gender equality**, to reduce child mortality, to combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases, and to ensure environmental sustainability, made a significant contribution to raising public awareness, increasing political will and mobilizing resources to end poverty in developing countries. The **European Union** (EU) supported the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was approved unanimously by members of the UN in September 2015, and which builds on and extends the achievements of the MDGs, incorporating targets agreed at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, and aiming to address poverty eradication together with the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The **European Commission** has been an active participant in contributing to this process, and is committed to it both inside the EU (such as through the Circular Economy Strategy adopted in 2014, designed to address more sustainable patterns of production and consumption) and through the EU's external policies, by supporting similar efforts in developing countries. The Sustainable Development Goals, also known as Global Goals, succeeded the MDGs.

MINORITY RIGHTS are referenced by the **Treaty on European Union**. The European Union (EU) insists in the **Copenhagen Criteria** for accession to the EU that respect for the rights of minorities is a prerequisite for membership. Article 21 of the EU's **Charter of Fundamental Rights** prohibits discrimination against members of national minorities.

MOLDOVA gained its independence from the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1991 and has since struggled with the political and economic challenges of the transition from communist rule to democracy and a market economy. It also endured a civil war that left the country divided between Moldova proper and the separatist and pro-Russia Transnistria. Relations with the European Union (EU) nevertheless developed, primarily on the basis of a **partnership and co-operation agreement** signed in 1994 (which came into effect in 1998) and financial assistance under the former **Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States** programme. Since then, Moldova has sought some form of **association agreement** with the EU and it joined the **stability pact for South Eastern Europe** in 2001. The EU's response has been to include Moldova in its

European Neighbourhood Policy and more recently its **Eastern partnership**. This resulted in an Action Plan designed to promote closer ties between the EU and Moldova. Evidence of the EU's increasing engagement with Moldova—now a country on the EU's border following **Romania's** accession in 2007—came with the appointment in 2005 of an EU Special Representative on Moldova whose role is to strengthen the EU's contribution to the resolution of the Transnistria issue. There is a notional domestic political consensus in Moldova on the country eventually becoming a member of the EU. From the EU's point of view, such a goal could only be seriously contemplated if considerable progress were made in implementing democratic and market-focused economic reforms. The country's reform efforts led to progress in negotiations—launched in January 2010—on an **association agreement** similar to that under discussion with **Ukraine**. In December 2011 the EU agreed to instigate negotiations with Moldova on a **deep and comprehensive free trade area** (DCFTA), as an integral part of the association agreement talks, although the EU remained steadfast in not offering Moldova a clear perspective of membership. Following the conclusion of the seventh round of negotiations in June 2013, the DCFTA negotiating process was technically completed. The **European Council** formally approved an association agreement with Moldova, providing for the gradual introduction of a DCFTA, in June 2014 (alongside similar agreements signed with both Georgia and **Ukraine**); the agreement entered into effect in July 2016. The **Russian Federation** had expressed strong reservations about such close ties between the EU and these three republics.

MONETARY POLICY is fundamental to **economic and monetary union** (EMU). **Decision making** in this area varies with regard to the topic in question: for the issue of coins by the member states the **co-operation procedure** applies, after consultation with the **European Central Bank** (ECB); for the formulation of exchange-rate policy guidelines, the **Council of the European Union** decides by **qualified majority voting** (QMV) following a recommendation from the ECB; for technical adjustments to the Statute of the **European System of Central Banks**, the Council decides by QMV on a recommendation from the ECB after consulting the **European Commission** and obtaining the assessment of the **European Parliament** (EP); for the exchange rate of the **euro** against non-EMU currencies, the Council decides by **unanimity**, following a recommendation from the ECB or the Commission and after consulting the EP.

The **MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE** is the name of an adjunct to the **Council of the European Union**. Along with the **Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers** and the Economic Policy Committee, it is one of the bodies that provide a regular meeting place for representatives of the economic and finance ministers of the member states.

JEAN MONNET (1888–1979) probably contributed more than any other single individual to the post-war developments that established the building blocks that became the European Union (EU). Although he was pragmatic in his approach to integration, his contribution was in the form of ideas rather than as a practising politician. Monnet already had a distinguished diplomatic and business career when, in 1940, he contributed to the formulation of the plan for an Anglo-French Union subsequently advocated by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. After the Second World War, Monnet was appointed head of the French Planning Commission in charge of the Modernization Plan. His experiences there persuaded him that no European country could, by itself and using its own resources, plan an effective programme of economic growth, development and prosperity. While Monnet's ultimate objective was a European political union, he tended to be suspicious of ostentatious political gestures. He believed that a programme of integration had to be practical and long-term: effective political integration could only be built on an accretion of proven and accepted experiences of co-operation. For Monnet, the means of achieving progress was a gradual integration of discrete economic sectors that would, through a process of **spillover**, lead in time to full economic and political union.

Monnet was the original conceiver of the **Schuman Plan**, and was appointed as the first President of the High Authority of the **European Coal and Steel Community**. He was the originator of the Plevin Plan that produced the ill-fated **European Defence Community** (EDC). When the EDC collapsed, Monnet resigned from the High Authority to found the Action Committee for a United States of Europe. He successfully sponsored the creation of the **European Atomic Energy Community**, which, after the collapse of the EDC, he thought had more chance of success than the proposal for a **common market**.

Monnet's vision of a united Europe was not exclusive. While he believed that reconciliation between **France** and **Germany** was essential, it was a matter of regret to him that only six countries were willing to participate in experiments in integration. He continually urged the **Six** to encourage other states to join them; in particular, he believed that European integration would be incomplete without the involvement of the **United Kingdom**. Monnet's labours are commemorated in several ways by the EU, mainly through the funding of Monnet fellowships and other positions in the field of education.

MONNET METHOD is the term used to describe a strategy of integration based on **spillover** from one area of activity to another. It proved successful in the early years of European integration and again under Jacques Delors in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since then, it has proved more difficult to implement.

MONTENEGRO emerged again as a sovereign and independent European nation state (after nearly 90 years) in May 2006 when it severed its union with

Serbia following the outcome of a referendum in which some 55% of the population opted for independence. The vote heralded the end of the former Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which came into being in 2003 and which was itself the rump of the former **Yugoslavia** that had been created in 1919. The Government expressed at the outset its intention to join the **European Union** (EU), and Montenegro has made some progress in this direction since the split with Serbia. (Montenegro had unilaterally adopted the **euro** as its state currency when it was launched in January 2002.) In January 2007 the EU adopted a **European partnership** for Montenegro and two months later it concluded negotiations on a **stabilization and association agreement**. This was then signed in September 2007 (and came into force in May 2010), as was a visa facilitation agreement. An interim agreement on free trade entered into force on 1 January 2008 and Montenegro applied for EU membership on 15 December. The Commission published its *avis* on the application in November 2010 and proposed the conferral of candidate status (which was officially granted on 17 December 2010). A year later it also recommended the opening of **accession negotiations**, which, following a decision of the **European Council**, were duly opened on 29 June 2012. At 2021 these negotiations were ongoing, and more progress on closing the various policy chapters remained to be achieved before admission could be considered.

MOROCCO, one of the **Maghreb states**, entered into a bilateral trade and aid agreement with the European Communities (EC) in 1976. A decade later, in 1987, it submitted a formal application for membership, but was informed by the EC that because Morocco is not a European state it was not eligible for membership. An **association agreement** was signed with the European Union (EU) in 1996 (and came into effect in March 2000), and the country is part of the **Euro-Mediterranean partnership**. The first EU-Morocco summit took place in Granada, **Spain**, in March 2010. Negotiations towards a **Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement** with Morocco commenced in April 2013 in the Moroccan capital, Rabat.

MOVIMENTO 5 STELLE (M5S—Five Star Movement) was founded in 2009 by the late Gianroberto Casaleggio and Beppe Grillo, a popular comedian. Since its existence, M5S has gained a reputation for being an anti-establishment party and has sometimes been characterized as populist and **Euro-sceptic** (for example, one of its founders called for the suspension of the **Schengen Agreement**). In the 2018 general election M5S became the single largest party in the Italian legislature and went on to form a coalition Government with **Lega**. From September 2019 it formed part of a new coalition Government, in which former Deputy Prime Minister and M5S leader **Luigi Di Maio** was appointed to the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. Di Maio was re-appointed to the role in the new Government formed by **Mario Draghi** in early 2021.

The **MULTI-ANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK** (MFF) is the seven-year framework for the European Union (EU)'s annual **budget**. It sets the spending ceiling for the EU budget each year and must be adopted unanimously by the **Council of the European Union** with the consent of the **European Parliament** (EP). Negotiating the latest MFF for 2021–21 was a difficult process as the EU sought to shore up a socioeconomic framework that would demonstrate the EU's global power, withstand the United Kingdom's official departure (**Brexit**) and, latterly, help Europe recover from the **COVID-19** crisis. An agreement was finally reached in July 2020, with commitments amounting to some €1,074,300m. for the seven-year period (at 2018 prices). Political agreement on the MFF for 2021–27 was reached between the EP and the Council on 10 November 2020, and it was adopted in mid-December. See also **financial perspective**.

MULTIFIBRE ARRANGEMENT (MFA), the full title of which is the Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles, was first negotiated within the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT) in 1973. It was an agreement between Western industrial states and suppliers of low-cost textile goods from developing countries. The textile industries of the developed world had already been severely damaged by low-cost imports, and the MFA was established as a means of controlling imports in such a way that Western markets would be gradually opened to developing countries as an orderly contraction and restructuring of the Western textile industries was taking place. In practice, the MFA operated as a protectionist mechanism restricting the level of low-cost imports. In the renegotiations of the MFA in 1977, 1981 and 1986, Western governments successfully imposed stricter quotas on the developing countries. Textiles were therefore generally excluded from GATT and the European Communities' commitment to free trade. However, as a result of the **Uruguay Round** of GATT trade negotiations, the MFA was progressively eliminated over a 10-year period. The agreement finally expired on 1 January 2005. Immediately, exports from the People's Republic of China into the European Union (EU) soared and this ultimately compelled the EU to bring in a quota system to protect some European manufacturers, especially in **Greece** and **Portugal**.

MULTI-SPEED EUROPE is a term that is used to describe the notion of differentiated integration, whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of member states that are both willing and able to advance them. The term assumes that the other member states, which may be temporarily unable or not willing to advance a given objective at that moment in time, will join the participating member states at a later date.

MUTUAL RECOGNITION

MUTUAL RECOGNITION, as a principle, is essential for the proper functioning of the **single market**. It means that when a product is legally manufactured and marketed in one member state, it may be freely offered for sale in other member states, irrespective of whether it complies with the relevant national legislation in that country. The **Court of Justice** established the principle in 1979 in the *Cassis de Dijon* case.

NACC: See **North Atlantic Co-operation Council**

NAFO: See **North Atlantic Fisheries Organization**

NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS have always played a role in the development of the European Communities (EC) and European Union (EU), not least in adopting the necessary implementing legislation for **directives**, undertaking the **ratification** of treaties and agreements, and scrutinizing the activities of the EU and national governments. To these ends, national parliaments have created specialized committees dealing with EU matters. These committees meet with a group of **Members of the European Parliament** every six months under the umbrella of **COSAC** (Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires). Meetings of the Conference of Speakers of Parliaments in the EU are also held every six months. Less regular are the so-called **assizes** (or Conferences of the Parliaments) that are supposed to meet to discuss major developments in the EU.

Despite such involvement in EU affairs, concerns have long been expressed that closer integration at the EU level is leading to a reduction in the powers and roles of national parliaments. Moreover, there have been persistent concerns about the **democratic deficit** within the EU. Various, often fairly superficial, attempts have been made to remedy the situation. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** sought to improve the flow of information on EC/EU matters to national parliaments, particularly on matters concerning **police and judicial co-operation in Criminal Matters**, and to encourage a greater input from COSAC on the legislative activities of the EC/EU. These did little, however, to assuage concerns. Consequently, one of the main issues highlighted in the Declaration on the Future of the Union, adopted at the Nice **European Council** meeting in December 2000, was the 'role of national parliaments in the European architecture'. This was developed in the **Laeken Declaration**, which called on the **European Convention** to look at what role national parliaments should play in the future, possibly as part of a new institution in which they would be represented alongside the **European Parliament** and the **Council of the European Union**. The hope was that an increased involvement of national parliaments might help improve the

legitimacy of the EU and reduce the democratic deficit. The **Treaty of Lisbon**, which came into force on 1 December 2009, provided a more formal role for the national parliaments in the policymaking process and invited them to comment on and (if enough agreed) to block certain policy proposals.

NATO: See **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

NEGATIVE ASSENT is a phrase that has been used in the **United Kingdom** to describe the power of veto over **legislation** and the generally enhanced authority given to the **European Parliament** under the **Treaty on European Union** by the latter's implementation of the **co-decision procedure**, which created a joint **decision-making** mechanism.

NEIGHBOURHOOD, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INSTRUMENT: See European Development Fund

NEO-FUNCTIONALISM embodies one of the classical theories of European integration. It was devised in the 1950s as an attempt to explain and account for the political integration process that emerged in its unique form in Western Europe in that decade. According to the political scientist Ernst B. Haas, regional integration was the process of how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, and how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict themselves. For neo-functionalists the available evidence as manifest in the **European Coal and Steel Community**, the **European Economic Community** and the **European Atomic Energy Community** (Euratom) treaties seemed to suggest that the nation state was becoming redundant as an authoritative source of governance. In this European laboratory powers and sovereignty were being transferred from the nation states to a set of supranational institutions. Supranationality appeared to offer a new and definitive answer to resolving conflict through the pooling of sovereignty and the beginnings of a new Europe, but it was questioned whether a model could explain what was happening in such advanced countries and what the dynamics pushing the process onward were. Haas devised such a model. It refers to the placing of emphasis on a process of economic and political co-operation in limited and specified areas, rather than a commitment to a grand design such as **federalism**. Central to neo-functionalism is the idea of **spillover**, whereby co-operation in one area creates demands for, and leads to co-operation in, another. The appropriateness of neo-functionalism in explaining the process of integration has been challenged by, *inter alia*, **liberal intergovernmentalism**.

The **NETHERLANDS** has been deeply involved in European integration ever since 1945. Its Government-in-exile during the Second World War agreed on the establishment of the **Benelux** Economic Union (renamed the Benelux Union in 2010) and the Netherlands was also a founder member of the European Communities (EC). Several of its statesmen have made major contributions to European co-operative efforts. In the 1960s the Netherlands was a strong supporter of **enlargement**: it opposed the **Fouchet Plan**, wanting the question of enlargement to be settled first, and supported closer links between the EC and the **European Free Trade Association**. It also, albeit unsuccessfully, urged a reactivation of **Western European Union**. With its efficient agriculture, the Netherlands was a strong advocate of the **common agricultural policy**, of which it has been a major beneficiary. It later stressed the need for a stronger **environmental policy**, and after 1989 emphasized the importance of developing closer political links with **Central and Eastern Europe**. It persistently supported closer economic and political collaboration, favouring institutional reform and a substantially greater role for the **European Parliament** (EP). As the host of the **Maastricht summit**, which was to consider a constitutional reform of the EC, it was responsible for constructing the summit agenda. The **Netherlands** produced a draft that went beyond what most member states were prepared to accept, and it had to moderate its position, making the **Treaty on European Union** less comprehensive than it desired. It proved more successful in handling the end stages of the 1996 **intergovernmental conference**, which led to the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. The Dutch Government took a bold decision when it opted to hold a referendum on the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. **Referenda** are very unusual in Dutch political culture and it was assumed that the generally pro-European Union (EU) Dutch population would simply endorse the Government's position on the constitutional treaty. However, on 1 June 2005, three days after the French 'no' vote, some 62% voted against the treaty in the Netherlands, and so plunged the EU into a state of crisis. The Dutch Government decided not to hold a referendum on the **Treaty of Lisbon**. This treaty was ratified in the Dutch parliament in 2008.

NEUTRALITY, in some form, characterizes the foreign policies of six of the member states comprising the European Union: **Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta** and **Sweden**. It means that in times of war the neutral states refrain from becoming engaged in the conflict and treat the belligerents equally. For most of the **Cold War**, this meant that Austria, Finland and Sweden felt unable to join the European Communities. Once they did apply for membership in 1989–92, concerns were raised about the impact that their membership and continued adherence to neutrality would have on plans for **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP). In practice, the neutral countries have not raised significant or insurmountable objections to the

development of CFSP. The issue surfaced as a controversial theme in the Irish **referenda** on the European treaties.

The **NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA** (NTA) of 1995 represented an extension of the 1990 **Transatlantic Declaration** and provided a framework for European Union (EU)-US partnership and co-operation across a wide range of activities. The NTA contained four main priorities: to promote peace and stability, democracy and development throughout the world (e.g. joint co-operation over the former **Yugoslavia** and the **Middle East**); to respond effectively to global challenges (e.g. co-operation in fields such as public health); to promote economic relations and contribute to the growth of world trade; and to build closer links between Europe and the **USA**. The last two aims led to a number of transatlantic dialogues being established in areas such as the environment, consumer protection and business issues. The NTA was accompanied by an EU-US Joint Action Plan that contained some 150 specific areas of action. In May 1997 both parties reached agreement on Customs Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters, and in 1998 they signed a Mutual Recognition Agreement, which covers particular goods such as **pharmaceuticals** and medical devices and telecommunications equipment. In 1998 a further development included the launch of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, which sought to develop a regular dialogue on multilateral trade issues.

The NTA launched an era of unprecedented co-operation on a wide range of political, economic and civil society issues between the EU and the USA, although this did not by any means resolve all differences between the two economic powers over issues such as the environment, the structure of labour markets and economic protection of the US steel industry. The EU-US partnership developed as a highly strategic relationship, representing an ongoing means for dialogue on a range of issues and evolved into formal biannual EU-US summits between the Presidents of the **European Council** and the **European Commission** and the President of the USA. A Transatlantic Economic Council was established in 2007 to help steer economic co-operation between the EU and the USA.

NEXT GENERATION EU (NGEU) is the European Union (EU)'s **COVID-19** recovery plan. In conjunction with agreement on the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2021–27 NGEU was to support the creation of a Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), to provide funding to be distributed by means of grants and loans. This would facilitate the provision of significant financial support for public investment and reforms to increase the resilience of EU economies, and to develop preparedness for future economic and social challenges. Finalized by EU leaders in July 2020, under the agreement the Commission could borrow up to €750,000m. on the markets. At the heart of the recovery plan was the idea of solidarity, whereby wealthier EU

countries were to commit some €390,000m. in grants to the regions and sectors worst affected by the pandemic, with another €360,000m. to be made available in the form of loans for member states that most need such assistance as part of their recovery. The amounts available under NGEU, as agreed by the **European Council**, were broken down as follows: RRF, €672,500m. (loans €360,000m.; grants €312,500m.), React EU (which was to provide targeted crisis response and recovery measures by supplementing proposed cohesion funding for 2021–27), €47,500m.; **Horizon Europe**, €5,000m.; **InvestEU**, €5,600m.; European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), €7,500m.; the Just Transition Fund (put forward in January 2020 as part of the environment-orientated **European Green Deal** Investment Plan), €10,000m.; and the disaster-preparedness mechanism RescEU, €1,900m. The **European Parliament** and the Council reached political agreement on NGEU in November; it was adopted in mid-December.

NGO: See **Non-governmental Organizations**

NICE TREATY: See **Treaty of Nice**

NOISE is the subject of several European Union (EU) **directives** agreed as part of the EU's **environmental policy**. Maximum noise limits have been set for a wide range of commercial and domestic equipment. Manufacturers of many household appliances are required, moreover, to indicate the noise level on the packaging. Limits have also been set for decibel levels in the workplace.

NOMENCLATURE OF TERRITORIAL UNITS FOR STATISTICS (NUTS) describes a classification of regions in the European Union (EU) by the Statistical Office of the European Union (**Eurostat**). The NUTS system has three levels: each level 1 unit is normally subdivided into a certain number of level 2 units, and level 2 units are composed of smaller level 3 units. NUTS units often correspond to national administrative divisions, but are sometimes ad hoc groupings of smaller national units for the purposes of EU regional statistics. Not all member states are subdivided at all three levels.

The **NOMINATION PROCEDURE** is used to nominate the **European Commission** and its President. Originally, nomination involved only the 'common accord' of the governments of the member states. Following the adoption of the **Treaty on European Union**, the **European Parliament** (EP) was involved more, and the procedure split into four stages: nomination of the Commission President; nomination of the remainder of the Commission; approval by the EP; and appointment by 'common accord' of the member states. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** further involved the EP,

NON-COMPULSORY EXPENDITURE

requiring its approval of the Commission President before the rest of the Commission was nominated. Under the terms of the **Treaty of Nice**, the **Council of the European Union** took over the responsibilities of the member states and made **decisions** in this procedure by **qualified majority voting**.

NON-COMPULSORY EXPENDITURE referred to that part of the European Communities' (EC) **budget** (about 40%) that related to policies that were not directly provided for by the **Treaty of Rome** and its subsequent amendments. In practice, it included most EC **expenditure** except that on agriculture. After 1988 greater emphasis was placed upon 'privileged' non-compulsory expenditure, a phrase that refers to spending on long-term programmes. This development was criticized by the **European Parliament** (EP) for reducing its ability to influence the budget. The EP had greater influence over the non-compulsory part of the budget, and continually sought a redefinition and expansion of what that term covered. In practice, EP amendments to non-compulsory expenditure were not allowed to exceed an overall maximum figure previously set each year by the **Council of the European Union**. The criteria that determined the maximum level were the trend in gross national product, the average variation in the budgets of the member states, and the trend during the previous year in the cost of living. The **Treaty of Lisbon** ended the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure as far as the EP was concerned and gave the **Members of the European Parliament** an equal voice with the Council on the entire European Union budget.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) is a term which, when used in the context of the European Union (EU), refers to **interest groups** that are involved with the EU and active in seeking to influence EU policy development, but have no formal connection with the EU. The majority of these groups represent business interests (e.g. ERT, **BUSINESSEUROPE/UNICE**) alongside a smaller number of non-business or more diffuse interests (e.g. trade unions, and consumers' and environmental associations). There are multiple points of access to the EU policy process, including the **European Commission**, the **European Parliament** (EP), the **Council of the European Union** and even the Courts. The EU system is very open to interest groups and, indeed, the European institutions consider interest group involvement to be essential in the development of legitimate and appropriate policies. The Commission set up a database, CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society), of around 1,000 NGOs working at EU level, covering approximately 100 branches of activity. Both the Commission and the EP sought to regulate NGO activities in order to improve **transparency** and to establish minimum standards. (See also **lobbying**.)

NORDIC COUNCIL is the name of a body established in 1952 by the Nordic states as a loose association of intergovernmental co-operation. Despite its purely consultative character, the Nordic Council has achieved a high degree of co-operation and co-ordination in a wide range of policy fields. However, it failed, despite several initiatives, to secure an agreement on a Nordic economic union. After 1970 the Council created a limited institutional structure, with a small secretariat. In their membership applications to the European Communities (EC), **Denmark** and **Norway** made their continued membership of the Council an essential element of their submissions, a condition that was accepted by the EC. Denmark remained a member of the Council after joining the EC in 1973. It saw its role as one of liaison between the two organizations.

NORM PRICE is the term usually used to describe the price guaranteed to tobacco producers under the **common agricultural policy**.

The **NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL** (NACC) was a body linking the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** with the new democracies of **Central and Eastern Europe** and the **Commonwealth of Independent States**. It was established in 1991 as a framework for co-operation in defence and security to ensure stability throughout the continent of Europe. Its formation was criticized by some for duplicating and confusing the role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, now the **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**. The **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council** replaced the NACC in 1997.

The **NORTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES ORGANIZATION** (NAFO) is a body that consists of all those states with a major fisheries interest in the North Atlantic. NAFO was established in 1979 as a successor to the International Commission of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF, 1949–78). The fisheries regulated by NAFO centre on those areas outside the coastal 200-mile exclusive economic zones in the North Atlantic. At 2020 12 states were operating in the area covered by NAFO, which deals with questions of fishing limits and zones, permissible quotas and catches, conservation of stocks and the types of equipment allowed. NAFO does not have responsibility for managing all fishery resources; notably, salmon, shellfish, tuna/marlins and whales are outside its remit. Given the existence of the **common fisheries policy**, the European Union member states are represented in the organization by the **European Commission**.

The **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION** (NATO) owes its existence to the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949 that brought the **USA** and Canada together with 10 European countries (**Belgium, Denmark,**

France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the **United Kingdom**) in a military arrangement for the collective defence of Western Europe. During the **Cold War** the membership of NATO was enlarged to include **Greece** and **Turkey** in 1952, the Federal Republic of **Germany** in 1955, and **Spain** in 1986. France, however, withdrew from the integrated military command structure in 1966, although in 1996 it resumed participation in some of the military organs of NATO. NATO has undergone several further rounds of enlargement. As a result, only six of the **Twenty-Seven** European Union (EU) member states—**Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta** and **Sweden**—are not NATO members. France returned to the integrated military command structure in 2009.

NATO member states are committed to providing military forces according to their means; these forces are subject to the NATO chain of military command. An attack upon one state is regarded as an attack upon all, although the treaty does not specify how the affected member state will receive assistance from its partners, who are required to take only such action as they deem necessary. The organization was not meant to be an agent of integration, but NATO and the other new international organizations of the late 1940s made an important contribution to integration by bringing Western European countries together in a series of institutional frameworks that obliged them to co-operate and liaise with each other on an intensive and continuous basis. After the end of the Cold War, there was some doubt over the future of NATO.

After 1990 it sought to redefine its role as a political and security alliance in association with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (now the **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**—OSCE), and in 1992 it brought the former communist states of Eastern Europe into its consultative processes through the formation of the **North Atlantic Co-operation Council** (since 1997 replaced by the **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council**—EAPC). In 1994 the Partnerships for Peace programme was established under the aegis of NATO. This was open to EAPC and OSCE states and aimed to promote political and military co-operation throughout Europe. By December 1997 27 countries from **Central and Eastern Europe** and the former **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) had joined the initiative. In March 1999 three Central and Eastern European countries—the **Czech Republic, Hungary** and **Poland**—became full members of NATO. At the Prague (Czech Republic) summit in November 2002 NATO leaders agreed to extend membership invitations to up to seven more countries from the former Soviet bloc: **Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia** and **Slovenia**. These countries joined NATO in 2004. Further invitations were issued in 2008 to **Croatia** and **Albania**, and both joined on 1 April 2009. **Montenegro** joined in 2017. Georgia and **Ukraine** have also expressed a desire to join NATO. In February 2019, upon resolution of the decades-long ‘name dispute’ between the two countries, Greece was the first NATO member state to ratify the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia’s

NATO accession protocol, allowing the agreed name change as the Republic of **North Macedonia** to enter into force officially four days later. North Macedonia became a full member of NATO in March 2020.

In general, relations between NATO and the EU have been close. NATO's protection permitted the European Communities (EC) to develop and consolidate themselves, while conversely the economic co-operation engendered by the EC contributed to a stronger Western Europe. Fears by some nations of the potential for undermining NATO did not, however, prevent the establishment of either the **Eurocorps** in 1992 or the **European Rapid Reaction Force**. Nor did it prevent the EU from developing a **European Security and Defence Policy** and pursuing the goal of a common defence, identified as part of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** in the **Treaty on European Union** and confirmed in the **Treaty of Lisbon**. Such developments did not always contribute to harmonious relations between the EU and NATO, despite their overlapping membership. However, despite misgivings in some NATO circles, more often than not expressed from within the USA, about the EU's aspirations regarding security and defence matters, the EU-NATO relationship became closer over time. The Berlin-Plus Agreement of 2002 provided for EU access to NATO assets and planning capabilities in the event of EU-led crisis management operations, and in the more institutionalized nature of dialogue. **Enlargement** to include the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe** from 2004 increased the ranks of pro-NATO member states within the EU. At a NATO summit meeting held in Lisbon, **Portugal**, in November 2010, a new Strategic Concept was adopted, which committed NATO to working more closely with its international partners, including the United Nations and the EU. In July 2016, following a NATO summit held in Warsaw, **Poland**, the EU and NATO signed a joint declaration, which identified seven specific areas for enhanced co-operation. Building on this, in December more than 40 measures to strengthen co-operation were duly approved by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both organizations. The current Secretary-General of NATO is Jens Stoltenberg.

After **Donald Trump** took office as US President at the beginning of 2017, he was especially critical of those European NATO partners that were not considered to be contributing sufficiently to the Alliance. Indeed, this was a major narrative of Trump's presidential campaign. The USA's sometimes more ambivalent attitude towards NATO under Trump further encouraged the development of **PESCO**.

NORTH MACEDONIA, officially the Republic of North Macedonia, was part of **Yugoslavia** from 1919 until its declaration of independence, as the Republic of Macedonia, in 1991. The decision on the country's name drew a hostile response from **Greece**, which had a province of the same name, and the Greek Government feared that any international recognition of the new 'Macedonian' state might encourage a false claim to future territorial

expansion. Greek opposition culminated in thwarting the European Union's (EU) recognition of Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia until 1995, by which time the new state had been admitted to the United Nations under an interim name, as the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYRM). The FYRM concluded a **trade and co-operation agreement** with the EU in 1997. A **stabilization and association agreement** (SAA) followed in 2000, along with medium-term financial assistance. Although it was keen to join the EU, civil unrest in 2001 excluded the FYRM from the chance of joining the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe** in **accession negotiations**. It was, nevertheless, recognized as a **potential candidate state**. Successful **ratification** of its SAA in early 2004 was scheduled to be swiftly followed by the submission of an application for EU membership on 26 February 2004. The death in an air crash of the country's President, Boris Trajkovski, earlier that day meant that the application was postponed to 22 March. The **European Commission's** response to the application came in November 2005 and was positive. The following month the European Council upgraded the status of the FYRM to **candidate country**, although no timetable was given for the opening of accession negotiations. Two years later the Commission proposed the adoption of an **accession partnership** for the FYRM, thus upgrading relations from the **European partnership** of 2004 to a mechanism focused, symbolically, more squarely on accession. The country remains a candidate state alongside **Albania, Montenegro, Serbia** and **Turkey**. However, the European Commission acknowledged that the accession process had reached an impasse by the mid-2010s, and a severe political crisis in the country in 2015–16 led to EU concern. In mid-2015 cross-party talks between the FYRM Government and opposition leaders, mediated by the European Commissioner then responsible for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, **Johannes Hahn**, resulted in an agreement, according to which early legislative elections were scheduled to take place in the FYRM in 2016 as part of efforts to resolve the crisis; however, the elections were repeatedly postponed owing to political disagreement. A new accord was reached in the FYRM in July 2016 with the mediation of the EU and the **USA**, which provided for electoral and media reforms to be undertaken. Legislative elections duly took place in December and, following intervention by, notably, the EU and US officials, at the end of May 2017 a new Government was formed under Zoran Zaev, and the party that had ruled the country for a decade was removed from power. In June 2018, following almost 30 years of disagreement, an agreement was reached between the FYRM and Greece to rename the country the Republic of North Macedonia, subject to legislative and popular approval. The name change entered into effect in February 2019. In March 2020 the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with both North Macedonia and Albania, although talks had not opened by late 2021.

The **NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL** (Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland) is a compromise arrangement negotiated between the **UK** Government and the European Union (EU) in 2019, and finalized in 2020, in order to avoid customs checks within the island of Ireland. The protocol also helped to guarantee the gains of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which had largely brought peace to Northern Ireland, following decades of conflict. The protocol was the **Boris Johnson** Government's alternative to the **backstop**, and it was agreed as part of the **withdrawal agreement** (although in September 2020 the Johnson administration had declared its intention to set aside elements of that agreement, attracting criticism from the EU). One unintended consequence of eliminating a 'hard' border on the island of Ireland was that it, in some cases, effectively created one between the British mainland and Northern Ireland. For example, chilled meat products are not allowed to enter the EU from non-EU countries, and thus the transportation of chilled meat from the rest of the UK into Northern Ireland was technically not permissible. An exemption was negotiated, which was subsequently extended. Furthermore, the UK has also been seeking to remove the jurisdiction of the **European Commission** and the European **Court of Justice** (ECJ) to oversee the functioning of the protocol. Because this agreement has the status of international law, a breach on the part of the UK represents a breach of international law. Beyond the legal implications, the impact of the lack of consensus over the protocol has led to increased tensions, including in 2020 the worst street violence since the introduction of the Good Friday Agreement. In October 2021 the EU offered to remove some border controls between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK in an effort to reduce tensions with the UK, after the British Government threatened to suspend the implementation of the protocol; however, the UK Government asserted that the concessions did not go far enough, and talks were ongoing at late 2021.

NORWAY has been, in general, suspicious of close European relations that involve anything more than intergovernmental co-operation. It first applied to join the European Communities (EC) in 1962, doing so out of necessity more than enthusiasm for European integration. Indeed, there was considerable disquiet in the country over what membership might mean in terms of national sovereignty and the 'special problems' arising from the country's 'geographical location and economic structure', which the Government had said would need to be resolved by the negotiations. Hence, **France's veto** of the **United Kingdom's** application in 1963 and again in 1967 was not wholly unwelcome. Opposition to membership increased after the resumption of negotiations in 1970, and the deep feelings aroused had widespread repercussions throughout Norway. In September 1972 a narrow majority (53%) voted against membership in a consultative referendum. Preparations for accession were halted and replaced by discussions on a **free trade agreement**, which entered into force in 1973. Thereafter, EC membership disappeared from the

NOUVELLES EQUIPES INTERNATIONALES

Norwegian political agenda until 1988, when it re-emerged because of concerns over the possible effect of the **internal market**. Initially, the preference was for the **European Economic Area** (EEA), but Norway soon found itself following its neighbours in applying for EC membership in 1992. **Accession negotiations** were concluded in 1994, but once again membership was rejected in a referendum. Since then, Norway's relations have been based on full participation in the EEA (which it joined in 1994) as well as involvement in the **Schengen Agreement**. Future membership of the European Union (EU) has not been wholly ruled out, but the issue of EU membership is one that continues to divide public and political opinion in Norway.

NOUVELLES EQUIPES INTERNATIONALES was the name of a transnational association of Christian Democrat political parties formed in 1947. In 1965 it changed its name to the European Union of Christian Democrats, and in 1976 its members from member states of the European Communities founded the European People's Party (see **Group of the European People's Party—Christian Democrats**) as a transnational organization.

NOUVELLES FRONTIÈRES is the name of a French travel agency that challenged the price-fixing regulations of the French Civil Aviation Code in the **Court of Justice**. In April 1986 the Court ruled in favour of the company, declaring that air transport was not exempt from the **competition policy** of the European Communities, and that, under the **Treaty of Rome**, member states were not permitted to approve air fares that resulted from agreements between airlines. This was the first major challenge to the **cartel** arrangements on air fares pursued by both governments and airlines. The Court also pointed out that responsibility for determining whether an air-fare agreement transgresses the treaty rests with the **European Commission** and the national anti-trust authorities. The ruling gave the Commission greater powers, although subsequent progress on air transport liberalization was slow.

NUCLEAR ENERGY: See **Energy Policy; European Atomic Energy Community; European Fusion Development Agreement; Joint European Torus; European Consortium for the Development of Fusion Energy**

NUTS: See **Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics**

OCTs: See **Overseas Countries and Territories**

OECD: See **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**

OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EUR-OP): See **Publications Office of the European Union**

The **OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (OJ)** was first published in 1952 as a daily journal. The OJ is published daily in the official languages of the European Union (EU) member states (with the exception, generally, of Irish). It records the details of all EU (and, earlier, European Communities) **legislation. Regulations** become law throughout the EU as soon as they are published in the *Journal*. Only legal acts published in the OJ are binding. It also carries details of EU initiatives. Before the entry into force of the **Treaty of Nice**, the OJ was called the *Official Journal of the European Communities*. Since 1998 an electronic version of the OJ has been made available on **EUR-Lex** with every printed edition.

OJ: See *Official Journal of the European Union*

OLAF: See **European Anti-fraud Office**

An **OMBUDSMAN**, a post created by the **Treaty on European Union**, is appointed by the **European Parliament (EP)** to deal with complaints of maladministration in European Union (EU) **institutions** (with the exception of the **Court of Justice** and the **General Court**) and initiatives. Upon the receipt of complaints from citizens, from business and other interests working in the EU, the Ombudsman launches an inquiry to try to resolve any particular issue of concern. The first Ombudsman, who took office in September 1995, was Jacob Söderman of **Finland**; he remained in the post until March 2003.

His successor was Nikiforos Diamandouros, who, having served as the first ombudsman in his native **Greece**, was elected by the EP in January 2003. Diamandouros assumed the post on 1 April 2003 and was re-elected in 2005. In January 2010 Diamandouros was re-elected; after he announced his retirement, **Emily O'Reilly** of Ireland was elected Ombudsman in July 2013. O'Reilly was re-elected for a five-year term in December 2014, and again in December 2019. The Ombudsman submits an annual report on their activities to the EP.

OMC: See **Open Method of Co-ordination**

OPEN METHOD OF CO-ORDINATION (OMC) is a policy method (introduced in 2000) that essentially involves the comparison of national policies across the European Union (EU) and the dissemination of best practices in such areas as social policy and employment policy. This instrument aims to facilitate the exchange of ideas and experiences between the member states and is intended to foster policy and learning. Under this method, member states seek to agree to and apply non-binding EU guidelines to national and regional policies, while avoiding the necessity of enacting new EU **legislation**.

OPENNESS relates primarily to increasing calls from the 1990s onwards for the provision of greater information about European Union (EU) policy debates and the EU decision-making processes within the EU **institutions** and, in particular, the **Council of the European Union**. Openness is closely associated with the other concepts such as **transparency**, **legitimacy** and **accountability** that are familiar, recurrent themes of European governance. The EU institutions have promised greater openness in a serious effort both to reduce the criticisms of a '**democratic deficit**' and to enable the public to appreciate and understand much better the workings of the EU. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** included a chapter on transparency that gives 'any citizen ... a right of access to **European Parliament**, Council and **European Commission** documents'. Despite these aspirations, access remains rather restricted, especially to the workings of the **Council of the European Union**. The launch of the **European Convention** in February 2002, following the meeting of the Laeken **European Council** of December 2001, was a further means of drawing the people of Europe closer to the EU, as are efforts to enable citizens to petition the EU institutions (under the **Treaty of Lisbon**) and also to have recourse to the European **Ombudsman**.

OPINIONS are one of two kinds of non-binding pronouncement that may be issued by the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Commission**. Like **recommendations**, they do not constitute instructions, but merely express the preference of the European Union, and may be

disregarded by the member states. (See also **Court of Justice; decisions; directives; law; legislation; regulations; resolutions.**)

OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA is a term, attributed to the US economist Robert Mundell, which refers to a group of countries bound together by a system of fixed exchange rates. From 1970 such an area was an objective of the European Communities and was to be achieved through the establishment of **economic and monetary union**.

OPT-OUT is a term that came into common usage after the 1991 **Maas-tricht summit**. It refers to a decision to allow a member state the statutory right not to take part in any specific activity pursued by the European Union. Opt-outs are in fact exemptions from treaty provisions and have been granted to **Denmark** and the **United Kingdom** (before **Brexit**) over **economic and monetary union**, and enabled the UK to remain outside the aspirations and all decisions pertaining to the Social Chapter of the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) until the UK Government abandoned this opt-out in 1997. (See also **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.**) Denmark also secured some political opt-outs from the defence elements of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** following its initial rejection of the TEU in 1992. Denmark, the UK and Ireland were granted various opt-out and opt-in arrangements governing the area of freedom, security and justice and Schengen, which were both established by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. These arrangements survived the **Treaty of Nice** and the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the latter updating those on the area of freedom, security and justice and Schengen and creating a new partial opt-out from the application of the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** for **Poland** and the UK. (See **Schengen Agreement.**)

VIKTOR ORBÁN (1963–) has been the Prime Minister of Hungary since 2010. He has also been the leader of the conservative party Fidesz since 2003 (as well as in 1993–2000). Orbán studied law at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, from where he graduated in 1987. Prior to entering politics, he also studied political science for a short time at Pembroke College, Oxford, the **United Kingdom**. Orbán's brand of politics is significantly **Euro-sceptic**, quite nationalistic and increasingly populist. As such, the Orbán administration has experienced substantial friction in its relations with the European Union (EU). During the **European migration crisis**, Orbán, like other leaders in the **Visegrad Group**, rejected the EU's plan for the compulsory re-distribution of immigrants between EU member states. Orbán has accused the EU, *inter alia*, of 'muslimizing' Europe, in what has been widely deemed a pattern of Islamophobic rhetoric. (See **Hungary.**) Following his re-election as Prime Minister in 2018, Orbán continued to pursue nationalist policies, which were

ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE

also often perceived to be anti-democratic, and counter to the spirit of Hungary's membership of the EU.

The **ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE** (formerly known as the co-decision procedure) is the European Union's standard decision-making procedure. It was introduced by the **Treaty on European Union**, being later simplified by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, and requires all **legislation** adopted under the procedure to be approved by both the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament**. Where the two institutions are initially unable to approve legislation, a **Conciliation Committee** is held. The co-decision procedure is used to adopt legislation in an increasing number of policy areas (e.g. the **single market**, **social policy**, **transport policy** and **environmental policy**), although it does not apply to certain principal areas, such as the **common agricultural policy** (CAP), which is still governed by the **consultation procedure**, and matters of **economic and monetary union**, which are decided by the **co-operation procedure** introduced by the **Single European Act** of 1987. The **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** envisaged the co-decision procedure being renamed the 'ordinary legislative procedure'. The **Treaty of Lisbon** copied this example and, in renaming the procedure, also further extended the areas in which co-decision would be utilized, notably to include decisions relating to the CAP.

The **ORDINARY REVISION PROCEDURE** is the means by which the European Union's member states amend the **founding treaties**. Traditionally it has involved an **intergovernmental conference** and **ratification** of the new treaty by **national parliaments** and/or **referenda**. With the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, a new element has been included: a convention. This will examine proposed amendments and adopt recommendations, and follow structurally the model of the **European Convention** of 2002–04 which produced the **draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. The Treaty of Lisbon also introduced a **simplified revision procedure**.

EMILY O'REILLY (1958–) became the **Ombudsman** in October 2013, when she succeeded Nikiforos Diamandouros. She was re-elected for a five-year term in mid-December 2014. O'Reilly was born and grew up in **Ireland**. She graduated with a degree in Modern Languages and Literature from University College Dublin in 1979 before pursuing a career in journalism and broadcasting. She became Ireland's first female Ombudsman in 2003 and was appointed Commissioner for Environmental Information and Freedom of Information in the **European Commission** in 2007.

The **ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES** (OACPS) is the new name of the rebranded group of **ACP states**.

In December 2019 the 9th summit of ACP heads of state and government, held in Nairobi, Kenya, endorsed revisions to the Georgetown Agreement that, *inter alia*, renamed the organization as above, with effect from 5 April 2020. In September 2018 the (then) ACP states had initiated negotiations with the European Union (EU) on drafting a successor agreement to the 2003 **Cotonou Agreement** governing EU-ACP development co-operation, which was scheduled to expire at the end of February 2020 (in turn, the Cotonou Agreement had succeeded the 1975 **Lomé Conventions** as the mutual co-operation basis); in February 2020 both sides agreed to extend the existing agreement until the end of the year, and in December a further extension, until November 2021, was approved; in December 2020, meeting virtually, the OACPS Council of Ministers endorsed a draft post-2020 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement; a finalized version of the text was initialled in April 2021 and was scheduled to be signed formally at a ministerial meeting to be held in Apia, Samoa. The OACPS Council of Ministers convenes two ordinary annual sessions, and sectoral ministerial meetings on trade and on culture are also held. Membership comprises 48 African, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific states.

The **ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT** (OECD) was established under US leadership in 1961 as a successor to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. The **USA** sought a collaborative body that might mitigate some of the feared adverse consequences of the division of Western Europe into the **European Economic Community** and the **European Free Trade Association**. The USA and Canada became full members of the new organization, and **Japan** joined in 1964. The majority of European Union member states belong to the OECD, which is a forum for the advanced industrial democracies, concerned not only with the effectiveness of the domestic economies of its members, but also with the broader and long-term problems of the international economic system. The OECD has 36 member countries and is based in Paris, **France**, where it maintains a substantial organization staffed by economic experts. It has often acted as a pioneer in developing economic concepts, for example on **competition policy** and labour markets, and its regular economic reports and surveys on the international and national economies are detailed and highly regarded. The recommendations of its reports are often implemented, although the OECD cannot impose a policy upon any one state. The OECD seeks to foster good governance in the public service and in corporate activity. It also provides a forum to assist policymakers in adopting strategic orientations. The OECD is currently headed by Mathias Cormann, who took up the post of Secretary-General on 1 June 2021.

The **ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE** (OSCE) was originally known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), a series of European conferences on security,

science and technology, economic, environmental and **human rights** issues. A meeting place for all European countries, the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR), the **USA** and Canada, it first convened in Helsinki, **Finland**, in July 1973. The conclusion of this first meeting was the Helsinki Final Act, which marked agreement in three main areas: economic co-operation, human rights and the exchange of information about military activities. Further meetings were held at regular intervals, in addition to a number of more specialized sessions, primarily on arms control, disarmament and human rights. The CSCE quickly assumed considerable importance as the principal opportunity for dialogue between East and West during the **Cold War**. Nevertheless, its significance as a pan-European forum could even be said to have increased after the ending of the Cold War.

Under the terms according to which the CSCE was established, and also at the insistence of the USSR, the European Communities (EC) were not allowed to have a common representation of their own. However, the EC member states collaborated closely with one another in one of the first successful applications of **European political co-operation**, and the Helsinki Final Act was signed by Aldo Moro of **Italy** (the holder of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers—see **Council of the European Union**—at the time) ‘for Italy, and in the name of the European Community’. At the 1990 Paris meeting, which concluded with the signing of the **Charter of Paris for a New Europe**, endowing the CSCE with permanent institutions, the EC participated as a single entity rather than as separate states. In December 1994 the Budapest summit conference adopted the new name OSCE to indicate the organization’s permanent nature and growing political role. The OSCE maintains a secretariat in Vienna, **Austria**, and has 57 member states, including all the former republics of the USSR. The abrupt rise in membership from 35 in 1990 to 55 by 1997 reflected the disintegration of the USSR and **Yugoslavia** in the early 1990s. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now divided between Serbia and **Montenegro**), which was suspended from the CSCE in 1992, was admitted to the OSCE in 2000. The OSCE Secretary-General is Helga Maria Schmid.

OSCE: See **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

The **ÖSTERREICHISCHE VOLKSPARTEI** (ÖVP—Austrian People’s Party) is a Christian-democratic, centre-right conservative party and the ruling party of **Austria** in 2017–19, where it governed in coalition with the **Euro-sceptic** and populist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ—Freedom Party of Austria). The ÖVP is led by Chairman Sebastian Kurz, who served as the Austrian Federal Chancellor until October 2021. In snap elections in October 2019, the ÖVP emerged as the leading party. The ÖVP is a member of the **Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)** parliamentary group within the **European Parliament**.

OSTPOLITIK refers to the reorientation of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of **Germany** (FRG—West Germany) after 1969 under the new left-of-centre Chancellor, Willy Brandt, which led to a series of treaties concluded by the FRG with the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR), the German Democratic Republic (GDR—East Germany), **Poland**, and Czechoslovakia, and a Four Power agreement on Berlin. This change in policy was denounced by the Christian Democrats and their allies in Germany and caused a degree of concern in the West about Bonn's rapprochement with Moscow. To counter this, however, Brandt reinforced his support for European integration and strongly backed British membership of the European Communities (EC). As a result of the agreement with East Germany, the latter's products gained access to the EC in such great numbers that East Germany was sometimes described as the silent member of the EC.

OUTER SEVEN was a phrase often used in the 1960s to describe the member states of the **European Free Trade Association**.

OUTERMOST REGIONS were formally acknowledged in the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU). There are eight such regions: four French overseas departments (Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion), one French overseas collectivity (Saint Martin), the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. All, by nature of their size, remoteness and climate, are dependent economically on a small number of export products. All the outermost regions are relatively depressed and receive substantial financial assistance through the European Union **budget**. The outermost regions are subject to a declaration drawn up at the time of the TEU, which acknowledges their major structural problems, and the **Council of the European Union**, acting under the rules of **qualified majority voting**, can give these areas exemption from the application of the provisions of the common policies.

The **OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES** (OCTs) were colonies or former colonies constitutionally subject to European Union (EU) member states and the subject of Articles 182–187 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Articles 198–204 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**). Mainly French possessions when the treaty was signed in 1957, they were either overseas adjuncts to the metropolitan country or, in practice, colonies. A special convention annexed to the treaty specified the details of the association. Products from OCTs would have access to the European Communities (EC) market on the same terms as those of the member states, with a gradual removal of customs duties over five years. An Overseas Development Fund was established to finance development projects. After 1963 OCTs were absorbed into the broader EC agreements of the Yaoundé Convention, the **Lomé Convention** and the **Cotonou Agreement**. However, in 2001 a new

OWN RESOURCES

association agreement was adopted, which provided a new co-operation framework for EU-OCT relations.

OWN RESOURCES is a term that refers to the possession by the European Union (EU) of financial resources that belong to it as of right and together form the **budget**. When the **European Economic Community** was established, its funding relied on the receipt of annual contributions from the member states. With the 1970 **Treaty of Luxembourg**, the member states agreed to move to a funding system of own resources, an independent source of income for the European Communities to spend as they wished within the limits of the obligations and decision-making criteria set down by the treaties. Own resources were to be phased in over a period of five years. The own resources of the EU collected for it by the member states consist of **customs duties** on imports from third countries, levies on agricultural imports and the sugar and isoglucose levies, a contribution from the member states based on each country's share of total gross national product (GNP) in the EU and a proportion of the **value-added tax** (VAT) levied by the member states. In January 2019 VAT-based own resources were replaced by a simplified method, with a uniform rate of 0.3%. According to the agreement reached on the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2021–27, from January 2021 a new own resource was introduced, made up of a national contribution calculated using the weight of non-recycled plastic packaging waste. The **European Commission** was expected to propose new own resources in 2021, specifically a so-called carbon border adjustment mechanism and a digital levy, with plans for their introduction by 1 January 2023.

PADOA-SCHIOPPA REPORT is the name of a report commissioned by the **European Commission** and submitted in April 1987 by a committee headed by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (1940–2010), the Deputy Director-General of the Bank of Italy. The committee had been asked to evaluate the effect of the entry into the European Communities (EC) of **Portugal** and **Spain**, and of the commitment to an **internal market** upon the EC's economic system. The report contained four major recommendations: the establishment of a common monetary policy; the promotion of cohesion; the completion on schedule of the internal market; and the development of a macroeconomic strategy. These measures, it argued, were necessary to promote economic development while preventing an aggravation of regional economic differences within the EC.

A **PARAGRAPH** is a sub-element of an **Article** in the **European treaties**. Paragraphs within an Article are usually numbered.

A **PART** is a main sub-division in the **Treaty of Rome** and its successor, the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**. Parts may in turn be sub-divided into **Titles**. The **Treaty on European Union** does not contain Parts, but is divided instead into Titles.

PARTNERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS (PCAs) were initially conceived to provide a framework for closer political, cultural and economic relations between the European Union (EU) and former republics of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR). In some cases, the agreements make reference to the possibility of eventual free trade with the EU. In all cases, emphasis is placed on the commitment of the contracting parties to **human rights** and democracy.

The **PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS (PES)** forms part of the **Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)** group in the **European Parliament**.

PASSERELLE CLAUSE

The **PASSERELLE CLAUSE** was originally found in Article 42 of the **Treaty on European Union** and allowed the **Council of the European Union**, acting unanimously, to transfer policy competences from the inter-governmental **pillar** III to the supranational European Community pillar of the European Union. Any transfer had first to be ratified by the member states. Since the abandonment of the pillar structure with the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the passerelle clause has been replaced by the **simplified revision procedure**.

PATENTS are not necessarily exempt from the **competition policy** of the European Union (EU). The **European Commission** has the authority to decide whether a patent or trademark violates the rules of competition. The **Court of Justice** has upheld the general principle of the non-exclusiveness of patents. Conversely, the Commission has launched several initiatives to facilitate the registration and protection of patents. In December 2012 all member states (with the exception of **Italy**, **Spain** and **Poland**) and the **European Parliament** agreed on a ‘patent package’—a legislative initiative consisting of two regulations and an international agreement, laying the ground for the creation of unitary patent protection and a Unified Patent Court in the EU. (See also **Unitary Patent Convention**; **European Union Intellectual Property Office**.)

PCAS: See **Partnership and Co-operation Agreements**

PEOPLE’S EUROPE: See **Citizenship**; **Committee for a People’s Europe**

PERMANENT MISSION is the name given to the diplomatic representation of a non-member state to the European Union.

PERMANENT REPRESENTATION is the name given to the large delegation that each member state maintains in **Brussels**. It consists of both diplomats and administrative officials seconded from those national ministries whose work is affected by **decisions** of the European Union. A Permanent Representative, who possesses senior ambassadorial status, heads each delegation. Collectively, the Permanent Representatives meet at least weekly as the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** (COREPER).

PERMANENT STRUCTURED CO-OPERATION: See **PESCO**

PERMISSIVE CONSENSUS was coined by academics in the 1970s to describe the way in which European publics appeared to take for granted or

readily accept the process of European integration. The permissive consensus has since been seriously challenged, as seen in: the rise of Euroscepticism; the **ratification crises** surrounding the **Treaty on European Union**, the **Treaty of Nice** and, more recently, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and the **Treaty of Lisbon**; and the concerns expressed about the **legitimacy** of the European Union (EU); and, significantly, **Brexit**. The way in which a gap now exists between the political and economic elite and the wider populations of the former **Fifteen** and now **Twenty-Seven** member states cannot be disputed and has also been clearly displayed in the findings of **Eurobarometer** from 1992 onwards and in the **referenda** on, for example, the **euro**. These results led to repeated demands for greater ‘civic participation’ in the EU project.

PES: See the **Party of European Socialists**

PESCO (Permanent Structured Co-operation) is a framework devised to enhance the defence and security of European Union (EU) member states, established in 2017; 25 EU member states agreed to participate, with **Denmark** and **Malta** remaining outside the arrangement. PESCO is based on Article 42.6 and Protocol 10 of the **Treaty on European Union**. PESCO aims to pool resources in terms of defence equipment, research, funding and other initiatives of the **European Defence Agency**. Additionally, at full functionality, PESCO should have the capacity to supply to missions for between 30 and 120 days. These missions could include humanitarian, conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization and peacekeeping tasks. Participating member states identified 17 initial projects to be undertaken under PESCO, relating to the broad areas of training, capability development and operational readiness, which were formally adopted by the Council in early March 2018. At the same time, the Council adopted a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO. The Council adopted a second set of 17 projects in November and a third set of 13 projects in November 2019.

The **PETERSBERG TASKS** were originally set out in the Petersberg Declaration issued by foreign and defence ministers of the member states of **Western European Union** (WEU) in June 1992. They cover humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping activities and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. At the time, it was anticipated that WEU would undertake these tasks. Since then, however, the emphasis has shifted to the European Union (EU), notably through the **Treaty of Amsterdam** and, more recently, the further development of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the creation of a **European Rapid Reaction Force**. With the de facto transfer of many of WEU’s activities to

PETITIONS

the EU, the latter's responsibilities for, and commitment to, undertaking Petersberg tasks have increased.

PETITIONS may be referred to in the context of the right of citizens of the European Union (EU) to petition the **European Parliament** (EP) on any matter that falls within the EU's areas of authority, and that affects them directly. The right of petition was formalized by the **Treaty on European Union**, which empowered the EP to appoint an independent **Ombudsman** to receive and evaluate petitions and complaints. Where the Ombudsman upholds an allegation of maladministration, a report is submitted to both the institution concerned and the EP. The formalization of the right of petition was part of the attempt to develop a notion of EU **citizenship**.

PHARE, sometimes known as Operation PHARE, is the name originally given to the **Poland** and **Hungary** Assistance for Economic Restructuring programme, a system for co-ordinating economic aid set up by the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**, and co-ordinated by the European Communities. Established in 1989, it was subsequently extended to include **Albania**, **Bulgaria**, the **Czech Republic**, **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Romania**, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia**. In March 1997 the **European Commission** agreed to the extension of PHARE in order to provide specific assistance to the **applicant countries** of **Central and Eastern Europe**, to help these countries implement the reforms required to fulfil the criteria for European Union membership. Assistance was to focus on building democratic institutions and administrations and financing investment (especially in the areas of the environment, transport, product quality, working conditions and major infrastructure projects). Among the projects funded were **twinning**, the **instrument for structural policies for pre-accession** (ISPA) and the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD). A Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAEIX) was opened in 1996 as part of PHARE operations. Overall annual funding available under PHARE, **SAPARD** and ISPA in the period 1999–2003 amounted to €2,645m. This compares with an annual figure for PHARE during 1995–99 of €730m. Assistance programmes similar to PHARE were established for the former **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (see **Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States**—TACIS) and the **Western Balkans** (see **CARDS**). On 1 January 2007 the **instrument for pre-accession assistance** replaced PHARE.

PHARMACEUTICALS have been a central concern of the **European Commission**. In pursuance of its **health and safety** policy, the Commission has been active in regulating pharmaceutical products, and a series of **directives** apply to their testing, patenting, production, marketing and labelling.

Patenting in the use of brand names has also been held, in principle, to contravene **competition policy**, which has encouraged the growth of generic products that are often substantially cheaper than the branded product. In 1994 the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products was established in London, the **United Kingdom**, as a decentralized agency of the European Union responsible for overseeing the registration of human and veterinary medicinal products; the agency was renamed the **European Medicines Agency** (EMA) in 2004. The EMA relocated from the UK to Amsterdam, the **Netherlands**, in March 2019, as part of preparations for **Brexit**.

PILLAR is a term that was applied to the notional structure of the European Union (EU) prior to the **Treaty of Lisbon**, which came into force in December 2009. During this period the EU was held to consist of three pillars, the **European Council** being the only body capable of co-ordinating all three. The central pillar, the first pillar, was the European Communities (EC), where the **Community method** applied and the **European Commission**, **European Parliament** and the **Court of Justice** exercised their full powers. The two other pillars were **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP), pillar II, and **justice and home affairs** (JHA), pillar III. These were governed by principles of intergovernmental co-operation where the constitutional authority of the EC did not apply. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** amended the third pillar to the effect that it was now concerned with **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**. With the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the pillars were replaced by a more integrated structure, although the CFSP retains many of its intergovernmental characteristics.

POCO: See **European Political Co-operation**

POLAND entered into negotiations for association with the European Communities as a new democracy in 1989, and in December 1991 signed the **Europe agreement**. This was the first major step by Poland towards the ultimate objective of membership, and in April 1994 it submitted a formal application to join the European Union (EU). Three years later, the application received formal approval, although the **European Commission's** report made clear that investment would be needed if the country was 'to comply with Community rules on agriculture, environment and transport', and that further administrative reform would be required for the application and enforcement of the *acquis communautaire*. **Accession negotiations** began in March 1998 and were successfully concluded in December 2002. In June 2003 81.7% of those who participated in a national referendum in Poland (turnout was 58.8%) voted in favour of EU membership. Poland therefore joined the EU on 1 May 2004 as its largest new member.

Concerns that Poland might prove to be among the most difficult of the new members to integrate were borne out at the **European Council** meeting in December 2003, when the Polish and Spanish Governments opposed changes to **qualified majority voting** rules, thereby preventing conclusion of the **intergovernmental conference** that had begun work three months earlier. This Polish/Spanish alliance came to an abrupt end with the election of a new Spanish Government in early 2004. All member states reached agreement on a treaty text in June 2004. The EU remains a contested issue within Polish politics. Poland possessed one of the most **Euro sceptic** governments in the run-up to agreement on the **Treaty of Lisbon**, and battled hard to realize its own interests on issues such as voting rights and the place of Christianity within the treaty base. The Euro sceptic Government of Jarosław Kaczyński was replaced in October 2007 by a new administration under **Donald Tusk**, which sought to steer a more EU-friendly and pro-German course. Poland became part of the EU's **Schengen Area** in December. The Polish parliament endorsed the Treaty of Lisbon in April 2008, but the then Polish President, Lech Kaczyński, waited until he knew the outcome of the second vote on the treaty in **Ireland** before he signed off the **ratification** process in Poland in October 2009. Kaczyński's death in a plane crash in April 2010 precipitated a new presidential election over two rounds in June and July, which was won by Bronisław Komorowski. The Polish parliament gave its support to the signing of the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (**Fiscal Compact**) in March 2013, which was formally approved by Komorowski in August. In September 2014 Donald Tusk announced the resignation of his Government, prior to assuming his new role as **President of the European Council** from December.

In September 2015 the reformist, centre-right Government agreed to accept refugees under a resettlement programme agreed by the EU, amid the **European migration crisis**, precipitated, in particular, by large numbers of migrants fleeing civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**. Poland, alone of the **Visegrad Group** of states, did not, at that time, vote against the imposition of mandatory quotas by the EU. However, with the election in late 2015 of a new, populist Government, pledges on immigration quotas were withdrawn. The new administration cited, in particular, security concerns in the wake of attacks linked to perpetrators affiliated with **Islamic State** in the French capital in mid-November.

Meanwhile, revisions to legislation on the judiciary and the media in late 2015 also prompted criticism from the European Commission. In 2017 judicial reforms that envisaged the dismissal of the entire Supreme Court, with the exception of those judges selected by the Minister of Justice, and the introduction of parliamentary powers permitting the legislature to appoint members of the National Council of the Judiciary, caused controversy. Poland continued to challenge the EU, initially dismissing EU demands temporarily to halt logging in a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site, the ancient Białowieża forest. In

December the Commission recommended that the Council of the EU prepare to initiate an unprecedented sanctions procedure against Poland (under Article 7 of the **Treaty on European Union**), owing to the systemic threat posed to the rule of law in that country. The Commission also published its fourth rule of law recommendation with respect to Poland, which included demands that the country abandon plans to reduce the retirement age for judges; withdraw from the President discretionary powers to extend the mandate of judges at the Supreme Court; and restore the independence of the national Constitutional Tribunal. In July 2018 the Commission launched **infringement proceedings** relating to Poland's reforms of the Supreme Court, owing to continuing concerns over excessive political influence over the judiciary. The European **Court of Justice** (ECJ) issued a final ruling confirming that the legislation on the Supreme Court was in contravention of EU law and in breach of the principle of the irremovability of judges, and compromised the independence of the judiciary. Poland and other countries in the Visegrad Four are increasingly turning to right-wing **populism** and nationalism to assert their position within Europe, and the EU. In April 2020 the ECJ ruled that the **Czech Republic, Hungary** and Poland had violated the law by refusing to fulfil their obligations under the EU's migrant relocation scheme.

In November 2020 Hungary (and Poland) vetoed the adoption of the EU's new long-term budget, incorporating post-pandemic recovery funds, owing to objections to a mechanism that would link the disbursement of EU funds to the observance of rule of law criteria by member states. Following negotiations, an agreement was reached on 10 December, under which Hungary and Poland agreed to withdraw their vetoes, with implementation of the mechanism to be deferred until the ECJ had ruled on its legality (after which it would apply retroactively from 1 January 2021). On 11 March 2021 Hungary and Poland submitted a legal challenge at the ECJ against the proposed new mechanism. In October Poland's Constitutional Tribunal ruled that elements of EU law were incompatible with the country's Constitution, prompting the Commission to threaten to impose sanctions; approval of funding of some €36,000m. for Poland under **Next Generation EU** already appeared to have been delayed amid ongoing EU-Poland tensions; Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki argued that the EU was exceeding its legal competences.

POLICE AND JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS was the name given to Title VI of the **Treaty on European Union** prior to the **Treaty of Lisbon**. Originally known as **justice and home affairs**, this third pillar of the European Union (EU) was renamed by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. The objective of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters is to prevent and combat: problems of racism and xenophobia; terrorism; trafficking in human beings and crimes against children; drug trafficking; weapons trafficking; and corruption and fraud. Through **Europol**, the European Police Office, there is scope for closer co-operation between

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national police forces and customs and judicial authorities, co-operation in the latter area also being provided for through **Eurojust**. This co-operation may lead to closer approximation of rules on criminal matters in the member states. The Treaty of Lisbon transferred responsibility for such co-operation to the EU's supranational decision-making procedures.

POLICY in the context of the European Union (EU) refers to the collectivity of proposals, initiatives and **legislation** intended to achieve EU aims in specific fields of activity.

The **POLICY PLANNING AND EARLY WARNING UNIT** was set up as part of the reforms to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) introduced by the **Treaty of Amsterdam** in 1999. Its main role is to monitor and analyse developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, provide assessments of and early warning reports on issues of concern to the European Union, and prepare papers on options for policies. Personnel drawn from the member states, the **European Commission** and the **General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union** staff the unit.

The **POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE** succeeded the **Political Committee**. It was renamed and had its powers increased by the **Treaty of Nice**. Hence, acting under the responsibility of the **Council of the European Union**, the Committee exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations undertaken by the European Union (EU). It may also be authorized to take specific implementing **decisions**. With the development of a more explicit defence dimension to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**, the Committee has also provided support for the EU Military Staff, which is under the authority of the **European Union Military Committee**.

The **POLITICAL COMMITTEE** is the name of a body that had its origins in the committee of **Political Directors** originally charged with preparing the quarterly meetings of the member state foreign ministers under **European political co-operation**. It was formally established by the **Treaty on European Union** as part of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP). The tasks of the Political Committee, which was composed of the Political Directors, were to monitor the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP, and to advise and submit proposals to the **Council of the European Union** on foreign and security policy. In conjunction with the Council Presidency, the Committee also had responsibility for implementing policies decided upon according to the CFSP structure. The **Treaty of Nice** enhanced the committee's powers and renamed it the **Political and Security Committee**.

POLITICAL CO-OPERATION: See **Common Foreign and Security Policy; European Political Co-operation**

POLITICAL DIRECTORS, each of whom is appointed by a member state as an aide to its foreign minister, are invariably senior diplomats. They formerly played an essential role in the operation of **European political co-operation**. Collectively, the Directors were responsible for the co-ordination and implementation of foreign policy initiatives, meeting monthly to review progress and urgent current issues. Under the **Single European Act**, the Directors were provided with their own secretariat in **Brussels, Belgium**, and under the **Treaty on European Union**, they were formally constituted as a **Political Committee** with a major role in the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. The **Treaty of Nice** enhanced the committee's powers and renamed it the **Political and Security Committee**. The responsibility for organizing the Directors belongs to the foreign ministry of the member state currently holding the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union**, and therefore rotates between the Political Directors, changing every six months. The division of labour between the Directors and the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** is under constant review. The immediate subordinate of the Political Director, responsible for routine business, is known as the European Correspondent.

POLITICAL GROUPS are the basic organizational feature of the **European Parliament (EP)**. While **Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)** normally belong to national political parties, in the EP they band together in transnational political groups. The EP originally laid down the criteria for what constitutes a political group in 1979. At that time, if a proposed group contained MEPs elected from at least five member states, then the minimum size required was 20 MEPs. The rules have changed as the European Union (EU) has enlarged, and currently political groups need to comprise at least 25 individuals from at least seven member states. A member may not belong to more than one political group. Political groups cannot be established if the proposed membership consists of MEPs from only one member state. However, in the past, it was possible for one-party groups to be created. The first example, following the 1994 EP elections, was the Forza Europa group, which consisted exclusively of Italian MEPs.

The President shall be notified in a statement when a political group is set up. This statement shall specify the name of the group, its members and its bureau. In each EP, a few MEPs have chosen to remain unaffiliated to any group but, in general, groups are the basis of parliamentary procedure. They nominate and elect the President and Vice-President of the EP; the roles of committee chairperson and all memberships are filled on a group basis (although some provision is made for the few independent MEPs), and seating in the EP is by political group. The groups also receive funding, in proportion

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to their size and the number of countries represented, to enable them to maintain a secretariat and their various activities. The **Court of Justice** has ruled that these funds cannot be used for electoral purposes.

An examination of the history of political groups in the EP reveals a considerable degree of fluidity and instability as groups (with the exception of the Socialists) have become subject to regular change as they form, disband, amalgamate, constitute and reconstitute themselves. Consequently, the EP political groups can be said to be weakly institutionalized. There are seven political groups in the ninth Parliament (2019–24). Following EP elections in May 2019 these were: the **Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)** (EPP), with 182 members; the **Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament** (S&D), with 154 members; the **Renew Europe** group (including both former members of the **Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe** (ALDE) and La République En Marche, founded by **Emmanuel Macron**), with 108 members; the **Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance**, with 74 members; the **Identity and Democracy** group, the successor to the **Europe of Nations and Freedom** group, with 73 members; the **European Conservatives and Reformists Group**, with 62 members; and the **Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left** (GUE/NGL), with 41. The remaining 57 MEPs were non-attached (the so-called *non-inscrits*).

The series of **enlargements** of the EU from 2004 entailed a degree of destabilization for the political group structure with the arrival of a host of new parties and MEPs. However, the real test for the political groups is the challenge to command loyalty from EU citizens and to foster the concept and benefits of EU integration. Overall voter turnout at the 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections was lower than at preceding elections, at some 45.5%, 43.0% and 42.6%, respectively. However, turnout increased in 2019, and was recorded at 50.6%.

POLITICAL UNION: See **European Union; Maastricht Summit; Treaty on European Union**

POPULISM is a political ideology that can be adopted by those on the left or right of the political spectrum. Those who subscribe often consider society in binary terms: ‘pure people’ and ‘corrupt elite’. For the populist, politics must be defined by the will of the people—the people being those who share the values of the populist elites. Although most forms of populism rely on the invocation of nationalism and, often, xenophobia and racism, these are not necessary conditions for populism. Populism, according to leading scholar Cas Mudde, is ‘an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism’. Many countries in the EU are increasingly led by governments guided in part by

populist ideologies. These include the **Czech Republic** (Czechia), **Hungary** and **Poland**.

PORTUGAL originally had no prospect of becoming a member of the European Communities (EC) while it remained under an authoritarian regime. In 1962, along with other members of the **European Free Trade Association**, Portugal approached the EC, but without specifying the form of association it desired. Negotiations had not begun when **France** vetoed the British application for entry, and Portugal's proposed schedule was abandoned. Discussions were not resumed until 1970, and a **free trade agreement** was signed in July 1972. After the 1974 revolution, the new Government expressed a desire for further co-operation with, and financial assistance from, the EC. A **protocol** to the free trade agreement, providing for financial aid, was signed in September 1976; further protocols were signed in 1979 and 1980. Portugal formally applied for full membership in March 1977. Progress on the negotiations was slow. Officially commencing in October 1978, they did not begin in earnest until 1980. The negotiations were concluded in March 1985, and Portugal joined the EC in January 1986. One of the poorest states in the European Union (EU), it has benefited substantially from the **structural funds**, the **Cohesion Fund** and other aid programmes. Portugal has generally been well disposed towards the EU, but at times difficulties have arisen. In June 2005 the Portuguese Government was requested to cut its budget deficit to fall in line with EU rules on the **Stability and Growth Pact**. Portugal's economy entered recession in 2003 and recorded only 1% growth the following year. Unemployment reached an eight-year high (some 7.5%) in 2005. The Portuguese Presidency of the **Council of the European Union** in the second half of 2007 culminated with the signing of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, which has since reshaped the EU institutions and their decision-making capabilities. The Portuguese Government decided not to hold a referendum on the treaty, and the Portuguese parliament ratified it with a strong majority in April 2008. The slump in Portugal's economy following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 led the Government to seek a bailout (of €78,000m.) from the EU and the International Monetary Fund in April 2011—which was approved the following month—and to introduce a more stringent austerity programme to bring the country's finances back under control. This move proved unpopular, especially given the rise in unemployment (which by April 2012 had almost reached 15%). Following the defeat in the legislature of further government austerity proposals, Prime Minister José Sócrates resigned in March 2011 and an early general election was scheduled for June. The Social Democrats, under Pedro Passos Coelho, triumphed in these polls, but remained committed to the austerity programme and participated in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (**Fiscal**

POTENTIAL CANDIDATE STATE

Compact) in March 2012. The current Prime Minister, following legislative elections in 2015, is António Costa. New elections took place in late 2019.

POTENTIAL CANDIDATE STATE, as opposed to candidate state, was the status assigned to the countries of the **Western Balkans** by a **summit meeting** of the **European Council** in June 2000. The term has since been confirmed in the preambles to the **stabilization and association agreements**. It is to be assumed that a potential candidate state becomes a candidate state once it is admitted to the accession process.

A **PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY** to help prepare countries from **Central and Eastern Europe** for membership of the European Union was launched in 1994 by the Essen **summit meeting** of the **European Council**. The idea was to build on the existing relationship based on the **Europe agreements** by intensifying co-operation and by outlining more precisely the steps necessary for meeting the obligations of membership, notably concerning adoption of the *acquis communautaire*. In 1998 the strategy was enhanced by the launch of **accession negotiations** and the conclusion of **accession partnerships**.

PREAMBLE refers to the opening recitals of a treaty. In the case of the European Union (EU), the preambles to the **founding treaties** outline the aims and purposes of the EU. The **Court of Justice**, in defining EU law, has often referred to preambles.

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS signed by the European Union (EU) with other countries are intended to lead, within a reasonable period of time, to the establishment of either a free trade area or a **customs union**. This is a requirement that the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** demanded of all preferential trade agreements. Those signed by the EU form part of the **common commercial policy** and fall into several categories: **trade and co-operation agreements**; **association agreements** (see also **Europe agreements** and **stabilization and association agreements**); the several individual and collective agreements signed with states bordering the Mediterranean; the **Cotonou Agreement** (see also the **Lomé Conventions**); and **partnership and co-operation agreements**. In the majority of cases, the agreements are not restricted to purely economic matters.

The **PRELIMINARY RULING** procedure is a key element of the legal system of the European Union (EU). Under the procedure, a national court may refer a question about the meaning of an EU law to the **Court of Justice**. Once the Court issues its decision, it is applied to the relevant case by the national court.

PRESIDENCY: See **Council Presidency**

A **PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL**, to be elected by the other members of the **European Council** for a term of two and a half years, was one of the institutional innovations originally contained in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and carried forward in the **Treaty of Lisbon**. The incumbent has five key tasks: chairing the European Council and driving forward its work; ensuring proper preparation for meetings and continuity in co-operation with the **European Commission** President; facilitating cohesion and consensus within the European Council; reporting to the **European Parliament** after each European Council meeting; and ensuring the external representation of the European Union on issues concerning the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. The first person to occupy the position was Herman Van Rompuy, who assumed his post on 1 December 2009. He was re-elected to the post by the European Council on 1 March 2012, and his second (and last) term in office ran from 1 June 2012 to 30 November 2014. **Donald Tusk** of Poland succeeded him, and secured re-election to the post in March 2017. He was succeeded by **Charles Michel** in December 2019, following his election by the European Council in July.

PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS have been declared illegal by the **European Commission** on the grounds that they are contrary to the **competition policy** of the European Communities. The precedent was set in 1969 when the Commission successfully prosecuted the dyestuffs **cartel** that controlled some 80% of the European market at that time. Yet, price-fixing agreements remain an established fact of contemporary business activity across the European Union (EU). The European Commission intensified its efforts to deter companies from engaging in such anti-competitive price-fixing arrangements. This resolve saw a significant increase in the size of the fines imposed on companies that deliberately sought to fix prices, as well as the adoption of **leniency notices**. In December 2002 the member states agreed to radical reforms (under regulation 1/2003) of the EU's anti-trust rules, which were designed to make it easier for the Commission to act against those seeking to fix prices. The new regime came into force in May 2004. The combating of cartels was identified by former Commissioner with responsibility for Competition, Neelie Kroes, as a particular focus of her term of office. One of the highest ever fines in the history of the Commission's war against cartel arrangements was levied against a number of truck manufacturers in 2017, and totalled some €2,966.5m. Price-fixing agreements remain a focus for the Commission.

The **PRIMACY OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW** is a doctrine established by the **Court of Justice** in 1964. The case that provided this

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

landmark decision was *Costa v Enel* and, when this decision is taken together with the doctrine of **direct effect**, it signifies nothing less than a complete metamorphosis of the nature and scope of European Communities (EC) law. These two doctrines transform the EC into a powerful means to advance the **supranational** idea and to challenge existing national law. A first formal reference to primacy of EU law was contained in a declaration adopted with the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

The **PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES** of the European Communities (EC) were first laid down in a **protocol** of the 1965 **Merger Treaty**. It defined the privileges and immunities of all those who were members of, or who worked for, EC **institutions**. It further established the rights of the Communities themselves within the territory of the member states.

PRODUCTION QUOTAS can be imposed by the **European Commission** on the coal and steel industries. Under the powers it inherited from the High Authority of the **European Coal and Steel Community**, the Commission has the authority, if a state of manifest crisis is adopted, to impose quotas on individual companies. Severe production quotas were imposed upon steel companies in 1980, and were not abolished until June 1988. In the late 1980s, production quotas were also introduced into the **common agricultural policy**.

PROPORTIONALITY, like **subsidiarity**, is a principle invoked to contain the accumulation of powers by the European Union (EU). In line with the principle of proportionality, the EU should not be taking any action that goes beyond the minimum necessary to achieve its objectives as laid down in the **European treaties**. Hence, proportionality is concerned with the scale and effect of any EU action.

A **PROTOCOL** is an additional element of a treaty. It either provides details of the implementation of treaty requirements or is too lengthy for inclusion in the treaty itself. However, protocols are equal in status to the main body of a treaty.

PROVISIONS is a term generally used in the context of the European Union to describe the contents of the **European treaties**.

The **PRÜM CONVENTION**, also known as the Treaty of Prüm or Schengen III, was signed in May 2005 by **Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain**. It facilitates co-operation for the purpose of combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal

migration, and the sharing between signatories of personal data (e.g. DNA, fingerprints). It builds on existing co-operation under the **Schengen Agreement** and on **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**.

PUBLIC HEALTH: See **Health Policy**

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, although referred to in the **Treaty of Rome**, only emerged as a major objective after the Single European Market programme when a series of **directives** were introduced requiring all public contracts above a specific cost threshold to be open to competitive tender throughout the member states. The threshold varies according to the product or service involved, but is otherwise the same throughout the European Union.

PUBLIC SERVICES do not enjoy the privileged status within the European Union (EU) that some member states would like to see and their status often appears ambiguous. In principle, except where exemptions are approved, EU rules on **state aid** apply as much to public services as they do to commercial enterprises. Nevertheless, Article 16 of the **Treaty of Rome**, as introduced by the **Treaty of Amsterdam** (and now Article 14 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**), draws particular attention to the role of ‘services of general economic interest’ and calls on the EU and the member states to ‘take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfil their missions’. The **Treaty of Lisbon** introduced a dedicated **protocol** on the subject.

The **PUBLICATIONS OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**, which was formerly called the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (EUR-OP), is based in Luxembourg. It is an agency of the **European Commission**, but provides services to, and is managed by, all European Union (EU) **institutions**. It is responsible for the publication and dissemination of EU publications, including official reports and pamphlets. These are available directly from the EU and are also lodged in several educational institutions throughout the EU, which have been recognized as depositories for EU publications and are known as **European Documentation Centres**. The office also offers a number of online services giving free access to information on EU law (**EUR-Lex**), EU publications, public procurement (Tenders Electronic Daily—TED), and EU research and development (**CORDIS**—Community Research and Development Information Service).

Q

QMV: See **Qualified Majority Voting**

QUAESTORS are five individuals elected from the ranks of the **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs). They sit in an advisory capacity in the Bureau of the **European Parliament** and are responsible for financial and administrative matters affecting MEPs.

QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING (QMV) is one of the ways in which the **Council of the European Union** arrives at a decision on issues and proposals put before it. The vote is qualified in two ways. First, a qualified majority must be substantially in excess of 50%: traditionally, it has been more than two-thirds. Second, it is qualified in that it is based on a weighted voting system, where each member state has an indivisible block of votes at its disposal, the size of which is based roughly on the size of its population.

The **Treaty of Rome** envisaged that QMV would apply to most proposals after 1965. The **empty chair crisis** and the **Luxembourg Compromise** prevented the achievement of this objective. The possibilities for a greater use of QMV did not increase until the **Single European Act**. With the adoption of the **Treaty on European Union** and further **enlargement** of the European Union (EU), there was renewed pressure for an increase in the size of the minority that would be needed to obstruct a proposal, in the hope that this reform would speed up the process of integration. From January 1995, when the General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed on amendments to voting procedures in the Council which took into account the accession of three new member states, the total number of votes was 87. A qualified majority was constituted by 62 votes, and thus 26 votes were sufficient for a blocking minority. However, as a result of pressure from **Spain** and the **United Kingdom**, the so-called **Ioannina compromise** of March 1994 meant that 23–25 opposing votes ensured the continued discussion of proposed **legislation** by the Council for a ‘reasonable’ period until a consensus was obtained.

QMV was extended by the **Treaty of Amsterdam** into a number of areas previously subject to unanimous decision. The **European Parliament** was

also to have the right of co-decision in these areas (see **co-decision procedure**). As the EU expanded, the use of qualified majority voting in a wider range of **decisions** was expected to minimize ‘policy drag’. Under the terms of the **Treaty of Nice**, a further range of areas, mostly minor in nature and relating to appointments to various EU institutions (such as the **European Court of Auditors**), became subject to QMV. By 2002 most areas under pillar I were determined by QMV, although there were some notable exceptions, including decisions in the area of **economic and monetary union**.

With EU enlargement imminent there was general acceptance in the Council in the late 1990s that the voting procedures would have to be altered. Agreement would not be easy, given political sensitivities. The issue was postponed at the Amsterdam **summit meeting** and agreement was finally reached at the Nice summit in December 2000. The Treaty of Nice had two major impacts. First, it complicated **decision making** by requiring a triple majority for a decision to be adopted by QMV. This comprises: first, a qualified majority of the weighted votes; second, a majority of the member states (which was already implicit under the existing regime); and, last, a demographic majority of at least 62% of the EU’s total population. In effect, this new formula ensured that numbers and percentages became more important in determining voting in the Council. It also increased the leverage of the larger EU states.

Second, the Treaty of Nice reformulated the votes for an EU of **Fifteen** and agreed the anticipated vote allocations for the **candidate countries** in an EU of **Twenty-Five**. These were subsequently confirmed in the **Accession Treaty**. Following the accession of **Romania** and **Bulgaria** in January 2007 and of **Croatia** in July 2013, a qualified majority could be attained with 260 votes by at least 15 member states. From 1 November 2014, in accordance with the terms of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the existing QMV system was replaced by a **double majority voting** system, under which an act is required to have the support of at least 55% of the member states (i.e. 15 member states in a Union of 27) and at least 65% of the population of the EU. A blocking minority must include at least four member states. However, the previous rules remained applicable until 2017 at the request of a member state.

QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS: See **Quota Restrictions**

QUOTA RESTRICTIONS on internal trade in the European Communities (EC) were abolished by the **Six** by 1968. Later entrants to the EC were allowed a transitional period of between four and six years in which to complete the process of abolition. In external trade, quota restrictions were removed by many of the international agreements that the European Union has signed with other countries. They still exist, however, in certain areas, and for specified manufactured goods from some countries.

R

RAILWAYS became a more prominent issue from April 1998, when the **European Commission** published a report on railway policy, with the aim of achieving greater harmonization, the regulation of state **subsidies** and the progressive liberalization of the rail freight market. In October 1999 EU ministers responsible for transport concluded an agreement that was regarded as a precursor to the full liberalization and revitalization of the rail freight market. The agreement provided for the extension of access to a planned core Trans-European Rail Freight Network, with a charging system designed to ensure optimum competitiveness. During 2000–04 the EU adopted three ‘railway packages’, which dealt with the progressive deregulation of the rail market. Other measures included developing a common approach to rail safety; upholding principles of interoperability; and setting up a European Railway Agency (ERA). The ERA opened in Lille/Valenciennes, **France**, in June 2005. In January 2013 the Commission adopted proposals on a fourth railway package, which, *inter alia*, proposed transferring substantial administrative responsibility from individual member states to the ERA, in order to help new operators to enter the market and to reduce costs (it was anticipated that railway companies could save some €500m. by 2025 if the ERA were to become a so-called one-stop shop for authorizing trains and issuing safety certificates) and proposed that the provision of domestic rail passenger services be opened up to private companies across the EU from December 2019, with the aim of improving quality and choice, and increasing passenger rail traffic. By 2013 only **Sweden** and the **United Kingdom** had fully liberalized their rail markets, while **Austria**, the **Czech Republic**, **Germany**, **Italy** and the **Netherlands** had undertaken partial liberalization. The role of independent track managers was to be strengthened, with such managers to be given responsibility for all core functions (in order to enable networks to be run in an efficient and non-discriminatory manner at EU level). In November 2014 the Commission adopted a regulation that sought to improve access to rail travel for people with disabilities from January 2015.

The fourth railway package comprised two pillars, relating to technical and market-related issues. The three legislative proposals making up the technical pillar (revising interoperability and safety directives and developing the role of the ERA) were adopted by the **European Parliament** in April 2016. The three proposals comprising the market pillar (amending directives on opening

the market for passenger rail services, the governance of infrastructure and common rules pertaining to accounting) were finally adopted by the **Council of the European Union** in October of that year (after modification), and by the Parliament in December.

RAPPORTEUR is the title given to the **Member of the European Parliament** responsible for drafting and presenting a report to a committee and to the plenary session of the **European Parliament**.

RATIFICATION refers to the process of approval of a treaty (such as one of the **European treaties**, or an **Accession Treaty**, or an external relations agreement) by the member states according to the rules and procedures established by their own constitutions. In certain member states (i.e. **Denmark, Ireland**) this has often involved a referendum. Treaties and agreements requiring ratification cannot come into force unless ratified by all the member states. In the case of an **accession treaty** or an **association agreement**, ratification also involves the **European Parliament** giving its approval via the consent procedure.

RATIFICATION CRISIS is the term given to the political crises that have followed the popular rejection of a Treaty. The first ratification crisis came after the Danish ‘no’ to the **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** in June 1992, a crisis that intensified when the French people only narrowly gave their support to the TEU in a referendum three months later. The Danish result was later overturned by popular endorsement of the TEU in a further referendum in May 1993. A second ratification crisis occurred following the rejection by Irish voters of the **Treaty of Nice** in June 2001. The response was to hold a second referendum in the latter half of 2002, when the original result was overturned by a vote in favour of the treaty. A third crisis, and the most major to date, occurred when the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** was rejected by French and Dutch voters in the first half of 2005. This led to the formal abandonment of the treaty. Much of its content was subsequently included in the **Treaty of Lisbon**. This treaty, in turn, was the focus of a fourth ratification crisis following a clear-cut ‘no’ in the Irish referendum in June 2008. This crisis involved various challenges and delays in three other states: **Germany, Poland** and the **Czech Republic**. All member states ultimately ratified the treaty, and it came into force on 1 December 2009.

RDE: See **Group of the European Democratic Alliance**

RECOMMENDATIONS are one of two kinds of non-binding pronouncement that may be issued by the **Council of the European Union** and the

European Commission. Like **opinions**, they do not constitute instructions, but merely express the preference of the European Union (EU), and may be disregarded by the member states. Recommendations made according to the provisions of the **Treaty of Paris** were slightly different, however: they were binding upon member states as to the final result, but not the means of achieving it, and were thus more similar to EU **directives**. (See also **legislation**.)

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES are those policies of the European Union (EU) that primarily involve the redistribution of resources from the richer to the less developed areas of the EU as part of the process of promoting economic and social cohesion. Such policies are generally financed from the **structural and cohesion funds**. Also included under the broad heading of redistributive policies are those policies that involve financial support being given to particular areas of production, for example, agriculture (via the **common agricultural policy**) and fisheries (via the **common fisheries policy**).

The **REFERENCE PRICE** has been of importance in the **common agricultural policy**. The average price calculated from the market prices for fruit and vegetables in each member state, if the price of **foodstuffs** imported into the European Union should be lower than the reference price, the imports would incur a levy to raise their price to the same level.

REFERENDA on European Union (EU) issues play an increasingly important role in the European integration process. Countries joining the EU have tended to submit the terms of accession to their people for approval, while some member states have sought popular support, often in line with a constitutional requirement, for several of the more recent **European treaties** such as the **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** and the **Treaty of Nice**. In the case of referenda on accession to the EU, the outcome of a referendum has always been respected. The Norwegian Government, for example, was been forced twice to abandon plans to join the European Communities and the EU following a 'no' vote. By contrast, where a member state's electorate rejected the TEU or the Treaty of Nice and therefore brought about a **ratification crisis**, a second referendum was held. Nine of the 10 **candidate countries** that joined in May 2004 held a referendum on EU membership. In each case the outcome was positive.

Following the adoption of the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in 2004 the EU prepared itself for what amounted to the most important series of referenda. A total of 10 member states (the **Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain** and the **United Kingdom**) had pledged to hold a

referendum on **ratification** of the new treaty, and it was generally assumed, on the basis of early opinion polls, that the treaty would be endorsed by the public where and when it was put to a referendum. However, events took a rather different course. The first of the referenda took place in Spain in February 2005, with the treaty being approved, but the rejections of the treaty in France and the Netherlands (two of the founding member states of the EU) in the first half of 2005 put an end to the treaty altogether as all member states needed to endorse the Constitution, whether by referendum or by parliament or by both, in order for it to come into effect. It was left to the **European Council** to consider how to proceed as the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe had held some very valuable alterations to existing decision-making instruments. After much internal debate, it was decided to scale back the contents of the rejected treaty and to produce an amending treaty to incorporate many of the principal elements. A new text that bore considerable resemblance to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was agreed and the **Treaty of Lisbon** was signed in December 2007. Only Ireland was scheduled to hold a referendum on the text. Victory for the ‘no’ campaign in Ireland in June 2008 led to a **ratification crisis** for the EU.

On taking office in 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition Government in the UK introduced in Parliament an ‘EU Bill’ designed to subject future amending treaties and other major decisions affecting the UK’s position within the EU to a referendum; this bill became law in July 2011. The move followed an amendment to the French Constitution to establish the referendum as the default means by which France would, once **Croatia** had joined the EU, ratify each future **accession treaty**. On 23 June 2016 the UK held a referendum to decide whether to remain a member of the EU; the vote in favour of **Brexit** prompted the immediate resignation of Prime Minister **David Cameron**.

REFERRALS: See **Court of Justice**

A **REFLECTION GROUP** (or Comité des Sages) is established by the **European Commission** to consider reforms to the European Union (EU). The first such group consisted of representatives of the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states and of the **European Parliament** and European Commission. It was responsible for preparing the agenda of the 1996 **inter-governmental conference**, which resulted in the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. A more recent group, the **González Group**, was established in December 2008 with the goal of identifying how best the EU could ‘more effectively anticipate and meet challenges in the longer term horizon of 2020 to 2030’. It presented its report, called *Project Europe 2030*, to the European Council in May 2010. In another example, in April 2010 the European Commission set up a reflection group on the digitization, online accessibility and preservation of cultural

REFORM TREATY

works across Europe; the group presented its report, entitled *The New Renaissance*, in January 2011.

A **REFORM TREATY** was the planned outcome of the **intergovernmental conference** called by the **European Council** in June 2007. Having concluded negotiations, the **member states** dropped the 'Reform Treaty' title and instead decided to name the new treaty the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

REFUGEE POLICY forms part of the European Union's **migration and asylum policy** and is a relatively new area of competence of the European Union. Explicit reference to refugees in the **founding treaties** came with the **Treaty of Amsterdam** and the goal of creating an **area of freedom, security and justice**. This placed emphasis on adopting measures to ease the sharing of the burden of incoming refugees, and on proceeding in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 **protocol** concerning refugees, as well as on consulting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (See also **European migration crisis; Immigration policy**.)

REGIONAL FUND COMMITTEE: See **European Regional Development Fund**

REGIONAL POLICY was not specifically covered by the **Treaty of Rome**, although the **Preamble** refers to the need to reduce 'the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions', while a special **protocol** stated that the Italian *Mezzogiorno* (the southern half of the country) was a European responsibility. Pressure for a regional policy grew in the late 1960s and early 1970s, firstly because of increasing pessimism about the rate of economic growth, and secondly because of **enlargement**, with the **United Kingdom** (which left the EU in 2020) and **Ireland** joining **Italy** in insisting upon a regional policy. Although formally established in 1973, regional policy did not acquire a high profile as a European Communities (EC) activity until the enlargements of the 1980s.

The **European Commission** has the responsibility for developing policy relating to the regions. The targets of European Union (EU) regional policy are two-fold: underdeveloped rural areas with low levels of agricultural modernization and high levels of unemployment or underemployment; and industrialized regions in rapid decline. The bulk of the spending is directed towards those regions with a gross domestic product below 75% of the EU average. To secure the modernization or renewal of these regions, EU policy has three strands. In addition to providing aid for the development of poorer regions, the Commission seeks to co-ordinate the regional policies of member states and secure a co-ordinated approach to regional problems in all relevant EU policy concerns.

The principal element of regional policy is the financial programme, channelled primarily through the **European Regional Development Fund** (ERDF), which was established in 1975 and funded from the EC budget. The other **structural and cohesion funds** of the EU are also required to maintain a strong regional focus in their own areas of concern. A number of further special regional programmes have been launched by the European Commission to deal with the problems of regions that are economically coherent, but divided politically between two or more member states, and several attempts have been made to ensure that the poorer regions benefit from, and participate in, technological developments and programmes. To ensure co-ordination across all these investment activities, the Commission monitors and reviews the socioeconomic state of the regions on a regular basis, and undertakes analyses of the regional impact of all EU policies. With respect to the regional policies of the member states, the Commission is concerned to avoid duplication or waste of resources. Maximum limits have been established for the financial inducements that governments may offer to potential industrial investors in the poorer regions: the limits vary according to the nature of the particular regional problem. The resources of the structural funds have been directed more towards integrated programmes that link together various elements of a region's needs rather than isolated and discrete development projects. Financial resources are distributed under the terms of various agreements, or Community Support Frameworks, between the Commission and the member states. Regional policy was formally recognized in the **Single European Act**, which identified it as a major element in developing the socioeconomic cohesion of the EC. Its centrality was further emphasized by the **Treaty on European Union**, particularly by the establishment of a **Cohesion Fund** and the commitment to **Trans-European Networks**.

In 2007–13 some 36% of the entire EU budget was allocated to regional policy, and regional policy was targeted towards convergence, **competitiveness**, employment and co-operation. Priority in terms of regional policy spending has gradually shifted eastwards and towards the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe**. The money available is divided into three separate funds: the ERDF to enhance infrastructure projects; the **European Social Fund** (ESF, now ESF+) to help provide vocational training projects and other employment assistance initiatives; and the Cohesion Fund, which targets environmental and transport projects. The EU's budget for regional development and cohesion policy in 2021–27 envisaged funding of €290,587m., in 2018 prices, including funding under **Next Generation EU**. See also **structural and cohesion funds**.

REGIONAL POLICY COMMITTEE: See **European Regional Development Fund**

REGIONS

REGIONS: See **Cohesion Policy**; **Committee of the Regions**; **European Regional Development Fund**; **Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics**; **Regional Policy**

REGULATIONS are one of three different types of **legal instrument** that the **European Commission** and **Council of the European Union** are empowered to issue. Regulations are the highest, most rigorous form of **legislation**. They are fairly detailed instructions, applicable throughout the European Union, and are directly binding upon all member states. (See also **decisions**; **directives**; **law**; **opinions**; **recommendations**; **resolutions**.)

REGULATORY POLICIES are those policies of the European Union based on regulations designed to achieve specific, and generally **single market**-orientated, policies. Most prominent among them are **competition policy** and **environmental policy** and measures to promote **health and safety**.

The term **REMAINERS** refers to the group of voters, political elites and campaigners who favoured the **United Kingdom** remaining part of the European Union (EU). While some Remainers advocated the abandonment of **Brexit**, many campaigned instead for a ‘soft’ Brexit, and some were more focused on campaigning for a second referendum on the negotiated outcome of future EU-UK relations. **Remainers** represented the opposing side to **Brexiters**.

The **RENEW EUROPE** group (RE) is a new, centrist political group in the **European Parliament** (EP), which succeeded the **Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe** (ALDE). RE is, effectively, ALDE plus the party founded by **Emmanuel Macron**, La République En Marche. RE was formally established in June 2019 for the EP’s ninth session, and RE’s inaugural Chairperson is Romanian politician Dacian Cioloş, also the leader of Romanian party PLUS. Following elections to the EP in 2019, RE comprised 108 **MEPs**, making it the third largest grouping in the Parliament for 2019–24.

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT (RTD) POLICY and the application of new technologies, apart from the sponsoring of research in the nuclear area through the **European Atomic Energy Community** (Euratom), received relatively little attention until the 1980s. The lack of a European-level policy led to both duplication of effort and, often, missed opportunities. More importantly, high-level research is complex and costly. The **European Commission** intensified its efforts to encourage technological and collaborative research, to foster and promote research

networks and teams at the European level in order to permit the EC to remain economically competitive.

The main objective of European Union (EU) research and development policy is to amalgamate the many projects and individuals conducting research in the member states into collaborative programmes that involve companies, universities and research institutes. The European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT), adopted in 1984, was swiftly followed by the first framework for research and technological development. The **Single European Act** made science a Community responsibility. A second framework programme identifying several priority areas for research was adopted in 1987, and in 1988 a monitoring system was introduced in the form of Strategic Analysis, Forecasting and Evaluation in Matters of Research and Technology (MONITOR). The importance of research and development was confirmed by the **Treaty on European Union**, and further general framework programmes that extended the list of priority research areas were adopted in 1990, 1993 and 1998. In just over a decade the budgets for these programmes had grown substantially, from €3,250m. for the first programme to €13,215m. for the fourth (1994–98). Overall, the 1990s heralded the emergence and increasing salience of EU RTD policy.

The Sixth Framework Programme (FP6), for 2002–06, allocated €15,000m. to RTD, and was much more ambitious in scope than its predecessors. It sought to integrate research in priority areas (through the creation of centres of excellence) and to create and structure a European Research Area. To maximize its impact, the framework programme focused its attention on a limited number of research areas—technological, economic, social and cultural, among others. Since their launch in 1984 the framework programmes have played an instrumental role in producing multi-disciplinary research and forging cross-national research teams and networks across the EU and beyond. In the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), which covered the period 2007–13, research and innovation was allocated a **budget** of €50,500m. A pan-European agency, the European Research Council, was set up to take responsibility for funding scientific research. In addition, a new risk-sharing finance facility was created to assist private investors seeking to engage in research projects by providing them with greater access to loans from the **European Investment Bank**. Under the Eighth Framework Programme (2014–20), the financial instrument for research and innovation was **Horizon 2020**, which was allocated a budget of some €80,000m. The Ninth Framework Programme for 2021–27 was to be funded by **Horizon Europe**.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES are the principal means through which the European Union implements its **Research and Technological Development (RTD) Policy**. Each programme consists of a variety of specific projects.

RESOLUTIONS

RESOLUTIONS are statements of principle adopted by the **Council of the European Union** on the recommendation of the **European Commission**. While indicating governments' agreement or willingness to act, they have no basis in the **founding treaties** of the European Communities and are not legally binding upon the member states. (See also **opinions; recommendations.**)

RESTITUTIONS have formed an important part of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP). Restitutions are the export **subsidies** or refunds that have allowed European Union (EU) agricultural produce to be competitive on world markets, where prices are usually lower. EU exporters have received restitutions to make up the difference between what they must pay to CAP producers and the lower prices at which they must sell on the world markets. Restitutions have been one of the most controversial elements of the CAP, because in the past they consumed up to 30% of the **expenditure** made through the Guarantee Section of the **European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund**. This figure was later reduced to some 15% of expenditure.

REVENUE accrues to the European Union (EU) from a variety of sources. Initially, the European Communities (EC) were financed by contributions from member states based upon the gross national product (GNP) of each member state. The **European Commission** argument that the EC should have their own sources of revenue was one of the contributing factors to the 1965 **empty chair crisis**. In 1970 the member states agreed that a system of **own resources** should progressively replace that of national contributions, with the change to be completed by 1975. The EU now has its own resources to finance its **expenditure**. These form the basis of the EU's own tax revenues, which automatically accrue to it without the need for any subsequent decision by national authorities. In other words, while the own resources would be collected by the member states, the revenue would belong as of right to the EU.

In terms of revenue, own resources consist of several elements. The first is levies and duties on imports, comprising customs duties on finished products and a levy on agricultural imports to raise their price to the level set by the **common agricultural policy** (CAP). The second, which soon became the most important source of revenue, was a proportion of the **value-added tax** (VAT) imposed by the member states. The VAT contributions that would accrue to the EC were set at a maximum of 1.0% of the final selling price of a common base of goods and services. By the early 1980s this revenue was proving insufficient to meet demands and, after much argument, the VAT maximum level was raised to 1.4% in 1986. This still proved to be insufficient, and annual deficits in the EC **budget** had to be covered by non-refundable contributions from the member states. The reform of the Community's finances took another step in June 1988 when the **European Council**

approved a new category of revenue, which was based on GNP. This new revenue source provided the necessary funds for the **Delors I** package in 1989. To contain the growth of the resources taken up by the Community, the European Council decision set an overall ceiling rising to 1.2% of total community GNP in 1992, which increased to 1.27% of GNP by 1999. During this period the uniform VAT rate was gradually reduced from 1.4% to 1.0%.

In terms of EU budgetary calculations and expectations, gross national income (GNI) widely replaced GNP in Commission documentation as an indicator of income from 2002. In order to maintain, unchanged, the cash value of the ceiling of EU revenue referred to as the 'own resources ceiling', it became necessary to recalculate it in percentage terms. It was established at 1.24% of GNI instead of the previous 1.27% of EU GNP. (By means of a definition, GNI at market prices represents total primary income receivable by resident institutional units: compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, property income receivable less payable, operating surplus and mixed income. GNI equals GDP minus primary income payable by resident units to non-resident units plus primary income receivable by resident units from the rest of the world.)

Total revenue during the 1990s increased from **ECU** 47,000m. in 1990 to €93,000m. by 2002. With the prospect of **enlargement**, the estimated costs of admitting more member states ranged from €4,000m. to €38,000m. for the CAP alone, plus an estimated €30,000m. for the **structural and cohesion funds**. There was an expectation that total revenue would have to rise significantly. Reluctance on the part of member states to increase contributions meant, however, that greater emphasis was placed on reforming policies. The budgetary perspective for 2000–06 was agreed at the Berlin (**Germany**) European Council in March 1999, and the Council adopted a new own resources decision in September 2000 that became effective in January 2002. This introduced further reduction of the VAT resource ceiling, which in 2004 stood at 0.5%, and a reduction of the ceiling for GNI contributions to 1.24%. In 2010 the own resources ceiling stood at 1.23% of GNI.

Owing to the ongoing **eurozone** financial crisis, in February 2013 the Council of the European Union agreed to reduce the budget for the **Multi-annual Financial Framework Programme** (MFF) for 2014–20. In March 2013, however, the **European Parliament** (EP) rejected the budget agreement, demanding some €14,000m. from member states to cover arrears in payments, which had accumulated over the course of preceding budgets. Further negotiations subsequently took place, and new proposals for the MFF for 2014–20 were submitted unsuccessfully for endorsement by the EP and the Council in June 2013. Tensions between the Council and the EP persisted and agreement on the arrangements for the new MFF were only finally approved in January 2014.

The agreement reached by the European Council in July 2020 on the MFF for 2021–27 (subject to approval by the EP) introduced an own resources ceiling of 1.40% of GNI. VAT-based own resources were replaced by a

simplified method from January 2019, with a uniform rate of 0.3%. From January 2021 a new own resource was introduced, made up of a national contribution calculated using the weight of non-recycled plastic packaging waste.

DIDIER REYNDERS (1958–) is a Belgian lawyer and politician who currently serves as the European Commissioner responsible for Justice in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** that took office in December 2019. He served in various capacities and in different governments in **Belgium** between 1999 and 2019. A graduate of the University of Liège, Reynders began his legal career in 1981. He is also a former ex officio member of several regional development banks in Africa, Asia and Europe.

The **RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT**, as laid down in the **Treaty of Rome**, confers on nationals of one member state the right to set up business operations in another member state. It is a key principle underpinning the **single market** and the free movement of services.

The **RIGHT OF INITIATIVE** within the European Union (EU) has traditionally been the preserve of the **European Commission**, it being the only institution that could formally initiate **legislation**. Since the **Treaty on European Union**, however, this is no longer technically the case. The **European Central Bank** has a right of initiative in certain areas concerning **economic and monetary union**, and member states were to enjoy a right of initiative over measures concerning asylum, immigration and border controls until 2004. The right of initiative under the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters** is shared by the European Commission and the member states. The **European Parliament** has no formal right of initiative, but can request that the European Commission submit a proposal under the **Treaty of Rome**. The **Treaty of Lisbon** introduced a right of initiative for EU citizens, thereby increasing their participation in the EU decision-making process. It enables them, through the acquisition of at least 1m. signatures from a significant number of member states, to put proposals to the Commission.

ROAD TRANSPORT is an area of European Union **transport policy** where the **European Commission** has historically been very active. Most initiatives have been concerned with conditions of employment and road safety. Rules covering, for example, training and minimum rest periods have existed since the 1970s, and the ensuing decade saw the introduction of a common standard for the weight and dimensions of commercial vehicles, maximum limits for the axle weights of articulated vehicles, and several **directives** concerning road safety. The subsequent focus of road transport

measures included the deregulation of national licensing and quota systems governing inter-state road freight. A transitional road freight system of *cabotage* (the right to ply for hire in another country) was agreed in 1993 (and updated in 2006 and 2010), and in 1999 a directive was issued introducing distance-related tolls and a *vignette* (a time-based user charge) for heavy goods vehicles, which would raise funds for distribution among the member states most affected by road transport.

The overall aim of the EU's trans-European transport network (TEN-T) policy included so-called intelligent transport systems and services and aimed to unite the various national networks into a single European network, by eliminating bottlenecks and adding missing links. A Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-T EA) was established in November 2006 to manage priority projects. The first annual ministerial conference on the future of TEN-T, held in October 2009, with participation by delegates from the EU member states, the Balkans, the Western Mediterranean and Africa, and from **Norway, Switzerland, the Russian Federation and Turkey**, determined to strengthen co-operation to facilitate the creation of a sustainable infrastructure network, and outlined common priorities until 2020. In January 2014 the TEN-T was relaunched as part of the EU's new transport infrastructure policy, and a new Innovation and Networks Executive Agency commenced operations in **Brussels**, replacing the TEN-T EA. The **Connecting Europe Facility** is the funding instrument for transport infrastructure, with a budget of €11,384m. (in 2018 prices) in 2021–27.

ROMANIA concluded a trade and economic **co-operation agreement** with the European Communities in 1990, and a **Europe agreement** was signed in 1993, coming into effect in 1995. Although Romania applied for membership of the European Union (EU) in the same year, the **European Commission** recommended in 1997 that **accession negotiations** be deferred, owing to the need primarily for further economic reform in Romania. Subsequent reports made similar calls for further reform so that Romania could meet all the **accession criteria**. Nevertheless, in 1999 Romania was invited to start accession negotiations. Despite a public commitment to speed up integration with the EU, progress in the negotiations was the slowest of all **candidate countries** involved. By the end of 2003, only 22 of the 31 negotiating chapters had been closed. As a consequence, Romania did not join the EU as part of the 2004 **enlargement**. By the end of that year, however, it had concluded the outstanding chapters. A **Treaty of Accession** followed in April 2005, which envisaged Romania joining the EU alongside **Bulgaria** on 1 January 2007. However, concerns persisted about the country's preparedness for membership. With this in mind, it was agreed that accession could be delayed, through a decision by a qualified majority of the member states, if Romania failed to address EU concerns, particularly regarding corruption, state aid (see **subsidies**) policy and border controls. Three monitoring reports

followed before it was finally confirmed that accession would take place on 1 January 2007. Romania duly entered the EU on that date. Between 26 September 2005 and 31 December 2006 Romania had 35 observer members in the **European Parliament** (EP), who were appointed from government and opposition parties, as agreed by the Romanian Parliament. Following the country's accession on 1 January 2007 the observers became **Members of the European Parliament** (MEPs), who contested the elections to the EP held in June 2009. Upon Romania's accession to the EU, many existing EU member states imposed extensive labour market restrictions; only nine countries guaranteed unlimited access to migrant workers from Bulgaria and Romania; however, all transitional migration restrictions were lifted from 1 January 2014. Alongside Romania's membership, however, came domestic political crises, post-accession monitoring by the Commission of progress in terms of compliance with judicial reform and anti-corruption measures, and further demands for action to be taken in these areas. The Romanian Parliament approved the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (**Fiscal Compact**) in May 2012 and it was granted presidential approval one month later. In early 2017 widespread protests took place in Romania against planned reforms, which had appeared to reverse anti-corruption legislation. In May, during a visit to the Romanian capital Bucharest, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the **European Commission** described corruption in Romania as a 'national evil'. In May 2020 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Laura Kövesi (who had been appointed to the newly created EU post of European Chief Prosecutor) had been wrongfully dismissed in 2018 from her position at the head of Romania's anti-corruption bureau.

RRF: See European Rapid Reaction Force

The **RUSSIAN FEDERATION's** relations with the European Union (EU) were based on a **partnership and co-operation agreement** (PCA) concluded in June 1994, providing for closer political, cultural and economic relations, which entered into force in December 1997. This PCA followed an earlier agreement in 1993 on the establishment of regular political dialogue. This led to annual summits between the President of the **European Commission**, the EU's **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the Russian President. The PCA was complemented by the adoption in 1999 by the **Council of the European Union** of a **common strategy** on EU-Russia relations. The strategy placed emphasis on assisting with the promotion of political and economic stability within Russia and the development of a market-based economy, as well as addressing common challenges relating to the environment, crime and illegal immigration. To these ends, financial assistance was made available under the **Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States**

programme, although there were demands for such assistance and the PCA to be suspended over Russia's handling of the Chechnya conflict; the EU generally resisted these. Nevertheless, the relationship—as a Commission report in 2004 highlighted—did not develop as positively as envisaged. There were major disagreements over whether negotiations should be opened on upgrading the EU–Russia trade relationship to a free trade area, over access in an enlarged EU for Russian citizens to the exclave of **Kaliningrad**, over **ratification** of the Kyoto Protocol, and over the extension of the PCA to the 10 **candidate countries** that joined the EU in 2004. Such differences threatened to undermine progress in achieving the strategic objective of EU–Russia relations as set out in St Petersburg in May 2003: a common economic space, a common space of freedom, security and justice, a common space of co-operation in the field of external security, and a common space of research and education, including culture. A set of road maps for the development of these common spaces (which Russia chose to pursue rather than joining the EU's **European Neighbourhood Policy**) was adopted in May 2005 at an EU–Russia summit in Moscow, but progress was limited. Initial plans for a replacement for the PCA also made little progress, leaving the PCA, renewed annually on a rolling basis, to continue to provide an inadequate legal basis for relations. A mandate for a new agreement covering trade and co-operation to replace the PCA was eventually agreed by EU member states in May 2008. Negotiations, expected to be protracted, began the following month. They were suspended, however, as a result of the Russia–Georgia conflict of 2008. Russia subsequently agreed to withdraw its troops from Georgia by mid-October. By 2011 Russia was the third largest trading partner of the **Twenty-Eight**, and the value of EU exports to Russia in that year was €108,400m., having been only €22,700m. in 2000. Relations between the EU and Russia have remained guarded, and have come under considerable strain following developments in **Ukraine** since 2013. In March 2014 the EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes against Russian and Ukrainian officials, in response to the destabilization of Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea; these sanctions were later strengthened. Sanctions against the Russian Federation have been repeatedly renewed. Regular bilateral talks with Russia have been suspended since 2014, as a result of that country's involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In addition, Russia's involvement in the conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic** from 2015, in support of President Lt-Gen. Dr Bashar al-Assad, as well as campaigns of disinformation, resulted in increased tensions. In February 2021 the EU's **High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** visited the Russian capital, Moscow, where unsuccessful talks were held on issues including the alleged state-sanctioned poisoning of Russian opposition figure Aleksei Navalnyi and his subsequent arrest; during the course of the visit, the expulsion of three EU diplomats from Russia was announced. In mid-June the Commission and the High Representative published a joint statement on future EU–Russia relations, identifying its intention to 'push back, constrain and engage' with Russia, by responding to human rights

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violations and breaches of international law (through the imposition of restrictive measures if deemed necessary), by countering attempts to undermine EU values, and by engaging with Russia where necessary, and in line with EU interests (for example, in relation to the **COVID-19** pandemic or environmental issues).

SAA: See **Stabilization and Association Agreements**

SAFETY: See **Health and Safety**

PEDRO SÁNCHEZ PÉREZ-CASTEJÓN (1972–) is the Prime Minister of **Spain**. He took office in June 2018 following a vote of no confidence in his predecessor, Mariano Rajoy. Sánchez Pérez-Castejón was born in Madrid, Spain, and took his undergraduate degree in 1998 in Politics and Economics at the Free University of Brussels, **Belgium**. In 2012 he earned a PhD in Business and Economics. Sánchez Pérez-Castejón became Secretary-General of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers Party) in 2014 and was twice fielded as their candidate for prime minister. He has worked in the **European Parliament** and served in different capacities in Spain both regionally and nationally, notably as the official leader of the opposition from 2014 to 2016.

SANCTIONS and their collective imposition against specific countries were accepted by the member states as a valuable element of their collaboration on foreign policy under **European political co-operation**. European Union (EU) sanctions have been applied on numerous occasions over the years. However, not all member states are willing to participate in a collective imposition of sanctions against a named country.

SAPARD was the acronym of the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development, a programme of the European Union (EU) operating in the **candidate countries** of **Central and Eastern Europe** in order to prepare their agricultural sectors for membership of the EU. Following the **enlargement** of May 2004, when 10 candidate countries became members, SAPARD continued with a budget of €225.2m. for **Bulgaria** and **Romania** in 2004. SAPARD came under the remit of the Directorate-General for Agriculture, and covered 2000 to 2006. From 1 January 2007 SAPARD was replaced by the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**.

DAVID-MARIA SASSOLI (1956–) became the new President of the **European Parliament** (EP) on 3 July 2019, succeeding **Antonio Tajani**. Sassoli is a former Italian journalist and politician. He was born in Florence, **Italy**, and educated at the University of Florence. He began his career as a journalist, working locally before moving to the Italian capital, Rome. He left his career in journalism in 2009 to stand as a candidate for the EP for the centre-left Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), representing the Central Italy district. He contested, but came second, in the election for Mayor of Rome in 2013, and was re-elected to the EP in 2014. On 1 July of that year Sassoli was elected as the Vice-President of the EP, and five years later he left that position to take on the role of President.

The **SCHENGEN AGREEMENT** is the name of a document originally signed by five founder members of the European Communities in the town of Schengen, Luxembourg, on 14 June 1985. The Schengen Convention was signed in June 1990. Under the Agreement, **Belgium, France**, the Federal Republic of **Germany, Luxembourg** and the **Netherlands** agreed in principle to work towards the formation of a border-free **Schengen Area**. The Agreement was implemented with effect from March 1995 by the original five signatories, along with **Portugal** and **Spain**. Frontier controls at airports on travellers between the countries were dismantled. However, France continued to impose border controls on countries other than Spain and Germany. **Italy, Austria, Greece, Denmark, Finland** and **Sweden** (along with non-member states **Norway** and **Iceland**) later became signatories. Of the then **Fifteen, Ireland** and the **United Kingdom** remained outside the Schengen Area.

Although the Schengen Agreement began as an international agreement outside the framework of the European Union (EU), it was incorporated into the **Treaty of Rome** and the **Treaty on European Union** following provisions contained in the **Treaty of Amsterdam** as part of moves to create a common area without frontiers. The UK (which officially left the EU in 2020) and Ireland negotiated an **opt-out** and were allowed to retain jurisdiction over their borders and rules of asylum and immigration. In May 2000 the British Government secured agreement in the **Council of the European Union** that enabled the country to participate in substantial parts of the Schengen *acquis*, particularly in relation to the creation and operation of the **Schengen Information System**; Ireland did likewise. In 2005 seven member states signed the **Prüm Convention**, known as Schengen III, on data exchange for the purpose of combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. On 21 December 2007 the Schengen Area was enlarged to include nine of the member states that joined the EU in 2004: the **Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia** and **Slovakia**. Initially internal land and sea border controls were abolished, and the abolition of air border controls followed in March 2008. Two non-EU states, Iceland and Norway, were officially classified as states associated with Schengen (and

where Schengen rules apply) because of their involvement with the 1957 Nordic Passport Union, and also because of the lengthy land border between Norway and Sweden. **Switzerland** gained the status of a country associated with the Schengen activities in December 2008, following the approval in a referendum of that country's bilateral agreement with the EU to abolish passport controls. Its association with the Schengen Area offered the benefit to the Swiss authorities of access to a vast database on criminals, traffickers and stolen goods. **Liechtenstein** became the 26th member of the Schengen Area (as an associated state) in December 2011.

Nevertheless, the Schengen Agreement has attracted criticism from nationalists and **Euroseptics** who have claimed that it facilitates illegal migration and the free movement of criminals. Large-scale terrorist attacks in Paris, France, in mid-November 2015, which resulted in the deaths of 130 people, and which were attributed to supporters of **Islamic State**, prompted demands for the revision of the Schengen Agreement. In mid-December the **European Commission** proposed an amendment, reinforcing checks at the EU's external borders against relevant databases (for example, police records) for both EU and non-EU travellers. Non-EU nationals with a Schengen visa have generally been exempt from identity checks within the Schengen Area, although such checks became more frequent from November 2015. If a serious threat to public policy or internal security is identified, a member of the Schengen Area may temporarily reintroduce border controls at its internal borders. For example, at March 2018 six countries had temporarily reintroduced border controls, owing either to persistent 'secondary movements' of migrants, from one Schengen state to another, or concerns relating to potential terrorist activity. In response to the **COVID-19** pandemic from 2020, temporary border controls were introduced by Schengen countries.

The **SCHENGEN AREA** is the area in Europe in which the free movement of people has been realized on the basis of the **Schengen Agreement**. Following the European Union's (EU) **enlargement** in July 2013 it covers all EU members, with the exception of **Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland and Romania**, and also includes four non-members, **Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland**, which have the status of countries associated with Schengen (and subject to Schengen rules and regulations). The Schengen Area also, de facto, includes Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican. Although not members of the Schengen Area, Ireland participates in substantial parts of the Schengen *acquis*. Since their accession to the EU in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania have been aiming to join the Schengen Area. However, political will is not sufficient in itself. In order to join the Schengen Area prospective members must fulfil a series of preconditions that include full control of external borders, close co-operation with law enforcement agencies in other states, the full application of the Schengen *acquis* (i.e. control of land, sea and air borders) and signing up to the **Schengen Information System**. Other

member states continue to express concern over the readiness of both Bulgaria and Romania to join. The EU's newest member state, Croatia, also expressed a wish to join the Schengen Area. Nevertheless, the continued functioning of the Schengen Area was placed under considerable pressure by the **European migration crisis**. Under the **Dublin Regulation** migrants were expected to claim asylum in their point of entry, but were able to traverse Europe owing to the lack of internal border controls. Some politicians, notably **German Chancellor** Angela Merkel, argued that European countries should share responsibility for refugees or place the **Schengen Agreement** at risk.

The **SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM** (SIS), once also known as the European Information System, is a computer network that links the computer systems of immigration services and the police in signatory countries of the **Schengen Agreement**. A new network, SIS II, which has enhanced functionalities (including the possibility of using biometrics) and ensures stronger data protection, became operational in April 2013.

MARGARITIS SCHINAS (1962–) is a Greek civil servant and politician. He is a Vice-President and Commissioner for the (controversially named) 'European Way of Life' in the new **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** from late 2019. Schinas previously held the role of Chief Spokesman of the Commission, a post that he had occupied since 2014. He was also previously a **Member of the European Parliament** in 2007–09.

The **SCHUMAN PLAN**, named after Robert Schuman, was the original proposal for a consolidation of coal and steel resources that led to the **European Coal and Steel Community** (ECSC). In addition to the economic benefits, the Plan also argued that it would 'immediately provide for the establishment of common bases for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe'; it went on to state explicitly that 'Europe must be organized on a federal basis'. The more specific political objective was to secure a rapprochement between **France** and the Federal Republic of **Germany** (West Germany). The Plan opened with the declaration that 'the French Government proposes that Franco-German coal and steel production should be placed under a common High Authority within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe'. The Schuman Plan was first revealed at a press conference on 9 May 1950. It was immediately supported by West Germany and the **USA**. Only six countries entered the negotiations resulting in the **Treaty of Paris** of 18 April 1951, which formally established the ECSC.

NICOLAS SCHMIT (1953–) is a politician from **Luxembourg** who currently serves as the European Commissioner responsible for Jobs and Social

Rights in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** since December 2019. Schmit was previously a **Member of the European Parliament**, who represented the Luxembourg Socialist Worker's Party between 2004 and 2019, and he served in various national government roles before becoming a member of the **European Parliament**. Schmit holds a doctorate in International Economic Relations from the Faculty of Law and Economics of the University of Aix-Marseille, **France**.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE (CREST): See **European Research Area Committee (ERAC)**

SCREENING is an integral stage of the process leading to accession. In order to ensure as smooth a transition as possible into the European Union (EU) for the countries of **Central and Eastern Europe**, a 1995 **White Paper** drew up an initial list of EU **legislation** that had to be incorporated into the domestic legislation of all the applicant states before membership could be deemed possible. The negotiations on EU membership began formally in 1998 and have involved a careful examination of the compatibility of all existing legislation with current EU rules and the necessity of additional legislative action. This process conforms to a screening mechanism. It is conducted primarily by the **European Commission** and each of the **applicant countries**, which together analyse, sector by sector, the degrees of compatibility. The process has allowed outstanding measures to be identified and a timetable for their **implementation** to be drawn up.

SCRUTINY is the process whereby **national parliaments** monitor and try to influence **legislation** emanating from the European Union (EU). In the **United Kingdom**, for example, the procedure (during its membership) centred on the 'scrutiny reserve', which prohibited a national minister from adopting any legislative proposal unless it had been examined by the House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation. The **European Parliament** (EP) undertakes scrutiny of the EU policy process and of the annual **budget**. Members of the EP can put forward questions (orally and in writing) to both the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Commission**; they can, moreover, question individual Commissioners and national ministers in parliamentary committees. The EP also has the authority to draw up reports in particular policy areas and can pass **resolutions** on current themes. It can also hold public hearings and establish committees of inquiry. Ultimately, the EP can dismiss the Commission and can bring cases before the European courts.

SEA: See **Single European Act**

SEC DOCUMENTS are those produced by the **Secretariat-General** of the **European Commission**. Less formal than **COM Documents**, they consist of internal reports, discussion papers and draft **resolutions**.

SECRETARIAT-GENERAL is the name of the senior and central bureaucratic service of the **European Commission**. It sits alongside other services such as **Eurostat**, the **European Anti-fraud Office** and the **Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid**. It is answerable to the President of the Commission, and is the major administrative link between the President and the various **Directorates-General** and other agencies. It comprises some 450 officials and is headed by the Secretary-General of the Commission, the most senior official within the Commission, whose post should not be confused with that of the **Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union**. The Secretariat-General is a highly important part of the Commission's machinery and ensures that all parts of the Commission co-ordinate their activities, act in accordance with established procedures and liaise properly with the other **institutions**.

The **SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION** heads the administration of the Council. The structure of the General Secretariat was changed in the late 1990s to make the Secretary-General also the European Union's **High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**. The Council appoints the Secretary-General (although in reality they are selected by the **European Council** operating under **unanimity**). The appointment of Javier Solana in 1999 marked a significant departure from previous practice, since, for the first time, a politician was selected instead of the more customary senior diplomat. Solana, who was the fifth Secretary-General, stepped down in November 2009 and was replaced by Pierre de Boissieu, his deputy, as Secretary-General, while Baroness Catherine Ashton took over as the new **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** (in accordance with the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the two posts were now separate). In June 2011 Uwe Corsepius replaced de Boissieu as the new Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. On 1 July 2015 he was replaced by **Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen**, whose (second) mandate runs until June 2025.

A **SECTION** is a subdivision of a **Chapter** within a European Union treaty.

SECTORAL INTEGRATION was the major alternative to the federalist approach to integration. **Jean Monnet** was the main proponent of the more gradualist sectoral approach. The strategy was to integrate national economies in stages, by taking one economic sector at a time. The process would be accelerated by '**spillover**', and would eventually create such an interlocking of

national economies that a common political structure for their direction would be required and inevitable. Ultimately, the **European Coal and Steel Community** was the only successful example of sectoral integration, following which the **Six** directed their efforts instead to the development of a **common market**.

A **SECURITY UNION STRATEGY** was published by the **European Commission** in July 2020, replacing the European Agenda on Security and extending the scope of European Union (EU) action on security for 2021–25. The European Agenda on Security had been adopted by the Commission in April 2015, outlining the principal actions required to ensure an effective response by the EU to threats of terrorism and risks to security in 2015–20, as part of a reformed Internal Security Strategy, adopted by the **Council of the European Union** in June 2015. In December action plans on firearms and explosives were adopted, followed in February 2016 by an action plan on strengthening efforts to combat the financing of terrorist operations. In April two communications were adopted, on information systems for border security and on combating terrorism and creating an effective Security Union.

MAROŠ ŠEFČOVIČ (1966–) was named as Vice-President and Commissioner for Inter-institutional Relations and Foresight in the new **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** from late 2019. He had been nominated in 2014 as the Slovakian Commissioner-designate to the 28-member **European Commission** led by President-elect Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014–19. In September 2014 Juncker named Šefčovič as the Commissioner for Energy Union. Šefčovič commenced his term as European Commissioner on 1 November. Prior to this appointment, Šefčovič had been one of the Commission Vice-Presidents in 2010–14, when he held the portfolio for Inter-institutional Relations and Administration. He had briefly also been Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth in the previous Commission. Šefčovič studied law and received his doctorate from Comenius University in Bratislava in 1990. After graduation he worked in the diplomatic service of the former Czechoslovakia and thereafter Slovakia. He was Slovakia's ambassador to Israel in 1999, the Director-General of European Affairs in the Slovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then the Slovakian representative to the European Union in 2004–09.

SEPA: See **Single Euro Payments Area**

SERBIA emerged as an independent country from the former state of Serbia and **Montenegro** (which itself had previously been named the Federal Republic of **Yugoslavia**) in May 2006. For much of the 1990s, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) underwent a process of disintegration,

with Serbia, under Slobodan Milošević, being held responsible internationally for much of the ensuing conflict. After the departure from office of Milošević in October 2000 **sanctions** imposed by the European Union (EU) in the 1990s were lifted and the FRY was included in the EU's **Stabilization and Association Process** and financial assistance programme for the **Western Balkans (CARDS)**. Despite fears of the disintegration of the FRY, agreement was reached in 2002 on maintaining the republic and renaming the country Serbia and Montenegro. However, in April 2002 the coalition Government in Montenegro collapsed, as a result of opposition to the agreement, although the Federal Assembly subsequently ratified this in May. Within Serbia, the assassination of the Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić, in March 2003 reinforced concerns about organized crime and political stability in the country. Such concerns, along with continued unrest in **Kosovo**, which remains under international civilian and military administration, initially prevented the EU from opening negotiations on a **stabilization and association agreement** (SAA) with Serbia and Montenegro. However, progress with political and economic reforms in 2004 led the **European Commission** to propose such negotiations in April 2005 and these were later opened in October. Seven months later the negotiations were suspended owing to Serbia's lack of co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), notably regarding the arrest and handing over of alleged war criminals such as Ratko Mladić. Also overshadowing relations was the prospect of Montenegrin independence—on which a referendum had been scheduled for April 2006—and the future of Kosovo. In the referendum a majority (55%) of Montenegrin voters opted for independence, and the union with Serbia was soon dissolved. Kosovo was also moving towards independence, a development Serbia utterly opposed.

Disagreement on the future of Kosovo cast a shadow over Serbia's relations with the EU. However, improved co-operation with the ICTY led the EU to resume SAA negotiations in June 2007, and these were concluded at the technical level three months later. A process of 'enhanced permanent dialogue' was under way, focused on monitoring and encouraging the reforms set out in the **European partnership**, first adopted in 2004 and subsequently revised. Visa facilitation and readmission agreements were signed in September 2007, and in its progress report on Serbia in November the Commission, while critical of reforms in many areas, recorded encouraging progress in others. It also noted that Serbia was in receipt of financial assistance under the new **instrument for pre-accession assistance**. Formal conclusion of the negotiations and signature of the SAA were still outstanding, however, and in early 2008 relations entered a new period of strain following Kosovo's declaration of independence and pledges of support for the new state from many—but not all—of the EU's member states. However, in a subsequent move designed to bolster the electoral prospects of pro-EU forces around the then Serbian President, Boris Tadić, member states, demanding that Serbia improve its co-operation with the ICTY (notably by tracking down Mladić), agreed to lift

their veto on finally concluding the SAA, and the agreement was signed on 29 April. The move was welcomed by supporters of integration in Serbia but widely criticized by nationalists and others as a cynical move to interfere with the election by manipulating public opinion. Victory for Tadić and his supporters led to a rapprochement with the EU and in December 2009 an application for EU membership. The Commission's **opinion** was published in October 2011 and, owing in part to the arrest by the Serbian authorities of Mladić and his transfer to the ICTY in May, was broadly positive. Conferral of candidate status followed in March 2012. Following further progress towards the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in April 2013 the European Commission recommended the initiation of **accession negotiations** with Serbia. In June the **Council of the European Union** announced that negotiations would commence in 2014. The first EU-Serbia inter-governmental conference duly took place on 21 January. In August 2015 the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Federica Mogherini, announced that the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia had signed four significant agreements, aiding the further normalization of relations. The agreements focused on energy, telecommunications, the introduction of additional rights for Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosovo, and freedom of movement. In December negotiations on the first two of the 35 policy areas of the *acquis communautaire* (on the normalization of relations with Kosovo and on financial control) were opened. The need for the normalization of relations with Kosovo remained a principal obstacle to Serbia's accession to the EU. However, negotiations collapsed in September 2018, when the Serbian President refused to participate, citing Kosovo's obstruction of a planned visit to the territory. Agreements on a degree of 'economic normalization' were signed in September 2020.

The **SET-ASIDE SCHEME** was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in **Brussels, Belgium**, in 1988 as a means of improving the effectiveness of the **common agricultural policy** (CAP) through the elimination of surpluses of produce. Under the scheme, farmers received financial compensation, on the condition that they undertook not to produce anything, leaving land uncultivated or destroying crops and livestock, on at least 15% (reduced to 10% in 1996) of their arable land for five years. The idea of set-aside became a fundamental part of the CAP reform package endorsed by the Council in 1992. In November 2008 the **European Commission** agreed to abolish the set-aside scheme completely.

SHIPPING was not always regulated by the European Union (EU), despite the fact that almost 90% of EU external trade is carried by sea, short sea shipping represents around 40% of intra-EU exchanges in terms of ton-kilometres, and land links between member states on the geographical fringes of the EU are relatively indirect. A common shipping policy was adopted in December

SIMMENTHAL SPA V COMMISSION

1986, consisting of four **regulations**. The first regulation made sea transport subject to EU **competition policy**, from which it had been exempted in 1962; certain shipping consortia, however, remained exempt from competition rules. The second endorsed the right of EU-based ships to ply freely for trade within and beyond the EU. This was reinforced by a 1992 regulation on the liberalization of coastal shipping within the EU. The other two regulations dealt with **discrimination**. One permitted the **European Commission** to take anti-**dumping** measures against third parties: where the case was proved by a complaints investigation procedure, duties could be imposed upon vessels from the country concerned. The other regulation permitted the EU to retaliate against countries that reserved a proportion of the trade between themselves and the EU for their own vessels: the Commission was authorized to impose loading or discharging permits and quotas, and/or to levy duties. **Cabotage** by sea began to be introduced from January 1993 and was virtually complete by January 1999. To maintain an adequate shipping fleet, the EU has, since the 1970s, had guidelines for state **subsidies** to shipping, and proposals were made for an EU system of vessel registration.

In January 2009 the Commission presented its new Maritime Transport Strategy, the two main goals of which were: the ability of the maritime transport sector to provide cost-efficient maritime transport services adapted to the needs of sustainable economic growth in the EU and other world economies; and the long-term competitiveness of the EU shipping sector, enhancing its capacity to generate value and employment in the EU, both directly and indirectly, through the whole spectrum of maritime industries.

In June 2002 the European Parliament established by regulation the **European Maritime Safety Agency** (based in Lisbon, **Portugal**). In November 2005 the Commission proposed a third package of maritime safety measures, including a requirement that member states ensure that ships flying their flags comply with international standards; an improvement in the quality and effectiveness of ship inspections; and an obligation that member states designate an independent authority responsible for the prior identification of places of refuge for ships in distress. The Commission noted that the EU accounted for some 25% of the world's fleet.

SIMMENTHAL SPA V COMMISSION is the title of an important case heard by the **Court of Justice**, which ruled that national governments must apply European Union **law** in full, and that, where this is not done, individuals have the right to appeal to the Court.

SIMPLIFICATION relates to efforts to simplify **legislation** in order to make it easier to comprehend, and to ensure greater effectiveness. The notion dates back to the 1985 **White Paper** on the Completion of the **Internal Market** and was explicitly dealt with at the December 1992 meeting of the **European Council** in Edinburgh, the **United Kingdom**. Since the 1980s the pursuit of

a genuine single market based on the free movement of people, capital, services and goods has produced a substantial amount of European Union (EU) legislation. Simplifying this was a necessity. A pilot programme (SLIM—Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market) was launched in 1996 (running until 2002). Simplification was also used to describe the process undertaken via the **Treaty of Amsterdam** to repeal or amend obsolete **articles** in the **founding treaties**. The **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** should also be read as an attempt to simplify EU machinery and EU **decision making**. The same is true for the **Treaty of Lisbon**, which repealed or amended obsolete treaty provisions and saw the formal abandonment of the EU's **pillars** and the **European Community**.

The **SIMPLIFIED REVISION PROCEDURE** was introduced by the **Treaty of Lisbon** and allows the **European Council** to amend certain provisions of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** governing internal policies and how they are made, without recourse to a convention or an **intergovernmental conference**. Such amendments cannot involve any increase in the competences of the European Union and have to be ratified by **national parliaments** or by referendum.

KADRI SIMSON (1977–) is the Commissioner for Energy in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** that was installed in December 2019. A politician and former member of the Estonian legislature, Simson was also previously the Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure.

SINGLE CURRENCY: See **Economic and Monetary Union; Euro**

The **SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA** (SEPA) is a private-sector initiative, launched in early 2008 and involving about 4,000 banks in Europe representing approximately 80% of transactions, which facilitates cross-border payments made electronically within the **eurozone**. The SEPA Regulation adopted in 2012 set 1 February 2014 as the date for the migration to SEPA in the eurozone. However, as the migration rates for credit transfers and direct debits were not high enough to ensure a smooth transition to SEPA, in January the **European Commission** adopted a proposal to allow an additional transition period of six months, to 1 August. SEPA comprises all European Union member states, the four **European Free Trade Association** member states, as well as Monaco and San Marino.

The **SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT** (SEA) was an important amendment of the **founding treaties** of the European Communities (EC) that came into force in July 1987 after **ratification** by the national legislatures of the member

states. The Act consisted of 34 Articles, divided into four sections. The first section (Articles 1–3) constituted the objective of the SEA—‘making concrete progress towards European unity’—as well as legitimizing the status of the **European Council**. The second section (Articles 4–29) formed the greatest part of the SEA, dealing with the amendments to the founding treaties. The third section (Article 30) provided for a permanent secretariat for **European political co-operation** (EPC), while the final section (Articles 31–34) outlined the procedures necessary for the ratification and **implementation** of the Act.

The SEA had three main themes: the **internal market**, EPC and institutional reform. Its implications for the internal market were enormous. It obliged the EC to deal definitively with the whole range of national systems of **taxation** and law, national standards and **regulations** in a number of policy areas, and national social security and welfare systems. It specifically strengthened the role of the EC in several policy areas. It made the **European Commission** an equal partner in EPC, with the views of the **European Parliament** (EP) also needing to be taken into consideration; and it committed the EC to extending EPC to include collaboration on security policy issues. While its institutional reforms were limited, it provided for a more widespread use of **qualified majority voting** in the Council (see **Council of the European Union**), and required the latter to collaborate more with the EP in the legislative process according to a new **co-operation procedure**, whereby a rejection by the EP of a Council decision could be overturned only by unanimous agreement in the Council. A final amendment created a Court of First Instance (now **General Court**) to reduce the workload of the **Court of Justice**.

The **SINGLE MARKET** was originally conceived as an internal market achieved by ‘progressively approximating the economic policies of member states’, and was an immediate general objective of the **Treaty of Rome**. The Treaty set a specific timetable for the achievement of the **common market**. It was to be reached in a series of stages, and completed within 12 to 15 years. Although the **Six** successfully abolished **quota restrictions** and **tariffs** on internal trade, the broader objective was not attained within the stipulated time limit. It was not until the 1980s that the **European Communities** (EC) began to consider with greater urgency the need to tackle the numerous non-tariff barriers (so-called physical, technical and fiscal barriers) that restricted the **freedom of movement** of people, goods, services and capital. There was concern that the EC were not enjoying the economic advantage over their main trading rivals that their large population should provide. **European Commission** initiatives on economic liberalization were accumulating in the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), where the effective requirement of unanimous agreement was seen as a major obstacle to any rapid progress. Jacques Delors, the incoming President of the Commission,

had recognized the potential of pushing for a genuine internal market as a means not only of increasing trade and prosperity among the **Ten**, but also of re-launching the European integration project. In a tour of member state capital cities in the latter half of 1984 he found a general consensus in favour of the creation of an internal market, which he then presented to the **European Council** in **Brussels, Belgium**, in March 1985.

The Council accepted the principle of establishing a single market within a specified deadline, and instructed the European Commission to draw up a detailed programme, according to which the internal market would be completed by December 1992. The Commission responded with a **White Paper**, which listed some 300 actions (subsequently reduced to 282), with a timetable for each. Three months after its Brussels meeting, the European Council set in motion the developments that resulted in the **Single European Act**. This made the process of **harmonization** less subject to delay by amending the provisions relating to voting in the Council of Ministers. By 1992 most of the measures included in the White Paper had been adopted (although many still required **implementation** at national level). The effort to complete the internal market helped to revive the European project. It also persuaded the **European Free Trade Association** countries to seek a closer relationship with the European Union (EU), and possibly even membership. Furthermore, it led directly to renewed pressure for both **economic and monetary union** and closer political integration, and so indirectly to the **Treaty on European Union**. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** also introduced measures to improve freedom of movement within the EU, which could have an impact on the internal market. Other measures that had to be agreed at European level included greater combating of state aids (see **subsidies**), more market liberalization (especially in the energy sector), a more concerted **research and technological development** strategy, greater assistance for small and medium-sized businesses, better **Trans-European Networks**, greater labour mobility and, most controversially of all, fiscal harmonization. The **Treaty of Lisbon** deleted all references to the internal market, preferring the term ‘single market’.

The **SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM** (SRM) applies to those banks covered by the **Single Supervisory Mechanism** (primarily those in the eurozone). It establishes that when banks fail—even following strong supervision—a Single Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund, financed by the banking sector, will respond and resolve the issue. The principal aim of the SRM is to ensure an orderly resolution in the case of a failing bank, and one that involves minimum costs for taxpayers and public funds. The SRM entered into force in 2014 and was signed by all member states except **Sweden** and the **United Kingdom** (which left the European Union in 2020).

SINGLE RULEBOOK

The **SINGLE RULEBOOK** forms the foundations of the European Union's (EU) **banking union** and its origins lie in the financial crisis that hit Europe in 2008. The rulebook comprises a series of texts and rules that apply to all financial institutions (some 8,500) in the EU. The rulebook endeavours to provide rules on issues such as capital requirements for banks, and rules on giving greater protection for depositors, and also seeks to prevent and manage bank failures. Fundamentally, it seeks to prevent any reoccurrence of the banking crisis that took hold of Europe from the late 2000s, leading to huge public bailouts.

The **SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM** (SSM) is a powerful tool that made the **European Central Bank** (ECB) the main prudential supervisor of all financial institutions in the **eurozone** area and also in those countries that opt to participate in the SSM. The creation of an SSM was proposed by the **European Commission** in September 2012 as the first step towards a **banking union** that also envisaged other fundamental components, such as a **single rulebook**, common deposit protection and a single bank resolution system. The SSM was formally approved in October 2013 and aims to strengthen **economic and monetary union**. From November 2014 the ECB became responsible for the direct supervision of the largest banks in the European Union (EU), with responsibility for managing smaller banks falling to national supervisors. This mechanism seeks to ensure that banks comply with EU **regulations** and that any potential problems are identified and addressed much earlier than in the recent past.

VIRGINIJUS SINKEVIČIUS (1990–) is a Lithuanian politician and former Minister of the Economy and Innovation. He joined the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** as Commissioner responsible for the Environment, Oceans and Fisheries. He is a graduate of Aberystwyth (**United Kingdom**) and Maastricht (**Netherlands**) Universities.

SIS: See **Schengen Information System**

The **SIX**, or the Europe of the Six, is a popular way of referring to the membership of the European Communities from the **Schuman Plan** of 1950 until the first **enlargement** of 1973. It refers to the six founder members: **Belgium**, **France**, the Federal Republic of **Germany**, **Italy**, **Luxembourg** and the **Netherlands**.

SLOVAKIA applied for membership of the European Communities (EC) in early 1993, and subsequently signed a **Europe agreement** in October of that year. This agreement superseded the earlier Europe agreement signed between

the EC and the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (Czechoslovakia) in 1991. The first Agreement had become obsolete in January 1993 with the creation of two separate states, the **Czech Republic** and Slovakia. Relations between Slovakia and the European Union (EU) can be divided into two periods. The early years of the new Slovak state under the authoritarian Prime Minister, Vladimír Mečiar, were characterized by a degree of friction between that country and the EU. The second period, following the election of a new Prime Minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda, in October 1998, constituted nothing less than a complete transformation in relations and contacts with the EU.

Despite the Europe agreement in force since the beginning of 1995, and Slovakia's application for EU membership, doubts about the country's potential membership persisted under the Mečiar regime because of reservations about the country's commitment to democracy. The **European Commission's** 1997 report on Slovakia's membership application stated that the country's institutions were unstable and that there were shortcomings in the functioning of its democracy, a situation which was 'all the more regrettable as the country would be capable of meeting the economic criteria [for membership] in the medium term'. Considerable improvements were made under Dzurinda's leadership, particularly with regard to **minority rights**, but Slovakia continued to struggle in terms of economic progress. However, progress was made in the **accession negotiations**, which were opened in 2000. By the end of 2002 Slovakia had closed all negotiating chapters. A national referendum in May 2003 then endorsed membership (92.5% of those who participated voted in favour), and paved the way for Slovakia to join the EU on 1 May 2004. The Slovakian parliament ratified the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** by 116 votes to 27, with four abstentions, in May 2005. Slovakia adopted the **euro** and thereby joined the **eurozone** in January 2009. It joined the EU's **Schengen Area** in December 2007. However, public support and interest in the EU seemed low: Slovakia recorded the lowest turnout figures for the **European Parliament** elections among the **Twenty-Seven** (EU27) in both 2004 and 2009 (both were less than 20%). In October 2011 the Slovakian legislature failed to support plans by the EU to enhance the powers of the **European Financial Stability Facility**; the proposals required ratification by each EU member state prior to their implementation. The Government of Iveta Radičová subsequently collapsed, and the general election of March 2012 saw the return to the premiership of Robert Fico (who had been Prime Minister of Slovakia in 2006–10) at the head of the Direction-Social Democracy party. This new administration ensured the ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (**Fiscal Compact** treaty) in December 2012. Following legislative elections in March 2016, a new Government led by Fico took office. Large-scale political protests followed the murder of a journalist in early 2018, and in March Fico announced his resignation. He was replaced by Peter Pellegrini. In the EP elections in 2019, turnout in Slovakia reached its highest-ever level, at 22.7% (compared with

SLOVENIA

13.1% in 2014), but the country still recorded the lowest rate of participation in the Union. The Government is led by Eduard Heger.

SLOVENIA was the first of the former Yugoslav republics to declare independence, in 1991. The **European Communities** recognized the country in 1992. Slovenia is a small nation (with a population of some 2.1m. citizens) and in the early 1990s was clearly the most economically advanced of the former Yugoslav republics. Moreover, Slovenia found the transition from a socialist to a market economy easier than most. Nevertheless, relations with the European Union (EU)—primarily the conclusion of a **Europe agreement**—were initially held up by difficulties with **Italy**, which demanded compensation for Italian nationals who in 1947 had left territory now held by Slovenia. Once a compromise solution had been found and a Europe agreement concluded in 1995, Slovenia applied for EU membership in June 1996. The country subsequently received praise from the **European Commission** for its economic endeavours and political stability and, with strong political support from both **Austria** and **Germany**, opened **accession negotiations** with the EU in early 1998. These were successfully concluded less than five years later and, following the successful outcome of a referendum on EU membership held in March 2003, when 89.6% of the electorate voted in favour of accession, Slovenia joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Slovenia's parliament voted overwhelmingly (79 votes for and four against) to ratify the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in February 2005. Slovenia joined the **eurozone** and adopted the **euro** on 1 January 2007. In December of the same year it joined the EU's **Schengen Area** and the following month it became the first of the new members from the 2004 **enlargement** to hold the **Council Presidency**.

In October 2015, after **Hungary** closed its border with **Croatia** at the peak of the **European migration crisis**, Croatia began to direct migrants, many of whom were seeking refuge from conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, into Slovenia; according to official figures, within five days 50,400 immigrants had entered the country, leading the Slovenian Government to request EU assistance. Slovenia's erection of a razor wire fence on its border with Croatia in December, in an effort to control the flow of migrants, prompted Croatia to submit a complaint against Slovenia to the Commission, on the grounds that the fence endangered wildlife.

The **'SLUICE-GATE' PRICE** was similar in its effect to the **threshold price**. It applied to pig meat and eggs and other poultry products. Imports of these products into the European Union were liable to a levy to raise them to the level of the sluice-gate price.

SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs) and their development in the **single market** have been the subject of a number of

European Union (EU) policies. In 1996 the **European Commission** agreed new guidelines for state assistance for SMEs: aid for the acquisition of licences, patents, etc., would be allowed at the same level as aid for tangible investment. SMEs have been financially assisted to invest in new technologies. Euro Info Centres were established primarily as a source of information for SMEs. The Commission has prioritized the simplification of the legislative, regulatory and administrative constraints on SMEs, and in 1997 a **European Council** meeting approved an action plan for the **European Investment Bank** to generate additional investments for SMEs. In November 1998 CREA (the French acronym for Risk Capital for Business Start-ups) was launched to offer investment to small businesses. In June 2008 the Commission adopted the Small Business Act for Europe (SBA) to streamline bureaucratic procedures for SMEs and promote entrepreneurship. The EU also developed the **JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises)** initiative together with the **European Investment Fund** to support SMEs. There are more than 20m. SMEs in the EU, representing some 99% of businesses. In 2013 the Commission proposed a new Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan on 'reigniting the entrepreneurial spirit in Europe'. A programme, COSME, for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, was implemented in 2014–20, with a budget of some €2,300m. COSME seeks to support SMEs by facilitating access to finance and to markets; providing support to entrepreneurs; and helping to ensure favourable conditions for the conception and growth of businesses. From 2021 COSME became part of a new Single Market Programme, proposed by the Commission in June 2018, and intended to support the implementation and monitoring of EU legislation in relation to the single market for goods and services, market surveillance, standardization, competition and financial services. It was also to provide advisory services to SMEs. Political agreement on the programme was reached in December 2020.

SMEs: See **Small and Medium-sized Enterprises**

SNAKE was the name given to an agreement in 1972 by several European states to establish a European system of exchange rates within the broader Smithsonian Agreement, with only one-half of the permissible fluctuation range of the latter. It proved to be ineffectual as an instrument of exchange-rate control. Many countries were forced to leave it because of their inability to stay within the prescribed parameters. The Snake was effectively abandoned by the mid-1970s, and its failure disappointed the European Communities' hope that it would enable them to achieve **economic and monetary union**.

SOCIAL CHAPTER: See **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**

SOCIAL CHARTER: See **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**

The **SOCIAL DIMENSION** is a concept that gained increasing significance from the second half of the 1980s. It was promoted by left-of-centre politicians, most notably by the then French President, François Mitterrand, the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe González Márquez, and the President of the **European Commission**, Jacques Delors. They argued for the development of a social dimension at the European Communities level to protect and advance matters relating to workers. This policy commitment was regarded as an essential complement to the **internal market** programme, which contained benefits for the business community. Social issues emerged as one of a series of policies that culminated in the 1989 **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers** and the **Social Protocol**, part of the **Treaty on European Union**. The concept forms a fundamental aspect of many policies relating to competitiveness and growth.

SOCIAL DUMPING is a phrase that has been used to describe the process whereby, taking advantage of the greater freedoms available under the **single market**, manufacturers relocate their production sites within the European Union from high- to low-wage areas.

SOCIAL FUND COMMITTEE: See **European Social Fund**

SOCIAL PARTNERS refers to the organizations that the **European Commission** is obliged to consult when it wishes to pursue policy proposals in the field of **social policy**. This social dialogue takes place between the Commission and the following three main organizations that represent the social partners: the **European Trade Union Confederation**, **BUSINESSEUROPE** (formerly the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe), the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest. The Commission encourages and facilitates discussion with each of these groups on issues relating primarily to the labour market. Alongside these cross-industry organizations the Commission consults many other socioprofessional groups representing specific or sectoral interests. In addition, the Commission is also obliged, under the 1957 **Treaty of Rome**, to consult with the **European Economic and Social Committee** on a range of policy issues.

SOCIAL POLICY in the context of the European Union (EU) has a much narrower ambit than is usually implied by the phrase in the domestic context:

it refers specifically to **employment** matters, education and vocational training, **health and safety** issues, equality matters and the part of social policy that relates to employer–worker relations. During the first decade of the European Communities' (EC) existence, social policy had a very low profile and priority. The **Treaty of Rome** contained very few references to a specific social policy. The provisions that did exist related to the free movement of workers and to the freedom of establishment and creation of a then-small **European Social Fund**. Social policy became much more important with the arrival of mass unemployment in the 1970s, and the EC adopted a Social Action Programme in 1974. From 1983, social policy had two priority areas: the training and employment of people aged 25 years or under, and the provision of training and employment in the most disadvantaged regions of the EC. The **European Commission** administers social policy through the **European Social Fund** (ESF).

The **Treaty of Amsterdam** marked an important step forward in this particular policy area, as it promoted a series of social policy priorities at EU level, particularly in the area of employment, which was designated as an EU objective (under Article 2) and a matter of common concern. The aim was to reach a 'high level of employment' throughout the EU and to this end the EU was charged with developing a 'co-ordinated strategy' for employment to complement the activities of the member states. A new title on employment (125–130) clarified EU priorities in this area and provided for the creation of an **Employment Committee**. As regards **decision making**, the Council adopted **directives** by **qualified majority vote** and in conjunction with the **European Parliament** under the **co-decision procedure** in the following areas: workers' health and safety, working conditions, integration of persons excluded from the labour market, information and consultation of workers, and equality between men and women. **Unanimity** prevailed, however, in relation to the following areas: social security and social protection of workers, conditions of employment for third-country nationals residing in the EU, and financial contributions for promotion of employment and job creation. It should be noted also that certain matters were not been brought under EU **competences**. These included pay issues, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lockouts. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** has been drawn up. It restates many of the principles and goals underpinning social policy, including the aim of combating social exclusion.

An employment body, European Employment Services (EURES), launched in 1994, maintains a web portal and operates as a network of more than 750 specialist advisers across Europe, who provide the three basic EURES services of information, guidance and placement to both job seekers and employers interested in the European job market. EURES has a particularly effective role to play in regions where there are significant degrees of cross-border commuting by employees. EURES, which also covers the countries of the **European Economic Area** and **Switzerland**, provides a public database of

employment vacancies and a database through which job seekers can make their professional details available to a wide range of employers.

The framework of the Social Policy Agenda (2006–10) was designed to link economic, employment and social policies, including through the **European Employment Strategy**. Common EU rules established the baseline standards in a wide range of areas. These included protection against specific health risks, such as **noise** or exposure to chemicals, or in specific circumstances, such as pregnancy or where workers are under 18 years old. They also covered **workers' rights**. **Equal pay** for equal work, and protection against sexual harassment and all forms of **discrimination**, are fundamental tenets of the EU.

In December 2013 the Council adopted a regulation on a new programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI), with a budget of €815m. for 2014–20. The EaSI programme aimed to support measures by member states to develop and implement social reforms, and incorporated the PROGRESS and EURES programmes, and the European Progress Microfinance Facility (launched in 2010 to facilitate the provision of small loans for the establishment of businesses).

In September 2015 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced proposals for the development of a European Pillar of Social Rights. The new Pillar was formally declared in November 2017, focusing on equal opportunities and support in accessing the labour market, equitable working conditions, and social protection and inclusion, primarily in the member states of the **eurozone**. The Pillar sought to serve as a framework to ensure fair and effective labour markets and social welfare systems. Alongside the Pillar, a new Social Scoreboard was established to monitor the progress made by member states in achieving various social and employment objectives. Moreover, the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights were made a priority, with their incorporation into the work of the European Semester, the EU's yearly cycle of economic governance.

In early April 2020 the Commission proposed the establishment of a new instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). SURE, worth up to €100,000m., was intended to help to preserve employment during the **COVID-19** pandemic, specifically by making loans available to member states, on favourable terms, to help them to mitigate the increases in public spending required to protect jobs. The loans sought to help member countries to cover costs related to the provision of national short-time work schemes, and other measures introduced for self-employed people, in response to the pandemic. There were longer term plans to introduce a permanent European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme.

Four agencies provide essential technical input into EU work on employment, carry out research on social policy matters and disseminate best practice. They are the **European Agency for Safety and Health at Work** in Bilbao, **Spain**; the **European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions** in Dublin, **Ireland**; the **European Institute for**

Gender Equality (which was established in 2007 and is now located in Vilnius, **Lithuania**); and the **European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights** (in Vienna, **Austria**). (See also **Disability Policy**; **Employment**.)

The **SOCIAL PROTOCOL** was an agreement, stemming from the **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers** (aiming to promote employment, improve living and working conditions and combat exclusion), reached between 11 of the **Twelve** European Communities member state governments at a meeting of the **European Council** in December 1991 at Maastricht, the **Netherlands**.

SOCIALIST GROUP IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: See **Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament** (S&D)

SOFT LAWS are rules of conduct that in principle have no legally binding force, but which nevertheless may have practical effects in aiding policy development. This broad definition encompasses not only international agreements but also texts issued by the European Union (EU) **institutions**. In terms of the **European Commission**, soft law is usually equated with the following: codes of conduct, frameworks, **resolutions**, communications, **declarations**, guidance notes and circulars. Although the concept of soft law remains highly problematic for lawyers, it is generally regarded by policymakers as a useful instrument to encourage consistency in bureaucratic **decision making**, to enable speedy resolution of issues that would otherwise demand **legislation**, and to allow for regulation where no regulation would otherwise be possible. However, the use of soft law has its detractors, who emphasize the dangers and the undemocratic and illegitimate situations that might arise from such informal policymaking. When soft law is utilized, parliaments are bypassed, which, as far as the public is concerned, leads to opaque decision making, and the content of policies may often be vague, as well as possibly inconsistent with existing legislation. Moreover, it can be argued that because soft law is not legally binding, **implementation** must rest on the goodwill of those agreeing to it. Nevertheless, soft law is a fundamental part of EU policymaking (e.g. state aid—see also **subsidies**).

SOLEMN DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN UNION is the title of the general statement signed by the heads of government and foreign ministers at the conclusion of the meeting of the **European Council** held in Stuttgart, Federal Republic of **Germany**, in June 1983. The Declaration reviewed the extent to which the potential of each institution of the European Communities (EC) had been implemented, and considered possibilities for their further co-ordination. It asserted a wish to work for further EC development as a

SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

nucleus of European union, to strengthen **European political co-operation** (EPC), to promote closer cultural co-operation, to launch a concerted action to deal with international problems of law and order, and to seek further **approximation** of the **legislation** of the member states. It also indicated the purpose of the Council and its relationship to the EC **institutions**. More a statement of belief than a plan of action, it nevertheless contributed to the movement in favour of change that developed during the 1980s.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA has not been, in general, the subject of a co-ordinated policy. However, the European Union (EU) has concluded economic and trade co-operation agreements with most of the countries in this area, which enable the latter to benefit from the EU Generalized System of Preferences. The arrangements allow duty-free access into the EU for some of their manufactured products. Between 1990 and 2009 regular ministerial meetings were held between the EU and the so-called Rio Group (which started off with a membership of six countries but over the years expanded to 23 countries, including all the Latin American nations). In 1998 the **European Commission** proposed negotiating mandates for the creation of a free trade area with the countries of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and Chile. This was followed by a first summit between heads of state and government of the EU and six Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1999. At this meeting (the first EU–Latin America and Caribbean—LAC summit), a highly ambitious action plan, with 54 priorities covering institutional dialogue, trade liberalization and investment, was agreed. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was launched in 2010 as a regional mechanism for political dialogue and co-operation encompassing for the first time all 33 LAC countries. It merged the Rio Group and Cumbres América Latina y Caribe (the organizing body for internal LAC summits). In June 2012 the EU and the six Central American countries signed a comprehensive **association agreement**, which included an ambitious trade component. In the same month the EU signed a trade agreement with Colombia and Peru. In November 2016 Ecuador acceded to the trade agreement, and provisional application took place from January 2017. Meanwhile, the second EU–CELAC summit (the eighth EU–LAC summit) was held in Brussels, **Belgium**, in June 2015. Trade talks with MERCOSUR were successfully concluded in mid-2019. Following a meeting in October 2020 of EU and CELAC senior officials for science and technology, in July 2021 a strategic roadmap for 2021–23 was approved by the EU.

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE has been a term used by the European Union when referring to **Bulgaria**, **Romania** and the countries of the **Western Balkans** collectively.

The **SOVEREIGNTY** of the member states has been significantly diminished by their acceptance of the principles of the **founding treaties** and their subsequent amendments. Encroachment on national sovereignty has further increased with the accumulation of the *acquis communautaire*. The net effect is that while the European Union (EU) may not be a sovereign body in the full political or legal sense, neither are the member states. The question of sovereignty has remained a contentious issue within the EU.

SOVIET UNION: See **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**

SPACE POLICY was documented by the **European Commission** in July 1988. It identified six ‘action lines’: the promotion of co-ordination and complementary action between space programmes and EC **research and technological development (RTD) policy**; **telecommunications** and satellite technology; industrial development and the **internal market**; the development of observation of the Earth from space; the legal environment; and the development of space-related technology training programmes. Since 1988 the EC/EU has collaborated more closely with the **European Space Agency (ESA)**. The **Treaty of Lisbon** envisaged the EU adopting a more focused engagement, with space policy as part of its activities in the area of RTD policy. In October 2009 the first EU-ESA International Conference on Human Space Exploration was held, in Prague, **Czech Republic**. In October 2016 the Commission announced a new Space Strategy for Europe, which was to promote the use of the European global navigation satellite system Galileo by mobile devices and to support improved connectivity in remote locations; to ease business access to satellite data, in order to develop new services and applications; to encourage private investment; and to support the development of industrial space hubs in European regions. The financial perspective for 2021–27 provided for spending of €13,443m. (in 2018 prices) for the implementation of the space programme over that period. (See also **European Space Agency**.)

SPAIN first approached the European Communities (EC) in 1962, with a request for an **association agreement** that would, in time, permit full membership. The request was renewed in 1964. Negotiations on a **preferential trade agreement** began in 1967, and an agreement was signed in 1970. Full membership could not be considered by the EC as long as Spain continued to be governed by an authoritarian regime. Discussions on a new agreement for a free trade area were broken off by the EC in October 1975 in protest against executions in Spain that violated ‘the principles of the rule of law and in particular the rights of the defence’. The new, democratic Spanish Government that emerged after General Francisco Franco’s death in November 1975 submitted an application for full membership in July 1977, and

negotiations began in February 1979. The negotiations proved to be difficult, particularly where agriculture and fishing were concerned, but were eventually concluded in March 1985, and Spain joined the EC the following January.

A beneficiary of EC **regional policy**, including the **Cohesion Fund**, and **social policy**, Spain was a strong supporter of further economic and political integration, even though its determination to meet some of the economic and monetary criteria set by the EC placed enormous strains on the Spanish economy. Spain successfully entered stage three of **economic and monetary union** in 1999. Under the premiership of the conservative José María Aznar (1996–2004), Spain's economic expansion continued. Little known outside Spain prior to his first election victory and appointment as Prime Minister in 1996, Aznar rapidly emerged as a leading figure on the European stage. Aznar's decision to stand down in 2004 may also have contributed to his determination to resist the proposals (which reduced Spain's position) outlined in the Draft Constitution on the new voting arrangements within the **Council of the European Union** after **enlargement**. This led to recriminations from other European Union (EU) member states and the episode helped to ensure that the 2003 Rome **intergovernmental conference** collapsed without agreement. A change in government in April 2004, when José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero became Prime Minister, brought a more accommodating approach to the EU, which helped the EU leaders to agree a treaty text in June 2004. Spain was the first EU member state to hold a referendum on the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** in February 2005 and a decisive majority (77%) approved the text. However, turnout was low, at just 42%. No referendum was held on the **Treaty of Lisbon**, Spain opting instead for parliamentary **ratification**, which was easily secured.

The Zapatero Government introduced an austerity programme in April 2010 to ease the country's debt burden and to help stabilize the **euro**. However, the country's economic situation deteriorated throughout 2011 as the growth rate fell, the housing market collapsed and unemployment climbed steadily. Amid these economic problems, an early general election was held on 20 November. The elections saw the defeat (and worst ever electoral result since 1982) of the Socialist Party and the victory of the centre-right Peoples' Party. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, who assumed office on 22 December 2011, participated in the negotiations with the EU that led to the signing of the **Fiscal Compact** (of the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union) in March 2012 and supported the austerity agenda. By early 2012 nearly 25% of the country's workforce was unemployed and opposition was growing towards the Government's stringent austerity measures. Large protest rallies were held, notably in Madrid. The Spanish Government was compelled to bail out a number of leading Spanish banks in May and in July the **eurozone** finance ministers formally approved providing Spain with up to €100,000m. in loans in an attempt to support the country's ailing banking sector. Spain was able to exit its international bailout programme in January 2014. Rajoy declared this development to be an

important ‘milestone’ in Spain’s economic recovery, but admitted that much work still had to be undertaken, especially with regard to the challenge of creating new jobs. Rajoy was replaced by **Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón** following a motion of no confidence in mid-2018.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE is the name of a specialist committee within the **Committee of Permanent Representatives** (COREPER). It is the only COREPER body that deals with all agricultural issues that come before the plenary Committee.

SPIERENBURG REPORT is the name of a document produced for the **European Commission** in 1979. A group of experts headed by a former **Netherlands** diplomat, Dirk Spierenburg, was asked to review the structure and organization of the European Communities. The Report recommended a rationalization of the Commission—including a reduction in the number of Commissioners—and of its system of personnel management. It was opposed by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), and was never implemented.

SPILLOVER was a term widely used in the 1950s to describe how **sectoral integration** would lead to full European union. It had two components. Functional spillover was based on the principle that modern economies were based on interrelated sectors. Once one economic sector had been integrated, this complexity would generate pressure for the integration of other sectors. Political spillover suggested that once European institutions had been established for one sector, economic interest groups would look to that political level for the realization of their demands, and the advantages provided would lead them also to press for further sectoral integration. The notion largely fell into disfavour after the late 1950s as an explanation of, and strategy for, integration.

The **SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS** was devised to allow EU citizens to have a voice in choosing the leadership of and bringing democracy to the EU executive—the **European Commission**. The process was first devised and utilized in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. Prior to elections to the EP, the idea was to allow the **political groups** to field their top candidates for the powerful post of President of the European Commission. The eventual winner of the position would be the candidate of the political group that succeeded in gathering the most parliamentary support, as determined by which political grouping had the most votes in the elections. Subsequently, the **European Council**, made up of national leaders, would nominate the candidate of the winning group to be confirmed by the EP as Commission President. However, despite early

SPORT

commitments to repeat the process fully in 2019, it was less successful on this occasion. In 2019 the leaders of member states appeared to override this process. Whereas EPP leader **Manfred Weber** had been the top candidate at the beginning of the process, neither he nor **Frans Timmermans** (of the **Party of European Socialists**) could command enough support. Member states, by means of the European Council, effectively bypassed the process, to select German defence minister **Ursula von der Leyen** as the preferred candidate for the Commission presidency. Her nomination was approved by the EP and she became the first female President of the European Commission in late 2019.

SPORT was identified by the **Committee for a People's Europe** as an area where, because of the mass interest and loyalties it generates, the European Communities (EC) could seek to encourage a sense of European identity and awareness. In 1997 the **European Parliament** passed a resolution requesting that a reference to sport be inserted into the **article** of the **Treaty of Rome** dealing with culture. This was not taken up, although the **Treaty of Lisbon**, following the abandoned **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, envisaged a greater role for the European Union (EU) in promoting European sporting issues as well as developing the European dimension in sport. This was to be done by 'promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and co-operation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportspeople'. As laid down in the 2007 White Paper on Sport, the EU Sport Forum, which coincides with an informal meeting of EU Sport Ministers, is held annually, bringing together some 250 delegates, including leading figures from the international and European Olympic Committees, European federations, 'sport for all' organizations, and organizations of leagues, clubs and athletes. The 2021 EU Sport Forum took place online in June 2021.

SRM: See the **Single Resolution Mechanism**

SSM: See the **Single Supervisory Mechanism**

The **STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT** (SGP) emerged as an essential aspect of the third stage of plans for **economic and monetary union** (EMU). It was realized that if EMU were ultimately going to be successful, budgetary discipline across all **eurozone** members would have to be maintained after EMU had been launched in 1999. This demand was principally led by **Germany** and resulted in a **European Council** resolution (adopted at the Amsterdam European Council in 1997) and two subsequent Council regulations. The pact established clear and detailed arrangements for the surveillance of budgetary positions and for the co-ordination of economic policies, and

procedures for dealing with excessive deficits and public debt. All eurozone members pledged to pursue budgets close to balance or in surplus for the foreseeable future and to present both the **European Commission** and the **Council of the European Union** with annual reports on their economic situation.

The SGP allows the Council to penalize any participating member state that fails to take the necessary measures to end an excessive deficit. In the first instance the penalty is more likely to constitute a non-interest-bearing deposit with the European Union (EU), but it could be converted into a fine if the deficit is not corrected within two years. The Commission is charged with supervising the economic policies of the participating countries and with alerting the member states to potential problems. The situation with Germany, the prime architect of the pact, deteriorated in 2003 as both Germany and **France** watched their economies remain locked in recession or stagnation. For the third successive year, both states breached one of the keystones of the pact—maintaining budget deficits at less than 3% of gross domestic product (GDP), the total value of goods and services the economy produces (the other keystone is maintaining public debt below a ceiling of 60% of GDP). With their economies stagnant, tax receipts were down, while public spending in terms of unemployment benefits had gone up. In November 2003 the SGP was effectively suspended through the reluctance of **France** and Germany to accept the recommendations of the **European Central Bank** and the Commission to reduce their budget deficits to below 3% of GDP. According to the rules, both states were therefore liable to pay substantial fines. However, the **Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers** disregarded the Commission's recommendation and granted the eurozone's two largest economies an extra year's grace. France and Germany were therefore allowed to break the 3% rule again in 2004. The pact was thus severely undermined. Germany's wish at the time was to draw up additional EU fiscal rules that would lead to a 'better interpretation'—in other words, a less strict interpretation—of the pact, allowing more account to be taken of the economic situation, the impact of ageing on social security systems and the role played by public investment in modernizing the economy. The eurozone crisis from 2010 led to a stricter interpretation of the SGP generally being favoured. A revised pact, the Euro Plus Pact, was agreed in March 2011. It provides for more stringent commitments with emphasis on **competitiveness**, employment, sound public finances and financial stability.

In March 2020, in response to the **COVID-19** crisis, the Commission activated a so-called escape clause permitting countries temporarily to leave the bounds of the **Stability and Growth Pact**. This enabled member states to undertake the measures needed to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic, even if the implementation of such measures resulted in the violation of budgetary requirements under the European fiscal framework.

The **STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE** was launched in June 1999 following the **Kosovo** conflict to assist in the stabilization and reconstruction of the region, the European Union playing a lead role through its **Stabilization and Association Process** and the implementation of the former **CARDS** programme of financial assistance and its successor the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**. In April 2008 a Regional Cooperation Council, based in Sarajevo, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, replaced the Stability Pact.

STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS (SAAs) are the **association agreements** that the European Union (EU) has devised for countries in the **Western Balkans** as part of the **Stabilization and Association Process**. The first was concluded with the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (now **North Macedonia**) in 2001 and was soon followed by an agreement with **Croatia** and, later, one with **Albania** (2006). In March 2007 **Montenegro** concluded negotiations on an SAA. Agreements with **Bosnia and Herzegovina** and with **Serbia** followed in 2008. An SAA with **Kosovo** was signed in October 2015 and entered into force in April 2016. These are modelled very much on **Europe agreements**, but place a much greater emphasis on the pursuit of regional co-operation as a prerequisite for closer collaboration with the EU. They also confirm the associate country's status as a potential candidate for EU membership (see **potential candidate state**).

The **STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS** (SAP) was launched by the European Union as its contribution to the **stability pact for South Eastern Europe** following the **Kosovo** conflict in 1999. Its key elements are the **stabilization and association agreements**, the **CARDS** programme of financial assistance and its successor, the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**.

STABILIZERS were introduced into the **common agricultural policy** (CAP) in 1988 as fixed ceilings, or upper limits, imposed on the production of several agricultural products. They involved production quotas, limits on both production and processing guarantees, and intervention ceilings, supported by a system of **co-responsibility levies**. Should the ceiling be exceeded, an automatic reduction in the level of price support provided by the CAP would be triggered. The most significant effect, perhaps, was upon cereal production.

The **STAFF** employed by the European Union (EU) number over 50,000—about 32,000 of these work for the **European Commission**, 7,500 for the **European Parliament** and 3,500 for the General Secretariat of the **Council of the European Union**. The total is substantially lower than staff employed by national bureaucracies. Formally, there are no quotas for each of the

member states; in practice, however, an unofficial system of national allocation is employed, to ensure that each member state is adequately represented in all areas and at all levels of the administration. In principle, officials must be EU nationals and adequately bilingual, and those appointed as translators or interpreters must be proficient in two EU **languages** other than their own. Apart from these qualifications, most posts are filled by open competition. In addition, several senior posts are filled by nomination from the member states.

STAGIAIRE is the name given to a short-term trainee, usually a recent graduate, attached to a **European Commission** office. The position provides the appointee with an apprenticeship and in-service training, but does not guarantee subsequent employment with the European Union.

STANDARDIZATION: See **CEN**; **CENELEC**

STATE AID: See **Subsidies**

STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: See **Eurostat**

STOCKHOLM CONVENTION is the name of the document that in 1960 formally established the **European Free Trade Association**. The signatories accepted the economic aim of an elimination of tariffs on reciprocal trade in industrial goods, with special provisions for agriculture and fisheries. The Convention had no political implications.

The **STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME** was an initiative of the European Union (EU) to establish and develop its **area of freedom, security and justice**. Launched in 2009, it followed the Hague programme, and was designed 'to define the framework for EU police and customs co-operation, rescue services, criminal and civil law co-operation, asylum, migration and visa policy' for the period 2010–14.

STRASBOURG, France, is central to the theme of European unity because it is the home of the **Council of Europe**, and became the location of the plenary sessions of the **European Parliament** (EP) after 1958. Although the EP continues to meet in the city, many of its members would prefer it to be relocated in **Brussels**, where many EP committees meet. In recent years an absolute majority of **Members of the European Parliament** have repeatedly voted in favour of a single seat (i.e. Brussels). However, any decision to move must be agreed by all European Union member states and France is adamantly opposed to a move. The **Treaty of Amsterdam**, by means of a **protocol** on

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the location of the **institutions**, had tried to put an end to suggestions that the EP might relocate by confirming **Strasbourg** as its home and requiring that 12 plenary sessions be held in the city each year.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS (SPs) are European Union (EU) agreements that frame co-operation, collaboration and interdependence with third countries and regions. They are the fundamental instruments of the EU's foreign policy. The EU has established 10 SPs with Brazil, Canada, the People's Republic of China, India, **Japan**, Mexico, the **Russian Federation**, South Africa, South Korea and the **USA**. Moreover, an SP exists, in effect between the **African Union** and the EU through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. These partnerships have attracted criticism for lacking strategy on the part of the EU in the sense of traditional foreign policy. Nevertheless, they now often serve as a framework for the relationships between signatories.

The **STRUCTURAL AND COHESION FUNDS** (see also the **Cohesion Fund**) have been designed to reduce the socioeconomic gap between the richest and poorest member states, and between rich and poor regions within states, through a coherent redistribution of financial resources. The strategy of reducing regional disparities has always been central to the European Union (EU) because such disparities clearly undermine the integrity of the single market and also run contrary to the aims of solidarity and assistance advocated by the European integration project. The **Treaty of Rome** explicitly, although briefly, referred to regional disparities; however, the initial assumption was that the operation of the free market would help reduce these. Attention was originally focused upon southern **Italy** and was subsequently widened to cover other Mediterranean regions as well as **Ireland**. The decision to create an **internal market** made resolution of the disparities more urgent, and the term 'cohesion' was first employed in the **Single European Act**. The inclusion of the relevant paragraph (title V) owed much to the efforts of the four poorest states (**Greece**, Ireland, **Portugal** and **Spain**), but was also promoted by richer states (notably **Germany**) as a means of presenting financial support and inducements to those regions that would not necessarily or immediately reap benefits from the prompt completion of the single market.

The term cohesion encompassed notions of solidarity and harmonious economic development that could not be secured by the free market alone, and the following structural funds were established: the **European Regional Development Fund** (ERDF), which was set up in 1975 and finances infrastructure, productive investment to create jobs, local development projects and assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises; and the **European Social Fund** (ESF, now ESF+), which was established in 1958 and is designed to help the workforce adapt to changes in the labour market. The term cohesion was further elaborated in the negotiations on the **European Economic Area**

(EEA) and in the **Treaty on European Union**, which established a new structural fund, known as the Cohesion Fund, through which monies from the richer member states and the other members of the EEA would be directed to aid infrastructural developments in the poorer countries of the EU. The latter, in return, agreed to accept the provisions in the treaty relating to **economic and monetary union**. Two other funds that contribute to regional development are the **European Agricultural Guarantee Fund**, which finances rural development measures and provides assistance to farmers, the **European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development** and the **European Maritime and Fisheries Fund**.

The financial assistance provided to counter regional disparities increased rapidly, from some 5% of the **budget** in 1975, and the structural and cohesion funds have accounted for over one-third of the EU budget since the late 1980s (see **Delors I** and **Delors II**). The financial assistance for these programmes is calculated on a multi-annual basis, with the funds being used to tackle regional disparities and support regional development through actions including developing infrastructure and telecommunications, developing human resources and supporting research and development. They are subject to continuing changes of emphasis.

To facilitate the provision of financial assistance to the neediest areas and to prepare the EU for **enlargement**, the EU's structural policy was substantially reformed and now focuses on a number of objective areas. The declared aim of the particular reform initiative was to concentrate aid where it was most needed. In the 2000–06 financial perspective there were three main areas. Objective 1 areas were those regions that were lagging behind the rest of the EU in terms of development, i.e. regions in which gross national product (GNP) per head was less than 75% of the EU average. These objective 1 areas consumed 70% of structural funds expenditure. Objective 2 areas were those areas with structural difficulties, such as areas undergoing economic change, rural areas in decline and areas dependent on fishing. The third objective area related to the development of human resources outside those regions eligible for objective 1 aid.

In addition, there were four major structural funds initiatives. These were **Interreg** (1989–), which seeks to stimulate cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation; **Leader** (1991–2006), which aimed to foster rural development through the initiatives of local action groups; **EQUAL** (2000–08), which provided assistance for the creation of new means to combat **discrimination** and inequalities in general; and **URBAN** (1994–2006), which promoted economic and social revitalization of cities and suburban areas in crisis.

As the candidate states moved closer to EU membership, it was decided to create two new funds to assist their progression for the period 2000–06. These funds, namely the **instrument for structural policies for pre-accession** (ISPA) and the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (**SAPARD**), were designed to support infrastructure projects,

industry, services, **small and medium-sized enterprises** (SMEs), agriculture and the environment. ISPA and SAPARD were replaced in January 2007 by the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**.

In December 2005 the European Council agreed a total structural and cohesion funds budget of €347,000m. (at 2007 prices) for 2007–13. The new period also saw a simpler and more efficient operation of the funds. To this end, the number of instruments was reduced from six to three, and a new ‘proportionality’ principle was to provide for less bureaucracy. The Commission defined new objectives for 2007–13. The greatest emphasis was placed on the first objective, which targeted **convergence**. The Commission sought to accelerate the economic convergence of the least developed countries and regions of the EU, which were home to some 35% of the EU’s population. This area consumed some 82% of funds; monies were available through the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund. This objective was very much concerned with developing human and physical capital, innovation, knowledge society, environment and administrative efficiency. The budget allocated to this instrument was €251,300m. The second objective centred on regional competitiveness and employment (where some €55,000m. was allocated for 2007–13). It applied to all parts of the EU and sought to ensure greater competitiveness and boost employment opportunities. The third and final objective focused on territorial co-operation. This built directly upon the Interreg initiatives of the previous years, which were originally planned to be fully incorporated into the main objectives of the structural funds. There was some €7,750m. available under the ERDF for this objective, which covered three distinct strands: cross-border co-operation, transnational co-operation and interregional co-operation. In total, some 423 programmes were financed by the structural and cohesion funds between 2007 and 2013.

Plans for the further development of policy in these areas commenced in 2011, but the legislative proposals for cohesion policy in 2014–20 were only finally approved in early 2014. The themes of economic, social and territorial cohesion formed part of the category (one of six) ‘Smart and Inclusive Growth’ within the **Multi-annual Financial Framework** for 2014–20. This category accounted for some 47% of overall spending and was the largest category of spending. The largest element within this category itself was cohesion, which took some 34% of total spending; the remaining 13% was allocated to competitiveness.

For the long-term EU budget for 2021–27 the EU’s budget for regional development and cohesion policy was to be allocated funding of €290,587m., in 2018 prices, including funding under **Next Generation EU**. See also **regional policy**.

STRUCTURAL POLICY: See **Structural and Cohesion Funds**

STUTTGART DECLARATION: See **Solemn Declaration on European Union**

SUBSIDIARITY is a term that was first used in the context of the European Communities (EC) in the 1970s, but it only became politically contentious in the period preceding the signing of the **Treaty on European Union**. As defined by the **Treaty of Rome**, the term embodies the principles that the European Union (EU) can act only when it possesses the legal power to do so, that the EU should act only when an objective can be better achieved at the supranational level, and that the means employed by the EU when it does act should be proportional to the desired objective. It implies, therefore, that national powers are the norm, with EU action the exception. It remains, nevertheless, an ambiguous and controversial concept regarded by both those for and those against more intensive integration as supporting their own agenda. An attempt was made in a **protocol** introduced by the **Treaty of Amsterdam** to provide a clearer definition of subsidiarity. In the framework of the **intergovernmental conference** launched in February 2000, the **Committee of the Regions** asked for the principle of subsidiarity to be amended formally to recognize the role of the local and regional authorities. This did not happen at the Nice **summit meeting**. The **European Commission** produces, on an annual basis, a report (*Better Lawmaking*) that for the most part examines the application of the subsidiarity principle. The concept of subsidiarity was reaffirmed in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and more recently in the **Treaty of Lisbon**.

SUBSIDIES by the member states to either private companies or public enterprises are, in general, not permitted if the effect is likely to be contrary to the **competition policy** of the European Union (EU). **European Commission** guidelines permit subsidies for industries experiencing very severe economic difficulties, but in each instance the case should be demonstrated to be exceptional, the aid programme should be short-term only, and the objective should be the re-establishment of economic viability by a planned reduction in capacity. State aid is also permitted for natural disaster relief, depressed regions, and investment in new economic activities. In each instance, member states must inform the Commission of their intentions. Where member states have provided subsidies that do not conform to EU **regulations**, the Commission has the authority to demand their repayment and to levy fines on member states. Subsidies have always been controversial, and especially so in such sectors as agriculture and aircraft manufacture, and have led to ongoing disagreements within the EU and in relations with third states. The whole issue of subsidies became extremely controversial following the onset of economic recession in 2008 and governments' subsequent moves to assist their respective banking sectors.

DUBRAVKA ŠUICA (1957–) is a Croatian politician. She is a Vice-President and Commissioner for Democracy and Demography in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** since 1 December 2019. Šuica previously held the role of Mayor of Dubrovnik in 2001–09, and was elected as a **Member of the European Parliament** in 2013.

SUMMIT MEETINGS are gatherings of the heads of government of the member states. During the first decade of the three European Communities the **Six** held only three summits. Three further ad hoc summits were held between 1972 and 1974. In 1974 it was agreed to institutionalize summits with the establishment of the **European Council**. Such meetings now usually take place four times a year. Provisions also exist for the convocation of extraordinary or emergency sessions. Most summit meetings deal primarily with routine business and general reviews; a few, however, have been highly significant for European developments. (See, for example, **Fontainebleau summit**; **Hague summit**; **Maastricht summit**; **Milan summit**; **Tampere summit**.) It was traditionally the practice that summits were held in the country holding the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union**. From the second half of 2003, however, all scheduled summit meetings of the European Council were held in **Brussels, Belgium**.

SUPRANATIONALISM is the condition whereby the structures and **decisions** of the European Union are superior to and, some would claim, independent of national governments. Supranationalism is completely different from intergovernmental **co-operation**.

SURE: see Social Policy.

The **SUSPENSION CLAUSE** was written into the **Treaty on European Union** by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**. Under this clause, some of the rights of a member state (e.g. voting in the **Council of the European Union**) can be suspended if that particular member state consistently or seriously contravenes the principles on which the European Union has been constructed, such as liberty, democracy, respect for **human rights** and the rule of law.

SUSTAINABILITY is the quality that may be ascribed to a form of economic growth that is self-maintaining without exhausting natural resources.

SWEDEN maintained a position of political and military **neutrality** after 1945, eschewing involvement in anything other than intergovernmental and economic co-operation. In 1961 it approached the European Communities (EC) for a form of economic association that did not imply full membership.

Negotiations eventually began in 1970, and in 1971 Sweden ruled out full membership as being incompatible with its policy of neutrality. A **free trade agreement** was signed in 1972. Following the EC decision to implement the **internal market** by 1992, Sweden accepted the need for a closer economic relationship with the EC. This was eventually achieved through the **European Economic Area**. Before this was concluded, however, Sweden revised its view on membership, and in 1991 submitted a formal application to join the EC. Negotiations were completed in 1994 and, following approval in a popular referendum, Sweden joined the European Union (EU) on 1 January 1995. Sweden opted not to enter **economic and monetary union** (EMU) in 1999. In a referendum held in September 2003 on joining EMU, a majority of those participating (56%) voted against replacing the krona with the **euro**. In November 2015, in the context of the **European migration crisis**, the Swedish Government announced that it was to reverse its hitherto liberal policy towards migrants and that henceforth the country would impose border controls and revert to EU minimum requirements in relation to asylum seekers. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven accused the EU of having failed to distribute the burden of the migrant crisis equitably between member states.

SWITZERLAND has historically adopted a strict position of **neutrality**, but it was a founder member of the **European Free Trade Association** (EFTA). It applied to the European Communities (EC) in 1961 for an economic association, but negotiations began only in 1970. A **free trade agreement** was signed in 1972 and subsequently ratified by a national referendum. In 1989 Switzerland accepted the need for EFTA to seek a new and closer relationship with the EC, and began examining the question of EC membership. However, in a referendum in December 1992 the Swiss rejected participation in the **European Economic Area**, thus forcing the Government to suspend the application for EC membership that had been submitted in the previous May. Subsequently Switzerland negotiated a series of sector-specific bilateral agreements with the European Union (EU) covering free movement of persons, air and land transport, agriculture, research, public procurement and the mutual recognition of conformity assessments; these were signed in June 1999 and entered into force two years later. In June 2002 negotiations on a further 10 bilateral agreements began. The negotiations lasted until 2003–04 and covered: pensions; trade in processed agricultural products; the environment; statistics; education, occupational training and youth; the media; taxation of savings; the fight against fraud; and co-operation in the fields of justice, police, asylum and migration. During their negotiation and **ratification**, official government policy was to seek EU membership. In a referendum held in March 2001, however, 77% of voters voted against commencing membership negotiations. In 2005 Switzerland voted in a referendum to join the **Schengen Agreement**. The decision meant that Switzerland would open its borders and become part of Europe's passport-free zone, and that the Swiss authorities

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would also share information with their EU colleagues on crime and on asylum applications. A year later, however, the Government, although it did not withdraw the 1992 membership application, dropped eventual EU membership from the objectives of its relations with the EU. Switzerland joined the **Schengen Area** in December 2008. By 2010 Switzerland had signed about 210 trade treaties with the EU, and its relations with the EU have been notably close for a non-member state. In September 2011 the Swiss Franc effectively switched to a euro peg: the franc had hitherto ‘floated’ independently until its currency appreciation became unsustainable during the financial crisis in the **eurozone**. By 2013 around 75% of Swiss imports came from EU member states, and more than 50% of its exports were purchased by EU countries.

However, in February 2014 some 50.3% of voters approved proposals that the country should renegotiate its freedom of movement agreement with the EU, and introduce immigration quotas. Switzerland subsequently failed to ratify an agreement on extending free movement to **Croatia**, the EU’s most recent member state. In response, the EU excluded Switzerland from the **Erasmus+** student exchange programme, and suspended the country’s participation in the **Horizon 2020** research programme. In April Switzerland announced that it would allow a limited number of Croatians into Switzerland under a new quota system. In December a renegotiated agreement for Switzerland’s ‘third country’ participation in Horizon 2020 was finalized. In March 2016 Switzerland signed a treaty with the EU extending the principle of free movement of persons to Croatia. In June the Swiss legislature voted to terminate formally a long-dormant application to accede to EU membership. In December Switzerland passed legislation to ensure that employment vacancies gave priority to Swiss-based job seekers (particularly in areas with high levels of unemployment), but did not introduce quotas for workers from EU member states. The Swiss Government extended freedom of movement to Croatia from 1 January 2017. Negotiations between the EU and Switzerland took place over Switzerland’s future relationship with the Union. The EU sought Switzerland’s endorsement of a new framework agreement, to replace some 120 sectoral agreements hitherto in place, agreed when Swiss accession was still anticipated, and reportedly considered by the EU to be unduly favourable to a non-member state; following an impasse in negotiations, in mid-2019 controversy surrounded the expiry of the ‘equivalence’ deal, which had recognized Swiss measures governing regulation of financial markets to be equivalent to prevailing EU norms. A draft Institutional Framework Agreement, announced in December, providing for equivalence with EU law in key areas, was subject to a public consultation period in Switzerland; however, amid some popular opposition to **freedom of movement**, the Swiss Government also came under pressure to organize a referendum on the issue. A referendum held on 27 September 2020 rejected ending the existing freedom of movement arrangements with the EU. Nevertheless, in late May 2021 the Swiss Government failed to sign a new institutional framework agreement

with the EU, and withdrew from the negotiations, although it announced its intention to initiate a political dialogue on continued co-operation with the EU. In return for unimpeded access to the EU's single market, the EU had sought to introduce arrangements providing for conformity with EU regulations on market governance, and to withdraw arrangements permitting Swiss exceptionalism in certain areas, notably state aid, restrictions on access to the Swiss welfare system for EU citizens, and wage protection.

The **SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC** has been embroiled in civil conflict since 2011. From mid-March of that year anti-Government protests in Syria were forcibly quashed by the authorities. In response, the **European Union (EU)** imposed a number of restrictive measures, including an arms embargo and targeted **sanctions**, comprising a travel ban and the freezing of assets, against those deemed to be responsible for, or involved with, the repression. The Syrian authorities continued to implement harsh measures in an attempt to quell escalating demonstrations against the rule of President Bashar al-Assad. By August 2012 the EU had imposed 17 sets of sanctions on the Syrian authorities. In mid-November the Council expressed its continued support for ongoing efforts to reach a political solution to the situation in Syria. The EU delegation to Syria closed in December, owing to security concerns. In that month the EU Foreign Affairs Council recognized the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. In June 2013 the EU adopted a communication establishing a comprehensive approach to the crisis in Syria. In August the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** expressed deep concern at reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and urged intensified diplomatic efforts to bring about a rapid resolution to the conflict. In mid-February 2014 the EU pledged €12m. to help to dismantle and destroy stockpiles of chemical weaponry in Syria. In August the **European Council** expressed dismay at the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and Syria, and the rise of the extremist grouping **Islamic State** (formerly known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), together with widespread **human rights** violations carried out against Christians and other minorities. The European Council noted that the ongoing civil conflict in Syria had facilitated the emergence of Islamic State, which it recognized as a threat to security in Europe, and announced its intention to co-operate with the USA and other countries in order to counter Islamic State and other organizations deemed to pose a terrorist threat. A comprehensive EU regional strategy for Syria, Iraq and the threat from Islamic State was adopted in March 2015, and subsequently reviewed in May 2016. Also in May a special envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief was appointed, in an advisory role, to the **European Commission**, with an initial mandate of one year. The establishment of the role followed the adoption of a **European Parliament** resolution condemning the mass murder of religious minorities in

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Iraq and Syria by Islamic State, and sought to help to protect religious freedom in the context of the EU's programmes with countries outside the Union. According to an EU report published in September 2019, since the beginning of the Syrian conflict the EU and EU member states had allocated around €17,000m. to the country in humanitarian and **development aid**, as well as economic and stabilization assistance. The EU had been the most significant provider of international aid to Syria throughout the conflict.

TAC: See **Total Allowable Catch**

TACIS: See **Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States**

The **TAMPERE SUMMIT** of the **European Council** in November 1999 represented a highly significant event in the development of European Union (EU) policy governing **justice and home affairs** (JHA). It was the first time that an area of loose intergovernmental co-operation had been propelled to the top of the political agenda. The origins of this agenda date back to early 1999 and a joint letter from the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and the Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, which called for European action in three broad areas. These all related to the then third pillar activities initiated by the **Treaty on European Union**, and covered asylum and **immigration policy**, the creation of a European **area of freedom, security and justice** and combating transnational crime. These became the main agenda items of the Tampere summit, where the heads of state and government reached agreement on the need for a 'common asylum system'. Tampere highlighted the expanding nature and position of the European Council as an agenda-setter and a driving force for EU integration. It led directly to a further extension of the EU's scope vis-à-vis policymaking in the field of JHA and resulted in several new initiatives and new bodies being set up in 2000, such as **Eurojust** and a European Police College.

With regard to the **European Commission**, Tampere was the first occasion for the post-Jacques Santer Commission to present itself as a credible and potent force to the leaders of the member states. However, scandal surrounding the Santer regime and the growing determination of the European Council to control the policy agenda had already put the Commission on the defensive. The changing relationships among the EU **institutions** were epitomized by the European Council's rejection of the Commission's report on the restructuring of the EU institutions.

TARGET

TARGET, or Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer, is a system of inter-bank payments established on 1 January 1999 at the start of the third stage of **economic and monetary union**, to regulate transactions between the **European Central Bank** and commercial banks of the participating member states. National central banks of non-participating member states also have some access to the settlement system. TARGET2 was launched in 2007.

The **TARGET PRICE** is the basic price set annually for each commodities covered by the **common agricultural policy**.

TARIC is the acronym for the Integrated Community Tariff established within the former Caddia (Co-operation in automation of data and documentation for imports/exports and agriculture) structure in 1988. It is similar to the **common external tariff**, but contains additional provisions relating to preferences and quotas. The **European Commission** maintains an online, multilingual TARIC database.

TARIFFS on intra-European Communities (EC) trade were removed by the **Six** by 1968, well within the time limit set by the **Treaty of Rome**. New member states were given a transitional period in which to remove their tariffs, although acceding states often already participated in free trade arrangements with the European Union (EU). The EU **common external tariff** has been progressively reduced in line with decisions taken under the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**, and now by the **World Trade Organization**.

TAX HARMONIZATION: See **Taxation**

TAXATION has, in general, been accepted by the European Union (EU) as a policy field that is the preserve of the member states and, normally, proposals relating to taxation that come before the **Council of the European Union** require unanimous approval. Despite the introduction of a **single market** and **economic and monetary union**, an EU policy on taxation is still absent and this reflects the political sensitivity of fiscal policy and explains why the principle of unanimous **decision making** in this area was maintained in the **Single European Act** and beyond. The exceptions to the general rule are cases where national taxation policy is against EU **competition policy**, or where it discriminates against nationals of other member states. The problems of maintaining monetary union without economic and fiscal union were brought to the fore in early 2010, when the **euro** came under increasing strain on account of the financial difficulties throughout the EU and in particular in **Greece, Spain and Portugal**.

By contrast, the EU has an interest in indirect taxation and is bound to work for the **harmonization** of indirect taxation in order to enable the **single market** to function properly. Currently, significant disparities exist in the levels of excise duty paid, for example, on alcohol and tobacco within the single market. A code on corporate taxation was agreed in 1997 that would eliminate harmful tax competition between member states. Proposals made in December 1998 for the harmonization of taxes in the member states were rejected by the **United Kingdom**, which made it clear that a **veto** would be used to keep taxation within the realm of national governments (the UK left the EU in 2020). Such a position, shared by other member states, was emphatically restated during the **intergovernmental conference** in 2000. Consequently, the **Treaty of Nice** failed to extend **qualified majority voting** to tax harmonization. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the adoption of a single currency has intensified the pressure for a truly common rate of **value-added tax** (VAT) and for common rules in the area of corporate taxation in the EU.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (TACIS) was an aid programme for the successor states of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR), often referred to as the **Commonwealth of Independent States**, and also Mongolia. Established in 1991, TACIS had as its objective to assess and aid economic reform and privatization in a range of economic sectors and to foster the development of democratic societies. In January 2007 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced TACIS (see **European Neighbourhood Policy**).

TED: See **Tenders Electronic Daily**

The **TELECOMMUNICATIONS** sector was regarded by the **European Commission** as one of the real success stories of the single market and the European Union (EU) regulatory framework. Three factors propelled the Commission towards the liberalization of the sector. These were recognition of the radical changes in technology and the impact they would have on the industry, the shift towards globalized markets, and a growing trend towards greater liberalization and competition, especially in the **USA** and Scandinavia.

Several initiatives were launched in the fields of **media policy**, information networks, common standards and the **harmonization** of technical rules, and the development of satellite transmissions. Moreover, the telecommunications sector was targeted as part of efforts to develop **Trans-European Networks**. These initiatives, however, did not lead to an integrated policy. The push towards the creation of a **single market** focused attention on the public monopolies and, in particular, on telecommunications and energy. A 1988

directive opened the telecommunications terminals market to competition. It was supplemented by a directive relating to the liberalization of satellite telecommunications equipment and services, which came into force in late 1994 (but allowed for deferment until 1 January 1996). Telecommunications infrastructures in the EU, which had been operated mainly by state monopolies, also faced the arrival of competition. In 1993 the **Council of the European Union** decided to liberalize voice telephony services fully by January 1998 (although some states, such as **Ireland, Spain, Portugal** and **Greece**, were given **derogations** until 2003). Agreement by member states on common rules in the form of the Open Network Provision framework effectively meant the full harmonization of an EU-wide telecommunications market. It allowed new entrants into the market, and the growing ethos of competition completed the drive to create a genuine single telecommunications market.

By 1998 the EU had liberalized all telecommunications goods and services and, as a result, the number of operators doubled between 1998 and 2003, investment intensified and increased brought better deals for consumers in terms of both product specification and lower prices. The Commission adopted the i2010 agenda—a European Information Society for Growth and Employment—in 2005 and laid out an ambitious scheme to create a single European Information Space in the field of electronic communications and media services by 2010. In August 2010 the Commission launched a **Digital Agenda for Europe**, replacing the i2010 agenda, which highlighted the creation of a single market for content and telecommunications services as a vital tool to regain progress lost during the economic crisis. In particular, as part of the new agenda, the Commission set out to remove the difference between roaming and national tariffs by 2014. It also set ambitious targets for fast and ultra-fast internet access in Europe. In June 2015 agreement was reached to remove all mobile roaming charges by June 2017, with a transitional period from April 2016.

In September 2015 the Commission launched public consultations on broadband needs and a review of the existing telecommunications framework. The Commission subsequently proposed a new European Electronic Communications Code to encourage businesses to invest in new infrastructure throughout the EU, thereby stimulating competition, and strengthening both the single market and consumer rights; the code was adopted in November 2018. A further regulation adopted on the same day revised the mandate of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, and introduced a maximum rate on charges for mobile telephone calls and text messages between member states from mid-2019. The Commission also presented an action plan to deploy 5G, the fifth generation of wireless communication systems, throughout the EU.

TELEVISION: See **Media Policy**

The **TEN** (EU10), or the Europe of the Ten, are terms sometimes used to describe the membership of the European Communities (EC) between January 1981, when **Greece** became the 10th member state, and January 1986, when EC membership rose to **Twelve**.

TENDERS ELECTRONIC DAILY (TED) is an electronic information service detailing those **public procurement** contracts awarded by national and local authorities where bidding for the contract is open to any supplier within the European Union. It is the online version of the *Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union*.

TENS: See **Trans-European Networks**

TESM: See **Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism**

TEU: See **Treaty on European Union**

TEXTILES: See **Multifibre Arrangement**

TFEU: See **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**

THRESHOLD PRICE was the minimum price fixed for cereals, milk products and sugar within the **common agricultural policy**. Cheaper imports into the European Union (EU) have been subject to a levy to raise their price to the level of the threshold price, which, unlike the **target price**, included internal transportation costs from the port of entry into the EU.

FRANS TIMMERMANS (1961–) is currently an Executive Vice-President in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** and the Commissioner responsible for the **European Green Deal**. He was initially nominated in 2014 as the Dutch Commissioner to the new, 28-member **European Commission** led by Jean-Claude Juncker. In September Juncker named Timmermans as First Vice-President of the Commission and Commissioner-designate for Better Regulation, Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, subject to approval by the **European Parliament** (EP). Prior to his appointment to the Commission Timmermans was, most recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the **Netherlands** (2012–14). Timmermans studied French language and literature at Radboud University, Nijmegen and after graduation joined the Dutch diplomatic service. His subsequent career is steeped in mostly European Union (EU)-related affairs. He was elected to the Dutch parliament in 1997 and was

TINDEMANS REPORT

Minister of European Affairs in 2007–10. Timmermans was approved at his confirmation hearing with **Members of the European Parliament**. Following the endorsement of the Juncker Commission by both the EP and the **European Council**, he took up his new role as a European Commissioner on 1 November. In 2019 Timmermans emerged as a leading candidate for the role of President of the European Commission for the **Party of European Socialists** (PES). However, in the event he was unable to attract enough support.

TINDEMANS REPORT is the name of a document that originated at the 1974 **summit meeting** in Paris, where the heads of government commissioned Leo Tindemans, the Prime Minister of **Belgium**, to undertake a series of consultations in the national capitals examining what might be achievable by political co-operation. The Tindemans Report was published in 1976. It proposed a common foreign policy and defence collaboration, economic and monetary union, the development of regional and social policies, a common industrial policy and a strengthened **European Commission** elected by, and accountable to, a popularly elected European legislature. It also advanced the notion of a **‘two-speed’** Europe, suggesting that the goals of the European Communities (EC) might be more easily achieved if all member states were not expected to proceed at the same rate in all policy areas. Despite remaining on the agenda of all its sessions until 1978, the report was never discussed by the **European Council**. It did, however, serve as a basis for the several reviews of the EC that occurred in subsequent years.

A **TITLE** is a sub-division of a **Part** within a European Union treaty. Titles can in turn be divided into **Chapters**. In the **Treaty on European Union**, titles form the main sub-division of the treaty.

The **TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH** (TAC) is a central element of the **common fisheries policy**. It relates to the conservation and management of fish stocks. TACs are overall quotas, fixed annually by the **Council of the European Union**, for each species of fish that is thought to be threatened by overfishing. Within each overall quota for the European Union, each member state is allocated its own quota. The documentation of catches and other surveillance measures are the responsibility of the member states. The scheme is supervised by a team of inspectors who report directly to the **European Commission**, which has the authority to impose penalties for infringements of the TAC quotas. The ability of the **United Kingdom** to determine quotas within its own jurisdiction was a key issue in the context of **Brexit**.

TOURISM is a major industry in the European Union (EU) and an important growth area for **employment**. However, **European Commission**

efforts to gain member state approval of a multi-annual programme for European tourism (Philoxenia) in 1996 failed. The major emphasis since has been focused on tourism within the context of employment. The **Treaty of Lisbon**, like the abandoned **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**, did, however, envisage EU action complementing that of the member states in promoting the **competitiveness** of undertakings in the tourism sector. The **COVID-19** pandemic has had a severe impact on tourism.

TOURS DE TABLE refers to the procedure where each national delegation at a meeting of the **Council of the European Union** is allowed to make an opening statement on its views of a particular proposal or subject. In a European Union of 27 states, such interventions could be problematic in terms of time. (For example, assuming each member state took five minutes to make its statement, this would mean that more than two hours would elapse before any discussions proper could commence.)

TOWN TWINNING was launched by the **European Commission** in 1989. Through carefully targeted grants it seeks to foster and develop further existing links between the populations of the member states. It aims to raise awareness of other European cultures and to promote an understanding, through meetings of twinned towns and municipalities, of what European integration has achieved to date and what challenges remain. The Commission's work under this programme is divided into two areas. Under 'Town Twinning' the Commission promotes exchanges between towns across the European Union and projects that involve towns in current member states and in **applicant countries**. To this end, it supports financially exchanges between citizens and towns that are twinned, conferences and meetings on European subjects, and training seminars for organizers of town-twinning schemes. The second area deals with the so-called 'golden stars of town twinning', which is essentially an annual award presented to the towns that are judged to have done the most in forging closer links between their respective citizens.

TRADE and its development between the member states was the initial economic objective of the European Communities (EC). By 1968 internal **tariff** barriers had been removed by the **Six**, and new member states have been given a short transitional period in which to eliminate their tariffs. The process of free trade was not completed until the implementation of the **internal market**. The European Union (EU) has become the world's largest trader, accounting for some 15% of world trade. The EU has agreements of various kinds—**association agreements**, **free trade agreements** and **trade and co-operation agreements**—with over 120 countries, as well as some 30 multilateral arrangements.

TRADE AND CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS take various forms and have been concluded with a variety of states. Such trade and co-operation agreements form part of the **common commercial policy** and normally involve preferential access to the European Union's **single market** and the eventual establishment of an industrial free trade area. This is supplemented by co-operation in areas of mutual interest, often focused on facilitating trade and the economic development of the signatory state.

TRADEMARKS are important as indicators of the origin and quality of goods, but companies have had to make separate applications in each member state to secure protection for their trademarks. Since 1980 the **European Commission** has pursued a policy of **harmonization** that envisaged a common European Union trademark that would exist alongside the national ones. (See also **European Office Intellectual Property Office; Unitary Patent Convention.**)

JEPPE TRANHOLM-MIKKELSEN (1962–) was appointed as the new **Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union** (EU) in April 2015, with effect from 1 July. His second term lasts until mid-2025. His predecessor was Uwe Corsepius. Tranholm-Mikkelsen is Danish, and studied at the University of Aarhus before his MSc at the London School of Economic and Political Science in the **United Kingdom**. He then filled a number of diplomatic roles and was also an adviser on EU policy to the Danish Prime Minister and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2007 he was appointed as ambassador to the People's Republic of China, a role that also included responsibility for Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 2010 he was appointed the Permanent Representative of **Denmark** to the EU, a post that he retained until being appointed to his current position.

The **TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION** is the name of a document signed in November 1990 by the European Communities (EC) and the **USA**. It was intended, given the common heritage and the close historical, political, cultural and economic links between Europe and the USA, to form the basis of greater collaboration and co-operation between the two. The Declaration affirmed their desire for a partnership with specific goals and aspirations. These included openly supporting democracy and the rule of law and advancing respect for **human rights** and individual liberties. The signatories of the declaration sought to safeguard peace and promote international stability; to pursue policies that were targeted at advancing economic growth (such as greater liberalization and **competition policy**) and maintaining low inflation; to promote market principles; to reject all manner of protectionism; and to provide adequate support, in co-operation with other states and organizations, for the emerging liberal democracies of **Central and Eastern Europe**. The

Declaration envisaged close consultation between the EC and the US Government on issues of mutual concern and common interest. For example, emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen the multilateral trading system and its organizations, on promoting liberalization and on pursuing bilateral dialogue in order to reduce and eventually eliminate other non-tariff barriers that impeded trade. Also within the Declaration, attention was focused on the need to develop joint scientific research projects in areas such as high-energy physics, **space policy** and environmental protection, as well as on extending youth and student exchanges. To facilitate such co-operation and networking the Declaration set up a regular system of biannual summits and ministerial meetings. (See also **New Transatlantic Agenda**.)

The **TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP)** is the name of a proposed EU-USA free trade agreement, under negotiation from July 2013. In August 2016 German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel stated, after the 14th round of negotiations had taken place in **Brussels, Belgium**, in July, that neither side had succeeded in reaching agreement on a single common issue out of the total of 27 under discussion. The TTIP appeared to be moribund by the end of US President Barack Obama's term of office in January 2017, with the inauguration of the new President, **Donald Trump**, who introduced a policy of increased US protectionism.

TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS or TENs was a concept introduced by the Treaty on European Union, which committed the European Union (EU) to developing such networks in energy (TEN-E or Ten-Energy), telecommunications (eTEN) and transport (TEN-T) through the interconnection and opening-up of national networks. The assumption was that such networks would aid both the **single market** and social and economic cohesion within the EU.

TRANSPARENCY is a term now used widely in the context of the need for more **openness** in and easier public access to the working of the institutions of the European Union (EU). It is hoped that increased transparency and openness will improve the **legitimacy** and **accountability** of the EU.

TRANSPORT POLICY was particularly slow to develop in the European Communities (EC), despite being identified as an objective by the **Treaty of Rome**. The vested interests of the member states in the domain of transport—for example, road haulage quotas and licences, customs documentation, **subsidies** for **railways** and **shipping**, and the protection of national airlines—meant that little progress was made towards a common transport policy until 1982. The catalyst was an action brought by the **European Parliament** in the

Court of Justice against the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**) for failing to fulfil the requirements of the Treaty of Rome. The Court upheld the complaint, arguing that the Council had an obligatory duty to liberalize international transport within the EC and to make it open to carriers of all member states, and recommended the establishment of a common transport policy. The Court ruling enabled the **European Commission** to act with more vigour. In 1983 the Commission formulated a list of policy objectives: a more effective integration of national transport policies; greater productivity and efficiency through reducing the number of bureaucratic constraints and the amount of documentation; greater competition within and between different modes of transport; and **harmonization** of rules relating to working conditions, **health and safety**, environmental protection and technical standards. However, because of the different problems and requirements of the various transport sectors, the Commission found it difficult to develop a common transport policy. Instead, it has sought common rules and harmonization within each major sector: **air transport, inland waterways, railways, road transport and shipping**. Common to all sectors is a programme of support for infrastructural developments and modernization. As part of the wider system of **Trans-European Networks** (TENs), the EU adopted a new policy in 1996. The transport network (TEN-T) guidelines envisaged co-ordinated improvements to primary roads, railways, inland waterways, airports, seaports, inland ports and traffic management systems, providing integrated and intermodal long-distance, high-speed routes throughout the EU. The projects undertaken under this initiative were managed by the Trans-European Transport Executive Agency, which was established in 2006 (replaced by the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency). The majority of the projects were funded by national governments. The **Connecting Europe Facility** (CEF) is currently the EU's primary funding instrument for infrastructure projects, including those relating to transport; the CEF had a budget for transport of €11,384m. for 2021–27, in 2018 prices.

The **TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE** was agreed in June 2004 and, had it been ratified, would have replaced the **Treaty of Rome** and the **Treaty on European Union** as the formal legal basis of the European Union (EU). Often referred to as a **Constitutional Treaty** or the European Constitution, the treaty emerged out of the deliberations of the **European Convention** that adopted the **draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and the negotiations that took place in the subsequent **intergovernmental conference** (IGC).

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe envisaged a range of reforms to the EU and its institutions. These included abolishing the existing **pillar** structure and granting the EU **legal personality**. New posts of **Union Minister for Foreign Affairs** and **President of the European Council** were planned, as were a new system of **qualified majority voting** (QMV)

and a revised range of **legal instruments**. **Ratification** of the treaty would also have resulted in the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** being made legally binding, and in increased use of QMV, the extension and a renaming of the co-decision procedure as the **ordinary legislative procedure**, an eventual reduction in the size of the **European Commission** and changes in the rotation of the **Council Presidency**. The rules governing use of **enhanced co-operation** would also have been eased and a **European Public Prosecutor's Office** provided for and, for the first time, a formal mechanism for **withdrawal** from the EU would have existed.

Unlike the **Single European Act** or the Treaty on European Union, no significant expansion of the EU's policy competences would have occurred with the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. All the same, the list of areas in which the EU enjoys a formal **competence** to act would have been increased, mainly in recognition of existing practice. Such areas include administrative co-operation, energy, **humanitarian assistance**, intellectual property, **public health**, **space policy**, **sport**, and **tourism**. One new area of competence was **civil protection**. In addition, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe envisaged reforms to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**, the **European Security and Defence Policy**, EU activities regarding **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters** and the **area of freedom, security and justice**.

The entry into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was thrown into question in mid-2005 when electorates in **France** and the **Netherlands** voted against its ratification. For some, such a dual rejection should have seen the immediate abandonment of the ratification process. Instead, it was agreed that member states could choose for themselves whether they wished to pause for 'reflection' as the **European Council** in June 2005 agreed or push ahead. **Cyprus**, **Luxembourg**, **Malta** and later **Belgium**, **Estonia** and **Finland** took the latter route, while others put on hold their ratification processes, pending clarification from the French and Dutch on how they intended to proceed. For states outside the EU seeking membership, the **ratification crisis** was worrying since it threatened to postpone or derail further **enlargement**. Following elections in France and the Netherlands in 2007, in June the European Council agreed a mandate for a new IGC that would subsequently adopt the **Treaty of Lisbon**, incorporating key elements of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY: See **Treaty of Rome**; **European Atomic Energy Community**

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY: See **Treaty of Paris**

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: See **Treaty of Rome**

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: See **Treaty of Rome**

The **TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM (TESM)** was signed by the 17 members of the **eurozone** on 11 July 2011 as part of their efforts to resolve the financial crisis in the eurozone. With additional decisions to strengthen the ESM being adopted in July and December, the treaty was subsequently revised and a new version signed on 2 February 2012. With the crisis in the eurozone deepening, swift **ratification** was demanded. However, the scheduled date of 1 July 2012 for the entry into force of the treaty was not met, owing to delays in ratification in **Germany** and **Italy**. Germany's eventual ratification of the document on 27 September (Italy having ratified it on 23 July) brought the TESH into force on that date for the 16 eurozone members that had completed the ratification process; **Estonia** ratified the treaty on 3 October and the ESM commenced operations on 8 October.

A **TREATY OF ACCESSION** contains the **legal instruments** governing the accession of a state to the European Union (EU). Accession treaties have to be ratified by all existing member states as well as the acceding state or states. **Ratification** normally involves a referendum in the acceding country. Since the **Single European Act**, the approval of the **European Parliament** via the consent procedure has also been necessary. The most significant accession treaty of the past decade was signed in Athens, **Greece**, on 16 April 2003 between the EU's member states and 10 applicant states, mainly from **Central and Eastern Europe: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia**. With the exception of Cyprus, each of the applicant states held a referendum during 2003 on whether the country should join the EU. In each case, a majority of those voting voted in favour of membership. Successful ratification of the Accession Treaty in the member states ensured that **enlargement** took place, as planned, on 1 May 2004. An Accession Treaty was signed in **Luxembourg** on 25 April 2005, which governed the accession of **Bulgaria** and **Romania** to the EU. Neither country held a referendum to ratify the Accession Treaty. Its ratification was successfully completed in December 2006, allowing the two countries to accede to the EU on 1 January 2007. The most recent Accession Treaty was signed with **Croatia** on 9 December 2011 and membership was approved by a referendum held in Croatia on 22 January 2012. Croatia's accession to the EU took place on 1 July 2013.

The **TREATY OF AMSTERDAM** was agreed in June 1997 by the **Fifteen** heads of state and government of the European Union (EU). The Treaty was signed in October 1997 and, following **ratification** by the member states, came into force on 1 May 1999. The measures it introduced were discussed during the 1996 **intergovernmental conference** (IGC) review of the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), which sought to address changing circumstances in **Central and Eastern Europe** and the new arrangements that would be required on **enlargement** of the EU. The IGC also highlighted measures introduced by the TEU that had not proved effective, particularly in relation to closing the gap between national governments and the people, regarding the way the EU was developing (see **democratic deficit**). The new Treaty therefore amended and updated the TEU. It also amended the **founding treaties**, removed many obsolete provisions and renumbered the **articles** of these treaties.

High priority was given in the Treaty of Amsterdam to measures combating high unemployment, extending **citizens' rights** and improving democratic **accountability** and participation in the institutions of the EU. In future, governments were to co-ordinate their employment strategies and a new **Employment Committee** was to be established to oversee the co-ordination process. Greater efforts were to be encouraged in the battle against **discrimination** on grounds of sex, race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability or sexual orientation. Member states were also required to address gender inequality, and to protect citizens against misuse of data stored in EU **institutions**. New and continued efforts in the fields of public health, the environment and sustainable development, and consumer protection were also to be encouraged. The **protocol** on social policy (see **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**) was incorporated into the revised **Treaty of Rome**, following the decision of the British Labour Government to sign the Charter in 1997.

The **pillar**-based system brought in by the TEU was kept, although much of the province of the **justice and home affairs** pillar was transferred to the Treaty of Rome, thereby coming under the first, or Community, pillar, leaving the third pillar to deal primarily with **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters**.

In an attempt to improve public accountability, the treaty introduced measures to ensure greater **openness** and **transparency** by improving public access to documents originating from the institutions of the European Communities and to the voting results of legislative **decisions** taken by the **Council of the European Union**. Moreover, in an attempt to counter criticisms that a democratic deficit existed within EU institutions, members of **national parliaments** were to become more involved in the **decision-making** processes of the EU through the Conference of European Affairs Committees. This group was to be encouraged to voice its opinions in specific policy areas such as fundamental rights and freedoms, justice and security, and **subsidiarity**. National parliaments were also to be given more time to debate

EU issues, as the treaty provided for a six-week interval between the tabling of legislative proposals and their placement on the Council agenda, thereby improving democratic participation.

Institutional reforms also featured in the treaty (see **Council of the European Union; European Commission; European Parliament—EP**), not only to improve democracy but for practical reasons as the EU prepared for expansion. The number of **Members of the European Parliament** elected to the EP was to be limited to 700, and decision-making procedures were simplified. **Qualified majority voting** was extended, although **unanimity** was required for constitutional matters and certain policy areas, such as **taxation**. The authority of the Commission's President was also enhanced prior to a review of that institution before enlargement.

Moreover, membership of the EU was made more explicitly conditional. This means that successful applicants have to agree to abide by the principles of **human rights** and fundamental freedoms, liberty and democracy in relation to their citizens, as set down by the EU, or face suspension of certain membership rights, including the right to vote.

The treaty also focused on creating a safer and stronger Europe by introducing new internal security measures, as well as measures that were intended to promote greater co-operation in foreign policy. A timetable was set within which a series of common immigration and asylum rules was to be established. Improved co-operation between national police forces and the legal systems of the member states was also required, as was incorporation of the **Schengen Agreement** *acquis* into the treaties (although the **United Kingdom** and **Ireland** were allowed an **opt-out**). Strict anti-**fraud** measures were to be introduced. The position of the **European Court of Auditors** was to be enhanced to assist in fraud prevention, and greater co-operation between customs authorities in the member states was to be developed. A stronger Europe in the world was also considered to be a priority, given the EU's failure to agree on a united policy during the 1990–91 hostilities in the Gulf, or in relation to the break-up of, and civil war in, the former **Yugoslavia**. The Secretary-General of the Council was simultaneously to hold the newly created post of **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**. A new unit charged with early warning, planning and analysis in EU foreign affairs was also to be created. Closer co-operation between the EU and **Western European Union** (WEU) was called for, and the possibility of the integration of WEU into the EU was raised, but the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** was still seen by the EU to be the main security organization for Europe.

Despite its innovations and reforms, the treaty failed to introduce the institutional reforms necessary to prepare the EU for enlargement. Hence, even before it entered into force on 1 May 1999, preparations were being made for a further IGC that would lead to the **Treaty of Nice** in 2001.

The **TREATY OF BRUSSELS** was signed in March 1948 by the Governments of the **United Kingdom, France** and the **Benelux** countries. It was modelled on the 1947 **Treaty of Dunkirk** and, as such, was an agreement on mutual military assistance against military attack from either **Germany** or, more likely, the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**. It also sought to foster greater economic, social and cultural co-operation between the five states. The Treaty was a precursor to establishment of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** in 1949 and **Western European Union** in 1954. The Treaty was largely the creation of Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary. This initiative was endorsed by the **USA**. Many Europeans who hoped that it promised greater British involvement in the construction of a new European order also welcomed the treaty. However, it was rendered almost meaningless with the creation of NATO under US hegemony in 1949.

TREATY OF DUNKIRK was the name of a document signed in 1947 by **France** and the **United Kingdom**. Although the pact called for bilateral economic assistance and co-operation, its justification was primarily military: a guarantee of mutual aid in the event of any future German aggression. It was superseded by the **Treaty of Brussels** in 1948.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP is the name of the pact, also known as the Elysée Treaty, signed by **France** and the Federal Republic of **Germany** (West Germany) on 22 January 1963. It was the only tangible result of the **Fouchet Plan** for greater political co-operation and integration, and provided for institutional co-operation between the two states in the four policy areas of defence, foreign affairs, education and culture. Strongly criticized at the time by the other members of the European Communities (EC), it became the basis of a considerable degree of liaison and regularized co-operation between the two states, and of a powerful Franco-German axis within the EC.

The **TREATY OF LISBON**, originally named the **Reform Treaty**, was agreed in October 2007 and signed on 13 December. It was drawn up in an **intergovernmental conference** launched by the **European Council** in June 2007 and, having been ratified by all 27 member states, introduced a range of essentially institutional and political reforms originally contained in the abandoned **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe**. The Treaty of Lisbon was agreed with a view 'to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy' of the European Union and 'to improving the coherence of its action'. To these ends, it provided for increased use of **qualified majority voting (QMV)**, the eventual replacement of QMV with a **double majority voting** system, the extension and a renaming of the co-decision procedure as the **ordinary legislative procedure**, an eventual reduction in the size of the

European Commission and changes in the rotation of the **Council Presidency**. It also eased the rules governing use of **enhanced co-operation**. In terms of the coherence of what the EU does, particularly externally, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a number of reforms to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and was more explicit about what the EU envisages as the form and purpose of its **European Security and Defence Policy**. It also developed the position of the **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**, now retitled **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, created the post of **President of the European Council**, and allowed for **permanent structured co-operation** on military matters.

Drawing also on what was envisaged in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the EU's existing **pillar** structure, granted the EU **legal personality**, made the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** legally binding, provided for the establishment of a **European Public Prosecutor's Office** and, for the first time, established a formal mechanism for **withdrawal** from the EU. There was also clarification of the EU's formal **competence** and formal legal bases in a number of areas of existing practice, notably administrative co-operation, energy, **humanitarian assistance**, intellectual property, public health, space, **sport**, and **tourism**. One new area of competence was **civil protection**. EU activities regarding **police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters** and the **area of freedom, security and justice** also saw some reforms.

By the end of May 2008 the parliaments of 16 member states had endorsed the treaty. The remaining member states were due to complete ratification by the end of the year, thereby allowing the treaty to enter into force on 1 January 2009. In the first half of June 2008 a further three parliaments—those of **Estonia, Finland** and **Greece**—ratified the treaty before attention switched on 12 June to Ireland, the only member state to hold a referendum. The outcome was a seemingly decisive victory for opponents of the treaty. However, the Irish came under considerable pressure to hold a second vote. Agreement to do so came following a commitment from the European Council to agree various clarifications and guarantees concerning the impact of the treaty on Irish neutrality, taxation powers, the right to life, family and education, and **workers' rights**. A second referendum was held in October 2009, at which voters endorsed the treaty by a two-thirds' majority. Following some last-minute delays in the **Czech Republic**, ratification was completed in time for the Treaty of Lisbon to enter into force on 1 December.

TREATY OF LUXEMBOURG is the name of a document signed by the member states in April 1970. An amendment to the **Treaty of Rome**, it incorporated the new budgetary system of **own resources** into the structure of the European Communities.

The **TREATY OF NICE** was agreed in December 2000 and signed in February 2001. **Ratification** took longer than expected after the process was thrown into doubt when, in June 2001, the Irish populace rejected the treaty in a referendum. As had been the case following the **ratification crisis** in 1992, when the Danish populace rejected the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), a second referendum was scheduled. This took place in October 2002 and on this occasion the treaty was endorsed by 63% of those who voted. The Treaty was then successfully channelled through both Irish houses of parliament before finally coming into force on 1 February 2003.

The essential purpose of the treaty was explained in its preamble: to prepare the European Union (EU) for **enlargement**. It did this by introducing a series of staged reforms to the **institutions**, notably by: reducing the size of the **European Commission** to a maximum of one national from each member state; re-weighting votes within the **Council of the European Union**, essentially to the advantage of the larger member states; and re-allocating seats in the **European Parliament** (EP). Moreover, Council votes and EP seats were provisionally allocated to the **candidate countries** (albeit with the exception of **Turkey**), as were seats on the **Committee of the Regions** and the **Economic and Social Committee**. The **Court of Justice** and **Court of First Instance** were also to undergo some reform: innovations included the creation of **Grand Chambers** and **Judicial Panels** in an attempt to enable the courts to deal with an already large caseload. The existence and activities of **Eurojust** that enabled member states to co-operate in the area of cross-border crime were also formally recognized.

Beyond institutional reform, the Treaty of Nice introduced changes to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP), allowing for **enhanced co-operation** and essentially excising from the TEU references to **Western European Union**, a move that coincided with the establishment of the CFSP. More generally, enhanced co-operation was to be facilitated by reducing the number of member states needed to begin a project. Likewise, **decision making** generally was also facilitated through the extension of **qualified majority voting** to more than 40 provisions, although **unanimity** was still retained for the most sensitive areas (e.g. tax **harmonization**).

Unlike earlier treaties such as the **Single European Act** and the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, the Treaty of Nice did little in the way of increasing the competences of the EU. Little was included beyond a slight extension of the treaty-making powers of the EU to include services and the insertion into the **Treaty of Rome** of a new **title** on economic, financial and technical co-operation with third countries. However, when adopting the treaty, the member states set in motion a process that could lead to significant increases in the activities of the EU. Equally, it could lead to limits being placed on them. The process in question was the debate on the future of Europe, which was later expanded in the **Laeken Declaration** and provided with a forum for expression in the **European Convention** launched in February 2002. Its

TREATY OF PARIS

conclusions informed a further **intergovernmental conference** that began work in October 2003.

TREATY OF PARIS is the commonly used name of the document, signed on 18 April 1951 and designated to remain in force for 50 years, which established the **European Coal and Steel Community**. This **founding treaty** committed the signatories to contribute to economic expansion through ‘the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating countries through the institution, in harmony with the general economy of the member states, of a common market’. Subsequent entrants to the European Communities and European Union had to accept the terms and obligations of the treaty, although after 2002 new members were no longer required to, as the Treaty of Paris expired in July 2002.

TREATY OF PRÜM: See **Prüm Convention**

TREATY OF ROME is the commonly used name of the document that established the **European Economic Community**. Signed on 25 March 1957, it is the most important of the **founding treaties** of the European Communities. It was concluded for an unlimited period of time and committed the signatories, ‘by establishing a **common market** and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations between the States belonging to it’. The greater part of the treaty lists the actions and common policies to which the member states committed themselves, and the institutions of the new body. The Treaty has been amended on several occasions since 1957, most significantly by the **Single European Act**, the **Treaty on European Union**, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** (which renumbered the treaty’s **articles**) and the **Treaty of Nice**. With the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, the treaty was further amended and renamed the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**. The **European Atomic Energy Community** was established by a separate document, also often referred to as the Treaty of Rome, which was signed at the same time. With the exception of its institutional provisions, this largely remains unamended, although there is currently support from some member states for a substantial revision.

TREATY OF ROME (EURATOM): See **European Atomic Energy Community; Treaty of Rome**

TREATY OF WESTMINSTER: See **Council of Europe**

The **TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION** (TEU) is one of the main **European treaties**. Agreed at the **Maastricht summit** of the **European Council** in December 1991 and later signed by representatives of the member states of the European Communities (EC) on 7 February 1992, it formally established the European Union (EU), basing it on three **pillars**: the existing EC as the first pillar and two new pillars of intergovernmental co-operation covering a **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and **justice and home affairs**. In doing so, the TEU also brought about a significant revision of the **Treaty of Rome**, thereby increasing the powers of the EC. The member states, with the exception of the **United Kingdom**, agreed to further integration in social affairs in the form of a Social Chapter (see **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**). Substantial institutional reforms to the EC were also introduced, as was the notion of EU **citizenship**. More significantly, the TEU laid down a detailed timetable and **convergence criteria** for **economic and monetary union** (EMU), which was to be established by 1999 at the latest. Not all member states wished to be tied to the goal of EMU, however. Hence special **opt-outs** were agreed for **Denmark** and the UK, the latter also gaining an opt-out from the Social Chapter. The EMU opt-out did not assuage the concerns of the Danish people, however, who rejected the TEU in a referendum in June 1992. This led to a **ratification crisis** and the granting of further concessions to Denmark. In May 1993, the Danish people approved the TEU and it entered into force on 1 November 1993.

The Treaty was formally reviewed by an **intergovernmental conference** in 1996. The conference debated the measures required to address the shortfalls of the TEU, with the place of the EU in the world and its position vis-à-vis **enlargement** featuring prominently in debates. Measures required to move forward to a ‘People’s Europe’ were also discussed and introduced via the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, which was signed in October 1997. Amendments to the TEU made in the Treaty of Amsterdam were soon to be followed by further revision via the **Treaty of Nice**. Had the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** been ratified, it would have replaced the TEU. Its replacement, the **Treaty of Lisbon**, further amended—and renumbered—the TEU’s provisions.

The **TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION** (TFEU) was the new name of the **Treaty establishing the European Community**—the Treaty of Rome—following the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon** in December 2009. With this name change, all references to the **European Community** were replaced with ‘European Union’ and the European Community ceased to exist.

TREATY ON STABILITY, CO-ORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: See **Fiscal Compact**

TREVI stands for Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme, Violence Internationale. It was established in 1975 as a forum for intergovernmental cooperation by the member states on matters relating to internal security, organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. It also worked for the co-ordination of **migration and asylum policy**. Its twice-yearly meetings of justice and home affairs ministers were held in secret. A more structured approach towards these policy areas was accepted as a consequence of the decision to establish an **internal market**, and in the late 1980s several more specialized subgroups were established within the TREVI framework. It formed the basis of the more formal **justice and home affairs** pillar of the European Union that was established by the **Treaty on European Union**.

TROIKA is a term that originally referred to the grouping that, prior to the **Treaty of Lisbon**, represented the European Union (EU) internationally as part of the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and, previously, **European political co-operation**. Originally it comprised the member state occupying the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union**, its immediate predecessor and its scheduled successor. The idea was that such a combination would achieve consistency in the activities and efforts of the EU and greater success in the attainment of their aims. Following the **Treaty of Amsterdam** the member state holding the Presidency of the Council was accompanied by the **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the member of the **European Commission** responsible for external relations. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, representation fell to the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**. The term troika was also used during the **eurozone** crisis to refer to the tripartite committee of the **European Commission**, the **European Central Bank** and the International Monetary Fund, which organized bailout packages for indebted states, contingent on the adoption of austerity measures.

DONALD TRUMP (1946–) assumed office in January 2017 as the 45th President of the **USA**. He had no prior political experience before being elected to the presidency, but was well-known as a reality television personality and highly successful real estate entrepreneur. He campaigned on a platform of **populism**, protectionism and right-wing nationalism. Trump had at times a somewhat antagonistic relationship with the European Union (EU), calling the EU a trade ‘foe’ and criticizing both **Germany** and **France** for not contributing sufficient funds within the **North Atlantic Treaty**

Organization. Trump left office in January 2021, when Joe Biden became the 46th President of the USA.

TUNISIA: See **Maghreb States**

TURKEY, recognized by the European Communities as a European state, submitted an application for association in July 1959. Negotiations began in 1962 and concluded with an **association agreement** in 1963. This specified a transitional period of 22 years, commencing in 1970, that was designed to lead to a **customs union**. European opposition to the Turkish military coup of September 1980 further delayed developments. Talks were resumed in 1983, after the re-establishment of civilian government, and in 1987 Turkey submitted an application for full membership. The application did not progress within the European Union (EU) because of fears over Turkey's weak economy, doubts about its suitability in terms of democracy and **human rights**, and concern over the continuing partition of **Cyprus**. However, in March 1995 an agreement on a customs union was signed; it came into force in December 1995 following **ratification** by the **European Parliament (EP)**. Despite persistent doubts over Turkey's progress in economic, political and human rights and over the Cyprus issue, Turkey's eligibility for accession to the EU was confirmed in 1997: the country would be judged according to the same criteria as the other **applicant countries**. Turkey was not, however, invited to participate in the accession process launched in 1998.

In December 1999 the **European Council** held in Helsinki, **Finland**, agreed to recognize Turkey, alongside the applicant countries from **Central and Eastern Europe**, as a candidate state. Formal negotiations finally commenced on 3 October 2005, but progress proved to be slow. In some cases, national leaders were personally opposed to Turkish accession, and in some member states there was popular disquiet at the prospect of Turkish membership. In the case of **France**, this led to a constitutional change, subjecting future EU enlargements to a referendum. Meanwhile, **Cyprus** remained determined to see Turkey fulfil its obligations towards the EU and open up access to its ports to Cypriot vessels. By July 2012 only 13 of the 35 negotiating chapters of the *acquis communautaire* had been opened (of which eight had been frozen) and only one had been closed. During the second half of 2012 Turkey suspended negotiations during Cyprus's tenure of the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union**. Negotiations regarding EU accession had been due to recommence in June 2013 but, following a controversial crackdown by the Turkish security forces on anti-Government protesters that month, the EU postponed further talks until November.

In July 2016 the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Federica Mogherini, and the then Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, **Johannes Hahn**, condemned a coup attempt in Turkey. Although membership

negotiations had opened in additional policy areas in December 2015 and June 2016, amid increased co-operation between the EU and Turkey on migration (see below), in November the EP approved a non-binding resolution supporting the temporary suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey, owing to concerns over human rights and the rule of law following the suppression of an attempted coup in July. In mid-December the European Council confirmed that negotiations would not be launched in any new policy areas while the ongoing political situation in Turkey prevailed.

Meanwhile, in October 2015 a Joint Action Plan was negotiated between the European Commission and Turkey in an attempt to ameliorate co-operation in responding to the **European migration crisis**, caused, in particular, by the ongoing civil conflict in the **Syrian Arab Republic**. The agreement provided for political and financial engagement with Turkey to be deepened in several areas. In mid-March 2016 a new EU-Turkey agreement was reached, providing for the return of undocumented migrants crossing into the territory of **Greece** and considered not to be in immediate need of international protection; the EU pledged to accept an officially documented Syrian refugee from inside Turkey for each migrant returned to that country, and to provide assistance worth up to some €6,000m. by the end of 2018, together with the acceleration of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens. By June 2016 the European Commission reported there to have been a significant decline in the numbers of migrants leaving Turkey for Greek territory. Prior to the implementation of the agreement with Turkey, around 1,740 migrants were traversing the Aegean Sea to the Greek islands each day. From the beginning of May the average number of arrivals each day had reportedly declined to some 47, which represented a reduction of more than 95%.

In July 2017 the European Parliament voted, in a non-binding resolution, in favour of the suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey if it proceeded with constitutional changes approved by a referendum held there in April, which had endorsed strengthening the powers of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and reintroducing the death penalty, contrary to the democratic principles endorsed by the EU. In March 2019 Parliament again voted in favour of a recommendation that the EU formally suspend negotiations with Turkey, owing to continued concerns about human rights and the introduction there of a new Constitution. Relations between Turkey and the EU came under further pressure when Turkey announced the suspension of the application of the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement in February 2020, announcing that it was permitting migrants to traverse its borders with Europe (following an upsurge in fighting in Syria, which caused the deaths of tens of Turkish soldiers). In August Turkey carried out seismic research, with military support, in waters claimed by Greece and Cyprus, prompting demands from the EU for the de-escalation of tensions. Relations between the EU and Turkey improved somewhat towards the end of 2020, and in March 2021 the European Council indicated its readiness to re-engage with Turkey on issues including an updated

EU-Turkey customs union, the resumption of high-level dialogue and increased co-operation in managing migration.

DONALD TUSK (1957–) was named at the end of August 2014 as the new President of the **European Council**, and as President of the **Euro Summit** (meetings of eurozone heads of state and of government) for the same period. Tusk, who was born in Gdąnsk, **Poland**, was the leader of the liberal-conservative Platforma Obywatelska (PO—Civic Platform) party, and had held the role of Prime Minister of Poland for seven years, which had been a period of relative political stability. He was the only Prime Minister to secure re-election for a second term in Poland since 1989. His Government resigned in September 2014. Tusk regarded the **USA** as an important ally for Poland, and was in favour of increased European Union integration, primarily owing to security concerns. Owing to his reputation for pragmatism and tenaciousness, he drew comparisons from some observers with the German leader **Angela Merkel**. In March 2017 Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło, who led the populist Government, placed Poland in conflict with the **European Council** when she was the only national leader to oppose Tusk's re-election as Council President. Tusk was duly re-elected for a second term. He was succeeded by **Charles Michel** in late 2019. Tusk was elected to the leadership of the European People's Party in November 2019, and was re-elected Chairman of the Polish opposition PO in October 2021 (after serving as acting leader since July).

TWELVE (EU12), or the Europe of the Twelve, are terms sometimes used to describe the membership of the European Communities after 1986, when the accession of **Portugal** and **Spain** increased the number of member states from **Ten** to Twelve, and before 1995, when the accession of **Austria**, **Finland** and **Sweden** made the number **Fifteen**.

TWENTY-EIGHT (EU28), or Europe of the Twenty-Eight, is a term sometimes used to describe the membership of the European Union from July 2013, when **Croatia** joined the **Twenty-Seven** existing member states, until the departure of the **United Kingdom**, which took place on 31 January 2020 (see **Brexit**).

TWENTY-FIVE (EU25), or Europe of the Twenty-Five, is a term sometimes used to describe the membership of the European Union after May 2004, when **Cyprus**, the **Czech Republic** (Czechia), **Estonia**, **Hungary**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Malta**, **Poland**, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia** joined the existing **Fifteen** member states.

TWENTY-SEVEN

TWENTY-SEVEN (EU27), or Europe of the Twenty-Seven, is a term sometimes used to describe the membership of the European Union from 2007, when **Bulgaria** and **Romania** joined the **Twenty-Five** existing member states, and before 2013, when the accession of **Croatia** made the number **Twenty-Eight**. By 2019 it was often used to describe the current membership of the EU, excluding the **United Kingdom**, in the context of **Brexit**. The UK officially left the EU on 31 January 2020.

TWINNING is a programme directed at assisting the process of administrative reform in **candidate countries** in **Central and Eastern Europe**. The focus of the project is the development of the administrative capacity in these countries to implement effectively the *acquis communautaire*.

TWO-SPEED EUROPE is a more limited variant of **multi-speed Europe**.

UEN: See **Union for Europe of the Nations Group**

UK: See **United Kingdom**

The **UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY** (UKIP) was established in 1993 in opposition to any further European integration and, primarily, opposition to the **Maastricht Treaty**. The core principle uniting its members was a demand for the **United Kingdom** to leave the **European Union** (EU). For over a decade, however, UKIP remained a minor party. With leadership changes it made its first major breakthrough at the 2004 elections to the **European Parliament** (EP), winning 12 seats and finishing third. In 2009 UKIP secured 13 seats and 16.5% of the votes cast to become the second largest British party in the EP. In the 2014 EP elections UKIP was the first-placed British party, with 27.5% of the votes cast, winning 24 seats. The successes at European level were not replicated at national level in the general elections of 2005 and 2010, at which UKIP polled 2.3% and 3.1%, respectively, and won no seats. In 2014 UKIP won its first seats in the House of Commons following two by-elections in Clacton (with some 59% of the votes) and in Rochester and Strood (with some 42% of the votes). Although UKIP continued to demand the UK's exit from the EU, it also benefited from strong opposition towards the UK's immigration policy and its anti-establishment rhetoric. Its growth was aided by Nigel Farage's leadership and his ability to connect with particular sections of the electorate, although UKIP won only one seat at the May 2015 UK general election. Farage campaigned vociferously and sometimes controversially for the 'Leave' side prior to the referendum held in the UK in late June 2016 on British membership of the EU, in which a majority of participating voters chose to leave the Union (also referred to as **Brexit**).

UKRAINE gained its independence from the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) in 1991. In 1994 it concluded a **partnership and co-operation agreement** (PCA) with the European Union (EU), which entered into force in 1998. It is also a recipient of financial assistance from the EU under the **European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP—formerly the

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States—TACIS—programme), and in 1999 was the focus of an EU **common strategy**. This was designed to support the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine; to ensure co-operation in meeting common challenges in the areas of stability and security in Europe, the environment, energy and nuclear safety; to assist Ukraine's integration into the European and world economies; and to enhance co-operation in the field of **justice and home affairs**. With **enlargement** in 2004 meaning that Ukraine suddenly shared a border with the EU, further developments in relations took place primarily within the framework of the ENP. Westward-looking governments in Ukraine, under Viktor Yushchenko's (2005–10) presidency, expressed strong interest in EU membership in the future. However, the main focus was on implementing the ENP Action Plan agreed in 2005 and completing negotiations on an **association agreement** to replace the PCA (which expired in 2008). The new agreement was to involve more intense political dialogue, a **deep and comprehensive free trade area** and strengthened co-operation. Negotiations began in March 2007 and were eventually closed at the end of 2011 (without any agreement being signed). Meanwhile, in May 2009 Ukraine became part of the EU's **Eastern partnership** project. Elections in early 2010 saw the defeat of Yushchenko, his replacement by Viktor Yanukovich and the start of a new period of less ambitious engagement with the EU. In fact, relations soon deteriorated as the EU strongly criticized the Ukrainian Government for its politicization of the country's judicial system. The EU became increasingly concerned about developments within Ukraine and, although an association agreement was initialled with Ukraine in March 2012, its signature by the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament** was indefinitely postponed until the national Government made substantial progress regarding electoral, judicial and constitutional reform. In February 2013 the Ukrainian Government adopted a Plan on Priority Measures for European Integration of Ukraine in a bid to facilitate the country meeting the EU stipulations for the signature of the association agreement by November.

However, events were to take a different direction, with Ukraine entering a period of real political uncertainty, when domestically relations between the people of Ukraine deteriorated, as did those between the **Russian Federation** and Ukraine. The Ukrainian crisis emerged as a major European and international issue throughout 2014. The crisis commenced when the Ukrainian (and pro-Russian) Government of Yanukovich opted to suspend preparations for signing the Association Agreement with the EU, as had been planned, at a summit in Vilnius (**Lithuania**) in late November 2013. This decision led to immediate public protests and culminated in the overthrow of Yanukovich in February 2014. These developments increased tensions within Ukraine and ultimately led to Crimea's annexation by Russia (following a referendum in the region). The EU tried to stabilize the situation and the new pro-European Ukrainian Government rapidly signed agreements with the EU on the political

and economic aspects of association in March and June, respectively; parts of the agreement were provisionally applied in November. Meanwhile, in May EU ministers of foreign affairs, meeting in **Brussels, Belgium**, agreed to impose broader sanctions against those deemed to be threatening Ukrainian sovereignty. In mid-June the Council agreed to establish a **Common Security and Defence Policy** mission, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform. In early July the EU extended the scope of the restrictive measures in place. Additional sanctions were imposed in late July, following the shooting down of a Malaysian Airlines aeroplane over Donetsk, and in September. In January 2015 the **European Commission** offered lending of some €1,800m. to Ukraine, in support of its reform programme. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, which formed part of the Association Agreement signed in 2014, entered into effect from January 2016. By late 2016 the Association Agreement had been ratified by all EU member states with the exception of the **Netherlands**; voters participating in a non-binding referendum held there in April rejected the deal. The deal was finally ratified in the Netherlands in May 2017, and in July the Council approved the Association Agreement with Ukraine, thereby permitting its full implementation from September of that year. Ukraine remains an area of contention in the EU's relations with Russia.

UNANIMITY applies to certain types of decision taken by the **Council of the European Union**. Its use is laid down in the **founding treaties**. Policies that are subject to unanimity require the agreement of all member states before a proposal can be adopted. For much of the early history of the European Communities, especially following the **Luxembourg Compromise**, unanimity was essential. Since the **Single European Act**, there has been a general shift away from unanimity towards greater use of **decisions** being taken under **qualified majority voting** (QMV). The **Treaty on European Union**, the **Treaty of Amsterdam** and the **Treaty of Nice** extended the use of QMV, and currently far fewer decisions are subject to unanimous agreement in the Council. This is particularly the case following the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon**. For what were previously **pillar I** and **pillar III** matters—the pillars have since been abandoned—QMV became the general rule. By contrast, decisions relating to the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** are still generally subject to unanimity. However, even with QMV, the Council prefers to reach either unanimous agreement or consensus wherever possible.

UNEMPLOYMENT RISKS IN AN EMERGENCY: See **Social Policy**.

UNICE: See **BUSINESSEUROPE**

UNIFORM ELECTORAL PROCEDURE relates to the method of elections to the **European Parliament** (EP). The idea that some form of uniform electoral procedure based on direct universal suffrage should be used across all member states dates back to the **Treaty of Paris** and can be found also in Article 190 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Article 223 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**). However, despite treaty commitments there has been little progress towards any uniform procedure. Elections in the member states and rules pertaining to them are decided at the national level. Elections to the EP first occurred in June 1979 but the procedures varied from state to state. Most countries opted for some form of proportional representation. Currently there is no single electoral procedure throughout the member states, and voting continues to take place on different days of the week.

The **UNION FOR EUROPE OF THE NATIONS GROUP** (UEN/ UPE) is a former **political group** of the **European Parliament** (EP). It was formed in 1999 as a conservative force that was largely sceptical towards the issue of any deeper European integration, although some of its member parties, such as the Irish Fianna Fáil, supported the Constitution for Europe. In stark contrast to the other EP groups, the UEN was a noticeably less cohesive force, reflecting the wide and often divergent views of its members. It grew gradually in membership following its establishment. In 2002 UEN had 21 members in the EP. After the 2004 elections it increased its representation in the parliament by securing 27 deputies, and its membership climbed to 35 immediately after the 2009 EP elections. However, the lack of internal cohesion not only ensured a lack of common purpose, but also created tensions. The group dissolved following the 2009 EP elections, as the representatives from the Polish Law and Conservative Party forged a new alliance (the **European Conservatives and Reformists Group**) with **David Cameron's** British Conservatives, while Fianna Fáil had already left the group's ranks to join the **Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe** (ALDE) in April 2009.

The **UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN** (UfM) is part of the **Barcelona Process**, hence its official title, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. It was launched in July 2008 and follows from ideas promoted by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President. Initially limited to littoral states of the Mediterranean, it now comprises all European Union (EU) member states plus **Albania**, Algeria, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya (observer status only), Mauritania, Monaco, **Montenegro**, **Morocco**, the Palestinian Territories, the **Syrian Arab Republic**, Tunisia and **Turkey**; it also includes the League of Arab States. In essence, the Union for the Mediterranean is a re-launch of the **Euro-Mediterranean partnership**, albeit with some additional elements, notably a dedicated Secretariat

responsible for promoting co-operation projects in six designated areas: depollution of the Mediterranean Sea; the establishment of maritime and land highways; joint civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters; a Mediterranean solar energy plan; the inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in **Slovenia** (plans to construct a second such institution, in Fes, Morocco, were announced in June 2012); and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, **small and medium-sized enterprises**. The launch of the Union for the Mediterranean signalled a shift in the EU's approach to its immediate neighbours. Henceforth, as was underlined by the later launch in 2009 of the **Eastern partnership**, the **European Neighbourhood Policy** would essentially comprise distinct Mediterranean and Eastern elements. The Secretariat of the UfM was inaugurated in Barcelona, **Spain**, in March 2010; the Secretary-General is elected upon consensus from a non-EU country. The current holder of the post is Nasser Kamal of Egypt.

A **UNION MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS** was envisaged in the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** and would have replaced the **High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**. Under the terms of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, which came into force in December 2009 many of the powers planned for the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs passed to the renamed **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**.

UNION OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS (UEF) is the name of an organization established in 1946 to harness and combine, on a transnational basis, the energy and ideas of the several groups and organizations that had emerged in 1945 to advocate a federal European state. The UEF is based in **Brussels** and consists of 24 constituent organizations.

UNION OF INDUSTRIAL AND EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATIONS OF EUROPE (UNICE): See **BUSINESSEUROPE**

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR) was the major European military power after 1945 and unwittingly influenced the development of integration in Western Europe by arousing fears about its own power and intentions. Its actions in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948 and the dawning of the **Cold War** persuaded many Western states of the virtues of collaboration, at least in the form of a collective security system, and led them to urge greater involvement of the **USA** in Europe. The USSR remained hostile to Western European integration on both economic and political grounds, and only in 1988 did it declare a willingness to enter into discussions with the European Communities on a possible trading agreement. Since then,

UNITARY PATENT CONVENTION

the USSR has disintegrated, with most of the successor states becoming members of the **Commonwealth of Independent States** and concluding **partnership and co-operation agreements** with the European Union (EU). The three **Baltic states**—**Estonia**, **Latvia** and **Lithuania**—are the main exceptions, having concluded **Europe agreements** and having gained EU membership, which all three countries applied for in 1995.

The **UNITARY PATENT CONVENTION** (UPC), formerly referred to as the Community Patent Convention (CPC), is an initiative aimed at overcoming some of the problems experienced by European companies in registering **patents** and **trademarks**. The European Patent Convention (EPC) was signed in 1973 and entered into force in 1977. In that year a European Patent Office was set up in Munich, **Germany**. The original Convention was not a European Communities (EC) instrument, since the member states could not agree on a common policy, and some did not join the scheme. The main problem was that, although it introduced a common registration procedure, where patent infringements occurred, the plaintiff had to pursue separate litigation in each country where the infringements were alleged to have taken place. Revisions to the EPC were agreed in November 2000 and a revised EPC entered into force on 13 December 2007. Meanwhile, in June 1997 the **European Commission** published proposals to simplify the European patent system through the introduction of a unitary Community patent, to remove the need to file patent applications with individual member states. Upon the entry into force in December 2009 of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, which provided a new legal basis for the establishment of unitary intellectual property titles within the European Union (EU), the proposed Community patent was renamed the EU patent. During that month the **European Council** agreed a draft regulation on the EU patent, in accordance with which it was envisaged that the EU would accede to the EPC (which would require further revision to the Convention), and the European Patent Office would grant EU patents with unitary effect throughout the territory of the EU. Infringement and validity issues relating to the planned EU patent were to be addressed by a proposed European and EU Patents Court. In December 2012 the **European Parliament** approved the so-called patent package, comprising two draft regulations, on increased co-operation to facilitate unitary patent protection and associated translation arrangements, and an agreement on the establishment of a Unified Patent Court, which prepared the way for the introduction of a European patent with unitary effect. The agreement establishing the Unitary Patent Convention was signed in February 2013 and adopted in December 2015. It was to enter into force following its ratification by a minimum of 13 EU member states.

The **UNITED KINGDOM** was a long-term member of the European Union (EU) and it played an important role in EU affairs. However, the UK

also often had a troubled relationship with the EU, resisting further integration, often in opposition to **France** and **Germany**, and culminating in the referendum decision to leave the Union in June 2016 (see **Brexit**).

In 1945 British prestige in Europe was high, and in many states there was an expectation that the UK would take the lead in developing European integration. However, British policy was to seek intergovernmental co-operation, and the UK avoided involvement in any partnership that might diminish its own sovereignty and affect its relations with the **USA** and the Commonwealth. Europe was seen as an important issue, but it ranked behind both of these. Consequently, the UK dismissed the European initiatives contained within the **European Coal and Steel Community**, the **European Economic Community** (EEC) and the **European Atomic Energy Community**. The UK finally applied for membership of the EEC in 1961 and again in 1967, but **France**, under President Charles de Gaulle, effectively vetoed both applications. Negotiations recommenced in 1970, and the UK became a member of the European Communities (EC) in January 1973.

After 1973, the UK was often seen as only a partial member of the EC. It demanded and obtained a renegotiation of its terms of entry in 1975, and waged a campaign until 1984 for a reduction of what it regarded as its excessive contribution to the EC **budget**. Although the UK was at the forefront of plans for the **internal market**, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher grew increasingly hostile to the process of European integration by the late 1980s, and was particularly opposed to plans towards **economic and monetary union** (EMU). The UK frequently maintained a position of complete isolation in the **European Council** and the Council of Ministers (now the **Council of the European Union**). For example, the UK declined full membership of the **European Monetary System** until October 1990: even then, as a result of speculative pressure on sterling, it withdrew from the **exchange rate mechanism** in September 1992. The UK also negotiated exemptions, or **opt-outs**, from parts of the **Treaty on European Union**, most notably from the Social Chapter (see **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**), and from the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, which incorporated the **Schengen Agreement**. However, the Labour Government that came to power in 1997 agreed to sign the Social Chapter shortly after coming into office, and hence the **protocol** on social policy was incorporated by the Treaty of Amsterdam into the revised **Treaty of Rome**. Although often hostile to moves towards political integration, the UK was a strong advocate of economic reform, supporting **freedom of movement** and the **single market**. It refused, however, to join EMU, which came into operation in January 1999. The UK strongly supported **European political co-operation** and its replacement, the **Common Foreign and Security Policy**.

There can be little doubt that minimal debate among politicians and limited EU coverage from large sections of the popular media had a negative impact on voters in European Parliament (EP) elections. This was reflected in low turnout (34.5%, down from 38.4% in 2004) in the UK at the EP elections in

2009, for example, and ongoing apathy and resistance towards European integration among the general public and large sections of the British media. In May 2010 a new, Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition Government was formed under **David Cameron**'s leadership. As expected, the Liberal Democrat members of the coalition arrangement sought to dilute the more **Euro-sceptic** tendencies of their Conservative partners. The coalition Government nevertheless proposed an EU Bill, which envisaged tighter parliamentary controls over transfers of power and competence from the UK to the EU and a referendum on the adoption of most future amending treaties as well as on principal decisions concerning the UK's position within the EU. The bill was passed into law on receiving Royal Assent in July 2011. The issue of closer EU integration resurfaced almost immediately as members of the **eurozone** endeavoured to respond to the ongoing instability with the **euro** by searching for greater co-ordination. To this end, most of the EU member states agreed to sign the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (**Fiscal Compact**). Neither the UK nor the **Czech Republic** signed this document, once again exemplifying the fact that these two countries appeared to be less integrated than the majority of their counterparts. In June 2013 the British Government presented to Parliament draft legislation advocating the holding by the end of 2017 of an 'in/out' referendum on the issue of the country's continued membership of the EU. Following the EP elections in May 2014 and the success of the **UK Independence Party**, the pressure on the Government for a referendum (both from within and outside the Conservative Party) intensified. Following the electoral success of the Conservatives in May 2015, and the subsequent formation of a single-party Government, again led by Cameron, the organization of an 'in/out' referendum and, therefore, the potential for **Brexit**, a term coined to describe the UK's potential departure from the EU, became a certainty.

On 18–19 February 2016 the European Council concluded a 'new settlement for the UK within the EU', exempting the UK from further political integration in the Union. The intention was to incorporate this into the various treaties and constitutional requirements of the member states. However, the settlement depended on the UK informing the Secretary-General of the Council that it was to remain a member of the EU, following the referendum, which was duly scheduled for 23 June.

The referendum campaign was divisive, and both sides were accused of being selective in their presentation of the facts. The 'Remain' side initially focused on the anticipated negative economic implications of leaving the EU, supported by negative forecasts by financial organizations. The 'Leave' campaign responded by arguing that the UK would have additional funds available for public spending if it left the EU and ceased its net payments to the Union. It also sought to focus attention on the controversial and emotive topic of immigration, asserting that Brexit would be the only way that the UK could regain control of its borders and its sovereignty.

At the referendum, 51.9% of voters expressed support for leaving the Union, while 48.1% voted in support of remaining. The results emphasized the deep divisions within the UK, with 62.0% of voters in Scotland, 55.8% of voters in Northern Ireland and 95.9% of voters in Gibraltar voting in support of remaining within the EU, as did many of those in some of England's major cities, including Liverpool, Manchester and the capital, London. The turnout was recorded at 72.2%. White British, the elderly and the less formally educated were more likely to vote to leave (at 52%), compared with 34% of those from Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds. Those who had suffered most from the global financial crisis and austerity politics after 2008 appeared most likely to favour a departure from the Union. The vote also appeared to have represented an opportunity for those who felt themselves to be largely powerless to express their disenchantment with the political elite. Cameron's accusers suggested that he had been irresponsible in scheduling a referendum without understanding the feelings and concerns of the electorate.

The vote to leave the EU created the most significant crisis in British politics since the end of the Second World War, as neither side of the referendum position had planned for Brexit. Moreover, policymakers lacked an understanding of how to bring about an exit from the EU and consensus over what they wished to achieve in the negotiations to leave the Union. The day after the referendum Cameron, who had campaigned for the UK to remain within the EU, announced his resignation. In July **Theresa May** was invited to form a new Conservative Government.

The formal process of leaving the EU required the British Government to invoke **Article 50** of the **Treaty of Lisbon**, after which the UK would have a two-year period within which to negotiate its departure from the Union. Prime Minister May formally invoked Article 50 on 29 March 2017, and the UK was duly scheduled to leave the Union on 29 March 2019. May subsequently called an early election for June 2017, but during her election campaign failed to clarify how she planned to negotiate the terms of the UK's future relationship with the EU and was also forced to make a number of policy reversals. The elections resulted in reduced support for May's Government, which had to seek the support of Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party.

Theresa May resigned in June 2019, having repeatedly failed to secure parliamentary support for the **withdrawal agreement** she had reached with the EU in November 2018. She was replaced by **Boris Johnson**. Brexit was delayed until 31 October 2019, and then until 31 January 2020, but even after the UK's departure widespread uncertainty remained over the implications of Brexit. **Remainers** continued to warn of the dangers of leaving without a deal at the end of the transition period (due to expire at the end of 2020), while increasingly **Brexiters** were in favour of leaving without a deal on future relations with the EU, as negotiations stalled in late 2020. An agreement on trade and co-operation was finally concluded between the UK and the EU on 24 December, and it provisionally came into effect at the beginning of 2021;

UNITED NATIONS

the agreement formally entered into force on 1 May, although tensions remained between the two sides, particularly in relation to the application of the **Northern Ireland Protocol**.

The **UNITED NATIONS** (UN) is one arena where **European political co-operation** and the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** have generally been applied successfully. The permanent representatives to the UN of the European Union (EU) member states continue to meet regularly, to ensure that the member states vote together in as many divisions within the UN General Assembly as possible. In addition, since 2011 the President of the **European Council** has addressed the opening session of the General Assembly each September on behalf of the EU (a privilege previously held by the foreign minister of the member state currently holding the Presidency of the **Council of the European Union**). In May 2011 the EU was granted an enhanced observer status at the UN. This means that the EU now has the right of reply, the right to speak in debates among representatives of major groups and before individual states, the right to submit proposals and amendments, and the right to raise points of order and to circulate documents. However, the EU does not have voting rights in the UN or the right to sit on the UN Security Council. In addition, the EU, which is the UN's largest financial contributor, holds an observer seat on the UN executive board for funds and programmes.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: See **USA**

UPE: See **Union for Europe of the Nations Group**

JUTTA URPIILAINEN (1975–) is a Finnish politician and the Commissioner responsible for International Partnerships in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** since 2019. Urpilainen was the first female chairperson of the Social Democratic Party in **Finland**, and she was Minister of Finance during 2011–14.

URUGUAY ROUND is the name of a series of talks within the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT). They began in 1986 and were initially due to be completed by the end of 1990. They were hindered by several disagreements over various aspects of the attempt to extend GATT rules beyond manufactured products to a variety of other areas, including services and intellectual copyright, and were eventually blocked by an impasse between the **USA** and the then European Communities (EC), primarily over agriculture (with **France** being the most vocal defender of the EC agricultural policy regime). Risking collapse on several occasions, the Round was

eventually concluded in 1994, after France had agreed to accept the inclusion of agriculture in the agreement, resulting in a World Trade Agreement that led to the creation of a **World Trade Organization**.

The **US-EC DECLARATION** of 20 November 1990 was an attempt to place the relationship between the **USA** and the then European Communities on a more regularized base. Its major element was an agreement on the need for a framework within which consultations could be held on political and economic issues of interest to both sides, and since 1991 regular meetings have been held. (See **Transatlantic Declaration**.)

The **USA** (United States of America) made a major contribution to the development of European integration in the form of its strong involvement in European affairs after 1945, especially its provision of economic assistance (see **Marshall Plan**) and a defensive shield (see **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**—NATO), with the benefit of which the Western European states had the time to consider and explore ways of closer collaboration. Itself a federation, the USA encouraged efforts at integration until the 1960s, and did not seem to be averse to the notion of political union. After the 1960s, relations between the European Communities (EC) and the USA became more strained. While to some extent this was due to political arguments over foreign and defence policy, the major point of difference was economic. As the EC grew to be a more integrated economic entity, a conflict of interest developed with the USA, which was both a major economic rival and the EC's most important trading partner. Threats of action and retaliation from across the Atlantic, which reached their peak during the **Uruguay Round**, became commonplace, but disputes were usually resolved eventually by some form of compromise. (See **bananas**.)

During the 1990s, relations between the EC and the USA were institutionalized via a number of initiatives. The **Transatlantic Declaration** of 1990 provided a basis for greater collaboration and co-operation, and was followed in 1995 by the launch of a **New Transatlantic Agenda**. Consequently, in May 1998 a Transatlantic Economic Partnership was initiated. In its draft Action Plan for the Partnership, the **European Commission** proposed that the European Union (EU) and the USA stimulate trade liberalization at worldwide level. Efforts to achieve such a goal have often been hindered by EU–US trade disputes. Equally, relations have often been soured as a consequence of major differences over, for example, the **Middle East** and the **Iraq War**. Annual summits nevertheless provide opportunities to stress the extent to which the EU and the USA do co-operate in an ever wider range of areas, including, for example, sharing information on **competition policy** cases. Following several years of discussion, in July 2013 the USA and the EU commenced official negotiations on the proposed creation of a **Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership** (total trade in goods between the USA

USA

and the EU amounted to some €500,000m. in 2012, while trade in services totalled around €280,000m.). The talks had been expected to take up to three years to reach a conclusion, but the deal appeared moribund by the end of President Barack Obama's term of office in early 2017. Following the election of **Donald Trump** as US President in November 2016, then **President of the European Council Donald Tusk** acknowledged that new challenges to the transatlantic relationship were likely to arise during the course of Trump's Administration, which was expected to introduce a policy of increased US protectionism. Tusk confirmed that the EU would seek to continue its co-operative relationship with the USA and maintain transatlantic unity. In early 2021 Joe Biden succeeded Trump as US President.

VAL DUCHESSÉ is a château on the outskirts of **Brussels** variously associated with the European Communities and the European Union. It was at Val Duchesse that the **Treaty of Rome** was drawn up in 1955–58. In 1985 the château gave its name to the process of social dialogue between the employers represented by the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (now renamed **BUSINESSEUROPE**), employees represented by the **European Trade Union Confederation**, and the European Centre of Public Enterprises.

ADINA-IONA VĂLEAN (1968–) is the Romanian member of the **European Commission**, and the Commissioner responsible for Transport in the Commission led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, which took office in December 2019. From 2007 to 2019 Vălean was a **Member of the European Parliament**.

VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) has been the third most important source of **revenue** for the European Union (EU), after the revenue based on gross national income (GNI) and on customs duties and sugar levies. In most cases, a uniform rate of 0.3% is levied on the harmonized VAT base of each member state. The taxable VAT base is capped at 50% of GNI for each country. The aim of this ceiling is to prevent less wealthy member states from having to pay a disproportionate amount (in low-income countries VAT generally accounts for a higher percentage of national income). In 1967 two **directives** obliged all member states that had not already done so to introduce a system of VAT as the third major element of indirect **taxation** by 1970. New members have also had to introduce a VAT system.

A second dimension to VAT is the issue of **harmonization**. As part of the **internal market** programme, an attempt to introduce a greater degree of harmonization was made by Francis Cockfield in his **White Paper** (see **Single Market**). This was only partially successful, and the member states continued to contribute moderately different VAT rates. In 1992, however, formal agreement was reached on a minimum standard rate of 15%. This was subsequently confirmed in 1996 when informal agreement was also reached on a

VAN GEND EN LOOS

maximum rate of 25%. However, certain goods remained ‘zero-rated’ or appeared on a special list subject to ‘reduced rates’ of VAT.

VAN GEND EN LOOS is the shortened name of a case, *Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen*, which was heard by the **Court of Justice** in 1962. The Court ruled that European Communities **law** was a new legal order, directly applicable in the member states, and that individuals were required to be aware of this.

OLIVÉR VÁRHELYI (1972–) is a Hungarian lawyer and diplomat who currently serves as the European Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood and Enlargement in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, which took office in December 2019. Prior to his role in the Commission he held the position of the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the EU, based in **Brussels, Belgium**.

VARIABLE GEOMETRY is a phrase that was coined by Jacques Delors in the early 1980s and is widely used to refer to the possibility of common policies being developed and implemented at different rates by the member states, depending upon their degree of commitment to each policy. Reminiscent of the notion of a **two-speed Europe** raised by the 1976 **Tindemans Report**, it met with strong criticism from countries wary of political union. All the same, it came to characterize aspects of the European Union’s activities, notably **economic and monetary union** and the **area of freedom, security and justice**, where certain member states were given **opt-outs**.

VAT: See **Value-added Tax**

VERs: See **Voluntary Export Restraints**

MARGRETHE VESTAGER (1968–) took office in December 2019 as Executive Vice-President of the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen**, with responsibility for A Europe Fit for the Digital Age. She had initially been nominated in 2014 as the Danish Commissioner in the 28-member **European Commission** led by Jean-Claude Juncker. In September Juncker named Vestager as Commissioner-designate for Competition, and she took office in November. Prior to her appointment to the Commission Vestager served as Deputy Prime Minister of **Denmark** and Danish Minister of the Economy and the Interior. She is an economist and holds a Master’s degree in economics from Copenhagen University. She worked in the Ministry of Finance after graduation, becoming education minister in 1998.

VETO refers to the option available to each member state in the **Council of the European Union** to reject proposals put before it. Thanks to the **Luxembourg Compromise**, the option to veto survived almost unscathed until the mid-1980s. Since then, and owing mainly to the increased use and acceptance of **qualified majority voting**, the use of the veto was essentially restricted to areas (e.g. tax **harmonization**, the admission of new member states, treaty reform) where **unanimity** was still required under the treaties. In practice, the veto is rarely used.

A **VISA POLICY** was established by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU), which declared the aim of developing such a policy, applicable throughout the European Union (EU), for nationals from third countries. The TEU demanded the establishment of a common format for all visas before January 1996 by which time visa policy decisions would require only a **qualified majority vote** in the **Council of the European Union**. The visa policy does not prevent member states from pursuing their own policies with regard to internal security and the maintenance of law and order. The **Treaty of Amsterdam** was also concerned that there should be greater co-operation over visa policies. The majority of EU member states now have a unified visa system as part of the **Schengen Area**. Of the six EU member states that do not form part of the Schengen Area, four—**Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus** and **Romania**—have a visa policy that is based on the Schengen *acquis*, while **Ireland** operates a travel zone known as the Common Travel Area with former EU member the **United Kingdom**. The non-EU states of **Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein** and **Switzerland** are part of the Schengen Area (with associated status). In April 2010 a new EU Visa Code (previously adopted in 2009 by the **Council of the European Union** and the **European Parliament**—EP) came into force. This code, which represented an attempt to harmonize EU visa law, collected into one document all legal provisions governing the decisions on visas for those states belonging to the Schengen Area. It was hoped that the conditions for issuing visas to third-country nationals would be more straightforward, transparent and fair. In May 2018 the **European Commission** proposed amendments to the Visa Code, which were approved by the EP in April 2019 and by the Council in June.

The **VISEGRAD GROUP** originally consisted of Czechoslovakia, **Hungary** and **Poland** when it was created in 1991–92 as a mechanism for the three states to support each other in efforts to pursue closer integration with Western European organizations, notably the European Communities. In 1993 membership rose to four countries when the **Czech Republic** and **Slovakia** replaced the now-disbanded Czechoslovakia. Among the activities of the Visegrad group was the establishment of the **Central European Free Trade Association** (CEFTA). The extension of CEFTA to include other countries from **Central and Eastern Europe** and Slovakia's slower progress towards

VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS

European Union (EU) membership during the mid-1990s led to the effective demise of the Visegrad Group. Multilateral co-operation between the members has nevertheless continued. Amid what became widely known as the **European migration crisis**, in September 2015 the Visegrad Four countries adopted a joint statement on migrants at a summit in the Czech capital, Prague. The statement was prompted by the Commission's upcoming proposals for the resettlement of an additional 120,000 refugees. The scheme was to be compulsory for all states except those with exemptions, although the numbers to be taken by individual states were in some cases quite small: for example, 1,502 in the case of Slovakia, 2,978 for the Czech Republic and 9,287 for Poland. An Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council (a meeting of the relevant ministers from the EU member states) adopted the plan in late September. Unanimity was not required for the decision to be binding and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and **Romania** voted against it. In June 2017 the EU warned the countries of the Visegrad Four that it could launch **infringement procedures** against them if they failed to adhere to the terms of the compulsory relocation scheme. In recent times, members of this group of countries (with the exception of Slovakia) have attracted criticism for moves towards right-wing **populism**, increased nationalism and illiberal politics. In April 2020 the **Court of Justice** ruled that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had violated the law by refusing to fulfil their obligations under the EU's migrant relocation scheme.

VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS (VERs) are bilateral agreements reached by the European Union (EU) with other countries, whereby the latter voluntarily agree to limit exports of particular products to the EU. The restraints are not in fact truly voluntary, but have been accepted by the exporting countries in preference to other restrictions that might be imposed. The best-known VERs have related to trade in steel and cars. The **European Commission** has a mandate to negotiate VERs on behalf of the EU.

URSULA VON DER LEYEN (1958–) is President of the **European Commission**. She was born in **Brussels, Belgium**, and is fluent in German, French and English. A former student of the London School of Economics and Political Science, in the **United Kingdom**, von der Leyen is a graduate of Hanover Medical School in **Germany**, where she acquired both her license to practise medicine and her Master's of Public Health. Von der Leyen is a member and deputy leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party in Germany and considered a key ally of chancellor **Angela Merkel**. In Merkel's cabinet, she held different roles including Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, and most recently Minister for Defence. She became the European Commission's first female President on 1 December 2019, following her nomination by the **European Council** in early July, and her subsequent approval by the **European Parliament** on 16 July.

The **WARSAW PACT** was the name of the **Cold War** alliance of Eastern European countries led by the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** (USSR) that regarded itself as a mutual defence organization against the ambitions of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**. It derived its name from the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which was signed by the USSR, **Albania**, **Bulgaria**, Czechoslovakia, **Hungary**, **Poland** and **Romania** in May 1955. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991 following the fragmentation of the USSR.

WATER and its pollution are major European Union (EU) concerns, and a number of **European Commission directives** have been aimed at improving the quality and protection of water in all its aspects. High standards have been set for the quality of both drinking and bathing water, and member states risk punitive action if they do not meet the required standards within stipulated deadlines. Further directives relate to fish habitats and the discharge of pollutants. The EU has also signed several international conventions designed to reduce the level of water pollution. (See also **environmental policy**.)

MANFRED WEBER (1972–) was born in Wildenberg, in Bavaria, **Germany**. He studied physical technology/engineering at the University of Munich. He is a member of the Bavarian-based Christian Social Union party and was first elected to the **European Parliament** (EP) in 2004, after having developed his political activity at both local and regional level. He has taken a particular interest in and worked within the EP's committees on civil liberties and constitutional affairs and became a Vice-Chairman of the **Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)**—EPP in 2009. He has been Chairman of the grouping in the EP since May 2014. Weber declared his intention to run for the leadership of the European Commission through the **spitzenkandidat** process in 2018, and emerged as the leading candidate for the EPP. However, his nomination was not taken forward at the EU summit in June 2019, with leaders of member states bypassing the process in favour of the selection of **Ursula von der Leyen**.

The **WERNER REPORT** is the name of a 1970 plan for **economic and monetary union** (EMU) prepared by a committee, headed by Pierre Werner (1913–2000), then Prime Minister of Luxembourg, which was appointed by the 1969 **Hague summit**. The report emphasized the need for the European Communities to proceed simultaneously in co-ordinating and harmonizing economic policy, narrowing exchange-rate margins, integrating capital markets and establishing a common currency and a **European Central Bank**. It presented a three-stage programme for the implementation of full EMU by 1980, the deadline imposed by its remit. Although its views were accepted in a modified format by the Council of Ministers (see **Council of the European Union**), the economic difficulties of the 1970s led to the programme's abandonment. The question of full EMU was not considered again fully until Jacques Delors was appointed by the Council in 1988 to consider the EMU question, and this led directly on that occasion to a specific title on EMU being inserted into the **Treaty of Rome** by the **Treaty on European Union**.

WEST GERMANY: See **Germany**

The **WESTERN BALKANS**, as far as the European Union (EU) is concerned, comprises **Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia** and **Serbia**. Croatia became a member of the EU in July 2013, while Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia have been granted the status of **candidate countries**. Membership negotiations with Montenegro began in June 2012, and the first EU-Serbia intergovernmental conference in January 2014 marked the formal start of Serbia's accession negotiations. The **Council of the European Union** agreed to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in March 2020, although they had not yet commenced by late 2021. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo remain potential candidate countries (**stabilization and association agreements** were signed with Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2008 and with Kosovo in October 2015). The EU continues to support political stabilization and economic development in this region. Financial assistance to the Western Balkans is provided via the **instrument for pre-accession assistance** (III), with a total budget of over €14,000m. in 2021–27.

WESTERN ECONOMIC SUMMITS: See **G-8**

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) originated in the 1948 **Treaty of Brussels** to promote co-operation in the fields of defence and security. After the collapse of the **European Defence Community** proposals in 1954, the treaty was used to establish a body 'to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe', which included the Federal Republic of

Germany (West Germany) and **Italy** in addition to the original five signatories (**Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands** and the **United Kingdom**). WEU had little infrastructure, and was only occasionally activated in the 1950s. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization absorbed its military functions more or less immediately after 1949, and it ceded its social and cultural responsibilities to the **Council of Europe** in 1960, in effect becoming moribund. In 1984, partly as a result of the growing rapprochement between the **USA** and the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**, it was reactivated as a body that could provide a distinctive Western European voice on defence and security issues.

In 1987 it adopted a programme that called for the creation of a ‘cohesive European defence identity’, strengthening conventional capabilities while retaining nuclear potential, improving consultation and co-operative mechanisms, and establishing a common system of monitoring obligations. The **Treaty on European Union (TEU)** made WEU an integral part of the European Union (EU), identifying it as a de facto constituent of the pillar of **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. The EU was to ‘foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union’. WEU moved its headquarters to **Brussels** and by 2002 28 countries enjoyed one of four different types of status with regard to WEU. These ranged from membership through associate membership and observer status to that of associate partner.

The **Treaty of Nice** paved the way for the de facto incorporation of WEU into the EU by reducing the status of WEU and establishing a **European Security and Defence Policy**. The Treaty effectively removed various references to WEU from the TEU, with the most visible representation of the incorporation of WEU into the EU being Javier Solana assuming the dual roles of Secretary-General of WEU and **Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union**. In December 2009 the entry into force of the **Treaty of Lisbon** transferred the mutual defence clause of WEU to the EU. WEU was formally dissolved in June 2011.

WHITE PAPER is the term used to describe a **European Commission** document setting out proposed legislative initiatives, such as, for example, the 2001 **Governance White Paper** or the 2006 White Paper on a European Communication Policy. In some cases, it follows a **Green Paper**, which is used by the Commission to launch a full-scale public discussion on a proposal. The document produced in 1985 by Francis Cockfield for the European Commission on the measures required to implement the **internal market** by 1992 is still the most widely known example. Entitled *Completing the Internal Market*, it listed some 300 separate measures that would need to be taken, for each of which a target date and a timetable were set. The measures related to the removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to a single market. To facilitate their **implementation**, appropriate provisions were incorporated

WIDENING

into the 1987 **Single European Act** and, by 1992 most of the measures had been introduced. When a White Paper has been endorsed by the **Council of the European Union**, it becomes the action programme for the European Union in that specific policy area.

WIDENING involves extending the membership of the European Union (EU) through the process of **enlargement**. For much of the history of the EU, widening has been subordinated to **deepening**.

WITHDRAWAL from the European Union (EU) has rarely been seriously contemplated by any member state, although **Greenland**, as part of **Denmark**, did withdraw in 1985, and the **United Kingdom** voted in favour of withdrawal (**Brexit**) in June 2016. With increasing evidence of Euroscepticism and concerns among some member states over the future path of integration, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe** included a dedicated withdrawal clause. This clause, inserted into the **Treaty on European Union** by the **Treaty of Lisbon**, allows a member state to withdraw from the EU provided it notifies the **European Council** of its intention. An agreement setting out the arrangements for withdrawal is then to be concluded by the Council, acting by a two-thirds' majority and after obtaining the consent of the **European Parliament**. Withdrawal would take place two years after the notification to withdraw is received by the European Council (subject to extension). A former member state seeking to re-join the EU would be subject to the same conditions as any other applicant country.

The **WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT**, officially the 'Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community', is a treaty signed between the European Union (EU), **Euratom** and the **United Kingdom** on 24 January 2020. The agreement, reached on 17 October 2019, established the terms for the UK's orderly withdrawal from the EU (**Brexit**), in accordance with **Article 50** of the **Treaty on European Union**. An earlier version of the withdrawal agreement was rejected by the UK Parliament three times, and prompted the resignation of **Theresa May** as British Prime Minister in mid-2019. May's successor, **Boris Johnson**, succeeded in concluding a withdrawal agreement with the EU, and the UK finally left the EU at the end of January 2020. Negotiations commenced with the EU on the future relationship between the two parties, which were concluded during the period of transition that expired on 31 December 2020. The resulting agreement on trade and co-operation entered into force provisionally from the beginning of 2021. It formally came into force on 1 May, although tensions remained between the EU and the UK, particularly over the operation of the **Northern Ireland Protocol**.

WITHDRAWAL PRICES: See **Common Fisheries Policy**

JANUSZ WOJCIECHOWSKI (1954–) is a Polish politician who is currently the Commissioner responsible for Agriculture in the **European Commission** led by **Ursula von der Leyen** since December 2019. Wojciechowski has previously served as a **Member of the European Parliament**, the Polish legislature and the **European Court of Auditors**. A former judge of the Polish High Court of Justice, he holds a Master's degree in law from University of Łódź, **Poland**.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS have become a fundamental European Union (EU) concern, based initially upon Article 141 of the **Treaty of Rome** (now Article 157 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**). The Article, as amended by the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, committed the member states to upholding the 'the principle of **equal pay** for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied'. Various **directives** require the member states to amend their laws to exclude any form of sex **discrimination** and to ensure equality in training, appointments, promotion and pay. Workers who believe they are the victims of discrimination have the right to take their case to a tribunal without fear of dismissal: the **Court of Justice** can act as the final arbiter as to whether national laws conflict with EU rules. Discrimination in social security systems was banned in 1978, and in 1986 it was decreed that discrimination in occupational pension schemes had to end by 1993. In 1997 the **Council of the European Union** adopted a directive on sex-discrimination cases, whereby the plaintiff and defendant were to share the burden of proof. The **European Commission** also launched a number of special action schemes. The Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) is one of the standing committees in the **European Parliament**.

WORKER PARTICIPATION: See **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers; Fifth Directive; Workers' Rights**

WORKERS' RIGHTS were referred to in the **Treaty of Rome**, which obliged the member states to promote the improvement of living and working conditions for workers and required member states to collaborate on a number of questions relating to **employment**. Most European Communities/Union activity has been devoted to improving working conditions through the implementation of several **directives** on occupational **health and safety** (see **European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions**). Other directives relate to the principle of **freedom of movement**. Restrictions on free movement can be applied by the member states only on grounds of a risk to public order, safety or health, or where jobs are in

a particular sector of public administration. Persistent efforts by the **European Commission** to establish worker participation in company **decision making** (see **Fifth Directive**) first achieved success when all the member states (except the **United Kingdom**), decided to implement the **Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers**; the UK eventually signed up to the Charter in 1997 after the election of a Labour Government. Workers' rights are also prominent in the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** proclaimed in December 2000.

The **WORKING GROUP ON GENDER IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION** was established in 2017. It was formerly known as the Helsinki Group on Women and Science, established in 1999 as an advisory group on gender issues to the **European Commission**. It comprises European Union member states and a number of associated countries (**Iceland**, Israel and **Norway**) and the European Commission. The Group provides advice to the **Council of the European Union** and Commission on policies and initiatives pertaining to **gender equality** in research and innovation so that they benefit scholars, research institutions, universities, business and society at large. The Group meets at least twice annually and a majority selects its Chairperson from within its membership for a three-year period.

The **WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE** (WTD) aims to protect the **health and safety** of workers against the adverse effects of working long hours without adequate breaks. It also addresses disrupted working patterns and sets a maximum working week of 48 hours within any four-month period. Guidelines relating to daily rest times, weekly rest periods, minimum holiday entitlements and night-shift working are also included. Certain categories of workers, including those employed in oil extraction and transport, and junior doctors in training, were initially excluded from the **directive**.

The 1993 Working Time Directive had a treaty basis under Article 138 of the **Treaty of Rome** (Article 154 of the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union**), which was incorporated into the treaty as part of the **Single European Act** in 1986. Approval of measures is by **qualified majority voting**. Former member state the **United Kingdom** opposed the directive and was successful in obtaining an **opt-out** of the 48-hour working week (under certain conditions). The original Working Time Directive (93/104/EC) covered all sectors of activity except transport, activities at sea and the activities of doctors. The provisions of the WTD did not apply if other European Union (EU) law contained more specific provisions in a particular field or if national laws contained provisions that were more favourable to workers (for example, in February 2000 the French Government passed legislation adopting a 35-hour working week).

The WTD provided for: a maximum 48-hour working week averaged over a reference period; a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours a day;

a rest break where the working day is longer than six hours; a minimum rest period of one day a week; and a statutory right to annual paid holiday of four weeks. Normal hours of work for night workers must not exceed an average of eight hours in any 24-hour period. Workers are entitled to a free medical examination before being employed on night work and at regular intervals thereafter. Anyone suffering from health problems connected with night work must be transferred, wherever possible, to day work. In 2000 the scope of the WTD was extended to include some previously excluded professions (doctors in training, transport workers, activities at sea) to cover some 5m. people. In 2003 the **European Commission** issued a Communication on the review of the directive, which analysed the **opt-outs** and **derogations** in member states, and summarized recent case law concerning the definition of working time. This consultation period ran until the end of March 2004 and fed into a new Commission proposal that still contained an opt-out, but one that made it more difficult for employers to press staff against their will to work for any longer than 48 hours. The sensitivities that working hours caused for some member states, particularly the UK, but also **Germany, Malta, Poland, Slovakia** and **Slovenia**, became apparent in early 2005 when the **European Parliament** voted in its first reading of the proposal to phase out the opt-out over a three-year period. The **European Trade Union Confederation** strongly supported the ending of the opt-out, but in June 2005 the Council voted to maintain it.

The **WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION** (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995 as the successor to the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT). The origins of both GATT and the WTO can be traced back to the late 1940s and efforts to liberalize international trade by reducing the levels of tariffs. By the 1990s the agenda of international discourse on trade issues had widened considerably with a series of policy issues requiring consideration at a multilateral level. These included **competition policy, environmental policy** and approaches to labour market deregulation. GATT had been a fruitful exercise but was limited in its scope, and for this reason it was decided to establish a new organization that became the WTO. The WTO has a much broader scope than GATT. Whereas GATT regulated trade in merchandise goods, the WTO also covers trade in services, such as **telecommunications** and banking. The highest body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference. This usually meets every two years and, among other things, elects the organization's chief executive—the director-general—and oversees the work of the General Council. The General Council is in charge of the day-to-day running of the WTO and is made up of ambassadors from member states that also serve on various subsidiary and specialist committees. The WTO has a crucial role to play in ensuring, promoting and protecting trade liberalization. It serves as a forum to settle disputes and may operate as

WTO

the ideal body for settling cases on competition policy that involve European and North American companies.

Despite the apparent logic of such an international forum to resolve disputes, there has been unease and dissatisfaction among sections of the public about the democratic credentials of this body. Four main criticisms abound. These are: first, that the WTO is too powerful; second, that (it is believed) the WTO only serves the needs of the rich states and is largely indifferent to the needs of the economically less advanced states; third, that the WTO is indifferent to the impact of free trade on **workers' rights**, child labour, the environment and health; and last, that this organization lacks democratic **accountability**. This discontent was, in the early 2000s, manifest in street protests and a series of violent confrontations between protesters and the police at meetings of the WTO in response to the perceived threat of **globalization**. In September 2002 a former Thai Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, began a three-year term as Director-General and was charged with pursuing the **Doha Round**. He was the first WTO head to come from a developing nation. As a respected economist, he played a key role in leading Thailand out of the Asian currency crisis. In September 2003 the world trade talks in Cancún, Mexico, collapsed after four days; many commentators maintained that the failure to reach agreement would affect the poorest nations most severely. Agreement was reached in Geneva, **Switzerland**, in August 2004 when talks achieved consensus on a framework agreement on opening up global trade. The **USA** and the EU were to reduce agricultural **subsidies**, while developing nations would cut tariffs on manufactured goods. However, the Doha Round effectively failed, with continuing disagreements over trade liberalization and protectionism remaining major obstacles to progress.

The Director-General of the 164-member WTO is Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who took office in March 2021.

WTO: See **World Trade Organization**

YUGOSLAVIA's disintegration in the 1990s was associated, as far as the European Union (EU) is concerned, with the early failure of efforts to develop an effective **Common Foreign and Security Policy**. From the outset of the conflict in the Balkans (see **Western Balkans**), the European Communities (EC) were involved in efforts to try to avert war and the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. Initially, the EC offered the prospect of an **association agreement**, but this failed to prevent the secession of **Slovenia** and **Croatia** in 1991. Indeed, under pressure from **Germany**, the EC effectively sealed the fate of Yugoslavia by recognizing the two countries. Soon after this, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** was recognized, although Greek objections delayed recognition of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (now **North Macedonia**) until 1995. All that was left of Yugoslavia were **Serbia** and **Montenegro**, which existed as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until adopting the name 'Serbia and Montenegro' in 2003. The dissolution was completed in June 2006 when, following a referendum, Montenegro officially declared its independence.

In the mean time, the EC sought to avert further conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventually the **USA** became more deeply involved and, with the backing of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, secured a peace deal at Dayton (Ohio, USA) in November 1995.

In 1997 proposals on closer ties with the EU were put forward. In what was referred to as the 'regional approach', the EU required that the successor states co-operate with one another and commit themselves to respect minority and **human rights** as well as democratic principles as preconditions for financial aid and better trade access to the EU market. Following the **Kosovo** conflict in 1999, the need to promote stability in the region—now referred to as the **Western Balkans** and incorporating **Albania**—led to the creation of the **Stabilization and Association Process**. As part of this process, countries of the former Yugoslavia gained the status of **potential candidate state**, and in some cases, **candidate state**, as well as access to a new programme of financial assistance, **CARDS** (and subsequently the **instrument for pre-accession assistance**). Croatia acceded to the EU in July 2013.