**THE POETS’ VOICE AGAINST SLANDER:**

**PINDAR (*PYTHIAN* 2.53-6, 72-88), CALLIMACHUS’ APOLLO LYC(E)IUS AND OTHER POETIC ‘ANIMALS’**

**FLORA P. MANAKIDOU**

To Chris, for his many sensitive readings of ancient Greek poetry.

Callimachus’ profound debt to archaic poetry of all genres is a well-known fact. That his debt to Pindar is not confined to his epinicians is widely acknowledged,[[1]](#footnote-1) all the more so because the Hellenistic poet could have had easy access to the Pindaric poetry through systematic reading of his editions, a fact that actually replaced the past reperformances of this poetry. Still, we lack a systematic survey of their common attitudes and ideas. Pindar’s I-statements about slander, envy and blame and how they are set against rivals could provide rich material for an instructive comparative reading of both poets.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Related to this issue is the haunted question about the relationship between narratorial persons and their authorial grounding, and therefore about the historicity of the first-person narrative as part of reality or fictionality.[[3]](#footnote-3) This still remains an open issue and concerns both the Archaic and the Hellenistic poets in their use of the narrator in different generic contexts, including choral poetry, iambic abuse and a complicated intermingling of many genres. All these poetic categories are, interestingly enough, involved in the investigation about slander, envy and blame and its opposite, praise and eulogy. Leaving aside ongoing modern theories dealing with the identification of the Pindaric *ego*,[[4]](#footnote-4) scholarship contemporary with Callimachus very often identified it with the poet himself.[[5]](#footnote-5) Even if this is a ‘strait-jacket’ approach to our honoured friend,[[6]](#footnote-6) it is wise to agree with Lefkowitz that ‘we must be prepared to recognize limitations to justifiable modern attempts to shake off the yoke of historicism and biography᾽.[[7]](#footnote-7) The ancient inclination for biographical, i.e. historical, interpretation, also labelled as ‘external’ by Lefkowitz, saw in Pindar a victim of envy, compelled to defend himself against bad-mouthed slander and to attack his rivals, mostly identified with Simonides and/or Bacchylides (e.g. *O*. 2.154b, 157a, 158c, d on Bacchylides and Simonides; *O*. 9.74b an anti-Simonides, fr. 75); *N.* 3.143 on Bacchylides; *N*. 4.60b on Simonides).[[8]](#footnote-8) Such a self-reflexive interpretation of first-person statements conformed well to (and was justified by) the self-reflexive nature of contemporary poetry and the highly antagonistic relationships between Alexandrian poets, who side by side with many other issues for conflict were divided into opposing groups according to their tastes for different older models.

We have only one piece of evidence for Callimachus’ profound interest in Pindar; his classification of *Pythian* 2 under the *Nemeans* probably under the so-called κεχωρισμέναι celebrating minor victories (fr. 450 Pf. = schol. DEFGQ *P*.2 inscr*.*).[[9]](#footnote-9) The poem was (and still is) a mystery as regards its occasion and its epinician character.[[10]](#footnote-10) In it there are two I-statements that deal with slander and express ideas on how a just and right man can deal with such offences with efficient verbal attacks and counter-slander. Both I-statements were explained by the scholia as Pindar’s allusion to Bacchylides’ slandering of him in front of Hieron, the ode’s *laudandus* (schol. 97, 99, 101a, 101e and f, 131b, 132a, c, e, f).[[11]](#footnote-11) In the first (49-56), the first-person statement ‘I must avoid the violent bite of slander’[[12]](#footnote-12) (53 ἐμὲ δὲ χρεὼν / φεύγειν δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριᾶν) brings the idea of the debt (χρεών) the poetic I declares to have as opposed to slandering and introduces Archilochus as the slanderer par excellence: ‘the censorious Archilochus often suffering because he fattened himself on harsh words of hatred’ (54-55 τὰ πόλλ᾽ ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ ψογερὸν Ἀρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν / πιαινόμενον). In the second (72-88), the poetic *ego* speaks about its own strategy against cunning and deceitful people acting in secret ways, and wishes to be a friend to its friends but to act like a wolf against its adversaries using crooked paths; in conclusion, it is the ‘man of straight speech’ who excels (προφέρει) under every regime (especially 83-86):

οὔ οἱ μετέχω θράσεος. φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν

ποτὶ δ᾽ ἐχθρὸν ἅτ᾽ ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι,

ἄλλ᾽ ἄλλοτε πατέων (Schadewaldt πατέονθ’ ) ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς.

ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προφέρει *...*

I wish no part in his audacity. Let me be a friend to my friend, but my enemy – since I am his enemy – I shall hunt down like a wolf, tracking here and there on zigzag paths. In every polity the straight-speaking man is best

The scholiast’s comment on the wolfish way of ambush against enemies stressed the qualities of versatility (παντοῖος) and secrecy (λεληθότως; schol. 153a, 153c and d). The fabulistic context this time indirectly recalls Archilochus, who was fond of similar analogies between animals and humans for moralizing purposes. The aspect of the moralizing Archilochus in his identity of blame-poet is, in turn, also closely intertwined with the undecided matter of the poetic persona as real or fictional.[[13]](#footnote-13) The wolf-simile was followed by another first-person statement about envious men who end up harming themselves. In the final first-person wish to have relations with good men in the future (96 ‘May it be my fate to enjoy the approval of good men, and to keep their company’), the scholia again discovered references to Bacchylides and his relationship to Hieron or to political relationships (132b) that influenced Pindar’s position (171c, 171d, 132b).

The following investigation attempts to understand how this biographical approach to the Pindaric I influenced Callimachus in his choice of Lycius Apollo, who in the *Aetia*-Prologue appears as his patron and legitimizes his principles against poetic rivals.[[14]](#footnote-14) I shall also try to show that it is in this Pindaric reading that Callimachus found the basis for his presentation of the god as both patron of poets and punisher of evil-doers in his *Hymn* to Apollo and in the presentation of the Delian statue (*Aetia* fr. 114 Pf.).[[15]](#footnote-15) The Pindaric word ἔντεα (*Hymn* 19), meaning both weapons and musical instruments, serves as an explicit sign of this divine bilateral nature. Archilochus as the third party also plays an important role in this investigation.

**1. Pindar’s position on slander and envy, and Callimachus**

To legitimize the Callimachean reading of Pindar ~~Πίνδαρον~~ ~~ἐκ Καλλιμάχου σαφηνίζειν~~ reading, it is necessary to outline the numerous similarities both poets share in their dealing with slander and envy, and accordingly, in their belief in standing on the right side. Although the following remarks do not aim exhaust the vast material in these issues, they provide a solid basis for proving that Callimachus shared the same ideas with Pindar as regards praise/blame, slander/envy:

a) Pindar conceives his laudatory mission as a double-sided task of ‘praising the praiseworthy and scattered reproof on the wicked (αἰνέων αἰνητά, μομφὰν δ᾽ἐπισπείρων ἀλιτροῖς, ‘having praised the praiseworthy and scattered reprood on the wicked’ *Ν*. 8.35-9, 39;*N*. 4.95-6; *P*. 11.53-4; fr. 181).[[16]](#footnote-16) Blame is seen as supplementary to praise. In his belief that praising causes Envy (26 X), a threat for virtuous men (*N*. 4.36-43; *N*. 8; *Parth*. 1.8.f; *P*. 11.29; *P*. 7.19-20; *I.* 1.41-6; *I.* 2.43-5; fr. 212), Pindar forewarns us of the dangers of all praise (e.g. *O*. 2.95-6; *P*. 8.29-34). Envy begets slander and envious slanderers are able to distress not only the object or the subject of the praise, but also the listeners to whom the slanderer addresses his derogatory and envious words. Moderation is the recommended way, and measure should be respected by both *laudator* and *laudandus* (*P*. 2.34, cf. 72 on Hieron; *P*. 11.53). This idea reproduces an old saying of Pittacus also found in Callimachus (*Epigr*. 1 τὴν κατὰ σαὐτὸν ἕλα; cf. e.g. *P*. 11.50-8). Pindar also anticipates the very Callimachean idea that envy could have arisen from one neoteric artistic enterprise within a poem that deals with envy and criticism (*N*. 8.21-3).[[17]](#footnote-17)

b) Pindar’s confidence that slanderers end up harming themselves instead of their targets appears already in Hesiod, and later on in Callimachus almost *verbatim*: Hesiod, *W&D* 265 οἵ τ᾽ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων (‘a man contrives evil for himself when he contrives evil for someone else’) ~ *P*. 2.89-91 στάθμας δέ τινος (τινες Snell-Maehler) ἑλκόμενοι / περισσᾶς ἐνέπαξαν ἕλκος ὀδυναρὸν ἑᾷ πρόσθε καρδίᾳ, / πρὶν ὅσα φροντίδι μητίονται τυχεῖν (‘who stretch the measuring line too tight and so inflict a painful wound in their own heart before they can achieve what they have devised in their minds’) ~ Callimachus, *Aetia* fr. 2.5 Pf., H. (= 4.5 M.) τεύχων ὡς ἑτέρῳ τις ἑῷ κακὸν ἥπατι τεύχει (‘if one prepares evil for another one prepares it for one’s own liver’).[[18]](#footnote-18) A similar idea occurs in *O*. 1.53 (ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρους: ‘the slanderous seldom win themselves profit’).

c) Treacherous people or slanderers are by nature whisperers and liars (*P*. 2.73-4; *N*. 7.49f.) and act secretly (*O*. 1.47; *P*. 1.84; cf. *Etym. Mag*. 819.2 ~~κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν ψευδομένων τὸ ψιθυρίζειν λαμβάνεται).[[19]](#footnote-19)~~ The opposite attitude is sanctioned by Apollo, the mantic god at Delphi, the god of poetry (*N*. 7.49 it is no lying witness ~~οὐ ψεῦδις ὁ μάρτυς~~ [sc. Apollo] ~~ἔργμασιν ἐπιστατεῖ~~; in this case the unnamed testifier is identified with Apollo).[[20]](#footnote-20) This is well illustrated in Callimachus. In the *Aetia*-Prologue, the poetic *ego* is opposed to the muttering Telchines (ἐπιτρύζουσι), who are also known for their evil eye (βασκανίη). This verbal quarrel is followed by the appearance of Apollo Lycius, who instructs the poetic ego in composing poetry. In *Iambi* 1 and 13 we find similar poetic quarrelling and rebuke between the poetic ego and his opponents, in the latter in the context of a libation to Apollo and the Muses. In the Epilogue to the *Hymn* to Apollo, we find a similar quarrel between Envy and his sidekick Blame/Criticism (Μῶμος) and Apollo himself.[[21]](#footnote-21) In a situation that recalls the *Aetia*-Prologue, Φθόνος whispers in Apollo’s ear, the god kicks and rebukes him and, in the closing *envoi* of the god, Blame is sent off together with Envy. In other words: Callimachus’ Apollo substitutes the Pindaric first-person, and thus overtly sanctions the need for verbal attack that Pindar also justified with the blessing of the gods as a defence against unjust slander. It goes without saying that in all these cases the quarrelling tone prevails.

**2. Apollo, the wolf and Archilochus**

The next task is the Pindaric reading of Callimachus. ~~Καλλίμαχον ἐκ Πινδάρου σαφηνίζειν.~~ The latter’s ~~Callimachus’~~ preference for Apollo Lycius has been explained in many ways, including his biography (Leto) and his many cult-places. For instance Apollo was the killer of the Telchines or became Cyrene’s lover *in lupi habitu*. A further linguistic connection is of course with Lycia, a place as famous for its archery as Apollo (Menander Rhet. XVII *Sminthiakos* 438.29-440.15). Given that his cult as the patron god in Argos[[22]](#footnote-22) connected him to Danaos and his progeny, the main ancestors of all Macedonians and especially the Ptolemies of Egypt, he also served as a straightforward Ptolemaic adoration and thus his worship added to the political investment of Callimachus’ poetic world.[[23]](#footnote-23) His Panhellenic status is revealed in Attic tragedies where he is frequently invoked in his double capacity of protecting friends and severely punishing δυσσεβεῖς foes who commit unjust deeds.[[24]](#footnote-24) It is quite probable that this Apollo Lycius is identified in Athens with Λύκειος and λυκοκτόνος Apollo in the Lyceum, also known to Callimachus in its Athenian orthography (*Hecale* fr. 261 Pf. = *SH* 289 = 71 Hollis ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἤντησα Λυκείου / ... Ἀπόλλωνος). As early as 1960 Pfeiffer had noticed that Apollo Lycius was invoked in Pindar’s *Pythian* 1 (39), which is also dedicated to Hieron. The Sicilian setting of both odes could be hinted at in the *Aetia*-Prologue’s naming of Etna and Typhoon, the sinner and divine opponent in Pindar. After Pfeiffer, Harder discovered more affinities with *Pythian* 1 in her commentary on the Prologue.[[25]](#footnote-25) For my argument, it is important that Pindar’s Apollo Lycius is invoked shortly before the I-speaker wishes to attack his rivals and while he is expressing his (very Callimachean ante litteram) preference for brevity in praise to avoid criticism (μῶμος) and satiety (κόρος). The latter idea is expanded in *Pythian* 2 where Lycius gives place to *lycos*, the animal. The poem’s main message is that song is the tribute to virtue (14 ὕμνον ἄποιν᾽ ἀρετᾶς) but this credo is complicated by the ongoing oscillation between positivity and negativity as regards persons and values. By analogy, the poetic enterprise is split into two functions too, one of praising (the virtuous) and the other of blaming (the villains); to that is also linked the gratitude-vs-ingratitude theme. To the positive group belong the main *laudandus* Hieron, Kinyras and the poetic *ego*; to the negative one Ixion, the Centaurs and the *ego*’s opponents. Such a mixed nature of song clearly indicates Pindar’s decision to combine laudatory and iambic voices both invested with a personal colouring.

Within this duality of poetic diction and content appears the wolf-simile that leads us to the heart of the connection with Callimachus’ Apollo (84f.): in the laudatory apostrophe to Hieron that correlates intelligence and wisdom and their perception of reality with moral principles and right behaviour (72), the opposite side is present in the negative notions of stupidity, deceit and rumours of slander and whispering, all bringing evil. In the next statement about self-destruction of slanderers and success of the right-speaking man (86-7) morality is linked to the function of *logos*. Since Hesiod kings and poets were closely linked thanks to their right use of speech, whose aim was to benefit mankind, an idea also undertaken and reworked by Callimachus in his *Hymn* to Zeus, an overtly political poem. In Pindar the same pair has to confront the ‘dishonest citizen’, the δόλιος ἀστός who is unable to ‘utter weighty words in good men’s company’ (like Hieron, 81f.).[[26]](#footnote-26)

To illustrate this duality of wrong and right behaviour, Pindar introduces different animals. The fox symbolizes cunning and deceit which act in secrecy (75f.).It is interesting that Plato recognized the fox as Archilochus’ mask (*Resp*. 365c3-6) as it is interesting that the fox features in Callimachus’ *Iambus* 2.[[27]](#footnote-27) Τhe fox was thought as motley (ποικίλη) because of its cunning.[[28]](#footnote-28) By contrast, the Pindaric poetic *ego* is compared to a cork on the surface, i.e. its quality is visibility, since he is unsubmerged (ἀβάπτιστος 80).[[29]](#footnote-29) The *ego* undertakes the double role of helping friends and harming enemies, an idea first attested in Solon (fr. 13.5-6 W. [1 G-P, Noussia]): εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν, / τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν (‘grant that in these circumstances I be sweet to my friends and bitter to my enemies, viewed with respect by the former and with dread by the latter’; trans. D. E. Gerber).[[30]](#footnote-30) The comparison to a wolf refers exclusively to his attitude towards rivals. Still, the animal itself was thought to be more than one-sidedly aggressive, and dangerous. The wolf’s nature has been extensively examined, starting with Aristotle who defines it as thoroughbred (γενναῖος), wild (ἄγριος) and scheming (ἐπίβουλος, *περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι* Ι, 1.488b17-20). Aristophanes of Byzantium in his *On animals* described the wolf as a double-sided creature; just like Apollo Lycius, it was just towards its equals and a fierce opponent, not only an ἀγριώτατον ζῷον (2.227.3) but also the most just (ib. 237-8 ~~συνδιαιρεῖται τῷ νομεῖ τὴν θήραν … Οἱ λύκοι μὲν οὖν, ὁπότε δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονες μίαν διαρπάσουσιν αἶγα, διαιροῦνται κατ’ ἰσότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἄδικος οὕτω θήρα δικαίας τυγχάνει νομῆς~~). Another remark perhaps because of the savage nature is that one becomes speechless when facing the animal (ib. 239 ~~μὴ λάθῃ δέ σε ὁ λύκος μηδέποτε προϊδεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἄφωνόν σοι τὸ στόμα καὶ μηδὲ φθόγγον ἀφιέναι θείη δυνάμενον~~) which became a proverb and was explored by Plato (*Rep*. 336d5-8; cf. Theocritus 14.22 ~~doλύκον εἶδες;).[[31]](#footnote-31)~~ Even in the *Iliad*, where it is second only to the lion, the wolf symbolizes ‘fierce and carnivorous nature’,[[32]](#footnote-32) and appears in battle similes. On the other hand, wolves attack in groups and their hunting practice was thought to reflect an egalitarian social structure in which victims were shared in equal share ~~εἰς τὰ ἴσα~~, and therefore they are characterized as a political animal.[[33]](#footnote-33)

When we come to Callimachus, there is one wolf-I-statement (fr. 725 inc. sed. “I was howling like a wolf “ ~~καὶ ὡς λύκος ὠρυοίμην~~) of unknown context. The verb used implies that the *ego*-wolf is probably threatened by someone or is confronted with danger and is defending himself. This is stated e.g. by Porphyrius (*de abstinentia* 3.6). ~~καὶ λύκος ὠρυόμενος ὅτι κακῶς πράσσει~~. Similarly, the Iambist Solon compared himself to a wolf surrounded by dogs and thus showed his isolated position among foes (fr. 30.26f. = 36.26f. W ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιεόμενος / ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῇσιν ἐστράφην λύκος: ‘... I set up a defence on every side and turned about like a wolf among a pack of dogs’; trans. D. E. Gerber). As Noussia-Fantuzzi rightly points out, Solon here displays his radical alienation from the human world – becoming thus a sort of *pharmakos*, a common idea for the iambic world.[[34]](#footnote-34) Alcaeus also seems to adopt this quality within a first person’s presentation as λυκαιμίας, being in exile and living on the boundary: ἔγ[ω .ἀ]πὺ τούτων ἀπελήλαμαι / φεύγων ἐσχατίαις᾽, ὡς δ᾽ Ὀνυμακλέης / ἔνθα[δ᾽] οἶος ἐοίκησα λυκαιμίαις (‘having been driven out from these, fleeing into the back and beyond, like Onomacles, I settled here alone in the wolf-thickets’, fr. 130b 8-10, trans. Steiner).[[35]](#footnote-35)

The iambic context of Solon’s wolfish mask reminds us of Archilochus’ main iambic target, Lycambes (‘he who walks with the steps of a wolf’, ‘wolf-walker’). Although there is much uncertainty whether this was a real name or a stock character,[[36]](#footnote-36) by Hellenistic times Lycambes was thought to be Archilochus’ main enemy, because he broke the rules of human relationships and social order. To pinpoint his contrast to this morally deficient rival, Archilochus used at least two beast fables featuring the fox, one in its opposition with the eagle about revenge of wrongdoers (frr. 172, 173; fox also fr. 201) and one perhaps with a monkey (frr. 185-7).[[37]](#footnote-37) Even if one remains sceptical as to the theory that ‘the wolf is an animal symbolic of the ψόγος ideology in the Archilochean iambics’,[[38]](#footnote-38) such a possibility gains conviction when associated with Pindar’s similar use of wolf against foes, and Callimachus’ Apollo Lycius who appears within a context of an Iambic-like opposition of the poetic I against evil-doers in general, and against slanderers in particular in the very beginning of his elegiac *Aitia*. As regards Archilochus’ position towards enemies and friends, the aristocratic Critias (intentionally?) blurred the picture by saying that he equally blamed his friends and foes (Critias 88 B 44 D.-K [= 33 W]) … ὁμοίως τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς ἔλεγε). To be sure, Critias is an excellent example for the biographical interpretation of Archilochus’ poetic situations and he was more interested in his aristocratic prejudices than in a systematic literary criticism.[[39]](#footnote-39) The material which has survived proves that the opposite is the case with Archilochus. Archilochus presents himself as a deeply moralizing person, who much resembles Pindar and Callimachus in the principle of helping friends and harming enemies and by proposing moderation (fr. 23.14-15; frr. 126; 128; cf. fr. 15 [Glaucus]; frr.13, 16 [Pericles]; fr. 24 W.). Pindar expresses a similar idea in connection with Apollo (*Paean* II.31-4): εἰ δέ τις ἀρκέων φίλοις / ἐχθροῖσι τραχὺς ὑπαντιάζει, /μόχθος ἡσυχίαν φέρει / καιρῷ καταβαίνων (‘But if any man in aiding his friends resists his enemies fiercely, toil brings peace, reaching its goal at the right moment’, trans. Rutherford). Archilochus also invoked Apollo in the first person, thus accepting the punitive nature of the god towards wrongdoers, and played with Apollo’s name in connection with the verb ἀπολλύναι (fr. 26 West) ~~ὦναξ Ἄπολλον, καὶ σὺ τοὺς μὲν αἰτίους / πήμαινε καί σφας ὄλλυ᾽ ὥσπερ ὀλλύεις~~. Biographically, the Iambist was closely linked to Apollo, as we know from Paros’ cultic practice according to the Mnesiepes inscription (*SEG* 15.517 = T 3 Gerber) and the later judgement of Dio Chrysostom (33.17).[[40]](#footnote-40) According to the biographical tradition of Archilochus Apollo’s fondness for the archaic poet went so far as to punish the Parians with impotence (what else?) because of their hostility towards him and the Delphic oracle announced their cure only if they honour him. Again, it is the biography that could have appealed to Callimachus for finding a link to Archilochus. Of course, the question about Callimachus’ attitude to Archilochus is strongly connected with the theory on two different positions regarding Iambic writing in Hellenistic times, and this involves the distinction suggested by Degani between the wine-loving Archilocheans and the sober (?) Hipponacteans.[[41]](#footnote-41) Things become even more complicated with Theocritus’ epigrammatic homage on both archaic Iambists.

Be that as it may, Pindar calls Archilochus a blamer who is fattening through slander and is therefore very often driven to defencelessness (ἀμαχανία). Given the dual nature of the Pythian ode, which praises and blames according to the moral quality of the person involved, Archilochus the blamer is mentioned as an example not of poetic failure but of a one-sided poetic voice.[[42]](#footnote-42) In another instance Pindar named him as the precursor of praise-poetry with whom he was a rival: Τὸ μὲν Ἀρχιλόχου μέλος φωνᾶεν Ὀλυμπίᾳ / καλλίνικος (P. *O*. 9.1-2, ‘Archilochus’ song, the loud high triple hymn of victory’).[[43]](#footnote-43) Callimachus adopted the same attitude, naming him within an epinician context (fr. 384.39 Pf. Ἀρχιλόχου νικαῖον ἐφύμνιον, ‘Archilochus’ victory hymn’), and in another case compared him with the dog and the wasp because of his bitter tongue (fr. 380 Pf. εἵλκυσε δὲ δριμύν τε χόλον κυνὸς ὀξύ τε κέντρον / σφηκός, ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων δ᾽ ἰὸν ἔχει στόματος). In his comparison with the dog, he agrees with Pindar’s judgement that to concentrate on blame to the exclusion of everything else is unsatisfactory. Perhaps the point of Callimachus that the gods are unlike dogs, in that they are slow to punish mortals (*SH* 239), could be another argument for the metaphorical use of animals by all these poets.[[44]](#footnote-44) What separates Pindar and Callimachus (and Solon) from Archilochus is illustrated in the different animals: unlike the dog-like rabid Iambist, whose bile in front of immoral slanderers is straightforwardly negative, and the fox-like versatility, all three prefer the wolf as the symbol of vindictive retaliation that operates in self-defence against rivals. All the same, the references of both Pindar and Callimachus to Archilochus include a double-sided evaluation and not a straightforwardly negative position of his blame poetry.

To conclude, the wolf has one more quality which might appeal to a poet, and this is its nature of exclusion from others and its feeling of being an outsider. Pindar was believed to have suffered because of Hieron’s preference for his rival Bacchylides (according the contemporary explanation of the scholia); as for Callimachus, despite his laudatory mission for queens and kings, he failed to hold any prestigious post. Perhaps Sophocles told a great truth (*Ajax* 154-5, 157 τῶν γὰρ μεγάλων ψυχῶν ἱεὶς / οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι... πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ᾽ ὁ φθόνος ἕρπει) in one story of interest for Pindar in his *N*. 8. But both Pindar and Callimachus seem to me to have agreed with the concluding wish of *P*. 2.96f.: ‘may it be their fate to enjoy the approval of good men and to keep their company’.[[45]](#footnote-45)

1. T. Fuhrer, *Die Auseinandersetzung mit den Chorlyrikern in den Epinikien des Kallimachos* (Basel and Kassel 1992); B. Acosta-Hughes, *Arion’s lyre: archaic lyric into Hellenistic poetry* (Princeton 2010); A. Kirichenko, ‘Von Delphi nach Kyrene: Dichtung und Religion in Kallimachos’ Hymnus auf Apollon’, *WS* 123 (2010) 37-61; A. Kampakoglou, *Studies in the reception of Pindar in Hellenistic poetry*, Trends in Classics 76 (Berlin 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. G. Rawlinson and H. M. Lee, ‘Slander (διαβολή) in Herodotus 7,10, and Pindar, Pythian 2, 76’, *Hermes* 106 (1978) 279-83; S. Goldhill, *The poet’s voice* (Cambridge 1991) 138-41; P. Bulman, *Phthonos in Pindar* (California 1992); B. Gallet, *Recherches sur Kairos et l’ambiguïté dans la poésie de Pindare* (Bordeaux 1990) 343-53; Fuhrer, *Auseinandersetzung* (n. 1, above) 196-8 with n. 750; G. W. Most, ‘Epinician envies’, in *Envy, spite, and jealousy. The rivalrous emotions in ancient Greece,* ed. D. Konstan and N. K. Rutter (Edinburgh 2003) 123-42 (with literature). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. S. Slings, ‘The I in personal archaic lyric’, in *The poet’s I in archaic Greek lyric* (Amsterdam 1990) 1-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Α. D. Morrison, *The narrator in archaic Greek and Hellenistic poetry* (Cambridge 2005) 37-41, on Pindar 61-6. Worth reading is H. Lloyd-Jones, ‘Modern interpretation of Pindar: the Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean odes’, *JHS* 93 (1973) 109-37 (117, 124); A. M. Miller, ‘Pindar, Archilochus, and Hieron in P. 52-56’, *TAPA* 111 (1981) 135-43 (136); on the strategies of the narrator see C. Carey, ‘The panegyrist’s persona’, in *Poesia e religione in Grecia.* *Studi in onore di G. Aurelio Privitera*, ed. U. Pizzani and M. Cannatà Fera (Bari 2000) 165-77 (173-7). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. R. Pfeiffer, *History of classical scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 1.205; Fuhrer, *Auseinandersetzung* (n. 1, above) 31-5; M. Negri, *Pindaro ad Alessandria: le edizioni e gli editori* (Brescia 2004) 13-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. C. Carey, *A commentary on five odes of Pindar* (New York 1981) 16 n. 37; G. W. Most, *The measure of praise*, *Hypomnemata* 83 (Göttingen 1985) 99, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. M. Lefkowitz, *First-person fictions. Pindar’s poetic I* (Oxford 1991) 72-88, 127-46 (133, 144). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Carey, ‘Commentary’ (n. 6, above) 51: ‘we should remember that Alexandrian writers had a vested interest in literary squabbles’. For a negative evaluation of the ancient comments: H. Fränkel, ‘Schrullen in den Scholien zu Pindars Nemean 7 und Olympian 3’, *Hermes* 89 (1961) 385-97; Lloyd-Jones, ‘Modern’ (n. 4, above) 126-7; Lefkowitz, *First-person* (n. 7, above); *contra* C. M. Bowra, ‘Pythian II’, *HSCP* 48 (1937) 1-28 (cf. his *Pindar* [Oxford 1964]); J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge Mass. 1966) 92-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. ‘[P]robably right’: Carey, ‘Commentary’ (n. 6, above) 21. Cf. Fuhrer, *Auseinandersetzung* (n. 1, above) 33-5; M. Brumbaugh, *The New Politics of Olympos: Kingship in Kallimachos*’ *Hymns* (Oxford 2019) 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. More modern opinions in Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia vetera in Pindari Carmina*, vols II, III (Leipzig 1927/1997), vol. II. Rightly Carey, ‘Commentary’ (n. 6, above) 50: ‘All this is mere conjecture’, with older views 56f. Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 104-5 and n. 69 on p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The translation follows A. Verity, *Pindar. The complete Odes* (Oxford 2007). C. G. Brown, ‘Pindar on Archilochus and the gluttony of blame (*Pyth*. 2.52-6)’, *JHS* 106 (2006) 36-46, saw Archilochus as a negative paradigm of poetic failure, as a foil for Pindar’s success (see below, n. 26). D. Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary: the “Coda of Pythian 2’, *Phoenix* 65 (2011) 238-67, rightly interpreted the Ode under the light of Archilochean critique and Pindar’s own role of advice-giver within the archaic tradition. She also connected *charis* with Archilochus’ critique (pp. 242f.); on *charis* see also F. Pontani, ‘Noblest *charis*: Pindar and the scholiasts’, *Phoenix* 67 (2013) 23-42 (26-30). Miller (n. 4, above) argued for the ‘ethical mission as poet’ (138) and stressed ‘the spiritual and ethical gulf between the two types of poetry’ (141). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Slings, ‘The I’ (n. 3, above). Carey, ‘Commentary’ (n. 6, above) 53. See below, n. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. A. M. Harder, *Callimachus. Aetia*, vol. 2 (Oxford 2012) 57-60. Carey, ‘The panegyrist’s persona’ (n. 4, above) 176, rightly remarked: ‘Like Kallimachos, he (sc. Pindar) is acutely aware of the burden of tradition and the need to do something new with the genre’ and ‘perhaps Kallimachos comes closest to the Pindaric manner …’. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. A new interpretation of fr. 114 proposes an aesthetic function and a new location at the beginning of the *Aetia*: E. Livrea, ‘Callimaco, Fr. 114 Pf., il Somnium ed il Prologo degli Aitia’, *Hermes* 123 (1995) 47-62. Cf. E. Prioux, *Regards alexandrins: histoire et théorie des arts dans l'épigramme hellénistique* (Leuven 2007) 187ff., 210-14, 234-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 116-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. A. Köhnken, *Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar. Interpretationen zu sechs Pindargedichten* (Berlin 1971) 19-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. F. P. Manakidou, ‘Καλλίμαχος, Ησίοδος και ιαμβική ποίηση (Αρχίλοχος, Ιππώναξ): τι χρειάζονται οι ποιητές σε χαλεπούς καιρούς;’, *Πλάτων* 60 (2015) 37-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. #  J. M. Bell, ‘God, man and animal in Pindar’s Second Pythian’, in *Greek poetry and philosophy. Studies in honour of L. Woodbury*,ed.D. E. Gerber (Chico,CA 1984) 1-31 (19f.) and n. 56. Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 105 with nn. 52, 107.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 176-8. A. Stefos, *Apollon dans Pindare* (Athens 1975) 280-7 (263-79 on Apollo’s qualities). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Envy is not identical with blame as early as U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hellenistische Dichtung*, vol. 2 (Berlin 1924) 86. Cf. Fuhrer, ‘Auseindersetzung’ (n. 1, above) 196-7, 252-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. F. Graf, *Nordionische Kulte: religionsgeschichtliche und epigraphische Untersuchungen zu den Kulten von Chios, Erythrai, Klazomenai und Phokaia* (Rome 1985) 219-26; on wolf-Apollo and its Dorian origin, F. Graf, *Apollo* (London 2008) esp. 97-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Harder, ‘Callimachus’ (n. 14, above) 57-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Noted by Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 116 n. 98. All occurrences of Lycius Apollo found in Attic tragedies are examined by Cl.-Fr. de Roguin, ‘Apollon Lykeios dans la tragédie: dieu protecteur, dieu tueuer, «dieu de l’initiation»’, *Kernos* 12 (1999) 99-123. On *Agamn*.1257 see E. Higgins, ‘Wolf-god Apollo in the Oresteia’, *PP* 31 (1976) 201-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Harder, ‘Callimachus’ (n. 14, above) 5-60 passim. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Important for my approach are Most’s remarks: ‘Epinician envies’ (n. 2, above) 138-41 with id., ‘Two leaden metaphors in Pindar 2’, *AJP* 108 (1987) 569-84. Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above), following Brown, ‘Pindar’ (n. 12, above), proposed to see here a Pindaric poetic medley; cf. D. Steiner, ‘“Wolf’s justice”: the Iliadic doloneia and the semiotics of wolves’, *CA* 34(2) (2015) 335-69 (345-7). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. In l. 78κερδοῖ (corr. Huschke, Carey, Most) refers to fox; v.l. κέρδει (Snell-Maehler, Iakov, Steiner) δέ τι μάλα τοῦτο κερδαλέον τελέθει. On the fox-like quality of Archilochus: Brown, ‘Pindar’ (n. 12, above) 46, 34; especially Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above) 249-53, who presented the fox (Iambus and *ainos*) as the opposite of Pindar’s aristocratic ideas. Callimachus’ *Iambus* 2 (fox = Archilochus): M. Giuseppetti, ‘Poetry in the Iron Age: interplay of voices in Callimachus’ Iambi’, *Aitia* (en ligne) 2 (2012), mis en ligne le 11 juillet 2012 URP: http://aitia.revues.org/558; DOI: 10.40000/aitia.558, 4f. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Its cunning nature: Chr. A. Zafiropoulos, *Ethics in Aesop’s fables: The Augustana collections, Mnemosyne* 270 (Leiden and Boston 2001) 14f., 29, 159, 163. It is noteworthy that his examination of the different Aesopic fox stories recalls many Archilochean ideas, e.g. ‘learning through suffering’ (65-9), fox as king 103 (in connection with the ape-fox *ainos* in frr.185f.), on dysfunctional reciprocal relationships, extremes of behavior between enemies, the wish to take revenge on an enemy are important remarks that fit well with Archilochus’ ideology (103, 105, 106, 115, 116, 118 n. 73). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ι follow Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 108-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. M. Noussia-Fantuzzi, *Solon the Athenian, the poetic fragments*, *Mnemosyne* 326 (Leiden and Boston 2010) 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. I owe the Platonic passage to Zafiropoulos. A. Pappas, ‘Remember to cry wolf: visual and verbal declarations of *Lykos Kalos*’, in *Orality, literacy, memory in the ancient Greek and Roman world*, ed. E. A. Mackay (Leiden and Boston 2008) 97-114, on Apollo Lycius 108ff. There was another proverb on the Athenian market as ‘market of wolves’ because of the predatory nature (~~ἀγορὰ λύκειος: ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως πιπρασκομένων· ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τοῦ ζῷου, ἁρπακτικὸν γάρ~~ Diogenianus Gramm. 2.49; Michael Apostolius 1.17). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. R. Janko, *The Iliad: A commentary,* vol*.* IV (Cambridge 1992) at 157 and 162f.; C. Mainoldi, *L’image du loup et du chien dans la Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1984); Most, ‘Measure’ (n. 6, above) 115f.; M. Detienne and J. Svenbro, ‘Les loups au festin ou la Cité impossible’, in *La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec*, ed. J. P. Vernant (Paris 1979) 215-37; R. Buxton, ‘Wolves and werewolves in Greek thought’, in *Interpretations of Greek mythology*, ed. J. Bremmer (London 1986) 60-79. Following Most, Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above) 253-63 (260-63, with discussion of previous literature) returns to the biographic reading of Pindar not in front of epinician rivals but as regards Iambic discourse with the prototype Archilochus; on wolf’s imagery in Archaic poetic genres Steiner, ‘“Wolf’s justice”’ (n. 26, above) esp. 335-69, see also n. 34, below (Solon, Homer, Aesop). The wolf in Aesop with many interesting side remarks of his superiority and as predator par excellence in Zafiropoulos, *Ethics* (n. 28, above) e.g. 29, 79, 113, 160, 165 (μακελλάριος), 173. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. L. Kurke, *Aesopic* *conversations, popular tradition, and the invention of Greek prose* (Princeton 2010) 152-3 follows Detienne and Svenbro, ‘Les loups’ (see above n. 32). Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above) 257-8, ‘“Wolf’s justice”’ (n. 26, above) 336-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Noussia-Fantuzzi, *Solon* (n. 30, above) 71f., on 36.26f., 482-5. E. Irwin, *Solon and early Greek poetry: the politics of exhortation* (Cambridge 2005) 245-61 (250-51 on Pindar), with Kurke, *Aesopic* *conversations* (n. 33, above) 151-3, emphasizes the wolf’s ambiguity and political connotations. Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above) 258-9 and ‘“Wolf’s justice”’ (n. 26, above) 339-44, rightly emphasizes the generic character, speaks of ‘psogic register’ and assimilates the (democratic) Solonian wolf with Archilochean precedent and his opponents with dogs (340-1). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Steiner, ‘“Wolf’s justice”’ (n. 26, above) 344 and 347, suggests also λυκαιχμίαις, ‘wolf-spearman’; if dative plural the speaker fights ‘wolf battles’. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The problem remains unsolved. Previous literature and a new meta-literary but rather unconvincing interpretation in T. Hawkins, ‘Out-foxing the wolf-wolker: Lycambes as performative rival to Archilochus’, *CA* 27.1 (2008) 93-114; already E. Irwin, ‘Biography, fiction and the Archilochean ainos’, *JHS* 118 (1998) 177-83, with emphasis on the use of *ainos*; C. Carey, ‘Archilochus and Lycambes’, *CQ* 36 (1986) 60-7, belongs to the group that accept his historicity. Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above) 262, ‘“Wolf’s justice”’ (n. 26, above) 338-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Zafiropoulos, *Ethics* (n. 28, above) 86-90. See also nn. 27, 28, above. Steiner, ‘Pindar’s bestiary’ (n. 12, above) 244-49, also argued that Pindar’s monkey (ll. 72-3) has Archilochus and Iambus in general and Aesop as his models, and she thus corroborates her approach to the Ode as a generic plunge in its most extreme form. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. C. Miralles and J. Pòrtulas, *Archilochus and the iambic poetry* (Rome 1983) 53-60. Noussia-Fantuzzi *Solon* (n. 30, above) ‘very convincing’. Steiner, ‘“Wolf’s justice”’ (n. 26, above) 338 n. 12, found it ‘very suggestive’. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Bossi, *Studi* (n. 13, above) 33, 57-60, 63; A. Rotstein, ‘Critias’ invective against Archilochus’, *CP* 102 (2007) 139-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. D. Clay, *Archilochos heros. The cult of poets in the Greek polis* (Cambridge MA and London 2004) 104-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. E. Degani, *Studi su Ipponatte*, *Spudasmata* 89 (Bari 1984/2002); W. Bühler, ‘Archilochos und Kallimachos’, in *Archiloque: sept exposés et*  discussions (Genève and Vandoeuvres 1964) 225-53, leaves open the attitude of Callimachus to Archilochus; J. N. Hawkins, ‘Anger, bile, and the poet’s body in the Archilochean Tradition’, in *Iambus and Elegy. New Approaches*, ed. C. Carey and L. Swift (Oxford 2016) 317-22. See Manakidou, ‘Καλλίμαχος᾽ (n. 18, above). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Finley, ‘Pindar’ (n. 8, above) 95-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. On the connection of both poems see Kampakoglou, *Studies* (n. 1, above) 37-41; Hawkins, ‘Out-foxing’ (n. 36, above) 319-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. A. Harder, ‘Some thoughts about Callimachus, S.H. 239 and 253’, *ZPE* 67 (1989) 23-6. Zafiropoulos kindly suggested to me the possibility of a Cynic influence in Callimachus (e.g. fr. 192 on Eudemus). Cratinus in his *Archilochoi* spoke of the ‘Thasian pickle [i.e. Archilochus] brine … barking’ (Θασίαν ἅλμην…βαΰζει). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Many thanks to my colleague and friend Maureen Alden for her valuable comments. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)