

The background of the cover is a detailed marble relief of a woman's face in a state of laughter. She has her mouth wide open, showing her teeth. Her hair is styled in a crown of grapevines with clusters of grapes and large, pointed leaves. The entire scene is carved into a light-colored stone.

OXFORD

Talking about  
**Laughter**

*and other studies in Greek Comedy*

ALAN H. SOMMERSTEIN

# TALKING ABOUT LAUGHTER

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ALAN H. SOMMERSTEIN

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UNIVERSITY PRESS

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*To the memory  
of  
Surya Shaffi  
† 8.ii. 2008*

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## Preface

This book comprises a selection of my articles on Greek comedy from 1980 to the present—though, for a reason which will be explained presently, all but one of them actually originated in or after 1990. The majority have been published previously, but in two cases—Chapters 6 and 14—I have, with the consent of the conference organizers, included papers originally destined for publication in conference volumes which have not in the end (or at any rate have not yet) seen the light of day. I hope soon to bring out a further volume mainly consisting of articles on tragedy.

I have chosen to present here those papers which might otherwise be difficult for many readers to access. I have therefore left out of consideration those which first appeared in books published in English-speaking countries, or in periodicals widely available in the libraries of universities with Classics departments, or in e-journals accessible without subscription. (Chapters 11 and 12 are exceptions only on the surface: the former appears here with the scholarly apparatus which would have been inappropriate in the book in which it was originally published, and the collection containing the latter was actually an issue of a little-known, and now defunct, periodical, the *European Studies Journal*.)

These principles of selection largely account for the chronological asymmetry mentioned above, owing to a change in my publication habits which reflects—in a somewhat exaggerated form—a development that has affected the entire discipline. Until 1990 I hardly ever gave papers at academic conferences, and my articles were invariably submitted to journals. Then the conference on ‘Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis’, held at Nottingham in July 1990 (when I presented the paper which appears here as Chapter 13), led to the planning of a series of others (two of which gave rise to the papers which appear here as Chapters 5 and 8), and since then most of the articles I have written (more than two-thirds, up to the time of this writing) have been committed in advance to publication in conference proceedings or other edited volumes. I do not wish to



express any opinion on whether this development has been for the better or the worse.

With the exception of Chapter 11 (on which see above) and of Chapter 4 (which appears here in its original English, having been previously published in a French translation), these articles are published here essentially as they originally appeared; each is followed by an addenda section drawing attention to significant subsequent developments in the relevant scholarship, or to points where my own thinking has changed since the article was first published. Reference to the addenda is made by an asterisk inserted in the text. This also applies, with some modifications, to Chapters 6 and 14, which have been left essentially in the revised form in which they were *submitted* for publication; their text has been updated as regards style and referencing but not on matters of substance.

In the ten chapters not mentioned in the previous paragraph, the original page numbers have been inserted in the text (and, where necessary, in the notes), in square brackets and in boldface, at the point where each new page of the original began. I have also made the following further changes; except for those in the first three categories, these are indicated in the text by angle brackets.

(a) The style of references, abbreviations, etc., has been made uniform throughout; I have not, however, attempted to regularize my practice in such matters as the representation of Greek names. Where the original makes reference to a paper of mine now included in this volume, I have replaced this by an internal cross-reference.

(b) Where the original publication had endnotes, these have been replaced by footnotes, but the pagination of the original endnotes is still recorded.

(c) At the end of each chapter an additional footnote has been inserted recording its original publication (or conference delivery) and acknowledging the permission given for it to be published here.

(d) In a few places I have corrected a misprint, omission, or blatant factual error, which ought to have been dealt with at proof stage; in one case I have corrected a reference to a statement in a conference paper which, unknown to me at the time, had been omitted from the version submitted for publication.

(e) Where I originally referred to an edition of a text, or a collection of fragments or inscriptions, which has since been superseded by a more recent edition, I have inserted an up-to-date reference while not suppressing the old one. Changes of this type have occasionally necessitated the insertion of a few words of explanation elsewhere (e.g. in n. 19 to Chapter 2).

(f) I have occasionally inserted an explanation, unnecessary in the original context, of a phrase like ‘the Colloquium from which this volume derives’.

(g) In the discussion section of Chapter 10 I have made minor modifications to the text as originally published (derived from sound recordings of the speakers’ impromptu words) in the interest of grammaticality and intelligibility.

It remains to express my gratitude to Hilary O’Shea, of Oxford University Press, for the enthusiastic support she gave to my unsolicited proposal for the publication of this volume; to the British Academy, the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, and above all the University of Nottingham, for making it financially possible for me to attend many of the conferences at which I presented papers that are here reproduced; and to those whose invitations—to speak, or to write, or both—engendered so many of the chapters that follow: Umberto Bultrighini, Susan Carlson, Francesco De Martino, Marie-Laurence Desclos, Andy Fear, Juan Antonio López Férez, James McGlew, Giuseppe Mastromarco, Marco Presutti, Jim Roy, Pascal Thiery, and Bernhard Zimmermann.

I have dedicated this book to the memory of my former research student, Surya Shaffi, who pursued her studies undauntedly in the face of physical disabilities (including a life-threatening illness) that few if any others would have braved let alone surmounted, devoted her life to enabling and encouraging others to do likewise, and died tragically young in the midst of her endeavours. May that memory be a blessing and an inspiration.

ALAN H. SOMMERSTEIN

*Nottingham*

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## Abbreviations

THIS list includes only abbreviations not listed in the Liddell–Scott–Jones *Lexicon* (Oxford, 1940), in its *Revised Supplement* (Oxford, 1996), or in the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 1996). In some cases abbreviations of ancient author names or text titles may be less drastic than those used in these works, or may differ from them owing to transliteration conventions (e.g. by using *k* rather than *c*). Where the number of a fragment, hypothesis, etc., is followed by the name of a scholar, the reference is to that scholar's edition of the author or text in question; where there might be ambiguity about the meaning of such a reference, the editor's name is listed below.

APF	<i>Archiv für Papyrusforschung</i>
Aul.	<i>Aulularia</i> (Plautus)
CFC	<i>Cuadernos de Filología Clásica</i>
CGFP	C. Austin, <i>Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta</i> (Berlin, 1973)
Gentili–Prato	B. Gentili and C. Prato, <i>Poetarum elegiacorum testimonia et fragmenta</i> (2 vols.) (Leipzig, 1979–85)
HSCP	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
HT	<i>Heauton Timorumenos</i> (Terence)
K–T	Körte and Thierfelder (1953)
Hypoth.	Hypothesis (headnote to, or synopsis of, a literary text)
LICS	<i>Leeds International Classical Studies</i> (electronic) ( <a href="http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics">http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics</a> )
PMLA	<i>Publications of the Modern Language Association of America</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
Snell	B. Snell, <i>Supplementum</i> , in reissue of <i>TGF</i> (Hildesheim, 1964)
SPAW	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin</i>

<i>Truc.</i>	<i>Truculentus</i> (Plautus)
<i>UCPCP</i>	<i>University of California Publications in Classical Philology</i>
West	(for iambus and elegy) M. L. West, <i>Iambi et elegi Graeci</i> (Oxford, 1971–2)
	(for epic) M. L. West, <i>Greek Epic Fragments</i> (Cambridge, Mass., 2003)
Σ	scholium

## Introduction

Although, as has been explained in the Preface, the essays included in this volume are a fairly arbitrary sample of what I have written in article form on Old Comedy<sup>1</sup> over the past few decades, it is also a fairly representative sample, incorporating work on all the major themes that have concerned me repeatedly over this period, with the exception of the history and criticism of the Aristophanic text.<sup>2</sup> In what follows, I attempt to define these themes and offer some reflections on them.

There could have been more than one reasonably logical arrangement of the chapters that follow, and so I have decided to arrange them in the book in one sequence, but discuss them in this Introduction in another. In the book, Chapters 1–4 deal with aspects of language, proceeding broadly from the general towards the particular; Chapters 5–7 examine areas of the subject-matter of Old Comedy, or of Aristophanic comedy, generally; Chapters 8–13 are

<sup>1</sup> I have as yet written nothing dealing exclusively with later comedy, though it figures importantly in Chapter 2 of this volume and in one other article (Sommerstein 1998*a*). Henceforth in this Introduction, to avoid constant repetition of my name, my own publications will be referred to by date (and suffix letter, if necessary) alone.

<sup>2</sup> For this, in addition to the volumes of *The Comedies of Aristophanes*, see (1977*c*, 1978, 1980*b*, 1986*b*, 1993*a*, 1993*b*, forthcoming). Other publications of mine not classifiable under any of the ‘major themes’ include a few short studies of particular passages (1974, 1983*b*, 1987) and also (1984*b*), a not very felicitous attempt to trace back into Old Comedy the ancestry of the five-act structure of New Comedy, (2004*a*) on comedy’s portrayal of aspects of the life and art of Euripides, (2006*a*), an autobiographical piece which may or may not be of some value to future historians of classical scholarship, and (2007*b*), a study in the ‘reception’ of Aristophanes, with significant points of contact with Chs. 10 and 11 of this volume.



studies of particular surviving Aristophanic plays or groups of plays; and Chapter 14 deals mainly with a lost play that was probably Aristophanes' last, and with another comedy that may have been roughly contemporary with it.<sup>3</sup> In this Introduction, the approach I take focuses on the 'major themes' mentioned in the previous paragraph, and discusses the individual chapters (some of them more than once) in a sequence determined by the themes they reflect. Readers are welcome, when they turn to the body of the book, to take the chapters in either order, or indeed in any other.

The fundamental theme of *the nature and functions of comedy* is, at least implicitly, the topic of Chapters 4 and 5.

There can be no doubt that the prime objective of Athenian comedy was at all times to entertain and amuse its public, principally by stimulating them to laugh.<sup>4</sup> Chapter 4 seeks, by means of an analysis of the use of vocabulary items referring to laughter, to determine how Aristophanes himself, whether consciously or instinctively, understood and categorized this end-product of his art, and identifies three basic types of laughter, each with its own typical vocabulary: the laughter of derision; laughter deliberately induced by a person whose interest it serves; and the spontaneous laughter of shared pleasure, which one might almost call the *sum-mum bonum* in Aristophanes' comic world.

There has, however, been a persistent tendency to suppose that an art-form whose primary aim is to arouse laughter cannot also be aiming—in the words which Aristophanes gives to his Euripides in *Frogs* 1008–9, when the latter is asked to name the qualities for which a poet<sup>5</sup> ought to be admired—to 'make men better members of their communities'. There may have been some excuse for supposing this to be true in 1938, when Gomme published his famous article 'Aristophanes and politics'; there is none today, when scores of

<sup>3</sup> Despite the title of the chapter, this comedy is not, of course, the *Odysseus* of the long-dead Cratinus; to learn what play *is* being referred to, and why Cratinus' play is relevant, please read the chapter!

<sup>4</sup> Even the comedies of Menander, a far less hilarious dramatist than Aristophanes, in the invocation of the goddess of Victory with which they end, regularly refer to her as 'the laughter-loving maiden' (*Dysk.* 968, *Mis.* 465, *Sik.* 422; cf. *Men. fr.* 903.20 KA, *Poseidippus fr.* 6 KA).

<sup>5</sup> A poet, be it noted; not specifically a tragic poet.

stand-up comics deal in undisguised political polemic, and when few social commentators exercise so great, and arguably so beneficial, an influence on public thinking in the English-speaking world as the scriptwriters of *The Simpsons*. In Chapter 5 I explore the comic dramatists' own views about the nature of their art and its criteria of quality—or at least what they *desired to be perceived* as their views on these matters—through their own words about their own and each other's work, and come to the conclusion that while most of them seem to have been almost entirely concerned with the aesthetic qualities and entertainment value of their work, Aristophanes—and so far as our admittedly skewed evidence goes, Aristophanes alone—regularly claimed to be a benefactor of his community, devoted to its well-being and to the cause of right and justice. We may well wish to query the validity of this claim, but it remains highly significant that the claim was made, over and over again.<sup>6</sup> What is no less significant is that the claim was frequently recognized in other public discourse: comic dramatists could be honoured for their services to the community in their professional capacity,<sup>7</sup> their words could be cited in the courts as character evidence,<sup>8</sup> and politicians could speak and act on the assumption that both their own reputation and interests, and those of Athens itself, could be promoted or damaged by things said on the comic stage.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the evidence for this begins well before Aristophanes; the first known instance of political interference with comedy dates from 440/39,<sup>10</sup> when Aristophanes was perhaps 9 or 10 years old, and is doubtless to be associated with the fierce attacks made on Pericles and his associates in some of the plays of Cratinus.<sup>11</sup> Thus from the 440s at least, to adopt an apt expression of

<sup>6</sup> It appears in all Aristophanes' first five surviving plays, and also in *Frogs*.

<sup>7</sup> See Ch. 13.

<sup>8</sup> See (2004c) 155–6, citing Lysias fr. 53 Thalheim (= 195 Carey), Aeschines 1.157, and Pl. *Apol.* 18a–19d.

<sup>9</sup> See (2004c) *passim*.

<sup>10</sup> Σ Ar. *Ach.* 67.

<sup>11</sup> Most of the known references to Pericles and Aspasia in the fragments of Cratinus (e.g. fr. 73, 118, 258, 259) are likely to be later, but this may merely be because most of his plays of the 440s did not survive into Hellenistic times. Two plays of Cratinus from as late as the mid-420s, *Cheimazomenoi* and *Satyrs*, appear to have been completely lost, and we know of their existence only from the mention of them in the *didaskaliai* attached to the Hypotheses of Aristophanes' *Acharnians* and *Knights*.

Giuseppe Mastromarco's,<sup>12</sup> Athenian comedy was *impegnato*, engaged with and committed to the concerns of the Athenian *polis* community.

Often, though not always, this commitment to the *polis* was manifested in the relatively narrow sphere which goes by the name of *politics* today, and the political aspects of Aristophanic comedy are the main theme of Chapters 7, 10, 11, and 13.<sup>13</sup> Chapter 7 explores how Aristophanes exploited and transformed the traditional figure, well attested both in Sicilian and in earlier Attic comedy, of the fearsome monster/ogre/demon who is defeated (usually) by a hero from myth or even by a god: the monster becomes a political figure, Lamachus or (especially) Cleon, and his vanquisher is an ordinary mortal—sometimes the 'comic hero', Dicaeopolis or the Sausage-Seller or Trygaeus, sometimes the comic poet himself. This theme, or formula, dies with Cleon (or rather a few months after him), but is revived in a surprising form in *Frogs*, when the contest between the monster-like Aeschylus and the sophistic(ated) Euripides, a contest whose final round is explicitly political, ends with the victory of the monster.<sup>14</sup>

Had Aristophanes in 405, when *Frogs* was produced, wished to cast a living politician in the monster role, it would certainly have been Cleophon, and Chapter 13 examines the possible connection between the subsequent fortunes of Cleophon and the remarkable decision taken by the Athenian Assembly, at some point after the original production of the play, to order it to be performed again and at the same time to confer public honours on its author. It is argued that this decision was made in the autumn or winter of 405, and the play restaged at the Lenaea early in 404, and that the decree had 'the precise object of influencing public opinion against

<sup>12</sup> Mastromarco (1998), esp. 29–30 (on Cratinus), 32–3, 41–2.

<sup>13</sup> And of several other papers not included in this volume, notably (1977*b*, 1986*a*, 1996*c*, 2004*b*, 2004*c*, 2005).

<sup>14</sup> A point that might have been made in Ch. 7 is that the motif of a false preparation for the monster's appearance, found in *Wasps* (197, 409) and in *Peace* (313–23) in connection with Cleon, reappears in *Frogs*—and in connection with Cleon—when the two women innkeepers, taking the disguised Dionysus for Heracles who had robbed them on his last visit to the underworld, decide (569–78) to fetch their 'patrons' Cleon and Hyperbolus, now of course underworld residents, to have the criminal prosecuted and punished; neither ever comes.

[C]leophon' who, quite close to the time of the second performance, was in effect judicially murdered; and the question is considered whether Aristophanes was a knowing confederate of the anti-democratic conspirators who, on this view, were behind the decree. The conclusion reached is that he was an innocent party (in more senses than one, some may think).

But if Aristophanes was not guilty of actively plotting to subvert the democracy,<sup>15</sup> it is far from clear that he positively believed in it as the best form of government for Athens. He never, indeed, openly criticizes the constitution itself, or allows any of his characters to do so; but then, so far as we know, nobody ever did, in any text composed for public performance or delivery in democratic Athens, unless either (i) the criticism was clearly flagged as coming from an unsympathetic character and promptly refuted by a sympathetic one<sup>16</sup> or (ii) there seemed to be a good prospect that democracy would be overthrown at an early date.<sup>17</sup> As I argue in Chapter 10, however, he regularly does disparage crucial features of democracy—public pay for civic functions, the prosecution of rich defendants by volunteer accusers, the throwing open of political leadership to populist 'demagogues', and readiness to wage war against Sparta—all policies that were also criticized by the 'Old Oligarch' and reversed by the oligarchs of 411 and 404. This does not prove that he was an anti-democrat in the sense of desiring the disfranchisement of the poorer Athenian citizens, but it does indicate, at the very least, that he would have preferred the kind of democracy that was prepared to defer to the well-born, well-educated, and well-heeled and leave them

<sup>15</sup> That he served as a councillor c.390 (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 1740.24 = *Ath. Agora* xv. 12.26) shows that he had been able, at his *dokimasia*, to satisfy the previous year's councillors that there was nothing in his past life to disqualify him from holding public office in a democratic state—or alternatively that no one had been hostile enough to him, or confident enough of success, to challenge his fitness to serve, in the way that councillors-designate like Philon (*Lysias* 31) and Mantitheus (*Lysias* 16) had been challenged on the basis, in part, of things they had done or not done in the troubles of 405–403.

<sup>16</sup> As in the case of the speech by the Theban herald in Euripides' *Suppliants* (409–25): he is carefully labelled, before and after it, as an advocate of tyranny (399, 404, 429), he is defending the right of the Thebans to deny burial to their enemies (471–2, 495), and Theseus is given, in rebuttal, a speech more than twice as long (426–62).

<sup>17</sup> As in the Assembly debates in the period preceding the seizure of power by the Four Hundred in 411 (*Thuc.* 8.53, 8.65–6).

in *de facto*, even if not *de jure*, control of the state.<sup>18</sup> Chapter 10 also examines the fantasy polities created in *Birds*, *Lysistrata*, and *Ecclesiazusae*, each of which is an absolute monarchy, but in none of which is monarchical power exercised by a male Athenian over male Athenians.

*Lysistrata*, in the play named after her, uses *her* (temporary) monarchical power to force the Athenians and Spartans, with their respective allies, to make peace with each other; and this dénouement, together with the heroine's memorable choice of a method for achieving it, has caused her and her creator to be adopted as the patron saints, one might say, of a succession of 'peace' campaigns in recent generations.<sup>19</sup> In Chapter 11 I argue that this is a complete misinterpretation of Aristophanes' play, in which *Lysistrata* is not at all opposed to war or violence as such, but only to war against Sparta, and that even with Sparta she is willing to make peace only on terms which in the real world, at the time of production, would have been utterly unobtainable—and which indeed proved to be so when the Four Hundred did seek peace a few months later. That conclusion is quite compatible with the view that Aristophanes did at the time believe (i) that it was highly desirable to end the war as speedily as possible, and (ii) that Sparta would be ready to accept peaceful coexistence with a powerful Athens controlling a maritime empire; after all, that was what the Four Hundred, or most of them, apparently believed when they came to power. Naive optimism is hardly an unknown phenomenon among amateur politicians, or even professional ones.<sup>20</sup>

If Aristophanes' dramas indeed often reflected specific political stances, they are likely on these occasions to have polarized his

<sup>18</sup> A similar conclusion emerges from my study in (1996c) of the choices made by Aristophanes and his rivals of which individuals to satirize and, at least equally important, which individuals not to.

<sup>19</sup> An early example of this, which its author subsequently found something of an embarrassment, is discussed in (2007b).

<sup>20</sup> I again find myself speaking of political naivety in connection with *Frogs* at the end of Ch. 13, and with *Knights* at the end of the discussion section in Ch. 10; see also (1999) 253 ('readers acquainted with twentieth-century politics may be surprised to learn that if a proposal for political action is "thoroughly sentimental" ... [or] disregards "the reality of military campaigns and the complexities of political negotiations" ... that is evidence that its public is not expected to take it seriously').

audiences rather sharply along the lines of their own political preferences. I have argued elsewhere<sup>21</sup> that the average theatre audience was probably a good deal more affluent, and a good deal more right-wing politically,<sup>22</sup> than the average meeting of the *ekklesia*; the case for this view is made considerably stronger if we accept arguments recently advanced which give the fifth-century Theatre of Dionysus a capacity much lower than the figure conventionally accepted, perhaps 7,000 or even less.<sup>23</sup> But class, wealth, and politics were not the only, or even the most prominent, lines of *division within the population* of Attica, and several others are explored in various parts of this volume.<sup>24</sup>

Chapter 6 deals mainly with the division between the old and the young. Throughout the history of Greek comedy (and of Roman comedy too) this is virtually always thought of as a simple two-way polar opposition, on one side young men, unmarried or recently

<sup>21</sup> See (1998c) and—partly overlapping with it—(1997), esp. 65–71. The case I there made was amicably criticized by Henderson (1998–2007) i. 19–22, but he had already accepted (p. 11) that the admission charge, ‘roughly equivalent to the cost of attending a major concert today... may well have deterred the poorer classes from attending’ unless strongly motivated; and Revermann (2006) 168, while also disagreeing with my position, himself notes that ‘[the] very introduction [of the theoretic subsidy] is best taken to be motivated by the perceived need to annihilate an economic entry barrier which debarred the poor from attending.’

<sup>22</sup> I define a “right-winger” as one who favours the active use of the power and institutions of the state to maintain or extend privilege and inequality among those under its jurisdiction, and a “left-winger” as one who favours the active use of the power of the state to reduce or eliminate such privilege and inequality. Strictly, therefore, all Athenian politicians were right-wing, since they all supported legal discrimination against slaves, women, and aliens. But I will follow their own practice and confine the universe of discourse [for this purpose] to adult male citizens, which is only what we always do when we speak of classical Athens as a democracy’ (1997: 68–9 n. 36).

<sup>23</sup> The best presentation—at least in English—of the case for this smaller-capacity theatre is by Csapo and Goette (2007) 97–100, 116–21. It should be borne in mind that, the smaller the seating capacity we assume for the theatre, the larger becomes the proportion of it that will be taken up by office-holders (magistrates, councillors, priests, etc.), by the families and friends of those involved in the productions, and (at the City Dionysia) by official delegations from perhaps two hundred allied states.

<sup>24</sup> See also (1984a), discussing mainly wealth and age, and (1998a), discussing gender, specifically the treatment of rape in Old and New Comedy respectively (I have returned to this subject in (2006b), where I argue that comedy’s attitude to rape, barbaric as it was, can by no means be regarded as straightforwardly typifying ‘the Athenian view’ of this crime).

married, on or just within the threshold of adult life, and on the other side the generation of their fathers. To a considerable extent, this way of thinking seems to have been characteristic of the whole culture; indeed there hardly existed a Greek expression for ‘middle-aged’.<sup>25</sup> But whereas in New Comedy it tends to be the young men who drive the action forward, and the play almost invariably ends with the marriage or betrothal of one or more of them, in Aristophanic comedy the older males are normally the central figures and, in the end, the triumphant ones. Almost every one of Aristophanes’ surviving plays contains at least one elderly male as a major character, and in almost every one of them an elderly male (often, by then, rejuvenated) dominates the play’s conclusion.<sup>26</sup> In two plays, *Clouds* and *Wasps*,<sup>27</sup> the action is largely centred on a conflict between an old man and his son; in each case the father has an old-fashioned, frugal lifestyle while the son moves expensively in high society. Chapter 9 focuses on *Wasps*. It criticizes what had become, in recent decades, an extremely popular model for interpreting much Greek imaginative literature (especially but not exclusively texts concerned with young adult males), the model of ‘initiation’ or ‘*ephebeia*’, arguing that there did not exist in fifth-century Athens any ritual, or combination of rituals, on which such a model could be based,<sup>28</sup> and *a fortiori* that the process which gives the action of *Wasps* its shape—the re-socialization of the old man Philocleon from his passion for judging

<sup>25</sup> The nearest we get is in *Men. Dysk.* 495–6 where the cook Sikon, discussing how to ingratiate oneself with strangers, says that when he knocks on a door and it is answered by a woman *τῶν διὰ μέσσοις*, he calls her ‘priestess’.

<sup>26</sup> In *Knights* this elderly male is Demos—who, in addition to becoming the ‘monarch of Greece’ (1330, 1333), is given multiple sexual rewards in the shape of two girls and a boy (1384–93); in *Frogs* it is Aeschylus (Dionysus, who has been the central figure of the whole play, neither speaks nor is spoken to in the final scene); in *Ecclesiazusae* it is Blepyrus, who during most of the play has cut a sorry figure in comparison to his wife, but who eclipses her in the *exodos* (where he too gets multiple sexual rewards). The exception to both generalizations is *Lysistrata*, where the only individual elderly male character, the *proboulos*, appears only in a single scene and is humiliated by the women.

<sup>27</sup> We know that there was a somewhat similar situation in Aristophanes’ earliest play, *Banqueters* (*Daitalēs*), except that the old man there had *two* sons, one traditionally and one sophistically educated; see *Clouds* 529 and *Ar. fr.* 205, 206, 225, 233.

<sup>28</sup> I discussed the implications of this for certain fifth-century *tragedies* in a 1996 conference paper, ‘Adolescence, *ephebeia*, and Athenian drama’, which I hope to publish in a future volume.

and condemning to a passion for drinking and revelling—cannot be regarded as any kind of variation or transformation of this non-existent model. Rather, I suggest that the key educative agent, in this and many other comedies, is the god Dionysus, ever ready to grant collective, pain-free pleasure to those who are willing to welcome him into their lives.<sup>29</sup> Philocleon proves, in the end, ready to do so, and he entirely dominates the ending of the play; his son Bdelycleon, despite having been the principal human agent of his father's re-socialization, despite having actually been responsible for taking a reluctant and protesting Philocleon to his first high-class symposium, is himself neither the drinking nor the laughing kind, and in the final scene he has been completely forgotten.

Chapter 6 explores Aristophanes' treatment of two dichotomies generally thought fundamental to the world-view of most classical Greeks, that between free people and slaves and that between citizen and alien. It argues that 'far from validating or confirming [these] status distinctions . . . Aristophanic comedy rather consistently negates and subverts them': free people are at least as likely as slaves to be beaten up with impunity, slave characters often establish a strong rapport with the audience, they regularly share the rewards of their masters' success, and deserving foreigners (provided they do not pretend to be citizens) normally end up doing better than undeserving Athenians. Perhaps, in assessing the importance of these and other status distinctions in the society of fifth- and fourth-century Athens, we should remember to compare that society not (or not only) to the western societies of our own day (let alone to our ideal model of what these societies *ought* to be like) but to other societies of *its* day, within and beyond the Greek world. When Plato makes Socrates and Adeimantus agree that in democratic Athens women and slaves (and, they add, animals) enjoyed an extraordinary and absurd degree of liberty and insubordination,<sup>30</sup> the modern reader wonders how he could possibly have been so utterly detached from reality; that is certainly not the reaction Plato expected to elicit from the contemporaries for whom he was writing.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Eur. *Ba.* 64–169, 378–433, 677–713—in contrast with most of the rest of *Bacchae*, which shows what Dionysus can do to those who are *not* willing to welcome him into their lives.

<sup>30</sup> Pl. *Rep.* 562b–d.



Women and animals certainly do demonstrate a high degree of insubordination in some of Aristophanes' comedies: animals in *Birds*,<sup>31</sup> women in *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazusae*, and *Ecclesiazusae*, in marked contrast to the other eight plays in which women play very marginal roles and seem to exist only for the convenience and pleasure of men. Chapter 12 examines two of the devices by which women in *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae* are made to assert and make evident this insubordination, by appropriating two practices that were normally treated as the exclusive preserve of males: the voluntary display of the naked body and the free use of obscene language.<sup>32</sup>

*The use of language* by, to, and about women (and men, in comparison with them) is the topic of Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 2 deals with a specific issue, considering whether it is possible to generalize the finding by David Schaps (1977) that in the Athenian courts women were not normally mentioned by their own personal names unless they were dead, or disreputable, or connected with the speaker's opponent. It concludes that this finding can indeed be generalized, not only to comedy but, so far as our evidence goes, to all public Athenian discourse: to be precise, a free man does not mention a respectable woman by her own name in public<sup>33</sup>—that is, in the presence of other free men who are not members of the woman's family. As Pericles was reported to have said,<sup>34</sup> among women 'the greatest honour belongs to her of whom there is the least report among men, whether for praise or blame'. *Lysistrata* is a notable exception to this principle; different (though not incompatible) explanations for her special status are offered in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 12.

<sup>31</sup> As also in the *Fishes* of Aristophanes' younger contemporary Archippus (cf. Archippus fr. 23, 27, 28), and probably in the *Beasts* of a dramatist of the generation before him, Crates (cf. Crates fr. 19).

<sup>32</sup> It is striking that both these practices feature in the behaviour of one notoriously insubordinate *tragic* woman, the Clytaemestra of Aeschylus' *Oresteia*: when facing the sword of her son she displays her breast to him (Aesch. *Cho.* 895–7), and when justifying the killing of her husband she speaks of his sexual infidelities and of her own in language that comes nearer to outright obscenity than anything else found in tragedy (Aesch. *Ag.* 1435–47; see (2002*b*) 154–7).

<sup>33</sup> Instead, just as in the courts, he will identify her, if necessary, by calling her the wife of X, the daughter of Y, etc.

<sup>34</sup> Thuc. 2.45.2 (addressed to war widows on the occasion of their husbands' state funeral!).

Chapter 1<sup>35</sup> is a much broader survey of gender-related<sup>36</sup> differences in linguistic usage in Athenian comedy. These differences are significant but not enormous; it is fairly easy for a woman to learn to talk like a man (or vice versa) sufficiently well to avoid detection. Some of them, though by no means all, can be seen as ‘clearly reflect[ing] the subordinate status of women in society’; but except in the case of obscene language, there is little positive evidence that the use by a woman of linguistic forms that were normally exclusive or almost exclusive to men would be regarded as unwomanly or insolent. If certain kinds of speech were considered improper for women, the reason was more likely to lie in their content than in their expression. An aspect of the subject that was not systematically discussed, or indeed seriously noticed, in this paper was the greater tendency of women than men to use euphemistic expressions; I analysed this a few years later in the study that appears here as Chapter 3 (see below).

I began my career in the discipline of general/theoretical linguistics, and the analysis of linguistic phenomena has continued to be one of my interests.<sup>37</sup> Chapter 3 deals with a linguistic phenomenon which is hardly the first that comes to mind when one thinks of Aristophanes, but of which his plays do in fact contain a great deal (nearly two hundred separate instances): euphemism. It finds that euphemisms are heavily concentrated in Aristophanes’ later plays (they are more than three times as frequent after 413 BC than before) and in the mouths of women (who use them, proportionately, two and a half times as often as men do), and examines particular scenes and passages in which they are especially prominent.

Chapter 4 is a study of the language of laughter<sup>38</sup> in Aristophanes, which shows that the poet’s vocabulary clearly distinguishes three

<sup>35</sup> This chapter, though first published only in 1995, originated from a lecture given at the University of Essex in 1980—that is, at about the same time as the publication of the paper appearing here as Ch. 2.

<sup>36</sup> Or, as the paper itself would say (see its first footnote), sex-related; I have let this particular linguistic practice stand as it was in the original publication, but today, only thirteen years later, it hardly seems to be current English any longer.

<sup>37</sup> Exemplified—in addition to the studies included in this volume—by (1980*a*, 2004*b*, 2004*d*, 2007*a*).

<sup>38</sup> And of smiling, which Greek treated lexically as a species of laughter.

varieties of laughter: laughing derisively at a person (often an enemy) who has been discomfited; laughing by the contrivance of a person who, unlike most people, benefits by being laughed at; and the spontaneous laughter of shared pleasure. All three are crucial to Old Comedy: the first is indulged at the expense of its satirical victims, the second is the objective of its composers, the third could almost be said to be the *summum bonum* of its heroes, often associated with one or more of the seven comic happinesses of ‘song, dance, food, drink, sex, sleep, and good company’.<sup>39</sup>

Two studies deal with the *composition and production history* of particular plays. One surviving Aristophanic play, *Clouds*, existed in antiquity in two forms,<sup>40</sup> one of which (the one we possess) included references to events later than the production of the play and other anomalous features; ancient scholars concluded that the poet had revised his script, the original play having been a failure, but had not in the end produced the revised version. Another, *Frogs*, was reportedly ordered to be restaged at some time later than its first production, and while our text of it contains no obvious anachronisms, it does contain some curious apparent doublets and one crucial passage (1410–67, just before the long-awaited conclusion of the Aeschylus–Euripides contest) where it has been frequently suggested, ever since antiquity, that there have been interpolations or displacements in the text. Chapter 8 attempts to infer from the available evidence as much information as possible about the content and structure of the original *Clouds* and about the process of revision, concluding that Aristophanes’ main concern in revising the play was to make the guilt of Strepsiades more apparent and his punishment less disturbing. Chapter 13, already discussed above in connection with the political content of *Frogs*, also argues that lines 1437–53 constitute a further doublet and that coherence can be restored, without positing any losses from or spurious additions to the text, simply by separating out the earlier and later versions of this passage; this was not a new proposal (it had been made more than once in the nineteenth century), but it had been neglected since 1956 in favour of

<sup>39</sup> Dover (1968) liii.

<sup>40</sup> So probably did one lost Aristophanic play, *Aiolosikon*, discussed in Ch. 14, but its two versions probably differed only in that one of them included the texts of choral songs and the other did not.

more elaborate alternatives.<sup>41</sup> In this case, I suggest, Aristophanes' motive in revising his script was to maintain suspense over the result of the contest,<sup>42</sup> which risked being dissipated if Euripides' final response was an obviously absurd one.

Finally, Chapter 14 seeks to unravel how the late ancient writer Platonius came to make certain muddled, and in some respects provably inaccurate, statements about the history of comedy (and of Athens), what factual inferences can safely be drawn directly from the passages in question (answer: none), and what we can learn by investigating the processes by which Platonius may have been led to write them (answer: quite a lot).

I will conclude this Introduction by quoting again two statements I have made in the past that attempt to articulate what may be called the Aristophanic spirit. The first appears three times already in the following pages, near the ends of Chapters 9, 4, and 6 (to list these papers in the order in which they were originally written):

The Dionysiac spirit, as it is presented in comedy, is the spirit of seeking enjoyment for oneself and others, as inclusively as possible . . . Its enemies are those who seek enjoyment for themselves at others' expense, or those who reject enjoyment for themselves and try to deprive others of it as well.

The other appeared first in the introduction I wrote for the revised (more accurately, rewritten) Penguin translation of *Acharnians*, *Clouds*, and *Lysistrata* (2002c: xxxix), and I repeated it in an autobiographical survey of my engagement with Aristophanes (2006a: 138). It was offered as a distillation of the sensitive account by Michael Silk<sup>43</sup> of 'the comic vision of Aristophanes', and it therefore claims no originality save of expression.

<sup>41</sup> Since that date no less than nine different rearrangements of the text have been proposed (all are referenced either in the body of the chapter or in the Addenda), not counting two attempts at defending the transmitted text in its entirety.

<sup>42</sup> Or rather over how it was to be reached. Most spectators will have realized from the start that Aeschylus was bound to win: the first speaker in an Aristophanic *agon* is always the loser, and Euripides had been the first speaker in every round of this contest. But if Euripides puts forward an idea that seems to merit serious attention (such as that of 1442–50) they will be wondering what Aeschylus will be able to say to cap it; whereas after something as silly as 1437–41 Aeschylus, as I put it in the article, 'only has to get the ball back over the net to win the championship'.

<sup>43</sup> Silk (2000) 403–9.

Nothing is beyond imagination; no one is contemptible (except those who choose to make themselves so); everything that can be seen and felt and experienced is of interest, and capable of generating happiness through laughter; and we are what our past has made us, though our nature also impels us to reach out for an ideal future.

With which thought, I leave you to read on.

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## The language of Athenian women

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper\* I will be examining the extent and nature of sex-based<sup>1</sup> differentiation in spoken Attic Greek between the late fifth and early third centuries BC, using as my main evidence the words put into the mouths of male and female characters by the composers of Athenian comedy, principally Aristophanes and Menander.<sup>2</sup> I will be considering not only forms and usages which are employed *exclusively* in speech by or to members of one alone of the two sexes, but also those which could in principle be used by (or to) members of either sex but which were in fact associated *disproportionately* with one.<sup>3</sup>

So far as Menander is concerned this field was admirably investigated a few years ago by David Bain [62] (1984), and I shall frequently

<sup>1</sup> Throughout the present paper I use the word 'sex' rather than the currently fashionable substitute 'gender', because 'gender' has a highly specific and quite different meaning in a linguistic context.

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise stated, statements and statistics about Aristophanes refer to the eleven plays that survive complete, and statements and statistics about Menander refer to the eighteen complete and fragmentary plays printed in Sandbach (1990) 1–300, together with the addenda *ibid.* 341–54.

<sup>3</sup> This of course begs the question of what constitutes a disproportion—or more precisely, perhaps, what constitutes due proportion. In this paper I shall in general assume that the due or expected extent to which a given usage is employed in speaking by or to females in a given corpus of material is the proportion which speech by or to females (as the case may be) in that corpus bears to the total size of the corpus, and significant departures from that expectation will be regarded as disproportions. The question of the extent to which speech by or to females is itself disproportionately rare, though sociologically a very important one indeed, will here be regarded as not a linguistic question.

be referring to his findings; the present inquiry, however, makes use of Aristophanes as well, thus very greatly extending the information base. Bain had a total corpus of only 346 lines spoken by women; each of three Aristophanic plays (*Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazousai*, *Ekklesiazousai*) easily exceeds that figure on its own.<sup>4</sup> Bain was reluctant to use Aristophanic comedy as primary evidence because 'individual characterization in Old Comedy is discontinuous' (Bain 1984: 27); but while one can fully agree with him that 'the wisest course is... not to regard isolated and unsupported utterances by [Aristophanes'] female characters as evidence for women's speech' (*ibid.*), this is very far from showing that evidence of consistent and distinctive patterns for women's speech in Aristophanes is of no value. Nor should we restrict ourselves to using Aristophanes 'to confirm findings obtained from Menander' (*ibid.*). Aristophanes, after all, was writing about a century earlier, and we know that there were significant changes in Attic Greek during that interval; moreover, we know independently that Aristophanes and Menander use different ranges of linguistic registers (for example Aristophanes makes far greater and freer use of sexual and excretory language that was normally regarded as taboo). Where Aristophanes and Menander agree, there, certainly, we have strong evidence for (male perceptions of) women's linguistic usage between (say) 430 and 290 BC. Where they disagree, provided we have an adequate sample of relevant evidence from each, and provided that there is no special reason in the particular case for discounting the Aristophanic evidence (e.g. because the usage only occurs in a [63] paratragic context), the most plausible explanation will be that usage has changed. In some cases we may be able to support this hypothesis by evidence external to comedy. I am sure, however, that Bain is right in regarding comedy as our primary source of evidence in this field, certainly if

<sup>4</sup> Using Bain's criterion ('all those lines which contain something, even a monosyllable, uttered by a female speaker', Bain (1984) 30; in the case of Aristophanes we must also include male speakers posing as women, like the old man in *Thesmophoriazousai*, and exclude female speakers posing as men, like Praxagora in *Ekklesiazousai* 173–240), *Lysistrata* (ed. Sommerstein 1990) has 768 'women's lines' (58.1% of its total length); *Thesmophoriazousai* (ed. Coulon 1923–30) has at least 708 (57.5%); *Ekklesiazousai* (ed. Vetta 1989) has 636 (53.8%). The other eight surviving Aristophanic comedies have between them a total of about 560 such lines (4.8%), of which the majority (377) are spoken by divinities.

we are considering the speech of fifth- and fourth-century Athenian women.<sup>5</sup>

It must first be said that while first-person sex differentiation<sup>6</sup> certainly exists in the language of Athenian comedy, it is not as strong as one might expect given the very wide difference between men's and women's lifestyles in Athenian society. Two plays of Aristophanes provide us with test situations. In one (*Thesmophoriazousai*, produced in 411 BC) a man disguises himself as a woman to attend, and speak at, a women's meeting; in another (*Ekklesiazousai*, produced in or about 391) a party of women disguise themselves as men to attend the citizen assembly, and they hold a dress-rehearsal on stage where several in succession speak, posing as men, while the others shout words of approval. In both cases the impostors succeed in speaking like the opposite sex. It is true that the man disguised as a woman is in the end unmasked, but it is not his use of language that betrays him.<sup>7</sup> As for the women who pose as men, they do, to be sure, need a certain amount of speech-training; they must remember not to use feminine [64] adjectives of themselves,<sup>8</sup> not to address their hearers as 'ladies',<sup>9</sup> and (though this is not strictly a linguistic point) not to talk too much about drink;<sup>10</sup> but the only part of this training that is really relevant to the present inquiry is that they have to learn to use

<sup>5</sup> On difficulties inherent in the use of other kinds of literature, see Bain (1984) 27–8; add that tragic drama, though written in fifth-century Athens and much concerned with contemporary social issues, is almost invariably set in a period many centuries earlier, and its female characters normally belong to a class which did not exist in fifth-century Athens, that of the wives and daughters of monarchs.

<sup>6</sup> Henceforward, differentiation governed by the sex of the speaker will be termed *first-person* differentiation; differentiation governed by the sex of the addressee, *second-person*; differentiation governed both by the sex of the speaker and by that of the addressee, *first-plus-second person*.

<sup>7</sup> The steps that lead to his discovery are: (1) a rumour has been going round the Agora, and is conveyed to the women, that a man has succeeded in infiltrating their meeting (*Thesm.* 584–91); (2) he is the only person present whom the other women do not know (614); (3) the supposed woman cannot name 'her' husband or 'her' tent-mate at the Thesmophoria (619–25); (4) he forgets that a woman could not urinate into the type of vessel called a *ἀμῖς* (633–4; cf. J. J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1991) 191).

<sup>8</sup> *Ekk.* 297–8 (contrast 204 and 213 where they use masculine adjectives in praising the speaker).

<sup>9</sup> *Ekk.* 165.

<sup>10</sup> *Ekk.* 132–46, 153–5.



men's rather than women's oaths.<sup>11</sup> I will return to this directly. The impression given is that any woman can learn without too much difficulty to speak like a man, and any man to speak like a woman. The differences are definite but minor.

## 2. OATHS\*

To judge both by comedy and by other texts such as the dialogues of Plato and even the speeches of the orators, classical Athenians were in the habit of making extensive use of oaths by various deities to strengthen their assertions;<sup>12</sup> and the great majority of these oaths were [65] used exclusively by men or exclusively by women.<sup>13</sup> Over time, too, there seems to have been a tendency for this sexual segregation of oaths to become more complete.

<sup>11</sup> Avoiding 'by Aphrodite' (*Ekkl.* 189–91) and 'by the Two Goddesses' (155–9)—which latter the speaker, on being pulled up, corrects to 'by Apollo'.

<sup>12</sup> Bain (1984) 42 remarks that in Menander 'men have many more (real) oaths than women'. It is not clear whether this refers to oath-types (i.e. *variety* of modes of swearing) or to oath-tokens (i.e. *frequency* of swearing). As regards oath-types the statement is true, with the caveat that some allowance must be made for the fact that men, with much more to say in the surviving texts, have more *opportunity* to use a wide variety of oaths. In Menander there are fifteen oath-types used by men and six used by women. In Aristophanes the contrast is less clear-cut: if we exclude those oaths appropriate only to foreigners (e.g. 'by Iolaus' for a Theban, 'by Kastor' for a Spartan), to philosophers (e.g. 'by Air'), or to birds ('by the kestrels'), there are fourteen oath-types used by men (five of which, however, occur only once each) and nine used by women. In terms of oath-tokens, however, it proves that women in these plays actually swear *more* than men. In Aristophanes, female speakers utter one oath in about every 23 lines, males one in every 35. In Menander (using Bain's approximate figures for 'total lines' and 'women's lines' (Bain (1984) 31), adjusting to take account of new discoveries (see n. 2), and ignoring altogether, as Bain does, prologues spoken by divinities, who in Menander never swear) women utter fourteen oaths in 372 lines (about one in every 27) while men utter 126 oaths in approximately 3,856 lines (or about one in every 31). And both these calculations actually understate the difference in relative frequency, because they count any line in which both a man and a woman speak as a 'women's line' (see n. 4 above) and therefore overstate the total number of lines spoken by women and understate the total spoken by men.

<sup>13</sup> The same is true of invocations of the gods not in the form of oaths, such as ὦ πολυμήτροι θεοί (used only by men throughout comedy) and ὦ θεοί (used only by women in Menander, but by both sexes in earlier comedy); see Bain (1984) 41–2.

Generally speaking, men swear by male and women by female deities, but there are exceptions in both directions. Women are found in comedy swearing by two male deities, Zeus and Apollo. There is a marked decline over our period in the frequency of their doing so. In Aristophanes, women use the oath by Zeus more frequently than all others put together, and not much less often than men in proportion to the total number of their oaths.<sup>14</sup> In Menander, on the other hand, out of fourteen oaths uttered by women<sup>15</sup> only two or at most three are by Zeus,<sup>16</sup> whereas among men Zeus still has nearly half of the total number of oaths uttered.<sup>17</sup> The oath by Apollo is already almost [66] exclusively male in Aristophanes; men use it about thirty times, women once for certain, once probably, and once possibly,<sup>18</sup> and in *Ekkl.* 158–60 a woman

<sup>14</sup> In the eleven comedies of Aristophanes, out of a total of 117 oaths uttered by females 63 (53.8%) are by Zeus (next in frequency are ‘the two goddesses’ 16, Aphrodite 13, Artemis 8, Hekate/Phosphoros 7); out of a total of 447 oaths uttered by males 295 (66.0%) are by Zeus (next come Apollo 30, Poseidon 23, Demeter 23, ‘the gods’ 23, Dionysos 14, Hermes 7).

<sup>15</sup> All but one of which, incidentally, are uttered by <women> not of Athenian citizen status (slaves, ex-slaves, hetairai, etc.); the exception is *Epir.* 819.

<sup>16</sup> *Georgos* 34, *Perik.* 757. The oath by a male deity whose name is lost, uttered by Pamphile at *Epir.* 819, may also be by Zeus (though Hymenaios has also been suggested, see Turner on *POxy* 3532.8). Otherwise the pattern is very similar to that in Aristophanes: there are six oaths by the ‘two goddesses’ (*Georgos* 24, 109; *Dysk.* 878; *Epir.* 543; *Mis.* 176; *Sik.* 33), two by Aphrodite (*Epir.* 480, *Perik.* 991), one by Artemis (*Dysk.* 874), one by Demeter (*Epir.* 955, discussed below), and one by ‘the gods’ (*Dis Exapaton* 95, where Sostratos is imagining what the Samian girl will be saying to herself; this is the only oath of this particular type ascribed to a woman either in Menander or in Aristophanes, as against 41 uttered by men, and it *may* be that Sostratos is envisaged as mistakenly putting in her mouth the sort of oath that he himself would use).

<sup>17</sup> Of a total of 126 oaths uttered by men 58 (46.0%) are by Zeus; next come ‘the gods’ with 18, Apollo 14, Helios 9, Dionysos 6, Athena and Asklepios 4. Neither Helios nor Asklepios figures among the 447 oaths uttered by Aristophanic males; Hermes has disappeared from the Menandrian repertoire.

<sup>18</sup> Certain: *Lys.* 917. Probable: *Frogs* 508; many scholars, including the three most recent editors (W. B. Stanford (London, 1963); D. Del Corno (Milan, 1985); and K. J. Dover (Oxford, 1993)), have held that the speaker is a man:\* but the speaker is a servant of Persephone (ἦ...θεός 504), not of Pluto whom (s)he never mentions, and addresses the supposed Herakles in a tone of gushing personal affection and personal determination to get him into the palace (ὦ φίλταθ’ 503, οὐ γάρ σ’ ἀφήσω 513, εἴθι four times in as many short speeches) which is hard to account for except on the assumption that *she* hopes to become Herakles’ latest conquest (on his matchless record in this respect cf. *Soph. Trach.* 459–460) even if she does find it necessary

practising to pose as a man, pulled up short by Praxagora for using a feminine oath, hastily corrects it to 'by Apollo'. In Menander the restriction of this oath to men has become total.

While the tendency was thus for oaths by gods to become more and more exclusively male, oaths by goddesses were by no means exclusively female. Some, indeed, were reserved for men. Only men swore by the warrior goddess Athena (once in Ar., four times in Men.) and, in our evidence, only men swore by Gē (once in Ar., once in Men.). In the case of Demeter the situation was more complex, and may have changed with time. In Aristophanes, the oath by Demeter alone was exclusively male (23 times) while the oath by Demeter and Kore together (τῶ θεῶ) was exclusively female (16 times). In Menander the latter oath remains confined to women, but Demeter appears alone in three men's oaths (*Dysk.* 570, 666, *Perik.* 505, all in the form νῆ τῆν Δήμητρα) and one woman's oath (*Epitr.* 955, νῆ τῆν φίλην Δήμητρα). The oath by Aphrodite was nearly always female (13 times in Ar., twice in Men.) but is used once by a man in [67] Aristophanes (*Thesm.* 254), significantly at the moment when he puts on a woman's garment. Other oaths by goddesses (Artemis; Hekate/Phosphoros; the minor deities Pandrosos and Aglauros) are used by women only; once in Aristophanes (*Clouds* 773) a male character applauding an elegant sophism swears by the goddesses of elegance, the Charites, but this oath does not occur at all elsewhere and may be an *ad hoc* coinage to suit the context.

In some cases a particular oath has an obvious appropriateness to one sex or the other, as in the case of Poseidon (horses, ships) or Artemis (maidenhood, childbirth). In others, the rationale (if any) of the oath's usage is less clear: why should Apollo, rather than (say) Dionysos, be the one male deity other than Zeus who could figure in women's oaths? Why should Aristophanic (though not Menandrian)

to tempt him with a few dancing-girls as well (possibly because she is a good deal less attractive than they); the fourfold εἴσιθι (answered by Xanthias/Herakles with εἰσέρχομαι, 520) may, especially if reinforced by appropriate gesture, be designed to be taken as a *double entendre*. Possible: *Ekkl.* 631; this has often been ascribed to Praxagora (so still R. G. Ussher (Oxford, 1973)), but M. Vetta (Milan, 1989) sees that it must belong to one of her male hearers: 'l'osservazione che si tratta di una trovata "veramente democratica" non può venire da Prassagora, che ne è stata l'artefice, ma è una forma di assenso'.

males so often swear by Demeter, almost alone among goddesses?<sup>19</sup> Some of these questions will probably remain unanswerable.

Not all the women who speak (and swear) in Athenian comedy are Athenian women. In Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* both male and female Spartan characters have speaking parts, and their swearing patterns are all but identical. The Spartan woman, Lampito, swears four times by 'the two gods' (Kastor and Polydeukes) and once by Kastor alone; the male Spartans who appear later in the play swear six times by 'the [68] two gods', once by Kastor, and twice by Zeus. We cannot take this as evidence for actual Spartan practice (Aristophanes is unlikely ever to have met a Spartan woman); possibly Spartan men and women are made to swear alike because Spartan women were supposed to be unfeminine in certain aspects of their behaviour (e.g. gymnastic training, cf. *Lys.* 80–2), but quite likely Aristophanes, in a scene in which everyone on stage was female, was merely more concerned to mark out Lampito as a Spartan than to mark her out as a woman, and therefore made her swear in the manner supposed to be typical of Spartan men.

### 3. ADJECTIVES

Bain (1984) 33–9 investigates the usage of a variety of specific words by women in Menander: one interjection (*ai'*), two nouns, mainly

<sup>19</sup> Demeter's seeming loss of popularity in Menander may be partly due to metrical reasons: her affirmative oath *νὴ τῆν Δῆμητρα*, with its four consecutive long syllables, cannot fit into any iambic or trochaic line (though the negative form *μὰ τῆν Δῆμητρα* can); Aristophanes on the other hand had been able to use the affirmative form in his many scenes in anapaestic rhythm. The entire absence from Menander of oaths by Hera might have a similar explanation, were they not absent from Aristophanes as well. Such oaths do occur in Plato and in Xenophon's Socratic works; they are not confined to Socrates or even to people who knew him (Lysimachos in Pl. *Laches* 181a is meeting Socrates for the first time; cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4.45 (Kallias), 8.12 (Hermogenes), 9.1 (Lykon)). Dodds (1959) 105 notes that in Plato they 'always accompan[y] an expression of admiration', and this appears to be true in Xenophon also (*Mem.* 3.11.5, 4.2.9, 4.4.8; *Oik.* 10.1, 11.19; *Symp.* 4.54; and the passages cited above). That all who use this oath are male is of little significance, since except for Diotima—who uses no oaths at all—women hardly speak in our Socratic material. It remains a mystery why Hera's name should be absent from the oaths of comedy, which is not deficient in expressions of admiration and wonderment.\*

used in the vocative (πάππας and τέκνον), and three adjectives (τάλας, δύσμορος, and γλυκός). To the vocative nouns (which are only two of very many in which sex-based differentiation is found) I will return later. On the interjection αἶ I have nothing to add to Bain's discussion. On the adjectives I wish to amplify and modify his observations, and to add another candidate to the list of distinctive items.

(1) The use of the adjective τάλας in Menander is fully discussed by Bain (1984) 33–5. In Aristophanes the pattern is partly similar and partly different. The overall figures for the use of the adjective (39 times by males, 30 times by females) are of comparatively little significance, since they mask sharp contrasts between the sexes. The adjective is used, in Aristophanes, in six ways:

(a) In the exclamation οἶμοι τάλας. In Aristophanes this is used *only* by males (27 times, plus one instance of οἶμοι μοι τάλας); the feminine form οἶμοι τάλαινα does not occur (contrast Men. *Dysk.* 189, *Mis.* 247).<sup>20</sup> The exclamation always indicates genuine (or at least [69] comically credible) distress, alarm, or annoyance (for the last-mentioned cf. *Birds* 1260, *Thesm.* 625, *Frogs* 926, *Wealth* 880; in *Birds* 1646 Peisetairos is pretending to be distressed on Herakles' behalf at the way Poseidon is allegedly deceiving him).

(b) In the rather similar exclamation αἰβοῖ τάλας, denoting disgust (*Knights* 957, *Peace* 544, both uttered by males).

(c) In the exclamations τάλας ἐγώ and τάλαιν' ἐγώ. These are semantically similar to (a), but only the feminine form seems to have been in actual spoken use. It appears six times, all in reasonably normal contexts;<sup>21</sup> the masculine form appears only thrice, all in solo lyrics of paratragic character, two by the wounded Lamachos (*Ach.* 1192, 1210) and one by the plank-bound in-law of Euripides playing the role of Andromeda, though at this particular moment speaking in his own name (*Thesm.* 1038). It thus appears that τάλαιν' ἐγώ should be regarded as the feminine equivalent, in Aristophanes, of οἶμοι τάλας.

<sup>20</sup> The near-total avoidance of οἶμοι τάλας in tragedy (where its component words are so common separately) is remarkable: it occurs three times in the mouth of the Sophoclean Philoktetes (*Phil.* 416, 622, 995) and only once to our knowledge elsewhere (*Soph. OT* 744).

<sup>21</sup> *Lys.* 735, 944; *Thesm.* 559, 690, 695; *Wealth* 1044.

(d) In paratragic contexts. In addition to the passages just mentioned there are two or three others spoken by men, and one by (a man acting the part of) a woman.<sup>22</sup>

(e) As a vocative, in three forms. The feminine *τάλαινα* is used six times by women,<sup>23</sup> always without an accompanying name or noun, [70] and once by a man apostrophizing his heart, *with* an accompanying noun (*Ach.* 485 ὦ *τάλαινα* καρδιά). The neuter *τάλαν* is used, as in Menander, by women only, nine times.<sup>24</sup> Also exclusive to women are the superlative vocatives *ταλάντατε* (*Wealth* 684, 1046, 1060) and *ταλαντάτη* (*Thesm.* 760).\*

(f) On its own as a parenthetical expression of pity or self-pity. Outside paratragic contexts this is found only three times, one speaker being a man (*Peace* 251, pitying the Sicilians) and two being women (*Lys.* 760, *Thesm.* 385, both in self-pity). The form is always *τάλαινα*.

Thus the great majority of uses of *τάλας* are peculiar either to men or to women; except where tragic diction is being imitated, out of the five inflected forms of the adjective that occur in Aristophanes only one, *τάλαινα*, is used by speakers of both sexes, and then only marginally (women use it fourteen times, men only twice, both times incidentally in soliloquies or asides).

(2) In Menander *δύσμορος* is exclusively a women's word (Bain, *op. cit.* 36). In Aristophanes, contrariwise, women do not use it at all, its only occurrence being on the lips of Euelpides (or Peisetairos<sup>25</sup>) in *Birds* 7.

<sup>22</sup> Men: *Ach.* 454 (Euripides, who speaks wholly in paratragic language throughout the scene), 1203 (the wounded Lamachos), and probably *Peace* 1225 (where the previous line ended with the paratragic phrase *θώρακος κύτει*, cf. Rau (1967) 195). Woman: *Frogs* 1346 (the spinning-woman in Aeschylus' mock-Euripidean lyric). For the distribution of *τάλας* in (Euripidean) tragedy see McClure (1995) 45–8, who suggests, not implausibly, that *Ach.* 485 may also be paratragic (note that the speaker, Dikaiopolis, is wearing a Euripidean costume, speaks of himself as having 'swallowed a dose of Euripides', and will shortly be making a speech explicitly based on one by the Euripidean Telephos).

<sup>23</sup> *Frogs* 565; *Ekk.* 90, 156, 190, 242, 919. Only at *Ekk.* 242 is the vocative preceded by the particle ὦ, and there the particle is not metrically guaranteed and may have intruded from the previous line.

<sup>24</sup> *Lys.* 102, 910, 914; *Thesm.* 644; *Frogs* 559; *Ekk.* 124, 526, 658, 1005. Five times the addressee is a man, twice a woman, and twice the context leaves it unclear. The particle ὦ is present in three cases and absent in six.

<sup>25</sup> In the opening scene of *Birds* it is not clear which speaker is which; see Marzullo (1970) 181–91.

(3) Both in Aristophanes and in Menander the adjective *γλυκός* is used both by men and by women. In what follows I will ignore passages in which *γλυκός* is used to refer to sweet or pleasant *things* (wine, cakes, sleep, song, etc.) and consider only those in which it refers to *persons* or their qualities. *Γλυκός* and its cognates are used in this way fourteen times in Aristophanes' eleven surviving plays, seven times by men and seven times by women. Men use these words in two sorts of context only. One is in addressing or describing females for whom they feel intense desire;<sup>26</sup> the other is the scene in which [71] Dikaiopolis cadges beggars' stage-properties from Euripides, or rather the last quarter of that scene (*Ach.* 462, 467, 475) when Euripides is nearing the end of his patience and Dikaiopolis has to resort to the most desperate and ludicrous wheedling in order to persuade him to part with the last few items.<sup>27</sup> In women's mouths it simply connotes affection, normally with no erotic connotations; four times women use it (always in the superlative or in an intensive compound) in speaking to or of each other,<sup>28</sup> twice a mother uses it in addressing her young child (*Lys.* 889, 890). Only once (*Ekk.* 985) does a woman use a cognate form (*γλύκων*) in addressing a man, and though she does desire him sexually, her tone at the time is less amatory than admonitory and legalistic.<sup>29</sup> In Menander the pattern is the same. Men use *γλυκός* only in soliloquy, talking about the women they love (*Dysk.* 669, *Epitr.* 888); women (or rather—in the eighteen-play corpus we are considering—one woman, Habrotonon in *Epitrepontes*<sup>30</sup>) use it in speaking to or about anyone, male or female, of

<sup>26</sup> *Peace* 526 (Trygaios praising the fragrance of Theoria, on whose charms cf. 713–17, 726–8, 871–909); *Lys.* 872 (Kinesias to Myrrhine); *Thesm.* 1192 (the Scythian on Elaphion's tongue, which has apparently just been in contact with his); *Ekk.* 1046 (Epigenes to his girlfriend, to whom he proceeds to promise a 'long thick thank-you' for getting rid of the old woman who had tried to seize him for herself).

<sup>27</sup> The comic device of a male thus treating an ugly old man as a love-object is repeated in *Knights* 725 ff. (Paphlagon and the Sausage-seller with Demos), *Thesm.* 1105 ff. (Euripides/Perseus with his in-law, whom the Scythian obstinately refuses to accept is Andromeda), and *Frogs* 52–67 (Dionysos with Euripides).

<sup>28</sup> *Lys.* 79 and 970 (*παγγλυκέρα*; this line is certainly spoken by the women's chorus or their leader, cf. Sommerstein (1990) ad loc.); *Ekk.* 124, 241.

<sup>29</sup> 'That [sc. preference given to young women] was under the old government, sweetie; now the ruling is to handle our [sc. old women's] cases first'.

<sup>30</sup> But cf. also Men. fr. 396 <= 350 KA>, where a woman character apparently addresses *the audience* as *ἄνδρες γλυκύτατοι*.

whom they are fond (*Epir.* 143, 862, 953, also 989 if, as is likely, Chairestratos is there picturing to himself Habrotonon's words or thoughts). It may be significant that, both in Aristophanes and in Menander, women of *citizen status* do not use *γλυκός* (or cognates) when addressing men, except in the second half of *Ekklesiazousai* when the constraints on their sexual freedom have been swept away; such an expression would perhaps have been too easy to misinterpret, especially if, as [72] Habrotonon's use of it suggests, it was characteristic of young prostitutes.\*

(4) A fourth adjective that gives interesting results, both in Aristophanes and in Menander, is *φίλος* (not considered by Bain). Here again we must separate out distinct usages. Much of the time *φίλος* is little more than a descriptive and classificatory term, its normal function being to categorize a person as being among those towards whom one is bound by the mutual obligations of *φιλία*, to whom one can look for help when needed and to whom one must if possible give help when needed, etc. In some of its uses, however, *φίλος* acquires a tone of emotional fondness. This is true especially, though not exclusively, (i) of the vocative case and (ii) of the superlative *φίλτατος*. And in just these forms we find that it is disproportionately women who employ the word. In the eleven plays of Aristophanes, the vocative of *φίλος* is used nineteen times by males<sup>31</sup> and fifteen times by females (or males disguised as females); while *φίλτατος* is used twenty-two times by males and fifteen times by females. The proportions of uses by women to total uses of these forms, at 44% and 40% respectively, should be compared with the proportion of women's lines to the total length of the text, which is about 17% (see n. 4). In the three plays where a majority of the text is spoken by women (or men disguised as women), they use the vocative of *φίλος* twelve times, against once by a man (and that man a sexual invert), and *φίλτατος* eleven times, against twice by men. In Menander the tendency for these forms to be particularly characteristic of women is if anything stronger than in Aristophanes. The simple vocative of *φίλος* is rare, but of its three occurrences two (*Georgos* 87, *Epir.* 555)

<sup>31</sup> This includes the chorus of *Birds* (676), despite their mixed gender (cf. 298–304), and the sexual invert Kleisthenes (*Thesm.* 574). It also includes (as two instances) Strepsiades' paratragic *ὦ φίλος*, *ὦ φίλος* at *Clouds* 1167.



are uttered by women;<sup>32</sup> while of the 27 instances of *φίλτατος* fourteen, an actual majority, are spoken by [73] women<sup>33</sup> who speak, be it remembered, at most nine per cent of the lines in the corpus; or to put it another way, men use forms of *φίλτατος* about once in every 297 lines, women use them about once in every 25 lines—twelve times as often. Statistics like these make it all the more remarkable that the characters of Plato's dialogues, all but one of whom are male, address each other as *ὦ φίλε* (or *ὦ φίλτατε*, *ὦ φιλούμενε*, etc.) no less than 202 times.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4. FORMS OF ADDRESS

In the use of forms of address in Attic there is evidence both of second- and of first-person differentiation. I will consider them in that order.

When one's audience is wholly female, whether one woman or a group of women, the basic principle governing the choice of address forms is that both the most disdainful and the most deferential expressions are avoided. One way of showing contempt for a male addressee, or at least a lack of desire for closer acquaintance with him, was to address him as *ἀνθρωπε*; but though, as is well known, the noun *ἀνθρωπος* is frequently used in other cases than the vocative to

<sup>32</sup> The third case is *Dysk.* 192, when Sostratos appeals to the 'dear Dioskoroi' to bear witness to the incredible beauty of his beloved; for such use of *φίλος* in the vocative by men in addressing divinities cf. also *Men. fr.* 1 and 287 <= *fr.* 1 and 247 KA>.

<sup>33</sup> Including *Dysk.* 648 and *Epitr.* 989, where a male speaker quotes a woman's actual or hypothetical words.

<sup>34</sup> This total represents 5.9% of all forms of address found in Plato (3,410) and 20.1% of those which do not consist simply of the name of the addressee with or without *ὦ* (1,007); *φίλος* (vel sim.) is much the commonest of all vocative epithets (*proxime accedit ἀγαθός*, together with its various superlatives, which occur 158 times). The two female speakers, Xanthippe (who speaks only at *Phaedo* 60a) and Diotima, use *φίλε* twice out of a total of 15 forms of address in their utterances. 'Plato' here refers to the whole of the nine Thrasyllan tetralogies except the letters. The predilection for *φίλος* must be regarded as a Platonic rather than a Socratic peculiarity; its vocative occurs only once among the 421 forms of address in the Socratic works of Xenophon (*Apol.* 28: Socrates making a jesting retort to his passionate devotee Apollodoros, 'stroking his head and laughing'). See further Halliwell (1995).\*

refer disdainfully or condescendingly to low-status women, no woman, of whatever status, is ever so addressed. Similarly, it is common in comedy for men to address each other, with little or no offensive tone, as 'god-forsaken one' (κακόδαιμον), 'miserable one' (πόνηρε), [74] 'ridiculous one' (καταγέλαστε), and by other epithets implying stupidity or misfortune, and women also use these expressions to men and to each other; but, at least in Aristophanes, it is decidedly rare for a man to use them to a woman.<sup>35</sup> The explanation may be that while a genuine insult may be hurled at anyone (see below), a jesting *mock-insult* implies a certain feeling of fellowship with the addressee which a free man might be reluctant to acknowledge towards a woman, except perhaps his own wife.<sup>36</sup> Epithets which genuinely carry offensive overtones, imputing criminality, immorality, or malediction, such as 'polluted one' (μιαρά, μιαρωτάτη),<sup>37</sup> 'accursed one' (κατάρατε), 'destined to perish horribly' (κάκιστ' ἀπολουμένη), can be freely used by men quarrelling with women.<sup>38</sup> A man is permitted, it seems, to be rude to a woman (particularly perhaps if, like several in Aristophanes, she starts acting or talking above her station); what he may not, or at any rate does not, do is *pretend* to be rude to her.

<sup>35</sup> In Aristophanes there are altogether 99 vocative expressions imputing misfortune or stupidity to the addressee; in 67 cases both speaker and addressee are male, in 11 both are female, in 17 a female is addressing a male, but (despite the powerful stereotype which maintained that all women were stupid) only four times do we find a male addressing a female or females in this way (*Peace* 113; \**Lys.* 521, 891, 948). In Menander the number of relevant cases is very small and the evidence for or against differentiation is inconclusive (male to male, 21 cases; female to female, *Perik.* 758 and *Samia* 255; female to male, *Epir.* 468 and *Samia* 69; male to female, *Dysk.* 587 and probably *Heros* 68).

<sup>36</sup> A jesting mock-insult will only produce its desired effect if the addressee is, or can be assumed to be, sufficiently familiar with the speaker to be confident that the insult was not seriously meant. Of the six cases in which a male addresses a female or females with an epithet implying stupidity or misfortune in Aristophanes and Menander, three are of a husband addressing his wife, and in two of the other three the speaker is a slave.

<sup>37</sup> This adjective figures in jesting mock-insults in Plato, but it is never so used in Aristophanes (cf. Halliwell (1995) 113–15); it is not found in the vocative in Menander.

<sup>38</sup> In Aristophanes this group of epithets are used about as often by men to women (11 times) as by women to men (10 times); in Menander, so far as we can tell (several relevant speaker-assignments are uncertain), men use them to women five times, women to men only once (*Dysk.* 441).

At the other end of the scale, it was common in addressing men to use one of a variety of honorific or complimentary epithets, the most common of which were ἀγαθὲ ‘good’ and its superlatives ἄριστε and [75] βέλτιστε. In over eighty places in Aristophanes use is made of vocative adjectives of this kind. In only seven of these is a woman the addressee, and even in these the speaker is each time either her own husband or another woman.<sup>39</sup> Of some twenty-five such vocative epithets in Menander two are addressed to women, and each time the speaker is a slave (once male, once female) and the addressee a citizen woman (but not the lady of the slave’s own household). Free men, it seems, did not pay compliments, even of this formal and nominal kind, to women other than their wives.\*

There were no forms of address reserved exclusively for women addressees, except those which were inevitably so reserved by virtue of their meaning, such as ‘woman’ (γύναι) and ‘old woman’ (γραιῦ). There was a sharp contrast between the latter and its masculine counterparts γέρον and πρεσβῦτα ‘old man’, which were respectful forms of address and could be used, for example, by a slave answering the door to a caller of citizen status (Ar. *Ach.* 397): the contexts in which γραιῦ (or its diminutive γράδιον) is used show that it is inherently disparaging,<sup>40\*</sup> and in Menander it is used only to slaves or ex-slaves.

In general we may say that forms of address used by men to women in normal circumstances (i.e. when the rules of etiquette had not broken down, as they might in a fierce altercation) were distinguished by their relative neutrality and colourlessness, devoid alike of conventional compliment and ironic mock-insult. But then neutrality and colourlessness were, it may well be said, precisely what the Athenian male expected in a citizen woman.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Husband: *Birds* 1759; *Lys.* 883, 945. Another woman: *Lys.* 549, 762, 765 (all plural) and 1108.\*

<sup>40</sup> In *Lysistrata* it is used to accompany a curse (506) and a kick (797–9), at *Thesm.* 1073 in an impatient attempt to silence the uncontrollable Echo, and at *Ekk.* 903 (by a female speaker) in an exchange of insults.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Thuc. 2.45.2: ‘that woman is highly thought of who has the least reputation among males, whether for praise or blame’. Even to mention the *name* of a living woman in public could be taken to imply that there was something not quite proper about her (see Schaps (1977) and Ch. 2 below).

[76] Passing now from second- to first-person differentiation, the forms of address which are used exclusively or preponderantly by women are principally those involving the adjectives with feminine associations—τάλας, φίλος, γλυκός—already mentioned. In addition, only a woman can address an individual man<sup>42</sup> as ‘man’ (ἄνερ),<sup>43</sup> and it is likely, though not certain, that in ordinary (as distinct from poetic) speech τέκνον ‘child’ was used as a form of address only by (older) women.<sup>44\*</sup>

There is a much longer list of forms of address which are scarcely or not at all used by women.<sup>45</sup>

(1) *Diminutive forms* ending in -ιον, -άριον, -ίδιον (e.g. χρυσίον, παιδάριον, παπίδιον, γράδιον) are very frequently (41 times in Aristophanes) used in the vocative by men and children as an affectionate or ingratiating form of address; there is only one [77] Aristophanic instance (*Eccl.* 891) of such a form being used by a woman.

<sup>42</sup> Most often her husband, but Ar. *Thesm.* 614 shows that any man may be so addressed.\*

<sup>43</sup> In Aristophanes the converse also applies: only a man may address an individual woman simply as ‘woman’ (γύναι); any woman may be so addressed (e.g. the brides-woman at *Ach.* 1063, the bread-seller at *Wasps* 1399), though most often it is the speaker’s wife. Ar. fr. 592.6 is not provably an exception, since only the last five letters of the line survive and the full vocative expression may have been [ὦ φίλη] γύναι as in *Lys.* 95. In Menander γύναι is also used by women—but only in one passage, where it occurs five times in sixteen lines (*Epitr.* 858, 859, 864, 866, 873) in the recognition-scene between Habrotonon and Pamphile. It is perhaps relevant that Habrotonon and Pamphile have never spoken to one another before—despite which the emotions involved in their meeting are so powerful that each also finds herself addressing the other as φιλιτάτη (860, 871; on the deployment of forms of address in this scene see Gomme and Sandbach (1973) 359).\*

<sup>44</sup> See Bain (1984) 38–9. Ar. *Thesm.* 1198 is prima facie an exception; but the speaker is a Scythian slave whose Greek is semi-pidginized and who has particular trouble with gender, and the possibility is very real that Aristophanes has made him address the dancing-girl in a manner normally employed only by women (and actually employed by the girl’s supposed owner ‘Artemisia’—really Euripides in disguise—at 1181). In Ar. fr. 129 one of the two speakers is a bread-seller; since bread-sellers in Old Comedy (like other working women) were normally envisaged as relatively old (cf. Henderson (1987b) 121–2) it is likely that she is the person who ends each of three half-line utterances with ὦ τέκνον.

<sup>45</sup> Whether ὦ τᾶν (exclusively masculine in Euripides; see McClure (1995) 55) should be included among them is a moot point; in its twenty Aristophanic occurrences Lysistrata (*Lys.* 501, 1163; both times addressing men) is the only woman to use it.\*

(In Menander women do use these forms, but only in addressing slaves or ex-slaves [*Georgos* 54; *Perik.* 190, 322].)\*

(2) Women do not use those forms of address which imply a brusque *assumption of superiority*, like ἄνθρωπε ‘fellow’\* or the yet curter forms which use the nominative instead of the vocative case (e.g. ὁ Ξανθίας, ὁ Τριβαλλος); and the sharp monosyllable παῖ, the normal summons to a slave, is used only by men.<sup>46\*</sup>

(3) *Address by name*, by far the commonest of all forms of address, is used freely by women among themselves, but in Aristophanes they hardly ever address men in this way: against 23 instances of women addressing women by name, there are at most<sup>47</sup> three of women so addressing men, one of which is paratragic (*Thesm.* 1134) while in another (*Thesm.* 634) the addressee is the ultra-effeminate Kleisthenes. In Menander, however, this differentiation has disappeared; women address men by name seven times, other women six times.\*

(4) Several of the most common *complimentary vocative epithets* such as βέλτιστε, ἄριστε ‘excellent one’ and μακάριε, δαιμόνιε ‘blest one’<sup>48</sup> are scarcely used at all by women, in whom it may have been thought presumptuous to profess to judge the worth of members of the superior sex. In Aristophanes these four epithets are used in the vocative a total of 35 times by men and twice by women (*Lys.* 762, and *Eccl.* 1129 where the speaker is drunk); in Menander 21 times by men and again twice by women (*Epitr.* 873—in the remarkable Habrotonon–Pamphile dialogue already discussed—and *Samia* 81).

(5) Whereas a man is free to address a woman as γράυ, women do not address men by terms designating the man’s age such as γέρον, [78] νεανίσκε, μειράκιον. There are no exceptions either in Aristophanes or in Menander, save that in Menander’s *Georgos* Philinna,

<sup>46</sup> A woman may say παιδίον (*Perik.* 190, 322).

<sup>47</sup> ‘At most’ because *Thesm.* 1175 is a doubtful case; it is probable, however, that the piper Teredon is a boy rather than a girl (see Sommerstein (1994) on 1160–75, where I also argue against the suggestion of Taplin (1993) 107–8 that Teredon is none other than the piper who accompanied the whole performance).

<sup>48</sup> That δαιμόνιε is in Attic a respectful, deferential form of address was shown by Sommerstein (1977c) 272.

formerly Myrrhine's nurse, addresses Myrrhine and her son alike as τέκνον (25, 84, 109).<sup>49\*</sup>

Indeed, especially in Aristophanes, if one compares the spectrum of forms of address used by men to each other with those used by women to men, they scarcely meet at any point,\* except where the addressee is a visitor from abroad, who stands in the same relation of outsidership to all members of the community, and whom men and women alike may address as ξένε (cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 882, 893, 1107).

## 5. OBSCENE LANGUAGE

Various studies of various cultures have observed that women avoid using what is regarded as 'obscene' language, though in some<sup>50</sup> they use such language freely among themselves and avoid it only when speaking to or in front of men. Before we can deal with this subject as regards Aristophanes<sup>51</sup> we must know what we mean by an obscenity. We certainly do not mean any and all of the words discussed in Henderson (1991a); for his catalogue (very properly, given its aims) includes many euphemistic and/or metaphorical expressions which taken literally are not obscene at all, and such expressions are freely used by women. By an obscenity, or more precisely what I shall call a *primary* obscenity, I mean a word which directly denotes some sexual or excretory organ, state, or activity, and whose distribution in literature puts it in the class defined [79] by Bain (1991) 53:

Such words are almost entirely absent from the higher prose genres like oratory, philosophy and history (as well as from romance) and, although they describe entities and activities which are often the concern of doctors, they are scrupulously avoided by literate writers on medicine. Naturally they

<sup>49</sup> Ar. fr. 148 (ὦ πρεσβύτα) is a possible further exception, if the speaker there is indeed, as the editors of *PCG* (followed by Gil (1989) 69) assume, a *lena* rather than a *leno*.

<sup>50</sup> An example is Moroccan Berber (Roux 1952). In Attica the use of obscene language by women was particularly associated with the women-only banquet at the festival of the Haloa (Σ Luc. 280.14–20 Rabe; Parke (1977) 98–9).\*

<sup>51</sup> The incidence of obscene language, as defined below, in Menander is too low for analysis to be useful.

are also absent from the higher poetic genres. Their literary appearances and those of their reflexes tend to be most prolific in Old Comedy. Elsewhere their appearances are practically restricted to iambic poetry, New Comedy... and satirical and sub-literary prose. Often they figure in non-literary provenances, in graffiti, curse tablets, and magical texts.

In *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazousai*, and *Ekklesiazousai* there occur sixteen words, or families of words, of this class, a total of 75 times.<sup>52</sup> Of these 75, men utter 55<sup>53</sup> and women 20,<sup>54</sup> though in all these plays, as we have seen, women have more to say than men overall. Moreover, while men are quite uninhibited about using these words in the presence of women,<sup>55</sup> women never normally utter them in the presence of men. This distinction emerges not so much from the raw [80] figures<sup>56</sup> as from the fact that all cases where women utter primary obscenities in the presence of men are in various ways exceptional. In the first of them (*Lys.* 439–42) its exceptionality is shown by the male's reaction:

FIRST OLD WOMAN. Then, by Pandrosos, I tell you, if you so much as lay a hand on her [*Lysistrata*], you'll get such a pasting you'll shit [*ἐπιχρεεῖ*] all over the place!

<sup>52</sup> *βινεῖν* (+ derivatives), *δέφρασθαι*, *καταπύγων*, *κινεῖν* (in its sexual sense), *κύσθος*, *λαικάζειν*, *ληκᾶν*, *πέος*, *πέρδεσθαι*, *προσκινεῖσθαι*, *προκτός* (+ derivatives and compounds), *πυγίζειν*, *σπλεκοῦν*, *στύεσθαι*, *χέζειν* (+ compounds), *ψωλή*.

<sup>53</sup> Including *βινούμεναι* at *Ekk.* 228, which is spoken by a woman posing as a man.

<sup>54</sup> Including those at *Thesm.* 493, 570 which are uttered by a man posing as a woman. In the other eight surviving plays the only instance of a woman using a primary obscenity is at *Ach.* 1060, where the woman's words are not actually heard by the audience (the *νυμφεύτρια*, conveying a message from the bride which she may or may not be repeating verbatim, whispers to *Dikaiopolis*, who then repeats aloud her request that he should make it possible for the bridegroom's *πέος* to stay at home—on which his comment is *ὡς γελοῖον, ὦ θεοί*).

<sup>55</sup> It happens nineteen times, and no woman ever complains. This figure excludes cases where the only women present are a chorus (or part of a chorus) taking no part in the action; there is good reason to believe that the presence of such an inactive chorus could be dramatically disregarded, see Ch. 2 below, p. 45 n. 10, and Sommerstein (1990) 202.

<sup>56</sup> Again excluding cases (viz. *Lys.* 715, 776) where the only members of the opposite sex present are an inactive (half-)chorus, the number of primary obscenities uttered by women in mixed company is four, representing 17% of all primary obscenities uttered in mixed company, whereas the 16 uttered by women when only women are present represent 31% of all primary obscenities uttered in single-sex company.

MAGISTRATE. Shit indeed! Where's another archer? Tie up this one first, because she can't even hold her tongue.

Clearly the woman has grossly violated a norm. The other three cases all come in the second half of *Ekklesiazousai* (706, 709, 1062). Here the women have established a New Republic in which they are the rulers; the political and legal competence of men has been restricted in just the ways in which that of women was restricted in real life;<sup>57</sup> and whereas in real life fights between men over a hetaira or a handsome boy were commonplace, here we see tussles between women for the services of a young man, who is dragged off, a helpless victim, by one old hag after another (and eventually by two rivals simultaneously). It is not surprising in this topsy-turvy world to find women using primary obscenities in addressing men\*—though men, most of whom<sup>58</sup> show clearly by their behaviour that they have yet to adapt to their subordinate status, do not cease to use them in addressing women either. [81]

## 6. PARTICLES

There is some slight evidence that women had, or were thought to have, different preferences from men in the use of particles. It has often been suggested<sup>59</sup> that in one scene in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (549–78), involving two women innkeepers (or an innkeeper and her servant), there is grossly excessive use of the particle  $\gamma\epsilon$  (especially in 559–67 where it occurs five times in eight lines spoken by the two women); this, however, is not characteristic of women elsewhere in comedy, and it would be risky to extrapolate from it. At most we could say that Aristophanes thought that this habit of repeatedly bestowing special emphasis on a word or phrase (so frequently that the emphasis virtually loses its significance) was a good way of

<sup>57</sup> Thus e.g. a man cannot now make a valid contract for more than the value of a *medimnos* of barley (1024–5).

<sup>58</sup> With the exception of the law-abiding citizen of 730–871—who, for what it is worth, utters no primary obscenities.

<sup>59</sup> In the commentaries of Tucker (1906), Stanford (1963), and Del Corno (1985), and by Denniston (1954) 157.



comically characterizing elderly women of low social status. Quite a different peculiar feature of particle usage, however, does seem to characterize women generally in Aristophanes: a disproportionate use by them of the heavier adversative particles, those which can be roughly rendered by ‘but on the other hand’. In the three ‘women’s plays’ seven particles or particle-combinations of this type<sup>60</sup> occur 24 times on the lips of women as against 3 times on those of men.<sup>61</sup> Do we have here a reflection of a stereotype of women as unable to make up their minds?

## 7. PHONOLOGICAL FEATURES

Our one piece of evidence on differences between men’s and women’s pronunciation comes from a superficially puzzling passage of Plato, *Kratylos* 418b–d, whose context, coming as it does amid the fantastic etymologizing that fills most of that dialogue, does not inspire confidence in its accuracy. Nevertheless it is worth examining. [82] Socrates has just said that the meaning of certain words is made much clearer if we consider their ‘ancient pronunciation’: an unimpeachable dictum, if by ‘meaning’ we understand ‘original meaning’, and assume that Plato, like many people today, took it for granted that a word’s original meaning was its proper meaning, and innovations in this respect were corruptions and perversions (except when he himself was the innovator). He goes on as follows:

You know that our<sup>62</sup> ancients made very correct use of the *iota* and the *delta*, and not least the women, who preserve the ancient pronunciation the most; but today people alter *iota* to *ei* [= epsilon] or *eta*, and *delta* to *zeta*, because these sound more impressive. . . . For example the very old-fashioned used

<sup>60</sup> ἀλλ’ οὖν, γε μέντοι, γε μήν, καὶ μὲν δὴ, καὶ μὴν. . . γε, καίτοι, καίτοι. . . γε.

<sup>61</sup> As usual, women posing as men count as men, and vice versa. In the other eight surviving plays the use of these particles by women is only slightly above the expected frequency; they are used 4 times by female speakers, all in *Wealth* (531, 586, 1006, 1202), against 65 times by males.

<sup>62</sup> The implied ‘we’ presumably refers to the Athenians (the addressee is Hermogenes, brother of Kallias of the Kerykes clan).

to call the day *ἡμέρα*, those who came after them<sup>63</sup> *εἰμέρα*, and those of today *ἡμέρα*.

This statement is confirmed by his interlocutor Hermogenes, as is Socrates' claim a moment later that 'you also know that the ancients called the yoke *δυογόν\** (as against contemporary *ζυγόν*), and both are then made the basis for flights of etymological fancy. The trouble is that we know that both, as they stand, are false. The older form of *ἡμέρα* was not *ἡμέρα* but *ἄμέρα*; and the initial consonant (or rather, phonetically, consonant-group) of *ζυγόν* was historically derived not from [d] but from [j]. Yet there must be some element of truth in what Socrates says, otherwise even Hermogenes (who swallows a great deal in this dialogue) could hardly have let him get away with it. It is most likely<sup>64</sup> that Socrates is right when he associates pronunciations like *ἡμέρα* and *δυογόν* with women, but wrong when he claims, on the basis [83] of a generalization for which he provides no independent evidence,<sup>65</sup> that this proves these pronunciations to be archaic.

If so, we have it on the evidence of Plato that in the first half of the fourth century, and perhaps for some time earlier, a substantial number of women in Attica (and many more women than men) were saying [i:] for standard Attic [ε:] and [d] for standard Attic [zd]. I am sure it is significant that both these features were innovations (not archaisms!) characteristic of the Boiotian dialect spoken to the north of Attica. On the evidence of orthographic errors in contemporary inscriptions, graffiti, etc., this dialect appears to have exercised considerable influence in Attic pronunciation at least in some sections of the population,<sup>66</sup> and it now appears that women were more ready than men to adopt innovations from this low-prestige

<sup>63</sup> Inserting *ἄστερον* with Heindorf (following Proklos in *Crat.* 86 (p. 42.15–17 Pasquali)), who also, no doubt rightly, takes the first epsilon in EMERA to denote the sound now conventionally written *ε*.

<sup>64</sup> Pace Sommerstein (1977a) 61.

<sup>65</sup> Though it would fit in with the stereotype view of women as strongly conservative and resistant to change (*Ar. Ekkl.* 215–28).

<sup>66</sup> See Teodorsson (1974) for the inscriptional data; Buck (1955) 153–4 for the Boiotian vowel system; Sommerstein (1977a) for the possible connection between the two. The substitution of [d] for [zd], recorded only once in Teodorsson's data, finds confirmation in two fourth-century graffiti from the Agora (*Ath. Agora* xxi. B13 and C33: *ἐπιτραπεδι[α]* and *λαικαδε[ι]*).

source. One might hypothesize the following explanation for this openness of women to linguistic innovation. Men and women were alike subject to the innovative pressure of colloquial speech; but in the case of men this was largely counterbalanced by the influence of the prestige pronunciation which met them at school, in the assembly (where most of the speakers were wealthy, educated *rhetoires*) and the lawcourts, in the theatre, and so on. For women, who attended none of these places,<sup>67</sup> there was no such counter-influence. [84]

## 8. CONCLUSION

We have found first-person sex differentiation in a variety of areas of the lexicon, in some features on the borders of lexicon and grammar (diminutives, particles), and in some features of phonology. Certain of these differences clearly reflect the subordinate status of women in society. They were not supposed to speak as if they were in authority, or to address men in terms that implied superiority or even equality. They were expected to avoid grossness of language in speaking to men, who, however, were under no duty to reciprocate such restraint (this corresponds, in a milder form, to the situation as between slaves and free people). Their distinctive adjectival uses encouraged them to display pity and affection in their speech rather than any harder emotion. Many of them used innovative, low-prestige phonological forms borrowed from the ‘Boeotian pigs’.<sup>68</sup> Even their oaths were largely and increasingly confined to female deities, and to those female deities who were specially concerned with a woman’s ‘proper’ functions in life. And, as I have shown elsewhere,<sup>69</sup> they were

<sup>67</sup> It seems likely that some citizen women did attend the theatre (Henderson 1991*b*), but it remains, in comedy, the normal expectation that they would not: the adulterer in Ar. *Birds* 793–6 sees that his mistress’s husband is present in the theatre, but does not need to check whether she herself is absent. Henderson himself admits (1991*b*: 138) that ‘women with small children to care for’ would be unlikely to attend, and that would mean most women of childbearing age.

<sup>68</sup> Kratinos fr. 77 KA; Pind. *Olymp.* 6.90 and fr. 83.

<sup>69</sup> See Ch. 2 below.

supposed to be unknown and nameless outside the bounds of their (or their husbands') immediate family. Definite as these differences are, however, they are not immense, particularly as many of them are of a 'preferential' rather than an 'exclusive' character, more in the nature of trends than of taboos.

On the evidence we have considered, there is no clear general tendency for sex-based differentiation to become either more or less pronounced over time. In certain features, mainly concerned with forms of address (diminutives, address by name), there is less differentiation in Menander than in Aristophanes; in others, however (especially oaths, but also the use of *φίλος* and *τάλας*), there appears to be more. Overall, the degree of differentiation appears to have remained roughly the same in language. So too did the degree of discrimination in society. There are signs as the fourth century proceeds (including some notable ones in Menander's comedies) of a [85] feeling among some of the educated part of the Athenian population that women deserved more respect, and even more autonomy, than the law accorded them;<sup>70</sup> but there had been no significant change in the law itself, and indeed a new magistracy, the *γυναικονόμοι*, had been established specifically to ensure closer supervision of women's behaviour.<sup>71</sup> Women still had to know their

<sup>70</sup> To take two or three examples, Isokrates in the 360s (3.40), and Aristotle a generation later (*Pol.* 1335<sup>b</sup>38 ff.), had condemned all marital infidelity by husbands as well as wives; while Menander in *Epitrepontes* has Smikrines denounced and ridiculed for attempting to do what nobody in the play denies that he is legally entitled to do, viz. remove his daughter from her husband regardless of her wishes (cf. also P. Didot 1 <= *com. adesp.* 1000 KA>). The condemnation of another Smikrines in *Aspis* for exercising his legal right to claim an *epikleros* despite gross disparity of age and character is perhaps another example (cf. MacDowell 1982*a*), though it had always been open to the next of kin of an *epikleros* to waive his claim and leave the field clear for another, more suitable candidate.

<sup>71</sup> Timokles fr. 34; Men. fr. 238 <= 208 KA>; Philochoros 328 F 65; Pollux 8.112; cf. Hyp. fr. 14 Kenyon, Krobylos fr. 11, Aristodemos ap. Ath. 6.245a. Once established, these officials were given other functions as well, for some of which (e.g. to ensure that restrictions on the size of private celebration gatherings were observed) they apparently even had the right to enter private houses without the owner's consent. They are not mentioned in the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.* (c.330), but seem to have been in existence before 322.

place, and in front of men they still had to show in their speech that they knew it.<sup>72</sup>

#### ADDENDA

**p. 15** There is now a much fuller discussion of women's speech in Aristophanes, covering many areas not included here and drawing subtle sociolinguistic conclusions, by Willi (2003) 157–97.

**p. 18** oaths: see now the comprehensive database of references to oaths and swearing in Greek texts of all kinds down to 322 BC, compiled by A. J. Bayliss, I. C. Torrance, and myself, at <http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/classics/oaths/index.php> (though owing to its chronological limits, the database does not include Menander). Sex differentiation in the use of oaths will be discussed by Judith Fletcher, Isabelle Torrance, and myself in two chapters of Sommerstein, Bayliss, and Torrance (forthcoming).

**p. 19 n. 18** *Frogs* 508: the latest editor of all, Wilson (2007a), designates the speaker as female (*θεράπεινα*), while noting in his apparatus 'incertum est utrum ancilla an servus loquatur'.

**p. 21 n. 19** oaths by Hera: I discuss oaths by Hera more fully in Sommerstein (2008), where I argue that the evidence points to their being particularly associated with Socrates' deme of Alopeke; all but one of the characters who swear by Hera in Plato's and Xenophon's Socratic conversations are known to have been members of this deme. There is one Xenophontic oath by Hera which does *not* accompany 'an expression of admiration' (*Mem.* 1.5.4).

**p. 23** the vocatives of *τάλας*: in the large prose corpus (containing altogether some 12,000 address forms) analysed by Dickey (1996; *τάλας* is discussed on pp. 161–3, and instances listed on p. 286), the

<sup>72</sup> This article was first published in F. De Martino and A. H. Sommerstein (eds.), *Lo spettacolo delle voci* (Bari: Levante Editori, 1995) ii. 61–85. Reprinted here by kind permission of Levante Editori.

masculine form *τάλας* appears only in Epictetus (ten times); the feminine *τάλαινα* appears once in Plutarch (*Ant.* 79.3) and once in Lucian (*Dial. Mer.* 12.2), the speaker each time being a woman; the neuter *τάλαν*, and the superlative forms, do not occur in Dickey's corpus at all.

p. 25 *γλυκός*: in Dickey's prose corpus a vocative of *γλυκός* occurs only once, in the superlative, in the pseudo-Platonic *Hipparchus* (227d: Socrates to his unnamed, but youthful (226a), male interlocutor); see her discussion (pp. 119–27) of the use of affectionate or laudatory vocatives by the dominant character (usually Socrates) in Platonic and (to a much lesser extent) Xenophontic dialogues.

p. 27 *Peace* 113: it should have been noted that the addressees here are children.

p. 28 n. 39 *Lysistrata* 1108: the speaker is not in fact 'another woman' but the leader of the now united chorus, who is certainly male.

p. 28 complimentary epithets: Dickey unfortunately does not provide overall figures for the numbers of address forms in her corpus that are used by or to women, so it is difficult to determine the significance of the frequency with which particular forms, or types of forms, are so used; but for what it is worth, of 320 uses of *ἀγαθ-*, *βελτιστ-*, and *ἀριστ-* in Dickey's data (Dickey (1996) 277–8), only six, all in Lucian, are in the feminine gender (*ἀρίστη* 1, *βελτίστη* 5), and four of these are addressed to goddesses.

p. 28 'old woman' as an inherently disparaging form of address: this claim is not refuted by *Lys.* 637, cited by Dickey (1996) 83, where the presence of *φίλοι* makes all the difference; it is nevertheless probably too absolute. Near the end of *Thesmophoriazusae* the Archer addresses 'Artemisia' (the disguised Euripides) as *γράδιον* not only when he is angry with her (1213) but also when he is trying to get her to do him favours (1194, 1199) or expressing his gratitude for favours received (1210). It remains 'undeniable...that in Greek comedy [age terms] indicating old age are on average ruder when addressed to women than when addressed to men' (Dickey loc. cit.).

**p. 29 n. 42** ἄνερ addressed to men other than the speaker's husband: I should have added Ar. *Wealth* 1025. In Dickey's prose corpus ἄνερ is invariably (10 times) used by women to their husbands (Dickey (1996) 85–6, 270).

**p. 29 n. 43** γύναι: in Dickey's corpus, simple γύναι (occasionally γυνή) is used fairly freely by women characters in novels (7 instances, against 19 by men), but in other texts a woman uses it only once (a Spartan woman at [Plut.] *Mor.* 241c).

**p. 29** τέκνον: Dickey (1996) 65–72 has a very detailed discussion of the use of vocative τέκνον in post-classical prose (it does not occur at all in classical prose); in these texts τέκνον is freely used by men as well as women, but it remains striking that whereas men use παῖ more often than τέκνον (52:38, including plurals but omitting addresses to servants), women prefer τέκνον by a ratio of nearly four to one (9:32). Another form of address used disproportionately by women in Aristophanes is ὦ μέλε (11 female, 12 male; Willi (2003) 187). It occurs only once in what we have of Menander (fr. 345 KA), and a scholiast on Pl. *Theaet.* 178e helpfully tells us that the speaker is male (and also that in 'more recent' texts this expression was used only by women). There is no case of ὦ μέλε in any of the post-classical prose texts surveyed by Dickey.

**p. 29 n. 45** ὦ τᾶν: in Dickey's prose corpus ὦ τᾶν is used exclusively (22 times) by males (Dickey (1996) 286).

**p. 30** diminutives: an examination of Dickey's data shows that in her corpus, all but one of the 20 uses of diminutive forms of address by females (vs. 17 by males) occur on the lips of characters in Lucian's *Dialogues of Courtesans*. The one exception is Plut. *Mor.* 858c, from *On the Malignity of Herodotus*, where Plutarch is mocking Herodotus by retelling the story of Hdt. 1.61 and gives in direct speech (as Herodotus did not) the complaint of Megacles' daughter to her mother (ὦ μαμμίδιον) that Peisistratus was having intercourse with her 'improperly'—in order, evidently, to suggest that Herodotus was making this young noblewoman speak like a whore.

p. 30 *ἄνθρωπε*: in prose literature of the Roman period, this form of address was evidently not regarded as taboo for women. Dickey rightly points out (1996: 150–4) that *ἄνθρωπε* only has a disparaging tone when the addressee is a person known to the speaker; and of the 20 passages in her corpus in which *ἄνθρωπε* is used in addressing a ‘specified, known person’ (p. 285) there are three (Dion. Hal. 3.21.5; Luc. *Dial. Meretr.* 9.4; Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirrhoe* 6.7.9) in which the speaker is a woman, and they have no clear special factor in common.

p. 30 *παῖ*: in Dickey’s prose corpus too, when the addressee is a slave, *παῖ* is used only by men (12 times) (Dickey (1996) 267).

p. 30 address by name: Dickey (1996) 246 doubts the significance of the Aristophanic evidence, on the ground that in classical prose, as well as in Menander, ‘women addressing men use names freely’ and that in Aristophanes address by name ‘is not very common under any circumstances’. She suggests that ‘the figures for Aristophanes may be coincidental’, but does not explain how coincidence could have produced the *disproportion* between the use of names by women to women and their use by women to men. The explanation may be that most of the males whom women in Aristophanes address are either (i) not known (or not supposed to be known) to them by name or (ii) their husbands, whom they would not normally address by name anyway, whereas it is clearly assumed that a citizen woman would have a wide circle of female friends and acquaintances.

p. 31 age terms: in Dickey’s prose corpus (see Dickey (1996) 265–71) there are eight instances of women using age-terms in addressing unrelated men, all of which, however, occur in just two works, Lucian’s *Ass* (4 bis, 6, 8, 9) and Chariton’s *Chaereas and Callirrhoe* (1.13.10, 3.6.4, 3.6.5).

p. 31 ‘they scarcely meet at any point’: on my own showing this is something of an exaggeration, but it is true that in Aristophanes there are very few forms of address that are used by men to men, and by women to men, *with broadly similar frequency*.



p. 31 n. 50 women's use of obscene language: there is now a fuller discussion of obscenity in women's cultic activities, and its possible connections with Old Comedy and other poetic genres, in O'Higgins (2003).

p. 33 women's obscene language in *Lys.* and *Eccl.*: this and related phenomena in these two plays are discussed more fully in Chapter 12, below.

p. 35 While *δυογόν* is the transmitted reading, it is likely that Plato actually wrote *δυναγόν*, reflecting Socrates' derivation of the word from *δύο* and *ἄγειν*; this form is found in etymologies given in the *Etymologica* (s. vv. *ζυγός* and *ζεῦγος*) and has been restored to the text by Duke *et al.* (1995).

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## The naming of women in Greek and Roman comedy

David Schaps<sup>1</sup> has acutely observed that speakers in the Athenian courts scarcely ever mention women by their own names, except in the case of ‘women of shady reputation, women connected with the speaker’s opponent, and dead women’. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this reluctance on the part of free Athenian males to mention in public the name of a respectable living citizen woman was not a feature of the lawcourts only, but of Athenian life generally in the classical period and thereafter at least until 260 BC. This will be done by a consideration of the evidence of comedy; and it will also be shown that the Roman comedians recognized that their Greek models had followed such a practice, and themselves did their best, with fair success, to imitate it.

At first glance it might well be thought that Schaps was right to assert<sup>2</sup> that, whereas in the courts the naming of respectable women was generally avoided, ‘in comedy . . . women are regularly referred to by their given names, and rarely if at all by the names of their fathers, brothers, or husbands’. But on a closer examination it becomes apparent that the characters of comedy—the free male characters,

<sup>1</sup> [410]Schaps (1977).

<sup>2</sup> Schaps (1977) 329. That women are freely named in tragedy, in dedication-inscriptions, and on tombstones (*ibid.*) is what we would expect: the women of tragedy are mythological characters (except for the queen in Aeschylus’ *Persians*, who is never named in the play); tombstones commemorate dead, and therefore nameable, women; while a dedication-inscription is in effect a message from the dedicator or dedicatrix, and women, as we shall see, were under no constraint to refrain from naming themselves or each other in public, even though they were not normally named in public by men.

that is—are almost as reticent in this respect as speakers in the courts. Women name themselves and each other freely, even when addressing men. A slave may refer to a free woman by name, and a free man may do so if none but slaves are present. A woman may be mentioned by name to a male relative of hers in private conversation. A female slave, a hetaira, a music-girl, or other women of low or no repute, could be named freely by anyone. But with some interesting exceptions, which will be considered, the rule holds that in public—that is, in addressing or in the presence of one or more free men not related to the women in question—a free man does not mention a respectable woman by her own name.

To substantiate this statement I turn first to the eleven comedies of Aristophanes. In these plays, I find one hundred and four places<sup>3</sup> where a woman is addressed or mentioned by name; and in no less than sixty-two of these cases the speaker is also a woman (or a man pretending to be a woman).<sup>4</sup> When the speaker is a woman, it does not seem to matter whether she is speaking to women or to men: twenty-one times,<sup>5</sup> in fact, a woman names herself or another woman when addressing, or in the presence of, one or more men.

Forty-two times, then, in the eleven plays a woman is named by a male speaker. In eight cases, almost certainly, the woman is dead;<sup>6</sup> in

<sup>3</sup> I exclude, of course, goddesses and mythological characters; I also exclude purely allegorical figures such as Diallage, Spondai, Opora, Theoria, and Basileia, who (although some of them can apparently contract marriages with Athenian citizens) seem best describable as a sort of cross between goddess and hetaira. Kleonyme (*Clouds* 680), Amynia (*Clouds* 691), and Smikythe (*Knights* 969; cf. scholia, where alongside an absurd explanation the true one is preserved) are feminine names opprobriously applied to men.

<sup>4</sup> Euripides' relative disguised as a woman, *Thesm.* 279–93, 633; Euripides disguised as a woman, *Thesm.* 1172, 1200; Aeschylus impersonating a woman in a mock-Euripidean monody, *Frogs* 1343–63.

<sup>5</sup> *Wasps* 1396, 1397; *Lys.* 365, 370, 554, 696, 697, 851; *Thesm.* 633, 728, 739, 754, 804–8 (addressed to the audience), 898, 1172, 1200; *Ekk.* 943. There would be two more examples if we included those cases (*Lys.* 746, *Frogs* 549) where women address each other by name in the presence of a chorus consisting wholly or partly of men; but it would be unsafe to do this, since the presence of a chorus can be ignored in comedy where they are taking no part by word or deed in the action (cf. n. 10).

<sup>6</sup> *Ach.* 49: Amphitheos, giving his pedigree, names his grandmother Phainarete but not his mother (just like Euxitheos in *Dem.* 57.37). *Ach.* 614 (also *Clouds* 48, 800): [411] Koisyra, probably the wife of the Megakles who was ostracized in 486\* (cf. Davies (1971) 380–1). *Knights* 449: Myrrhine (called Byrsine for the sake of a pun),

a further nineteen<sup>7</sup> she is a slave or a hetaira or a *lena*. Four times<sup>8</sup> a husband addresses his wife by name, and once<sup>9</sup> he names her to another woman; in these cases no other free man is present.<sup>10</sup>

So there remain only ten apparent cases of a respectable woman being named by a free man 'in public' as above defined. But five even of these are phantoms. The names Sostrate, Lysilla, Philinna, Kleitagona, and Demetria in *Clouds* 678–84 are not the names of particular contemporaries; they are common women's names used as grammatical examples.<sup>11</sup> A sixth instance can also be disposed of: Lampito (*Lys.* 998) is Spartan (as is the man who mentions her), and Spartan women were notoriously much less restricted than their Athenian sisters, and to the male Athenian mind much less womanly. There are thus just four genuine instances in Aristophanes of a respectable woman being named by a free man in public: these four are of special interest, and we will return to them in a moment.

Meanwhile we may note that there is a tendency in Aristophanes, just as in the orators, to identify women indirectly by naming their male relatives. Strepsiades' wife, though not one of the *dramatis*

wife of the tyrant Hippias. *Wasps* 1246 and *Lys.* 1237: Kleitagora, eponym of a famous skolon. *Lys.* 675: Artemisia, who fought at Salamis.

<sup>7</sup> *Ach.* 273, 524, 527; *Knights* 765 (bis); *Wasps* 828, 1032, 1371; *Peace* 755, 1138, 1146; *Thesm.* 98, 1201, 1214, 1216, 1223, 1225; *Frogs* 1328; *Wealth* 179. I have excluded *Ekk.* 1101 from consideration, since it is not clear whether  $\Phi\text{P}\text{Y}\text{N}\text{H}$  there is a proper name or not.

<sup>8</sup> *Lys.* 872, 874, 906; *Ekk.* 520.

<sup>9</sup> *Lys.* 850.

<sup>10</sup> For in the *Lysistrata* scene the chorus (which is half male, half female) must be deemed absent even though they remain in the orchestra: note that Myrrhine, who will not make love in the presence of her infant child (907), makes no objection to the presence of the chorus, and after the departure of the slave Manes with the child everything proceeds as if the couple were alone: hetairai might confer their favours in public at symposia (Borthwick (1977) 32) but for a married woman to do so without protest or comment is incredible.\* I conclude that in the comedy of Aristophanes and his contemporaries, the presence of the chorus could by convention be ignored so long as attention was not explicitly drawn to it by word or action. There are other scenes in which the chorus is forgotten about almost as completely, notably *Ach.* 393–479 (see especially 416 and 440–4).\*

<sup>11</sup> It is interesting that a scholion (preserved only in the Venetus) asserts that the four names mentioned in line 684 were those of πόρνοι. Did the commentator with whom this note originated, assuming wrongly that the names were those of real women, deduce that they must have been prostitutes from the very fact of their having been mentioned by name?

*personae* of *Clouds*, bulks large in the play, her extravagance and her influence over her son having been the original cause of Strepsiades' [395] troubles. Strepsiades identifies her as 'the niece of Megakles son of Megakles' (*Clouds* 46–7), and this remote figure of Megakles is mentioned several times again, always by name,<sup>12</sup> but no name is ever given to his niece.<sup>13</sup> The mother of Hyperbolos is mentioned in *Clouds* (552) and elaborately attacked in *Thesmophoriazousai* (839–45) not only on her son's account but also for her own alleged activities as a moneylender; though she was thus doubly fair game—as the mother of a politician to whom the poet was hostile, and as a woman who engaged in activities which must normally have been the preserve of men—Aristophanes does not allow his chorus to name her.<sup>14\*</sup> Very interesting in this connection is *Thesm.* 603 ff. A man is known to have joined in the celebration of the Thesmophoria disguised as a woman, and Kleisthenes, trying to find him, asks each of those present to say who she is. The first woman questioned replies (605), 'You ask me who I am? The wife of Kleonymos'. The next turns out to be this woman's nurse, looking after her child; then Kleisthenes comes to the 'woman' who is in fact Euripides' relative, and this time the question he asks (619, contrast 603) is 'Who is your husband?' The evident implication is that so far as men outside the family were concerned, a married woman's only identity was as somebody's wife—so much so that the questions 'Who are you?' and 'Who is your husband?' were interchangeable.

We can now return to the four passages in Aristophanes where a free man does apparently break convention by naming a respectable Athenian woman in public. The passages are *Peace* 992 and *Lys.* 1086,

<sup>12</sup> *Clouds* 70, 124, 815.

<sup>13</sup> After the opening scene, in which she is the main subject of 41–70, she is referred to indirectly at 438 and directly at 1443–6.

<sup>14</sup> [412] She may have been named in the *Marikas* of Eupolis and/or the *Bread-sellers* of Hermippos, if Bergk was right in supposing that her name was Doko and that this lay behind the unintelligible *δοκούσαν* of schol. *Clouds* 555 and the entry in Hesychios (δ2122 Latte) *δοκικῶν ἀντὶ τοῦ δοκῶν ἔπαιξε δὲ Ἐρμιππος* (fr. 12) ἐν *Ἀρτοπώλῃσι*; the combination is attractive but hazardous,\* and the name does not seem to be attested elsewhere. Since Hyperbolos' mother was certainly a character in Eupolis' play (*Clouds* 555 with Σ) and may well have been one in that of Hermippos also, the mention of her name may have come from another woman, a slave, or (in Hermippos' play) the chorus.

1103, 1147; in the first of them the name in question is Lysimache, in the other three Lysistrate. Why should it be just these two women, and no others, who are treated as nameable? An answer lies ready to hand. If a respectable woman was not normally referred to in public by her own name, it was because, at least in theory, 'if she was a proper woman, the jurors [and others outside the family] would not be expected to know her, but would be expected to know her *kyrios*'.<sup>15</sup> A woman was supposed to have, in her own right, no public role and no public personality. But to one small class of women this [396] principle cannot have applied: those who held major priesthoods and therefore performed in their own right important functions on behalf of the community. And over twenty years ago Lewis showed<sup>16</sup> that in 411, when *Lysistrate* was produced, Lysimache was the name of the holder of the highest female priesthood of all, that of Athena Polias; and he suggested with much plausibility that the name Lysistrate was a thin disguise for the same person,\* noting that in *Lys.* 554 she all but calls herself Lysimache. If Lewis's conjecture is correct, it explains the unique nameability of this Lysimache–Lysistrate; and reciprocally the fact that in this respect as well as others<sup>17</sup> she is treated differently from any ordinary woman goes to confirm Lewis's identification of her.<sup>18</sup>

Thus we see that in Aristophanes, with one explicable exception, the rule holds that a free man does not name a respectable woman in public. I now go forward a century to consider Menander, taking as

<sup>15</sup> Schaps (1977) 330.

<sup>16</sup> Lewis (1955) 1–12. *Peace* 992, whose relevance was pointed out by Dunbar (1970) 270–2, indicates that Lysimache was already a well-known figure in 421, and presumably therefore already then priestess; this squares with the other evidence on the chronology of her career (see Lewis (1955) 4–6).

<sup>17</sup> See Lewis (1955) 2–3; add that Lysistrate, unlike the other Athenian women (*Lys.* 16–19) and unlike Praxagora and her fellow-conspirators in *Ekklesiazousai* (*Ekk.* 35–40, 54–6, 510–50), seems to be able to leave her house at any time unconstrained either by household duties or by a suspicious husband.

<sup>18</sup> The identification of the Myrrhine who appears in *Lysistrate* with the contemporary of that name who was priestess of Athena Nike (cf. *SEG* xii. 80) finds no such confirmation; and notice that in contrast with Lysistrate (see previous note), Myrrhine in the play is throughout presented as an ordinary woman subject to the normal constraints on a woman's life—thus in order to get to the meeting called by Lysistrate she had to get dressed in the dark without a lamp and leave her house clandestinely (*μόλις γὰρ ἤδρον ἐν σκοτῶι τὸ ζώνιον*, *Lys.* 72).

my corpus in the first place the eighteen plays of which Sandbach considered enough was preserved on papyrus to make them worth printing in the <1972> Oxford edition (Sandbach (1972) 1–300);<sup>19</sup> the remaining Menandrian material will be considered lower down.

In these plays women are named on seventy-eight occasions.<sup>20\*</sup> In fifty-six cases<sup>21</sup> the woman in question is, or is believed by the speaker to be, a slave, a freedwoman, a hetaira, or at best, like Glykera during most of *Perikeiromene*, someone's concubine (παλλακίη) and so less than completely respectable. Of the twenty-two cases in which respectable women are named, in six the speaker is a woman or a slave,<sup>22</sup> and in a further ten,<sup>23</sup> though the speaker is a free man, no other free man is present.

<sup>19</sup> Including the recently published new fragments of Act I of *Misoumenos* (Turner (1977) 315–31), though, as it happens, no woman's name appears in them. I am most grateful to Professor Turner for giving me this and [413] other information about the new material before it was published. All references to Menander cited by play and line are to Sandbach (1972); note that 'Sik. 5' means line 5 of the text of *Sikyonios*, while 'Sik. F 5' means the fragment of the play numbered 5 by Sandbach. For other Menandrian fragments (cited in the form 'Men. fr. 333</296>') I use the numbering of Körte and Thierfelder (1953) <followed in angled brackets by the numbering of PCG when different>.

<sup>20</sup> I include the dubious mention of Doris at *Kolax* 19 and the restored mention of Glykera at *Perik.* 1011, but not Wilamowitz's restoration [*Hδεῖ*]αυ at *Georgos* 16 (in a soliloquy), which Sandbach does not admit to the text.

<sup>21</sup> Slaves: Doris (eight times in *Perik.*; another of the same name at *Kolax* 19, *s.v.l.*), Parthenis (*Dysk.* 432), Simiche (*Dysk.* 636, 926, 931), Sophrone (*Epitir.* 1062, 1069, 1071), Thratta (*Heros* 68), Tryphe (*Samia* F 1). Freedwoman (?): Philinna (*Georgos* 22, 28, 108), apparently Myrrhine's old nurse (see the notes of Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on the plot of the play and on 22–96). Hetairai and concubines: Chrysis (nineteen times in *Samia*); Glykera before her recognition (*Perik.* 506, 507); Habrotonon in *Epitrepontes* (497, 535, 542, 958, F 1) and her namesake in *Perikeiromene* (476, 482); Malthake (*Sik.* 145); the five hetairai listed in *Kolax* F 4. In *Misoumenos* 42,\* where Krateia is named, the speaker is probably not Demeas naming his lost daughter, but his interlocutor naming Thrasonides' captive; note that the papyrus (*POxy* 2657) has a paragraphos below line 38, accidentally omitted in the Oxford text, which makes it likely that the speaker of 36b–38 (who is presumably not Demeas, cf. γέρον 37) is also the speaker of 42; besides, Demeas apparently had not come to the town in search of his daughter (cf. *Mis.* 32–3, 231–2 and F 2 Körte [not in Sandbach] <= Test. V Arnott> = Simpl. in *Phys.* p. 384.13 Diels).

<sup>22</sup> Woman: Sostratos' mother (*Dysk.* 430). Slaves: Daos in *Georgos* (41); Daos and Getas in *Heros* (24, 36); Doris in *Perikeiromene* (402); Dromon in *Sikyonios* (378).

<sup>23</sup> Smikrines lecturing Pamphile (*Epitir.* 717, F 7\*); Charisios discussing her with Habrotonon and Onesimos (*Epitir.* 956, 957); Demeas speaking to his rediscovered daughter in the presence of her nurse and (at first) Ge-[414]tas (*Mis.* 212, 252);

Six passages remain in which a free man names a respectable woman in the presence of another free man; but each time the person to whom, or before whom, the woman is named is a relative of hers. Knemon (*Dysk.* 709) addresses himself by name to Myrrhine, his ex-wife, and her (not his) son Gorgias; Knemon's and Myrrhine's daughter is also present (700, 732) but, as far as Knemon is aware, no one else.<sup>24</sup> Charisios in *Epitrepontes* (931) mentions his wife Pamphile by name in a little speech he is rehearsing for delivery [397] to her father Smikrines. In *Misoumenos* (305, 308) Getas reports how Thrasonides begged Krateia to stay with him, addressing her by name in front of her father Demeas; and in happier circumstances at the end of *Perikeiromene* Polemon refers at least once and probably twice (1011, 1020) to Glykera by name in addressing her father Pataikos.

Thus in these eighteen plays, so far as we can tell, the rule enunciated on p. 44 [393–4] holds without a single exception.

The evidence of the other surviving titles and fragments<sup>25</sup> of Attic comedy does not disconfirm the conclusions to which we have been led by the study of the preserved plays of Aristophanes and the

Thrasonides asking Getas about her (*Mis.* 259); Moschion apostrophizing Plangon in soliloquy (*Samia* 630). We may include *Perik.* 752 under this heading rather than that of n. 21; it is not clear precisely what, at this moment, Pataikos believes Glykera's status to be, but it does not matter because he and she are alone on stage. In *Heros* 72 also everything points to the speaker and Myrrhine being alone on stage, but it cannot be conclusively proved.

<sup>24</sup> The whereabouts of Sostratos during this scene are something of a mystery. Knemon notices his presence at 702 and shoos him off; yet at 753 Gorgias knows precisely where he is and produces him for Knemon to inspect, and Knemon comments on his appearance as though he had never seen him before. Probably after 702 Sostratos hides somewhere within earshot ('s'écarter... sans quitter la scène' as V. Martin's (1958) stage-direction has it); at 752, hearing himself talked about, he puts his head out cautiously and is noticed by Gorgias. Knemon, we may suppose, at 702 (and also in his earlier encounter with Sostratos, 167–78) was scarcely aware of Sostratos as a personality—to such a *δύσκολος*, the young man was simply a stranger and therefore a pest, and Knemon may have hardly looked at him; a prospective son-in-law is another matter, and even though Knemon has given away the right to dispose of his daughter, he cannot help looking the suitor up and down at 754. However these things may be, it is incredible that Knemon would have talked of family matters to his daughter, Gorgias, and Myrrhine knowing a stranger to be present, and it can be taken as certain that during Knemon's long speech (709–47) Sostratos is out of his sight.

<sup>25</sup> For fragments of comedians other than Menander I use Kock's numbering unless otherwise stated <followed in angled brackets by the numbering of PCG where different>; papyrus fragments are cited from CGFP.



wholly or partly preserved plays of Menander. About sixty lost comedies<sup>26</sup> have titles which are certainly or probably the names of (non-mythical) women. Two of the names are those of archaic poetesses whose stories had become legendary: Sappho (six plays) and Kleobouline (plays by Kratinos and Alexis). Two plays take their names from ladies of foreign royalty, Diphilos' *Amastris*<sup>27</sup> and Poseidippos' *Arsinoe*. Most of the remainder are certainly, and all of them may be, named after hetairai.<sup>28</sup> Only in a few cases is this open to serious doubt:

(1) Euboulos, *Olbia*. This name happens to be attested for a citizen woman<sup>29</sup> but not for a hetaira. Since Euboulos' five known hetaira-titles confirm his predilection for this class of play (only Antiphanes and Alexis are known to have written more) the lack of attestation may be accidental.\*

(2) Antiphanes, *Archestrate*. It is, of course, possible that there was a well-known hetaira of this name, though none is attested; but on the face of it the name is a typically citizen one. But was there a play of this name at all? The title is only transmitted in one place (Ath. 7.322c: Ἀρχιστράτη codd.), and it is suspicious that there is mention of the poet Archestratos immediately above. Is Ἀρχιστράτη a corruption, under the influence of the name Archestratos, of some other Antiphanean title, e.g. Ἀρχοντι?

<sup>26</sup> The exact number cannot be determined because some titles may be names or may be common nouns: e.g. Alkaios *Palaistra*, Timokles *Drakontion*.

<sup>27</sup> Amastris, a niece of the last Darius, was wife successively of Krateros, of Dionysios of Herakleia, and [415] of Lysimachos.

<sup>28</sup> Apart from those discussed in the text, the plays in question are: Pherekrates, *Thalatta*, *Korianno*, *Petale*; Hegemon, *Philinna*; Theopompos, *Batyle*, *Nemea*, *Pamphile* (cf. Ath. 13.591e); Alkaios, *Palaistra*; Diokles, *Thalatta*; Eunikos, *Anteia*; Kephisodoros, *Anti-Lais*; Euboulos, *Klepsydra*, *Nannion*, *Neottis*, *Plangon*, *Chrysilla* (this last is a known hetaira-name—Telekleides fr. 17</18>—though it can also be a citizen name—IG ii.<sup>2</sup> 1524.213);\* Ephippos, *Philyra*; Antiphanes, *Anteia*, *Lampas*, *Malthake*, *Melitta*, *Neottis*, *Philotis*, *Chrysis*; Anaxilas, *Neottis*; Epikrates, *Anti-Lais*; Alexis, *Agonis*, *Anteia*, *Lampas*, *Opora*, *Pamphile*, *Polykleia*, *Choregis*; Epigenes, *Bakchis*; Axionikos, *Philinna* (unless this takes its name from one of Philip II's wives, the mother of Philip Arrhidaios); Hipparchos, *Thais*; Timokles, *Drakontion* (if this is a name at all), *Neaira*; Philemon, *Neaira*; Diphilos, *Synoris*; Menander, *Glykera* (if the title is genuine), *Thais*, *Hymnis*, *Phanion*.

<sup>29</sup> Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, no. 11374.

[398] (3) Alexis, \**Dorkis*. Cognate names are sometimes borne by citizen women, but I cannot find one with this precise name; and that *Dorkis* is a hetaira is made probable by the alternative title *Ποπύζουσα* ‘Smack-lips’.

(4) Alexis, *Krateia*. This name appears on a tombstone in the fourth century<sup>30</sup> and is of course borne by an *ingenua* in Menander’s *Misoumenos*; no hetaira of the name is known.<sup>30a</sup> Mention is due, however, to the suggestion of Kaibel<sup>31</sup> that *Krateia* is here a mythical name, that of a figure in the cult of the *Kabeiroi*.

(5) Alexis, *Pezonike*. This name is unique, no doubt coined on the model of the common citizen name *Nausinike*; that it belongs to a hetaira is plausible but cannot be proved.

(6) Araros, *Parthenis*.<sup>32</sup> This is the name of a citizen woman in *SEG* xxi. 1059 (second century BC) but of a slave in Men. *Dysk.* 432. It means ‘wormwood’ (cf. Plin. *HN* 25.73) and is thus synonymous with the hetaira-name *Habrotonon*.

In fragments of the text of lost comedies, women are named in over 130 places. Two-thirds of these<sup>33</sup> are known from the context, from

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* no. 8732a.

<sup>30a</sup> Though *Krateia* is the name of a freed slave in *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 1570.78.

<sup>31</sup> Kaibel (1890) 98–9; cf. Kern (1890) 3.

<sup>32</sup> This is the title in the play-list *POxy* 2659 (see *CGFP* 14); it is clearly right as against the titles transmitted by the *Suda* (*παρθενίκα* V, *παρθενιδίκ* cett.).

<sup>33</sup> *Kratinos* fr. 241</259>; 331</369>; *Kallias* fr. 15</21>; 33 (Edm.) </40>; *Telekleides* fr. 17</18>; *Pherekrates* fr. 73a (Edm.) <= *Korianno* test. i KA>; *Eupolis* fr. 44 (Edm.) </50>; *Plato* com. fr. 179</196>; *Aristophanes* fr. 478</494>; *Archippos* fr. 27; *Strattis* fr. 3; 26</27>; *Philetairos* fr. 9 (naming ten women); *Nikostratos* fr. 21</20> (naming two); *Euboulos* fr. 54</53>; 89</88>; *Ephippos* fr. 15.13; *Antiphanes* fr. 22</23>; 26</27> (naming three women); 41</43>; 75</76>; 170</168>; *Anaxandrides* fr. 9 (naming five women); *Amphis* fr. 23 (naming three); *Anaxilas* fr. 22 (naming six); *Epikrates* fr. 3 (naming *Lais* twice); *Alexis* fr. 104</109>; 139</143>; 165</170>; 223</225>; *Axionikos* fr. 1; *Kallikrates* fr. 1; *Theophilos* fr. 11 (naming five women); *Krobylos* fr. 5; *Eriphos* fr. 6; *Timokles* fr. 14</16>; 17</15>; 23</25>; 25</27> (naming eleven women); *Archedikos* fr. 1; *Philemon* fr. 16</15>; *Philippides* fr. 5; *Poseidippos* fr. 12</13>; *Phoinikides* fr. 4 (one hetaira saying, evidently to another, why she has decided to quit the profession); *Menander* fr. 456</414>; *com. adesp.* 152</724>; [416] 274</446>; 303</698>; 475</459> (cf. *Luc. Musc. Enc.* 11); 579</489>; *CGFP* 284.3 <= *com. adesp.* 1117.3 KA> (for the name *Philotis* cf. *Antiphanes*’ play of that name and *Terence*’s *Hecyra*). We should probably add *Alexis* fr. 230</232>, where *Tryphe* speaks of mixing wine for a *ξένος*; despite *Men. Sam.* F 1, *Tryphe* is not necessarily a slave name (see *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 2357).

the comment of a quoting author, or (in New Comedy) from the use of a stereotype name, to be the names of living, dead, or fictitious hetairai;\* many others are personages of past history or semi-legend<sup>34</sup> or are clearly slaves,<sup>35</sup> and there is one royal lady.<sup>36</sup> In Men. fr. 489</712>, and in CGFP 277 <= com. adesp. 1076 KA>.11, the context is too obscure for any confident statement to be made about the status of the woman referred to or of the speaker. The following fragments require further comment.

(7) Pherekrates fr. 70</76>. Glyke is a citizen woman's name in Ar. *Ekk.* 43 and in real life;<sup>37</sup> in this fragment the context is alcoholic, and it is therefore likely that we are at one of those secret drinking sessions of which, according to Old Comedy, Athenian women were so fond, and that the speaker is herself a woman. The same consideration applies to Philemon fr. 84</87>.

(8) Eupolis fr. 53</61> and 273</295>. In one of these passages (not necessarily in both) Eupolis mentioned the name of a citizen woman, Rhodia, the wife of Lykon\* (cf. Ar. *Lys.* 270). [399] This lady was a notorious adulteress,<sup>38</sup> and Eupolis—and no doubt the public too—evidently regarded her as having forfeited all claim to respectability, as having made herself, like those other married women Phaidra and Stheneboia (Ar. *Frogs* 1043), no better than a πόρνη.

(9) Eupolis fr. 208(/221) names Elpinike, sister of Kimon, and implies that the pair were guilty of incest; and the manuscripts of Plutarch's life of Kimon (15.4), where the fragment is quoted, read Ἐλπινίκτην τήνδε, which would imply that Elpinike was present either on stage (while other people talked about her and her brother) or in

<sup>34</sup> Charixene (cf. Ar. *Ekk.* 943); Kratinos fr. 146</153>, Theopompos fr. 50 </51>. Kleitagora (cf. Ar. *Wasps* 1246, *Lys.* 1237): Kratinos fr. 236</254>, Aristophanes fr. 261</271>. Sappho: Epikrates fr. 4, Menander fr. 258 <= *Leukadia* 11 Arnott>. Kleito, Euripides' mother: Alexander fr. 7 (about 100 BC).\*

<sup>35</sup> Pherekrates fr. 125</130>; Ameipsias fr. 2; Theopompos fr. 32</33>; Philemon fr. 125</117>; Diphilos fr. 56; Apollod. Karyst. fr. 8; Menander fr. 873</642>; 928</432>; CGFP 245 <= com. adesp. 1103 KA>.25, 44(?), 47.

<sup>36</sup> Phila, wife of Demetrios Poliorketes, in Alexis fr. 111</116>.

<sup>37</sup> PA 3039–41. Probably the Glyke who stole the cock in Ar. *Frogs* 1343 ff. is also to be imagined as a free woman (no doubt, like the character who sings the monody, living in genteel poverty), since she has a dwelling of her own (1362–3).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Σ *Lys.* 270 ἐπ' αἰσχροῖς κωμωδομένην· Εὐπόλις Πόλεισι (fr. 215/<232>) ὄσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν Λύκωνος ἔρρει πᾶς ἀνὴρ.

the audience. In itself this would not be impossible: Elpinike was born in the last years of the sixth century, for she was unmarried in 489 (Plut. *Kim.* 4.4), so could have been alive in the late 420s when Eupolis' *Cities* was produced; but it is more likely that she was dead, and Meineke's conjecture τῆδε has been generally accepted.

(10) Euboulos fr. <105/103>,\* from *Garland-sellers*, describes the decking-out of a woman named Aigidion with a garland; this together with the mention of kissing in the admittedly corrupt last line of the fragment makes it virtually certain that Aigidion is a hetaira.

(11) Alexis fr. 55 </56> names a woman called Zopyra, a notorious drunkard (Ath. 10.441d). The name is not known as that of a hetaira, and is known (though not till the second century BC: *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 7839c) as that of a citizen woman. We may suppose either that Zopyra's intemperance had become a public scandal, or that, as so often when drink is the topic (cf. on Pherekrates fr. 70</76> above), the speaker is a woman, or, quite likely, both.\*

(12) Herakleides fr. 1\* refers to a gluttonous woman (Ath. 10.414d) named Helen. We have no clue to her identity; but the name is not known to have been borne by any Athenian till the Roman period (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 3555), and it would suit a πολυάνωρ γυνή. Or is the name a sobriquet? If Men. *Sam.* 335 ff. had been preserved as an isolated fragment, we would have thought that Helen was the name of Demeas' mistress.<sup>39</sup>

(13) Philemon fr. 66</69>:

νυνὶ δ' ὄταν λάβῃ τις εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν  
[400] τὰς Ἰππονίκας τὰσδε καὶ Ναυσιστράτας  
καὶ Ναυσινίκας, τὰς Ἀθηναίας λέγω. . .

These are not the names of individual citizen women, real or fictitious; like 'Sostrate' and the rest in Ar. *Clouds* 679 ff., they are examples of citizen women's names. The meaning is obviously not 'when one brings into one's house women like Hipponike, Nausistrate, and Nausinike', as if these three were well-known examples of bad wives, but 'when one brings into one's house women with names like H., N., and N.'—in other words, as the speaker explains, citizen women, lawful wedded wives. There is no reference to any particular

<sup>39</sup> Cf. also Men. fr. 334</297>.1 ἔχω δ' ἐπικληρον Λαμίαν: we know her name was Kroyble (see below on Men. fr. 333</296> and 345</492>).

person, and therefore the convention of non-naming has not been broken.

(14) Philemon fr. 132</120>. Someone is advising a woman whom (s)he addresses as Nikostrate about the proper demeanour of a good wife. Such advice would most naturally come from a parent (or possibly a husband) and be given in private.

(15) Baton fr. 4. Sibyne, the addressee, is almost certainly a slave; in any case there is no sign that anybody is present but her and the speaker (a cook).

(16) Menander fr. 60</65>. Myrtille is a nurse\* (τίτθην line 2) or, like Philinna in *Georgos*, an ex-nurse, and therefore a slave or a freedwoman.

(17) Menander fr. 87</96> and 280</240>. That the Glykera of fr. 87</96> is a hetaira is proved by the imitation of the passage by Alkiphron (4.18.1); and it is safe to assume that the Glykera of fr. 280</240> is one also.\* In real life the name was common for citizen women in the fourth century, but thereafter altogether disappeared;<sup>40</sup> did it become unsuitable for respectable daughters born after c.330 because of the fame of Glykera the mistress of Harpalos?

(18) Menander fr. 210</188> and 592</815> are both addressed to a woman named Rhode by her husband,\* and their hortatory tone makes it most unlikely that anyone else is present.

(19) Menander fr. 333</296> and 345</492> deal with a domineering heiress-wife named Krobyle. In fr. 333</296> we have part of the husband's complaint, and Körte ad loc. is undoubtedly right in taking this as soliloquy. In fr. 345</492> someone tells K.'s son 'obey your mother Krobyle and marry your relative'; we do not know who the speaker is, but it does not matter, [401] because the convention, as we have seen, permits women to be named in private conversation with members of their family.\* Observe that in fr. 334</297>, where the husband is speaking to a neighbour, though he is very rude about his wife, calling her an ogress ('Lamia'), he does not use her name.

<sup>40</sup> At least eight persons named Glykera, certainly or probably of citizen status, are known who died in the fourth century: see *PA* 3037a–f, 3038; *SEG* xxi. 1033, xxv. 309; *Ath. Agora* xvii. 757. Thereafter I find only *IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 6772 (cf. *SEG* xiii. 107), of the second or third century AD.

(20) CGFP 250.8 <= *com. adesp.* 1045.8 KA>. A father (Laches) names his daughter Pam[phile] when betrothing her to a young man apparently called Mixias.<sup>41</sup> This is the only case we have of a betrothal-formula in which the girl is named,<sup>42</sup> but evidently in these circumstances it was possible to name her; a person to whom you were prepared to make a formal offer of your daughter's hand clearly had the right thereupon to be treated for purposes of etiquette as a member of her family.\*

(21) CGFP 256.15 <= *com. adesp.* 1091.15 KA>. It is not agreed whether the mention of the name Kle[oboule] *vel sim.* comes from the young man or his mother;<sup>43</sup> but it is certain that they are not speaking 'in public' within the meaning of the convention, for no one is on stage but these two and perhaps the slave Dromon (line 25).

(22) CGFP 271.2 <= *com. adesp.* 1028.2 KA>. All that is preserved of the line is ]αλην γαμει, and there is no clue to the context. The received accentuation is γαμει̇: if this is right, presumably A is reporting to B that the young man C is marrying, or is going to marry, the girl... Myrtale?—in which case B might be, for instance, the young man's former mistress (though there are many other possibilities). But γάμει is also possible, in which case the speaker could well be the young man's mother.

(23) CGFP 294d.1 <= *com. adesp.* 1025.2 KA). The name Philo—if it is correctly restored here—is not attested for a citizen woman; and the subject of the fragment (criticism of the ἀστυνόμοι) suggests that we have here a conversation between two hetairai, whose activities these officials might well hamper (cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 50.2).

I conclude that, so far as our evidence goes, the convention discovered by Schaps holds even more strictly on the comic stage than it does in the courts—once we realize that it only prohibited the naming of respectable women *by free men in public*. So far as we can tell, the only ci-[402]tizen women to whom, in comedy, the convention did not

<sup>41</sup> Körte (1924) 151 proposed supplements that would make the fiancé's name Moschion, so that Mixias would have to be some third party also on stage; but no one has followed him.\*

<sup>42</sup> Contrast Men. *Mis.* 444 ff. (where there is no possibility of restoring the name Krateia), *Perik.* 1013 ff., *Samia* 726 ff.

<sup>43</sup> Stark (1957) 132 prefers to take the son to be speaking at this point.

apply, were at the one extreme those who had forfeited their respectability by promiscuous adultery, and at the other, those who possessed a public status through holding major priesthoods.

Plautus and Terence, in their different ways, adapted Athenian comedy for presentation before audiences whose society differed in many ways from Athenian society, and in particular was much less restrictive of the life of the citizen woman. It might well be expected that, knowing nothing themselves of any convention of non-naming, they would fail to recognize its existence in their Greek models, and would therefore frequently let their characters name women under circumstances where it would have been impossible for any free Athenian man to do so. Is this what happens?

In the extant plays of Plautus, excluding *Amphitruo* (which is, as we shall see, a special case), women are addressed or mentioned by name nearly three hundred times. In the overwhelming majority of these cases, however, the woman in question is, or is believed by the speaker to be, or (like Saturio's daughter in *Persa*) is pretending to be, a slave or a *meretrix* or a *lena* or a *fidicina* or a woman of similar low status. Only forty-eight times, at the outside, does anyone address or mention by name a woman he or she knows to be an *ingenua*; in sixteen cases the speaker is a woman,<sup>44</sup> in ten a male slave,<sup>45</sup> in thirteen the speaker is a free man but no other free man is among his hearers.<sup>46</sup> This leaves at most nine passages in which a free man names a respectable woman in front of one or more other free men; and in one of these (*Curculio* 636) the name is generally agreed to be a corruption or an interpolation. Of the remaining eight, seven fall into two well-defined classes:

(1) A character seeking to identify himself with precision names his mother as well as his father: Lyconides (*Aul.* 780) to prove that he is a

<sup>44</sup> *Casina* 171, 627, 1004 (*Cleustrata* suppl. Lindsay); *Cist.* 630, 631, 714; *Curc.* 643; *Merc.* 683 (twice); *Rud.* 235, [417] 237, 350, 1164; *Stich.* 247; *Truc.* 130, 479.

<sup>45</sup> *Casina* 1013 (if Chalinus is the speaker and not, as some suppose, Pardalisca); *Epid.* 635, 636; *Poen.* 894, 895; *Pseud.* 659; *Rud.* 455, 481, 677; *Stich.* 331.

<sup>46</sup> In *Asinaria* 851–908 the parasite and Artemona are throughout conversing apart, unseen and unheard by Demaenetus, Argyrippus, and Philaenium; the parasite addresses Artemona by name in 855 and (if Havet's supplement is right) in 908. The other instances are *Casina* 393, 541, 1000 (twice); *Epid.* 568; *Rud.* 826, 827, 1129, 1174, 1267, 1283.

citizen of good family and thus a fit husband for Phaedria (of whose child, just born, he is about to confess with much embarrassment that he is the father); Menaechmus of Syracuse (*Men.* 1131) to [403] remove the last relics of doubt in the mind of the other Menaechmus that he is his brother Sosicles; Agorastocles (*Poen.* 1065)<sup>47</sup> in reply to Hanno's inquiry about the Carthaginian family from which he was kidnapped in childhood. There is no exact parallel for this pattern in the remains of Greek comedy; the nearest is *Ar. Wasps* 1397, but there the speaker is a woman (cf. *Curc.* 643, *Rud.* 1164). Relevant, however, is Demosthenes 57.68, where the speaker names his mother as well as his father to establish his right to citizenship.

(2) *Rudens* 878, 882, and 1364 belong together. Plesidippus in 878,<sup>48</sup> and Labrax in 882, know that Palaestra is an Athenian citizen by birth; Daemones by 1364 knows that she is his own daughter. Yet all three use her name. The justification for this seems to be that Palaestra is not her real name. We are never actually told that it is not, but both the nature of the name itself and the evidence of the play prove that it cannot be. It is in the highest degree improbable that any Athenian would have called his daughter Palaestra ('Wrestling-school') or even that Plautus could have imagined this to be possible. As the title of a comedy by Alkaios *Palaistra* is probably the name of a hetaira, and its erotic implications are lovingly and lubriciously made explicit by Lucian in the early part of the *Ass* (2–10). And even if we were to accept that Daemones could have given his daughter such a name, the play shows that he did not. He learns at 739 that she is an Athenian citizen; he sees that she is the same age as his daughter would be if she was alive (744); he knows her name by 1129, though it is not clear when he is supposed to have learnt it; yet until she gives Daemones as her father's name (1160), it never occurs to him to suspect that an Athenian girl of that age,

<sup>47</sup> Hanno's own naming of Agorastocles' mother in 1068 is doubly permissible: first, Agorastocles is the only other free man present; second, Hanno knows that the woman is dead.

<sup>48</sup> It is true that when Trachalio is sent to fetch Plesidippus (775 ff.) he is not actually told to inform him that Palaestra is a freeborn Athenian, nor does Plesidippus when he arrives give any explicit indication that he knows this; but it is inconceivable that Trachalio should have allowed his master to remain the only person in ignorance of something which, to him of all people, was of such capital importance.



named Palaestra, in the hands of a *leno*, might be his daughter. I conclude that her real name was something quite different,\* and that the *leno* Labrax himself gave her the name Palaestra as a suitable one for her destined profession. He therefore knows all along that it is not her real name, and so, of course, by 1364, does Daemones. Plesidippus at 878 does not; but knowing that she is an Athenian, he can [404] be virtually certain that as an Athenian she was not called Palaestra. All the same, the Greek convention is here at any rate stretched considerably: if a Greek had saved hi<s> daughter from the life of a hetaira, I doubt if he would have referred to her 'in public' by the name she bore in that life.

An unknown quantity is *Vidularia* fr. XVII (Lindsay):

immo id quod haec nostra est patria et quod hic meu' pater,  
illic autem Soterinis est pater.

Prima facie this shows the young man Nicodemus mentioning a *virgo* Soteris by name,<sup>49</sup> possibly addressing a slave, with Soteris' father and his own father present. It may be, though, that Nicodemus and the slave are conversing apart, unnoticed by the two old men; the lost portion of the play is known to have included an intrigue in which an old man is deceived by or with the help of a slave (fr. XVI *nunc seruos argentum a patre expalpabitur*).

Till now I have left *Amphitruo* on one side. In this play the usual conventions are not observed. In the body of the play, indeed, there is little opportunity to violate them; only in one scene, until the appearance of the *deus ex machina* (if he may be so called) at the end, are two or more free males on stage together—and of that scene there survive only five lines (1035–9) and half a dozen fragments. Even here, though, we find Jupiter, who is posing as Amphitruo, referring to Alcumena by name in front of the real Amphitruo (1039), who according to him (Jupiter) is not Alcumena's husband but a burglar (fr. XV Lindsay *manifestum hunc optorto collo teneo furem flagiti*). And in three speeches addressed to the audience (97–152, 463–98, 861–81) Mercury and Jupiter freely mention

<sup>49</sup> We can be fairly confident, this time, that Soteris is her real name: it was borne by Athenian citizen women in the fourth and third centuries (*PA* 13398 and 13397b/c) and is not known as a hetaira-name.

Alcumena by name (thirteen times in all) in a manner quite foreign to Plautus' normal practice in his prologues. This unique treatment is exactly what we would expect under the Greek convention. That convention allows mythological characters to be freely named, and Alcumena is a mythological character.

Whatever may be the explanation of the three exceptional passages in *Rudens*, it is clear—not least from the contrast between *Amphitruo* and the other plays—that basi-[405]cally Plautus observed the same conventions as his Greek models with regard to the naming of women; the parallelism between their practice and his is far too close to be coincidental. We may now turn to Terence, who surprisingly proves to be *less* faithful to Greek practice than Plautus is.

Women are named on 228 occasions in Terence—proportionately far more often than anywhere in earlier comedy, Greek or Plautine. As usual, we find that in most of these cases (153 to be precise) the woman in question is, or is believed to be, non-respectable—a slave, a *meretrix*,<sup>50</sup> a music-girl, or at best someone's *amica peregrina*, like Glycerium in *Andria* and Antiphila in *Heauton Timorumenos* before their identity is discovered. Respectable women are named sixteen times by themselves or by other women,<sup>51</sup> twelve times by male slaves,<sup>52</sup> twenty-nine times by free men who know or believe or pretend to believe<sup>53</sup> that no other free man is present, nine times when the other free men present are members of the woman's family.<sup>54</sup> Of the other

<sup>50</sup> One *meretrix* alone, Thais in *Eunuchus*, is named no less than fifty times.

<sup>51</sup> *Andria* 228, 459; *HT* 662; *Eun.* 827; *Hec.* 337, 354, 588, 793, 809, 811, 830, 832, 870; *Adel.* 309, 321, 343.

<sup>52</sup> *Andria* 682, 859; *Phorm.* 782, 872; *Hec.* 179, 191, 320, 329, 332, 339, 349; *Adel.* 329.

<sup>53</sup> This refers to *Phorm.* 352, where Phormio and Geta, knowing that Demipho and his *advocati* are present and listening, pretend not to notice them and stage a quarrel to deceive them, until Demipho calls out to Geta at 373. At *Andria* 306 and 969 the speaker is talking to a slave, not seeing as yet that his friend is present; at *Eunuchus* 1036 Gnatho and Thraso are eavesdropping unnoticed; at *He-[418]cyr*a 243 and 623 Phidippus comes out speaking 'over his shoulder' to Philumena inside, and sees Laches only when the latter accosts him. The other instances are *Andria* 806; *HT* 663, 691, 1007; *Phorm.* 316, 322, 784; *Hec.* 219, 223, 229, 318, 325, 414, 445, 523, 541, 560, 845; *Adel.* 511, 616, 619, 635, 787.

<sup>54</sup> Nausistrata is named by her brother-in-law Demipho in front of her husband Chremes (*Phorm.* 813) and later several times by Phormio in front of both of them (986, 987, 1037, 1046, 1052). Philumena is named twice (*Hec.* 466, 480) in conversation between her father Phidippus, her husband Pamphilus and her father-in-law Laches. Hegio refers to Sostrata by name (*Adel.* 506) in front of her husband Demea.

nine passages, three are of types that we have already met in Plautus. In *Andria* 905, Crito, speaking to Glycerium's lover Pamphilus, mentions Glycerium by name, knowing that she is a citizen but also knowing (cf. 942) that Glycerium is not her real name; likewise Pamphilus himself (978) to Charinus after she has been identified as Chremes' daughter. For the identification to be made it was necessary for Chremes to be told Glycerium's real name, and this Pamphilus does (945) in the presence not only of Chremes but of Crito and Simo who are not related to her.

But there remain half a dozen passages which are clear and straightforward violations of the non-naming convention, for which I can see no excuse.

(1) In *Phormio*, it is known from the start (114) that Phanium is an Athenian citizen, and Antipho, who has married her as a result of Phormio's collusive lawsuit, is deeply in love with her. Yet twice (201, 218) he refers to her by name in front of Phaedria. Phaedria is Antipho's cousin, but there is no parallel for regarding this as supplying a strong enough link to his wife to justify waiving the non-naming convention; Phaedria is also Phanium's [406] half-brother, but neither he nor anyone else is yet aware of this.

(2) In the final scene of *Phormio* Nausistrata is addressed by name half a dozen times. Most of these are legitimate instances (see n. 54); but at 1014 Demipho addresses her by name in the presence of the parasite Phormio as well as of her husband.

(3) In *Hecyra* Laches twice names his wife Sostrata to or in front of Phidippus, who is no relation either of hers or his (he is the father-in-law of their son) (271, 629). Similarly Phidippus mentions *his* wife Myrrina by name in addressing Laches (632).

I do not see how Terence could have committed these 'errors' if he had been consciously aware of, and endeavouring to follow, the non-naming convention. But then it may well be asked: if he was not consciously aware of the convention, why are there not more than six 'errors'? I suggest that he had observed that Greek comic dramatists were sparing in allowing free men to name respectable women in front of other free men, but did not realize that what was crucial was whether the hearers included free men *not of the woman's family*.

It may indeed be that Plautus too had failed to take this point; of seven or eight passages in Plautus where a free man names a respectable woman in front of another free man, there is only one (*Men.* 1131) where the sole relevant audience is a member of the woman's family.

The conclusions, then, to which our survey has led are as follows.

(1) In Greek comedy the rule holds, with no known exceptions, that a free man (other than a Spartan) does not mention in public the name of a respectable living woman not holding a position in public life. In this definition, 'in public' means in the presence of, or in addressing, one or more free men not closely related to the woman or her husband;<sup>55</sup> 'respectable woman' means a woman who is, or is capable of being, lawfully married,\* and who has not forfeited her respectability by (for example) notorious and promiscuous adultery;\* 'position in public life' means the position of a priestess or, in later comedy, member-[407]ship of a reigning house. It must be presumed that, as in the Athenian courts (and as in Roman comedy), the convention was waived where the naming of the woman was essential to establish her identity or status or that of a child of hers—a situation which must have been fairly frequent in New Comedy, though we happen to possess no Greek example.

(2) Plautus and Terence were aware of the existence of the above convention, but seem not to have understood it perfectly:

(a) When a woman believed to be a slave or foreigner is discovered to be a citizen, both Plautine and Terentian characters occasionally refer to her after the discovery by the name by which she was known before it.

(b) Terence at least, on the relatively rare occasions when he permits a free man to name a respectable woman before other free men, takes no notice of whether the latter are members of the woman's family.

These conclusions have important consequences, especially for the interpretation of papyrus texts. Thus, if in a comic papyrus a speaker utters the name Myrrhine, Sostrate, or any of the other standard

<sup>55</sup> Note that (i) in the making of a betrothal, the man is deemed to be closely related to the woman (*CGFP* 250.8 <= *com. adesp.* 1045.8 KA>); (ii) choruses not interfering in the action are deemed not to be present (n. 10).

comic names for a *matrona* or *virgo*, we know without further inquiry that *either* the speaker is a woman or a slave, *or* the speaker is (or fancies himself to be) the only free man on stage, *or* any other free man present is closely related to the woman named. In certain circumstances evidence of this kind could be crucial for the understanding of a scene or even an entire play.

The evidence of comedy thus confirms the evidence of forensic oratory as to the status, or lack of it, of Athenian citizen women in society beyond the bounds of the family. In the streets as much as in the courts, before one's neighbour as much as before a jury, to name such a woman in public, without pressing necessity, was to degrade and dishonour her.

## APPENDIX

### The naming of women in fourth-century Attic prose

*Plato* does not often have occasion to mention women by name [408] at all. In the works generally accepted in antiquity as Platonic, thirteen non-mythical women only are mentioned by name, a total of 32 times. Of these, six were certainly or almost certainly dead at the supposed ('dramatic') date of the dialogue (Socrates' mother Phainarete, *Alk. I* 131e and *Tht.* 149a; Diotima, *Symp.* 201d–210b;<sup>56</sup> Sappho, *Phdr.* 235c; the slave Thratta, *Tht.* 174a–175d; and two women of the time of Anakreon, *Theages* 125d–e), and four were women with a public status, three foreign queens (Amestris of Persia, *Alk. I* 123c; Lampido of Sparta, *Alk. I* 123e; Kleopatra of Macedon, *Gorg.* 471c) and Aspasia (*Menex.* 235e–236c, 249d). Other cases which come within the convention\* are *Alk. I* 105d, where Socrates calls Alkibiades 'son of Kleinias and Deinomache' (cf. *Letter II* 313a, 'son of Dionysios and Doris') and *Alk. I* 123c6, where someone is imagined as

<sup>56</sup> The imperfect ἦν (201d3) strongly suggests that she is no longer alive. Socrates' alleged interview with her apparently took place when she came to Athens ten years before the plague (201d4), i.e. in 440, twenty-four years before the dramatic date of *Symposion*. Socrates several times quotes himself as having addressed Diotima by name, but since we may safely assume that no other man was present this would not violate the non-naming convention.

saying to Queen Amestris 'I am thinking of matching your son against the son of Deinomache'. The one passage which violates the convention is *Phd.* 60a, where Socrates' wife Xanthippe is named twice by the narrator Phaidon. Consideration of this case had best be deferred until we have dealt with Xenophon.

*Xenophon* in his Socratic writings names only three non-mythical women<sup>57</sup>—Aspasia (*Mem.* 2.6.36, *Oik.* 3.14), Theodote a celebrated hetaira (*Mem.* 3.11, cf. Ath. 13.574e)<sup>58</sup>—and Xanthippe (*Symp.* 2.10). We never learn, for example, the name of the wife of Ischomachos in *Oikonomikos*, much as she is discussed.\* The case of Xanthippe is very curious; one can only suppose that her bad temper was so notorious, and considered so unwomanly, that Socrates' friends regarded her as fair game: it is noteworthy that Xenophon, who is concerned to represent Socrates in a favourable light, does not think it necessary to have him defend his wife against Antisthenes' insult, but actually makes him by implication agree with it. When Phaidon in Plato, on first mentioning Xanthippe, adds parenthetically *γινώσκεις γάρ*, does he mean 'you know who she is' ('I do not need to explain whom I am referring to') or 'you know what she's like' ('she doesn't deserve to be referred to in the customary indirect manner')? Either way, the implication is that Xanthippe would not have been mentioned [409] by name but for special reasons peculiar to her case.\* The women mentioned by name in Xenophon's other works are all mothers, sisters, wives, or mistresses of rulers, mostly Asiatic.<sup>59</sup>

In the works of the orators (*Andokides*, *Lysias*, *Isokrates*, *Demosthenes*, *Hyperides*), other than forensic speeches—political speeches and tracts, rhetorical display-pieces, funeral orations, letters—only one non-mythological woman is referred to by name: Artemisia, widow and successor of Mausolos of Karia (*Dem.* 15.11 and 27).

<sup>57</sup> I take it that in *Symp.* 9.2–5 Ariadne is the name of the character being portrayed, not of the performer.

<sup>58</sup> Athenaios seems to have got his notes muddled in this passage, and to have mentioned Alkibiades' mistresses in the wrong order: it was not Theodote who arranged for Alkibiades' burial, but Timandra (*Plut. Alk.* 39.4: Athenaios in this passage calls her Damasandra).

<sup>59</sup> The only Greeks among them are Kyniska, sister of Agesilaos (*Ages.* 9.6), who has a special status both as a Spartan and as a princess;\* Phokais and the younger Milesia (*Anab.* 1.10.2–3), part of the baggage belonging to Cyrus; and Hellas (*Anab.* 7.8.8, cf. *Hell.* 3.1.6), whose two sons were despots, by Persian appointment, of a number of Asiatic cities.

Thus, except in the evidently special case of Xanthippe, the practice of fourth-century prose writers is seen to be the same as that of comedy.<sup>60</sup>

#### ADDENDA

**p. 44 n. 6** Koisyra: she is more likely to have been Megacles' mother than his wife. See Lavelle (1989), Willemsen (1991) 144–5, Lewis (1993), Stanton (1996).

**p. 45 n. 10** sex in public: the prosecutor of Neaera ([Dem.] 59.33) uses the alleged fact that her one-time lover Phrynion 'had intercourse with her in public everywhere whenever he wished' to strengthen his argument that Neaera was, and always had been, a hetaira.

**p. 45 n. 10** ignoring the chorus: perhaps in these scenes the chorus grouped themselves in an unobtrusive position; see Sommerstein (1990) on *Lys.* 907.

**p. 46** the unnamed mother of Hyperbolus: it is striking that the two choruses do not name her even though they are both female.

**p. 46 n. 14** Doko as the name of Hyperbolus' mother: Bergk's suggestion is not even mentioned in *PCG* v. 568 (on the Hermippus passage).

**p. 47** 'a thin disguise for the same person': I would now regard this as something of an overstatement. Henderson (1987*a*) xxxix–xl put it more judiciously: while 'we should probably not conclude... that Lysistrata was modelled on Lysimache, that actual portraiture was involved', nevertheless 'her close connection with the Akropolis and

<sup>60</sup> This article was first published in *Quaderni di Storia* 11 (1980) 393–418. Reprinted here by kind permission of *Quaderni di Storia* and its publisher, Edizioni Dedalo.

her assimilation to Athena are characteristics that may well have reminded the spectators of the priestess who occupied a seat of honour in the theatre and whose name was known to them'. For possible further links between *Lysistrata*, *Lysimache*, and *Athena*, see Sommerstein (2001) 302–3, building on an idea advanced by my student Eleanor Sibley (1995); and for 'another, complementary explanation' of *Lysistrata*'s nameability see Chapter 12 below, pp. 243–4.

p. 48 the Menandrian data: I have not attempted a complete survey of material published since this article appeared, but I know of nothing that certainly or probably violates the generalizations here stated.

p. 48 n. 21 *Misoumenos* 42: I was wrong in attempting to argue that the speaker here is not Demeas. However, he is not speaking 'in public' as the term is defined in this article, since his interlocutor, the only other person present, is probably a slave; see (Gomme and Sandbach (1973) on *Mis.* 1–90 and Arnott (1996a) 277.

p. 48 n. 23 Thanks to two new papyri, the reference to *Epitr.* F 7 should now be *Epitr.* 793.

p. 50 n. 28 *Chrysilla*: there is a much better known citizen *Chrysilla*, the wife first of *Ischomachus* and later of *Callias* (*Andoc.* 1.124–9, esp. 127).

p. 50 *Eubulus*' *Olbia*: subsequent editors (Hunter (1983) 164; Kassel and Austin, *PCG* v. 233) have found the evidence insufficient to decide whether the title is a woman's name or whether it means 'Land of Plenty' (cf. fr. 74).

p. 51 *Alexis* titles: Arnott (1996b) 177–8, 550, considers it likely that both *Dorkis* and *Pezonike* are the names of hetairai (noting that the first element of the latter's name implies that she was not, as many hetairai were, a musician); on *Krateia* (pp. 311–12) Arnott is non-committal.



pp. 51–2 hetairai named in lost comedies: the list in n. 33 includes a few passages where it is doubtful that any woman is named at all, e.g. *com. adesp.* 274</446> where Kassel and Austin adopt Ruhnken's emendation Πάμφιλ' for the transmitted, and probably unmetrical, Πάμφίλη. It also includes references to Aspasia, who was not a hetaira but tended to be treated as one in comedy (e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 527). To be added to the list are *Men. fr.* 534 KA; *Theopompus fr.* 90 KA; *com. adesp.* 1124.5. In *com. adesp.* 1141.4 we cannot tell whether Parthenis is a hetaira or a slave (cf. above on Araros' *Parthenis*).

p. 52 n. 34 Alexander fr. 7 Kock is not now regarded as a comic fragment (Kassel and Austin ascribe it to Alexander Aetolus). To be added to the list is *com. adesp.* 847 KA (Coesyra, cf. *Ar. Ach.* 614, *Clouds* 48, 800).

p. 52 Rhodia the wife of Lycon: I would now regard Ῥοδία as an ethnic rather than a personal name (i.e. the woman was, or was alleged to be, a native of Rhodes), in which case these passages cease to be relevant to the present inquiry; see Sommerstein (1990) on 270, and Storey (2003) 90–2.

p. 53 on the 'Aigidion' fragment of Eubulus: I have corrected the Kock reference, which in the original paper was wrongly given as fr. 99. Hunter (1983) ad loc. finds 'no warrant for assuming' that the woman named is a hetaira, but he fails to note the relevance of line 4.

p. 53 Alexis fr. 56 KA: Arnott (1996*b*) 176 also entertains the possibility that Zopyra might be a 'wet-nurse, midwife, [or] old female slave'.

p. 53 'Herakleides fr. 1': this was a wrong reference; Athenaeus actually cites a play named *Xenizon* by an otherwise unknown dramatist Heracleitus.

p. 54 Menander fr. 65 KA: if, as we probably should, we read with Bentley and Kassel and Austin ἡ τίτθην καλῆ, we can no longer say for certain that Myrtilé is a nurse; but she is at any rate the kind of person

whom one might reasonably (in everyone's eyes but her own) address as 'nurse', and therefore probably an elderly freedwoman.

p. 54 Menander fr. 240 KA: 'safe to assume' now seems to me distinctly over-optimistic, particularly given that Glycera in *Perikeiromene* proves in the end to be of citizen birth. However, the passage ('Greetings, Glycera!'—'The same to you!'—'How long it is since we met!') strongly suggests that there is no third person present, so that Glycera is in any case not being named 'in public'.

p. 54 Menander fr. 188 and 815 KA: nothing in fr. 188 provides knock-down proof that the speaker is Rhode's husband (*γύναι* can be used to almost any woman except a close blood relation); but since he is apparently explaining why he will not allow Rhode to perform a somewhat exotic ritual, involving the use of cymbals, with a view to safeguarding the life or welfare of some third person, it is reasonable to assume that he is her *kyrios*.

p. 54 Menander fr. 492 KA: Kassel and Austin prefer the variant *Κρώβυλε* (as the last word of an iambic trimeter, not the first word of a trochaic tetrameter), which will make this the name of the son rather than the mother; they regard it as 'scarcely credible' that Menander could have written *Κρωβύλη τῆ μητρὶ πείθου*, presumably because it would suggest that the addressee did not know who his mother was, which under all but extraordinary circumstances would be absurd and insulting.

p. 55 n. 41 Kassel and Austin do appear to favour Körte's supplements; at any rate they print them in their apparatus and offer no alternatives. The name Mixias, or rather its first three letters, appears as a superscript *nota personae* in line 3 of the fragment; the name Moschion (of course a very common name for young men in New Comedy) appears nowhere in what survives of the papyrus.

p. 55 *com. adesp.* 1045 KA: on the principle that a future son-in-law, once recognized as such, immediately becomes a family member,

cf. Men. *Dysk.* 871–3 where, on Gorgias expressing reluctance to join a celebration at which women are present (he means his fiancée—whom he has not yet met!—and her mother), his future brother-in-law Sostratus rejoins ‘What’s this nonsense? Go on in, won’t you? You must treat them all now as family!’ It is possible, too, that in Pamphile’s case there was a special reason for naming her: perhaps Laches had *two* daughters, and it was therefore important to specify that the one being given in marriage was Pamphile and not her sister (all the more important if, like Gorgias’ bride, she was being betrothed *in absentia*).

p. 58 In writing ‘I conclude that her real name was something quite different’ I was guilty of the documentary fallacy; I should have said ‘I conclude that *we are meant to assume that* her real name was something quite different’.

p. 61 ‘who is, or is capable of being, lawfully married’: perhaps we should add ‘or has been’ to cover the case of widows beyond child-bearing age, for whom remarriage was unlikely but who certainly did not lose their status as ‘respectable’.

p. 61 ‘and who has not forfeited her respectability...’: this clause was introduced to cover the supposed case of ‘Rhodia’, the wife of Lycon; if ‘Rhodia’ is a phantom (see on p. 28 above) there remains no positive evidence in support of the clause.

pp. 62–3 the naming of Alcibiades’ mother: these passages are ‘within the convention’ because Socrates and Alcibiades are alone. It is probably also relevant, however, that in both passages Socrates is comparing Alcibiades to Persian royalty; similarly the ‘son of Dionysius and Doris’, the addressee of the *Second Letter*, is the tyrant Dionysius II.

p. 63 the wife of Ischomachus: she is now widely believed to be none other than the Chrysis mentioned above (on p. 50 n. 28). For a review of the evidence and arguments see Pomeroy (1994) 261–3.

**p. 63** Xanthippe: either way, too, there is also an implication that Xanthippe is not, in Schaps's phrase, 'a proper woman'—since, if she was, Phaedo's interlocutor, Echebrates, 'would not be expected to know her', particularly since there is no indication in the dialogue that he had ever even been to Athens.

**p. 63 n. 59** Cynisca's name was also famous to all Greeks because she had become the first woman to be proclaimed as an Olympic victor, and had commissioned a statue of herself at Olympia to commemorate the event; see Perry (2007).

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## The anatomy of euphemism in Aristophanic comedy

### 1. INTRODUCTION [183]

The comedies of Aristophanes<sup>1</sup> may not seem an obvious group of texts in which to investigate the use of euphemism. Old Comedy is notorious not only for calling a spade a spade, but for using language which was taboo in every other kind of poetry (except the iambus, of which Old Comedy was in so many ways the heir<sup>2</sup>); a mealy mouth is almost the last thing one would think of associating with it. And yet, as we shall see, the characters in Aristophanes' surviving plays between them use nearly two hundred euphemistic expressions, the great majority of them in the very area, that of sex, in which Old Comedy has so great a reputation for unbridled *παρρησία*.

I take a euphemism to be any expression that is used in place of another whose use might cause offence or embarrassment (including embarrassment to the speaker) or be of ill omen, with the object of avoiding such offence, embarrassment, or ill omen. In general, therefore, an expression which could not itself be used in polite conversation cannot be euphemistic, since it could not successfully achieve the purpose for which euphemisms are used. So, too, the many metaphorical expressions for sexual organs and activities, amply discussed by Henderson (1991*a*), should not be regarded as euphemistic,

<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, references to the surviving plays of Aristophanes will be made by title alone.

<sup>2</sup> On the relationship between Old Comedy and iambus see e.g. Rosen (1988); Degani (1988, 1993); Henderson (1991*a*) 17–23.

since such expressions are used as much, or more, for [184] the sake of vividness as for that of propriety. In writing that does respect propriety—in serious drama, history, philosophy, public speeches, even medical writings—reference to sexual matters is not avoided when they happen to be relevant, but the language in which they are referred to is not that of vivid metaphor, as several other studies in <*Studi sull'eufemismo*> show.<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes a word or phrase may appear in two passages, have the same meaning in both, and yet be euphemistic in one and not in the other. For example, forms of the verb *εὐφραίνεσθαι* appear twice in *Lysistrata* (165, 591) with reference to sexual pleasure. In the second passage the verb is plainly euphemistic: the sense in which it is to be understood is hinted at by the parallel phrase *τῆς ἡβῆς ἀπολαύσαι* and made clear by the antithesis with *μονοκοιτούμεν* (592), but is not spelled out. In 165, on the other hand, the whole context is explicitly sexual and has been since the heroine told her fellow-women that to secure peace *ἀφεκτέα... ἐστίν... τοῦ πέους* (124), and if in 165 she does not make it explicit to what kind of *εὐφραίνεσθαι* she is referring, this is not in order to avoid impropriety but because her hearers already know and do not need to be told again.

There follows an analysis of the (approximately) 198 euphemistic expressions<sup>4</sup> in the eleven surviving comedies of Aristophanes. It is striking that one field in which euphemism seems to be almost completely absent is that of *religion*. It is possible that at one time expressions such as *μὰ τὸν κύνα* (*Wasps* 83) were designed to avoid the possible consequences of casual perjury;<sup>5</sup> but the enormous [185] frequency of true oaths in the names of gods, not only in comedy but in genres like oratory and Platonic dialogue, shows that by the classical period the currency of oaths had been so much devalued

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. Bain (1999), Carey (1999).

<sup>4</sup> The number of such expressions cannot be precisely stated, since there is an element of subjectivity in decisions about (i) what is to count as a euphemism and (ii) whether two (or more) uses of the same word in close proximity should be reckoned separately or should be considered as a single item. In arriving at the total given in the text, all repetitions of the same word in the same line (e.g. *Eccl.* 613 *ξυγκαταδαρθ-*) have been counted as single items, as have the following repetitions not within a line: *Ach.* 792–4 *Ἀφροδίτῃ θύειν*, *Birds* 1215–16 *ἐπέβαλεν*, *Lys.* 223–4 *πέισομαι*, 904–10 *κατακλίνῃθι* etc., *Frogs* 514–19 *ὄρχηστρίδες*.

<sup>5</sup> As *Birds* 521 *ὄταν ἐξαπατᾷ τι* implies (cf. Zanetto (1987) ad loc.)

that no one supposed a casual conversational oath-expression could have any untoward consequences.<sup>6</sup> The only possible case of a religious euphemism that I can find in Aristophanes is *δημοσίους* (lit. ‘publicly-owned individuals’) in *Knights* 1136, if, as is generally supposed on the basis of the scholia, this refers to animals which had been bought by the state and were being fattened with a view to sacrifice.

## 2. ALL-PURPOSE EUPHEMISMS

Some euphemisms are used simply in order not to have to mention an actual or prospective misfortune (for the speaker or the addressee). Some specialized groups of euphemisms of this kind (those related to politics, and to deformities and handicaps) will be considered below; but there are others which can be used to disguise any misfortune or unpleasantness whatever.<sup>7</sup>

*ἀλλόκοτος* ‘strange’ can mean ‘ill-omened’ (*Wasps* 47; note the reply *ἦκιστ’, ἀλλ’ ἄριστον*).

*κάλλιστ’, ἐπαινώ* ‘excellent, I thank you’, i.e. ‘no, thanks’ (*Frogs* 507), uttering the courteous accompaniments of a refusal but leaving the refusal itself (which, it is assumed, will disappoint the addressee) to be conveyed by gesture or tone of voice.

*νεώτερον* = *κακόν*: Blepyros fears his wife (who has taken his clothes) may be doing something *νεώτερον* (*Eccl.* 338). We later find that he suspects her of having slipped out to visit a lover (520–6), but [186] there is irony in the word he uses here, for even as he speaks she and the other women are doing something which is *νεώτερον* in a sense unimagined by him, namely making a political revolution.

<sup>6</sup> To some extent a distinction seems to have been made between, on the one hand, informal, implicit oaths of the type of *νῆ τὸν Δία* or *μά τῆν Δήμητρα* and, on the other, oaths taken formally and ‘performatively’, usually with the actual use of the verb *ᾄμνυμι* either by the person swearing or by the person administering the oath (e.g. *Wasps* 1046, *Birds* 444–5, *Lys.* 237, *Thesm.* 272/4, *Frogs* 305–6); the latter do appear to be considered solemn and binding, except by atheists and their dupes such as Strepsiades in *Clouds* 1232–6.\*

<sup>7</sup> Cf. López Eire (1999) 337–41.

οἶα δὴ ‘so-so’, ‘however’, i.e. ‘badly’ (*Ach.* 753; that the speaker does mean ‘badly’ is clear from the following three lines).

ὁ σὺ λέγεις <‘what you said’> (cf. *Lys.* 146) is a convenient way to refer to something previously mentioned which the speaker is reluctant to name explicitly. In this particular case the unnamed object is τὸ πέος, but it is not because πέος is a taboo word that Kalonike avoids using it (she *did* use it at 134); it is rather that the idea of ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ πέους so appals her (cf. 129–35 and 147 ὁ μὴ γένοιτο) that she does not want to speak of it for fear her speaking of it will cause it to happen. Apart from Lysistrata herself, the only woman in this scene who is willing to mention the proposal explicitly is also the only one who is at first willing to carry it out, the Spartan Lampito (cf. 143 ὑπνῶν . . . ἄνευ ψωλᾶς).

οὐκ ἐπαιῶ ‘I do not praise you’, i.e. ‘I am displeased’ (*Lys.* 70) is one of several instances of the technique of using a negated favourable expression as a substitute for a strongly unfavourable one; cf. μὴ γνῶναι καθαρῶς (*Wasps* 1045), μὴ γνούσιν παραχρῆμα (ib. 1048), οὐ κερδαίνομεν (*Birds* 1591; see §6), οὐκ ἐκ δικαίου (*Wealth* 755; see §5), εὖ φρονεῖν οὐ δόξομεν (*Frogs* 705), and especially an item that deserves an entry to itself:

οὐκ ἐπιγλωττήσομαι τοιοῦτον οὐδέν ‘I will not utter [*sc.* about Athens] anything of the kind [*sc.* that I have just uttered about the Peloponnesians and Boiotians]’ (*Lys.* 37) enables Lysistrata to make clear her meaning (that Athens too risks destruction if the war is not brought to an end) without uttering any words of ill omen. The verb ἐπιγλωττᾶσθαι is particularly associated with the uttering of ill-omened words (see Garvie (1986) 343).

οὐ σοὶ γάρ ἐστι περίπατος κάλλιστα περί γε τούτου (*Frogs* 953). Euripides has just claimed that his practice of giving a voice to all kinds of characters, regardless of age, sex, and station in life, is δημοκρατικόν: Dionysos advises him not to stress that point because ‘that’s not exactly the ideal ground for you to take your stand [187] on’, i.e. most people would not be willing to see Euripides as a principled democrat.<sup>8</sup> The euphemism is made even more

<sup>8</sup> Possible explanations for these suspicions about Euripides’ political leanings are considered by Dover (1993b) 311.



euphemistic by being the negation of an expression which is not merely favourable but *superlatively* so; similarly the blind wanderer Oedipus tells the men of Kolonos he is οὐ πάνυ μοίρας εὐδαιμονίσαι πρότης (Soph. OC 144–5).

φράσαι τι ‘say something’, i.e. ‘complain’ (*Wealth* 1090).

### 3. THANATIC EUPHEMISMS

Death is often seen as the ultimate misfortune, and in many cultures references to it (especially in connection with the speaker, the addressee, or someone close to either) are systematically disguised.<sup>9</sup> Several such euphemisms appear in Aristophanes.

ἀπαλλαγὴ πραγμάτων ‘release from troubles’ (vel sim.) appears at *Ach.* 757 (where there is a misunderstanding, see §9) and at *Frogs* 185. It was doubtless a cliché, cf. Eur. *Hek.* 271 (and, ironically, ib. 1292).

δεῖν ἐν τῇ σανίδι: about three-quarters of the way through *Thesmophoriazousai* the leading comic character, Euripides’ elderly in-law, is sentenced to death by the Council for sacrilegiously entering the sanctuary of the Thesmophorian goddesses, to which only females were admitted. The sentence is to be carried out by clamping him to a board (σανίς) by the neck, wrists, and ankles, with his feet off the ground, and leaving him to die of exposure, hunger, and thirst (or possibly eventually to be strangled by tightening the neck-clamp, perhaps at his own request to put an end to his suffering). The condemned man himself has no doubt that the sentence is a capital one (938, 946, 1025–8, 1055), but the *prytanis* who supervises the carrying out of the sentence speaks only of ‘fastening him to the board’ and allowing no one to approach him (930–4, 943). This may well have [188] been the regular practice when executions were carried out, even though the law (if the penalty was fixed) or the prosecutor (if the penalty was to be decided by the jury) will have

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Rodríguez Alfageme (1999) 289–95; López Eire (1999) 328–37; Lens-Tuero (1999) 398–409.

explicitly laid down ‘death’ as the punishment. The methods of execution in use (others were precipitation into the βάραθρον and hemlock) seem to have been designed to ensure that death was not caused directly by the action of the state’s agent, and this pretence, whose object was probably in origin the avoidance of ritual pollution, may have been carried through consistently in the words of those responsible for the execution. Even an animal, it will be recalled, could not be slaughtered in a sacrifice without appearing to give consent.<sup>10</sup>

ἐς μακαρίαν ‘to blessedness’ (*Knights* 1151) is an occasional substitute for the common imprecation ἐς κόρακας ‘to the crows’. It sounds like a blessing, but as its contexts here and elsewhere<sup>11</sup> show, it is intended and perceived as a curse; for οἱ μακάριοι could mean ‘the dead’ (cf. Ar. fr. 504.9–11, an interesting collection of thanatic euphemisms).

οἱ πλείονες ‘the majority’ is used to refer to the dead in *Eccl.* 1073.

πάσχειν τι ‘have something happen to one’, i.e. ‘die’, is the most common of all these ‘thanatic’ euphemisms (as I have termed them). It usually appears in prospective conditional clauses and in the first person (*Wasps* 385, *Peace* 169–70, *Eccl.* 1105), but once in the second person plural (*Frogs* 736–7), where it has a political reference and will be discussed under that heading.

A case of thanatic euphemism that cannot be associated with a specific phrase occurs in the parodos of *Thesmophoriazousai*. The women who form the chorus have been asked (331–51) to utter a curse on a variety of malefactors (serious and comic, male and female), the terms of the curse (in the generalizing masculine gender) being κακῶς ἀπολέσθαι τοῦτον αὐτὸν κῶκίαν (349). They respond (356–[189]66) by duly listing a series of sinners (women only: the list is introduced by the feminine relative ὅποσαι)—but when the moment comes for them to utter the operative words of the curse, they merely say that the subversives and traitors in question ἀσεβοῦσ’ ἀδικοῦσί τε τὴν πόλιν (367): as Colin Austin has put it,<sup>12</sup> the chorus ‘cannot bring itself to curse a fellow-woman’, and when they ask Zeus

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Peace* 960 with scholia, and see Burkert (1983) 3–4.

<sup>11</sup> Antiphanes fr. 239; Pl. *Hipp. Maj.* 293a.

<sup>12</sup> Austin (1987) 78.

to make their prayers effective (368–71) they are leaving to him the responsibility of deciding whether their words about subversives and traitors actually amount to a prayer—and no doubt hoping that he will think they don't!

#### 4. AGE, PHYSICAL APPEARANCE, AND DISABILITIES

Euphemistic expressions may be used to avoid categorizing oneself, or to avoid categorizing one's addressee, as old, ugly, or physically handicapped. In Aristophanes such euphemisms are far less common than plain-language terms such as *γραῦς*, *αἰσχρὸς*, *τυφλός*, etc., but a few of them do occur:

*λάμποντι μετώπῳ* 'with gleaming forehead' (*Knights* 550) is a phrase of almost epic grandiloquence created to refer to Aristophanes' own premature *baldness* (and perhaps much enjoyed by those spectators who were bald themselves). The *Knights* are here speaking in their own name, and refer to the poet in the third person; it is notable that in *Peace*, when the chorus speak in the first person as the voice of the poet, they use the plain-language adjective *φαλακρός* (767, 771).

*ὀφθαλμία* 'eye-disease, visual disorder' is Chremylos' delicate way of referring (*Wealth* 115) to the *blindness* of the god Wealth. Some learned ancient readers seem to have objected to this 'improper' use of a medical term with a precise technical meaning, and in some ancient copies of the play the line (*ταύτης ἀπαλλάξειν σε τῆς ὀφθαλμίας*) was rewritten as *τῆς συμφορᾶς ταύτης σε παύσειν [190] ἣς ἔχεις*.<sup>13\*</sup> At the start of the dialogue with Wealth (60) Chremylos had

<sup>13</sup> The scholiast to whom we owe our knowledge of this alteration, believing as he does that the text on which he is commenting is Ar.'s earlier *Wealth* of 408 BC, asserts that the change was made *ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ*, i.e. for the production of 388. Kassel & Austin in *PCG* iii.2 245 print *τῆς συμφορᾶς κτλ.* as a fragment of *Wealth I* (Ar. fr. 458); but the text in which the scholiast or his source found this line was one that, according to other scholia on the surviving play (on 173 and 1146), contained references to events of 403 and later, and is likely to have been simply a copy of the play of 388 with a different textual history from that of most other copies available to Hellenistic scholars.

warned his slave against speaking rudely to the stranger (who is not then known to be a god), and he never uses the word *τυφλός* in Wealth's presence.

*πέπειρα* 'ripe, mature' (*Eccl.* 896) is used by an old woman (when advertising her merits as a sexual partner) to refer to her *age*.

## 5. VICES AND CRIMES

Another important use of euphemism is to extenuate criminal or immoral actions or dispositions, usually in oneself or in persons to whom one is favourably disposed:<sup>14</sup> *ὀνόματι περιπέττουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν*, as Chremylos says (*Wealth* 159) of boys who will not sell their sexual favours for money but will give them in exchange for a valuable present.

*ἀγίζειν* (*Wealth* 681) and *καθαγίζειν* (*Lys.* 238) are used of priests (or other persons *in loco sacerdotis*) who appropriate religious offerings for their own use. In neither passage is it clear whether or not the appropriator is entitled to the perquisite by religious custom; this linguistic usage may reflect a tension between priests' own view of what was their due by sacred *nomos* and the perception of the ordinary person (as represented by Karion in the *Wealth* passage) that priests were given to abusing their privileges. Karion's reaction is to follow the priest's example by stealing some food himself (682–95).

*ἀμύνεσθαι* 'defend oneself against', i.e. 'fight' (one's father), is the term used by Pheidippides (*Clouds* 1429) of the behaviour of [191] young cockerels, who (he claims) provide an analogy and a justification for his assault on his own father. Like his use of *κολάζειν* a little earlier (see below) it insinuates that the father was the aggressor and therefore deserved to suffer.

*ἀναπεισιμμένος* 'persuaded, induced', i.e. 'bribed' (*Wasps* 101), is apparently a euphemism whose euphemistic qualities have worn so thin that it can be used, as here, in a hostile accusation without the immediate addition of *χρήμασι* (as in *Peace* 622), although *ἔχοντα χρήματα* does appear in apposition in the next line.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Rodríguez Alfageme (1999) 298–9.

*ἀπομερμηρίσαι* ‘shake off cares’, i.e. ‘go to sleep’ (*Wasps* 5), is how the slave Xanthias, who is supposed to be on all-night guard duty, refers to his intended dereliction of that duty.

*βούλομαι* ‘I am willing’ (sc. to prosecute), i.e. ‘I am a sykophant’ (*Wealth* 908) might be thought to be a mere comic conceit based on the laws providing for certain offenders to be prosecuted by *ὁ βουλόμενος*; but the fact that the other characters on stage understand the meaning of the word at once, without explanation, indicates that the word is not being used in this sense here for the first time. If it *was* a comic invention (and it may well have been), it was invented (by Ar. or by another) some time before 388, and caught the public fancy; alternatively it may have been the invention of a real-life sykophant on the defensive, and become a catch-phrase as ‘terminological inexactitude’ (lying), ‘inoperative’ (false), and ‘economical with the truth’ (misleading by omission) have done in English at various times during the twentieth century.

*δρᾶν τι* and *δρᾶν οὐδέν* ‘do something/nothing’, i.e. ‘do something/nothing bad’ (*Thesm.* 398), is the active equivalent of *πάσχειν τι* (see above) but less specialized. Cf. also §7 below.

*κολάζειν* ‘chastise, punish’, i.e. ‘beat’ (one’s father) (*Clouds* 1405) is both vaguer than the plain term *τύπτειν* (1412, 1424, 1443, 1446) and also carries the insinuation that the victim deserved what he got—as indeed the speaker, Pheidippides, claims to believe, saying that he beat up his father *δικαίως* (1377) for the offence of objecting to a speech from a play of Euripides in defence of incest.

*μισητία* ‘hatefulness, naughtiness’ appears twice (*Birds* 1620, *Wealth* 989) denoting avarice or greed (*φιλαργυρία*, *φιλοκέρδεια*, [192] *αἰσχροκέρδεια*). That it is euphemistic in this sense is suggested by the *Wealth* passage in which the speaker appears to be reporting the words of the person whose behaviour has aroused the suspicion of avarice. Elsewhere (e.g. Kratinos fr. 354) the adjective *μισητός* is used of sexually insatiable women, in which sense it is perhaps found even in tragedy (Aesch. *Ag.* 1228); if we had more evidence we might find that this family of words was capable of referring to *any* disgraceful vice.

*μῦθος* ‘tale’ is used in *Wealth* 177 to mean ‘lie’ (cf. the Latin comic interjection *fabulae!* and the English euphemism ‘story’, once much commoner than it is now): that the person concerned, Philepsios, is

indeed being spoken of as a liar (rather than a raconteur) is made highly probable by the fact that he was a politician!<sup>15\*</sup> Cf. Dem. 18.149 *μύθους*. . . *συνθείς* ('concocting', cf. [Aesch.] *Prom.* 686 *μύθοις ψευδέσιν*. . . *συνθέτους λόγους*, Ar. *Frogs* 1052 *οὐκ ὄντα λόγον*. . . *συνέθηκα*).

*οὐκ ἐκ δικαίου* 'not by justice', i.e. 'criminally' (*Wealth* 755), another example of the 'negation of the opposite' device.

*παίξειν* and *παιγνία* 'play, sport' can be used euphemistically in various senses, with the effect of suggesting that the activity referred to is mere innocent fun. Some of these are sexual (see below), but women in Aristophanes also use the word (*Lys.* 700, *Thesm.* 795) in reference to women's parties which—at least in the comic stereotype—will have been characterized by heavy drinking.

*προαιρεῖν* 'take from store' with specific reference to *illicit* taking (*Thesm.* 419).

*συμφορά* 'misfortune', i.e. 'unintentional wrongdoing' (*Wealth* 774), is Wealth's way of describing what he did while he was blind, viz. favour the wicked at the expense of the virtuous. Although it is assumed throughout the play that because of his Zeus-inflicted blindness Wealth could not distinguish the virtuous from the wicked and so was not morally responsible for his error, he nevertheless claims [193] to feel deeply ashamed of it. A less excusable series of euphemisms of the same type is deployed by Charisios in Men. *Epir.* 887–918, using words like *ἡτύχηκα* (891) and *ἐπταικότα* (915) to refer to an intentional crime committed by himself (rape) and also (898, 914) to what he admits was an unintentional misfortune (being a victim of rape) suffered by his wife—though, to be fair to Charisios, he feels his shame far more acutely than Wealth, screaming, tearing out his hair, etc. (893). Cf. also §6 below.

*σώφρων* (*Peace* 1297) is an interesting case of a euphemism which will be taken by a naive addressee as a compliment, but which other, less naive hearers will realize was meant as an insult. Trygaios has dismissed in disgust the son of Lamachos, who insists on reciting martial poetry, and summons instead the son of Kleonymos:

<sup>15</sup> He is mentioned by Demosthenes (24.134) in the company of two leading contemporary politicians, Thrasyboulos of Kollytos and Agyrrihos, as having been imprisoned, apparently for embezzlement.

Kleonymos is repeatedly accused by Aristophanes, in play after play from 423 to 414, of having thrown away his shield in battle,<sup>16</sup> and Trygaios is sure that Kleonymos will not sing about war because he is the son of a *σώφρων* father. The boy is assumed to have inherited his father's character, and will therefore take the epithet literally, believing that cowardice is indeed *σώφρων* 'wise, prudent'; and he duly proceeds (1298–1301) to chant the elegy<sup>17</sup> in which Archilochos, with equal apparent perversity, gave publicity to his own loss of his shield in battle with the Saioi. Other hearers, such as the chorus and the audience, will be aware that when Trygaios said *σώφρων* he meant *δειλός*. Another way of looking at the passage is that Trygaios uses mockingly, in reference to a coward, the word that the coward might use euphemistically in reference to himself, knowing that his very young addressee will not perceive the mockery.

[194] *τὰ πὶ τούτοις δρᾶν* 'do what comes next', i.e. (in context) 'use violence' (*Wealth* 57).<sup>18</sup>

## 6. POLITICAL EUPHEMISMS

To some extent this class blends into the last; its distinguishing feature is that the speaker is addressing the general public about the affairs of the *polis*, and fears that plain speaking might damage the public interest or his own political standing or reputation.

*ἀμαρτάνειν*: *κεῖ τις ἤμαρτε σφαλείς τι* (*Frogs* 689) introduces the most sustained piece of political euphemism in Ar. The chorus-leader is recommending the restoration of citizen rights to those who had been members or supporters of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, five or six years earlier; and in doing so he represents them consistently less as wrongdoers deserving pardon than as victims deserving

<sup>16</sup> We need not here consider whether the accusation was true (on which see Sommerstein (1986a) 103–4; Storey (1989); Henderson (1990) 295); it suffices that it was an established part of Kleonymos' comic reputation.

<sup>17</sup> Archilochos fr. 5.1–3 West.

<sup>18</sup> So the scholia ad loc., which gloss *τὰ πὶ τούτοις* as *τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς μὴ ἐθέλουσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκφαίνειν*: *τὰ δὲ ἐστὶ πηληγαὶ καὶ τραύματα* and paraphrase Karion's words as *μὴ λέγοντός σου, βίαιόν τι διαπράξομαι*.

sympathy. They have ‘erred, tripped up by the wrestling tricks of Phrynichos’ (689), the guilt being thus thrown on a conveniently dead leader of the oligarchic regime; they have ‘slipped’ (690 *δλισθοῦσιν*) and should be allowed to purge their previous ‘errors’ (691 *ἀμαρτίας*); they should be forgiven their one ‘misfortune’ (699 *ξυμφοράν*, cf. above)—an illogicality such as euphemism often induces, since if their role in 411 was indeed that of victims of misfortune there is nothing requiring to be forgiven. At this stage, in the early months of 405, most Athenians evidently would not be prepared to re-enfranchise these men unless persuaded that they no longer represented (or better still, had never represented) a threat to democracy. By the autumn, after Aigospotamoi, when the decree of Patrokleides was passed, they seem to have been less particular.<sup>19</sup>

[195] *δείξας ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται* (sc. *οἱ δῆμοι οἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν*) ‘showing in what manner (the people in the states) are popularly ruled’ (*Ach.* 642) is a delicately phrased way of referring to the position of the ‘allied’ states within the Athenian empire. Since Ar. is claiming that it was courageous for him to do what he did ‘before the Athenians’ (645), he must here be saying he said something which amounted to censure of the Athenians; in other words (i) *δημοκρατοῦνται* refers, not (in the middle) to the manner in which the allied peoples rule themselves, but (in the passive) to the manner in which they are ruled by the *demos* of Athens, and (ii) *ὡς* ‘in what manner’ means in effect ‘how badly’. This use of the relative pronoun/adverb is of course by no means always euphemistic (cf. e.g. *Knights* 335 *ἀκούσαθ’ οἷός ἐστιν οὗτοςὶ πολίτης*, spoken by a bitter enemy of the person referred to), but it clearly is so here.

*εἰς τό δέον* ‘for essential purposes’ (*Clouds* 859) alludes to an expression used by Pericles twenty years earlier, when he is said to have used this phrase in his financial accounts to describe a sum of ten talents actually expended on bribing the Spartan king Pleistoanax to withdraw from Attica (*Plut. Per.* 22.2–23.1). Strepsiades adapts it to avoid having to admit that he has been lured into giving Socrates an opportunity to steal his shoes.

<sup>19</sup> The decree (Andok. 1.77–9) makes no provision for its beneficiaries (who included among others all ex-members of the Four Hundred except those recorded as guilty of treason or murder) to take any oath or pledge of loyalty to the *demos*.



ξενικόν ‘foreign force’ (*Wealth* 173) was, and remained, a standard expression for a body of mercenary troops.

δλισθάνειν: see ἀμαρτάνειν.

οὐ κερδαίνομεν ‘we are deriving no benefit’ (*Birds* 1591) is yet another instance of ‘negation of the opposite’, appropriately put into the mouth of the leader of an embassy: the war has been a disaster for the gods, who are starving, and both Poseidon, the speaker, and Peisetairos, the addressee, know it perfectly well.

συμφορά: see ἀμαρτάνειν.

συνιστάμενοι ‘those who join together’ (*Lys.* 577) was already in current use as a somewhat less pejorative synonym of συνωμόται ‘conspirators’ (the two words appear together in *Knights* 862–3, and Thuc. 8.54.4, speaking of the same groups to whom Lysistrata refers here, calls them ξυνωμοσίαι).

σφάλλεσθαι: see ἀμαρτάνειν.

## [196] 7. SEX AND SCATOLOGY<sup>20</sup>

This is by far the largest class of Aristophanic euphemisms, easily outnumbering all the others combined. It has, however, been studied by Jeffrey Henderson,<sup>21</sup> and I have often contented myself with a simple reference to his discussions.<sup>22</sup>

ἀγαθὸν παθεῖν τι ‘have a good time’ means ‘have exceptionally enjoyable sex’ in the opening phrase of the old women’s advertising aria in *Eccl.* 893–4.

ἄγριος ‘savage’ in the sense of ‘promiscuous pederast’ (*Clouds* 349); cf. Aischines 1.52, and see Dover (1978) 37–8.

αἰδοῖα, the most neutral word the language offered to denote the genitals of either sex, is comparatively rare in comedy, no doubt owing to its colourlessness; on the two occasions when it is found

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Lens-Tuero (1999) 409–13.

<sup>21</sup> Henderson (1991a), esp. 54–5, 112–17, 133–4, 154–61, 247–50; cited in this section simply as ‘Henderson’.

<sup>22</sup> In several cases I cite fewer examples of a given usage than Henderson does; the reason will usually be that implicit in the palinode of Henderson 246.

in extant Aristophanes the speaker is each time an old man (*Clouds* 978, *Wasps* 578); see Henderson 113.

*αἰσχραὶ ἡδοναί* ‘disgraceful pleasures’, referring to cunnilingus (*Knights* 1284)—though it *could* have referred to any sexual act whatever of which the speaker disapproved; cf. Henderson 3–4.

*ἀμβροσία* is used in *Peace* 724, appropriately in an Olympian setting, to refer to the excrement of Ganymede (the only human in heaven) on which the dung-beetle will henceforth be fed.

*ἀναισχυντεῖν* ‘behave shamelessly’ (*Lys.* 460), coming as it does as the last of a series of exhortations to verbal or physical violence, makes a sad and vague anticlimax unless it refers euphemistically to some specific action such as the making of obscene gestures. For a [197] different euphemistic use of the same verb cf. Xen. *Symp.* 8.33 where homosexual lovers are spoken of as οἱ. . . ἀναισχυντεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐθιζόμενοι.

*ἀνόητα* ‘follies’ in *Clouds* 417 may well refer to sexual indulgence, which does not otherwise figure in the list of pleasures and comforts which, according to the *Clouds*, the student of ‘the higher wisdom’ must forgo (so Dover (1968) ad loc.).

*ἀπηνές* ‘something cruel’ (*Clouds* 974) refers to a display of (young male) nudity that arouses in onlookers the torments of unsatisfied desire; cf. Dover (1978) 124–5 who compares Theognis 1353–6.

*ἀπολαῦσαι τῆς ἡβης* ‘derive enjoyment from one’s youth’ (*Lys.* 591): see Henderson 154.

*ἀποπατεῖν*, frequent in medical writers, replaces the standard comic term *χέζειν* <‘shit’> in *Peace* 1228, *Eccl.* 326, 351, 354, *Wealth* 1184.

*ἄσσον ἰέναι* ‘to come near’ is used in *Knights* 1306, in a passage describing speeches supposed to be made at a meeting of warships in protest against the prospect of being commanded by Hyperbolos; the old ship who speaks first addresses the others as ὦ παρθένοι, and the next speaker is indeed a *παρθένος* in the sense that no man has ever boarded her. For the phrase cf. Aesch. fr. 175 ἀλλ’ Ἀντικλείας ἄσσον ἦλθε Σίσυφος.

*ἀταύρωτος* ‘unbullied’, i.e. ‘chaste’, in *Lys.* 217, euphemizes human sexuality by speaking of it in language appropriate to the more easily discussable sexuality of beasts; the word is probably redolent of

tragedy (cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 245), though it may also pun on *ταῦρος* = penis (Suda τ167; cf. Henderson 127).

*αὐλητρίς* ‘woman piper’. Women so designated are sometimes, for all we can tell, thought of primarily as musicians (e.g. *Wasps* 1219), but at *Frogs* 513–14, where the only thing that matters about the *αὐλητρίς* is that she is *ὠραιοτάτη*, the word is clearly little but a polite substitute for *πόρνη*.

*Ἀφροδίτη* means ‘sexual intercourse’ in *Eccl.* 8; the usual prose euphemism, *τὰ ἀφροδίσια*, is not found in Old Comedy. Euripides’ sneer at Aeschylus, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης οὐδέν σοι ἐρώσαν [198]γυναιῖκα* (1044): ‘you wouldn’t know what one was like—you never got lucky in your life!’ See also the next two entries, and *Κύπρις*.

*Ἀφροδίτη θύειν* ‘sacrifice to Aphrodite’ (*Ach.* 792–4): see Henderson 177 (though I see no reason to suppose that there is an implicit fire-metaphor; the act of sacrifice was performed not with fire but with a knife).

*Ἀφροδίτης ὄργια*, *Ἀφροδίτης ἱερά* ‘the (secret) rites of Aphrodite’, i.e. sexual intercourse: in *Lys.* 832 Kinesias is ‘possessed by’, ‘in the grip of’ these rites (*εἰλημμένος*) when he has a massive and obvious erection, and in *Lys.* 898–9 he tells Myrrhine that for a long time she has left the rites ‘uncelebrated’ (*ἀνοργίαστα*).

*γάμοι* ‘conjugalities’ (*Lys.* 943) appears as a euphemism for sex in other Attic texts, e.g. Eur. *Hel.* 190, Dem. 18.129. Cf. *Frogs* 850 *γάμους*. . . *ἀνοσίους* (=incest).

*γυνή* ‘woman’ denotes a male pathic at *Eccl.* 103 (cf. Eupolis fr. 171); see Henderson 213.

*διακλᾶσθαι* ‘behave effetely’ (*Thesm.* 163), if this reading (*διεκλῶντ’* Toup; *διεκίνων* codex unicus) is correct, is presumably used here, as in later Greek (D.H. *Dem.* 43, Luc. *Demonax* 18), as a coded way of indicating that the persons referred to (here the poets Ibykos, Anakreon, and Alkaios) were passive homosexuals.

*διακορεύειν* ‘deflower’ (*Thesm.* 480) is a synonym of *διαπαρθενεύειν* (Hdt. 4.168.2).

διαλέγεσθαι ‘converse with’ seems to mean ‘have sex with’ (cf. Henderson 155) at *Eccl.* 890 (where *τούτω διαλέγου* may = ‘use this dildo’,<sup>23</sup> cf. Vetta (1989) ad loc.) and *Wealth* 1082.

διαπράττεσθαι ‘effect one’s purpose’ (*Eccl.* 634): see Ussher (1973) ad loc.

διδόναι ἑαυτὸν τινί ‘give oneself to...’ (*Knights* 739–40): this expression, vague but easily understood in context (the subject, Demos, is being compared to the *παῖδες ἐρώμενοι* who reject *καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ* as lovers and prefer men of low status), does not appear to occur elsewhere in comedy, but surely lies behind Odysseus’ words to [199] Neoptolemos in *Soph. Phil.* 83–4 *νῦν δ’ εἰς ἀναιδὲς ἡμέρας μέρος βραχὺ δὸς μοι σεαυτὸν*—Odysseus is seducing Neoptolemos (who is just about the right age to be an *eromenos*) into giving up his moral integrity.<sup>24</sup>

διδόναι τινί τι ‘give something to...’: in *Lys.* 861 *δώσεις τί μοι*; is probably intended by the speaker, Lysistrata, not as a euphemistic request for sex, but as a request for a bribe; but the addressee, Kinesias, may briefly imagine that he is being propositioned. Cf. *Thesm.* 344 where a curse is pronounced on the lover (of a married woman) who *μὴ δίδωσιν ἂν ὑπόσχηται*, and *Wealth* 1031 where *ἀποδιδόναι* means ‘give it back to you’, ‘repay you’ (for the material benefits you have conferred on him).

δρᾶν τι ‘do something’, i.e. ‘copulate’, is implicit in *οὐδὲν δύνασθαι δρᾶν* ‘be impotent’ (*Wasps* 1381). In *Eccl.* 704, as a handsome young man runs towards a woman’s house, an ugly man reminds him that under the new affirmative-action laws *πάντως οὐδὲν δράσεις ἐλθών*.

δρόσος ‘dew’, with the epithet *ἀπόπτυστος* ‘abominable’, denotes vaginal secretion in *Knights* 1285; see Henderson 145.

εἶναι μετὰ ‘be with’ (*Wealth* 1081) is a variant of *συνεῖναι*.

εἰς ἄφοδον ἐλθεῖν ‘go to a place out of the way’, i.e. ‘defecate’ (*Eccl.* 1059): see Henderson 192, and cf. *ἀποπατεῖν*.

<sup>23</sup> Alternatively *τούτω* may be the speaker’s middle finger, i.e. *τούτω διαλέγου* = ‘go and masturbate’.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Blundell (1989) 185 n. 7. Related expressions are *πωλεῖν ἑαυτὸν* (Aischines 1.40) and *μισθοῦν ἑαυτὸν* (ib. 72).

ἐξιδίειν ‘give off sweat, exude’ refers at *Birds* 791 to the silent passing of (smelly) wind from the anus (cf. *Frogs* 237 where, however, there is no euphemistic effect as ὁ πρωκτός immediately precedes).

ἐπιβάλλειν ‘impose on’ in *Birds* 1215–16 is perceived by Iris as a double entendre; cf. Henderson 170.

ἔργα νυκτερήσια ‘nocturnal activities’ (of women, *Thesm.* 204) would be a dignified euphemism were it not that careless pronunciation turns the second word into νυκτερείσια with a pun on ἐρείδειν ‘knock’, a verb frequently employed in comic sexual metaphor of the earthier kind.

[200]ἔρως, unlike its nearest equivalents in modern West European languages (*love, amour, Liebe*, etc.), was not normally used as a euphemism for sexual activity; ἔρως was thought of as an affliction, and sexual activity (with the person in question) as the appropriate treatment for this affliction. In *Wealth* 190, however, ἔρως is one of the good things of life (like honour, power, music, and food); this is an appropriate description of sexual pleasure,\* but not of sexual desire. The word seems to be used similarly in *Soph. Aj.* 1205, and *ib.* 693 we find a further semantic shift to the sense ‘passionate joy (sc. as intense as that of sex)’.

ἑταίρα ‘female companion’ is the term used in ordinary discourse for a woman who makes her living by sex but who is not (or whom one does not want to present as) degraded enough to be called a πόρνη. In the orators ἑταίρα is the normal word, and πόρνη is used on selected occasions for its shock effect (e.g. [Dem.] 59.107–14, cf. Aischines 1.52 of a male); in Old Comedy, contrariwise, πόρνη is the normal word<sup>25</sup> and ἑταίρα has a euphemistic tone. In *Peace* 440 the possession of a hetaira is a blessing to be bestowed on those who work for peace, and the choice of word may suggest, as would be appropriate, a woman more desirable (and expensive) than the average πόρνη; similarly in *Wealth* 149 the word refers to the courtesans of Corinth who are not interested in any but rich clients, and in *Thesm.* 346 to a woman who has (or can be expected to have) long-term relationships with one lover at a time, whereas a πόρνη is normally thought of as

<sup>25</sup> It occurs 11 times in Ar.; ἑταίρα occurs eight times, but in four of these places (*Knights* 589, *Lys.* 701, *Ecll.* 23, 528) it merely means ‘friend, companion’ in an entirely non-sexual context.

giving herself (or being hired out) promiscuously to all and sundry who are prepared to pay. In *Eccl.* 1161–2, when the festival judges are being urged to treat the play fairly in spite of its having been the first to be performed, they are asked not to be like ‘the bad hetairai, who only remember their last lover’; the very mention of ‘bad hetairai’ implies that there can be such a thing as a good one, whereas a *χρηστή πόρνη* would have been almost a contradiction in terms.

[201] *ἔταιρειν* ‘be the male equivalent of a hetaira’ (see previous entry) is the dignified way of referring to the occupation of a male prostitute (see Dover (1978) 20–3); in Ar., who prefers more colourful expressions, we find it only at *Peace* 11.

*ἑταῖρος* ‘(male) companion’ means ‘lover’ in *Eccl.* 912 (as in Semonides 7.49); cf. *φίλος*.

*εὐνή καὶ γαμήλιον λέχος* ‘the bed and nuptial couch’ (*Thesm.* 1122) tautologically combines two common tragic designations of sex or marriage, and in most contexts in comedy its function would be less to avoid offence or embarrassment than to label a passage as paratragic (cf. 891). Here, however, the propriety of its language is in stark and obvious contrast with the crudeness of expressions used by the Archer such as *πυγίζειν* (1120, 1123) and *πρωκτίζειν* (1124).

*εὖ ποιεῖν* ‘do good to’ means ‘copulate with’ in *Wealth* 1029, on the lips of an old woman jilted by an ungrateful toy-boy on whom she had lavished gifts.

*εὐπρεπής* ‘nice-looking’ (*Eccl.* 427) probably hints that the supposed young man in question (and Nikias to whom he is compared) are passive homosexuals (cf. *Thesm.* 192).

*εὐφραίνεσθαι* ‘experience pleasure’, i.e. ‘experience sexual pleasure’ (*Lys.* 591); see Henderson 156.

*ἦβη* ‘young adulthood’, i.e. ‘genitals’ (*Clouds* 976): see Henderson 115.

*θεραπεύειν ἑαυτόν* ‘give oneself treatment’ (*Thesm.* 172) is probably not euphemistic on Agathon’s lips but refers to beauty-treatment; Inlaw, however, as his amazed reaction *πῶς πρὸς τῶν θεῶν*; indicates, seems to take the phrase as referring to medical/surgical treatment and implying delicately that Agathon, to preserve his boyish beauty

and/or to empathize better with his women characters, has had himself castrated.

**θύρα** ‘door’, used of the anus with reference to constipation (*Eccl.* 316, 361): see Henderson 199.

**καθεύδειν μετά** or **παρά** ‘sleep with/beside’ (*Ach.* 1147–8, *Thesm.* 1193, *Eccl.* 700–1, 894, 938, 1039, 1050–1): see Henderson 161.

[202]**κατὰ τοῖν σκελοῖν** ‘down over the legs’ in *Peace* 241 refers, according to the scholia, to one of Ar.’s favourite low-comic topoi, self-soiling resulting from defecation caused by fright (cf. perhaps *Men. Perinthia* 18); but this interpretation is by no means secure (see Sommerstein (1985) ad loc.). Cf. *πρὸς ποδῶν*.

**καταδαρθεῖν παρά** ‘sleep beside’ (*Eccl.* 628): see Henderson 160–1.

**κατακλίνεσθαι μετά** ‘lie down with’ (*Lys.* 904 ff.): see Henderson 160–1.

**κατόνασθαι ἑαυτῆς** ‘gain gratification from oneself’ means ‘masturbate’ (with the assistance of a dildo) in *Eccl.* 917.

**κνησιᾶν** ‘have an urge to scratch’ in the old woman’s retort (919) means much the same; cf. *Pl. Gorg.* 494c–e; cf. *ἀνακνᾶν* (of a man being given manual satisfaction either by himself or by a woman) in *Ar. fr.* 37.

**κοιμᾶσθαι παρά** ‘sleep beside’ (*Eccl.* 723): see Henderson 161.

**κόλπος** ‘bosom’ (*Peace* 536, *Lys.* 552) is a substitute for the normal comic terms for the female breast, *τιτθός* and *τιτθίον*. In *Eccl.* 964 *κόλπος* may mean ‘vagina’ (see Henderson 140–1); cf. *Lys.* 1169–70 where, however, the word is used not in order to avoid impropriety but in order to play on the geographical sense of *κόλπος*.

**κόπρος** ‘dung’ (*Eccl.* 360, cf. 317 *ὁ κοπρᾶϊός*) is the proper substitute for *σκῶρ* which (like its compound *σκατοφάγος*) is confined to comedy.

**κύλιξ** ‘cup’ may mean ‘vagina’ in *Lys.* 197; it can be seen as euphemistic, rather than merely metaphorical, because in context a hearer could almost equally well understand it literally as referring to the cup of wine over which the women’s oath is to be taken. In *Lys.* 841 *ὦν σύνοιδεν ἢ κύλιξ* ‘that which the cup also knows about’ the euphemistic device is a different one: the cup is here unequivocally

the cup of the oath, and its mention calls to mind the subject-matter of the oath without explicitly specifying it.

*Κύπρις* 'Aphrodite' is a frequent metonymy for sex in tragedy; Ar. has it at *Thesm.* 205 and *Eccl.* 722 (see Henderson 156). Cf. *Ἀφροδίτη*.

*κωλῆ* 'ham', i.e. 'penis' (found in this sense on magical [203] amulets<sup>26</sup>) appears twice in the tirades of the Better Argument in *Clouds* (989, 1018); see Henderson 129.

*λάβδα* (*Eccl.* 920) appears to stand for a verb beginning with λ, probably \**λαικασείειν* 'have an intense desire to fellate' (another word for which was *λεσβι(ά)ζειν*, alluded to in the following phrase *κατὰ τοὺς Λεσβίους* which leaves no doubt about the meaning of *λάβδα*): a rare<sup>27</sup> ancient instance of the 'euphemism by abbreviation' so familiar in modern languages (cf. 'VD', 'the F-word', etc.).

*λαμβάνειν* 'get it' in *Birds* 1214 is perceived by Iris as a double entendre, synonymous with *ἔχειν* (on which see Henderson 156); alternatively she may be taking it as equivalent to *συλλαμβάνειν* 'become pregnant'.<sup>28</sup>

*λευκός* 'fair-skinned' (*Eccl.* 428) hints at passive homosexuality: see Henderson 211, and cf. *εὐπρεπέης*.

*μέγιστα* (*τά*) 'the biggest thing' denotes sexual intercourse in Theokritos 2.143, and this euphemism is exploited in word-plays in *Thesm.* 813 (the biggest thing a woman ever steals from her husband is a basket of wheat, and then she gives him back *the biggest thing* the same night) and *Eccl.* 104 (Agyrrhios was once a 'woman', but now he has a beard and 'does *the biggest things*' sc. both politically and sexually speaking), and possibly also in *Birds* 708 (birds are the

<sup>26</sup> See Bain (1992).

<sup>27</sup> But not unexampled. A mid-fourth-century pot-graffito from the Athenian Agora (*Ath. Agora* xxv. C33) reads on one side of the pot *Θειοδοσία λαικάδε[ι] εἶδ* while the other side bears simply the letter λ which the editor, M. L. Lang, interprets (without reference to *Eccl.* 920) as *λ(αικάστρια)*. Evidently *λάβδα* was well established in Athenian slang between 400 and 350 as a substitute for *λαικάζειν* and its derivatives. See further De Martino (1999).

<sup>28</sup> For the simplex *λαμβάνειν* in this sense cf. Hippokr. *Genit.* 5 (vii 476.19 Littré) and the analogous use of *ἔχειν* in the sense 'be pregnant' as in Hdt. 5.41.2—though elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus *λαμβάνειν* means 'conceive' only when reinforced by *πρὸς ἑωυτήν* (e.g. *Genit.* 5 (vii 476.17 Littré)) or *ἐν γαστρὶ* (e.g. *Prorrh.* 2.24.1).



children of Eros, and make excellent and effective presents for lovers to give: all *the biggest things* come to humans thanks to birds).

*μείγνυσθαι* ‘mingle’, used in elevated poetry since Homer and Hesiod, appears at *Birds* 698 (in a mock theology) and *Frogs* 1081 (in [204] Aeschylus’ indignant complaint about Euripides’ use of incest as a dramatic theme); see Henderson 156.

*μετέχειν τῶν ἐκ κοινοῦ* ‘commune’, i.e. ‘copulate’ (*Eccl.* 612), is suitable to the context (the establishment of a communist society) but is adapted from an already established use of *κοινωνεῖν*, *κοινωνία* (*Eur. Ba.* 1276; *Pl. Laws* 784e; *Amphis* fr. 20.3).

*μη κακὴ γυνή* ‘a nice (i.e. obliging) girl’: in *Wasps* 1351 the rejuvenated Philokleon promises Dardanis that *ἐὰν γένη μοι μὴ κακὴ νυνὶ γυνή* he will buy her freedom and make her his *παλλακὴ*: it is evident that the clause means exactly the same as *ἐὰν χάριση μοι*.

*μηρῶν . . . ἀπόρρητοι μυχοί* ‘the secret recesses of the thighs’ (*Eccl.* 12) actually denotes, as the reference to depilation makes plain, the area *between* the thighs.

*νενευρώσθαι* ‘be highly strung’, i.e. ‘have a strong erection’ (*Lys.* 1078): see Henderson 116.

*νεφροί* ‘kidneys’ appears to mean ‘testicles’ in *Frogs* 1280 (see Dover (1993*b*) ad loc., citing Philippides fr. 5).

*δπιύειν* (*Ach.* 255): Henderson 157 takes this to mean ‘marry’, as I did in my edition (Sommerstein 1980*c*); but Solon had already used it to mean ‘copulate within marriage’ (Hesychios β466), and by the time of Aristotle (*EN* 1148<sup>b</sup>32) it had come to be a respectable synonym of *βινεῖν*.<sup>29</sup>

*ὀρχεῖσθαι* ‘to dance’ (*Thesm.* 1178) was, no doubt, the official, stated purpose for which the host of a symposium hired an *ὀρχηστρίς* (especially perhaps if he hired her from a female owner—and it is a female owner who is supposed to be speaking here); but everyone knew that she would in fact be expected to entertain the guests in other ways too.

*ὀρχηστρίς* (*Frogs* 514–19): see previous entry, and *αὐλητρίς*.

<sup>29</sup> See further Bonanno (1986).

[205]παίγνια ‘plaything’, i.e. ‘lover’ (*Eccl.* 922); cf. Ussher (1973) ad loc.

παίξειν μετά ‘play with’ (*Frogs* 415): see συμπαίξειν, συμπαίστρια.

πείθεσθαι ‘comply with the wish/request of’ in *Lys.* 223–4 is an even more colourless alternative to χαρίζεσθαι.

ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ‘do everything’ means ‘copulate’ in *Wealth* 978; cf. τι.

πράγμα ‘thing’ means ‘penis’ in *Lys.* 23 (where Kalonike is picking up, and misinterpreting, Lysistrata’s use of the word at 14); cf. Henderson 116 (none of the six other passages Henderson cites involves a conscious euphemism on the part of the speaker, and only one of them, *Lys.* 994, is likely to contain a phallic pun at all).

πρὸς ποδῶν (τὰ) ‘the parts in the direction of the feet’, i.e. the lower part of the body, i.e. (in *Birds* 66) the anus and its vicinity.

προσιέναι ‘approach’ in *Birds* 1212 is perceived by Iris as a double entendre (cf. Hippokr. *Steril.* 3.230 (viii 444.17 Littré) πρὸς ἄνδρα μὴ πρόσεισιν); in *Lys.* 152 too, where it is contrasted with ἀπέχεσθαι, it almost certainly implies more than mere proximity.

πυγή (properly ‘buttocks, bottom’) may be used of other neighbouring areas of the female body (*Peace* 868); see Henderson 150 and Dover (1978) 101.

πυρρόν τι δρᾶν ‘do something yellow’, i.e. ‘defecate in one’s clothes’ (*Eccl.* 1061): see Henderson 189–90.

σκυτίον (or σκυτίονον) ‘bit of leather’, i.e. the comic phallus (*Clouds* 538); cf. σκυτίνη πικουρία in reference to a dildo (*Lys.* 110), though this is not euphemistic because the object has just been called by its plain name ὄλισβος.

σοφόν (τὸ) ‘expertise’ sc. in sexual techniques, characteristic of the ‘riper’ woman according to the somewhat over-ripe singer of *Eccl.* 895.

στέργειν ‘cherish’ in *Eccl.* 897, in an advertising-song crammed with sexual euphemism, clearly refers to the same kind of ‘tender loving care’ as is frequently offered by the authors of present-day lonely-hearts advertisements.

συγγίγνεσθαι ‘be with’ (*Frogs* 57): see Henderson 159.

συγκαθεύδειν ‘sleep with’ (*Eccl.* 1009): see Henderson 161.

[206] *συγκαταδαρθεῖν* ‘sleep with’ (always aorist) occurs three times in *Eccl.* 613–22; see Henderson 160–1.

*συμπαίζειν* ‘play with’ (*Birds* 1098, cf. *πρός με παῖσαι* *Wealth* 1055), cf. Henderson 157.

*συμπαίστρια* ‘playmate’ (*Frogs* 411): feminine nouns ending in *-τρια* (e.g. *συκοφάντρια*, *κροταλίστρια*, *ἐταιρίστρια*, *ἀνδρεράστρια*) normally mean ‘a woman who habitually does X’ rather than ‘a woman who is/was doing X on this occasion’, and it should follow that *συμπαίστρια* here means ‘prostitute’ (we cannot tell, however, whether this was established usage or whether the word, which seems not to occur elsewhere before Heliodoros,<sup>30</sup> was coined for this passage). The Eleusinian authorities were, we know, perfectly happy to admit hetairai to initiation in the Mysteries (e.g. [Dem.] 59.21), so there is no reason why some of them should not figure among the deceased initiates who form the chorus of *Frogs*.

*συνεῖναι* ‘be with’ (*Peace* 862, *Eccl.* 619, 899): see Henderson 159 (who, however, cites several passages where there is no reason to believe the verb has a sexual sense at all).

*σφραγίδ’ ἔχειν* ‘receive a seal’ in *Birds* 1213 is perceived by Iris as a double entendre.

*τετανός* ‘tension’, i.e. ‘erection’ (*Lys.* 553).

*τι* ‘something’ denotes sexual intercourse in *Wealth* 977 *εἰ γάρ του δεηθείην ἐγώ* (for there was nothing else which the impoverished young man was capable of supplying to the elderly woman on whom he was sponging). Cf. also *δρᾶν τι*, *ἀγαθὸν παθεῖν τι*.

*τρόποι* ‘habits, styles’ refers at *Thesm.* 152 both to Agathon’s sexual orientation in general and more specifically to the sexual ‘variations’ at which, like a skilled hetaira, he is allegedly expert (for this sense of *τρόποι* see *Eccl.* 8, [Dem.] 59.114).

[207] *τρυφᾶν* ‘be self-indulgent’ at *Lys.* 405 refers in context to adultery (cf. 407–19); similarly at *Eccl.* 973 the girl is called *Τρυφῆς πρόσωπον* not as being vain or extravagant, but as being extremely

<sup>30</sup> A TLG search of the genres likely to be relevant discovered no instances of the word except *Frogs* 411 and Heliod. *Aith.* 2.24.3, 7.14.2, in both of which latter passages it has no erotic content but denotes a young woman serving as a confidential companion to a woman of higher status.

desirable sexually, and earlier (901) she has claimed that only in the ‘tender thighs’ of youth is *τό τρυφερόν* to be found. The word-family seems to have had something of the aura of such current English words as ‘voluptuous’ or ‘sensuous’.<sup>31</sup> At *Wasps* 688 *τρυφερανθείς* describes the body-language of a *μειράκιον κατάπυγον*.

*ῥδωρ* ‘water’ at *Lys.* 197 may refer to vaginal secretion; cf. *δρόσος* and *κύλιξ*.

*ἰμεναιοῦν* ‘wed’ is used (in an oracle, and in mocking repetitions of it) with reference to animal mating in *Peace* 1076a/b and 1112.

*φιλεῖν* ‘cherish’, i.e. ‘be the *παιδικά* of’ (*Knights* 748); not discussed by Henderson, but cf. Dover (1978) 49–50 (and see *φίλος* below).

*φίλος* ‘friend’, i.e. ‘sexual partner’ (*Thesm.* 346, 479; *Eccl.* 898, 931; *Wealth* 975), a sense of the word already implicit in the Homeric use of *φιλότης* = sexual intercourse. In four of its five Aristophanic occurrences it refers to the lover of a hetaira (or, in *Eccl.*, to the lover of a citizen woman who is behaving like a hetaira), and similarly Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.4 makes the hetaira Theodote use the word in the same sense. It may also have been used analogously in homosexual contexts:<sup>32</sup> in *Wasps* 1277 *ἅπασι φίλον* may be a hint that the person referred to (Arignotos) is a passive homosexual (cf. *χάρις*); and it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Agathon, who certainly was one, is described in *Frogs* 84 as *ποθεινὸς τοῖς φίλοις*.

*φύσις* ‘nature’ can denote the genitals of either sex;<sup>33</sup> the word can also serve as a device for excusing sexual (or other) immoralities [208] by arguments on the lines of *ἡ φύσις ἐβούλεθ’, ἡ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει* (Eur. fr. 920 = *Men. Epit.* 1123). In *Clouds* 1075 and 1078 these two uses of the word may be blended together.

*χαρίζεσθαι* ‘gratify’ (*Knights* 517, *Eccl.* 629): see Henderson 160 (and Dover (1978) 44–5, 83).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Eur. *IA* 1050 (of Ganymede) *Διὸς λέκτρων τρύφημα φίλον*, 1303, *Ba.* 150.

<sup>32</sup> Though, pace LSJ, Xen. *Lak.* 2.13 is not an instance of this, since the *φιλία* between man and boy which Lykourgos is there said to have approved of and encouraged is explicitly contrasted with a relationship involving physical desire (let alone its gratification).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Henderson 5 and Winkler (1990b) 217–20.

χάρις 'gratification, delight' (cf. Henderson 160; Dover (1978) 45) may be used in *Wasps* 1278 to hint that the person referred to (Arignotos) is a passive homosexual.<sup>34</sup>

## 8. THE DISTRIBUTION OF EUPHEMISMS IN THE ARISTOPHANIC CORPUS

On the basis of the above data, and subject to the uncertainties previously referred to,<sup>35</sup> the number of euphemistic expressions in the surviving plays of Aristophanes may be taken as 198, or say one in every 75–80 lines of the corpus (which contains approximately 15,300 lines of verse). They are, however, very unevenly distributed, both across plays and within plays.

[209] *Across plays* there are two main factors associated with relative frequency of euphemism:

(1) There is much more euphemism in later than earlier plays. The first six plays, from *Acharnians* to *Birds*, contain some 63 euphemisms in 8,800 lines, or about one every 140 lines; the other five contain about 135 euphemisms in 6,500 lines, or one every 48 lines—proportionately almost three times as many. Part of the difference is due to the fact that all the 'women's plays' figure in the later group, but not all of it; the last play of all, *Wealth*, has as many euphemisms as the slightly longer 'women's play' *Thesmophoriazousai*, and even *Frogs* has more, both absolutely and proportionately, than any of the six early plays.

(2) There is an equally strong disproportion between the three plays in which women play a prominent part (*Lys.*, *Thesm.*, and *Eccl.*) and the remainder. The three 'women's plays' have about 97 euphemisms in less than 3,750 lines, or about one every 39 lines; the other eight contain only slightly more euphemistic expressions (101) in about 11,550 lines, or one every 114 lines.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that by far the highest density of euphemism is found in *Ekklesiazousai*, which is both a late play (the

<sup>34</sup> See Totaro (1991).

<sup>35</sup> See n. 4 above.

Frequency of euphemism in extant Aristophanic plays

	No.	Per 100 lines
Acharnians	6	0.49
Knights	9	0.64
Clouds	13	0.86
Wasps	11	0.72
Peace	13	0.96
Birds	11	0.62
Lysistrata	26	1.97
Thesmophoriazousai	20	1.62
Frogs	18	1.17
Ekklesiazousai	51	4.31
Wealth	20	1.65

last but one) and a 'women's play'; it has over twice as many euphemistic expressions per 100 lines as any other play in the corpus.

*Within plays* the above data would lead us to expect that a strong indicator of the likelihood of euphemism might well be the gender of the speaker, and this is indeed the case. Of the 198 euphemistic expressions some 70, or over one-third, are uttered by females (or by males posing as females),<sup>36</sup> although female characters account for less than one-fifth of the lines spoken in the eleven comedies. Female characters use 70 euphemisms in about 2,700 lines (one every 39 lines), males use 128 euphemisms in about 12,600 lines (one every 98 lines or so). There is no strong tendency for characters to prefer euphemistic expressions more when addressing persons of the opposite sex, as the [210] <table on the next page> for the three 'women's plays' <shows (it omits> cases where words are spoken to no particular addressee or to the audience).

In several plays, there is a tendency for euphemisms to be concentrated in particular scenes and/or associated with particular characters. In *Acharnians*, three of the six euphemistic expressions in the play occur in the dialogue between Dikaiopolis and the Megarian (749–835, at 753, 757, 792–4); but the euphemisms are of three different types (general, thanatic, sexual), and their clustering may be fortuitous. In *Birds* there is a clutch of euphemistic expressions,

<sup>36</sup> Where a euphemistic expression is used by two speakers in dialogue in quick succession and counted only once in the total (see n. 4), it is here ascribed to the speaker who uses it first.

Euphemisms in the 'women's plays' by gender of speaker and addressee

	M-M	M-F	F-M	F-F
Lysistrata	1	4	8	10
Thesmophoriazousai	8	1	1	4
Ekklesiazousai	7	7	16	10

forming a misunderstanding joke (see below), which are addressed by Peisetairos to the prim goddess Iris (1212–16); of seven other euphemisms in the play two are found in the 27-line part of the aristocratic divine diplomat Poseidon (1591, 1620).

Much more striking is the concentration of euphemisms in *Clouds*. Of a total of thirteen such expressions in the play, seven occur in the *agon* of the two Arguments, and five of these (all of them sexual) come in the speech of the Better Argument (961–1023, at 974, 976, 978, 989, 1018), who manages to say a great deal about sexual matters and (as Dover has noted)<sup>37</sup> to make his own strong pederastic desires very plain without using a single improper expression (for *πόσθη* (1014) is 'more or less respectable').<sup>38</sup> Later the Worse Argument twice sanitizes criminal sexual activity by speaking of *φύσις* (1075, 1078), and in a second *agon* his pupil, Pheidippides, refers to the heinous crime of father-beating as 'chastisement' (1405) or 'self-defence' (1429), both, as the Better Argument had said, so using [211] language as to make the foul seem fair (1020)—except that the Better Argument had done the same thing himself.

In *Lysistrata* the only striking feature of the distribution of euphemisms is that they tail off in the latter part of the play and disappear altogether after 1078, just at the time when the Athenian and Spartan peace delegations meet. 'Let's have straight talking' (*αὔθ' ἕκαστα χρῆ λέγειν*), says the Athenian to the Spartan (1100), and they certainly do so; nowhere is euphemism more at home than in international diplomacy, but the words of the Athenian and the Spartan in this scene contain none of it at all, and in 38 lines of dialogue in this scene (between 1086 and 1188) they utter between them at least eight words that were taboo in polite conversation.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Dover (1968) lxiv–lxvi.

<sup>38</sup> Henderson (1991a) 109.

<sup>39</sup> *ἀναφλᾶν* (1099), *ἀπειρωλημένος* (1136), *βινεῖν* (1092, 1180), *κινεῖν* (1166), *κύσθος* (1158), *πρωκτός* (1148), *στύεσθαι* (1178).

In *Thesmophoriazousai* the main user of euphemism is the effeminate tragic poet Agathon (152, 163, 172, 204–5); in contrast Euripides uses no euphemisms of any kind when speaking in his own person (at 1122 he is posing as Perseus, at 1178 as the bawd Artemisia), nor does his in-law except when posing as a woman (479, 480). Only twice in the play do authentic males acting male roles (other than in tragic parody) use euphemistic expressions. The Prytanis, no doubt by a convention taken from real life, does so repeatedly when ordering the execution of Inlaw (930–944), and so, rather surprisingly, does the Archer when asking ‘Artemisia’ for the use of the dancing-girl Fawn (1193). In general, though, in this play more consistently than elsewhere, the use of euphemism is a mark of femininity.

In *Ekklesiazousai* the density of euphemism is, as we have seen, very high throughout, but nowhere is it higher than in the lyric exchanges between the Old Woman and the Girl (893–923) which contain fourteen euphemistic expressions in their 31 lines, more than can be found in the whole of any play before *Lysistrata*. The lyrics divide rather sharply into those in which the singers address the (male) public (893–903) or where one of them soliloquizes (911–14), and those [212] in which they address each other (904–10, 915–23). These two sections are about equal in length, having 79 and 69 words respectively. In the advertising arias euphemism is everywhere (893–4 *bis*, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 901; also one in the soliloquy, 912, and cf. too 914 *καί τᾶλλα μὲν οὐδὲν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα δεῖ λέγειν*), and neither character uses any expression more ribald than *μηροί* ‘thighs’ (902), a word that can be found in erotic contexts even in tragedy (Aesch. fr. 136). They are citizen women, and although they are soliciting much as prostitutes did before the revolution, they are doing so, paradoxically, with a certain modesty. Towards each other they are crudely insulting, and while some euphemistic expressions still appear (917, 918–19, 920, 922) they are of a kind to diminish, rather than obviate, linguistic impropriety. After the arrival of the young man Epigenes the incidence of euphemism sharply diminishes (the last 174 lines of the scene, from the moment of his entry, contain only ten euphemistic expressions—though this is still above the average density for the play as a whole); the women, especially the older women, are gradually shedding restraint (cf. 942 *σποδήσεις*, the text of the



‘decree’ in 1015–20, 1062 *χρεσει*). As the scene proceeds, too, such euphemism as we find leaves the sexual field and enters first the faecal (1059, 1061; cf. 311–71 where there are seven faecal euphemisms) and then the sphere of death (1073, 1105), a theme which dominates the conclusion of this long scene.<sup>40</sup> All told the scene contains 25 of the 51 euphemisms in the play, though it comprises only some 20% of the length of the play; it may be significant, as we shall see when considering *Wealth*, that this is the only scene of the play in which *old* women appear, even though nearly half the euphemisms are actually used by others (13 are uttered by the three old women, 5 by the girl—who has only 36 lines to sing or speak—and 7 by Epigenes). One other old woman is heard speaking briefly in the play (in a scene imagined by Praxagora at 697–701)—and she uses a euphemism too (*καθεύδειν*. . . *παρ’ ἐμοί*).

[213] In *Wealth*, too, euphemisms are concentrated in the scene where an old woman appears (959–1096); this scene contains nine of the 20 euphemisms in the play, a density of one every 15 lines compared with one every 97 lines in the remainder of the play. Again only about half of them (975, 977–8, 989, 1029, 1090) are uttered by the old woman herself, but her presence seems to stimulate other characters to similar speech-patterns too. There is nothing really comparable in earlier plays, but it is possible that by the early fourth century an association had developed, in comic convention, between old women and euphemistic language.

## 9. EUPHEMISM AND MISUNDERSTANDING

It is an evergreen piece of comic technique for one character to utter words which are ambiguous in some not quite obvious way, and for his or her interlocutor then to take the words in the sense which the first speaker did *not* intend and so make an inappropriate response to them.<sup>41</sup> Euphemism, which is the deliberate use of a word or phrase

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Saïd (1979) 58–60; Taaffe (1993) 123–7.

<sup>41</sup> A brilliant extended Aristophanic example of this device, the play on the two senses of *χοῖρος* in *Ach.* 764–96, has been analysed by Dover (1972) 63–5.

to convey a meaning other than that which it bears on the surface, lends itself particularly to this technique, which can work both ways: words intended as a euphemistic cover for something improper may be understood in a literal and innocent sense, or conversely words spoken literally may be understood as euphemistic. In Aristophanes the latter pattern is the more frequent and creates the more forceful jokes.

Both the above patterns are found in the scene between Dikaiopolis and the Megarian in *Acharnians* <referred to in n. 41>. In 751–63 Dikaiopolis asks how things are in Megara and consistently misinterprets the Megarian's gloomy answers, as when in 752 he responds to the Megarian's *διαπεινᾶμες* 'we have contests in being hungry' as if the latter had said *διαπίνομες* 'we have drinking contests'. When told [214] (754–6) that the Megarian magistrates have been taking steps *ὅπως τάχιστα καὶ κάκιστ' ἀπολοίμεθα*, he cheerily replies *αὐτίκ' ἄρ' ἀπαλλάξεσθε πραγμάτων* 'then you'll soon be free of your troubles' (757); the Megarian responds to the words rather than the tone, taking them as a euphemism for 'you'll soon be dead', and replies mournfully *σά μάν;* 'of course'. In 792–4 the misunderstanding works in the contrary direction and is bound up with the *χοῖρος* double-entendre: the Megarian says that the *χοῖρος* (= vulva, as its grammatical gender shows) he is selling will in due time be 'a splendid one to sacrifice to Aphrodite', at which Dikaiopolis, supposing him to refer to literal sacrifice, objects that one does not sacrifice a *χοῖρος* (= pig) to that goddess.

*Peace* 1297 provides another example, unusual in that the misunderstanding is not made explicit. The son of Kleonymos, a man notorious (at least in comedy) as a coward, is about to sing. Trygaios says he is confident that the boy will not sing about war, because he is the son of a *σώφρων* father. Trygaios means to imply (see §5 above) that Kleonymos has only the discretion that is 'the better part of valour'. The boy does not reply to him at all; he simply begins to chant an elegy by Archilochos; but his choice of poem (Archil. fr. 5 West, *ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαῖῶν τις ἀγάλλεται. . .*, where the poet—or the imagined speaker—proclaims himself a *ῥίψασπις* before the world) shows clearly enough that (like his father, it is implied) he sees nothing to be ashamed of in cowardice, and therefore that he is quite capable of supposing that Trygaios' gibe was really a compliment.

The most extended misunderstood-euphemism joke in Aristophanes is *Birds* 1212–16. Peisetairos, ordering the arrest of Iris for entering the airspace of Cloudcuckooville without permission, asks her a series of questions about her compliance with the proper immigration procedures (πρὸς τοὺς κολοιάρχους προσήλθες; . . . σφραγίδ' ἔχεις παρὰ τῶν πελάργων; . . . οὐκ ἔλαβες; . . . οὐδὲ σύμβολον ἐπέβαλεν ὀρνίθαρχος οὐδεὶς σοι;) every one of which can be taken to mean 'did you get fucked?' and is so taken by Iris, as becomes increasingly clear from her indignant replies (τί τὸ κακόν; . . . ὑγιαίνεις μὲν; . . . μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγ' ἐπέβαλεν οὐδεὶς). The laughter comes partly from wondering when, if ever, Peisetairos will wake up to the fact that [215] he is being misunderstood—or whether he knows it very well and is simply baiting the goddess. Later, however, he will threaten without circumlocution to rape her himself (1253–6) if she makes a further nuisance of herself.

In *Lysistrata* 23 Kalonike asks about the matter regarding which Lysistrata has called a meeting of women: τί τὸ πρᾶγμα; πηλίκον τι; She probably just means 'what kind of matter is it, and how important is it?', and Lysistrata's reply μέγα similarly means 'important' as in 511, *Wasps* 590, *Frogs* 1099. But πρᾶγμα can also mean 'penis' (see §7 above), and now the juxtaposition of πρᾶγμα with μέγα suggests to Kalonike the compound epithet with strong phallic connotations, μέγα καὶ παχύ (cf. *Ach.* 787, *Peace* 1351, *Ecl.* 1048): she reacts, that is, to Lysistrata's reply on the assumption that Lysistrata has interpreted her original question as euphemistically phrased and has responded accordingly.

Later in the same play (861), when Kinesias is asking Lysistrata (standing sentry on the Acropolis wall) to call Myrrhine, Lysistrata asks him if he means to give her something (δώσεις τί μοι;): she is playing the role of the doorkeeper who expects to be paid for committing a breach of duty and thereby risking punishment,<sup>42</sup> but Kinesias for a moment (so most interpreters agree) thinks she is propositioning him, until he realizes this is not so.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Compare the role of Hermes in *Peace*, where he is presented as the doorkeeper and caretaker of the gods' palace (180–202): he opposes Trygaios' rescue of Peace because he is terrified of the wrath of Zeus (380–1) until Trygaios bribes him with a golden bowl and lavish promises for the future (416–25), whereupon Hermes at once becomes Trygaios' partner in the enterprise.

<sup>43</sup> 863 is Kinesias' correction of 862, not a repetition of the same offer; see Sommerstein (1990) ad loc.

The one surviving instance of misunderstanding involving euphemism from the last two decades of Aristophanes' career comes in *Wealth* 1055. An old woman has been deserted by her 'gigolo' (as English-speaking commentators have traditionally called him) or 'toy-boy' (in the current idiom) because he has become rich and no longer needs her money. The young man runs into her on his way to a party, [216] speaks insultingly of her age and appearance, and then (1055) asks her 'do you want to play with me after this long time?' (βούλει διὰ χρόνου πρὸς με παῖσαι;). The old woman's reply, 'where, you poor fool' (ποῖ [*sc.* ἐλθοῦσα], τάλαν;), shows that she has understood παῖσαι in the euphemistic sense discussed above and imagines the youth to have been overcome once again by his old passion (which, of course, had in reality never existed in the first place, as Chremylos perceives, cf. 1005, 1009, 1019, etc.; but the old woman is convinced that he had been desperately in love with her, cf. 1008–9, 1016). He, however, is thinking only of a little guessing game: guess how many teeth the old woman has (1056–9).

Agathon in *Thesmophoriazousai* is both a tragic poet and a passive homosexual. In the former capacity he is accustomed to speaking of sexual matters in a euphemistic style, and in the latter he may well not wish to be explicit about habits that were regarded as disgraceful and unworthy of a male citizen, especially one who had a role in public life, as all leading figures in the theatrical world had by the nature of their professions. As we have seen, he euphemizes several times, and at least twice he does so, as it were, inadvertently—using language which, though meant in a non-euphemistic sense, is true in a euphemistic, sexual sense (if Agathon's comic reputation is justified) and is certain to be taken in that sense by Euripides' down-to-earth old in-law and by an audience on the alert for ribald innuendos. At 148, specifically talking about the women's clothes he is wearing, Agathon says that a poet must have τρόποι appropriate to the plays he is writing (149–50) and that, for example, if he is writing plays about women, 'his body must share in their habits' (μετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶμ' ἔχειν, 152). In context this must be intended by him to mean merely that his body must be attired like a woman's; but in view of the sexual meaning of τρόποι (see above), of the impression created on Euripides' in-law by what he has seen and heard of Agathon, and (for the audience) of Agathon's general reputation

(cf. 35 where Euripides takes it for granted that his in-law has buggered Agathon, presumably because more or less everyone has!), it is inevitable that the earthy old man supposes that 152 is an elaborate way of saying *βυεῖσθαι δεῖ* and draws the corollary that when writing a play about that ‘whore’ [217] Phaidra (cf. *Frogs* 1043) Agathon ‘mounts astride’ (*κελητίζεις*, 153) as a prostitute might do as a favour to her client (*Wasps* 500–1, *Men. Perik.* 484). Twenty lines later, having explained that ‘one just can’t help creating work that reflects one’s own nature’ (167), he says that ‘it’s because I recognized this fact that I gave myself this treatment’ (*ἐμαντὸν ἐθεράπευσα*, 172). He no doubt merely means ‘I took care of myself, I cultivated my personal appearance’ (LSJ *θεραπέύω* II 4); but the verb half suggests the idea of medical treatment, and Euripides’ in-law wonders what on earth this can have been (*πῶς πρὸς τῶν θεῶν*). His first thought may very well have been of castration. That is how, in *Thesmophoriazousai*, tragedy is presented: mealy-mouthed and unmanly, in contrast with comedy as gloriously impersonated, throughout, by the in-law (even when he is disguised as a woman<sup>44</sup>). Comedy, we are to understand, tells it like it is. This chapter has perhaps shown that this is as much a half-truth as many other claims that Old Comedy makes in its own praise.<sup>45</sup>

#### ADDENDA

p. 72 n. 6 On ‘informal, implicit oaths’ see now Sommerstein (2007a).

p. 76 rewriting of *Wealth* 115: I now think that the rewriting was most likely done by Aristophanes himself, for a second production at a deme festival; see Sommerstein (2001) 28–33 and 141.

<sup>44</sup> On the contrast drawn in *Thesm.* between tragedy and comedy, to the disadvantage of the former, see Bonanno (1990) 241–76; A. M. Bowie (1993) 219–25; Sommerstein (1994) 4–10.

<sup>45</sup> This article was first published in F. De Martino and A. H. Sommerstein (eds.), *Studi sull’eufemismo* (Bari: Levante Editori, 1999) 181–217. Reprinted here by kind permission of Levante Editori.

**pp. 78–9** Philepsius: I took a different view in my *Wealth* commentary (Sommerstein 2001), but the ‘evidence’ on which I there relied (Harpocration  $\phi 16$ ) may well be dependent entirely on the *Wealth* passage itself.

**p. 86**  $\epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma$  in *Wealth* 190: in my commentary I take  $\epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma$  here (and in Soph. *Aj.* 1205) to denote ‘the whole complex of desire + pursuit + fulfilment’.

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## Talking about laughter in Aristophanes

If one is investigating the subject of laughter in the ancient world, there can surely be few better informants than one who practised with great success the art of arousing it. I have accordingly catalogued and classified all the explicit references to laughter in the surviving comedies of Aristophanes, and I here present the results of my inquiry, which I hope will prove to throw some light on how ancient Greeks spoke and thought about laughter, and which I would strongly maintain throws a very significant light on the nature of Greek comedy itself.

I begin with two points of definition. In the first place, throughout this paper, when I speak of ‘laughter’, I should be taken as referring not to the concept denoted by the English verb *laugh* or the French verb *rire*, but to that denoted by the Attic Greek verb *γελάω*, its compounds, derivatives, and synonyms (which are, in Aristophanes, *ἐγγχάσκω*, *καταχάσκω*, *καχάζω*, and *κιχλίζω* with their respective cognates). This is an important distinction, because the semantic range of *γελάω* is distinctly wider than that of *laugh* or *rire*. Homeric Greek had regularly distinguished between laughing (*γελόω*) and smiling (*μειδιόω*): the latter verb exists, to be sure, in Attic, but it is rare, occurring only once in Aristophanes (*Thesm.* 513)<sup>1</sup> and then, perhaps significantly, in reference to a *deceptive* smile (by a slave running to congratulate her master on the birth of a baby boy which in reality, as she knows, is not his child at all). The only verb that can

<sup>1</sup> ‘Then the wicked old woman who’d brought in the baby runs to the husband with a beaming face and says, “You’re the father of a lion, a lion!”’ Note that throughout this article, if the Greek word corresponding to *laugh* or *laughter* is not given, it may be assumed to be *γελάω*, *γέλως*, *γελοῖος*, or one of their inflected forms.

take its place is *γελάω* (with its compounds *ἐπιγελάω* and *προσγελάω*): and, sure enough, there are several passages in Aristophanes where *smile* or *sourire* seems the most appropriate rendering of this verb, for example:

And therefore the vines  
and the young fig-trees  
and all the other plants there are  
will receive you with *smiles* of delight (*προσγελάσεται*)  
(*Peace* 596–600)

And then, grieving inwardly, we'd put on a *smile* (*γελάσασαι*) and ask you...

(*Lys.* 512)

And I entreat Hermes, god of shepherds,  
with Pan and the beloved Nymphs,  
to take pleasure in our dances  
and smile upon them (*ἐπιγελάσαι*)  
with ready heart

(*Thesm.* 977–81)

Athenians, it seems, did not normally feel compelled to distinguish between a physical expression of pleasure that involved only the jaw muscles and one that crossed the threshold of audibility to become what we would call a laugh; rather, they conceived *γέλως* as a continuum<sup>2</sup> that extended all the way from a gentle smile to the uncontrollable convulsions of laughter that seize Herakles when he opens his front door and sees himself inadequately impersonated by Dionysos (*Frogs* 39–43). Hereafter, accordingly, I will not make this distinction either, noting, however, that this broad meaning is borne only by *γελάω* and its compounds: the other verbs mentioned above always refer to laughter which is audible (*καχάζω*, *κιχλίζω*, both onomatopoeic) or in which the mouth is opened wide (the root meaning of *χάσκω*).

Secondly, I speak only of *explicit* references to laughter. Such verbs as *σκώπτω* 'mock' and *ὕβριζω* 'insult' very often *imply* laughter,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See López Eire (2000) and Fortenbaugh (2000).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Wealth* 880–99: 'Heaven help it, you're not in on it as well, are you, *laughing* at me (*καταγελάς*) like this?... You're *making game* of me (*σκώπτετον*), the two of



but they do not *denote* laughter: one does not need to laugh at a person to be guilty of *hybris* against him, and though the maker of a joke (σκῶμμα) may well laugh at it himself his prime objective is to induce others to do so. I make an exception, however, for one particular verb-form, namely ἤσθην (aorist of ἡδομαι ‘feel pleasure’), the reason being that this form is idiomatically used in Aristophanes when someone who has just laughed is explaining the reason for his laughter (e.g. *Knights* 696, *Clouds* 1240–1, *Peace* 1066). This does not apply to any other form of ἡδομαι, and indeed does not always apply to ἤσθην itself: only when the reference is to the *immediate* past, and not to the more distant past as in *Ach.* 2, 4, and 13 where Dikaiopolis is speaking of the experiences of his whole life.<sup>4</sup>

Having got these caveats out of the way, we may now proceed to examine how Aristophanes’ characters talk about laughter.

In Aristophanes’ eleven surviving plays, there are some 85 passages specifically referring to laughter—the exact number depends on how we choose to classify passages where two or three laughter-words appear close together. The 96 separate occurrences of laughter-words are distributed as follows:

γελάω and cognates	44
(γελάω 21, γέλως 10, γελοῖος 13)	
ἐγχάσκω	8
ἐπιγελάω	1
ἤσθην	5
καταγελάω and cognates	29
(καταγελάω 16, καταγέλαστος 9, κατάγεως 3, Καταγέλα 1)	
καταχάσκω and cognates	5
(καταχάσκω 2, καταχήνη 3)	
καχάζω and cognates	2
(καχάζω 1, καχασμός 1)	
κιχλίζω	1
προσγελάω	1

you... Is this endurable, the way these people are *insulting* me (ὕβριζεν)? The relationships between these verbs and the phenomenon of laughter are currently being investigated by my student Monica Ressel.

<sup>4</sup> ‘My *moments of delight* have been scant... What have I *enjoyed* that was fit for euphorication?... Another time I was *pleased* was once when...’ (all ἤσθην).

The uses of these words can be grouped into three (or perhaps four) basic types, and of the nine word-families listed, seven are each associated with a particular one of these types; only the simplex γελάω and its cognates can be used across the whole semantic field—and we find, not surprisingly, that with these words the boundaries between the types sometimes become blurred.

Type 1 may be termed *the laughter of derision*: it is laughter *at the expense of someone* who does not want to be laughed at, usually someone who has been exposed in manifest folly, failure, or misfortune (so long as the misfortune is not one that the laugher thinks likely to come upon himself), someone, in short, who has been put to shame. The victim is usually an *enemy* of the person laughing, at least in the sense that what is good for the former is bad for the latter, and the laughter is caused by the pleasure of seeing an enemy suffering—a pleasure which no less an authority than Athena (Soph. *Ajax* 79) can claim as the greatest one can have. Perhaps the two paradigm cases, in Aristophanes, are those of the politician who deceives the Athenian people and then laughs at their gullibility (this occurs seven times, all in *Acharnians*, *Knights*, and *Wasps*<sup>5</sup>) and of the comic hero laughing at the discomfiture of his opponents (above all Dikaiopolis at Lamachos, *Ach.* 1081, 1107, 1126, 1197).

Of the 85 references to laughter in Aristophanes, a clear majority (about fifty) refer to the laughter of derision. The verbs καταγελάω, καταχάσκω, and ἐγγάσκω, with their derivatives, are used in this sense exclusively, but there are also a number of similar uses of the simplex γελάω and its cognates.

The -χάσκω group presents the simplest picture. The basic meaning of the root is of course ‘be open-mouthed’, and one opens one’s mouth in laughter *at* a person (ἐγγάσκω + dative) or *down upon* him (καταχάσκω + genitive, or so one would expect; in the only actual instance in Ar. the dative is used, but then the speaker is a Scythian archer<sup>6</sup>), both constructions requiring there to be a victim. In one passage (*Lys.* 272) the two constructions seem to be blended and ἐγγάσκω is used with a genitive. These verbs (and the same goes for the derivative noun καταχήνη) invariably refer to laughter over the

<sup>5</sup> *Ach.* 77, 600–6; *Knights* 713, 1313; *Wasps* 515–16, 720–1, 1007.

<sup>6</sup> *Thesm.* 1089 κακκάσκεις μοι.\*

folly, failure, or misfortune of an enemy (in the sense indicated above): an alleged criminal who outruns his pursuers (*Ach.* 221), Dikaiopolis seeing Lamachos wounded (*Ach.* 1197), demagogues successfully deceiving the Athenian people (*Knights* 1313, *Wasps* 1007, both of Hyperbolos), the poor getting the better of the rich (*Wasps* 575, *Eccl.* 631—the only two occurrences of *καταχρήνη* in Ar.). It is striking that *ἐγχάσκω* in Ar. is always used *prospectively*: of its eight occurrences, four are in the future tense,<sup>7</sup> while the other four all refer to future contingencies (e.g. *Wasps* 721, where Bdelykleon says that he shut up his father at home because ‘I didn’t want these men to *make a fool of you* (*ἐγχάσκειν σοι*) with their bombastic ranting’).<sup>8</sup> To some extent this pattern may be due to the fact that future forms like *ἐγχανέται* are more convenient from the metrical point of view than *καταγελάσεται* with its five successive short syllables; but this is not the whole story, since the aorist indicative *κατεγέλασε(ν)* is almost equally refractory (and is not used by Ar.) but is never replaced by *ἐνέχανε(ν)*. It is likewise striking that *ἐγχάσκω* (and *καταχάσκω*) are always used by the prospective *victim*, or by someone who sees things from his point of view. In other words, these verbs present the laughter of derision as a danger that needs to be forestalled; they are not the words one uses if one is talking about the discomfiture of one’s own enemies. This does not apply to *καταχρήνη* which is used, both times it appears, with an air of intense satisfaction at the humiliation of those who think themselves superior.

Also invariably derisive is the laughter referred to by *καταγελάω*, and this verb too is often used of laughter at the expense of an enemy. Often—but not quite always. Admittedly *Wealth* 838 is an exception only on the surface. The Honest Man says that when he fell on hard times, he turned for assistance to those whom he had assisted in the past, but they turned their back on him; on which Karion comments ‘and made mock of you too, I’m sure’ (*καὶ κατεγέλων, εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι*). These, clearly, are those who should be friends behaving like enemies. *Knights* 320 is another matter. A man who has bought a shoddy pair of shoes finds himself ‘swimming’ in them before he has even

<sup>7</sup> *Knights* 1313; *Wasps* 1007, 1349; *Lys.* 272.

<sup>8</sup> The other passages are *Ach.* 221, 1197, and *Clouds* 1436.

got back home the same day, and became, he says, ‘a tremendous laughing-stock to my friends and fellow-demesmen’; we can hardly suppose that he has quarrelled with his whole deme on this account (indeed the only person he blames is Paphlagon who supplied the leather), and it follows that one may *καταγελάω* a friend if one is confident that he will not think one is doing it out of ill-will.

Just as *ἐγχάσκω* is regularly used with reference to the future, so *καταγελάω* is regularly used with reference to the present and the past: of twenty occurrences of the verb and its derivatives (other than *καταγέλαστος*, of which more presently), only one (*Eccl.* 864) refers to a prospective future event. But like *ἐγχάσκω*, *καταγελάω* is usually used from the victim’s point of view; very typical is Lamachos’ complaint of *Ach.* 1081, ‘Damn it all, are *you* making fun of me now?’ (*οἴμοι κακοδαίμων, καταγελάς ἤδη σύ μου;*), which recurs, each time with slightly different wording, in eight other passages.<sup>9</sup> Of the twenty passages under consideration there is again only one in which a character regards laughing at another person’s expense as something to be proud of or even mentions that he has ever done so, and this character is Paphlagon (*Knights* 713)<sup>10</sup> whose utter shamelessness (surpassed only by his rival, the Sausage-seller) is a fundamental premise of the play. Comic heroes may and do deride their antagonists, or at least behave in a way that makes the antagonists feel derided; but it is looking increasingly as though, even in the irreverent, not to say insolent world of comedy, doing this is not considered something one ought to boast about.

The adjective *καταγέλαστος* participates in a rather different pattern. The statement that something is ‘mockable’, ‘the sort of thing that is mocked’, is most likely to be made by way of warning (as it were, ‘don’t go on doing this or people will laugh at you for it’); it is so used, for example, by the leader of the women’s chorus in *Lysistrata* persuading her male counterpart to get dressed (1020, 1024) and by Euripides reminding his kinsman that having shaved off half his beard he has no alternative but to shave the other half also

<sup>9</sup> *Ach.* 1107, 1126; *Knights* 160–1; *Clouds* 1238; *Wasps* 1406; *Peace* 1245; *Birds* 1407; *Wealth* 880.

<sup>10</sup> ‘The Demos won’t believe you [the Sausage-seller] at all, poor thing; whereas I can make a fool of it (*καταγελάω*) to my heart’s content.’

(*Thesm.* 226). Such warnings are by their nature *friendly*, alerting the other party to the possibility of laughter some of which may be malevolent and enabling them to avoid it; hence it is quite in order to address a friend or a spouse as *καταγέλαστε* (*Lys.* 751, 907), though Xanthias is possibly going too far when he uses this form of address to his owner who is, moreover, a god (*Frogs* 480–1). It is even possible to implicitly call *oneself* *καταγέλαστος* as when one of the women in *Eccl.* (126–7) complains that she and her colleagues look ridiculous wearing false beards on faces which are still far too pale to look convincingly masculine.<sup>11</sup>

There is no doubt that the simplex *γελάω* and its cognates can sometimes be used of derisive laughter. This is the implication of the phrase *γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν* (*Clouds* 1035),<sup>12</sup> since the object of *ὀφλισκάνω* ought to denote a *punishment*; similarly when Euripides' kinsman, under sentence of death, fears he will be a source of laughter to the ravens when they eat his corpse (*Thesm.* 942), while when Chremes and others laugh at the shaking of the painted rope after an Assembly meeting (*Eccl.* 379) they are presumably laughing at the desperate efforts certain other citizens were making to avoid getting the paint on their clothes. Compare also the cruel laughter of the god Asklepios at the pain he himself has inflicted on the blind politician Neokleides (*Wealth* 723); or the Sausage-seller's defiance of Paphlagon's menaces in *Knights* 696.<sup>13</sup> The last three of these, it will be observed, are spoken of by someone who either took part in the laughter or approved of it.

A source of laughter which lies on the fringes of Type 1 is that which arises from *language* that is unintentionally amusing by its incongruity, either internally or with the speaker or situation (*Ach.* 1059–61, *Clouds* 174, *Peace* 1066, *Birds* 570, 880). This type of laughter is particularly associated with the word *ἡσθην*, which in this usage in Aristophanes invariably governs a dative referring to words someone has just spoken. The speaker of the words is sometimes an enemy (as in *Knights* 696), and even if not an enemy,

<sup>11</sup> She need not have worried: the men simply take them for shoemakers, i.e. indoor workers (*Eccl.* 385–7, 431–2).

<sup>12</sup> 'It seems you will need some clever schemes . . . if you are going to overcome the man and not *be a laughing-stock* (*γέλωτ' ὀφλήσεις*).

<sup>13</sup> 'I *enjoy* (*ἡσθην*) your threats! I *laugh* (*ἐγέλασα*) at your smoky boasts!'

may still find the laughter embarrassing: in *Ach.* 1059–61 we may safely assume that when the bride's female attendant whispered to Dikaiopolis that she wanted the bride to be given some of the wine of peace in order 'for her husband's cock to stay at home', she did not intend or expect that Dikaiopolis would repeat the words aloud! But some instances of this form of laughter shade into Type 2 below: Peisetairos in *Birds* is clearly to be seen as an expert orator, and, true to his name, he is highly successful as a persuader both with Euelpides and with the birds, so that when Euelpides laughs at the idea of sacrificing a gnat to the new wren-god, it is reasonable to suppose that that is precisely what Peisetairos wanted him to do. If Euelpides is laughing at anyone's expense, the victim is not so much Peisetairos as Zeus, humiliated as this tiny bird is given precedence over him.<sup>14</sup>

We are now moving into consideration of a variety of laughter which, so far as our Aristophanic evidence goes, is referred to almost exclusively by words of the uncompounded *γελάω* family: the type that I shall label as Type 2 and designate *provoked laughter*, laughter, that is, deliberately induced by a person whose interest is served by it. It is not surprising to find that this person is most often a comic dramatist or character (*Clouds* 539 and nine other passages<sup>15</sup>); but three times, all in *Wasps*, we hear of a person in trouble who tells a joke or a funny story 'in the hope that I'll laugh and lay aside my wrath' as Philokleon puts it (567, cf. 566)—which, so we are told, is exactly what the public hoped Ar. himself would do (1287) when prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution, by Kleon.\*

There is a paradox about this kind of laughter: normally the last thing an ancient Greek wants is to be laughed at. But it is clear that this kind of laughter is *not* supposed to humiliate the person who provokes it. Rather its aim is to give the hearers pleasure for which they will then show gratitude, forgiving him if he has done someone an injury or been accused of a crime, awarding him a prize if he is a comic dramatist. It thus has a link with Type 3 laughter, to be

<sup>14</sup> The single Aristophanic use of *κίχλιζω* (*Clouds* 983), usually rendered 'giggle' or 'cackle', appears to belong in this group and to refer to *inappropriate* laughter by boys or youths at words or actions which they find incongruous but which a mature, sensible person would not.

<sup>15</sup> *Clouds* 560; *Wasps* 56–7; *Frogs* 1–2, 6, 19–20, 389–90, 404–6; *Eccl.* 1156; *Wealth* 797–9.

discussed presently. But it also has a link with Type 1 laughter inasmuch as the laughter-maker achieves his aim by narrating, or causing to be enacted, stories in which *others*, usually fictitious characters, are put to shame (both Plato and Aristotle see comedy as having essentially to do with ‘the shameful’<sup>16</sup>). The paradox is alluded to by the Aristophanes of Plato’s *Symposium*, who says (189b) that he is not afraid of saying something *γελοῖον* but of saying something *καταγέλαστον*: not afraid, that is, lest *his words* (or the persons of whom he speaks) should become the object of laughter, but lest *he* should; or, to put it differently, not afraid of provoking Type 2 laughter, but very much afraid of provoking Type 1 laughter.

A further complication is created by the fact that in Old Comedy the dramatic pretence is never quite watertight. The characters are always also performers, and they can speak as if it were *their* objective to induce the audience to laugh at them. This is what Xanthias does in the opening scene of *Frogs*, asking permission to ‘say one of the usual things . . . that the audience always laugh at’ (1–2) and, when permission is refused, lamenting his inability to do what (not other comic characters but) other comic *poets* do all the time (13–15), while both he and Dionysos are blissfully unaware that they are provoking much more laughter for other reasons—Xanthias because, though he is riding on a donkey, the heavy luggage is not on the donkey’s back but on his, and Dionysos because he is wearing the costume of Herakles on top of his own.

But to analyse the methods of creating Type 2 laughter is, fortunately, not my business in this paper, and for the time being I shall pass to Type 3 laughter. This differs from Type 2 laughter in being spontaneous, and from Type 1 in being *victimless*: like all laughter in Aristophanes, it is caused by a pleasurable experience, but *not* one that is painful or humiliating to any other person. We find four sources of Type 3 laughter in Aristophanes’ texts:

- (a) The shared pleasure of the symposium or the festival (*Clouds* 621, 1073, *Birds* 733, *Thesm.* 979, *Eccl.* 849).
- (b) Sexual pleasure (*Clouds* 1078).

<sup>16</sup> Pl. *Laws* 816d; Arist. *Poet.* 1449a32–5. Cf. Fortenbaugh (2000) and Jaulin (2000).

- (c) Escape from suffering or danger (*Peace* 335, 338–9, 539–40, *Wealth* 757–8).
- (d) Reunion after separation (*Peace* 600, *Lys.* 512); this is the context in which one is most tempted to render γελάω by ‘smile’.

In addition to the all-purpose γελάω there are three other verbs which Aristophanes applies to Type 3 laughter and to no other kind: the compounds ἐπι- and προσγελάω and the onomatopoeic verb καχάζω—which appears, both times we find it,<sup>17</sup> in a symposiac context.

The most striking feature of the list of pleasures associated with Type 3 laughter is its close relation to a basic pattern of Old Comedy itself. Indeed, if it is the objective of comedy’s *authors* to elicit Type 2 laughter from others, it is fair to say that the objective of comedy’s leading *characters* is to achieve for themselves situations that give rise to Type 3 laughter, and they usually succeed. An Aristophanic comedy normally ends with feasting (*a*) and often with a sexual coupling (*b*) and, as Sifakis has shown,<sup>18</sup> invariably *begins* with a situation of suffering or danger from which the hero strives to escape and/or to rescue others (*c*). The reunion theme (*d*) too, though perhaps more familiar in New Comedy (and in one type of Euripidean *tragedy* such as *Ion*, *Iphigeneia in Tauris*, or *Melanippe the Captive*), appears several times in Aristophanes too: the return of country people to their homes in *Acharnians* and *Peace*, the reunion of husbands and wives at the end of *Lysistrata*, of Aeschylus and the Athenians at the end of *Frogs*, or of Wealth and the virtuous with whom he had once dwelt before Zeus blinded him.

If Types 1 and 2 laughter are forms of ‘laughing *at*’, Type 3 laughter is just as clearly ‘laughing *with*’. The pleasure of symposium, of festival, of reunion, is obviously a shared one; sexual pleasure is not always so, but it is in *Clouds* 1078 where the woman involved is not, say, a young bride<sup>19</sup> or a slave-prostitute, but a wife engaging in an adulterous intrigue; and all those in Aristophanes who laugh when

<sup>17</sup> *Clouds* 1073 (καχασμῶν R, κιχλισμῶν cett.); *Eccl.* 849.

<sup>18</sup> Sifakis (1992).

<sup>19</sup> Who could be validly and bindingly given in marriage without her consent or even her knowledge.\*



they escape from suffering or danger, laugh as a group. And corresponding to this, the schemes of Aristophanic heroes are only successful when they are capable of creating *shared* pleasure, of bringing happiness to others besides the hero himself: the purely self-centred plans of a Strepsiades or a Euripides are the ones that fail.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the analysis of the language of laughter confirms what I have written elsewhere:<sup>21</sup> ‘The Dionysiac spirit, as it is presented in comedy, is the spirit of seeking enjoyment for oneself and others, as inclusively as possible . . . Its enemies are those who seek enjoyment for themselves at others’ expense, or those who reject enjoyment for themselves and try to deprive others of it as well.’ These may well deride the comic hero, and he in justified retaliation may deride them too; but the *telos* of comedy is shared pleasure and the shared laughter it brings. And the audience can have both, laughing at the characters as spectators, laughing with them as participants in the Dionysiac experience.<sup>22</sup>

#### ADDENDA

**p. 107 n. 6** *Thesm.* 1089: the *codex unicus* actually reads *κακκάσκι μοι*; in my edition (Sommerstein 1994) I adopted Fritzsche’s emendation *κακκάσκis μοι*. It is easy to regularize the syntax by emending to *κἀγκ-* (van Leeuwen), and variants of this solution have been adopted by Coulon (1923–30), Gannon (1988), and Prato (2001). Austin and Olson (2004), following in essentials Brixhe (1988) 133,

<sup>20</sup> It will be realized that I am not one of those who regard *Dikaiopolis* in *Acharnians* as a paradigm of selfishness: the chorus may indeed comment at one point that ‘it does not seem he will give anyone a share of [his treaty]’ (*Ach.* 1038–9), but he begins to prove them wrong in the very next scene, and at the end of the play we see him fully integrated as a citizen and a Dionysiac celebrant, while the warrior Lamachos is the one who is left, literally, out in the cold alone.

<sup>21</sup> See the final paragraph of Ch. 9 below.

<sup>22</sup> This article was originally published in French, as ‘Parler du rire chez Aristophane’, in M.-L. Desclos (ed.), *Le Rire des Grecs: anthropologie du rire en Grèce ancienne* (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2000) 65–75. Republished in English by kind permission of Madame Desclos. In this version I have substituted my own English translations of Aristophanic passages for the French translations by Thiery (1997) which were used in the original publication.

print *κακκασκισ μοι*; (they leave the Scythian's Greek accentless throughout) and explain in their commentary that this is to be understood as an attempt at saying *καγκ-*; Wilson concurs. I have my doubts about this latter solution, since the Scythian does not elsewhere have difficulty with the sequences *-γκ-*, *-γγ-* (cf. 1007 ἔξιγικι, 1185 γογγυλί).

p. 111 the (threatened?) prosecution by Cleon: on this see more fully Sommerstein (2004c).

p. 113 n. 19 More generally, as I have put it elsewhere, 'sexual intercourse to which a woman did not consent was an offence if, and only if, her *kyrios* had not consented to it either' (Sommerstein (2006b) 233; this article gives many references to earlier discussions, to which should have been added Harris (2004)).

p. 114 n. 20 'those who regard Dikaiopolis... as a paradigm of selfishness': such as Dover (1972) 87–8; *contra*, MacDowell (1995) 75–7.

## Old Comedians on Old Comedy

Of the various Greek dramatic genres, Old Comedy was the only one which was able explicitly to incorporate within its scripts discussion of itself as an art-form. Tragedy, and so far as we can see satyr-play also, rigidly maintained the convention that the characters must speak and act only within the fictive situation; and in the fictive situation, belonging as it normally did to the remote heroic age, there was no such thing as drama on which to comment. Comedy too, by the time of Menander, had developed a parallel convention, with certain well-defined exceptions (such as the divine prologue and the concluding appeal for applause): here, to be sure, the characters are normally contemporary Athenians, and drama is therefore very much part of their lives, but specific reference to dramatic texts and performances in Menander seems always to relate to tragedy.<sup>1</sup> The convention seems to have developed gradually in the course of the fourth century BC: about the middle of that century Antiphanes could still complain of the difficulties comic dramatists face in making their plots and situations clear to the audience<sup>2</sup> and Alexis could savage his older rival, Aristophanes' son Araros, in a blistering one-liner;<sup>3</sup> one would dearly love, too, to know more about Timokles' comedy *Dionysiazousai* ('Women celebrating the Dionysia'), of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Aspis* 407–32; *Epitrepontes* 325–33, 1123–6; *Samia* 589–91; *Theophoroumene* F 5 Sandbach; Menander fr. 457, 763 K–T <= fr. 415, 643 KA>; *PHamb* 656 (= Men. fr. dub. 951 K–T <= *com. adesp.* 1089 KA>) 12–13. I can find no explicit reference in Menander to Attic comedy, though fr. 614.1–2 K–T <= 838.1–2 KA> cites the non-Attic comic dramatist Epicharmos as authority for a theological proposition.

<sup>2</sup> Antiphanes fr. 189.

<sup>3</sup> Alexis fr. 184 ('I've a well in my house that's icier than Araros').

which Athenaios has preserved a substantial fragment<sup>4</sup> explaining the beneficial effects of tragedy on the spectator (it reassures him that there is always someone worse off than he is!) but not, alas, the passage that must surely have followed it dealing with comedy.<sup>5</sup> In this paper, however, I am going to [15] concentrate on the evidence of Old Comedy, which I define for this purpose as the surviving output of those comic dramatists known to have been active at Athens before the end of the Peloponnesian War<sup>6</sup> together with those comic fragments of unknown authorship whose content or language makes it safe to assume that they originated from some dramatist of that period. We must remember, of course, that the evidence is lopsided. Only from Aristophanes do we have complete plays; and what survives from other authors is by no means a random sampling, since much of the relevant material comes from scholia on Aristophanes and is quoted for its bearing on the Aristophanic passage being commented upon. Nevertheless one finds, across the board, a distinct and reasonably consistent pattern, which I will now endeavour to describe.

We may first make a basic distinction between the spheres of what Dover (1993a), following *Frogs* 1009, has labelled *dexiotes* and *nouthesia*, ‘skilfulness’ and ‘admonition’, artistic merit and civic/ethical/political merit. Taking the former first, we find that the praise and blame which the dramatists heap, respectively, on themselves and on each other, are partly general and partly specific. The generalized categories and catch-words which the authors use to preen themselves and smear their rivals tend to cluster around four antitheses: one’s own work versus others’ work; the innovative versus the

<sup>4</sup> Timokles fr. 6.

<sup>5</sup> The fragment speaks of a group of types of experience which draw a man’s mind away from his own troubles by diverting him with those of others, so that he departs having had both pleasure and instruction (*παραψυχὰς οὖν φροντῖδων ἀνεύρετο | ταύτας· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβῶν | πρὸς ἀλλοτρίω τε ψυχαγωγῆθεις πάθει | μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἀπῆλθε παιδευθεὶς ἅμα*, lines 4–7). These can hardly be anything but forms of drama. ‘First of all’ (*πρῶτον*, line 8) the benefits of watching tragedy are explained; the implication is that a similar encomium of at least one other genre will follow, and since by the time of Timokles (*fl.c.*345–315) satyr-play was almost obsolete,\* this genre is virtually certain to have been comedy.

<sup>6</sup> Including plays by these authors produced after that date, such as Aristophanes’ *Ekklesiazousai* and *Ploutos*.

hackneyed; the laborious versus the slapdash; and the sophisticated versus the vulgar.

The traditional expectation in the Athenian theatrical world was that one and the same person should be solely responsible both for the composition of a play (including script, music, choreography, stage business, and all other relevant matters) and for its realization (*didaskalia*, strictly the training of the performers). In practice, by the 420s, as Halliwell (1989) has recently shown with abundant evidence, this simple picture had become considerably blurred.\* Two poets might collaborate on [16] a script<sup>7</sup>—and this might mean anything from the incorporation of a few suggestions to full-scale joint authorship; or a play might be composed by one person and produced at a festival by another.<sup>8</sup> These arrangements seem often to have become more or less public knowledge,<sup>9</sup> to a varying extent and with varying degrees of delay; but except in the special situation where the last works of a deceased author were produced by a member of his family,<sup>10</sup> they were always unofficial and hence, in a sense, clandestine.\* Officially the magistrate in charge of the festival had ‘given a chorus’ to a particular applicant some months before, and that applicant was the person who would appear in the festival records as *didaskalos* of the production. Hence there was felt to be something not quite proper about a situation in which a *didaskalos* took public responsibility for a production wholly or partly scripted by someone

<sup>7</sup> See nn. 14–16 below. The chorus of Euripides’ *Andromache* (476–7) seem to make a veiled allusion to this practice and the disputes to which it could give rise; anachronistic reference to drama is avoided by speaking of the product of collaboration as a ‘song’ (τεκόντων θ’ ὕμνον ἐργάταιν δυοῖν | ἔριν Μούσαι φιλοῦσι κραίνειν). The verb φιλοῦσι ‘are wont to’ indicates that such collaboration was of fairly frequent occurrence by the time *Andromache* was produced (the mid-420s).

<sup>8</sup> Thus five of Aristophanes’ eleven extant plays (*Acharnians*, *Wasps*, *Birds*, *Lysistrata*, and *Frogs*) are stated in their ancient headnotes (Hypotheses) to have had Kallistratos or Philonides as *didaskalos*, and the earlier plays of Platon were likewise produced for him by others (cf. *POxy* 2737.44–51 = Platon test. 7 KA).

<sup>9</sup> So that when Aristophanes was for the first time officially ‘given a chorus’ in summer 425 for the Lenaia of 425/4, many people (he claims) began to ask him why he had not applied for one in person (καθ’ ἑαυτόν) long before (*Knights* 512–13); by then, if not earlier, it was generally known that the plays produced by Kallistratos (and Philonides?) since 427 (*Daitales*, *Babylonians*, *Acharnians*, and perhaps one or two others) were Aristophanes’ work.

<sup>10</sup> As happened after the death of Pratinas, of Aeschylus, of Euripides and of Sophocles (see DID C4, D1, C22, C23 in *TrGF* i (1971)).

else, and anyone who took part in such an arrangement was vulnerable. The *didaskalos* might be attacked as having stolen the credit for another's work,<sup>11</sup> or his partner might be accused of cowardice in not daring to stake his own reputation in the contest,<sup>12</sup> or else mockingly pitied as one [17] doomed to spend his life toiling for the benefit of others.<sup>13</sup> Charges of this latter kind might sometimes be stood on their heads, as when Aristophanes in *Wasps* unverifiably and unfalsifiably claims credit for having contributed, in his early years, 'much comic material' to plays by other authors.<sup>14</sup> Charges of appropriating the work of another were very difficult to counter. Aristophanes seems never to have responded directly to the claim, made soon after the event by Kratinos<sup>15</sup> and later repeated by Eupolis himself,<sup>16</sup> that Eupolis had helped him with *Knights*; instead he launched a diversionary attack on Eupolis for having recycled ideas from *Knights* in plays of his own.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>11</sup> See nn. 14, 15 below. Hermippos fr. 64 (cf. Phrynichos test. 8 KA) may also be relevant.

<sup>12</sup> It may be to taunts of this kind that Aristophanes is replying in *Knights* 512–50, though he refers specifically only to an allegation that he had shown stupidity (*ἄνοια* 515) in waiting so long before coming forward officially as a competitor—an allegation which he rebuts by arguing that in reality he would have been acting stupidly (*ἀνοήτως* 545) to take the plunge any earlier.

<sup>13</sup> Ameipsias fr. 27; Aristonymos fr. 3; Sannyrion fr. 5 (all about Aristophanes). Platon fr. 107 may be similar, but is more likely (as Halliwell (1989) argues) to come, like fr. 106, from a context in which Platon is defending himself rather than attacking others: it is noteworthy that the biographical sources on Aristophanes (test. 1.8–9 and 3.9–10 KA), to which we owe the Ameipsias, Aristonymos, and Sannyrion references, do not cite Platon.

<sup>14</sup> *Wasps* 1018–20, which I take to refer to alleged activity by Aristophanes *before* the production of his first complete play in 427 (so Mastromarco (1979); Halliwell (1980, 1989) *contra*, MacDowell (1982*b*) and Perusino (1987) 37–57).\*

<sup>15</sup> Kratinos fr. 213 (from *Pytine*, produced the year after *Knights*).

<sup>16</sup> Eupolis fr. 89 (from *Baptai*). I would no longer wish to maintain the explanation of this fragment proposed in Sommerstein (1980*b*) 52–3 and (1981) 207; see Halliwell (1989) 523–4.

<sup>17</sup> This allegation is made first in the revised *parabasis* of *Clouds* (551–6) with specific reference to Eupolis' *Marikas*, and then again, it would seem, in the lost *Anagyros* (Ar. fr. 58 ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμῆς χλανίδος τρεῖς ἀπληγίδας ποιῶν). On the relationship between these two passages see Storey (1990) 22; he 'would put *Anagyros*... at the same time as the revision of *Clouds*', but it is perhaps more likely that *Anagyros*, in which three offences are alleged whereas *Clouds* only mentions one, dates from a year or two later.

With this we have passed to the second of our four antitheses. Ever since Homer it had been proverbial that ‘men always give most praise to that song which strikes its hearers as the newest’,<sup>18</sup> and the comic dramatists duly point with pride to their own alleged innovations<sup>19</sup> and accuse their rivals of endlessly repeating stale and hackneyed comic [18] devices<sup>20</sup> and of borrowing them from one another.<sup>21</sup> Of course, as Heath (1990) has emphasized, there is in all this a great deal of rhetorical cant. In any artistic genre with well-established conventions, most innovation will consist in variations on, or novel applications of, existing models, and can thus be looked on, from another point of view, as repetition or borrowing. The play of Aristophanes which contains the strongest accusations of plagiarism and repetitiveness against his rivals, and the loudest assertion that *he* never repeats himself once,<sup>22</sup> is *Clouds*; and *Clouds* in its present form is a revised version of a play produced several years before, in which many passages have been preserved, it would seem, without any alteration whatever.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless there must have been places (although we cannot in general hope to identify them) where the poets could fairly claim that they were drawing attention to genuine innovations; and there are certainly others where they are evidently being defensive about failing to innovate, as when the chorus-leader in Aristophanes’ lost *Amphiar<a>os* is made to say ‘I know I’m doing something old-fashioned, I’m quite aware of it’,<sup>24</sup> or when a

<sup>18</sup> *Odyssey* 1.351–2.

<sup>19</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 547–8; *Wasps* 1044–5 (cf. 1053), 1535–7; *Ekkl.* 576–87; Metagenes fr. 15; Pherekrates fr. 84.

<sup>20</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 551–9; *Wasps* 56–63 (note ἀδύς 61, 63); *Peace* 739–48; *Frogs* 1–18 (note ἀεί 2, εἴωθε 14, ἐκάστοτ’ 15); perhaps also Eupolis fr. 396 εἰωθὸς τὸ κομμάτιον τοῦτο.

<sup>21</sup> See nn. 15–17 above. Hermippos fr. 64, cited in n. 11 above, could also belong here.

<sup>22</sup> *Clouds* 545–50.

<sup>23</sup> The *parabasis* itself contains a passage (575–94) which refers to Kleon as alive and in office (he was killed in 422, and the revision belongs to 419 at the very earliest), and to eclipses of the sun and moon which occurred in 425/4; some other passages too would have lost their current relevance in 419 or 418 (e.g. 6–7, 186, 400 (Theoros), 688–92 (Amyntias)), and in addition a number of passages of the surviving text (1113–30, 1196–1200, 1417 δις παῖδες οἱ γέροντες) are in ancient sources cited from, or attested as belonging to, the ‘first *Clouds*’, i.e. the script of the 423 production (see Dover (1968) lxxxv–lxxxvi, lxxxix).\*

<sup>24</sup> Ar. fr. 30; that the line refers to some aspect of dramatic art is shown by fr. 31 ἀφ’ οὗ κωμωδικὸν μορμολυκεῖον ἔγνων, which is in the same metre and may safely be assumed to come from the same speech.

character in his *Ekklesiazousai* says that a proposed duel of songs ‘may be annoying (or boring) to the audience, but it does have something agreeable and comic about it’.<sup>25</sup> The continual need to innovate, spurred by the [19] relentless pressure of competition, may do much to explain the rapid evolution of comedy in the fifth and fourth centuries.

There have been times and places at which it has been thought an especial mark of supremacy in a great artist that he worked rapidly and without toil as if divinely inspired. The first editors of Shakespeare’s works claimed, most implausibly, that ‘what he thought, he uttered with that easiness, that we have scarce received from him a blot in his papers’;<sup>26</sup> and a similar notion has become deeply embedded in the conventional modern image of Mozart.<sup>27</sup> Such a view does not seem to have prevailed in fifth-century Athens. The comic dramatists do indeed claim to be under divine patronage,<sup>28</sup> but they never claim that this enables them to write with rapidity and ease; on the contrary, they emphasize the toil and effort that has gone into their work,<sup>29</sup> and deride their rivals for being ‘over-hasty in composition’<sup>30</sup> or as getting an idea in the morning and putting it on stage the same afternoon.<sup>31</sup> On one occasion when Aristophanes had perhaps not given himself as much time to perfect a play as he usually did, he was so apprehensive of being thought a slapdash artist that he inserted an elaborate account of how he had allegedly been ill for four months with hoarseness, shivering, and fever;<sup>32</sup> the

<sup>25</sup> *Ekkk.* 888–9. Since the song-duel is only the first of a series of lyric numbers occupying the greater part of the next 86 lines, it is not likely that Ar. really feared a uniformly hostile reaction from his audience; was there perhaps something of a ‘generation gap’, with the older spectators hankering after the styles of twenty or thirty years earlier while the younger were coming to feel that song and drama did not mix?

<sup>26</sup> Heminge and Condell (1623/1910), Preface ‘To the great Variety of Readers’.

<sup>27</sup> Memorable expression is given to it in Peter Shaffer’s *Amadeus*.

<sup>28</sup> At least Aristophanes does; see nn. <110–14> below.

<sup>29</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 523–4 (cf. *Knights* 516); Kratinos fr. 255.

<sup>30</sup> Ar. *Ach.* 851 (of Kratinos).

<sup>31</sup> This appears to be approximately what Eupolis was implying when in the *parabasis* of *Marikas* he urged his audience to cast off sleep and banish from their eyelids *αὐθημερινὸν ποιητῶν λήρον*, literally ‘the same-day balderdash of [other] poets’ (Eupolis fr. 205).\*

<sup>32</sup> The passage was quoted by Galen in his treatise *On medical terminology* (*περὶ ἰατρικῶν ὀνομάτων*), and Galen’s discussion of it, though not the quotation itself, has survived in a medieval Arabic translation; it provides a context for two hemistichs



implication no doubt was that rather than complain of imperfections in the play's composition, the public ought to admire the poet's heroic achievement in completing it at all.

[20] But by far the most typical and frequent hostile criticism of (other people's) comedy was for alleged reliance on crude and inartistic methods of raising laughter, often spoken of as fit only for children<sup>33</sup> (though it could never be overlooked that children formed a substantial part of the audience<sup>34</sup>) or for Megarians<sup>35</sup> (whom Athenians despised as only neighbours can). Many and varied are the indictments that can be framed under this general rubric. There is censure of indecency or impropriety in respect of violence,<sup>36</sup> of sex with special reference to certain varieties of the comic phallus,<sup>37</sup> of bad language,<sup>38</sup> and of suggestive dancing (the *kordax*).<sup>39</sup> There are complaints about a series of stock slave characters and stock episodes involving them—the luggage-carrier,<sup>40</sup> the *servus currens*,<sup>41</sup> the ingenious trickster<sup>42</sup>—all of which nevertheless remained in full vigour in the time of Menander a hundred years later;<sup>43</sup> and also about a

quoted in Greek sources (Ar. fr. 346). The play was *Thesmophoriazousai II*; despite having the same name as an earlier Aristophanic play, it was, as the many surviving fragments unequivocally show, a completely new composition.\*

<sup>33</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 539; Eupolis fr. 261.

<sup>34</sup> When the audience is subdivided into age-groups, separate mention tends to be made of the children (e.g. Ar. *Peace* 50, *Ekkl.* 1146; Platon fr. 222), as is done later by Menander in his final appeals for applause (*Dyskolos* 967, *Samia* 733).

<sup>35</sup> Ar. *Wasps* 57; Ekphantides fr. 3; Eupolis fr. 261.

<sup>36</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 541–3 (cf. Strattis fr. 38); *Peace* 742–7; *Lys.* 1217 ff.

<sup>37</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 538–9 and possibly also Strattis fr. 57 *Σανυρίωνος σκυτήνη ἐπικουρίαν*.

<sup>38</sup> Archippos was especially mocked on this account, according to a scholion on Ar. *Wasps* 481.

<sup>39</sup> Ar. *Clouds* 540, 555–6; Nikophon (fr. 26) also mentioned the *kordax* in an unknown context.

<sup>40</sup> Ar. *Frogs* 1–18.

<sup>41</sup> Ar. *Peace* 743/2 (the MSS have the lines in the wrong order) *τοὺς δούλους... τοὺς φεύγοντας*.

<sup>42</sup> Ar. *Peace* 742 *κάξαπατώντας*.

<sup>43</sup> The single play *Dyskolos* contains both a *servus currens* (Pyrhrias, 81 ff.) and a luggage-carrier (Getas, 401 ff.); and the audience will have anticipated the appearance of an ingenious slave trickster when Sostratos decides (181–5) to seek the help of Getas in solving his love-problems in the belief (which on the evidence of the play seems quite erroneous) that Getas *ἔχει τι διάπυρον καὶ πραγμάτων ἔμπειρός ἐστιν παντοδαπῶν*.

form of *captatio benevolentiae* that seems not to have lasted so well<sup>44</sup> in which a slave or slaves throw nuts or figs or the like out among the [21] audience.<sup>45</sup> Another stock episode that attracted much adverse attention was that in which the hero Herakles was shown in greedy anticipation of a promised feast which never materialized.<sup>46</sup> Here again, as in the case of charges of repetitiveness and plagiarism, much of the tut-tutting was highly disingenuous. Aristophanes at any rate—and there is no reason to suppose that his rivals were any different—uses, in one play or another, nearly all the ‘vulgar’ comic devices which he deplors when others use them;<sup>47</sup> he often deplors and uses them in the same play,<sup>48</sup> sometimes in virtually the same breath.<sup>49</sup> But this does not negate the evidence that these devices *were* regarded by many spectators as artistically inferior, and that some of those who did enjoy them were a trifle ashamed of doing so. If, as often happens, two modern political parties have very similar programmes each containing a mixture of strong and weak points, it is to be expected that each will draw attention to the weak points in its opponent’s platform while saying nothing at all about what may be identical weaknesses in its own.<sup>50</sup> This may not say much for the ethical integrity of the party spokesmen, but it remains good evidence about the sorts of features which the public are likely to perceive as

<sup>44</sup> Though it has parallels in certain types of theatrical entertainment at the present day, especially those aimed mainly at children.

<sup>45</sup> Ar. *Wasps* 58–9, *Ploutos* 796–9.

<sup>46</sup> Ar. *Wasps* 60, *Peace* 741; Kratinos fr. 346.

<sup>47</sup> Violence: *passim*, e.g. *Ach.* 280 ff., 824 ff., 925 ff., *Clouds* 1297 ff., 1321 ff., 1485–1509, *Wasps* 1436. Phallus: erect (and therefore presumably ‘thick and red-tipped’ as censured at *Clouds* 539) on characters in *Ach.* (cf. 1216–21), *Lys.*, *Thesm.* (cf. 1187–8) and probably *Ekkl.* (see Vetta (1989) 251–2). \* Vulgar language: *passim* (see Henderson (1991a)). *Servus currens*: *Wasps* 1292 ff., cf. *Ach.* 175 ff. (see Hunter (1985) 9). Throwing food to audience: *Peace* 962 ff. Herakles cheated of his dinner: *Birds* 1565–1693.

<sup>48</sup> See Hubbard (1986)—though I cannot agree with his main contention that the denials in *Clouds* 537–44, most of which are untrue of the text we possess, really refer to the *first* version of the play; this is refuted (i) by the use of present and perfect tenses in 542–4 (τύπτει, βοᾷ, ἐλήλυθεν) and (ii) with high probability by the evidence that much of the last third of the play, where most of the violence occurs, was taken over with little change from the earlier version (see n. 23 above).

<sup>49</sup> See especially *Lys.* 1217–24 and *Frogs* 1–18.

<sup>50</sup> An excellent ancient illustration of this principle is provided by Demosthenes’ and Aischines’ accounts, in their court battles of 343 and 330, of their own and each other’s roles in the events leading to the Peace of Philokrates in 346.

weaknesses. And the same holds true of ancient comic dramatists—who were likewise competing for public support and indeed for votes (strictly only the votes of the ten festival judges, but they were strongly influenced by the expressed feelings of the mass audience).<sup>51</sup>

[22] It might be expected that poets would often, contrariwise, draw attention to the artistic and intellectual elevation of their own work. Aristophanes indeed frequently does so, in the most extravagant terms;<sup>52</sup> but even he has to remember that just as there are those among his audience who do not want their entertainment to be too crude, there are also those—and they are likely to have loud voices—who do not want it too highbrow.<sup>53</sup> His rivals seem in general to have been much more conscious of this danger; few if any of them, one fancies, would have misjudged public taste as badly as Aristophanes apparently did with the original version of *Clouds*.<sup>54</sup> With one doubtful exception,<sup>55</sup> no evidence survives of any passage in which an Old Comic dramatist other than Aristophanes claimed credit for the intellectual sophistication of his comedies. Indeed in one well-known fragment<sup>56</sup> Kratinos turns Aristophanes' pretensions in

<sup>51</sup> Hence the dramatists are at least as concerned to appeal for the favour of the audience as for that of the judges, and often hold the audience responsible for the results of past contests. Cf. Ar. *Knights* 518–19 (with Kratinos fr. 25), 546–50; *Clouds* 520–6; *Wasps* 1016–17, 1043–8; *Peace* 760–1; Eupolis fr. 392. Ar. *Frogs* 141 ('Ah, how great in every place is the power of the two obols!') likewise probably alludes to the power which the ordinary theatre spectator (who paid two obols for his seat, cf. Dem. 18.28) had over the fortunes of dramatists and actors (cf. Rogers (1902) and Del Corno (1985) ad loc.). There are appeals to the judges in Ar. *Clouds* 1115–30, *Birds* 1102–17, *Ekkkl.* 1154–62, and Pherekrates fr. 102; in Eupolis fr. 239 the *λογισταὶ τῶν ὑπευθύνων χορῶν* might be either the judges or the audience, but the fact that the real *λογισταὶ τῶν ὑπευθύνων* numbered ten (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 54.2), like the judges, speaks in favour of the words being addressed to them. In *Birds* 445–6 the chorus-leader hopes for a victory by the verdict of 'all the judges and all the audience'.

<sup>52</sup> *Clouds* 520–7, 547–8; *Wasps* 650, 1044–50, 1055–9; *Peace* 749–50; *Frogs* 1109–18; *Ekkkl.* 1155.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Wasps* 55–66. A similar division of tastes was to be expected even among the judges (*Ekkkl.* 1155–7).

<sup>54</sup> Which he regarded as the best comedy he had written—full of *σοφία, δεξιότης, νοήματα, καινότητα διανοίαι*—and which suffered the worst defeat he had yet experienced. Cf. *Clouds* 520–7 (written for the second version of the play); *Wasps* 1043–50; Hypothesis II (Dover) <= V Wilson > to *Clouds*.

<sup>55</sup> Eupolis fr. 392, where however the expressions used (e.g. *μηδὲ ἐν χεῖρον φρονῶν*) are quite vague and may well merely refer to poetic skill in general.

<sup>56</sup> Kratinos fr. 342 *ὑπολεπτολόγος γνωμιδώκτης εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων*.

this respect into a charge *against* him, verbally bracketing him with Euripides and the sophists.

[23] These then are the ways in which the comic dramatists seek to characterize their work and that of their rivals in general terms. We also find a variety of comments on specific aspects of the dramatist's technique. These can be classified into comments on structure, on satire, on diction, on metre and music, and on special properties and effects. I have based this classification on Aristotle's listing of the 'parts' of tragedy,<sup>57</sup> but with one addition and two omissions. The additional category is that of satire,<sup>58</sup> which has no tragic equivalent. The omissions are firstly the category of *ēthos* (character), because the surviving comic material contains no remarks on the characterization of dramatic persons in comedy, and secondly that of *dianoia* (Aristotle's word for the argumentative, rhetorical element in tragic composition) because in comedy the features corresponding to this are inseparably bound up with the comic poet's claim to be a teacher and adviser of the people, which I will be considering presently on its own account.

First, then, *structure*. There is nothing explicit about the dramatists' overall view of how a comedy should or should not be constructed. There is one interesting reference<sup>59</sup> to the importance of what nowadays is often called 'pace':

So you don't want to wait, but to get started on your ideas right now, because speed wins the greatest favour with the audience

—the earliest known appearance of a maxim which some critics of later centuries seem to have held valid for comedy in general, giving especial praise to the Sicilian Epicharmos two generations before Aristophanes, and to the Roman Plautus two centuries after him, for their ability to keep the action of a play moving.<sup>60</sup> It must be said that not everyone would feel that *Ekklesiazousai*, from which the above quotation is taken, exhibits Aristophanes' skills in this respect to best advantage.

<sup>57</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 1450<sup>a</sup>8–10 τῆς τραγωδίας μέρη... ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἦθος καὶ λέξις καὶ διδάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία.

<sup>58</sup> What Aristotle called the *ἰαμβικὴ ἰδέα* (*Poet.* 1449<sup>b</sup>8).

<sup>59</sup> Ar. *Ekk.* 581–2.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.57–8 *dicitur... Plautus ad exemplar Siculi properare Epicharmi.*

[24] There also seems to have been a good deal of discussion of the use of self-contained episodes<sup>61</sup> in comedy. The little-known poet Metagenes commends an episodic type of dramatic construction as giving plenty of scope for variety and novelty;<sup>62</sup> and Kratinos<sup>63</sup> has a scene in which he is advised—very likely, as many have suggested,<sup>64</sup> by the personification of Comedy herself—that the best way to bring that favourite comic butt, the effeminate Kleisthenes, into a play is to ‘write him in in an episode’. This is one of the few subjects on which we have comments from Aristophanes’ rivals but none from Aristophanes himself. His own actual practice varied, some plays like *Birds* being full of short, diverting episodes, while others like *Knights* or *Lysistrata* contained scarcely a scene<sup>65</sup> that did not bear directly on the main action. If, as Heath has persuasively suggested,<sup>66</sup> Aristophanes regarded unity of action as a merit in a comedy, one can quite understand why he says nothing in favour of the self-contained episode; the fact that he also says nothing against it, and that he uses it quite a lot, suggests that whether or not he thought it proper from the artistic point of view, the episodic technique was popular in his day with audiences.

As regards *satire*, this was clearly seen by most of Aristophanes’ contemporaries as a crucial element in what went to make up a successful comedy. It had not always been so: as the chorus of *Knights* remark,<sup>67</sup> the variety-show techniques of Magnes (special mention is made of animal [25] imitations and sound effects<sup>68</sup>) had

<sup>61</sup> *ἐπεισόδιον* was already a well-known technical term; it is used in both the passages presently to be cited.

<sup>62</sup> Metagenes fr. 15 κατ’ ἐπεισόδιον μεταβάλλω τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἂν | κωνναῖσι παροψίσι καὶ πολλαῖς εὐωχῆσω τὸ θέατρον.

<sup>63</sup> Kratinos fr. 208 γράφ’ αὐτόν | ἐν ἐπεισοδίῳ. γελοῖος ἔσται Κλεισθένης κυβεύων | ἔν τῇ τοῦ κάλλους ἀκμῇ. Fr. 209, in which advice is given to Kratinos (who in this play, *Pytine*, made himself a character) on how to bring the rising politician Hyperbolos into a comedy, no doubt comes from the same context.

<sup>64</sup> Most recently Heath (1990) 151.

<sup>65</sup> Leaving on one side purely choral scenes, which do not appear to have come under the definition of *ἐπεισόδια* in the fifth century any more than they did for Aristotle.

<sup>66</sup> Heath (1987) 43–54.

<sup>67</sup> Ar. *Knights* 520–5.

<sup>68</sup> Ar. *Knights* 522–3 πάσας δ’ ὑμῖν φωνάς ἰεῖς καὶ ψάλλον καὶ περυνγίζων | καὶ λυδίζων καὶ ψηρνίζων καὶ βαπτόμενος βατραχείοις. The last five participial expressions are understood by the scholia as allusions to the titles of five plays by Magnes,

once<sup>69</sup> carried all before them, but in his old age he ‘was driven from the stage because he fell short in mockery (*tou skōptein*)’;<sup>70</sup> which I take to mean the type of ridicule of individuals characteristic of later Old Comedy. Magnes is implicitly contrasted with Kratinos, whose power in his great days is compared by the Knights to that of a rushing river, uprooting ‘oak trees, plane trees and enemies’.<sup>71</sup> Contemporary rivals may be criticized for concentrating their satire on allegedly easy targets instead of attacking the really important and dangerous individuals like Kleon;<sup>72</sup> contrariwise, if one person remained at the centre of political life for a number of years, a dramatist who made him a regular target was likely to be accused of repetitiousness and unoriginality.<sup>73</sup>

On *diction* we seem to have two comments from Aristophanes, both from unknown plays. In one the speaker says that ‘the Athenian people do not like hard, stiff poetry, nor do they enjoy Pramnian wine which knits together the brows and the belly, but rich wine with a bouquet, the kind that drips nectar’;<sup>74</sup> we cannot be sure, however, that this refers to comedy—it might be a comparison between, say, Aeschylus and [26] Sophocles.<sup>75</sup> In another, somebody’s diction is

but this may well be almost entirely a commentator’s improvised explanation (see Spyropoulos (1975)).

<sup>69</sup> Between the 470s and the 450s, when he won eleven victories at the City Dionysia, then the only official comic competition (*IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 2325.44*, cf. *Prolegomena de Comoedia* III 18 Koster), a record which, so far as we know, no later comic dramatist approached.

<sup>70</sup> Ar. *Knights* 524–5.

<sup>71</sup> Ar. *Knights* 526–8. The ‘enemies’ (*ἐχθρούς*) may be rival dramatists (so my translation in Sommerstein (1981)), but it seems at least as likely that the reference is mainly to political and other victims of Kratinos’ satire (Perusino (1982) 149).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Ar. *Wasps* 1025–30. The scenario envisaged in 1025–8 (a jilted lover asking a comic dramatist to hold his *εχ-παιδικά* up to ridicule)\* is so specific that it awakes the suspicion that allusion is being made to a particular recent occasion when this was alleged to have happened, though we have no clue to the identity of those involved (the claim, anyway dubious, of a scholion on 1025 that Eupolis is being criticized relates only to the first four words of 1025, *οὐδὲ παλαίστρας περιχωμάζειν πειρών*).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Ar. *Clouds* 551–8.

<sup>74</sup> Ar. fr. 688.

<sup>75</sup> The ‘sweetness’ of Sophocles’ poetry had become a cliché (Ar. fr. 598; Ar. *Peace* 531; cf. Soph. test. 108–14 Radt)—though one character in a comedy by Phrynichos (fr. 68) did actually, in praise and not in blame, compare it to Pramnian wine (*οὐ γλύξις οὐδ’ ὑπόχυτος, ἀλλὰ Πράμνιος*), meaning presumably that this ‘sweetness’ was not attained at the cost of dramatic and tragic power. Aeschylus is compared in Ar. fr.

spoken of as being a happy medium between two extreme varieties of spoken Attic, one ‘urban and rather effeminate’, the other ‘somewhat rustic and ungentlemanly’;<sup>76</sup> the somebody in question could quite well be Aristophanes himself, who rather similarly in *Wasps* (speaking of content rather than of language) promises his audience that the play will be ‘neither anything too grand <d> . . . nor, on the other hand, some laughter stolen from Megara’,<sup>77</sup> and who in *Ekklesiazousai* hopes to appeal both to the intellectuals (*sophoi*) and to ‘those who enjoy a laugh’.<sup>78</sup> No doubt many others similarly claimed to be in the centre ground (the mean was golden long before Aristotle),<sup>79</sup> and Aristophanes may, here as elsewhere, have been responding to claims that his plays were too much aimed at a sophisticated, conceited urban elite.

As might be expected, there are some vague criticisms of allegedly bad *metre and music*,<sup>80</sup> and poets also drew attention to their own innovations in this sphere—Pherekrates’ ‘folded anapaests’<sup>81</sup> (which he has succeeded in persuading posterity to name after him), Aristophanes’ [27] dancing choral exit.<sup>82</sup> We learn that particular songs could become popular independently of the plays from which they came, and be sung regularly at symposia<sup>83</sup> like the lyrics of a Simonides or a Praxilla.<sup>84</sup> By the 390s, however, tastes and habits

663 to the hard skin (or the tough meat?) on the neck of cattle or pigs (κόλλοιψι), and his diction is spoken of in *Frogs* with the imagery of ships’ timbers (824), tree trunks (903), and mountains (1056–7, cf. *Clouds* 1367).

<sup>76</sup> Ar. fr. 706 διάλεκτον ἔχοντα μέσσην πόλεως, | οὐτ’ ἀστεϊάν ὑποθηλυτέραν | οὐτ’ ἀνελεύθερον ὑπαγροικοτέραν.

<sup>77</sup> Ar. *Wasps* 56–7; cf. n. 35 above.

<sup>78</sup> Ar. *Ekk.* 1155–7.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Theognis 335; Solon fr. 5 West; Phokylides fr. 12 Gentili-Prato; Aesch. *Eum.* 529–30. The maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν (Eur. *Hipp.* 265, cf. Aesch. *Supp.* 1061) was attributed to the Seven Sages (Pl. *Prot.* 343a–b) or specifically to Chilon the Spartan (Kritias fr. 7 West).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Kratinos fr. 361, on the music of Xenias (unknown) and of Schoinion (‘Old Ropy’, a nickname of the comic poet Kallias); and the scholia to Ar. *Frogs* 13 (= Phrynichos test. 8 KA).

<sup>81</sup> Pherekrates fr. 84 ἄνδρες, προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν | ἐξευρήματι καινῷ, | συμπύκτοις ἀναπαισίτοις—cited by the metrician Hephaestion as the type-specimen of the ‘pherecratean’.

<sup>82</sup> Ar. *Wasps* 1535–7.

<sup>83</sup> Ar. *Knights* 529–30, referring to two songs from plays by Kratinos.

<sup>84</sup> Simonides: cf. Ar. *Clouds* 1356. Praxilla’s Ἀδμήτου λόγον (PMG 749 = <897>) is mentioned as a symposiac favourite in Ar. *Wasps* 1238, Ar. fr. 444, Kratinos fr. 254.

had changed, and Aristophanes finds himself almost having to apologize for having an extended lyric scene at all.<sup>85</sup>

A dramatist who relied extensively on *special properties and effects* might find himself vulnerable.<sup>86</sup> Statues and images of gods were, of course, very common stage-properties both in tragedy and in comedy, but when Aristophanes in *Peace* tried in effect to make such a statue into a dramatic character, at least two rivals found it cause for mockery.<sup>87</sup> Aristophanes praises one dramatist of the previous generation, Krates, for not imposing heavy expense on his financial sponsors (*choregoi*),<sup>88</sup> but his own claims to be similarly concerned for his sponsors' purses<sup>89</sup> are probably best regarded as gentle and traditional self-mockery by the production team, parallel with the invariable rule whereby the live animals which figure in sacrifice-scenes both in Old and in New Comedy are wretched skinny specimens promising little gastronomic pleasure to god or man.<sup>90</sup>

This more or less completes the role of discussion within comedy of the technical and artistic aspects of the genre, of *dexiotes*. What of *nouthesia*, of comedy's claim to make men 'better members of their communities'?<sup>91</sup> The nature and distribution of surviving material on this subject is extremely skewed. In the first place, all of it is praise (self-[28]praise) and none of it blame. We have seen how freely comic dramatists criticize one another for their technical shortcomings; but so far as our evidence goes, they *never* criticize one another for being a bad influence on the community. In view of the extreme freedom with which comic dramatists make charges of this sort against almost anyone else (including tragic dramatists such as Euripides), one almost wonders if there was a sort of tacit trade-union agreement whereby it was understood that comic poets would not accuse each other of anything that might bring the person

<sup>85</sup> Ar. *Ekk.* 888–9 (cf. n. 25 above).

<sup>86</sup> Like the tragic dramatist Sthenelos, who without his stage properties (according to Ar. *Wasps* 1312–13) would be as artistically 'naked' as a locust without its wings (see Sommerstein (1983a) ad loc.).

<sup>87</sup> Eupolis fr. 62; Platon fr. 86.

<sup>88</sup> Ar. *Knights* 538 *ὅς ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς δαπάνης ὑμᾶς ἀριστίζων ἀπέπεμπεν*.

<sup>89</sup> Ar. *Peace* 1022, *Frogs* 405–9.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Ar. *Birds* 899–902 ('nothing but beard and horns'); Menander, *Dyskolos* 438 ('all but dead already'), *Samia* 399–404; the most elaborate development of the idea is in a Roman adaptation (Plautus, *Aulularia* 561–8).

<sup>91</sup> Euripides' gloss on *nouthesia* in Ar. *Frogs* 1009–10.



accused into serious danger. It is true that we do find Eupolis accusing one or more rival poets of not being Athenian by birth<sup>92</sup>—an allegation which, if believed by a jury, might result in the accused being sold as a slave; on the other hand the rivals in question are not named or identified, and if (as is perhaps most likely) Eupolis' fire really is directed at a particular individual such as Aristophanes,<sup>93</sup> it could only be effective to the extent that rumours of his alleged foreign birth were already current.

Secondly, this self-praise is found exclusively in Aristophanes. It may be that other comic dramatists too saw and presented themselves as public benefactors; all we can say is that the idea, or rather the cluster of ideas, does not appear in what survives of their work, and that enough survives to make this absence significant, especially when we consider that Aristophanes presents himself in this way in six of his eight surviving *parabases*<sup>94</sup> and in several other places as well.

[29] Central to this self-presentation of Aristophanes is his commitment to justice (*to dikaion*) and to the interests of the *polis*;<sup>95</sup> it is altogether appropriate that the hero of *Acharnians*, who himself most clearly articulates that commitment and whom more than once<sup>96</sup> speaks in the name of the author, ascribing the author's experiences to himself, should be called *Dikaiopolis*.<sup>97</sup> The dramatist is a fighter

<sup>92</sup> Eupolis fr. 392.3.

<sup>93</sup> Who had a substantial connection with the island of Aigina, sufficient to make it comically plausible that if Athens gave up Aigina in a peace settlement she would have to give up Aristophanes as well (*Ach.* 652–4), and who may actually at some point, probably in 424 or 423, have been prosecuted by Kleon for the offence of falsely pretending to be a citizen (such a prosecution is mentioned by the scholia to *Ach.* 378, cf. Ar. test. 1.19 KA; see Sommerstein (1980c) 2–3).<sup>\*</sup> Ancient scholars, forgetting that 'the adage that there is no smoke without fire is not applicable to the Athenian law courts' (Dover (1968) xx), sought to find a non-Athenian origin for him; their solutions (Naukratis in Egypt, or any of three cities on Rhodes: Ar. test. 1.21–2, 2a/b.1–3, 11, 12 KA) are of no more authority or plausibility than, for instance, their four guesses at the origin of the fourth-century comic dramatist Antiphanes (Kios in Bithynia, Smyrna, Rhodes, Larisa: Suda *a*2735, *Prolegomena de Comoedia* III 48–9 Koster).

<sup>94</sup> The *parabasis* is the section of an Old Comedy, usually close to its mid-point, where the chorus address the audience directly at length in a sequence of speeches and songs.

<sup>95</sup> *Ach.* 497–508, 633–45, 650–1, 655, 661–4; *Knights* 510; *Wasps* 650–1, 1037; *Peace* 759–60; *Frogs* 686–7.

<sup>96</sup> *Ach.* 377–82, 502–3 (and cf. 500 *τρογυφδιαν ποιῶν*).

<sup>97</sup> On the figure of *Dikaiopolis* see now L. P. E. Parker (1991), who refutes the adventurous theory of E. L. Bowie (1988) that he is meant to be perceived as representing the similarly named dramatist Eupolis.

on behalf of his fellow-citizens,<sup>98</sup> defending them both against scheming foreigners<sup>99</sup> and against self-seeking Athenian politicians.<sup>100</sup> He fights also on behalf of the tribute-paying 'allied' states,<sup>101</sup> with beneficial results, he claims, both for them and for Athens. He does this without fear or favour. He does not turn his satire upon some insignificant and inoffensive person against whom some powerful individual bears a grudge;<sup>102\*</sup> he is prepared to be candid and unflattering with his audience;<sup>103</sup> and like a Herakles he is ready to do battle with the most fearsome monsters<sup>104</sup> (who usually prove to be transparent disguises for Kleon). It is his right and duty to give 'good advice and instruction to the community',<sup>105</sup> and to seek to cure sicknesses in the body politic.<sup>106</sup> He recognizes that some may think these aspirations beyond the proper scope of comedy; but 'even comedy is acquainted with justice'.<sup>107</sup> All this, of course, is advertisement, and a healthy scepticism about its sincerity is fully justified; but it remains true that Aristophanes is the only comic dramatist who we know sought to project this particular image of himself, the only comic dramatist whom we [30] know to have been threatened with prosecution because of things said in a play,<sup>108</sup> and the only comic dramatist whom we know to have been awarded public honours because of things said in a play.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>98</sup> *Wasps* 1036–7, *Peace* 759–60.

<sup>99</sup> *Ach.* 633–41.

<sup>100</sup> *Wasps* 1030–43, *Peace* 752–61.

<sup>101</sup> *Ach.* 642, *Peace* 760.

<sup>102</sup> *Wasps* 1025–8, *Peace* 751.

<sup>103</sup> *Ach.* 657–8, *Clouds* 518–26, *Wasps* 1015–17, 1043–50.

<sup>104</sup> *Wasps* 1029–43, *Peace* 752–60; cf. *Knights* 231–2 (where the terror of the mask-makers throws Ar.'s courage into relief), 510, *Clouds* 549; on this aspect of Aristophanes' self-projection see Mastromarco (1989).

<sup>105</sup> *Frogs* 686–7; cf. *Ach.* 634–5, 650–1, 656–8.

<sup>106</sup> *Wasps* 650–1.

<sup>107</sup> *Ach.* 497–500; cf. *Wasps* 650 *χαλεπὸν μὲν καὶ δεινῆς γνώμης καὶ μείζονος ἢ πῖ τρυφῶδοῖς*.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. *Ach.* 377–82, 502–3, 630–2, 659–64; *Wasps* 1284–91. There appear to have been two attempted prosecutions, one (referred to in *Acharnians*) for 'slandering the polis' in *Babylonians* in 426, the other two or three years later on a charge of falsely pretending to be a citizen (see n. 93 above). Both were the work of Kleon; neither case, however, seems to have come to trial (see Sommerstein (1980c) 2–3).\*

<sup>109</sup> He was officially commended and crowned for having advocated in *Frogs* (686–705) the restoration of citizen-rights to former supporters of the oligarchic

He is also, as it happens, the only comic dramatist whom we know to have presented himself as being under divine patronage and protection. In addition to the Muses<sup>110</sup> he invokes as his patrons the Charites,<sup>111</sup> goddesses of beauty and delight, Dionysos<sup>112</sup> the god of the festivals at which his plays are performed, and Athena<sup>113</sup> goddess of the *polis*; and the chorus of comic performers who are also a chorus of Eleusinian initiates speak of comedy as if it were itself a mystery-cult entitled to the same kind of reverence as the mysteries of Dionysos or of Demeter.<sup>114</sup>

We may say, in summary, that the Old Comic dramatists saw their art as a well-defined and highly competitive genre with clear criteria of artistic merit tempered by an overriding need to keep all sections of the audience entertained. To Aristophanes it was all that too, but it was also perhaps something more serious than that. It was a skill divinely bestowed on a member of the community, to be used for the community's good as well as his own. How well he perceived what would be for the community's good, whether in 425, 414, or 405 BC, is, as I have said elsewhere,<sup>115</sup> another matter altogether.<sup>116,117</sup>

regime of the Four Hundred (Dikaiarchos in Hypothesis I (Coulon<, Wilson>) to *Frogs*, lines 39–40; Ar. test. 1.35–9; see Ch. 13 below).

<sup>110</sup> *Wasps* 1022, 1028; *Peace* 775 ff.; *Frogs* 356, 674 (cf. 686); Ar. fr. 348.

<sup>111</sup> *Peace* 797–9; Ar. fr. 348.

<sup>112</sup> *Clouds* 519.

<sup>113</sup> Athena is invoked in *Knights* 581–5 as patron of Athenian excellence *πολέμῳ τε καὶ ποιηταῖς δυνάμει τε* and asked (586–94) to give victory to the chorus.

<sup>114</sup> *Frogs* 356–7, 367–8, 386–95.

<sup>115</sup> See Ch. 13 below (cf. Arnott (1991)).\*

<sup>116</sup> The author's attendance at the Zurich conference <in September 1991> on *Antike Dramentheorien und ihre Rezeption*, when this paper was delivered, was supported by grants from the University of Nottingham and the British Academy, which are gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of the paper, with rather a different emphasis, was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Classical Association at the University of Warwick, England, in April 1991.

<sup>117</sup> This article was originally published in B. Zimmermann (ed.), *Antike Dramentheorien und ihre Rezeption* = *Drama* 1 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung und C. E. Poeschel Verlag GmbH, 1992) 14–33 (pp. 31–3 were occupied by the bibliography). Reprinted here by kind permission of J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung und C. E. Poeschel Verlag GmbH in Stuttgart, Germany.

## ADDENDA

p. 117 n. 5 ‘satyr-play was almost obsolete’: a somewhat misleading statement. Satyr-drama, indeed, in a somewhat modified form, was actually enjoying a revival in Timocles’ time (a notable example is the *Agon* of Python, of which an 18-line fragment survives, Python fr. 1 *TrGF*), and from the third century, at many dramatic festivals, there were even separate competitions for satyr-drama. However, it is in any case overwhelmingly likely that Timocles passed directly from tragedy to comedy. I know of only two explicit references in comedy to satyr-drama as a genre, and both belong to Old Comedy: a joke at the expense of Agathon in Ar. *Thesm.* 157–8, and a reference (in dactylo-epitrite metre) to the long-past days of the early fifth century ‘when Choerilus was king among the satyrs’ in *com. adesp.* 694.

p. 118 collaboration in the composition and production of drama: I discuss this phenomenon in tragedy, with particular reference to Euripides, in Sommerstein (2004a).

p. 118 collaboration ‘always unofficial and hence, in a sense, clandestine’: this is disputed by Brockmann (2003) 1–26, 202–93, 316–46, who argues that if the two roles were filled by different persons, the official festival records credited *both*. This seems to me to be refuted by *Clouds* 530–1 (where Aristophanes, speaking of *Daitales*, compares himself to an unmarried mother who exposes, and thus abandons responsibility for, her baby) and *IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 2318.196* (= Araros test. 3 KA), which names Araros as the victorious *didaskalos* at the City Dionysia of 387 without any mention of Aristophanes, when we know that at about that time Araros was producing Aristophanes’ last plays (see Hypothesis III (Wilson) to Ar. *Wealth*) and that he did not produce any plays of his own until the mid- to late 370s (Suda *α* 3737: the 101st Olympiad). Brockmann’s efforts to explain away this evidence (pp. 276–7, 331–2) are far from persuasive.

p. 119 n. 14 Brockmann (2003) 232–72 has a searching critique of the Mastromarco–Halliwell thesis. Perhaps too much ink has been spilt on the issue: all the evidence we have is perfectly compatible

with the simple assumption that while the designated *didaskalos* took full *official* responsibility for a production, *unofficially* there might often be no attempt made to conceal the identity of the play's true author.

**p. 120 n. 23** See further Chapter 8 below and the references there cited.

**p. 121 n. 31** As is pointed out by Storey (2003) 206, the author who quotes Eupolis fr. 205, Aelius Aristides (28.91), says it occurs *ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ δράματος*, which suggests the *parodos* rather than the *parabasis* (though it has to be said that even the *parodos* of a comedy is hardly 'the beginning of the play'). However, given that Aristides neither understood the passage nor even knew that it was by Eupolis (for he goes on immediately to quote a passage from Cratinus' *Cheirones* as if by the same author; the attribution of our fragment to Eupolis, and to *Marikas*, comes from his scholiast), it is quite likely that *ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ δράματος* is mere guesswork based on the content of the fragment.

**p. 122 n. 32** on *Thesmophoriazusae II*: there has recently been considerable support for the view that the lost *Thesmophoriazusae* is actually earlier than the extant play (which belongs to 411). See Butrica (2001, 2005) and Karachalios (2006). Austin and Olson (2004) lxxvii–lxxxix, though they rightly take issue with many of Butrica's arguments, are prepared to accept that the lost play might have been produced up to three or four years before the extant one; I would, however, be much more reluctant than they are to ignore the almost unanimous consensus of ancient scholars, who, unlike us, had the whole of the now-lost play available for analysis.

**p. 123 n. 47** erect phallus: add perhaps *Peace*; see Olson (1998) 313, citing 1351 (his 1359) *τοῦ μὲν μέγα καὶ παχύ*.

**p. 127 n. 72** 'a jilted lover asking a comic dramatist to hold his *ἐπαιδικά* up to ridicule': this interpretation of *Wasps* 1025–6, long standard, is probably almost the reverse of the truth; the syntax runs more easily, and the sense more logically, if we suppose that, rather

than taking revenge on a boy who has jilted him, the lover is trying to gain (or retain) the *favour* of his beloved by getting the comic dramatist to *refrain* from satirizing the boy. See Imperio (2004) 280.

**p. 130 n. 93** The report of an attempted or threatened prosecution of Aristophanes for falsely pretending to be a citizen is discussed in Sommerstein (2004c), esp. 162–4. I conclude there that while ‘it is . . . likely that there was *something* about Aristophanes’ background that made it possible to cast doubt on his entitlement to citizenship’, this something was ‘probably *not* his connection with Aegina’.

**p. 131** ‘against whom some powerful individual bears a grudge’: these words should be replaced by ‘nor, at the instance of influential friends, refrain from satirizing those who deserve it’; cf. above on p. 127 n. 72.

**p. 131 n. 108** See Sommerstein (2004c).

**p. 132 n. 115** Also relevant are Chapters 10 and 11 below.

## Slave and citizen in Aristophanic comedy<sup>1</sup>

It has been a strong tendency in recent scholarship, exemplified in the work of Paul Cartledge, Simon Goldhill, Edith Hall, John Winkler, and many others,<sup>2</sup> to emphasize the classical Greek citizen's perception of his identity as a free adult male, possessed of civic rights, in contradistinction to outsiders or 'others' such as women, children, aliens, and slaves, and to explore the ways in which civic practices and rituals of many kinds can be viewed as affirming and validating this distinctive identity—and among them, not least, the performances at the Athenian dramatic festivals, the City Dionysia and the Lenaia.

It has, of course, always been well recognized that, at any rate in democratic Athens, many of these distinctions, much of the time, were in practice blurred in important respects. To concentrate on the two with which I am going to be concerned in this paper, those of citizen vs. alien and free vs. slave, we may note, to take a few examples, that there was no foolproof way to distinguish a slave from a citizen by his appearance or dress;<sup>3</sup> that citizenship was

<sup>1</sup> I am most grateful to Jim Roy for giving me the opportunity to present this paper at the *Belonging* conference in April 1999, and to all who took part in the discussion on it, including Carlos Galvão-Sobrinho, Jane Gardner, Eleanor OKell, Thomas Wiedemann, and above all Mogens Hansen. Responsibility for any errors or follies that remain in it is wholly mine.

<sup>2</sup> Cartledge (1993, 1997); Goldhill (1987, 1997); Hall (1989*a*, 1997); Winkler (1990*a*; 1990*b*: 45–70).

<sup>3</sup> [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.10; a prejudiced statement, to be sure, but confirmed by such incidents as that reported in [Dem.] 47.61 where creditors, raiding the house of a trierarch to seize his goods in satisfaction of a debt, take away his son, believing him to be a slave, until a neighbour tells them who the boy actually is. (It is of no consequence whether this incident actually occurred; what matters is that the speaker must have thought that a jury would find it credible.)

frequently granted to aliens, sometimes to former slaves,<sup>4</sup> occasionally even to men who were actually slaves at the moment of the grant;<sup>5</sup> that a citizen might be manhandled or even whipped by (public) slaves if he disrupted the activities of state bodies or officials;<sup>6</sup> that for a wide range of crimes citizens might be punished with death by *apotympanismos*, which seems from our evidence to have been both a painful and a prolonged form of execution;<sup>7</sup> that on at least one occasion the Athenian *boule* was prepared to order the torture of numerous citizens;<sup>8</sup> that slaves could become initiates in the Eleusinian Mysteries<sup>9</sup> and therefore share in the blissful afterlife

<sup>4</sup> Such as the bankers Pasion and Phormion; see Davies (1971) 427–42 and (1981) 66; Isager and Hansen (1975) 89; M. J. Osborne (1981–3) iv. 194–8; Trevett (1992) 160–2.

<sup>5</sup> Notably those who served in the Arginousai campaign of 406 BC (Ar. *Frogs* 693–4). The statement there that they had become ‘Plataians’ does not refer to any special intermediate status, but merely indicates that like the Plataian refugees of 427 and other naturalized citizens (cf. [Dem.] 59.92, 104–6) these ex-slaves were debarred from being archons or priests; their children, if born of Athenian mothers, were full citizens in all respects.

<sup>6</sup> Ar. *Ach.* 54–8, *Knights* 665, *Thesm.* 930–4, 1125–35, *Eccl.* 141–2; Pl. *Prot.* 319c.

<sup>7</sup> On *apotympanismos* see Gernet (1924); Bonner and Smith (1930–8) ii. 279–87; Todd (1993) 141. The condemned man was clamped to a board at neck, wrists, and ankles; the board was then stood up vertically and the victim left suspended in that position, usually naked (Ar. *Thesm.* 939) and exposed to sun, rain, or cold, until he died—though it is likely that if he lived till sunset he would be killed then, perhaps strangled by tightening of the neck-clamp (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1385<sup>a</sup>9–13 which presupposes that he could be certain he would not be alive the next morning; for sunset as the time for criminals to die, cf. Pl. *Phd.* 61e, 116e; the immortal Prometheus will get no such release, cf. [Aesch.] *Prom.* 22–5). There is no doubt that citizens were frequently executed by this method: cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 930 ff., Lys. 13.56, 67–8, Dem. 21.105. It is mentioned in connection with murder, treason, profanation of sacred places or rituals, and *kakourgiai* such as clothes-snatching; it may be significant that *apotympanismos* is not known to have been used in any case in which (as in the case of Socrates, the only person known to have been executed by hemlock under the democracy) the death penalty, rather than being prescribed by law, had been voted for by a jury choosing between prosecution and defence proposals.

<sup>8</sup> Andok. 1.43–4 (forty-two men; all of them who are identifiable were citizens, though we cannot be certain that all forty-two were; the resolution to have them tortured, moved by Peisandros, was greeted with shouts of approval, but was apparently withdrawn without being put to the vote).

<sup>9</sup> [Dem.] 59.21 (Lysias arranges to have the slave *hetaira* Metaneira initiated because this is the only way he can spend money on her so as to benefit *her* rather than her owner); cf. Theophilus com. fr. 1 (a slave recalling the benefits his master has bestowed on him: Greek culture, literacy, and initiation). One category of slaves—the public slaves who cleaned the hall of initiation—seem to have been initiated as a



that the initiate was promised; and that on most private social occasions citizens and aliens mingled freely, as they did also in the theatre, where an Athenian can be envisaged as sitting next to an Ionian (Ar. *Peace* 43–8) and the audience described as consisting ‘of children, women and men, of slave and free, all together’.<sup>10</sup>

None of this, it must be said, invalidates the evidence that points to a widespread ideology of free-adult-male-citizen identity and superiority; on the contrary, it is entirely plausible that the more the distinction of citizens versus the rest was blurred in practice, the more it was insisted on in theory. Nevertheless we may with advantage take warning against the temptation to assume that the classical Athenian citizen, like some stereotypical Anglo-Indian or Afrikaner of bygone days, was constantly thinking of his superiority to the lesser breeds around him and desperate to avoid any word or action that might seem to imply that they were, or remotely approached being, his equals.

I am considering in this paper some of the evidence that comedy can bring to bear on this issue. I would have liked to cover both Old and New Comedy, but in view of space constraints I shall restrict myself to Old Comedy, and specifically to the eleven extant comedies of Aristophanes. And I shall argue that far from validating or confirming the status distinctions with which we are concerned, Aristophanic comedy rather consistently negates and subverts them.

It is from one of these comedies, curiously enough, that we get one of the best classical Greek definitions of what it means to be a slave:

*τοῦ σώματος γὰρ οὐκ ἔσ' τὸν κύριον  
κρατεῖν ὁ δαίμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐωνημένον.*

matter of routine (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 1672.207, 1673.24), evidently because they would almost inevitably in the course of their work learn some of the secrets of the ritual and had to be prevented from divulging them; for other slaves, to judge by the tone of the sources, initiation was clearly a special privilege reserved for a few, which could be conferred by their owner (as in the case of the slave in Theophilos’ play) or by another person with the owner’s consent (as in the case of *Metaneira*). It was none the less true that when members of a household travelled to Eleusis for the festivals, the only one in the party who had no hope of ever being initiated was the donkey (Ar. *Frogs* 159). See Bömer (1961) 109–18 [351–60], esp. 112 [354].

<sup>10</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 502d. Accordingly, while a theatregoer who takes along his sons’ *paidagogos* (and pays for his seat with someone else’s money) may be being ‘shameless’ (Thphr. *Char.* 9.5), he is apparently doing nothing that law or religion forbids.

The god lets a person's body be controlled, not by the person himself, but by the man who buys him (Ar. *Wealth* 6–7).

Specifically, as is well known, a slave had no protection against physical or sexual abuse by his or her master—except indeed the flimsy protection afforded by the fact of his being a valuable asset, and the right to flee to sanctuary and beg passers-by to purchase him<sup>11</sup> (at the risk of death by starvation if he failed). Accordingly one might expect comedy, whose characters' ultimate goal is normally the pursuit of uninhibited communal pleasure,<sup>12</sup> and which is not at all averse from the portrayal of violence so long as it is not fatal, to regard the beating of male slaves and the rape of female ones (other people's as well as one's own) as a legitimate or at least excusable activity, particularly after a few drinks.

In the case of rape, this is indeed what we find, as I have shown in an earlier article;<sup>13</sup> but to say this is not a statement about slavery, it is a statement about gender. For, as I showed in that article, Aristophanic males consider themselves free to indulge in non-consensual sex, not only with their own slaves (of course) and with other people's slaves (if they can get away with it), but also with their wives, who themselves matter-of-factly take it for granted that a husband whose wife refuses his reasonable sexual demands (that is, demands that *he* regards as reasonable) can be expected to force himself upon her and beat her if she resists.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of corporal chastisement, the much-touted 'inviolability' of the citizen's body, in contrast with the slave's, is even less apparent. It is true, of course, that slaves in Aristophanes are frequently beaten, though on such occasions our sympathy is sometimes directed at least as much to the slave as to his chastiser.<sup>15</sup> But

<sup>11</sup> At the Theseion (Ar. fr. 577, cf. Ar. *Knights* 1311–12, fr. 475, Eupolis fr. 229, Pherekrates fr. 46); see Christensen (1988). Even if a buyer came forward, it is unlikely that the owner could be compelled to sell (since if sale were to be compulsory, there would need to be some authority with power to determine the price, and we know of none); but if a desperate slave remained indefinitely in sanctuary, he might become such a physical wreck as to be virtually valueless, and there was thus a considerable incentive for the owner to make terms with a buyer, if one was available, before this stage was reached.

<sup>12</sup> See Ch. 9 below, pp. 199–202.

<sup>13</sup> Sommerstein (1998a), esp. 105–9.

<sup>14</sup> Ar. *Lys.* 160–3. <sup>15</sup> Cf. pp. 143–4 below.

physical violence is just as often perpetrated, or threatened, against free men. In nine of the eleven plays at least one free Athenian male or (occasionally) female is subjected to corporal maltreatment,<sup>16</sup> or evades it by flight,<sup>17</sup> or is threatened with it with impunity;<sup>18</sup> in a tenth, *Frogs* (606–73), a similar indignity is inflicted on a god, Dionysos, though admittedly he had changed roles with his slave at the time. And the eleventh, *Knights*, may be seen as an exception that proves the rule; for though here the principal victim of violence (273, 451–6) is the slave Paphlagon, this character is easily identifiable, even before he appears, as the powerful politician Kleon.

The typical free man to be a victim of comic violence is a self-important person who, or whose kind, in the ‘real’ world beyond the theatre enjoys power or wealth that in the eyes of the less fortunate he does not deserve. If he is Greek, he is always an Athenian citizen, not a metic or a visiting foreigner. Often he is a professional accuser or *sykophantes* (twice in *Acharnians*, once each in *Birds* and *Wealth*);<sup>19</sup> often also he is a person whose trade or expertise or connections

<sup>16</sup> *Ach.* 926–58 (Nikarchos, a sykophant); *Clouds* 1297–1302 (Second Creditor), 1321 ff. (Strepsiades); *Wasps* 398–9 (Philokleon), 456–60 (jurors), 1322–41 (men in street), 1389–91 (Myrtia, a bread-seller), 1435–6 (man in street); *Peace* 1119–21 (Hierokles, a diviner); *Birds* 989–91 (Oracle-monger), 1018–19 (Meton), 1029–32 (Inspector), 1043–5 (Decree-seller), 1461–8 (Sykophant); *Ekkkl.* 1026–1111 (Epigenes); *Wealth* 929 ff. (Sykophant). I do not include the interrupted execution of Euripides’ in-law in *Thesm.* 930–1208, since that is the lawful punishment of a crime.

<sup>17</sup> *Ach.* 824–8 (Sykophant); *Clouds* 1508–9 (Socrates and pupils). In each of these cases it is possible that one or more blows are struck before the flight of the victim(s), but I have ignored this possibility since in these passages, unlike those cited in the previous note, the text does not provide positive support for it (such as a cry of distress, a shout of *μαρτύρομαι*, or a threat of legal proceedings).

<sup>18</sup> *Ach.* 280–346 (Dikaiopolis); *Lys.* 634–6, 657, 680–5, 705, 797–800, 821–4 (men’s and women’s choruses, mutually); *Thesm.* 1125–35 (Euripides). Except in *Frogs* (where the character who flogs Dionysos is a servant of a senior god, Plouton) no divinity is actually subjected to violence in these eleven plays, but Iris is threatened with rape in *Birds* 1253–6 and *Wealth* (before he is recognized) with beating, then with death, in *Wealth* 64–71.

<sup>19</sup> On the *sykophantes* see the sharply opposed analyses of R. G. Osborne (1990) and Harvey (1990). A strictly logical democrat ought no doubt to have held, with Osborne (and with the very eloquent Sykophant of *Wealth* 899–919), that the volunteer prosecutor was a public benefactor; but the evidence is overwhelming that *sykophantes* was invariably a term of abuse, and one that every defendant strove to apply to his prosecutor if the circumstances afforded him any sort of pretext for doing so.

enable him to live well on public money—an imperial official, a religious expert, a town planner and designer of timepieces, even the Decree-seller in *Birds* who, significantly, lives on money extracted from the taxpayers, not of Athens, but of the dependent allied states. Sometimes he is a person likely to be obnoxious to the average spectator for other reasons, like the creditor in *Clouds* who comes to collect his debt, or Socrates and his pupils at the end of the same play. But in several cases all that the victim has done to earn his fate is to be obstructing the progress of the comic project. When the wasp-like jurors in *Wasps* attempt to rescue Philokleon by force, they are driven off with sticks and smoke, and though they assail Bdelykleon with cries of ‘conspirator’ and ‘tyrant’ (463–87), their protests are ineffective and are presently shown to be misguided. The young man Epigenes in *Ekklesiazousai* is manhandled by three old women, and eventually nearly torn to pieces in a tug-of-war between two of them, because he is reluctant to obey the new law giving the oldest and ugliest among them the right to his sexual services on demand. An entirely inoffensive, blind man is threatened with violence, even with death, merely for refusing to give his name to a total stranger, until he reveals that he is in fact the god of Wealth—after which he goes home with his tormentor and blesses him with riches. On two occasions one of the greatest of Greek cultural prohibitions is violated, when a father is beaten by his son: the beating of Strepsiades in *Clouds* by his Socratically educated son Pheidippides is well known, but it is often forgotten that the incident is in essence repeated in Aristophanes’ next play, *Wasps*, when Bdelykleon first imprisons his father and then, when the old man tries to escape by climbing down on a rope, orders his slave to beat him into retreat—and for good measure, to use a sacred wreath (*eiresione*) as his weapon (398–9). Altogether at least sixteen individual male citizens, plus three groups of citizens (Socrates and company in *Clouds*, the jurors in *Wasps*, and some anonymous passers-by later in the same play) become, or narrowly miss becoming, the victims of bodily violence in these eleven plays. Frequently further indignity is added to the violence by the participation of slaves, usually on the orders of their owners<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Ach.* 954; *Clouds* 1508–9 (cf. 1485–9); *Wasps* 398–9, 456–60; *Peace* 1119–21; *Thesm.* 1125–35 (a public slave, carrying out orders previously given by a public official); *Wealth* 64–71.

but once or twice on their own initiative: the beating of Dionysos in *Frogs* is done at the suggestion of his slave Xanthias, and in *Wealth* 926–58 Karion takes a full part, in his owner's absence and without his knowledge, in the assault on the sykophant.

What is more, it is unheard-of for those responsible for these acts of violence to be brought to book or to suffer for their actions in any way. Several times<sup>21</sup> the victims depart threatening legal proceedings, but nothing ever comes of these threats; in the case of *Clouds* and *Wasps* critics have sometimes sought, as it were, to prolong the play beyond its end and speculate on 'impending prosecutions' menacing Strepsiades or Philokleon,<sup>22</sup> but it is not obvious why we should pay more attention to the threats of the Second Creditor or of Myrtia than to those of the Inspector and the Decree-seller in *Birds* or of the Sykophant in *Wealth*. Within a play, with one possible exception, no free person is ever punished, formally or informally, by human or by divine action, for any act of violence however gross; even in the case of Pheidippides in *Clouds*, where the whole dramatic point is that he has been corrupted by his sophistic training into committing one of the most horrendous acts that anyone can be guilty of, both the divine *Clouds* (1454–61) and, once admonished by them, the victim himself (1462–6) put all the blame on Strepsiades for dishonestly attempting to evade his debts and on Socrates for encouraging and facilitating the attempt. Strepsiades is actually the one possible exception of whom I spoke: his violent, insulting dismissal of the Second Creditor is followed by a choral song (1303–20) predicting his downfall, which is in turn followed by his return to the scene fleeing from the blows of his son. But Strepsiades is in any case abnormal among Aristophanic heroes in that his comic project is a total failure (probably because of its purely selfish goals<sup>23</sup>). Much more often the perpetrators of such violence finish triumphant; indeed they include among their number all the successful male, mortal comic heroes in Aristophanes—Dikaiopolis, the Sausage-seller, Philokleon and Bdelykleon,<sup>24</sup> Trygaios, Peisetairos,

<sup>21</sup> *Wasps* 1332–4, 1406–8, 1441 (cf. 1417–18); *Birds* 1046–7, 1052; *Wealth* 945–50.

<sup>22</sup> e.g. Dover (1968) xxiii–xxiv.

<sup>23</sup> Euripides' project in *Thesmophoriazousai* is a failure for the same reason; cf. Sommerstein (2002a) 68.

<sup>24</sup> Both these characters have some of the traits of the typical Aristophanic hero. Bdelykleon originates and executes the comic project, viz. to cure his father of his

and Chremylos. Even Strepsiades himself, after his final repentance, ends his play in a blaze (literally) of victory as he puts Socrates and his pupils to flight.

Indeed, if anything, it is those who perpetrate or instigate violence *against slaves* who are more likely to come off badly in the end. In *Knights* (62–70, cf. 1–7), Paphlagon–Kleon boasts of his domination over his master, Demos, and his ability to procure the flogging of any slave who crosses him; during the play the Sausage-seller helps Paphlagon’s victims to take ample revenge on him, and he ends (1395–1408) by being carried off, as if he were a corpse, to an ignominious new life as a street vendor. In *Peace*, one of the ways in which War displays the brutality of his nature is by striking his slave for trivial or imaginary faults (such as being slow to carry out an order that he has not yet been given, 256): in the upshot, War’s design for the final destruction of the Greek people is frustrated and his prisoner, Peace, is set free.

In *Wealth* there is a scene (870–6) in which, for the only time in the eleven plays, a free man threatens a slave with torture—carefully distinguishing, as was proper, between the slave and the citizen who is with him, against whom no such threat is made:

- Συ. μὰ Δί' οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔσθ' ὑγιὲς ὑμῶν οὐδενός,  
 κοῦκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἔχετε μου τὰ χρήματα  
 Κα. ὡς σοβαρός, ὦ Δάματερ, εἰσελήλυθεν  
 ὁ συκοφάντης. δῆλον ὅτι βουλμιᾶ.  
 Συ. σὺ μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν ἰὼν ταχέως οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις·  
 ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ γὰρ δεῖ σ' ἐκεῖ στρεβλούμενον  
 εἰπεῖν ἅ πεπανούργηκας.

ΣΥΚΟΦΑΝΤ [to Karion, Honest Man, and the latter's young slave]. By Zeus, you're rotten stuff, the whole lot of you, and I'm quite certain you're in possession of property of mine!

ΚΑΡΙΟΝ [scornfully]. Demeter! how fiercely this sykophant's blown in! He's obviously famished!

mania for judging; but he hardly says or does anything to laugh at in the entire play, and it is Philokleon who has all the ingenious devilry—*poneria* as Whitman (1964) dubbed it—of a Dikaiopolis or a Peisetairos. They both, at different times, use violence on citizen victims, and each gains his desires in the end as Philokleon abandons judging for Dionysiac enjoyment.

SYKOPHANT: Off to the Agora, you [sing.], as fast as you can go. You're to be racked on the wheel there till you confess your villainies.

But, as will be seen, the free man is that low form of life, a sykophant; the slave, quite unconcerned, merely replies 'You'll howl if you try!' (οἰμῶξ' ἄρα σὺ), and the sykophant is humiliated and driven away by the slave and the citizen in virtually equal partnership. How different from *Frogs* where the slave successfully contrives to have his master cruelly flogged, and (as is later confirmed)<sup>25</sup> gets completely away with it!

There are other respects too in which the presentation of citizens and slaves in Aristophanes places them closer to each other than many would have expected. I will mention four.

(1) There is no clear evidence that the language of slaves differs in any systematic way from that of free persons of the same gender; I say 'of the same gender' because as I have shown in an earlier article (see Chapter 1 above), there *are* clear-cut linguistic differences between the speech of men and of women. Sometimes, when a free man and a slave are together on stage and on the same side of an argument, it is very hard to tell which of them is speaking at any given moment; this is certainly true in the Sykophant scene in *Wealth*. In an earlier scene in which Chremylos and his slave Karion are trying to persuade Wealth of the immense power he possesses, there is one passage (189–92) in which the contrast between them is clear: they are arguing that for all good things, except money, there is a point of satiation beyond which they cease to be enjoyable, and when they list examples of 'good things', Chremylos lists social and intellectual goods (love, education, honour, excellence, ambition, public office) while Karion lists foods (bread, sweetmeats, cakes, figs, kneaded barley, soup).<sup>26</sup> But for forty lines before that point it is hardly ever certain whether the master or the slave is speaking, and in one

<sup>25</sup> *Frogs* 738–43—where, incidentally, Xanthias, using almost the same language as Karion does to the sykophant, tells his fellow-slave that if Dionysos had tried to beat him for his offence 'he'd have howled, I tell you' (ῥιμῶξε μέντ' ἄν).

<sup>26</sup> As the scholia (on 190) note: ὁ δούλος λέγει τὰ πρὸς τὴν γαστέρα, πρὸς τὸ θυμῆρες τῆς κωμωδίας ταῦτα τοῖς σπουδαίοις παραπλέξας ('the slave mentions things related to the stomach, alternating them with the serious things <mentioned by the master> to add spice to the comedy').

passage (170–9) it seems highly likely that a string of assertions about the *political* power of money is made by both of them in irregular alternation. I present this passage, in Greek as a bare text, in translation with the probable speakers<sup>27</sup> distinguished by font (bold for Chremylos, italic for Karion, plain where there is nothing on which to base a decision); readers are welcome to establish, if they can, what features of one or another line make it specially appropriate for the free or slave speaker to whom the dramatist has apparently assigned it.

μέγας δὲ βασιλεὺς οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτον κομᾷ;  
 ἡκκλησία δ' οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτον γίγνεται;  
 τί δέ; τὰς τριήρεις οὐ σὺ πληροῖς; εἰπέ μοι.  
 τὸ δ' ἐν Κορίνθῳ ξενικὸν οὐχ οὔτος τρέφει;  
 ὁ Πάμφιλος δ' οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτον κλαύσεται;  
 ὁ βελονοπώλης δ' οὐχὶ μετὰ τοῦ Παμφίλου;  
 Ἀγύρριος δ' οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτον πέρδεται;  
 Φιλέψιος δ' οὐχ ἔνεκα σοῦ μύθου λέγει;  
 ἡ ξυμμαχία δ' οὐ διὰ σέ τοῖς Αἰγυπτιοῖς;  
 ἔρα δὲ Ναῖς οὐ διὰ σέ Φιλωνίδου;

*And doesn't the Great King plume himself because of him?*

*Doesn't the Assembly get held because of him?*<sup>28</sup>

**Another thing, tell me, don't you get our warships manned?**

*Doesn't he maintain the mercenary force at Corinth?*

*Isn't it because of him that Pamphilos . . . will cop it?*<sup>29</sup>

And that needle-seller<sup>30</sup> as well along with Pamphilos?

*Isn't it because of him that Agyrrhios is in clover?*

<sup>27</sup> Assigned (as by Coulon (1923–30), Thiery (1997), and Halliwell (1997)) on the assumption that Chremylos speaks *to* Wealth in the second person (as he certainly does when summing up the whole argument in 160–1 and 182–3) while Karion speaks *of* him in the third;\* there seems no reason why the *same* speaker should alternate irregularly between second and third person when making a series of points which are all meant to cumulate into a single argument. The text and translation are those of Sommerstein (2001), to which readers are referred for detailed commentary. Pronouns referring to the god Wealth should be interpreted as meaning 'wealth' or 'money', whichever gives better sense in the particular context.

<sup>28</sup> i.e. because citizens are paid for attending it (cf. *Ekk.* 183–4, *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 41.3).

<sup>29</sup> Pamphilos, who had served (unsuccessfully) as a general in 389 (the year before *Wealth* was produced), may at this time have been awaiting trial for embezzlement (cf. *Plato com. fr.* 14, *Dem.* 40.22).

<sup>30</sup> One Aristoxenos, according to the scholia; not otherwise known.



Isn't it for your sake that Philepsios tells stories?<sup>31</sup>  
 Isn't it because of you that we've an alliance with the Egyptians?  
 Isn't it because of you that Nais loves Philonides?<sup>32</sup>

(2) It is often slave characters who establish a strong *rapport* with the audience early in a play. In *Knights*, *Wasps*, and *Peace* the opening dialogue is between two slaves, one of whom then explains the situation to the audience and appeals for their good opinion;<sup>33</sup> in *Frogs*, though the audience is not directly addressed, Xanthias establishes himself as the point of contact between them and the action through a series of brief but powerful asides;<sup>34</sup> in *Wealth* Karion makes the opening speech to the audience and does not address his master until line 18.

(3) Comic slaves often had light-coloured<sup>35</sup> hairpieces: Xanthias 'Fairhead' is the commonest slave-name in Aristophanes, occurring in five plays.<sup>36</sup> Yet light hair was thought of as characteristic of the heroic aristocracy: not only ξανθὸς Μενέλαος but also Achilles,

<sup>31</sup> 'Stories' (μύθους) may mean 'lies', or 'myths' (cf. Dem. 18.149), or 'amusing fables' (cf. *Wasps* 566–7).

<sup>32</sup> Who was a lumbering, ugly, uncultured man (Nikochares fr. 4, Philyllios fr. 22)—but a rich one.

<sup>33</sup> *Knights* 36–70 (where the appeal for the audience's favour is made by one slave, the speech of exposition by the other); *Wasps* 54–135; *Peace* 50–77.

<sup>34</sup> *Frogs* 51, 87–8, 107, 115, 159–60. Xanthias has the advantage, so far as his relationship with the audience is concerned, of being the only living human being in the play; everyone else is either dead (one speaking corpse, and numerous inhabitants of the underworld) or immortal.

<sup>35</sup> Greek ξανθός, a colour-term with a very wide range: it can denote both the colour of ripe corn (*Iliad* 5.500) and that of blood (Eur. *IT* 73) or wine (Soph. fr. 277), and would therefore be appropriate to almost any colour that human hair can naturally have except black (or near-black), grey, and white. No English word has this range, and my term 'light' should be understood as meaning nothing more specific than 'not (very) dark'.

<sup>36</sup> *Ach.* 243, 259; *Clouds* 1485; *Wasps* passim; *Birds* 656; *Frogs* passim; also Kephisosodoros fr. 3, Ath. 8.336e citing [Alexis] fr. 25 (on the spuriousness, and the probable date, of this fragment see Arnott (1996b) 819–30), Aischines 2.157, *CGFP* 106.118. The name also appears on several fourth-century Italian vases related to comedy: see Taplin (1993) 41 and pll. 12.5, 12.6, and 16.15, the last of which gives the name in the Oscan form Santia. The nearly synonymous name Pyrrhias is also frequent in (mostly later) comedy (e.g. *Men. Dysk.* 71; in Ar. it appears only in a disparaging reference to politicians of allegedly foreign or servile descent, *Frogs* 730); and heroic hair could be called πυρρός as well as ξανθός—the alternative name Pyrrhos for Neoptolemos, son of Achilles, goes back as far as the *Kypria* (fr. 19 West).

Odysseus, Meleagros, and others have fair hair in Homer,<sup>37</sup> and in tragedy (certainly in Euripides) the young and beautiful of both sexes regularly do.<sup>38</sup> In classical Athens, too, fair hair was something on which to pride oneself,<sup>39</sup> and women often sought to acquire it by artificial means.<sup>40</sup> What in real life and in tragedy is the sought-after emblem of noble blood, and is normally (though not always) borne by characters with whom the audience is likely to sympathize, becomes in comedy the badge of the slave.

(4) In some ways most significantly of all, it is the regular practice for the hero's slaves to be enthusiastically involved in his or her struggle and to share its rewards; this is not always made explicit, but there are quite enough examples to make the pattern clear. In *Acharnians* Dikaiopolis' slaves take part in the phallic procession at his celebration of the Rural Dionysia,<sup>41</sup> and presumably would have taken part in some way in the (private) partying to follow had the procession not been interrupted. In *Knights* the two downtrodden slaves of

<sup>37</sup> Achilles, *Iliad* 1.197; Odysseus, *Odyssey* 13.399; Meleagros, *Iliad* 2.642; also Agamede (*Iliad* 11.740) and Rhadamanthys (*Odyssey* 7.323). On the last-mentioned passage J. B. Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988) 339 acutely points out that ξανθός 'appears to be the regular generic epithet at this point [sc. when what is required is a spondaic word beginning at the hepthemimeral caesura] before names beginning with a consonant'; which implies that to the singers of early epic, heroes were as routinely assumed to be fair-haired as ships were assumed to be black or swords silver-studded.

<sup>38</sup> There is textual evidence in the following cases (all references are to Euripides): Dionysos (*Cycl.* 75, *Ba.* 235), Glauke (Jason's bride) (*Med.* 980), Helen (*Hel.* 1224), Herakles and his son (*Herakles* 362, 993), Hippolytos (*Hipp.* 1343), Iphigeneia (*IT* 173; *IA* 681, 1366), Cassandra (*IA* 758), Klytimestra (*El.* 1071; but her blonde is probably to be taken as an artificial one), Lykos (*Herakles* 233), Medea's children (*Med.* 1141), Menelaos (*IA* 175, *Or.* 1532), Orestes (*El.* 515, cf. *IT* 52), Parthenopaios (*Ph.* 1159), Phaidra (*Hipp.* 134, 220).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Pherekrates fr. 202 where an unidentifiable male is addressed as ὦ ξανθοτάτοις βοστρύχοισι κομῶν 'you who luxuriate in those oh-so-fair locks', with a play (as in Ar. *Clouds* 545) on two senses of κομῶ, 'grow one's hair long' and 'pride oneself (on)'; 'give oneself airs (on account of)'.  
<sup>40</sup> Eur. fr. 322; Men. fr. 450 νῦν δ' ἔρπ' ἀπ' οἴκων τῶνδε· τὴν γυναῖκα γὰρ / τὴν σώφρον' οὐ δεῖ τὰς τρίχας ξανθὰς ποιεῖν 'Now get thee from this house [this clause is paratragic in expression], because a decent woman shouldn't be lightening her hair'.

<sup>41</sup> *Ach.* 243, 259–60: two slaves are to carry the processional phallus, and twice they are instructed to make sure the phallus is 'upright' (ὀρθός), both times in language sufficiently ambiguous to encourage an alternative interpretation referring to the slaves' own organs excited by the proximity of Dikaiopolis' daughter, who is carrying the ritual basket in the procession as κανηφόρος.

Demos discover the Sausage-seller, tell him of his destiny, and assist him against Paphlagon; one of them reminds the Sausage-seller of his services in his moment of triumph,<sup>42</sup> and probably then has the satisfaction of hauling Paphlagon off to the city gates.<sup>43</sup> At the end of *Clouds* the slave of Strepsiades joins him in destroying Socrates' *phrontisterion* and chasing away its occupants. In *Peace* and *Birds* slaves play important ritual roles at sacrifices.<sup>44</sup> In the first half of *Frogs* Xanthias soon establishes a position of virtual equality with Dionysos,<sup>45</sup> and it is in keeping with this that the chorus in the parabasis (693–6) praise the recent decision to grant citizen rights to the slaves who had rowed at Arginousai; at the end of the play (1500 ff.) it seems to me virtually certain that he reappears to accompany Dionysos and Aeschylus back to earth, and more specifically to carry the instruments of death thoughtfully provided by Pluto (1504–7) for the use of Kleophon and other objectionable persons.<sup>46</sup> At the end of *Ecclesiazusae* (1112 ff.), since the dramatist does not want the heroine Praxagora to return to the scene, her place in the finale is in effect filled for her by her maidservant, magnificently drunk, who probably ends by taking a leading role in the exit-dance.<sup>47</sup> And in *Wealth* Karion is a full partner for Chremylos both in

<sup>42</sup> *Knights* 1254–6, where ἀνὴρ γεγένησαι δι' ἐμέ 'you became a man [i.e. a man of importance] through me' (cf. 177–9) applies much better to the slave ('Demos-thenes'), but for whom the Sausage-seller would never have dreamed of challenging Paphlagon (note his extreme diffidence in 178–224), than to the leader of the chorus who, with his colleagues, has done little more than act as his cheerleader.\*

<sup>43</sup> In the last two lines of the play (1407–8), Demos calls for 'someone' (τις), i.e. any slave in earshot who is physically capable of the task, to take Paphlagon away to ply his new trade as a sausage-seller; and except for Paphlagon himself, the two slaves who opened the play ('Demosthenes' and 'Nikias') are the only slaves of Demos that we have seen at any time.

<sup>44</sup> In the sacrifice in *Peace* (948–1126) Trygaios' slave, in addition to performing many of the lesser ritual acts, himself carries out, offstage, the actual slaughter of the victim (1017–21). In *Birds*, when Peisetairos dismisses the priest who has come to perform the sacrifice marking the foundation of the birds' city, he says he is going to 'sacrifice this beast all on my own' (894), but in fact he is assisted by his slaves, one of whom performs (958) the first and only ritual act preliminary to the sacrifice that ever does get done on stage, and eventually (1056–7) he says to them 'Let us get away from here... to sacrifice the goat... inside'.

<sup>45</sup> Notably in the Empousa scene (285–311), the successive exchanges of role (494–604), and the 'torture' challenge (605–73).

<sup>46</sup> On this see Sommerstein (1996*b*) 295 (on 1500–27).

<sup>47</sup> See Sommerstein (1998*b*) 237 (on 1166–7).

the prologue and throughout the second half of the play; he and his fellow-slaves share to the fullest extent in his master's newly-gained wealth (802–22), and he takes part in the discomfiture of the Sykophant (850–958) and all by himself (1097–1170) turns the god Hermes into a domestic servant (to whom he promptly gives the menial task of washing tripe).

Slaves are ubiquitous in Aristophanes, as in all Greek drama. Free foreigners—non-Athenians and non-Greeks—appear only in a few plays; there are large numbers of them in *Acharnians* and *Lysistrata*, one in *Birds*,<sup>48</sup> and in addition the chorus of *Peace* seem at certain moments<sup>49</sup> to be envisaged as a Panhellenic gathering though at other times they are Athenian peasants.<sup>50</sup> They are usually made identifiable by their appearance or costume (hairy Spartans, trousered Persians, and so on),<sup>51</sup> and always by their speech;<sup>52</sup> non-Athenian Greeks speak in a version of their particular regional dialect (often with prominence given to certain stereotypical words and phrases), while barbarian visitors (the Persian in *Acharnians*, the Triballian in *Birds*) begin by speaking gobbledygook and then produce small quantities of more or less intelligible but extremely broken Greek.<sup>53</sup>

But although to this extent their portrayals are caricatures, the Greeks among them, at least, are never treated with contempt or

<sup>48</sup> The Hoopoe, formerly Tereus, though strictly speaking a Thracian, appears to be regarded as an honorary Athenian in right of his wife (cf. *Birds* 368); almost the first thing we hear about him is that he still has a taste for Athenian food (75–7), and he never makes any reference to any other homeland.

<sup>49</sup> Notably at their first entry (292 ὄνδρες Ἑλληνες, 302 ὦ Πανελληνες) and in the earlier part of the hauling-scene (459–507) when different groups among them (Boiotians, Lakonians, Argives, Megarians, etc.) are addressed or spoken of separately.

<sup>50</sup> Already in their very first lyric (349–57) they speak as Athenians, men who serve on juries (349) and parade at the Lykeion (356); from 508 the chorus is consistently thought of as comprising only peasants, and from 619 at the latest they are specifically envisaged as *Attic* peasants. See Sifakis (1971) 29–32; Zimmermann (1984–7) i. 262–5; Cassio (1985) 69–77; Sommerstein (1985) xviii–xix.

<sup>51</sup> See Stone (1981).

<sup>52</sup> See Colvin (1999).

<sup>53</sup> The Scythian archer in *Thesm.* (see Hall (1989*b*); Sier (1989); Sommerstein (1994) 221),\* who will have lived in Athens for some years, does rather better, despite his struggles with aspirated consonants and with grammatical gender.

reduced to the status of joke objects. In *Acharnians*, to be sure, the Megarian is portrayed as ready to sell not only his daughters, but his wife and even his mother, for small quantities of food,<sup>54</sup> but then he is starving (and so are they), and neither Dikaiopolis nor the audience will hesitate for a moment when it comes to choosing between him and the sykophant who appears to denounce him; earlier in the play (513–56) Dikaiopolis had argued, at the risk of his own head, that the Spartans had been justified in declaring war on account of Athens' treatment of the Megarians and that Athens would have done likewise had the roles been reversed. The Theban, who appears next, is actually sold a sykophant, and both he and Dikaiopolis look forward to his making a profit on the deal<sup>55</sup> (whether by selling on or by putting his new purchase to work); this may, to be sure, be merely a case of the clever Athenian taking advantage of the proverbial stupidity of Boiotians, but the point is just as likely to be that a sykophant is a very effective money-making machine<sup>56</sup> and it could be extremely lucrative to have one as one's private property! Dikaiopolis has certainly done marvellously well out of his two transactions, but that doesn't necessarily mean that the two foreigners have done badly. We must surely, after all, be meant to conclude that they do better than Lamachos, the hate-figure of the play, who is excluded from Dikaiopolis' market altogether—as, we may note, is every other male Athenian.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> *Ach.* 734–7, 812–17.

<sup>55</sup> *Ach.* 905–7, 947, 956–8.

<sup>56</sup> For 'money-grubbing' as a (indeed the) leading characteristic thought typical of the sykophant, see Harvey (1990) 110–12. The sums which sykophants are reported to have received in individual cases range from 100 dr. to 3 talents (details in Harvey (1990) 115 n. 41); many of these may well be exaggerated, but they give an idea of how sykophants' earning power would be perceived by those who disliked them—as comedy certainly did.

<sup>57</sup> After the visit of the Megarian and the Theban, three Athenians (or their agents) try to trade in the hero's market. The servant of Lamachos, offering high prices for some of the delicacies Dikaiopolis has just acquired from the Theban, is sent packing, with threats against his master (959–68). The farmer Derketes, who has lost his oxen to an enemy raid and 'cried [his] eyes out', asks for a drop of peace-ointment and is flatly refused (1018–36). A bridegroom sends his friend offering meat from the wedding feast in exchange for some of the peace-ointment, so that the bridegroom can avoid military service; he too is refused (1048–55), but Dikaiopolis yields to a plea on behalf of the bride (because 'she's a woman, and not responsible for the war') and sends her the ointment without apparently demanding anything at all in exchange (1056–66).

In *Lysistrata* it is even clearer that aliens—and as before, they are actually *enemy* aliens—are being viewed, at first only by the women but in the end by everybody, as ‘us’ rather than ‘them’. For the heroine and her followers, the women of Sparta and other enemy states are partners in their scheme to force the men to end the war, and at a crucial moment (140–4) the Spartan Lampito saves Lysistrata’s whole plan from disaster by being the first to agree to it and thus shaming the others into doing likewise; later, when the men’s and women’s choruses are having one of their verbal battles (with threats of serious violence), the women at one point tell the men ‘I’m not going to worry about you lot, while my Lampito still lives, and the dear girl from Thebes, the noble Ismenia’ (696–7). When the male Spartans arrive, the Athenians at first make fun of their physical distress,<sup>58</sup> but since they are suffering exactly the same distress themselves this does not last long,<sup>59</sup> and even before Lysistrata appears they are spontaneously subsuming themselves and the Spartans under an inclusive ‘we’.<sup>60</sup> When she does appear, they repeatedly echo each other, first in their comments on her great reconciliation-speech<sup>61</sup> and then in their impatience to get the peace ratified and resume normal life (agricultural and sexual);<sup>62</sup> they emerge from the

<sup>58</sup> First Kinesias with the herald (982–9), later the chorus-leader with the Spartan delegates to the peace conference (1078–9).

<sup>59</sup> Kinesias ends the herald’s desperate attempts to conceal his erect phallus by showing him his own (992), is given a full account of the situation at Sparta, and immediately proposes that both sides appoint delegates to a peace conference (1009–12). When the Athenian delegates arrive on the scene (1086), they are at first too preoccupied with their own physical distress even to notice the presence of the Spartans, and the chorus (the males among whom are too old to be troubled by the affliction in question) joke at their expense (1082–94) exactly as they had joked at the expense of the Spartans.

<sup>60</sup> The first such expression probably appears in the very first line which the Athenian delegates address to the Spartans (1097 *αἰσχρά γ’ ἐπάθομεν* ‘we’ve been having an embarrassing time’): in principle the subject might be the Athenian men only, but the Spartan’s reply *δεινά γ’ αὐτὸν πεπόνθαμες* ‘we’ve been having a *dangerous* time’ (1098), lacking as it does any subject pronoun to specify the sense as ‘we <as opposed to you>’, indicates strongly that the speaker understood the Athenian to mean not ‘we Athenian men’ but ‘we Greek men’. Similarly at 1104 the Athenian suggests summoning Lysistrata as ‘the only person that can make a settlement between us’.

<sup>61</sup> *Lys.* 1146–7, 1157–8.

<sup>62</sup> *Lys.* 1173–4, 1178–81, 1186–7.

Acropolis party as if they had been friends all their lives;<sup>63</sup> and while much is uncertain about the finale of the play, it is at any rate clear that musically it is dominated by a Spartan singer, by Spartan dancing, and by the strains of a Spartan pipe—only the Spartan sings of the glory of the Athenians' battle at Artemision (1251–3) as well as of the Spartans' at Thermopylai (1254–61), and the final hymn<sup>64</sup> is to a goddess who is a patron of both cities.

There are, to be sure, foreigners, or alleged foreigners, towards whom Old Comedy does show itself extremely venomous. But these so-called foreigners are in every case actually Athenian citizens, accused of not being true Athenians by birth by one of the standard ploys of political polemic,<sup>65</sup> a ploy as common in the courts as in the theatre: what Dikaiopolis (*Ach.* 517–18) calls

ἀνδράρια μοχθηρά, παρακεκομμένα,  
ἄτιμα καὶ παράσημα καὶ παράξενα

some bent ill-struck pieces of humanity, worthless counterfeit foreign stuff  
and the chorus of *Frogs* (730–3) speak of as

χαλκοῖς καὶ ξένοις καὶ πυρρῖαις  
καὶ πονηροῖς καὶ πονηρῶν . . .  
ὑστάτοις ἀφιγμένοισιν, οἴσιν ἢ πόλις πρὸ τοῦ  
οὐδὲ φαρμάκοισιν εἰκῆ ῥαδίως ἐχρήσατ' ἄν

men of base metal, aliens, redheads, low fellows of low ancestry, johnny-come-very-latelys, whom formerly the city wouldn't have used lightly in a hurry even as *pharmakoi*

—but whom it now uses as political leaders.

<sup>63</sup> *Lys.* 1222–7, 1239–47; note especially how the Athenians twice order some persons who are (or, to the half-drunk Athenians, seem to be) making a nuisance of themselves to clear off 'so that the Laonians can come out and leave in peace' (1222–4, 1239–41).

<sup>64</sup> This hymn is announced in the last line of our text (1320–1 τὰν δ' αὖ σιὰν τὰν πάμμαχον, τὰν Χαλκίοικον ὕμνη 'and sing in praise of the all-vanquishing goddess [Athena], she of the Bronze House'), but its words are not actually included in the play-script (and perhaps never were). Two other Aristophanic plays, *Ach.* and *Wealth*, similarly end with lines evidently designed to introduce a song which does not itself appear in the script.

<sup>65</sup> On which see Dover (1974) 32; MacDowell (1993); Heath (1997) 232–3.

In short, in Old Comedy the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has nothing to do with whether one is a citizen or an alien, or with whether one is free or a slave. It has to do with whether one is for or against the comic project and, even more, the comic spirit. I have defined the comic, or the Dionysiac, spirit elsewhere<sup>66</sup> as

the spirit of seeking enjoyment for oneself and others, as inclusively as possible... [whose] enemies are those who seek enjoyment for themselves at others’ expense, or those who reject enjoyment for themselves and try to deprive others of it as well.

But in that definition I made a mistake. I added in parentheses that this inclusiveness is often—not always—confined to a universe consisting of free Greek males.

I am afraid I was still too much under the spell of the ‘civic identity’ model. At least I did say ‘Greek’ rather than ‘Athenian’, and that is important; and I would still stick with the restriction to males as a general rule, though there are important exceptions to it, above all *Lysistrata*. But true Dionysiac inclusiveness, even in the eyes of an Athenian male, can, and often does, include *everyone*.

One character in Greek drama who is very, very conscious of distinctions of status and ethnicity is Pentheus, king of Thebes.<sup>67</sup> And we all know what happened to *him*. The Dionysiac spirit, to which he opposed himself so resolutely, and which is also the spirit of comedy, is well summed up by two passages in *Bacchae*. One (206–9) is put into the mouth of Teiresias:

ὁ θεὸς . . .  
 . . . ἐξ ἀπάντων βούλεται τιμὰς ἔχειν  
 κουνάς, διαριθμῶν δ’ οὐδέν’ αὔξεσθαι θέλει

<sup>66</sup> See Ch. 9 below, pp. 201–2.

<sup>67</sup> Ethnicity: when the disguised Dionysos tells him that the whole barbarian world has taken enthusiastically to Dionysiac worship, he scornfully replies (Eur. *Ba.* 483) φρονοῦσι γὰρ κάκιον Ἑλλήνων πολὺ ‘yes, they have a lot less sense than us Greeks’. Status: when he is about to lead a military expedition against the bacchantes on Mount Kithairon, and the unrecognized god assures him that a peaceful solution is still possible, he retorts (ibid. 803) τί δρώντα; δουλεύοντα δουλείαις ἐμαῖς; ‘how? by becoming a slave to my own slaves?’



The god . . . wishes to have honours in common from all, and to be magnified while distinguishing nobody.

And the other (424–6) is sung by the chorus of Lydian women devotees of the god:

μισεῖ δ' ᾧ μὴ ταῦτα μέλει,  
κατὰ φάος νύκτας τε φίλας  
εὐαίωνα διαζῆν.

He hates the man who cares not for this, to live out by day and night a life of happiness.

Happiness with no distinctions. It doesn't sound much like the Athens we're taught about these days,\* but it does seem to be the ideal of Athenian comedy.<sup>68</sup>

#### ADDENDA

p. 145 n. 27 Henderson (1998–2007) and Wilson (2007*a*) assign the lines in this passage on the same principle.

p. 148 n. 42 Henderson and Wilson both assign *Knights* 1254–6 to this slave.

p. 149 n. 53 On the Scythian archer's Greek, see also Willi (2003) 198–225. Hall (1989*b*) has been republished with modifications in Hall (2006) 225–54.

p. 154 'the Athens we're taught about these days': or the Athens presented, for example, in Bettany Hughes's 2007 two-part TV series *Athens: The Truth about Democracy* (UK Channel 4).

<sup>68</sup> This paper, which is published here for the first time, was presented at the conference on *Belonging* held at Nottingham by the Leicester–Nottingham Ancient History Seminar in April 1999. I am most grateful to Jim Roy, the organizer of the conference, for permitting me to publish it here. In conformity with the pattern of this volume, I have left the text in essentially the revised form in which it was prepared, after the conference, with a view to publication in a proceedings volume, and updated it as appropriate in the Addenda.

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## Monsters, ogres, and demons in Old Comedy

In a valuable series of studies,<sup>1</sup> Giuseppe Mastromarco has focused on the self-presentation of Aristophanes in the parabases of *Wasps* (1029–37) and *Peace* (751–60) as a latter-day Herakles bravely confronting the terrifying monster Kleon, and has explored aspects of the literary ancestry of these passages. Curiously, though, he has not attempted to deal systematically with evidence in comedy itself (and the related genre of mime) which, as I will try to show, can reveal that the *Wasps* and *Peace* parabases, though certainly, as Mastromarco says, displaying ‘extraordinary novelty’, display that novelty within a clearly established tradition which goes back to the beginning of the genre and which was later to undergo further development and diversification, largely at Aristophanes’ own hands.

For the purpose of this paper, while I offer no exact definition of ‘monster’, ‘ogre’, or ‘demon’, I will assume that I am dealing with beings which are (1) too powerful for ordinary humans to resist (though they may sometimes be overcome by heroes, authentic or comic) and (2) essentially *terrifying*, so that often the mere sight or sound of them will scare a man out of his wits. They range from children’s bogies (like Mormo or Lamia) at one extreme, to certain chthonic divinities (especially Hekate and the Erinyes) at the other; they can be of either gender (or maybe occasionally, like Lamia,<sup>2</sup> of both at once).

<sup>1</sup> Mastromarco (1987); (1989); (1994) 102–5; cf. also Paradiso (1992) 61–4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Wasps* 1035 = *Peace* 758. (References in the notes to the extant comedies of Aristophanes will be given without author’s name.)

In the earliest comedies of which anything significant survives, those of Epicharmos, monstrous beings already figure. But in Sicilian comedy and mime, so far as we can tell, and likewise in Attic comedy before [20] Aristophanes, these beings are always well-established figures of myth or folklore. Five known plays of Epicharmos take their titles from monsters, ogres, and demons, all notorious as defeated adversaries of great heroes: Bouseiris and Pholos (vanquished by Herakles), Skiron (by Theseus), the Sphinx (by Oedipus), and the Cyclops (by Odysseus).<sup>\*</sup> Two surviving fragments of these plays refer specifically to the eating habits of the title-characters, a theme we shall meet again: in fr. 82 Kaibel <= 71 KA> the Cyclops praises the sweetness of (surely human) tripe and thigh, while in fr. 21 <= 18> Bouseiris is thus described:

First of all, if you saw him eating, you'd just die:  
there's a roaring down in his throat, his jaws clash,  
his molars grind, his dog-teeth gnash,  
he snorts through his nostrils and moves his ears.

The mere sight of him, then, can frighten a man to death; and we can safely assume, too, that the food he eats in this bestial manner is no ordinary food—we know that he was sometimes spoken of as a cannibal (Isok. 11.5). Thus in Epicharmos we meet a clear constellation of features partly defining the comic monster: fearsome appearance, fearsome sound-effects, tendency to eat people, eventual defeat by a hero. All these, of course, were already present in Homer's Cyclops (for sound-effects cf. *Odyssey* 9.235, 257, 395–6).

A monstrous being of a rather different kind appeared in one of the mimes of Sophron. This was the nightmare-demon Epioles or Epiales, who suffocates (someone's? his own?) father,<sup>3</sup> but is himself suffocated by Herakles<sup>4</sup> and in the process turns, apparently, into a hedgehog.<sup>5</sup> A version of Epiales reappears, as Mastromarco among others has noted,<sup>6</sup> as a victim of Herakles–Aristophanes in *Wasps* 1038–9 (and also, as we shall see later, in a comedy by Phrynichos). Mastromarco seems to equate him with the giant Ephialtes, slain by

<sup>3</sup> Sophron fr. 68 Kaibel <= 67 KA> *Ἡπιόλης ὁ τὸν πατέρα πνίγων*.

<sup>4</sup> Sophron fr. 70 <= 68> *Ἡρακλῆς Ἡπιάλγητα πνίγων*.

<sup>5</sup> Sophron fr. 73 <= 72> *Ἡράκλεις, πνίγεις γύλιον τῦ*.

<sup>6</sup> Mastromarco (1989) 421–2.

Herakles (and Apollo) in the Gigantomachy [21] (Apollod. 1.6.2); but there is no evidence, literary or artistic,<sup>7</sup> of any connection whatever between the Giants, whose typical weapons are boulders and whom Herakles fights with bow and arrows, and the nightmare-demon who chokes and is choked with bare hands.<sup>8</sup> It is quite likely that the idea of a combat between Herakles and the folklore bogey Epiales was an invention of Sophron's, probably inspired by the similarity of name between Ἐπιάλες and Ἐφιάλτες.

All the monsters we have met so far, while too powerful for ordinary mortals, are incapable of resisting a true hero; but some monsters are also divinities, and these cannot be defeated except by more powerful divinities. They can sometimes, however, be more or less controlled by ritual means, and this is what seems to have happened in Sophron's mime *The women who promise to drive out the goddess*—if, as is likely, this is the source both of GLP 73 Page and of Sophron fr. 2 Demiańczuk (= Plut. *Mor.* 170b) <= Sophron 4 and 8 KA respectively>. The goddess is Hekate, and in the Plutarchan fragment someone is praying to her:

whether thou comest after leaping from a strangling noose  
or after tormenting to death a woman in childbirth  
or defiled with blood from walking over corpses  
or whether, drawn by refuse-offerings where three ways meet,  
thou art at grips with a murderer . . .

This Hekate delights in death, it would seem, for its own sake, but appropriate ritual may at least be able to direct her malevolence against the guilty rather than the innocent.

Another group of such divinities *may* have been the subject, and even [22] formed the chorus, of Kratinos' comedy *Eumenides*—to move now from Sicily to Athens—if, that is, there actually was such a

<sup>7</sup> See *LIMC* s.v. Ephialtes II and III.

<sup>8</sup> It is true that in Hellenistic and later Greek ἐφιάλτης meant 'nightmare'; but we are specifically informed by Eustathios (*in Il.* 561.17–18), on the authority of Aelius Dionysios (ε52; cf. *Suda* ε2221), that the classical Attic name for the nightmare-demon was Ἐπιάλτης. No doubt this name eventually became assimilated, perhaps already in fourth-century Athens (though there is no positive evidence of this), to the much more familiar name borne by a participant in the Gigantomachy, by another enemy of the gods mentioned twice by Homer (*Iliad* 5.385, *Odyssey* 11.308), and by a fair number of contemporary Athenians.

play; the scanty fragments<sup>9</sup> give no hint of the theme, and I have yet to be convinced that *Eumenides* is anything but a corruption of the attested (and hardly ever correctly transmitted!) play-title *Euneidai*.<sup>10</sup> Even if *Eumenides* is a ghost, however, there is plenty of other evidence for the monster-theme in Kratinos, and it follows very much the same pattern as in Epicharmos. The Cyclops, as is well known, reappears in *Odysseēs*, threatening to cook and eat Odysseus' men (fr. 150) who cower under the dining-couches (fr. 148); Kratinos' contemporary, Kallias, too, soon afterwards<sup>11</sup> composed a play *Kyklopes*, but he seems to have treated the subject in a rather different way, with a Cyclops eager to learn the arts of the symposium (fr. 6, 7, 9, 10, 12). Herakles does not figure in our evidence for Kratinos' plays, but, this being Athens, Theseus does: in *Drapetides* he recalls his slaying of Kerkyon (fr. 53) and perhaps also of Sinis (fr. 328). Another monster famously laid low—though by a god, not a hero—was the watchdog Argos, and he, or perhaps a pluralized version of him, seems to have figured in Kratinos' *Panoptai*, a fragment of which (fr. 161) speaks of a being or beings with 'two heads and numberless eyes' just as Argos had in at least one contemporary representation.<sup>12</sup> The fact that the 'all-seeing [23] ones' of the title

<sup>9</sup> Kratinos fr. 69–70. (All fragments of Attic comedy, except those of Menander, are cited from PCG.)

<sup>10</sup> I note that the opening words of a song referred to in Ar. *Knights* 530, which according to the scholia comes from *Eumenides*, τέκτονες εὐπαλάμων ὕμνων, would fit well into *Euneidai*, since according to the lexica (Hsch. ε7007, Harp. ε161 Keaney) the *Euneidai* were a clan of *musicians*, and they later provided a priest of Dionysos *Melpomenos* (IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 5056). On the textual vicissitudes of *Εὐνεΐδαι* as a play-title see PCG iv. 157–8; it appears now as *Εὐνΐδαι*, now as *Εὐνίδες*, now as *Εὐναία* (or appropriate case-forms thereof).

<sup>11</sup> *Kyklopes* was produced in 434 (Mette (1977) VI A 2.1); *Odysseēs* is generally dated to the period when comic satire was subjected to legal constraints (440–437), since according to Platonios (*Diff. Com.* 63–4 Perusino = *Proleg.* I 51–2 Koster) it contained no personal satire—a statement not contradicted by anything in the surviving fragments, though I shall be arguing elsewhere (<see Ch. 14 below>) that it is not to be implicitly relied on.

<sup>12</sup> Argos—for whom πανόπτῆς is an epithet in Aesch. *Supp.* 304 and a sobriquet in Eur. *Phoin.* 1115, Ar. *Ekk.* 80—appears in late archaic art sometimes with two Janus-like faces and, presumably, four eyes, sometimes with eyes all over his body; in classical red-figure the latter conception of him predominates (cf. [Aesch.] *Prom.* 678–9), but on a krater (*LIMC* s.v. Io #34; see Yalouris (1986) 14 and fig. 9) by 'an unnamed hand in the Polygnotan Group' (Matheson (1995) 200; hence datable to the period 450–420, cf. ib. 81–175; Yalouris loc. cit. dates it c.460, in *LIMC* he modifies

are plural does not prove that we are dealing with metaphorical monsters such as we will meet in Aristophanes: no less than five other Kratinean play-titles (*Archilochoi*, *Dionysoi*, *Kleoboulinai*, *Odyssēs*, and *Cheirones*) are pluralizations of the names of individuals, and this play could perfectly well have been a burlesque of the myth of Argos, Io, and Hermes. It has sometimes been claimed<sup>13</sup> that *Panoptai* was a satire on sophists; but the only evidence for this is Kratinos' reference in this play (fr. 167) to the philosopher Hippon and his theory of the universe (comparing the sky to a hemispherical cover used in baking, cf. Ar. *Clouds* 95–7), and this no more proves that *Panoptai* was about sophists than a reference to the same theory (though without mention of Hippon's name) in Ar. *Birds* 1000–1, had it survived as an isolated fragment, would have proved that *Birds* was about sophists.

Another dramatist of the same generation, Krates, centred a comedy, as Sophron had centred a mime, on a folklore bogey, this time the child-eating<sup>14</sup> Lamia, whose comic features included the habit of using a foul-smelling fart as a defensive weapon (Krates fr. 20, cf. Ar. *Wasps* 1177, *Ekk.* 77–8). Since Euripides seems to have associated her with Bouseiris (Eur. fr. 312a Snell = 922 Nauck),<sup>15</sup> it is possible

this to c.440; G. Siebert in *LIMC* s.v. Hermes #844 dates the same piece c.430) he is both two-faced and full of eyes. The statement in *LIMC* s.v. Io #28 that Argos is similarly portrayed on a Boiotian skyphos of c.430 is incorrect, cf. Lullies (1940–1) 15 and Taf. 13, also Yalouris (1986) 14 and fig. 10.

<sup>13</sup> This was the view of Georg Kaibel (quoted in *PCG* iv. 200); it is asserted as a fact by W. Schmid (in Schmid and Stählin (1946) 80–1), who refers to Weiher (1914) 26 (*non vidi*).

<sup>14</sup> Herakleitos, *On Incredible Stories* 34; Horace, *AP* 340. Other sources (e.g. Douris *FGrH* 76 F 17; DS 20.41; schol. Ar. *Peace* 758) merely say she killed other women's children, but Horace (*neu pransae Lamiae vivum puerum extrahat alvo*) clearly takes it for granted that Lamia's cannibalism will be familiar to his readers.

<sup>15</sup> DS 20.41, who cites this two-line fragment in which the speaker identifies herself as the Libyan Lamia, does not say what play it comes from, but in a list of Sibyls transmitted in three different works the 'Libyan' Sibyl—Lamia's daughter according to Paus. 10.12.1, cf. Plut. *Mor.* 398c which seems to reflect an attempt by the Lamians of Malis to turn this Sibyl into a native of their city—is said to have been mentioned by Euripides ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῆς Λαμίας (schol. Pl. *Phdr.* 244b, *Orac. Sib.* prol. 36–7 Geffcken), in *Lamiae prologo* (Lactant. *Inst.* 1.6.8), and it is virtually certain that fr. 922 is the beginning of the prologue referred to. No play by Euripides called *Lamia* is otherwise known, and Wilamowitz (1875) 159 asserted that 'the prologue of Lamia' meant not 'the prologue of the play *Lamia*' but 'a prologue spoken by Lamia'; later he came to hold (Wilamowitz (1893a) 18) that fr. 922 came from Euripides'

that this was a Herakles-[24]play in the Epicharmean tradition, and this would fit together with the mention of Lamia in the description of Kleon the adversary of Aristophanes—Herakles in the *Wasps/Peace* parabasis.

Thus when Aristophanes arrived on the scene, there was a well-established type of comedy in which a major character was a fearsome man-destroying (often man-eating) monster or ogre who is defeated either by a hero or by a minor god like Hermes. In comedy we would not normally expect even a monster to be actually killed, and it is more likely that they underwent various kinds of symbolic death, as their equivalents sometimes do in Aristophanes (Lamachos wounded in the leg;<sup>16</sup> Paphlagon collapsing, and later being carried off like a corpse, *not* however to the grave but to take up the trade of a sausage-seller);<sup>17</sup> the blinding of the Cyclops would be a case in point. Crucially, there is no evidence that the tradition of the comic monster was ever blended with that of comic satire on individuals: no *komodoumenos*, before Aristophanes, is known to have been invested with the typical traits of the comic monster. Perikles, the victim of much comic satire in this period, was [25] presented as Zeus more than once,<sup>18</sup> and as Dionysos in Kratinos'

satyr-play *Bouseiris* (arguing that Lamia could not have figured in a tragedy, and that *Bouseiris* was the only Euripidean satyr-play with a Libyan setting). What is almost certainly the first line of the fragment is cited in *POxy* 2455 fr. 19 as the opening of a Euripidean play whose title is not preserved; E. G. Turner, the editor of the papyrus, noting that the opening line is introduced by the formula  $\underline{\omega}\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ , assumed that the title must have been plural, but Lloyd-Jones (1963) 442–3 pointed out that Wilamowitz's proposal could still stand if either (i) the title had been written in the papyrus as *Βούσ(ε)ιρις σάτυροι* rather than the more normal *Β. σατυρικός* (a suggestion of B. Snell's) or (ii) the title was *Theristai* (a satyr-play produced in 431, noted as 'not preserved' in the didascalical Hypothesis to *Medea*, and with no quoted fragments surviving) and *Bouseiris* was another name for the same play.\*

<sup>16</sup> *Ach.* 1214. On the possible significance of leg wounds (and dislocated ankles, cf. *Ach.* 1177, 1179) cf. Buxton (2000), esp. 100–5.

<sup>17</sup> *Knights* 1248–52, 1395–1408 (note  $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\phi\epsilon\rho\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega$  1407).

<sup>18</sup> Kratinos fr. 73, 118, 258, 259. If, as I believe, the Prometheus plays ascribed to Aeschylus were part of the victorious production put on by Euphion in 431 (Hypoth. Eur. *Med.* a41 Diggle; see Sommerstein (1996a) 326 n. 14, and Bees (1993) for evidence dating the plays to the late 430s), it is very likely that many spectators, rightly or wrongly, will have seen the figure of 'tyrant' Zeus as representing Perikles; Kratinos fr. 171.22 (from *Ploutoi*), spoken by a chorus modelled on that of *Prometheus Unbound*, almost presupposes such an identification. Marzullo (1993),

*Dionysalexandros*,<sup>19</sup> but never to our knowledge as Bouseiris or Epial-(t)es or the Cyclops; similarly Aspasia may be Omphale, Hera, or Deianeira (Plut. *Per.* 24.9), but not Lamia or Hekate.

We do not know how, if at all, Aristophanes exploited or modified this tradition in his earliest, lost plays—unless, as is quite possible, *The Dramas* or *The Centaur* belongs to 426.<sup>20</sup> If so, there does not seem to have been any radical innovation; it appears (schol. *Wasps* 60) that a gluttonous Herakles was the central character, and the play may in essentials have been quite similar to Epicharmos' *Herakles with Pholos* (except presumably for the involvement of the Dramas, or of drama—and our evidence gives us no clue to the role they, or it, played). The surviving fragments contain no personal satire at all, unless the reference to 'Byrsa, city of the gods' (fr. 303) comes from this play (rather than from *The Dramas* or *Niobos*) and refers to Kleon the 'tanner'—and even then the fragment could very well come from the parabasis and have no bearing on the plot. There is nothing here to prepare us for what we get in *Acharnians*.

In *Acharnians*, in keeping with tradition, a hero defeats a monster. But the hero is not a Herakles or a Theseus; he is an elderly farmer from the little deme of Cholleidai. And the monster is not one of those familiar from poetry or from nursery tales—though he is compared to Ares (964) and to Herakles' victim Geryon (1082), and bears a Gorgon on his shield [26] (574, 964, 1095, 1124, 1181); he is a bellicose Athenian general (or ex-general, or would-be general),<sup>21</sup> Lamachos.

Lamachos is summoned by the chorus with titles appropriate to Zeus and Athena (566–7). When he appears, the first words said to him by Dikaiopolis (575) could be spoken in a variety of tones, but

putting *Prometheus Bound* several years later and equating its Zeus with *Kleon*, entirely ignores the evidence of *Ploutoi*.

<sup>19</sup> POxy 663.44–8 (*Dionysalexandros* test. i KA).

<sup>20</sup> There is strong evidence that it was at any rate earlier than *Wasps* (schol. *Wasps* 60, 61); and if, as is likely, *Georgoi* was produced at Dionysia 424 (cf. Ar. fr. 102) and *Holkades* at Lenaia 423 (see Platnauer (1949) 6–7, though the evidence he cites is not conclusive), the only slots left available for *Dramas/Centaur* are Lenaia 426 and Dionysia 425.

<sup>21</sup> He calls himself a general in 593, but 1073–8 implies that he is not currently on the board of generals; for possible explanations see Molitor (1969); Dunbar (1970) 269–70; Sommerstein (1980c) 185–6 (on 593); and Kraus (1985) 57.



I now think that my stage-direction ‘in mock admiration’ (Sommerstein (1980c) 91) may well be wrong.\* Dikaiopolis will presently beg Lamachos’ forgiveness (578–9) and ask him to remove or conceal his frightening armour, the sight of which prevents Dikaiopolis from thinking straight (580–2); hence 575 ought to be a cry of *terror*. This is quite possible, since ‘heroes’, especially in armour, were dangerous beings to meet;<sup>22</sup> Dikaiopolis could well be perceived by the audience as wondering whether he is about to be half-paralysed by the ‘hero’ or turned to stone by the Gorgon. It soon turns out, however, that true comic hero as *he* is, Dikaiopolis is in fact not terrified at all; Lamachos may threaten to kill him (590), but he prepares to vomit into Lamachos’ upturned shield (582–6), makes fun of the great feather in his helmet (587–9), propositions him sexually (592), and soon acquires complete superiority over him. First a god, then a fearsome hero, then a general (593), Lamachos is downgraded to the status of a paid official (597), of a ‘youngster’ evading his military duties (601), of a bankrupt (614–17), and finally of an outcast, the only person debarred from Dikaiopolis’ new market (625); and in the end he departs, having achieved nothing, and leaving Dikaiopolis in command of the scene (the next words—the opening of the parabasis—are ‘The man is victorious’). In a sense, a contest of the kind that could have provided the entire plot of a comedy by Epicharmos or Kratinos is here compressed into a single scene of only 55 lines.

But despite appearances (and probably despite audience expectations), we have not finished with Lamachos. When his servant tries to buy some of the delicacies Dikaiopolis has just received from Boiotia, he describes his master (964–5) as ‘the fearsome, the [27] redoubtable,<sup>23</sup> who brandishes the Gorgon and shakes three shadow-casting crests’; but this attempt to strike terror by proxy fails, and Lamachos is dismissed from consideration again without this time even appearing on the scene.

And yet he does reappear, twice, in 1072–1141 and in 1190–1226. On neither occasion, however, is there anything fearsome about him. On the first occasion he is no longer a hero or even a general, but a subordinate reluctantly obeying orders (1073–9), forced to miss

<sup>22</sup> See Dunbar (1995) 692–3 (on *Birds* 1490–3).

<sup>23</sup> *ταλαύρινος*, an epithet of Ares (e.g. *Iliad* 5.289), applied to War in *Peace* 241.

festival celebrations, and from the start the object of Dikaiopolis' ridicule, as he frequently complains (1081, 1107, 1117, 1126). We are still reminded, though, of his former monster status; Dikaiopolis appears to address him as Geryon, the three-bodied giant slain by Herakles (1082),<sup>24</sup> and we even see again his shield with its Gorgon emblem—but Dikaiopolis mocks it by comparing it to a round cake and calling its bearer 'son of Gorgasos' (1125–31), and it ends up being used as a convenient means for carrying luggage (1136). His crests have been eaten by moths (1111), and his food is of the humblest—onions, salt-fish, and locusts (1099, 1101, 1116–17). He has been thoroughly brought low.

But he can still be brought even lower. Immediately after a short choral song, his return is heralded in a speech (1174–89) of a type which, to judge by parallels in *Birds* (1706–19) and *Ekklesiiazousai* (1112–26), normally featured in contexts of triumph or celebration. Here it is quite otherwise. Lamachos has virtually, though not actually, died (cf. 1184–5); he has been gravely wounded by an assailant that wasn't even animate (a stake planted in a ditch), and both his Gorgon and his crest-feathers have fallen from his armour (1181–3). Thus when he reappears he is without all the emblems of his monstrous/heroic status, probably bent with pain, and very likely now looking *smaller* than his antagonist Dikaiopolis, whose erect phallus (1220) also now affirms his manly superiority (contrast 592), and who mocks Lamachos in almost every line. At each appearance [28] Lamachos has shrunk somewhat, in body or spirit or both, and now in the end he is carried off, almost as though dead.<sup>25</sup>

In *Knights* the same pattern—the initially terrifying monster-politician steadily cut down to size and finally rendered insignificant in comparison with the triumphant hero—is repeated on a much larger scale. This time, as throughout the next three years, the monster is Kleon, here in the thin disguise of Paphlagon. His destroyer in *Knights*, as normally in saga and earlier comedy, is a young man rather than an old one, but in every other respect differs utterly

<sup>24</sup> Reading *Γηρυόνη τετράπτιλε* (van Leeuwen: *Γηρυόνη τετραπτόλω* fere codd. Suda); see Sommerstein (1980c) 208.\*

<sup>25</sup> Note *ἔξενέγκατ'* 1222, which (like *ἐκφερέτω* in *Knights* 1407, cf. n. 17 above) suggests the *ἐκφορά* of a corpse.

from a Herakles or a Theseus: he was brought up among the scum of the city, augmented his income for some time by working as a male prostitute (1242), and now practises the trade of a sausage-seller. He is in fact, as is frequently emphasized in the play, just like Kleon, only more so—at least until the final scene where he emerges as the virtuous and far-sighted counsellor of a rejuvenated Demos.

In the early scenes Paphlagon–Kleon is presented, both before and after his arrival on-stage at 235, with all the typical characteristics of mythical and comic monsters. In the imaginings of his fellow-slaves he is of gigantic size (75–9) and can bestride whole countries with a single step;<sup>26</sup> he tears men in pieces (294) or skins them alive (369–71, possibly 481), and has an appetite of fabulous voracity (353–5); there is no way to elude him (74) except when he, like the Cyclops, has fallen into a drunken sleep (103–4, 116). The tremendous power of his voice is emphasized over and over again (137, 274–5, 285–7, 304, etc.), and will of course be apparent every time he opens his mouth on stage, especially no doubt the first time (235–40); even his snores and belches are of prodigious volume (115, cf. *Odyssey* 9.374). He is compared to a bird of prey (197–205), to Charybdis (248), to a fierce baboon (416), to a storm (430–41, cf. 511). He terrifies rich and poor alike (223–4), and the first sight and sound of him panic the Sausage-seller into flight (240); his appearance is so horrific<sup>27</sup> that even the thought of reproducing it has been too much for the mask-[29]makers (231–2). The Sausage-seller needs massive assistance from the chorus, and also from one of Demos' other slaves ('Demosthenes'), before he succeeds—temporarily—in overcoming his enemy (451–6); and Paphlagon soon recovers and storms off to denounce the 'conspirators' before the Council (475–81).

In some ways the Council scene (624–82)—which is reported, not enacted on stage—is the hinge of the play. Here the Sausage-seller faces Paphlagon alone. He finds him 'crashing out words and hurling them like thunder' (626) or like great rocks (628), but defeats him by outdoing him in his own arts of bribery and fraud, reduces him to near-speechlessness (664), and brings it about that the great demagogue is first manhandled by Prytaneis and archers (665) and then

<sup>26</sup> Cf. MacQueen (1984) 455–6.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Dover ((1967) 1987) 273–4.

actually *shouted down* by the councillors themselves (670–4, with two occurrences of the verbal root *κραγ-* which in this play is overwhelmingly associated with Paphlagon);<sup>28</sup> in the last ten lines of his narrative, Paphlagon is not even mentioned. He returns to the scene shortly afterwards, but the power-balance has clearly changed. Paphlagon is still compared to a storm, and still thinks in terms of devouring his enemies (692–3, 698) or of disembowelling them (708), but they are no longer afraid of him; indeed, right from the start the Sausage-seller ridicules him (693, 696–7, 706–7, etc.) much as Dikaiopolis did Lamachos. Paphlagon appeals to Demos (722–6), but the very nature of his appeal highlights the change in the situation. He appeals as a *victim* of *hybris* (727, cf. 722) and addresses Demos as a lover (732)—which implies, surely, that he is now speaking rather than screaming: lovers do not scream out their declarations of love. Paphlagon’s boasts of greatness, which continue, are now less those of a superman than of a politician (e.g. [30] his stolen success at Pylos, 742–3; his general services to the Athenian people, 764–5; his financial administration as a councillor, 774–6); indeed in this whole section of the play (722–940) the only trace of monster/ogre language is found in connection not with him but with the Sausage-seller, whom at 760 the chorus encourage to bear down on Paphlagon like a mighty wind. By 842 Paphlagon is seen as man-for-man inferior to his opponent, who is expected to outwrestle him easily, and such threats as he continues to make are political rather than physical (a prosecution for embezzlement, 828–9; an expensive trierarchy, 912–18; a high *eisphora* assessment, 923–6). He may, in a play on his dramatic pseudonym, be ‘bubbling and boiling over’ (*παφλάζει . . . ὑπερζέων*, 919–20), but that does not make him any more dangerous than a pot that does likewise in the kitchen. Shortly afterwards he is deprived of his ring of office, and when examined it proves to be engraved with the image of a seagull (956), not a predator but a scavenger.

<sup>28</sup> Of its thirteen other appearances in the play, nine refer to Paphlagon (137, 256, 274, 304, 487 *bis*, 863, 1018, 1403), while three occur when the Sausage-seller is boasting that he can outshout his rival (285, 287 *bis*); the thirteenth (642) comes at the instant of the Sausage-seller’s spectacular intervention at the Council meeting, when he interrupts a ferocious speech by Paphlagon and wins the councillors’ hearts in a few moments with a promise of cheap sardines. For the association of *κραγ-* with Kleon cf. also *Wasps* 596, 1287, *Peace* 314, 637 (and Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 28.3 *Κλέων ὁ Κλαειέτου, ὃς . . . πρῶτος ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἀνέκραγε!*).

Paphlagon makes a last attempt to restore himself to superhuman status in the oracle scene (997–1110), having meanwhile been compared by the chorus not to any god or demon or hero or even wild animal, but to ‘two valuable utensils: a pestle and a stirring spoon’ (983–4), mere instruments for others’ hands to wield. In the first of the series of oracles he produces, he is described as a ‘holy jag-toothed dog... who barks (κεκραγώς) fearfully’ (1017–18)—but the Sausage-seller, claiming to have the correct text of this same oracle, speaks of this Kerberos as eating up, not the enemies of the Demos, but Demos’ own dinner (1032–4). In a second oracle (1037–40) he is a lion—but a lion who, according to the Sausage-seller, is to be confined in the stocks (1045–9). Paphlagon tries again with an oracle that calls him a hawk (1052), but this hawk catches only fish (κορακίνους, 1053), and with Paphlagon having thus deflated himself, the Sausage-seller takes the offensive and compares him to a woman (1056), a ‘fox-dog’ (1067), and a deformed beggar (1082–3), and imagines him being soaked in garlic-brine (1095). In the following song both Demos and the chorus speak of him as a beast being fattened for sacrifice (1127–40). From here on there is nothing even figuratively monstrous or frightening about Paphlagon any longer. He and the Sausage-seller compete in playing the waiter, further oracles finally reveal that the Sausage-seller is the man destined to overthrow him, and he vanishes from the scene (perhaps collapsing on to the *ekkyklema* platform [31] which is then withdrawn)<sup>29</sup> after uttering the words of the dying Alkestis as he relinquishes the garland that is his last mark of distinction (1250–2). Except that he does not vanish finally; *Knights*, like *Acharnians*, ends with a symbolic *ἐκφορά*, as Paphlagon is carried off, not exactly to the grave but to a living death among the rabble of ‘prostitutes and bathmen’ at the city gates, plying the Sausage-seller’s old trade while the Sausage-seller himself dines at the Prytaneion where Paphlagon once had the right to maintenance at public expense (1395–1408). Once again the positions of hero and monster have been neatly reversed.

Once Kleon has been established in the role of comic monster he reappears regularly. In *Clouds*, indeed, he figures only fleetingly, and

<sup>29</sup> Cf. 1249 κυλίνδεται εἴσω τόνδε τὸν δυσδαίμονα.

is nowhere threatening; but in *Wasps*, although he never appears *in propria persona*, and although the audience are promised that the play will not be directed against him (62–3), he is never far away from our thoughts<sup>30</sup> from the moment that he first appears in Sosias' dream as 'an omnivorous<sup>31</sup> whale with the voice of an inflamed sow' (35–6). His voice is heard off-stage again at 596 when he is called the 'scream-conqueror' (κεκραξιδάμας), and his voracity is emphasized again in the same sentence—he takes bites out of everyone except the jurors; in 670 he and his like are pictured threatening whole cities with destruction. 'He and his like', because in this play the Great Monster is surrounded by a cohort of subordinate monsters, like the 'very big eagle' Kleonymos (16–19), the 'raven' Theoros (42–51), the 'hundred head of accursed flatterers' (1033), [32] and the sykophants who play the role of the nightmare-demon Epial(t)es (1038–42).

Eventually Kleon does appear on-stage—in the form of a dog, and not a Kerberos either, but a domestic dog who never goes out of doors (970–1) and lives by extorting resources from those who have gone to the trouble and risk of procuring them. Although he figures in a trial as prosecutor, and is doubtless as loud-voiced as ever, he does not seem at all as ferocious as earlier mentions of him might have led us to expect; the worst thing he can threaten the jury with, in the event of a verdict he doesn't like, is that he will permanently stop barking (930). Thus once again the monster seems to be becoming less monstrous, and more contemptible, as the action proceeds; and Kleon, or rather *Κύων* of Kydathenaion (895), loses the trial. It is more difficult than in *Knights* to identify a point of transition at

<sup>30</sup> See Storey (1995), who shows excellently how Ar. plays with the expectations and uncertainties of his audience and how, while never quite perpetrating anything that would leave him open to an undeniable charge of slandering Kleon (contrast *Knights* 973–6, rejoicing in the prospect of his destruction, and *Clouds* 591–4, recommending that for the city's good he should be convicted and pilloried for bribery and embezzlement), he mounts a comic assault on him that is in many ways deadlier than the blunt, crude invective of *Knights*.

<sup>31</sup> Greek πανδοκεύτρια which can mean both 'like a female innkeeper' (i.e. foul-mouthed, cf. *Wealth* 426–8) and 'who accepts (takes in, ingests) anything'. Sea-monsters can devour people (cf. *Clouds* 556, Hellanikos *FGrH* 4 F 26b, and the legend of Andromeda), and Lykophron can use φάλλαυνα to mean 'horrific monster' (841, referring to the Gorgon slain by Perseus).

which Kleon begins to lose his power, but possibly it is during the *agon* when his devotee Philokleon has his eyes gradually opened to the true nature of his idol until at the climax he is brought to the point of speaking of Kleon as a thief (758).

In the parabasis, for the first time (except briefly and implicitly at *Knights* 511), the dramatist identifies *himself* as the heroic giant-killer who dares to stand up against the monstrous Kleon, and both explicitly and (as Mastromarco has shown) by a rich texture of indirect allusions equates himself with Herakles. This self-identification may or may not be associated, as Hermann Lind has suggested,<sup>32</sup> with a running dispute between Kleon and a *thiasos* of Herakles in Kydathenaion, to which at least one known friend of Aristophanes apparently belonged<sup>33</sup> (though [33] Aristophanes himself, on the evidence we have, did *not*); it is certainly to be associated with the comic story-pattern whose history we have traced. The Kleon-monster<sup>34</sup> is described as terrifying to the sight (1031–4), the ears (1034), and the nose (1035) alike, but as not having frightened the hero-poet at all (1036–7)—who indeed in a later parabolic passage (1284–91) boasts of having outwitted him easily for all his shouting (*μέγα κεκραγότα* 1287). Similarly in the imaginary symposium of 1220 ff., at which Kleon is one of the guests, Philokleon (whose name is now rather out of date) fearlessly makes game of him even when threatened with being ‘shouted to death’ (1228). In the play’s

<sup>32</sup> Lind (1990) 220–30, cf. 87–164.

<sup>33</sup> Of the sixteen members whose names are inscribed on the cult-table *IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 2343*, Philonides is with high probability to be identified with Philonides of Kydathenaion, himself a comic dramatist and the father of another (Nikochares test. 1–2 KA), and the producer of several of Aristophanes’ plays (including very possibly his first, *Daitalēs*, whose chorus consisted of members of a *thiasos* of Herakles; see Welsh (1983)). There is no evidence that Aristophanes was in close personal relations with any of the others, though he probably knew several of them by name, to judge by the appearance of the very rare names Amphytheos and Antitheos both in the *thiasos* and in Aristophanes’ plays (*Ach.* 46 ff., *Thesm.* 898); in particular, there are no positive grounds for identifying the priest of the *thiasos*, Simon of Kydathenaion, with Simon the hipparch and writer on horsemanship (*PA* 12687 = 12689; *LGN ii Σύμων* 10 = 6) on whom the chorus call in *Knights* 242. See Dow (1969); Griffith (1974); Welsh (1983); and Lind (1990) 132–48 (all of whom make considerably bolder claims than the evidence warrants).

<sup>34</sup> Who is ‘a mixture of Kerberos . . . , the many-headed hydra, the Typhon from Hesiod . . . , and certain unpleasant creatures (the seal, the camel, and the Lamia)’ (Storey (1995) 20).

last mention of Kleon he is, as is typical of 'last mentions', entirely passive: he is the vine that is 'deceived' by its prop (1291) and, presumably, falls over.

In *Peace* there are two monsters, but, as is appropriate in a play that is essentially a celebration, neither is much of a threat for very long. One, indeed, is none other than the now dead Kleon, who is conjured up briefly in the parodos as 'that Kerberos in the underworld', screaming as loud as ever (313–14); but though Trygaios is very fearful of what he may do, the chorus ignore the danger, and they are right—there is none. This monster is a thing of the past, as is underlined when the passage about him from the *Wasps* parabasis is repeated almost verbatim (752–60) with a significant change at the end: in 422 Ar. had boasted of having 'fought for you [against the monster] *right through till now*', in 421 he says in the past tense 'I *stood* my ground all the time, fighting for you'. The other monster in *Peace* is, of course, War (223–88), who is more than just a man-eater, he is a *polis*-eater, pounding up Laconia, Megara, Sicily, and Athens into a salad, and *ἰῶ*-ing with gusto, to Trygaios' terror, as he throws them into his giant mortar. Only, he finds he can't get a pestle to do the pounding with, and forthwith withdraws from the stage never to be seen again—and the hero hasn't done a thing.

Monster-figures, as we have defined them, are absent from *Birds*, *Lysistrata*, and *Thesmophoriazousai*. They return in *Frogs*, as is [34] appropriate enough in a play about a descent to Hades with strong connections to the Eleusinian Mysteries<sup>35</sup> and a central character who, if he is not Herakles, is at any rate dressed as Herakles. I am not going to discuss in this paper the cultic connections of some of these figures, which have been, and are being, well treated in recent and forthcoming work.<sup>36</sup> Instead I shall try to explore how they function, separately and as a group, in the drama.

Dionysos is warned by the real Herakles (143–4) of the 'innumerable serpents and other terrifying beasts' that he will meet on the road to the underworld. And sure enough he meets them. Or does

<sup>35</sup> On monsters in the Mysteries, see Brown (1991); Lloyd-Jones (1967); Lada-Richards (1999), esp. 90–4; Lada-Richards (2000), esp. 50, 69–75.

<sup>36</sup> See references cited in previous note, also A. M. Bowie (1993) 228–53 and Sommerstein (1996*b*) 18–19.



he? In 285–305 he confronts the multiformed monster Empousa—except that for one thing ‘confronts’ is not at all the right word (‘runs away from’ would be more accurate), and for another thing it is not at all clear whether Empousa is supposed to be actually there. Dionysos never sees her; Xanthias may do—but on the other hand he may just be making it all up to have some fun at his cowardly master’s expense. Of the four most recent commentators,<sup>37</sup> one (myself) thinks Xanthias is to be perceived as seeing the apparition, one thinks he is having Dionysos on, one thinks the text does not enable us to decide, and the fourth says nothing about the matter at all! Other monstrous beings of whom we hear later in the play are even more elusive. When Dionysos–Herakles knocks at the door of Pluto’s palace, the doorkeeper Aiakos<sup>38</sup> threatens him with whole battalions of devouring beasts (470–8):

Kokytyos’ roaming hounds  
 And the Echidna hundred-headed, who  
 Will rend apart thine offals, while thy lungs  
 Are gripped by the Tartessian murry-eel,  
 And while thy bloodied kidneys, guts and all,  
 The Gorgons out of Teithras tear asunder . . .

[35] Aiakos goes to fetch these, but when he eventually comes back (605) he is accompanied only by some very ordinary slaves and policemen, and it is evident that the monsters of 470–8 exist only in words (as perhaps Empousa did too)—but like Empousa, they literally scare the shit out of Dionysos (479–90). Long afterwards, in one of Aeschylus’ mock-Euripidean lyrics, a poor spinning-woman has a dream (1331–7):

O black-lit darkness of Night,  
 what direful dream is this  
 thou sendest me . . .  
 a fearful sight to make one shudder,  
 in black corpse-raiment,  
 with murderous murderous gaze  
 and with big claws?

<sup>37</sup> In the order in which they are referred to in the text, these are Sommerstein (1996*b*), Stanford (1963), Dover (1993*b*), and Del Corno (1985).

<sup>38</sup> As I think we ought to call him; see Sommerstein (1996*b*) on 464.

It is probably meant to make us think of the Sphinx (described in similar terms in Eur. *Phoin.* 1018–32); but in so far as the dream represents any reality at all, the reality is Glyke from over the street, sneaking into the spinning-woman's flat and stealing her cockerel!

Thus all the monsters in the Aristophanic underworld evaporate into nothingness on close inspection. Did I say all? There is one I have not mentioned, and it is perhaps the most innovative and unexpected of all Old Comic monsters. In myth and in drama, monsters are there to be destroyed or rendered harmless by the saviour-hero. But in *Frogs* there is a monster who *becomes* a saviour-hero. This monster is none other than Aeschylus.

When first we hear of Aeschylus in *Frogs* he is an ordinary human inhabitant of Hades, occupying the Chair of Tragedy and interacting courteously with the new arrival Sophocles (786–94). But the moment his anger is roused, he is said to have 'lowered his head and glowered like a bull' (804), and in the choral song that precedes the first appearance of the two rival poets he is called 'the mighty thunderer... [whose eyes] with formidable fury... will whirl about' (814–17), and his methods of combat are described like this:

Making the shaggy neck-hair bristle on his hirsute chine,  
contracting a fearsome brow, with a roar he will utter  
words coupled together with rivets, tearing them off like ship-timbers  
with his gigantic [lit. earth-born] gusting (822–5)

—[36] a picture that combines elements of a lion, a wild boar, a storm, and a Giant.<sup>39</sup> Arrived on stage, he is compared by Dionysos to a hailstorm (852) or a Giant hurling rocks (854–5) with a voice as loud as a holm-oak on fire (859); if we had some of these passages as fragments we might almost have thought they were about Kleon.<sup>40</sup> In a further choral song (902–4) he is implicitly compared to a centaur, fighting not with uprooted trees but with uprooted words; his favourite beasts are fantastic chimeras like griffin-eagles, horsecocks, and goatstags (928–38); and his alleged disciples are 'tree-bending

<sup>39</sup> Cf. A. M. Bowie (1993) 246. Lada-Richards (2000) 72–5 suggests that γγγεεῖι may alternatively (or additionally?) hint at a connection with the earth-born Athenian culture-hero Erichthonios; but it is very unlikely that any listener would detect such an allusion, when almost every other word in the stanza is redolent of bestial or elemental force.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Knights* 430–41, 626–8, and *Wasps* 36.

flesh-rippers' with bushy beards (965–6), reminiscent of Sinis who was vanquished by Theseus. His long obstinate silences, inarticulate noises (e.g. 927), growling interjections, and aggressive gestures (cf. 840–55) during the preliminaries to the contest and the early part of Euripides' presentation reinforce the impression that here we have a wild creature from the remotest mythic ages, utterly unsuited to a civilized world and surely an easy victim for a highly intelligent human like Euripides.

And then he presents his own case—and he's not like that at all;<sup>41</sup> as once he made the Erinyes reveal themselves as stern, indispensable, and highly articulate guarantors of Justice, so here he reveals himself as a representative of traditional Athenian (and also of heroic) values, claiming [37] to stand in the tradition of Orpheus, Mousaios, Hesiod, and Homer (1032–6), his ideal characters (1039–41) those models of courage and loyalty, Patroklos, Teukros—and Lamachos (Lamachos, of course, had once been a comic monster himself, but his death has changed all that). And he is capable of arguing as astutely as Euripides, or more so—the very first thing he does in his speech is to ask a mousetrap of a question ('what qualities ought a poet to be admired for?', 1008) and induce Euripides to give an answer that ruins his whole case. In the end the chorus will praise Aeschylus for, of all things, the precision of his intellect (1482), and it is not the (ex-?)monster who falls into passivity and oblivion, it is his opponent. Perhaps, on second thoughts, the paradox was not as great as all that. The archetypal monster-slayer, after all, was Herakles,<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> In an earlier version of this paper I wrote that Aeschylus 'reveals himself as no monster at all'; but Lada-Richards (2000) 70–2 (cf. 64–9) has justly pointed out that it is fallacious to assume that if Aeschylus becomes a 'representative of traditional Athenian . . . values' he must *ipso facto* cease to be monstrous, noting that Greek, and especially Athenian, myths are full of monstrous beings who become cultural benefactors while retaining their monstrous outward form (e.g. Cheiron, Kekrops, and Aeschylus' own Erinyes). There are certainly, even after 1004, signs from time to time that what one might call the animal forces within Aeschylus are still powerful, though the language used is much less graphic than previously (cf. 1006, 1020, 1056–7, 1132–6, 1405–6); and the phrase ἐνθένδ' ἀνίει τὰγαθά (1462) equates him with a chthonic divinity (see Henrichs (1991) 199 n. 83, and my commentary on *Frogs* 1462). It is unfortunate that we have no clue to the appearance of the mask worn by the Aeschylus actor.

<sup>42</sup> Whose image, of course, we have had before us throughout the first half of *Frogs*, and with whom it can be argued (Lada-Richards (2000) 70 n. 84)\* that the Aeschylus of the second half is at many points implicitly equated.

and he, wielding a club and looking out from between the jaws of a lion, himself had many of the characteristics of the beasts he combated. But the bestiality of Herakles (save in respect of his gastronomic and sexual appetites) was matter for tragedy rather than comedy. In comedy, what Aristophanes does with the monstrous Aeschylus is, so far as we know, unique.

But some other comic dramatists may at the same time have been transforming the traditional pattern of the comic monster in other ways. Certain traces of evidence suggest that of Aristophanes' close contemporaries, it was Phrynichos who contributed most to this process. One of his plays appears to have been named after the nightmare-demon Epialtes, who in a desperately corrupt fragment (fr. 1) appears to be addressing the audience and saying he was given his name 'on account of his manly virtue' (*ἀνδραγαθίας οὐνεκα*); it looks very much as though the audience's sympathies are to be engaged on Epialtes' side right from the start. This self-introduction by a *prima-facie* decidedly unprepossessing character is interestingly paralleled in Phrynichos' *Monotropos* (fr. 19, 20) where, however, the character is neither superhuman nor bestial but an anti-social, misanthropic man<sup>43</sup>—a type that can be traced through the fourth [38] century down to Menander.<sup>44</sup> Others, meanwhile, continued on more traditional lines; a notable example, from the generation *after* Aristophanes, is Nikochares—the son, incidentally, of Aristophanes' old collaborator Philonides—whose nine known plays include one featuring a Cyclops (*Galateia*), one featuring a Centaur, and one apparently featuring the Sphinx (fr. 23).

We have seen comedy's treatment of the hero vs. monster theme pass, in the hands of Aristophanes, from the traditional heroes to the Heroism of the Little Man, the Heroism of the Comic Poet, and finally to the Heroism of the Monster himself. We have also seen signs, in the work of Phrynichos, of a different development, which was in time to turn the comic monster into a Knemon or a Smikrines, characters human indeed, but in various ways falling short of

<sup>43</sup> He compares himself to Timon (fr. 19.2), and it is perhaps significant that Ar. *Lys.* 811 in turn compares Timon to the Erinyes.

<sup>44</sup> Fourth-century instances are Anaxilas' *Monotropos*, Antiphanes' *Misoponeros* and *Timon*, and Mnesimachos' *Dyskolos*; see Ireland (1995) 14–15, and Dunbar (1995) 708–9.

full *social* humanity and requiring to be tamed and humbled before the true spirit of comedy can fully assert itself: characters who played well before the contemporaries of Theophrastos. In Aristophanes we are still quite close to the mythical origins of the type, and through all his developments of it, these are never forgotten. After all, only one human lifetime separates Epicharmos' Bouseiris from the Aeschylus of *Frogs*.<sup>45</sup>

#### ADDENDA

**p. 156** To the list of monsters, etc., in Epicharmean play-titles, add Amycus (defeated by Polydeuces).

**pp. 159–60 n. 15** The Euripidean fragment cited (= fr. 472m Kannicht) is unlikely to have had anything to do with Busiris. As Kannicht points out (*TrGF* v.1 (2004) 517), in phrases of the form ἐν τῇ προλόγῳ τῆς Λαμίας or *in Lamiae prologo*, the genitive elsewhere invariably represents the name of the *play*, not of the prologue speaker; a few letters are now known from the first line of Euripides' *Busiris* (Eur. fr. 312b Kannicht, from *POxy* 3651), enough to show that it was nothing like the first line of fr. 472m; and *Lamia* could perfectly well have been one of the dozen or so Euripidean satyr-dramas whose texts were not available for study by Hellenistic scholars, at any rate in Alexandria. It remains possible that some tradition recorded, or some poet invented, an encounter between Heracles and Lamia, but it cannot be said that there is any solid evidence for the supposition.

**p. 162** *Ach.* 575: Olson (2002) ad loc. does not agree with my second thoughts (if he knew of them), finding Dicaeopolis' exclamation 'intensely sarcastic'.

<sup>45</sup> This article was first published in C. Atherton (ed.), *Monsters and Monstrosity in Greek and Roman Culture* (= *Nottingham Classical Literature Studies* 6) (Bari: Levante Editori, 2000) 19–40 (pages 39–40 were occupied by the bibliography). Reprinted here by kind permission of Levante Editori.

**p. 163 n. 24** Olson ingeniously suggests *βούλει μάχεσθαι, Γηρυόνη, τετραπύλω*;—the idea being that even the three-bodied Geryon would find it hard to fight against an opponent with four feathers (and therefore with four helmets, four heads, and four bodies); and this interpretation of the transmitted text has since been adopted by Wilson (2007*a*). I am not entirely happy with it, since one would expect the adjective *τετραπύλω* to be accompanied by a noun, but then no interpretation or emendation yet proposed for this passage is fully satisfactory.

**p. 172 n. 42** I have left unaltered the reference to Ismene Lada-Richards's contribution to the volume in which this paper originally appeared, but she did not in fact there develop the Aeschylus–Heracles comparison in any detail; see rather Lada-Richards (1999) 255–7, 267–8, 274–8.

## The silence of Strepsiades and the *agon* of the first *Clouds*

*For Pascal Thiery*

I have chosen to dedicate this paper to Pascal Thiery *πολλῶν οὐνεκα*, for many reasons. In the first place, because it is owing to him that I was fortunate enough to be invited to speak at the Colloquium <held in Toulouse in March 1994> from which <the> volume <(Aristophane: *la langue, la scène, la cité*) derived>. In the second place, because my choice of subject was not unconnected with my knowledge that his film realization of *The Clouds* would be a leading feature of the occasion. And in the third place, because my specific topic arises from one of the many stimulating discussions in his book *Aristophane: fiction et dramaturgie*. I refer to the discussion<sup>1</sup> of the number of actors in *The Clouds*, and of the related issue of the presence on or absence from the scene of Socrates and Strepsiades before, during, and after the *agon* of the two Logoi.

On a naively straightforward, consecutive reading of the text as we have it, what seems to happen is this. Strepsiades brings his son, Pheidippides, to the *phrontisterion*, presents him to Socrates, and asks Socrates to teach him the two Logoi (882–5). Socrates replies: ‘He will learn himself from the Logoi in person; I shall not be there’ (886–7). Socrates, it must follow, leaves the scene at or shortly after that point. It is not at this stage clear whether Strepsiades leaves also, though if the *agon* and its sequel (889–1114) had been lost we would certainly have assumed he did leave: a parent who entrusts his son to

<sup>1</sup> Thiery (1986) 44–5.

a teacher does not, and did not in classical Athens, normally remain in the school himself listening to the lessons, [270] and Strepsiades later in the play, while retaining substantial fragments of the instruction which Socrates had attempted to give him on his previous visit to the school (cf. especially 1247–58), gives no indication of having heard the discourses of the two Logoi.

Almost immediately after Socrates' departure, the two Logoi themselves appear as persons on stage, and from 889 to 1104 they are the sole speakers, except that the chorus-leader intervenes when an argument threatens to turn violent (934–40) after which the two halves of the epirrhematic *agon* are each introduced, in the conventional manner, by a choral strophe followed by a *katakeleusmos* (949–60, 1024–35). Their confrontation is staged, however, for the benefit of Pheidippides; he is frequently referred to or even directly addressed (929–33, 937–8, 990–1023, 1044, 1071–86), though he does not himself speak. His position is that of the prize put up for competition—like Helen at the combat between Paris and Menelaos,<sup>2</sup> or Deianeira at the fight between Herakles and Acheloius<sup>3</sup>—and to that position silence is appropriate. Strepsiades on the other hand is completely ignored: neither the Logoi nor the chorus betray any awareness of his presence, and we naive consecutive readers are confirmed in our assumption that he has gone home.<sup>4</sup>

So far, so good. Eventually the *agon* ends—not, as we might expect, with a decision by Pheidippides, but with the defection of one of the contestants themselves to the camp of the other (1101–4). If our text of the play broke off at this point we would, I think, suppose that what happened next was one of two things. Either Pheidippides' education was deemed to be complete (cf. 886 *αὐτὸς μαθήσεται παρ' αὐτοῖν τοῖν λόγων*), in which case his father would

<sup>2</sup> *Iliad* 3.245–382; Helen, who is the central character of the preceding and following scenes, is present throughout the oath-taking and the combat but neither does nor says anything.

<sup>3</sup> *Soph. Tr.* 18–26, 497–530.

<sup>4</sup> In performance, of course, we would not need to make any assumptions, since Strepsiades would have to be either there or not there on stage. I have not forgotten that; what we are trying to do is precisely to establish, if we can, whether he *would* have been there or not if the script we possess ever had been performed.



need to come to pay the school's fees (cf. 98, 876) and take his son home; or else the victorious Inferior Logos<sup>5</sup> would [271] take Pheidippides with him into the school so that, having accepted the basic attitude of contempt for traditional morality which the Inferior Logos has set before him, he can learn the full range of argumentative and rhetorical techniques by whose use an immoral lifestyle can be enjoyed with impunity.

What the text actually gives us is a short scene in which a choice is made between precisely these alternatives—but made by Strepsiades. Someone asks him: 'Do you want to take this son of yours away, or shall I teach him oratory for you?' (1105–6). Strepsiades replies 'Teach him' (1107), and a reluctant Pheidippides (1112) is taken into the school, while Strepsiades evidently goes home. After this there is a major break in the action, the first since 510–626; an address by the chorus-leader to the festival judges, the remnant or nucleus of a second parabasis, is followed by the return of Strepsiades to the *phrontisterion*, and as he enters counting the days till the end of the month<sup>6</sup> we are given the impression that some days have passed since Pheidippides entered the school.

The scene 1105–12 poses two major problems. The first is the identity of Strepsiades' interlocutor. The manuscripts, for what they are worth, give lines 1105–6 and 1111 to Socrates; this, however, was not the only view taken in antiquity, for one of the ancient Hypotheses speaks of the 'Unjust Logos' taking charge of Pheidippides and teaching him,<sup>7</sup> and the same assumption was made by the ancient commentator on 1101 who spoke of one of the Logoi 'sharing Pheidippides' sadness at being handed over for education to the other'.<sup>8</sup> The second problem is that the scene seems to contradict

<sup>5</sup> 'Superior' and 'inferior' are the closest renderings I can find for *κρείττων* and *ἥττων*: like the Greek terms, and unlike e.g. 'better/worse' or 'right/wrong', they do not in themselves carry any moral overtones, and they place maximum emphasis on the paradox that the *ἥττων* is capable of defeating the *κρείττων*.

<sup>6</sup> *Clouds* 1131 ff. *πέμπτη, τετράς, τρίτη, μετὰ ταύτην δευτέρα, εἴθ' . . . ἔνη τε καὶ νέα*. This implies that the current day is the *πέμπτη*, i.e. the 25th or 26th of the month; earlier in the play (16–17) Strepsiades had spoken of his alarm at seeing 'the moon in its twenties', which would incline the spectator to suppose that it was then past, but not long past, the 20th.

<sup>7</sup> *Clouds* Hypoth. A5 Holwerda (= III Dover<, Wilson>) *διαγωνισθεὶς ὁ ἄδικος πρὸς τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ παραλαβὼν αὐτὸν ὁ ἄδικος λόγος ἐκδιδάσκει*.

<sup>8</sup> Σ<sup>RVE</sup> 1101b ὁ κρείττων λόγος φαίνεται αὐτῷ συνάχθῃσθαι παραδοθέντι μανθάνειν τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

the assumptions we have been led to make about Strepsiades' absence during the *agon*. There is no sign of an entry by Strepsiades: he is addressed as if he had been present the whole time. Moreover, he had already before the *agon* made it clear that he wanted his [272] son to be taught oratory (cf. 887–8); for the question to be repeated now makes no dramatic sense unless Strepsiades is being asked to consider the matter in the light of some new development—and the *agon* is the only new development there has been. It seems to follow that, contrary to what we had inferred previously, Strepsiades must have been present throughout the debate even though no one during it takes any notice of his presence, and even though there was not at 888 any reason for him to stay, either in the logic of real life or in that of comedy.

At this point we shall have to stop being naive consecutive readers and bring in two other relevant factors from outside the text. One is our knowledge that the text of *The Clouds* which we possess is a revised version, and a version which according to Eratosthenes<sup>9</sup> (perhaps the greatest ancient authority on the history of comedy) was never produced. Already in antiquity it was observed that there should have been additional choral songs at 888/9 and at 1114/15,<sup>10</sup> and had the revised play been accepted for production such songs would presumably have been inserted. The other relevant factor is our knowledge, based on Aristophanes' other surviving plays, that the number of adult speaking actors he uses never, with minor and strictly defined exceptions, needs to be greater than four, and that many plays are clearly designed to be performed by three such actors only.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Σ<sup>E</sup> 553 Ἐρατοσθένης δέ φησι Καλλίμαχον ἐγκαλεῖν ταῖς διδασκαλίαις, ὅτι φέρουσιν ὕστερον τρίτῳ ἔτει τὸν Μαρικᾶν τῶν Νεφελῶν. . . λανθάνει δὲ αὐτόν, φησί, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς διδαχθείσαις (sc. Νεφέλαις) οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον εἴρηκεν (sc. Ἀριστοφάνης περὶ τοῦ Μαρικᾶντος). ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὕστερον διασκευασθείσαις εἰ λέγεται, οὐδὲν ἄσποναί διδασκαλία δὲ δηλονότι τὰς διδαχθείσας φέρουσιν, and *Clouds* Hypoth. A7 Holwerda (= I Dover<, VI Wilson>) διεσκευάσται δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους ὡς ἂν δὴ ἀναδιδάξαι μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ προθυμηθέντος, οὐκέτι δὲ τουτο δι' ἣν ποτε αἰτίαν ποιήσαντος.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Σ<sup>VE</sup> 889 τοῦ χοροῦ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἐπιγραφὴ δὲ φέρεται 'χοροῦ' (vel sim.); Σ<sup>Vb3</sup> 1115 τόπος κώλων ε' ὡς ἐλλειπόντων, ὁ εἰκόσ ἦν συμβῆναι, περὶ ἃ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν ταῖς πρώταις Νεφέλαις [i.e. 'in my commentary on the first *Clouds*'].

<sup>11</sup> See Sommerstein (1980c) 15, (1984b) 143–5; Thierry (1986) 40–67.

These considerations shed a different light both on the beginning and on the end of the *agon*. It is universally agreed that the ancient scholars were right to suppose that for any actual production a choral song would have had to be supplied between 888 and 889: otherwise it would be necessary for us to posit either the employment of five actors with major [273] speaking parts, or a costume change of lightning swiftness, neither of which can be paralleled in Aristophanic comedy as it is known to us.<sup>12</sup>

At the end of the *agon* there is also a potential five-actor situation. According to the manuscripts, the two Logoi are on stage up to 1104 (the Superior Logos speaks the last four lines, but the last words of the Inferior Logos carry not the slightest suggestion of an exit); the next line is addressed by Socrates to Strepsiades; and Pheidippides, as we have seen, must be present throughout. This passage too, therefore, could not have been performed in the Athenian theatre in the form in which the manuscripts present it. Either the manuscripts are in error, or else, here too, Aristophanes' revision was incomplete and a necessary choral song had yet to be composed when he abandoned the work.

The hypothesis of an error in the manuscripts is supported, as we have seen, by other ancient evidence pointing to Pheidippides' having been accepted as a pupil by the Inferior Logos rather than by Socrates; what is more, 'error' is in any case hardly the right word, given that it is unlikely that the earliest copies of the script contained speakers' names at all.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, following a proposal made in 1844 by C. Beer, Sir Kenneth Dover in his edition of the play<sup>14</sup> gave

<sup>12</sup> Another possibility, in principle, would have been to insert a few lines of dialogue between Strepsiades and his son after 888, which likewise would have given time for the actor playing Socrates to change costume (cf. e.g. *Birds* 85–91); but the view taken by the ancient scholars finds support in *Frogs*, the only other surviving Aristophanic play to include an *agon* between two contestants neither of whom had appeared earlier in the play, where the entry of the contestants (830) is preceded by a choral song (814–29) and followed, as in *Clouds*, by an unstructured slanging-match before the formal *agon* begins.

<sup>13</sup> See J. C. B. Lowe (1962).

<sup>14</sup> Dover (1968); so too Sommerstein (1982). Both note in their commentaries that, in the words of the latter (on 1105), 'throughout the debate the question at issue has been taken to be whether Pheidippides shall be taught by the [Superior] or the [Inferior] Argument (see especially 929–38), and Socrates has never been mentioned'.

lines 1105–6 and 1111 to the Inferior Logos, keeping Socrates off-stage until 1145. And here we can return to Pascal Thiery.

In the passage of his book to which I have referred,<sup>15</sup> Thiery rejects the Beer–Dover proposal on the ground that it requires Strepsiades to be [274] present and ignored throughout the *agon*. He prefers to suppose that Strepsiades left the scene at 888, shortly after Socrates, and was not present during the *agon*, and (modifying a suggestion of Th. Bergk) that the scene 1105–12 was designed to be separated from the *agon* by a choral song between 1104 and 1105, which would give time for the actors who had played the Logoi to change their costumes and re-enter as Socrates and Strepsiades.<sup>16\*</sup> He notes that if in production the *agon* was thus followed as well as preceded by a choral song, it would be possible for the play to be performed by three actors (given certain assumptions about the final scene); but this cannot be regarded as a decisive argument, since Thiery accepts that there are some Aristophanic plays for which four actors are required.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> See n. 1 above.

<sup>16</sup> As Pascal Thiery pointed out in discussion on this paper, he solved the problem differently in his film. In the film Socrates, Strepsiades, and Pheidippides are shown entering the *phrontisterion* together before the *agon* and coming out again together after it, though during the *agon* itself only Pheidippides is seen. It is not, however, I am sure, being suggested that this ingenious arrangement, or anything like it, could have worked under the conditions of the ancient Athenian theatre.

<sup>17</sup> Thiery also lays stress on the fact that his proposal will allow the contestants in the *agon* to be played by the ‘protagonist’ and ‘deuteragonist’, which he claims is Aristophanes’ regular practice. It is very doubtful whether any such general rule can be upheld. It would apply in any case to only six surviving plays, since *Acharnians*, *Peace*, and *Thesmophoriazousai* have no formal *agon* while in the *agones* of *Birds* and *Ekklesiazousai* the hero(ine) has no opponent. Among these six, four conform with the proposed principle, but *Frogs* presents severe problems for it, since Dionysos, whose role one would on every other ground expect to be taken by the protagonist, is not one of the contestants: Thiery (1986) 59–61 is therefore forced to divide his part between two actors, just as in *Clouds* itself he divides the part of Pheidippides (ib. 45–6) because Pheidippides has a less important role in the middle portion of the play (814–1112) than at the beginning and end. I see no reason at all to believe that dramatists were compelled to construct plays and distribute roles in such a way that, if humanly possible, the actors had in every scene roles corresponding in relative importance to their status in the troupe, regardless of damaging side-effects. I do not therefore consider that Strepsiades’ absence from the *agon* can be validly inferred from an argument of this type.

This solution, removing the seemingly irrelevant figure of Strepsiades from the *agon*, is an extremely tempting one. Certain apparent difficulties with it prove not to be serious. We need not, for example, suppose that Pheidippides remains on stage during the choral song; he can go into the *phrontisterion* with the Inferior Logos after 1104 and then come out again with Socrates. But there are at least two problems that are less easily [275] disposed of. One of these is that, as noted above (p. 179), if Strepsiades has not heard the debate he is being asked in 1105–6 a question which he has in effect already answered, with Socrates having no reason to suppose that anything could have happened to change his mind. The other is a small but vital point of grammar.

This second problem is embodied in the first two words of 1105: *τί δῆτα*; For these cannot be the opening words of a conversation. As Denniston showed in his great work *The Greek Particles*, ‘*δῆτα* in questions always has a logical connective force’:<sup>18</sup> it always refers back to something said just previously either by the addressee or, less often, by the speaker. It has, indeed, been used four times in this way (the Inferior Logos, incidentally, being the speaker each time) in the last 20 lines of the *agon* (1087, 1094, 1097, 1101). If the speaker of 1105 is Socrates, we would have to assume that he entered already in conversation with Strepsiades. This is of course unobjectionable in principle,<sup>19</sup> but it is unworkable here, because Socrates and Strepsiades clearly *parted* at 887–8 and should now be entering from different directions—Socrates presumably from the school, Strepsiades from his home.

If then, as we have seen must be the case, 1105 is continuing a dialogue already begun, that dialogue can only be the on-stage dialogue that ended the *agon*<sup>20</sup>—which means that there can be no place for any choral song before 1105; and the speaker of 1105 must be one of the participants in that dialogue, and specifically the

<sup>18</sup> Denniston (1954) 269.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. 1214; *Men. Dysk.* 50, 233, 784, *Sam.* 61, 283, 369.

<sup>20</sup> In discussion on this paper Pascal Thiery suggested that Ar. might have intended to write further lines of dialogue before 1105 for Socrates and/or Strepsiades, to which *τί δῆτα*; could be a reply. There is no other reason to suspect this; we might nevertheless be driven to make such an assumption if the text we have could not otherwise be accounted for—but it can be.

Inferior Logos who has just utterly defeated his rival. And since his  $\delta\eta\tau\alpha$ , with its 'logical connective force', implies that he is asking Strepsiades to make a decision based on something said just previously, Strepsiades must have been a spectator of the *agon*. This may be dramatically unsatisfactory, for reasons we have already examined, but it is inescapably what we are offered. To an *agon* which is written entirely as though Strepsiades were not present, Aristophanes has attached a conclusion which requires him to have been present.

In any normal play-script, this would be evidence of incompetence. But our *Clouds* is not a normal play-script, despite the efforts of some recent critics like Fisher and O'Regan<sup>21</sup> to interpret it as if it were: it is a transitional draft, intermediate between the performed script of 423 BC and the never-completed script that Aristophanes at one time hoped would be performed in, perhaps, 418.<sup>22</sup> In a transitional draft we may expect to find evidence of changes of mind; we may expect too to find surviving material from the original script which would eventually have needed to be rewritten or replaced—of which, as is well known, there is a substantial amount, in the form of topical references which had ceased to be appropriate at the time of revision.<sup>23</sup> I suggest that this is the explanation of the problem we are considering: Aristophanes had decided to modify the design of this part of the play, but had not completed making the necessary changes to the text at the time when he abandoned further revision.

What was the modification on which he had decided? And why had he decided upon it? Logically there are two basic possibilities.

<sup>21</sup> Fisher (1984); O'Regan (1992).

<sup>22</sup> The new speech for the parabasis (518–62) was written at a time when Eupolis' *Marikas*, produced in 421, had been followed by at least two other comedies in which Hyperbolos was a major figure (cf. 553–9), but when mention of Elektra still evoked recollections of an Aeschylean rather than a Sophoclean or Euripidean scene (cf. 534–6). Euripides' *Elektra* is firmly datable on metrical grounds to no later than 416 (i.e. before *Troades*), or no later than 417 if we accept, with Müller (1984) 60–77, that tragic dramatists did not normally put on productions in successive years; and Sophocles' *Elektra* is likely to have preceded Euripides' (see Cropp (1988) xlix–li) and hence to have been produced no later than 418. It is thus likely that this speech was written between the City Dionysia festivals of 419 and 418.\* The attempt by Kopff (1990) to downdate the revision of *Clouds* to c.414 is comprehensively refuted by Henderson (1993b).

<sup>23</sup> See e.g. *Clouds* 6, 186, 581–94; a fuller list is given by Storey (1993) 79–80.

One is that [277] in the original version of the *agon* the presence of Strepsiades had been taken into account; that Aristophanes, when revising the play, had decided that the *agon* would be better without him; and that 1105–12 survive by accident from the original version (or from an earlier, abortive stage of revision) and would eventually have been deleted from the final script. I have suggested elsewhere<sup>24</sup> that this, or something like it, may be the explanation of the presence in our text of the unsatisfactory lines 1437–9; and it might find support in the statement in one of the ancient Hypotheses that the section ‘where the Just Logos talks to the Unjust’ is, like the main speech in the parabasis (518–62), a completely new composition.<sup>25</sup> I would not wish to exclude this possibility.\* The short dialogue with Strepsiades could easily have been dispensed with: if it is removed, the Inferior Logos will escort Pheidippides into the *phrontisterion* after 1104, and this can be followed naturally enough, after the second parabasis, by Strepsiades coming there some days later to find out whether his son’s education has been successfully completed. However, if 1105–12 disappear, we must also sacrifice the brief but weighty *kommation* of the chorus *χωρεῖτέ νυν· οἶμαι δέ σοι ταῦτα μεταμελήσειν* (1113–14), where *σοι* can only denote Strepsiades,<sup>26</sup> giving the audience their first clear hint of the coming catastrophe; nor can we be certain that by ‘where the Just Logos talks to the Unjust’ the author of the Hypothesis meant to refer to the entire *agon*—I have elsewhere argued, indeed, on quite independent grounds, that the reference may have been only to the *proagon* of 889–948.<sup>27</sup> I would therefore suggest that an alternative, indeed almost an inverse scenario may well be preferable.

According to this scenario, the *agon* of the original *Clouds* was quite similar to the one we have (except perhaps, as I have just mentioned, for its introductory portion) and did not mention Strepsiades because he was not present: he had put his son into the hands of Socrates (and

<sup>24</sup> Sommerstein (n. 14) 148 and 229.

<sup>25</sup> *Clouds* Hypoth. A7 Holwerda (= I Dover<, VI Wilson>) ἃ δὲ ὀλοσχερῆ τῆς διασκευῆς † τοιαῦτα† ὄντα τετύχηκεν· αὐτίκα ἢ παράβασις τοῦ χοροῦ ἤμειπται, καὶ ὅπου ὁ δίκαιος λόγος πρὸς τὸν ἄδικον λαλεῖ, καὶ τελευταῖον ὅπου καίεται ἢ διατριβὴ Σωκράτους.

<sup>26</sup> Since, as Dover (1968) 229 says, Pheidippides ‘has not taken the decision himself, and in any case will be far from regretting it’.

<sup>27</sup> Sommerstein (1982) 4 n. 9.

thereby of [278] the Logoi) and gone back home, with 887b–888 as his parting words spoken to Socrates' retreating back. At the end of the *agon*, the collapse of the Superior Logos was followed by the immediate exit of the Inferior Logos and Pheidippides into the *phrontisterion*, leaving the scene empty of actors for the second parabasis. In revision, Aristophanes decided that Strepsiades should be made to hear the debate of the Logoi and that he, not Pheidippides, should decide thereafter that he still wanted Pheidippides taught in the *phrontisterion*. It is not difficult to discern a motive for this. The original production had been a resounding failure. One possible reason for this, Aristophanes could well have felt, might have been that the disaster which befalls Strepsiades was insufficiently motivated. Disasters in comedy normally happen to people who thoroughly deserve them—people like Lamachos in *Acharnians*, Paphlagon in *Knights*, or the *sykophantai* in *Birds*, *Wealth*, or Eupolis' *Demes*.<sup>28</sup> Strepsiades is not an obviously unsympathetic character like these; moreover, he is to a considerable extent himself a victim of, among others, a crafty match-maker (41–2), an extravagant wife and son, and harsh creditors. If we assume, as we presently will, that 1113–14 were inserted in the revision, Strepsiades received in the original version no warning of the error of his ways until it was too late. And yet he suffered the pain and humiliation of being beaten up by his son (we know he did, because the proverb *δὲς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες*, which Pheidippides exploits (1417) when justifying his action, is quoted by a scholiast on pseudo-Plato<sup>29</sup> as coming from the 'first *Clouds*') while the unfilial wastrel Pheidippides suffered nothing at all (nor perhaps did Socrates if the burning of the *phrontisterion* was a new scene in the revised version, as we are told it was).<sup>30\*</sup> It would have been very reasonable to suspect that many spectators, and with them many of the festival judges, may have taken as much offence at all this as they apparently did in 431<sup>31</sup> at the triumphant escape of Medea, with divine and Athenian aid, after [279]

<sup>28</sup> Eupolis fr. 99.79–119 KA.

<sup>29</sup> Σ [Pl.] Ax. 367b (Stallbaum). This scholion, by the way, refutes the suggestion of MacDowell (1995) 144–9 that the first *Clouds* ended with Strepsiades triumphant and that 'the new ending begins at 1303'.

<sup>30</sup> See n. 25 above.

<sup>31</sup> When the production by Euripides which included *Medea* was placed third of three (Eur. *Med.* Hypoth. a42 Diggle).



murdering four people three of whom were entirely innocent and two of whom were her own children.

In a new production, then (one can imagine the dramatist thinking to himself), Strepsiades must be made more clearly responsible for his own downfall. Let him, then, hear the debate of the Logoi. Let him learn what the new education really involves: the complete rejection of all moral standards (902) including the duty of respecting parents (998–1001), the acceptance of terms like *καταπύγων* and *πατραλοίας* as exquisite compliments (909–14), the glorification of vicious behaviour (1060 ff.) and in particular of adultery (1075 ff.) and passive homosexuality (1085 ff.)—to mention only matters which are admitted to, or rather boasted of, by the Inferior Logos. Let him, having heard all this, be given an opportunity to withdraw his son from that education (1105–6), and let him reject that opportunity—and that although Pheidippides himself enters the school without the least enthusiasm (1112). Let him even be given a warning by the divine Clouds (1113–14), and let him be deaf to it. That should be enough to convince most spectators that even a foolish old man like Strepsiades ought to have realized how terribly wrong was the path he was pursuing; it will as well to some extent reduce the guilt of Pheidippides (whom his repentant father comes to see as a fellow-victim, cf. 1464–6); and meanwhile we can also devise a spectacular conclusion that will give Socrates his deserts and let the play end with a victory for a chastened Strepsiades.

Well, for whatever reason, that new production never took place; and whether with or without Aristophanes' authorization, copies of his partly revised script found their way into the public domain.\* In the section of the play which included the *agon*, some parts had been revised and some not. At least two of the original choral songs had been deleted, perhaps because they included topical allusions which were out of date, but their replacements had not yet been written. A short passage (about as short as it could possibly be) had been inserted after the *agon*, in which it was made plain that Strepsiades, not Pheidippides, bore responsibility for Pheidippides' education and its consequences. The *agon* itself had been rewritten in part, but the author either had not yet attempted to insert references to Strepsiades, or had decided that it would be clumsy and unnecessary to do so. The essential adjustment still needed to make the action

run smoothly in its new form was the insertion, after or instead of 886–8, [280] of some lines to provide a motive for Strepsiades to stay and hear the Logoi. Perhaps Socrates could invite him to do so; perhaps Strepsiades could say ‘I’m very curious to see and hear them myself as well’ (cf. 181–3, 250–3, 1344). At any rate, in the draft we possess, this insertion (like that of the immediately following choral song) had not yet been made. And hence it is that we have, in the play we know as Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, a sequence of scenes that does not quite fit together.

Two points to finish with. Firstly, it will be evident that I am by and large in agreement with Ian Storey<sup>32</sup> as against Harold Tarrant<sup>33</sup> that the revision of *The Clouds* was not a fundamental rewrite, more a series of adjustments which still left the play in essence, as the author of Hypothesis A7 put it, ‘the same as the original one’.<sup>34</sup> An examination of the known or suspected fragments of the first *Clouds* tends to confirm this. There are twelve such fragments, of which two are also found in the surviving version.<sup>35</sup> Of the other ten, five<sup>36</sup> are certainly or probably anapaestic in metre, and may well therefore have stood in the replaced parabasis speech<sup>37</sup> or in the *proagon*; two more (fr. 393 KA, which is a threat of violence against Chairephon and someone else,<sup>38</sup> and fr. 400 KA which consists of the word *κόλασμα* ‘chastisement’) look as though they came from the conclusion of the play; while the reference to Phormion in fr. 397 KA, whose context is

<sup>32</sup> Storey (1993) 78–81. Storey notes that outside the new parabasis speech (518–62) the surviving play contains not one passage which can be shown by its extra-dramatic references to belong to the revision rather than to the original script.

<sup>33</sup> Tarrant (1991).

<sup>34</sup> *Clouds* Hypoth. A7 Holwerda = I Dover<, VI Wilson> *τοῦτο ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ προτέρῳ*.

<sup>35</sup> They are identical with *Clouds* 1196–1200 and 1417 respectively, but are specifically attributed to ‘the first *Clouds*’ by the authors who quote them.

<sup>36</sup> Ar. fr. 394, 395, 396, 398, 399 KA.\*

<sup>37</sup> The new speech 518–62 is in eupolideans; the speech which it displaced was in a different metre (cf. Σ<sup>E</sup> 520) and is almost certain to have been in anapaestic tetrameters, which are the normal metre of the first speech of the parabasis in every other surviving Aristophanic play that has such a speech at all, and which often give their name to the speech itself (cf. *Ach.* 627, *Knights* 504, *Peace* 735, *Birds* 684).

<sup>38</sup> It is couched in the second or third person dual (*κείσεσθον ὡσπερ πηνίω βινουμένω*), and is quoted (by Photios p. 428.27 Naber and Suda π1531) with the comment *σκόπτει γὰρ τοὺς περὶ Χαιρεφῶντα εἰς ξηρότητα καὶ ἀσθένειαν*.

unknown, may belong to one of the deleted choral songs, in the same way as the references to Phormion in *Knights*, *Peace*, and *Ly-*[281] *sistrata*.<sup>39</sup> A further fragment (fr. 401 KA *μετεωρολέσχαι*) is rightly viewed with great suspicion by Kassel and Austin.<sup>40</sup> This leaves only one fragment (fr. 392 KA) that is at all likely to come from a section of the play which is not explicitly attested as having undergone major changes.<sup>41</sup>

Secondly, it will have been observed that I have not hitherto made any mention of the subject it is currently most fashionable to discuss in connection with the *agon* of the first *Clouds*, namely cock-fighting.<sup>42</sup> The omission was deliberate. There are two significant pieces of evidence which have been held to show that the contestants in that *agon* were represented as fighting cocks. The more recent and more spectacular is the so-called Getty Birds vase.<sup>43</sup> I do not know what play this painting represents (though I now accept Taplin's case that it is unlikely to be *Birds*),<sup>44</sup> but I am sure it is not the first *Clouds*, for reasons that have been very well stated by Taplin himself;<sup>45</sup> his tentative suggestion that we are dealing with a chorus of satyrs costumed as birds, or transformed into birds, is much the most persuasive explanation of the piece that has been offered. The other testimonium, without which no one would ever have dreamed of associating the Getty vase with this play, is a scholion on 889 which asserts that the Logoi appear 'in wicker cages, fighting like cocks'.<sup>46</sup> This statement does not deserve the respect it has tended to receive.\* Neither cocks nor Logoi can fight with one another while they are in

<sup>39</sup> *Knights* 562, *Peace* 348, *Lys.* 804. It is striking that Phormion and another figure symbolizing the martial glory of bygone days, Myronides (*Lys.* 801, *Ekkl.* 303), are mentioned by Aristophanes, so far as we know, *only* in lyrics.

<sup>40</sup> *PCG* iii.2 p. 219, comparing *Clouds* 333, 360, and *Pl. Rep.* 489c and concluding 'fragmentum valde dubium'.

<sup>41</sup> And this fragment, having Socrates for its subject, is of exactly the kind that might most easily be attributed to *Clouds* in error; see Dover (1968) lxxxviii–lxxxix. On the 'section[s] of the play... attested as having undergone major changes', see Hypoth. A7 cited in n. 25 above.

<sup>42</sup> On which see especially Taplin (1987) 95–6 and Csapo (1993).

<sup>43</sup> First published by Green (1985), who positively identified it as <deriving from> *Birds*.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Taplin (n. 42) 93–5.

<sup>45</sup> Taplin (1993) 103–4.

<sup>46</sup> Σ<sup>VE</sup> *Clouds* 889 *ὑπόκεινται ἐπὶ τῇ σκηνῇ ἐν πλεκτοῖς οἰκίσκοις οἱ λόγοι δίκην ὀρνίθων διαμαχόμενοι*.

separate [282] cages. And how were the cages brought in? Were they carried (in which case each would have required at least two bearers)? Were they brought out on the *ekkyklema*? Or what? And is it entirely a coincidence that in the play we have, quite close to 889 (in fact in 847 ff.), two real domestic fowls (one male, one female) are brought on-stage, which it would have been theatrically prudent (as Dover notes)<sup>47</sup> to put in cages? I suggest that this scholion is the product of confusion, not between the first and second *Clouds*, but between 847 ff. and 889 ff.: perhaps at some stage of transmission a sentence from a note on 847 ff.<sup>48</sup> was omitted from its place, reinserted at the bottom of a page and taken to be part of a note on 889. At any rate I applaud the prudence of Kassel and Austin, who in their treatment of the first *Clouds* in *PCG* omit this scholion from the *testimonia* relating to that play.<sup>49</sup> In this respect, as in the respects discussed earlier in this paper, the first *Clouds* was probably, in outward form, not all that different from the second. Yet in the structure of a drama, as in the structure of a word or a sentence, a small difference of form can effect a great difference of meaning; and it is my contention that by so little a change as omitting to send Strepsiades away before the *agon*, and adding eight or ten new lines after it, Aristophanes aimed to make a major alteration to the moral balance of his play which he hoped would very greatly increase its public acceptability.<sup>50</sup>

#### ADDENDA

Debate has continued over the relationship between the two versions of *Clouds*; the most important subsequent discussions have been Casanova (2000), Sonnino (2005), and Revermann (2006) 217–18, 326–32.

<sup>47</sup> Dover (1968) 203: ‘They are live birds, caged or tied up to make their struggles ineffective (I presume it would be cheaper and easier to borrow a couple of birds than to make convincing models)’.

<sup>48</sup> Something, say, of the order of εἰσάγονται β’ ὄρνιθες ἐν πλεκτοῖς οἰκίσκοις.

<sup>49</sup> *PCG* iii.2 pp. 214–16.

<sup>50</sup> This paper was first published in P. Thiery and M. Menu (eds.), *Aristophane: la langue, la scène, la cité* (Bari: Levante Editori, 1997) 269–82. Reprinted here by kind permission of Levante Editori.

p. 181 The idea of a lost choral song between 1104 and 1105 has been adopted—independently of Thiery, it would seem—by Guidorizzi (1996).

p. 183 n. 22 I would not now wish to base any argument on the priority of Sophocles' *Electra* to Euripides': March (2001) 20–2 has offered powerful reasons for taking Sophocles' play to be later than Euripides', with 413 as the most likely date. If she is right, then the *termini post quos non* for the revision of *Clouds* are the production of Euripides' *Electra* (probably not later than 417, see n. 22) and the ostracism of Hyperbolus, comic attacks on whom are referred to in the present tense in *Clouds* 552 and 558 (417 or 416).

p. 184 'I would not wish to exclude this possibility': Casanova (2000) 27–8 offers a more radical version of this proposal: that in the original play the two Logoi did not appear at all, and that instead Strepsiades (and, one presumes, Pheidippides) listened to an *epideixis* by Socrates (perhaps with assistance from Chaerephon) of his techniques for enabling an objectively weaker case to defeat a stronger one; lines 1105–14 would be an unrevised relic of the end of this scene, and presumably (though Casanova does not spell this out), had the revision been completed, we would have found Strepsiades leaving the scene at 888 and not returning until 1131. This solution (and likewise the modified version of it adopted by Sonnino (2005)) requires us to assume that the clause in the Hypothesis, ὅπου ὁ δίκαιος λόγος πρὸς τὸν ἄδικον λαλεῖ, refers to the whole of the *agon*; Casanova (p. 29) and Sonnino (p. 222 n. 50), in their discussions of this issue, offer no response to my objection (Sommerstein (1982) 4 n. 9) that 'it is only in the initial altercation that the Better Argument can properly be said to be talking to the Worse'.

p. 185 the burning of the *phrontisterion*: I should have made it clear that in addition to the Hypothesis, we have a second piece of direct evidence that the burning of the *phrontisterion* did not figure in the original play, in the form of a scholium (Σ<sup>VE</sup> 543) which states this explicitly; see Casanova (2000) 30 with n. 41.

p. 186 ‘copies . . . found their way into the public domain’: Revermann (2006) 332 (cf. 84) suspects that the revised script may not have gone into circulation until after (perhaps long after) Ar.’s death, but was preserved archivally by his family; and it is certainly true that of Plato’s various references and allusions to *Clouds* (e.g. *Apol.* 18b–c, 19b–c, *Phd.* 70c, *Symp.* 221b) some must be, and all may be, to the 423 version.

p. 187 n. 36 Casanova (2000) 32 assigns fr. 394 to the *parodos* (comparing line 323 of the surviving play), and sees fr. 395 as part of a promise by Strepsiades similar to line 426 of the surviving play. The first suggestion must be wrong, as Kaibel already saw (see *PCG* iii.2 p. 218), since the clouds are described as departing, not arriving—and also as having become angry, for which they must have been given some reason. The association of fr. 395 with *Clouds* 426, on the other hand, is very plausible—if, that is, the three-word fragment is not just a misquotation or an adaptation, by a later writer, of *Clouds* 426 itself (a neighbouring passage, 412–17, is cited with extensive adaptations by Diogenes Laertius 2.27).

p. 188 the ‘fighting-cock’ scholium: Revermann (2006) 216–17, noting that the polemical tone in which scholia on *Clouds* 1032–3 assert that the Logoi appeared in *human* form suggests that someone had claimed they did not, suggests an alternative explanation for the scholium on 889: that cock-fighting metaphors were used in a choral song written for *Clouds II* (or written for *Clouds I* and retained in *Clouds II*), and that this song was preserved in some branches of the tradition and lost in others (including those from which our text descends). This proposal certainly deserves consideration, but the scholia on 1032–3 can also be accounted for on the hypothesis favoured in this article, if the commentator from whom they originate was already reading the note on 889 in its present, incorrect position.

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Response to Slater, 'Bringing up Father:  
*paideia* and *ephebeia* in the *Wasps*'

Niall Slater has produced an extremely stimulating paper in his attempt to establish just what it is that Bdelykleon is trying to teach his father in Aristophanes' *Wasps* and what it is that Philokleon finally learns (which turn out not to be quite the same thing). I am not going to analyse his analysis of *Wasps*: instead I will seek to set its essential features in the context of a broader approach to Aristophanes and to Greek comedy generally, and also air some doubts about one aspect of the analysis which in my view is *not* essential, but which also has implications well beyond the study of this play.

To start with the critical remarks, if only in order not to end with them. Slater has adopted and adapted from Angus Bowie<sup>1</sup> the idea that Philokleon's progress in *Wasps* can be viewed and analysed as a 'reversed ephebeia'. This, of course, depends crucially on the assumption that there existed in Athenian society in Aristophanes' time an institution, or set of institutions, associated with the passage of adolescent males from boyhood to manhood and full citizenship, which whether or not it bore the name *ephebeia* (it almost certainly did not) was perceived by Athenians as a coherent entity forming a recognizable stage in the male citizen's life cycle, as the *ephebeia* certainly did in the later fourth century and thereafter for those privileged enough to experience it. It requires more than that. It requires that this *ephebeia* was perceived as a 'rite of passage', a ritual process of 'strip[ping the adolescent] of his previous identity... and leav[ing] him ready to be reintegrated into society'.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. M. Bowie (1993) 78–101, esp. 78–86.

<sup>2</sup> Slater 44.

As Slater meiotically says, the case for the existence of such an institution in the fifth century ‘cannot be definitively proved on our [54] present historical sources alone.’<sup>3</sup> It would be truer to say that there is no evidence for it whatever. It is true that we can identify a series of experiences which every young male citizen is known, or can safely be presumed, to have gone through (though some of them may in practice have been restricted to the cavalry and hoplite classes). At or close to the age of 18 the youth underwent a *dokimasia* to establish his age and citizen parentage,<sup>4</sup> and then ‘left the ranks of the boys’<sup>5</sup> and was registered on the citizen roll of his deme. He was given a set of armour (normally, one presumes, by his father, but if he was a war orphan, by the state)<sup>6</sup> and swore an oath ‘not to disgrace these holy arms’ and to do his full duty as a soldier and citizen.<sup>7</sup> He then, during some part of the next two years, underwent training in hoplite fighting (not directly attested, but militarily essential) and also did service in the frontier guard (the *peripoloi*), in garrisons or on patrol or both.<sup>8</sup> And that is all. There is no [55] evidence that 18–20-year-olds had any distinctive common name when not actually performing military duties; or, to put it another way, there is no fifth-century

<sup>3</sup> Slater 45. Similarly A. M. Bowie (1993) 50: ‘there is no single, conclusive piece of evidence for a fifth-century *ephebeia* of whatever form’.

<sup>4</sup> Ar. *Wasps* 578; Lys. 21.1 (referring to 411/10); cf. Lys. 10.31, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1–2, and see Rhodes (1981) 496–502.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Isok. 15.289, Dem. 18.257, 21.154, Aischines 1.40, 2.167; in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1 those whom the deme considers not to have reached the age of 18 *ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παιδᾶς*. Eupolis fr. 171 *Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξίτω* may be a play on the expression.

<sup>6</sup> Ar. *Birds* 1360 ff.; Isok. 8.82 (referring back to the fifth century, and written by a man who remembered those days); cf. Pl. *Menex.* 249a, Aischines 3.154.

<sup>7</sup> Versions of the oath are preserved on an inscription from Acharnai (Tod ii no. 204)\* and by Pollux (8.105) and Stobaios (4.1.8); Lykourgos has it read to the court, and discusses some of its clauses, in *Leokr.* 76–8. On the archaic origin of the oath, and possible echoes of it in fifth-century literature, see Siewert (1977).

<sup>8</sup> For the *peripoloi* in the fifth century see Ar. *Birds* 1177; Eupolis fr. 340; Thuc. 4.67.2–5, 8.92.2; the term is never in this period specifically associated with one particular age-group, but in the fourth century the verb *περιπολεῖν* appears more than once in connection with youths of ephebic age (Aischines 2.167, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.4). As an age-class these young soldiers appear in the fifth century to have been called *οἱ νεώτατοι*; in addition to performing garrison and patrol duties they might fight as hoplites in emergencies (Thuc. 1.105.4), or might go on campaign as light troops (Thuc. 4.67) or as non-combatants (cf. Ar. *Knights* 604–5 where the chorus of cavalrymen, humorously speaking of their horses as if they were human, relate how after a landing near Corinth



Attic word that means ‘ephebe’.<sup>9</sup> There is no evidence that this age-group was segregated from the rest of society, or that a young citizen acquired any new rights or duties at the age of 20 which he had not already acquired at the time of his *dokimasia* and registration. 18- and 19-year-olds could speak in the courts and initiate prosecutions: the speaker of Lysias 10 prosecuted ‘the Thirty’ for the murder of his father ‘as soon as I had passed my *dokimasia*’.<sup>10</sup> They could undertake liturgies: the speaker of Lysias 21 boasts of having been a *choregos* four times in less than two years following his *dokimasia*,<sup>11</sup> [56]

‘οἱ νεώτατοι made dug-outs with their hooves and went in search of fodder’). This period of frontier and auxiliary service can of course be seen as a temporary exile from the city, a not uncommon feature of rites of passage; but it also makes sound military sense—this was a job that someone had to do, and it was reasonable to assign it to youths at the height of their physical vigour (the Attic frontiers, after all, were largely mountainous) who were not yet properly ready for fighting in the field.

<sup>9</sup> Bryant (1907) 74–6 shows that the two words most often applied to youths of this age, *μειράκιον* and *νεανίσκος*, are interchangeable and can also be used of men in their twenties: note that in Ar. *Frogs* 89 young tragic poets are called *μειρακύλλια*, and our evidence is that tragic poets normally made their debut in their mid-twenties; cf. too Pl. *Symp.* 223a (Agathon) and *Wasps* 687 (a prosecutor in court). Once the full-blown *ephebeia* system had been introduced in the 330s, there was a tendency for *μειράκιον* to be restricted to those over 20 (cf. Men. fr. 724 and the contrast of *adulescens* with *ephebus* in Catullus 63.63).

<sup>10</sup> Lys. 10.31.

<sup>11</sup> Lys. 21.1–2; these will also have been the first two of his seven years as a trierarch (*ibid.*), which must have run from 411/10 (the year in which he underwent *dokimasia*) to 405/4 (after which for some time Athens had no navy to speak of), and his total liturgical expenditure in this period was therefore as follows:

City Dionysia 411/0 (tragedy)	3,000 dr.
Thargelia 411/0 (men's chorus)	2,000 dr.
Panathenaia 410/09 (pyrrhic dancers)	800 dr.
City Dionysia 410/09 (men's chorus)	5,000 dr.
Two trierarchies (out of seven whose total cost was 6 tal.)	about 1 tal. 4,300 dr.
TOTAL	about 3 tal. 3,100 dr.

An estate of 3 to 4 tal. is reckoned by Davies (1971) xx–xxiv as the threshold figure for membership of the liturgical class (Davies discusses our man, as ‘lost name 7’, at pp. 592–3). About 400 exemption from liturgies for one year (not two) after *dokimasia* was a special privilege of *fatherless* youths (Lys. 32.24); as late as 354 Demosthenes, in what appears to be a comprehensive listing of classes of persons exempted from trierarchic liabilities, makes no mention of ephebes (Dem. 14.16). Contrast the situation at the time of the *Ath. Pol.* when, ‘in order that there might be no excuse for their leaving [their postings]’, ephebes were exempt from all normal civic responsibilities (except hereditary priesthoods) and could not sue or be sued except in inheritance matters (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.5).

during which he spent on these and other liturgies a sum equal to the entire property of some quite wealthy Athenians. They could speak in the Assembly: both Xenophon<sup>12</sup> and the author of the Platonic *First Alkibiades*<sup>13</sup> portray aristocrats in their late teens addressing the Assembly, or wanting to do so, with no suggestion that this was forbidden. They could marry, as Mantitheos son of Mantias did in the 360s, at the age of 18.<sup>14</sup> They could, in fact, do everything except hold public office and serve on juries, and the qualifying age for those functions was 30, not 20. There is little if any evidence for the existence of traditional rituals associated with the ephebic age-range;<sup>15</sup> the only feature of those described above that deserves the name of ritual is the presentation of the arms and the taking of the oath (which, as the opening of the oath shows, belong together),<sup>16</sup> and that, far from being [57] tied as we might expect to a particular ephebic festival, could happen, on our evidence, at a variety of times and places—in the theatre at the City Dionysia,<sup>17</sup> in the precinct of Aglauros at an unknown time,<sup>18</sup> in the sanctuary of Ares and Athena

<sup>12</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.1 (Glaukon, the brother of Plato who is Socrates' main interlocutor in the *Republic*).

<sup>13</sup> [Pl.] *Alk. I* 123d (Alkibiades).

<sup>14</sup> Dem. 40.4; for the date see Carey and Reid (1985) 163 ('c.364–362'), and Humphreys (1989) 183 ('summer 360').

<sup>15</sup> A. M. Bowie (1993) 49–52, in his search for ephebic rituals at Athens, finds only (i) the rituals associated with entry into the phratry at the Apatouria, which by definition are *not* ephebic since they took place at an earlier stage when the youth was still a *παῖς*; (ii) the activities described in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42, most of which are much more redolent of fourth-century civic and educational rationalism than of traditional ritual and none of which is associated by the author with any myth or festival; and (iii) three festivals relating to Theseus (the Oschophoria, Pyanopsia, and Theseia) which 'would have provided a ritual movement of the ephebes from margins to centre' (p. 51) but in only one of which is there evidence that adolescent males had any distinctive role.

<sup>16</sup> Accordingly Rhodes (1981) 506, on *Ath. Pol.* 42.4, assumes that in the 320s the oath (which the *Ath. Pol.* never actually mentions) was taken at the time when the ephebes were presented with a shield and spear by the state, at the beginning of their second year's training. The presentation took place not as part of a festival, but at a special meeting of the *ekklesia* held (on a non-festival day, like all *ekklesia* meetings) in the theatre.

<sup>17</sup> In the case of war orphans in the fifth century (cf. n. 6).

<sup>18</sup> Dem. 19.303; this seems always to have been the regular though not the invariable site for the ceremony (cf. Pollux 8.105, Plut. *Alk.* 15.7–8), and in the oath (line 17 of the inscriptional text) Aglauros stands first among the divine witnesses.

Areia at Acharnai during, presumably, a festival of those deities.<sup>19</sup> There is no reference to any special dress<sup>20</sup> or restrictive rules, no reference to any 'reintegration' ceremony when full manhood was attained (presumably at the age of 20),<sup>21</sup> in short, no indication whatever that 'these particular two years were...strikingly [58] different from the rest of a boy's life'.<sup>22</sup> As Wilamowitz saw long ago,<sup>23</sup> even Plutarch, who was intensely interested in education and who lived at a time when *ephebeia* was a fundamental social institution in almost every Greek-speaking *polis*, shows no awareness of any such distinctive stage in the early lives of his classical Athenian

<sup>19</sup> Our inscriptional text of the oath (see n. 7)—to which all references to the oath in this note relate—comes from Acharnai, names Ares and Athena Areia among the divine witnesses (lines 17–18), was dedicated by the priest of Ares and Athena Areia (lines 1–4), and probably stood in their sanctuary. Pollux omits Athena Areia, and she is fairly clearly an intruder in the list of deities (cf. Siewert (1977) 109–10); she can have intruded only at Acharnai, and if the oath was ever actually sworn in the form given in the inscription, it must have been at Acharnai.

<sup>20</sup> On the evidence, or non-evidence, of art regarding the dress of youths of ephebic age in the classical period, see Maxwell-Stuart (1970) 113–14; Maxwell-Stuart also argues (114–16) that the black cloaks so much discussed by Vidal-Naquet (1968) and others are reliably attested only in connection with one ritual event, a procession to Eleusis. In the third century the *chlamys* and *petasos* were synonymous with ephebic status (Philemon fr. 34); before the 330s the *petasos* is hardly mentioned (it does not figure at all in Old Comedy, at least under that name), while the *chlamys* is associated not with adolescents but with soldiers, especially cavalrymen (Xen. *Anab.* 7.4.4, Antiphanes fr. 17) or with Spartans (Ar. *Lys.* 987). But A. M. Bowie (1993) 48–52 continues to dress his fifth-century ephebes in black *chlamydes* throughout their two ephebic years (and cites Maxwell-Stuart's article in a footnote as if it supported this view).

<sup>21</sup> I assume that the oath-ceremony, whenever and wherever it occurred, always marked, as it does in the scheme described in *Ath. Pol.* (42.4), the beginning, not the end, of a training period during which the future hoplite would gain experience in the use of the arms with which he had been presented, and might even find himself using them in battle (see n. 8). In a speech delivered in 330, Lykourgos significantly speaks (*Leokr.* 76) of citizens taking the oath 'when they are enrolled on the deme registers and become ephebes'; this is inconsistent with *Ath. Pol.*, but it may well be true of Lykourgos himself and the jurors he was addressing, all of whom had come of age in 342 or earlier.

<sup>22</sup> Bryant (1907) 81.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Wilamowitz (1893*b*) i. 192 (who in fact makes the more sweeping claim—not contradicted by any evidence known to me—that the distinctive features of the *ephebeia* as described in the *Ath. Pol.* make no appearance in ancient biographies of any Athenian earlier than those celebrated fellow-ephebes, Epicurus and Menander).

heroes;<sup>24</sup> nor does Plato, in whose works both adolescent characters and educational concerns are often to the fore, ever refer to such an institution, or to *epheboi* or *peripoloi*.<sup>25</sup> If the experiences I have described really were perceived by fifth-century Athenians as a single institution of crucial social importance, the silence of our sources about this alleged institution is deafening and inexplicable. It is as if future historians possessed a varied collection of evidence relating to the lives of young British men and women of the middle and upper classes in the 1990s which gave no indication at all that most of them passed three or four years living mainly in semi-segregated communities of their own age-class, usually at a distance from their previous and subsequent domicile, and that during this time there was a strong tendency for them to be referred to neither as 'teenagers' nor as [59] 'adults' but as 'students'.<sup>26</sup> So far as fifth-century Athens is concerned, *ephebeia* as rite of passage is a myth.

Does this mean that all the brilliant scholarly discussion that has grown round the concept since Vidal-Naquet's 'Black Hunter'<sup>27</sup> is so much hot air? Not in the least. It is perfectly clear—and we are much more conscious of it now than we would have been without these studies—that the transition from childhood to male adulthood was to fifth-century Athenians a time of critical importance and of

<sup>24</sup> Themistokles, Aristeides, Kimon, Perikles, Nikias, Alkibiades, Phokion, Demosthenes. It is significant that Phokion sent his son Phokos to follow the Spartan *agoge* in the hope of curing his drunken and extravagant habits (Plut. *Phok.* 20.4). The lad must have been under 20 to be eligible for the *agoge*, and in view of his having participated in and won the Panathenaic *apobates* contest (on which see Crowther (1991)) he can hardly have been much if at all under 18; Phokion would surely not have taken the drastic and politically risky step of sending him away for a Spartan education if he was in any case about to enter two years of segregated and supervised ephebic training at Athens.

<sup>25</sup> The reference to the ephebate in the spurious *Axiokhos* (366e–367a) emphasizes by contrast the silence in the genuine works. Plato's four uses of the verb *περιπολεῖν* (*Phdr.* 246b, 252c; *Tht.* 176a; *Tim.* 41a) are all in contexts irrelevant to this discussion.

<sup>26</sup> This period is customarily terminated by a reintegration ceremony distinguished by the wearing of vestments, and the presence of officiants and of ritual objects (such as a mace, solemnly deposited before the Chancellor or his/her representative, in front of which every graduand must pass), hardly ever seen on any other occasion. My daughter Celia, aged 11, hit the nail on the head when she spontaneously noted, shortly before attending her sister's graduation, that it was a milestone in life comparable to a Bar Mitzvah, a wedding, or a funeral. Celia had never heard the term 'rite of passage', but she knew one when (or rather before) she saw it.

<sup>27</sup> Vidal-Naquet (1968).

intense interest, and that it is one of the stages of life most frequently analysed in tragic (less often in comic) drama: if we do not understand that (to take only three examples) Hippolytos, Neoptolemos, and Pentheus are at this crucial stage of life, we shall not understand *Hippolytos*, *Philoktetes*,<sup>28</sup> or *Bacchae*. But we should see the transition as one that has to be made *in life*, not as one that is made through ritual. The thing about ritual transitions is that virtually everyone makes them successfully. The trouble with life-transitions is that many people don't succeed in making them at all, and many others succeed only after a hard struggle—which the dramatic presentation of similar struggles in tragedy will, according to the spectator's age, prepare him for, sustain him in, or remind him of.

I do not think that Slater's analysis of *Wasps* will lose anything if it is purged of its association with non-existent rites of passage. The [60] Philokleon of the early scenes is very like a child. As he makes clear in the agon,<sup>29</sup> his sole interest lies in the gratification of his own senses and emotions, and he is completely devoid of feelings of responsibility towards others. He is indeed asocial; as Slater has said, he is essentially a spectator, who as a juror in court sits passively until the time comes to give a vote for which he need give no reason and for which he is not accountable.<sup>30</sup> His son first shocks him out of this way of life and then introduces him to a different and more active social world, but this merely enables him to find new methods of irresponsible self-gratification. That sequence ends with Philokleon being carried off-stage, kicking and screaming, by his son—but it is the son who then vanishes from the play as a new educative agent intervenes. This agent, as Slater implies, is the god Dionysos, whose influence dominates the final scene from its very first words (*νή τὸν Διόνυσον*), and who by the combined effect of wine and music (1476–7) turns Philokleon into a tragic dancer. I do not think this necessarily defines him as a choreutes,<sup>31</sup> any more than it so defines

<sup>28</sup> On which see now Lada-Richards (1998).

<sup>29</sup> *Wasps* 548–630.

<sup>30</sup> He lays particular emphasis on the fact that jurors are ἀνυπεύθυνοι (587).

<sup>31</sup> *Contra* Slater 49: 'the fact that Philokleon is dancing at all clearly identifies him as a chorister'. Whatever generalization a late grammarian may have made about dancing in tragedy (see Slater 49 n. 57), there can be no doubt that the gadfly-driven Io dances during her monody in *Prometheus Bound* (561–608), which with Bees

the sons of Karkinos; but at any rate the tragic dancer brings gratification to others as well as to himself (thus promoting social solidarity and civic unity), and the last moments of the play show Philokleon and a chorus actually co-operating. Only Dionysos proves truly capable of healing [61] Philokleon's 'sickness'—and, by implication, the comparable 'sickness' which, as we were told earlier, pervades the whole *polis*.<sup>32</sup>

This role of Dionysos and of wine as the restorer of social health is a theme that I would see as pervading Greek comedy throughout its whole existence so far as we can trace it, and it can sometimes be seen to involve a clear learning process.<sup>33</sup> In Aristophanes, this Dionysiac theme appears most strongly in *Acharnians*, where peace and wine are metonyms for each other,<sup>34</sup> war is above all the destroyer of vines,<sup>35</sup> and the play is built around three Dionysiac festivals;<sup>36</sup> the chorus are in the end ready to learn from Dikaiopolis about the

(1993) I would date in the late 430s, as do *Kassandra* in Eur. *Tro.* 307–41 (cf. especially 325–34) and probably *Polymestor* in Eur. *Hek.* 1056–84. These characters, to be sure, were in abnormal mental states, but so is Philokleon, at least in the judgement of Xanthias (*Wasps* 1486, 1489, 1491, 1496). At 1490, again, Philokleon identifies himself with the early tragic dramatist Phrynichos, who was not a member of his chorus but its trainer (*didaskalos*), and who, if he danced in his own plays (and he probably did), will have done so as an actor (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1403<sup>b</sup>22, *Life of Sophocles* 4). On solo dancing in tragedy see further Taplin (1977) 266 and Taplin (1978) 95–6 (discussing Eur. *Ion* 102–83).

<sup>32</sup> On the 'sickness' of Philokleon (viz. his addiction to judging) cf. *Wasps* 71–132. During the agon, when Bdelykleon is about to attempt to persuade his father to renounce judging, he speaks of it as νόσον ἀρχαίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐντετοκυίαν (651).

<sup>33</sup> I hope to deal with this subject more fully in a future paper, tentatively entitled 'Dionysos, wine and the spirit of comedy'.\*

<sup>34</sup> *Ach.* 184–200. Later in the play (1021–36, 1051–67) peace is no longer something to be drunk but something to be anointed with, and MacDowell (1995) 76 is probably right to suggest that in these scenes it takes the form of olive oil (for the war had destroyed olive trees as well as vines, and the chorus are eager to replant some, cf. 998–9).

<sup>35</sup> *Ach.* 183, 229–33, 512, 978–87.

<sup>36</sup> The Rural Dionysia (195–279); the Lenaia, at which the play is being performed, and which is explicitly mentioned in 504 and 1154–5; and the Anthesteria, which is first mentioned at 961 and whose Choes drinking contest forms the play's climax. There are also implicit references to the City Dionysia—that of the previous year, when Aristophanes had incurred the wrath of Kleon (377–82, 503–4, 630–2), and that soon to come, when the tribute-bearing delegations from the allied states will come 'eager to see that superb poet who took the risk of talking justice to the Athenians' (643–5).

blessings of peace/wine,<sup>37</sup> Lamachos is not and suffers accordingly.<sup>38</sup> It appears in *Knights*, where the inspiration that enables Paphlagon's fellow-slaves to overthrow him comes from the [62] drinking of neat wine, on which one of the slaves makes a panegyric.<sup>39</sup> It appears in *Peace*, where the hero is a wine-grower by occupation and also by name,<sup>40</sup> and the play ends with his marriage to Opora, the personification of the vintage. It appears in *Lysistrata*, where, after peace has been made and a symposium has established a new solidarity of pleasure between Athenians and Spartans, the Athenian delegates express the opinion that it would have been made much sooner if diplomats conducted their negotiations when drunk.<sup>41</sup> It appears in *Frogs*, where, in a sense, Dionysos himself has to learn to be Dionysos and what he truly stands for as he evolves from irresponsible self-centredness to civic responsibility (or, equivalently, from devotion to Euripides towards devotion to Aeschylus), an evolution that the Athenian people are invited to imitate.<sup>42</sup> It appears in *Ecclesiazusae*, which ends with a feast for the entire people where the wine is of particular magnificence;<sup>43</sup> in *Ecclesiazusae*, we may note, the replacement of self-centredness by community spirit is presented in a particularly absolute form.<sup>44</sup> We can also find it outside Aristophanes. Kratinos' *Pytine* appears to have been an exuberant affirmation

<sup>37</sup> Having begun by disrupting a Dionysiac procession, they end by becoming one (1230–4).

<sup>38</sup> The inglorious wound which he has suffered when we last see him was inflicted by a *χάραξ* (1178), a word which elsewhere in Ar. always means 'vine-prop'—though Lamachos himself believes that he has been wounded by a spear (1226). For the association and opposition between spear and vine-prop cf. *Peace* 1260–3 where Trygaios offers to buy a job-lot of spears (at a drachma per hundred!) in order to saw them in half and use them as vine-props.

<sup>39</sup> *Knights* 85–124, esp. 90–4.

<sup>40</sup> *Peace* 190 *Τρυγαίος Ἀθμονεύς, ἀμπειλουργὸς δεξιός*.

<sup>41</sup> *Lys.* 1225–38.

<sup>42</sup> This is essentially the conclusion of Ismene Lada-Richards's book *Initiating Dionysus* (Lada-Richards (1999)), though expressed in somewhat different language.

<sup>43</sup> *Ecll.* 834–52, 1112–24.

<sup>44</sup> In so extreme a form, indeed, that many critics have concluded that it is designedly being presented as unworkable and pernicious (so most recently Taaffe (1993) ch. 4); this line of interpretation has been challenged, to different degrees and from different angles, by Sommerstein (1984a), Reckford (1987) 344–53, and Rothwell (1990), all of whom give references to earlier discussions. See now also MacDowell (1995) 315–23.\*

of the identity of the spirit of wine with the spirit of comedy; Kratinos' wife and friends apparently didn't quite see it that way in the earlier part of the play, but surely they must have seen the light in the end, particularly since the wife *is* Comedy.<sup>45</sup> And in Menander's [63] *Dyskolos* the treatment of Knemon in the final scene may well seem disgustingly cruel until it is seen that he is one who has rejected both the spirit of community and the gifts of Dionysos<sup>46</sup> even after having been divinely shown (through his fall into the well and rescue) that this is not the way to live.

The Dionysiac spirit, as it is presented in comedy, is the spirit of seeking enjoyment for oneself and others, as inclusively as possible (though this inclusiveness is often—not always—confined to a universe consisting of free Greek males).<sup>\*</sup> Its enemies are those who seek enjoyment for themselves at others' expense,<sup>47</sup> or those

<sup>45</sup> The early part of the plot is thus summarized in the scholia to Ar. *Knights* 400 = *Pytine* test. ii KA: 'Comedy was Kratinos' wife but wanted to cease living with him, and brought suit against him for maltreatment. Kratinos' friends came along and begged her not to do anything rash, and asked her the cause of the quarrel; she complained that he was not writing comedy any more but devoted his time to drinking' (cf. Kratinos frs. 193–5). At some stage of the play an attempt was made to destroy every vessel in his house that could hold a beverage (fr. 199); but Kratinos seems to have affirmed that 'you can't produce great art if you drink water' (fr. 203) in the course of a speech which overwhelmed listeners with its exuberant brilliance (fr. 198). There are traces of a report of an off-stage feast (fr. 205 and perhaps 206) and of a scene in which Comedy, reconciled with her husband, was advising him how to bring well-known *komodoumenoi* such as Kleisthenes and Hyperbolos into a play (frs. 208–9).<sup>\*</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Knemon has refused—to the disgust of his slave Simiche (874–8)—to attend his own daughter's betrothal party, because, in keeping with his character as portrayed all through the play, he prefers to be alone. Sikon's description to the captive Knemon of what has been happening at the party is climaxed by drinking followed by dancing (946–54)—the same Dionysiac sequence that we saw at the end of *Wasps*; but Knemon, unlike Philokleon or any other Aristophanic hero, is still, nearly at the end of the play, excluding himself from the Dionysiac world, until Sikon and Getas force him to dance sober (954–7)—after which he surrenders and allows himself to be taken into the cave of Pan where the party is being held.

<sup>47</sup> For example, those who profit by war (the ambassadors and Lamachos in *Ach.*, the armament makers and sellers in *Peace*), politicians who take bribes or embezzle public funds, the Worse Argument in *Clouds*, the rich in *Wealth*, and most Athenian males in *Assemblywomen*. This type is not well represented in the surviving plays of Menander (partly because it would be difficult to include such characters in the general reconciliation and contentment with which a Menandrian play normally ends), but the pimp and the moneylender are known stock characters of New Comedy who meet its specification.



who reject [64] enjoyment for themselves and try to deprive others of it as well.<sup>48</sup> In *Wasps*, the first category is represented by Philokleon; the second is represented by Bdelykleon, though it is a long time before this becomes apparent. For four-fifths of the play, indeed, Bdelykleon seems to be doing Dionysos' work, though one can't help noticing that he never laughs, and in training his father for the symposium circuit (1122–1264) he is much more concerned about social propriety than about giving and receiving pleasure. After the party Bdelykleon is alarmingly sober and businesslike, even chiding his father about the trouble being caused by 'your wine' (1393) as if it had not been on his own suggestion that Philokleon had gone drinking in the first place; the chorus praise him in very uncomic terms (1450–73)—and he vanishes, leaving 'some god' to create, through wine and music, a Philokleon who, like the sounds and sweet airs of Prospero's isle, gives delight and hurts not.<sup>49</sup>

#### ADDENDA

p. 193 n. 7 The Acharnae inscription is now best read in Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 88.

p. 199 n. 33 Alas, this 'future paper' never got written.

<sup>48</sup> Outside *Wasps* the best Aristophanic example is Socrates in *Clouds*, who is repeatedly described as living a miserable and graceless life (barefoot, dirty, ill-fed, etc.) and whose divinities, the Clouds, tell Strepsiades (416–17) that he must endure cold and hunger and 'abstain from wine and physical exercise and all other follies'; another is Poverty in *Wealth*. In Menander, in addition to Knemon in *Dyskolos*, one might instance the two characters called Smikrines in *Aspis* and *Epitrepontes*, particularly the latter in whose mind any mention or thought of a festivity immediately raises the question of its cost (*Epitr.* 127–39, 749–50).

<sup>49</sup> This paper was first published in A. H. Sommerstein and C. Atherton (eds.), *Education in Greek Fiction* (Bari: Levante Editori, 1996) 53–64, as a response to Niall Slater's paper 'Bringing up Father: *paideia* and *ephebeia* in the *Wasps*' (Slater (1996)) which appeared on pp. 27–52 of the same volume, and which is referred to throughout simply as 'Slater'. Reprinted here by kind permission of Levante Editori.

p. 200 n. 44 For a fuller and more up-to-date bibliography on ‘the replacement of self-centredness by community spirit’ in *Ecclesiastusae* see Chapter 10 below, p. 215 n. 48.

p. 201 n. 45 On *Pytine* see now Rosen (2000) and Ruffell (2002) 155–62.

p. 201 ‘inclusiveness...confined to...free Greek males’: I later criticized this caveat; see Chapter 6 above (pp. 153–4).

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## An alternative democracy and an alternative to democracy in Aristophanic comedy

Athenian Old Comedy stands in a curious double relationship to the democratic *polis* in which it was produced. On the one hand it has an intense concern with the public issues and the prominent personalities of that *polis*, its heroes are usually seeking to promote what they see as the true best interests of that *polis*, and its authors, especially Aristophanes, at least present themselves as teachers and advisers of the community. On the other hand the typical comic plot is a fantasy adventure with a folktale type of structure,<sup>1</sup> often with powerful reminiscences of divine or heroic myth;<sup>2</sup> and both folktale and myth are primarily about the exploits of individuals, who sometimes (as most notably in the case of Herakles) do not represent a community in any sense at all, and if they do act for a community, generally do so in the capacity of a monarchical ruler. Hence there is bound to be a tension in comedy between an individualistic and a communal ethos. The comic hero is always essentially on his or her own (save for *divine* allies, whom we should not forget—though not all successful comic heroes have any);<sup>3</sup> the hero may have assistants

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sifakis (1992).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. M. Bowie (1993), and on individual plays Hofmann (1976), Lada-Richards (1999), and Olson (1998) xxxv–xxxviii.

<sup>3</sup> In addition to *Clouds* and *Thesmophoriazousai* (see n. 5 below), Bdelykleon in *Wasps* and Praxagora in *Ekklesiazousai* are not presented as having any divine support.

or supporters, but never equal partners, and the inspiration and initiative, so far as they are of human origin, normally<sup>4</sup> come from one person [196] alone. And yet the hero is nearly always<sup>5</sup> seeking to make things better not just for him- or herself, but for Athens or Greece or humanity, and when such is the hero's aim it is always successful, and then (if not earlier) it is endorsed and acclaimed by its beneficiaries. And while the hero's plan of campaign, and ultimate triumph, are in most cases imaginable only in a fantasy world, they always begin as a means of escape from a situation—an obviously and deeply unsatisfactory situation—which is real enough in the perception of many, most, or all Athenians; and this situation often arises, in whole or in large part, from the structure of, or the decisions taken by, the Athenians' political institutions. In *Acharnians*, *Peace*, and *Lysistrata* the situation is war; in *Knights*, *Wasps*, *Birds*, and *Wealth* it is each time, though with differences of detail and emphasis, the domination of the political and judicial systems by crooked demagogues and crooked prosecutors;<sup>6</sup> in *Ekklesiiazousai* it is the pervasive selfishness that leads Athenians to judge every political issue by the criterion of 'what's in it for me?'<sup>7</sup> and to view the citizen Assembly, where the crucial decisions were taken, primarily as an opportunity for earning pay for attendance;<sup>8</sup> even in *Frogs*, where the 'deeply unsatisfactory situation' is in the first place the parlous state of tragic poetry after the death of Euripides and Sophocles, the perils of Athens itself in early 405 BC come increasingly to the fore, and when Aeschylus is sent back from Hades to the upper world he is charged with the mission to 'save our city' (*Frogs* 1501)—and the first thing he's to do is get rid of Kleophon (*Frogs* 1504, 1532–3).

<sup>4</sup> An exception is *Knights*, where the Sausage-seller, though he proves a brilliant executant of the comic project, undertakes it rather reluctantly at the instigation of the slave who is conventionally labelled 'Demosthenes'; similarly in *Thesmophoriazousai* Euripides uses his in-law ('Mnesilochos') as his agent.

<sup>5</sup> The exceptions are *Clouds* (where Strepsiades' aim is to evade payment of his just debts) and *Thesmophoriazousai* (where Euripides' aim is to evade punishment for slandering the women, of which at 85 and 1161–7 he implies that he is guilty); not coincidentally, these are the two plays in which the comic project is a failure.

<sup>6</sup> This is obvious in the case of *Knights* and *Wasps*; for the other two plays, cf. *Birds* 37–41, 109–10, *Wealth* 30–1, 850–958.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. especially *Ekkkl.* 205–8; also 186–8, 197–8, 202–3, 408–26, and the attitudes exemplified in 746–876 by the man who is trying to avoid surrendering his property.

<sup>8</sup> *Ekkkl.* 186–8, 282–4, 289–310, 376–93, 547–8.

We shall not, therefore, be surprised to find in Aristophanes' plays, at least by implication, a twofold model of an alternative political system. Of course, it is not a comic author's business to present a coherent and comprehensive blueprint for political change; but unless one is the kind of satirist who denounces and ridicules everyone and everything indiscriminately—and Aristophanes is most definitely not that<sup>9</sup>—one cannot help betraying, by one's choice of personal and institutional targets, what aspects of the existing system one perceives as being in need of drastic change, and in what directions [197] one sees it as desirable to change them. And in fact, most fully in *Knights* but also in other plays, one can see easily enough the outlines of an *alternative democracy* which could plausibly be regarded as practicable in the real world and as being capable of eliminating the abuses (or what are presented as abuses) in the current system while preserving the sovereignty of the Demos. At the same time, in the fantasy worlds into which play after play takes us, we are also presented with an *alternative to democracy* which regularly leads to superlatives of bliss. Whether *that* alternative would have been practicable in the real world is not necessarily as absurd a question as it might initially seem, but at any rate, as we shall see, the circumstances in which it is set by the dramatist do encourage the audience to think of it in purely fantasy terms.

Aristophanes' *alternative democracy* is most fully articulated, as I have said, in *Knights*, but it leaves a greater or lesser mark on most of his plays, and especially on those where both hero and chorus are male Athenians—*Acharnians*, *Wasps*, *Peace*, and *Wealth*. A democracy it still very definitely is: its champions indignantly repudiate the idea that they might be sympathetic to 'tyranny' or 'aristocracy'.<sup>10</sup> In fact it is presented as being *more* of a democracy than the existing dispensation, for the Demos will take its own decisions through its own rediscovered intelligence<sup>11</sup> instead of being led by the nose by self-interested demagogues.<sup>12</sup> Nothing distinctive there; it's what

<sup>9</sup> The selectivity of Aristophanic satire is demonstrated in Sommerstein (1996c).

<sup>10</sup> *Wasps* 488–507, *Birds* 125–6.

<sup>11</sup> *Ach.* 633–40; *Knights* passim, esp. 1335–83; *Clouds* 581–94; *Frogs* 686–705, 734–7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ach.* 370–6; *Knights* passim, esp. 40–70; *Wasps* 31–8, 664–718; *Ekk.* 183–8. On Aristophanes' presentation of the *demos*, especially in these four plays, see Reinders (2001); also Rhodes (2004) 229–31—though, as the rest of this paper will show, I am

everyone said, including the self-interested demagogues themselves.<sup>13</sup> What matters is *what* sort of decisions the new, enlightened Demos can be expected to take. And here we get a fairly consistent picture—from what is said by those characters and choruses which seem to be meant for the audience to take as representing ‘us’ rather than ‘them’, from what is admitted by negatively portrayed characters like Paphlagon–Kleon in *Knights*, and also from what is *presupposed* by the utterances of just about any character whatever (very useful things, presuppositions, since they’re so very hard to deny). I will point to some of the more salient features.

1. The alternative democracy will either abolish, or drastically curtail, [198] *public pay*<sup>14</sup> for civic functions, especially for jury service<sup>15</sup> and (in the 390s) for attending the Assembly.<sup>16</sup> Such pay is a pointless waste of scarce resources; it makes the citizen see his civic and political activities as a source of income instead of a public duty; it encourages wrongful convictions, because fines and confiscations are seen as filling the coffers out of which the payments are made; and it delivers a captive following to any politician who introduces or increases such a payment (Kleon for jury-pay in the 420s, Agyrhios for Assembly pay in the 390s). Little is said about

less sure than he that Ar. ‘gives [no] sign of objecting to the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the assembly’ (p. 230). Cf. also nn. 37 and 43 below.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Thuc. 3.38.2–7 (Kleon!); Dem. 3.3, 3.22, 3.30–2, 8.34, 9.1–4, *Prooim.* 5, 28, 53. See further Dover (1974) 23–8.

<sup>14</sup> The claim by Spielvogel (2003) 19 that Aristophanes ‘befürwortet . . . zu keiner Zeit eine weitgehende Abschaffung des zivilen *μισθός*’ is true only in the most narrowly literal sense. Spielvogel himself can find no passages in Aristophanes expressing support for the *retention* of any form of civilian *misthos* whatsoever. He does cite (p. 16) three passages (*Knights* 799–809, *Wasps* 673–4, *Peace* 632–47) which imply that during the Archidamian War the poor, or some of them, were dependent on jury-pay to scrape a living, but by speaking of those referred to as ‘the war-tossed rural population’ (*die kriegsgeplagte Landbevölkerung*) he inadvertently reminds us that this was due to the war which, as Aristophanes presented things, was being prolonged by the very demagogues who were using jury-pay to hold their supporters in thrall. He notes also (p. 17) that something similar is said about Assembly pay in *Ekkl.* 380–2, 547–8; but it is probably being said to intensify the picture of widespread and serious poverty that the play presents, rather than to justify the continuation of Assembly pay.

<sup>15</sup> *Knights* 51, 255, 798–807, 1359; *Wasps* 300, 606–9, 661–4, 700–12; *Lys.* 624; *Frogs* 1466. See de Ste. Croix (1972) 357, 362.

<sup>16</sup> See n. 8 above.

payments to office-holders (except ambassadors<sup>17</sup>—but ambassadors, being chosen by election and not by lot, were normally men active in politics). And soldiers, sailors, and rowers on active service are a different matter altogether; their pay is thoroughly earned, and it is a disgrace if they do not receive it promptly when it is due.<sup>18</sup> Similarly the building and maintenance of a strong navy is seen as a praiseworthy use of public money which would otherwise have been 'squandered' on three-obol doles.<sup>19</sup>

2. The alternative democracy will rigorously repress *sykophancy* or malicious prosecution. *Sykophancy*, of course, is in the eye of the beholder; indeed one very reasonable definition of a *sykophant* is 'a prosecutor, if the defendant or a friend of his is speaking'. But the Aristophanic *sykophant* is typically one who attacks *the rich* in the hope of winning a share of any fine or confiscation, or of being bought off with a bribe;<sup>20</sup> poor Athenians doubt-[199]less knew that they were supposed to hate *sykophancy*<sup>21</sup> (indeed they had put it on the books as a crime),<sup>22</sup> but they would not normally themselves have experienced it.

3. The alternative democracy will reject *leaders of low social status* and turn instead to the well-born and well-educated.<sup>23</sup> In *Knights*, when the Sausage-seller says he does not see himself as 'worthy to hold great power', this at once arouses the suspicion that he has

<sup>17</sup> *Ach.* 66–7, 137, 597–619.

<sup>18</sup> *Ach.* 162–3; *Knights* 1078–9, 1366–8. See de Ste. Croix (1972) 357.

<sup>19</sup> *Knights* 1350–5, *Frogs* 1463–6.

<sup>20</sup> *Knights* 258–65, 326; *Wasps* 240–1, 288–9; *Peace* 639–40. Cf. de Ste. Croix (1972) 362–3 n. 10.

<sup>21</sup> Though they also knew (cf. *Wealth* 914–19) that law enforcement would be impossible without the volunteer prosecutor (*ὁ βουλόμενος*)—and 'volunteer prosecutor' and 'sykophant' were almost, though not quite, the same thing viewed from different angles. To this extent R. G. Osborne (1990) is right.

<sup>22</sup> E. M. Harris <at the Chieti conference suggested>\* that the law making *sykophancy* a prosecutable offence (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43, 5, cf. Aischines 2.145) was a fourth-century innovation aimed at remedying a perceived weakness in the fifth-century Athenian judicial system; but it was certainly in force very soon after the democratic restoration of 403 (Lys. 13.67), and I agree with Harvey (1990) 106 and Dunbar (1995) 683 that Peisetairos' advice to the *sykophant* in *Birds* (1448–50) to turn to 'a lawful activity' probably implies that *sykophancy* was already a crime by 414.

<sup>23</sup> See de Ste. Croix (1972) 357, 358–9; Spielvogel (2003), esp. pp. 9 and 21–2.

'something good on [his] conscience' and he is asked whether he comes of 'good, upright stock'; he replies that he is of thoroughly bad birth and barely literate, and is told that he has everything necessary for political success—except that it's a pity he's literate at all.<sup>24</sup> In the parabasis of *Frogs*<sup>25</sup> an elaborate comparison between politicians and coins leads to the conclusion that the Athenians should jettison their current leaders and 'honour the honest', namely those who are 'well-born, virtuous . . . fine upstanding men, reared in wrestling-schools and choruses and culture'. Once again, this kind of language does not *in itself* point to a particular group: every politician and lawcourt speaker in Athens tried his best, when opportunity offered, to portray his opponents as ill-born, ill-educated, of doubtful citizenship, and so on.<sup>26</sup> But when we find that in the same parabasis of *Frogs* the two politicians who get a hostile mention by name are Kleophon<sup>27</sup>—put to death early in 404 because the anti-democratic conspirators of those days saw him as the main obstacle to their success<sup>28</sup>—and the [200] apparently hawkish Kleigenes,<sup>29</sup> and that the parabasis also contains an eloquent plea for the restoration of political rights to disfranchised former supporters of the Four Hundred,<sup>30</sup> we can draw our own conclusions.

4. The alternative democracy will seek *peace with Sparta*:\* this is of course the main theme of *Acharnians*, *Peace*, and *Lysistrata*, but it also features in *Knights* (792–809, cf. 1394–5) and *Frogs* (1531–3, cf. 715).<sup>31</sup> I emphasize that it is only towards Sparta that Aristophanes champions a pacific policy:<sup>32</sup> to present him as a patron saint of any kind of movement that opposes war in principle is as naïve and

<sup>24</sup> *Knights* 177–93; cf. 217–19, 733–40.

<sup>25</sup> *Frogs* 718–37; cf. 1442–59.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Lys.* 13.63, 30.2; *Aischines* 2.22, 78, 87, 93, 171, 3.171–3; *Dem.* 18.127–31, 256–66, 19.199, 249, 22.61, 25.30, 65, 78; see Dover (1974) 30–5.

<sup>27</sup> *Frogs* 678–85; cf. 1504, 1532–3.

<sup>28</sup> *Lys.* 13.7–12, 30.10–13. On the possible connection between Kleophon's condemnation and the second performance of *Frogs*, see Salviati (1989) and Ch. 13 below, pp. 259–62, 268–9.

<sup>29</sup> *Frogs* 706–17; in 714–15 Kleigenes is called *οὐκ εἰρηνικός* 'no peacenik'.

<sup>30</sup> *Frogs* 686–705.

<sup>31</sup> See de Ste. Croix (1972) 358, 363–70.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Storey (2003) 334.



misguided as such movements often are in any case.<sup>33</sup> In *Peace* explicitly (1081–2), and in *Lysistrata* by clear implication (cf. especially 1176–81), peace between Athens and Sparta is to lead to their joint hegemony over the other Greeks, a hegemony that could only be maintained by force or the constant threat of force. In *Acharnians* the famous ‘anti-war’ speech by the hero (497–556) is not in fact an anti-war speech at all; it is designed to show, not that Athens had been wrong to go to war with Sparta, but that Sparta had been right to go to war with Athens!<sup>34</sup> It is instructive, too, to look at the one complete Aristophanic play we possess that was written and produced at a time when Athens was *not* at war with Sparta,<sup>35</sup> namely *Birds*—[201] and to find that the mood is cheerfully bellicose throughout: the terrible fate of Melos is material for a joke (186), a teenage tearaway is sent to work off his aggression on the Greeks and natives of the Thracian region (1360–71), and the only thing wrong with the Sicilian expedition is that Nikias is taking unreasonably long to get a result (639–40). Only in relation to Sparta is the avoidance, or the ending, of war considered an absolute imperative—even when

<sup>33</sup> This remark was meant as a topical allusion, the paper having been presented on 10 April 2003, the day after the capture of Baghdad, and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in Iraq, by an American–British invasion that was condemned by many well-meaning lovers of peace and democracy in many parts of the world. A month earlier, on and around 3 March, there had been held a worldwide ‘peace’ demonstration consisting of numerous public readings of *Lysistrata* (there were at least 26 such events in the Chicago area alone); as I write, information about it is still posted at [www.lysistrataproject.com](http://www.lysistrataproject.com) and many other websites.\* Some of the readings used one or another of the translations I have published at different times; I was not asked for my permission, and would not have given it.

<sup>34</sup> In 524–39 it is explained how the war allegedly arose from quarrels between Athens and Megara culminating in the ‘Megarian decree’ and the Athenian rejection of Sparta’s repeated requests (δεομένων πολλάκις) for its repeal. Then Dikaiopolis continues: ‘Someone will say “they shouldn’t have done”; but tell me, what *should* they have done?’ (540), and argues (541–56) that at the least interference by Sparta with the pettiest state allied to Athens, Athens would have flown to arms instantly: ‘do we think that Telephos [i.e. the Spartans] would not?’

<sup>35</sup> Although Athens considered that the Spartans had violated the Peace of Nikias as far back as 419/18 (Thuc. 5.56.1–3), and Athenians had fought Spartans at Mantinea a few months later, it was not till early in 414 that the Spartans decided to renew the war (Thuc. 6.93.1–3), and this did not become known to the Athenians until Gylippos reached Italy some months later (Thuc. 6.104.3), well after the performance of *Birds*—and even then it was not at first taken seriously.

in the same breath it is admitted, or not denied, that a Spartan's pledged word is not worth the papyrus it's written on!<sup>36</sup>

I could go further, but these are the main features, and they constitute, quite clearly, the skeleton of an *anti-democratic* programme.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, all of them find a place in the rambling diatribe of the 'Old Oligarch',<sup>38</sup> and all of them figured in either the policy or the propaganda of one or both of the successful oligarchic conspiracies of the late fifth century before, or shortly after, they assumed power. At the Kolonos assembly in early summer of 411, three motions were passed in quick succession: (1) that no motion put at this meet-[202]ing could be challenged for illegality, (2) that there should be *no public pay for office-holding* (this would apply to jurors—but not to soldiers and sailors on active service), and (3) that a body of four hundred should immediately be chosen to govern at their discretion until they saw fit to convene 'the five thousand'.<sup>39</sup> The oligarchs had already removed by assassination the man they regarded as the leading demagogue of the moment, Androkles, and several others

<sup>36</sup> This is usually said by opponents of peace (the Acharnians, *Ach.* 308; the average Athenian, *Peace* 217–18; Hierokles, *Peace* 1063–8, 1083, 1086; the men's chorus, *Lys.* 628–9). But it is never explicitly denied; a Spartan is made to admit (*Lys.* 1268) that Sparta as well as Athens has its 'wily foxes'; the god Hermes says that the most powerful of the Spartans are 'avaricious and treacherous towards outsiders' (*Peace* 622–4); and Lysistrata thinks it necessary to take hostages (*Lys.* 244) to ensure that the Spartans and their allies carry out their part of her plan.\*

<sup>37</sup> I fully agree with Harris (2005) that one can criticize aspects of the functioning of a democratic state without criticizing democracy itself; citizens of modern democracies are doing this all the time, and Harris (see also Rhodes (2005)) has presented ample evidence of the *demos'* readiness to accept improvements in its organization and procedure. However, it was *only* oligarchic regimes that sought to abolish jury pay; while Assembly pay, once introduced in the early fourth century, was repeatedly *increased*, reaching six to nine obols by the 320s (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 62.2). When the fourth-century democracy wished to economize on jury pay, rather than reduce the pay rate it would impose a moratorium on certain types of court cases (*Dem.* 39.17, 45.4); it was better, apparently, that the administration of justice should for a time be partly suspended than that it should be administered by un- or under-paid jurors.

<sup>38</sup> Jury-pay: [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.16. Sykophancy: *ibid.* 1.14. Leaders of low social status: *ibid.* 1.6–7; 2.19. Hawkishness of (urban) *demos*: *ibid.* 2.14. Spielvogel (n. 14) rightly points to differences in approach between the Old Oligarch and Aristophanes, but does not consider to what extent these may be due to the fact that the former is addressing himself to the like-minded, the latter to the general public.

<sup>39</sup> *Thuc.* 8.67.2–3.

(including the exiled Hyperbolos),<sup>40</sup> just as their successors were to get rid of Kleophon several years later, and they moved to start peace negotiations as soon as they took power;<sup>41</sup> the Thirty, of course, were installed in power, under Spartan eyes, as a *result* of the conclusion of peace—and almost the first thing *they* did, to general approval, was to arrest and execute some of the most notorious sykophants.<sup>42</sup>

I am not positively asserting that Aristophanes was a closet oligarch.<sup>43</sup> I am saying that there were certain policies that he supported which were also supported by oligarchs, and which they seemed to believe (in most cases probably rightly) would never be accepted in a democratically ruled Athens. Aristophanes may have thought as they did, or he may have been more optimistic. I don't know, and I don't see how we can know. Perhaps, but only perhaps, Aristophanes' alternative democracy for the real world was after all an alternative *to* democracy the whole time. I want now to turn to the alternative *to* democracy that we meet in his fantasy worlds.<sup>44</sup>

This alternative is, quite simply, absolute monarchy. A hero or heroine takes the reins into their hands and does as they please, and provided it is done for the general benefit and not just for the hero's own, they are always successful. And what's more, they win the approval and acclaim of the public—but only in retrospect. No attempt is made to secure public approval in advance by legitimate methods; the people are either bypassed, or deceived, [203] or coerced. And the hero ends up in a position of supreme power, with titles and honours like those of a monarch or a god.

<sup>40</sup> Thuc. 8.65.2; 8.73.3.

<sup>41</sup> Thuc. 8.70.2–71.1; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 32.3. Cf. Heftner (2005) 99–100.

<sup>42</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.12; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 35.3.

<sup>43</sup> de Ste. Croix (1972) 357, with whose general position I am in close agreement, says that 'there is no indication at all that [Aristophanes] was an oligarch, in the literal sense of wanting to restrict the franchise and . . . reduce the lower classes to complete political subjection'. That there is no *open* indication of such views is hardly surprising: so far as we can tell, no one in democratic Athens ever did indicate openly, in speeches publicly delivered or poetry publicly performed, that he held anti-democratic views, except at moments when it seemed a safe assumption that the democratic régime would soon be overthrown.

<sup>44</sup> I have provided a fuller discussion of the fantasy *poleis* created in *Birds* and *Ekklesiazousai*, incorporating some of the material that follows, in Sommerstein (2005).

This happens three times in Aristophanes' surviving plays: in *Birds*, *Lysistrata*, and *Ekklesiazousai*. It is no coincidence that the world of these plays is not, as in most of Aristophanes' other comedies, the world of male Athenian citizens, but in two cases mainly a world of women and in the third a world of birds.<sup>45</sup> Only in one of the three, *Lysistrata*, is there a chorus of male Athenians, and there it is only a half-chorus and is opposed by what are in effect no less than four separate groups of women (the chorus of old women present on stage; the other old women who have seized the Acropolis, and who sally out of it at 456–61 to confront the Proboulos and his archers; the young Athenian wives who run the sexual boycott; and the women from Sparta and elsewhere, some of whom remain in Athens as hostages and are present in the first and last scenes of the play). If the male citizen body is to be persuaded, as in most of the early plays and in *Wealth*, it is brought on stage as a character (Demos in *Knights*) or a chorus. If it is to be bypassed or deceived or coerced, it is kept out of sight, or at least, like the men's chorus and the Proboulos in *Lysistrata*, made to seem utterly pathetic.

Peisetairos, the hero of *Birds*, does not even pretend to try and persuade the Athenians that their institutions are not serving their best interests: he sees they are not serving his, and he leaves. He then sets up, with the aid of the birds, the new *polis* of Cloudcuckooville in the skies. At first the constitution of this *polis* remains rather vague, though it may be significant that as early as line 815 Peisetairos is speaking of it as 'my city', but in 1123 he is given the title of 'ruler' (*archon*); in 1274–5 he is presented with (and presumably thereafter wears) a golden crown; towards the end of the play he demands and eventually receives a divine bride, and when he returns with her to Cloudcuckooville he is hailed as its *tyrannos* (1708). This *polis* is very definitely a monarchy. It is true that according to him, the birds he is cooking when the divine embassy arrives are 'some birds who have been found guilty of rebellion against the bird democracy' (1583–5), but everywhere else (once his colleague Euelpides has been sent off on a set of menial errands) Peisetairos behaves as an absolute ruler

<sup>45</sup> These three are, in fact, all and only the surviving Aristophanic plays in which (i) the hero and/or at least half the chorus are mortal beings other than male Athenian citizens and (ii) the comic project is successful.

(from line 837 to the end of the play he at no time seeks the advice or consent of the chorus), and the supposed rebellion can be no more than a pretext: Peisetairos is cooking these birds because he wants a meal—and far from protesting, the birds only adulate him the more. [204] But he is the ruler of men now, as well as of birds, and over men he rules with their consent. Not that he *asked* for it: he just sent a herald to mortals (844, 1269) to *tell* them ‘that the birds are kings, and so in future they should sacrifice to the birds’ (561–3)—which in practice means to him, since he is now king of the birds. They were delighted none the less, as the herald reports on his return, and Peisetairos’ golden crown is a spontaneous gift from them. Like Trygaios in *Peace*, Peisetairos by unilateral action has achieved something that he knows all men desire—in this case, liberation from the oppressive rule of the gods; like Trygaios, he wins their admiration and honour; unlike Trygaios, he acquires and retains autocratic power over them, to become in the final scene a new edition of Zeus, re-enacting his wedding procession, holding his thunderbolt (1714, 1745–7, cf. 1538), dwelling in his palace (1757), and acclaimed, in the last words of the play, as the ‘most exalted of gods’. A more monarchic monarchy is impossible to imagine.

Lysistrata is a very different character from Peisetairos, but she too achieves what she perceives to be for the general good without any attempt to seek the consent of the community (that is, of the men) and indeed against their evident and clearly expressed wishes (as witness the men’s chorus and the Proboulos; even Kinesias, despite the intensity of his frustrated desires, is far from enthusiastic about peace when pressed on the subject at 901–2 and 951).<sup>46</sup> She does this by straightforward coercion, sexual and financial. She too is recognized by men in the end as having acted in their best interests; even before the peace is actually concluded Athenians and Spartans are already talking about themselves, together, as ‘we’ (six times in 1097–1106), and after it is made they are bosom friends (1225–46). And she too ends by being assimilated to a divinity (in her case Athena).<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Both his answers are evasive: at 901–2 ‘we’ll do that [make peace] if we so decide’ (to which his wife rejoins ‘then I’ll return home *if* [and only if] you so decide’); at 951 ‘I’ll think it over’ (to which his wife’s rejoinder is to run away).

<sup>47</sup> *Lys.* 1273–90; see the addenda to *Lysistrata* in Sommerstein (2001) 302–3 (drawing on Sibley (1995)).

She has achieved one of Aristophanes' favourite policy objectives—peace and friendship with Sparta—and has won approval and acclaim in the end; but she has done it by force. One is tempted to call it a political reverse rape.

The heroine of *Ekklesiazousai*, Praxagora, has a recipe for saving Athens that is very different from anything seen in Aristophanes' earlier plays—so different indeed that the most widespread scholarly opinion is that it is to be interpreted ironically.<sup>48</sup> Whether or not that is the case, one thing certainly [205] remains unchanged: the male Athenian citizen body is not asked for its consent. The Assembly meeting which votes to hand over power to the women is packed with voters who are women in disguise (and many of the men, two of whom we meet on-stage, have been prevented from attending because their wives have 'borrowed' their clothes (351–3)); the 'young man' who argues eloquently for the proposal is himself, or rather herself, one of these women; and his (her) speech contained, so far as we are told, no hint of the revolutionary plan (for the abolition of private property and marriage, and an equal-opportunity, affirmative-action policy on sex) that Praxagora unveils once safely in command. The men have been conned. When Praxagora presents her scheme for a new society in detail, it does, to be sure, win the approval of the two men present (710); but then there *are* only two of them (in contrast with *Acharnians*, *Wasps*, *Peace*, and *Wealth* where the hero either has or gains the support of a whole chorus) and they are unrepresentative (being poor, ugly, and old, all categories that stand to gain under the new dispensation). That is before the scheme has been implemented. Later on, as the scheme comes into operation, we begin to hear evidence of somewhat wider male acceptance of it (805–6, 846–50); by 1132–3 Blepyros is 'the only one who hasn't had his dinner'—and dinner was available only to those who handed in their property. We may well not think much of their reasons for acceptance; so far as we can gather, these were mainly (1) that there wasn't much alternative, (2) the prospect of free meals, (3) the abolition of work for men (461,

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Flashar (1967); Saïd (1979); Foley (1982); Taaffe (1993) 123–9; Hubbard (1997); Reinders (2001) 243–79; *contra*, Sommerstein (1984*b*); Sommerstein (1998*b*) 11–22; MacDowell (1995) 312–23; Slater (1997). Von Möllendorff (2002) 117–24 (cf. too Ruffell (2006)) considers both views and suggests that the ambiguity may be designed.

605, 651–2), and (4) for the old and ugly, the promised sexual privileges. Still, they have accepted it, and they have also accepted Praxagora's rule. And it very definitely *is* Praxagora's rule. The new 'Gynaikopolis', as we might call it, is no more ruled by the women than Cloudduckoooville is ruled by the birds. They have already elected Praxagora to be General in the event of the plot succeeding (246–7)—and that does not mean, as it would have meant in the old Athens, that she will be one member of a board of ten; 'general' means *sole* general, the same position to which a certain Dionysios had been elected at Syracuse in 406 (D.S. 13.95.1). When the women come back from the Assembly meeting they are already referring to her by this title (491, 500); when she appears she promptly begins giving them orders, and they make it clear (514–16) that orders are what they expect from her. She asks them to act as her 'advisers' (518), but this seems to be purely an excuse to keep them on-stage as a chorus; they do give her some (unsolicited, and not very helpful) [206] advice at 571–82, but thereafter they are completely ignored, and at 725 Praxagora goes off to the Agora on her own to take charge of the surrender of goods and preparations for the dinner. She never returns, but at 1112 her maidservant does, to launch into an extravagant *makarismos* of her and everyone connected with her: all are happy, but 'my mistress [is] happiest of all', and even those who are merely 'standing near [her] door' can pick up the contagion, as it were, of her blessedness (1114). Another detail also points to a status for her that is not at all like that of a magistrate in a constitutional state. In Athens no public office, with one exception, conferred on the *spouse* of its holder any special status at all; the exception was the office of *basileus*, in classical times no more than the archon in charge of religious affairs, but the successor in title, and in some cultic functions, to the ancient kings of Athens. Kings always had queens, and the *basileus* had (indeed, was required by law to have) a *basilinna* who had ritual duties of her own.<sup>49</sup> And in this respect Praxagora resembles a king—or a tyrant. Blepyros looks forward to being pointed out as 'the General's husband' (726), and is referred to as such later (1126), even though under the new dispensation marriage itself is supposed to have been abolished.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. [Dem.] 59.72–84, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 3.5.

Since *Birds*, *Lysistrata*, and *Ekklesiazousai* are plays of Aristophanes' middle and late periods, and since in four of his five surviving plays earlier than *Birds* an individual or group representative of the Athenian people is brought on stage and persuaded of the rightness of the hero's plan,<sup>50</sup> one might be tempted to put forward a chronological, developmental explanation: a youthful Aristophanes, eager for combat with the likes of Kleon and willing to run considerable risks in the process, and confident in (or at least hopeful of) the support of his public if he can only persuade it, gives place to a mature and more disillusioned poet who sees the Athenian people as being beyond persuasion and suspects they can be saved only against their will (to quote *Lys.* 499–501). We know of others who thought the same in the last decades of the fifth century, from Theramenes to Socrates—and, at least in retrospect, Thucydides.<sup>51</sup> But this neat schema is ruled out by the latest play in the corpus, *Wealth*, whose hero, Chremylos, having formed the plan of curing Wealth of his blindness and thus enabling him to benefit the virtuous and shun the wicked, immediately communicates it to his friends<sup>52</sup> who enthusiastically support him, before he takes any action at all. Rather we must suppose that throughout his career, Aristophanes always conceived himself to have the *choice* between a hero who persuaded the people by argument and one who persuaded them (if at all) by results, the choice between a hero who helped make Athens into an alternative, ideal democracy and one who created an alternative *to* democracy under his or her own individual rule.<sup>53</sup> The first kind of hero is always an Athenian man showing other Athenian men the way forward. The second kind never is. There were some utterances

<sup>50</sup> The odd play out is *Clouds*, in which the plan is a failure.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. respectively Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.16–17; Pl. *Apol.* 29c–32a; Thuc. 2.22.1; 2.65.5–13.

<sup>52</sup> First the chorus (*Wealth* 222–6, 253–331) and then Blepsidemus (335–45); the latter takes some persuading that Chremylos' new-found wealth is not the result of some crime, but once convinced of this he is eager to proceed with the plan as quickly as possible (406–14).

<sup>53</sup> For what it is worth, Eupolis' *Demes* appears to have fallen into the first category, with a chorus which, though it does not strictly speaking consist of male Athenian citizens, at any rate represents the male Athenian citizen body, and which enthusiastically supports the hero's project to restore the past virtues and glories of Athens. *Demes* is usually dated to 412, but Storey (2003) favours 417, and my student Giulia Torello (2006) argues for Lenaia 414, two months before *Birds*.



in Athens that were illegal (for example, a false public allegation of murder)<sup>54</sup> and some that were just inadvisable. Even if one's aim was fundamental political change, it was normally inadvisable to avow it (as the very success of Praxagora illustrates). And it was also inadvisable to present as an ideal, even in fantasy, a situation in which one citizen of the Athenian *polis* lorded it monarchically over other citizens of the Athenian *polis*. So far as we can tell, Aristophanes never did either.

## DISCUSSION

[229] *Lucio Bertelli*: I have very much appreciated this mapping of the political topics of Aristophanes' attitude towards democracy. I wonder only about this systematization in such form of these issues. Perhaps it appears as a real political <programme>, systematized as you have made these issues of Aristophanes they appear as a real political programme. Two problems remain open, first, do you think that Aristophanes has in mind something as a man of this sort, to propose to his public—something similar to a political programme... something similar, not a political programme <but> a political suggestion in a reformistic direction? Second problem. The alternative to democracy is mostly in the hands of the women: do you think this is a mark of ἀδύνατον, of utopianism <on> the part of Aristophanes?

*AHS*: On the first point I do not think that I would say exactly that. If he had want-[230]ed to propose a political programme he would have done it in another form. On the other hand we do know that on one occasion at any rate, that is to say after the *Frogs*, a policy suggestion commended in that play was put into practice not very long afterwards and the poet was officially awarded an honour for it.\* So it could happen, <but> that was an exception, in what was almost literally a life or death situation. On the second point, yes, I think

<sup>54</sup> I have discussed these prohibitions, and comedy's comportment towards them, in Sommerstein (2004b), with references to earlier studies.

I am on the whole suggesting this. As I said at the beginning, the 'alternative to democracy' is normally only imaginable in a fantasy world and the result of the combination of elements of fantasy with elements of topicality, and that is why it tends to happen not in a world of Athenian men, but in a world of women and birds.

*Martin Ostwald:* Do you have any comments on the interpretation of Aristophanes proposed by Michael Vickers,\* <namely> that the various characters represent actual historical figures who reflect ideological tensions among Aristophanes' contemporaries?

*AHS:* I had hoped that no one would mention Vickers, because it would make it necessary for me to express an opinion. I would merely say that with the kind of evidence that he presents and the way he deploys it, I think one could prove absolutely anything.

*Martin Ostwald:* It has been observed, I believe by the late George Forrest,\* that the representatives of the conventional democracy are usually the older men whereas the young people favour some kind of change, usually on the side of a more oligarchical stripe. For example, we have a Strepsiades opposed to his son Pheidippides in the *Clouds*, a Philokleon to a Bdelykleon in the *Wasps*, etc. That is a point that might be pursued.

*AHS:* I'm not quite sure how far I would want to go. There is a distinct tension in [231] Aristophanic comedy, into which I obviously don't have time to go on this occasion, with, on the one hand, the association you mention between rich young men and anti-democratic tendencies, and on the other hand comedy's high evaluation of the old, linked with the theme of rejuvenation, which frequently results in the innovative hero being an old man (Dikaio-polis, Trygaios, Peisetairos, Chremylos). This whole complex of ideas is something about which I definitely need to think further.

*Martin Ostwald:* Thank you. I appreciate your point.

*Mario Lombardo:* I would like to submit to you a question about some of the points you have underlined in Aristophanic plots about 'alternative democracies'. Some of these points remind us, I think, of the old 'good' democracy of Cimonian times, perhaps the pre-Periclean democracy without pay for the jury. I want to ask you if you don't see in these plays something of a *laudatio temporis acti*, a reminder of the ancient <'good'> democracy, when Athens was <at> peace with Sparta, Cimon was the (aristocratic) leader and

public money was not <ex>pended, like in Pericles' times, for perhaps too <many> things.

AHS: I believe that possibly, had the phrase *patrios politeia* been susceptible of being put into comic verse, Aristophanes might have used it, and I had myself described his political position as Cimonian before I realized that the same term had been applied to him by de Ste. Croix too.\* One can only say that those who put forward that kind of position as a political programme in the late fifth century might well come under suspicion of being pro-Spartan, and that there had been such a faction ready to intrigue with Sparta as early as the [232] 450s, although Cimon, we are told, had refused to associate himself with them.

Paola Ceccarelli: I find your distinction between two alternative models in Aristophanes entirely convincing. I am referring to the distinction you draw between on the one hand the fairly realistic (if nostalgic) representation of the 'good life', which one could read as Aristophanes' view of Athenian democracy as it once was (at, say, the time of Marathon), and, on the other, the <wildly> unrealistic utopias that one finds for example in *Birds* or *Ekklesiazousae*. But I am not so convinced by your interpretation of the politics of the latter model. With Bakhtin, one could argue (and many scholars have actually argued) that this second model is meant to reinforce the status quo, by offering a carnivalesque reading of it.

AHS: Yes, this notion that the presentation of an alternative, a radical utopian alternative, serves to reinforce the *status quo* is certainly one that has been widely put forward. I think it would only work if the radical utopian alternative is so designed that it is *easily perceived* to be damaging in its consequences; and while one could argue whether or not that is the case in the *Ecclesiazusae*, it's certainly not clear to me that the life of the male citizen is worse at the end of *Birds*, let alone *Lysistrata*, than it is at the beginning.

Edmond Lévy: I want to say that we have in Aristophanes some kind of ambiguity, because Aristophanes is criticizing the state of affairs but he's also criticizing the possibility of correcting this. He presents utopia just like a utopia: so we have for example the critique of demagogues and sycophants and so on, but he thinks that after Cleon we'll have an order that is still worse. In the *Ploutos*, very well, he condemns the poverty in Athens, but he thinks that the solutions

that are proposed are contradictions in terms, it's impossible to do what is proposed, Aristophanes knows it, so I think we have a pessimistic presentation of things, because things are bad and their evolution is bad, but we have nothing to put in their place.

[233]AHS: Again I'm not sure it is by any means clear to the average spectator that the last state in *Ploutos* is worse than the first. I have discussed this and the *Ekklesiazousai* in 'Aristophanes and the demon Poverty' (Sommerstein (1984a)). As far as *Knights* is concerned, that play certainly assumes that Kleon can be overthrown only by a super-Kleon or if you prefer by an infra-Kleon. In the play, though, this super-demagogue magically becomes a brilliant saviour, and while it may seem incredibly simplistic to believe such a thing possible, we know from catastrophic experience that not only irresponsible satirists but hard-bitten politicians *can* believe it, and act on it too.<sup>55</sup>

#### ADDENDA

p. 208 n. 22 In the original publication I referred here to Harris (2005), which appeared in the same volume; but that does not contain the suggestion here attributed to him, which should therefore not be regarded as his considered view.

p. 209 peace with Sparta: but not at any price; see Chapter 11 below.

p. 210 n. 33 The Lysistrata Project's website is now at [www.lysistrataproject.org](http://www.lysistrataproject.org), and the page referring to the play-reading event is no longer available.

<sup>55</sup> This paper was first published in U. Bultrighini (ed.), *Democrazia e antidemocrazia nel mondo greco: Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Chieti, 9–11 aprile 2003* (Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2005) 195–207 (discussion, pp. 229–33). Reprinted here by kind permission of Edizioni dell'Orso. I have lightly edited some of the discussants' contributions where the published text (evidently transcribed from a sound recording) is not readily intelligible; these interventions are marked by angle brackets.

- p. 211 n. 36 In fact the Spartans seem to have been scrupulous about literal fulfilment of their sworn (though only their sworn) word, but also to have been past masters of using oaths to mislead by equivocation and ambiguity; see Bayliss (forthcoming).
- p. 218 honours for Ar. after *Frogs*: see Chapter 13 below.
- p. 219 Michael Vickers: for example in Vickers (1997).
- p. 219 George Forrest: the reference is probably to Forrest (1963) 11 n. 25.
- p. 220 Ar. the 'Cimonian': de Ste. Croix (1972) 358. If I did use the term independently, it cannot have been in print; the earliest instance I can trace of my doing so, in Sommerstein (1977*b*) 121, explicitly refers to de Ste. Croix.

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## Lysistrata the warrior

*Lysistrata* is Aristophanes' great peace play, of course. Everyone knows that, even those who know very little else about Aristophanes; the play has been performed countless times as an act of protest against this, that, or the other use of military force, from Vietnam to Iraq,<sup>1</sup> and on one day in March 2003 there were twenty-six public readings of the play in the Chicago area alone as part of a worldwide protest action called the Lysistrata Project.<sup>2</sup> Over the first seven years of the present millennium, the Oxford *Archive of Performances of Greek and Roman Drama* records 44 productions of *Lysistrata* (or adaptations thereof) in all countries, nearly three times as many as for any other Aristophanic play and more than for the three old favourites, *Birds*, *Frogs*, and *Clouds*, put together;<sup>3</sup> and of course that means a good many more than 44 actual performances. And while the play's sexual theme no doubt accounts for some part of this popularity, it is likely to have been of very secondary significance; *Ecclesiazusae*, which also has a sexual theme, received just six productions. *Lysistrata* is a hit because it is thought of—along with that very different work, Euripides' *Trojan Women*—as *the* anti-war drama of antiquity, and its author—in the words of his finest present-day French interpreter, Pascal Thiercy<sup>4</sup>—as 'le grand poète pacifiste'.

<sup>1</sup> And sometimes long before that. I discuss two sharply contrasting exploitations of *Lysistrata* (one acknowledged, one not) by the same modern author, in 1938 and 1944 respectively, in Sommerstein (2007b).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ch. 10 above (p. 210 n. 33 and Addenda).

<sup>3</sup> Information from <http://www.apgrd.ox.ac.uk/asp/BookSearch.asp> (accessed 7 Jan. 2008). The full figures for 2001–7 were: *Lysistrata* 44 productions, *Birds* 17, *Frogs* 15, *Clouds* 10, *Acharnians* and *Thesmophoriazusae* 8 each, *Ecclesiazusae* 6, *Peace* and *Wealth* 4 each, *Knights* and *Wasps* 3 each—in total 122.

<sup>4</sup> In an e-mail to me in March 2003.

What I am going to argue in this paper is that this has very little to do with anything in *Lysistrata* itself. I have no idea what Lysistrata's attitude, or Aristophanes', would have been to modern conflicts fought in a world whose politics, and whose technology, they could never have imagined in their wildest fantasies. But neither of them can reasonably be regarded as an unconditional opponent of war and violence under all circumstances (which is what I take 'pacifist' to mean), or even as an unconditional advocate of ending the current war against Sparta.

To begin with the weaker claim. To start with, Lysistrata herself is quite prepared to order the actual use of violence, as when she gives military orders to 'four . . . companies of fully armed fighting women' (453–4)<sup>5</sup> to attack the Scythian archers who are attempting to arrest her and her leading followers. And even her famous tactic of a sex-strike is no mere withdrawal of labour; it is presented as making itself effective through the infliction on the men of severe physical pain (845, 967, 1089–90) which is explicitly compared to the pain of someone 'being tortured on the wheel' (846). That enforced abstinence from sex (or rather from *marital* sex, this being the only kind over which the strikers have any control) could have such an effect is of course a comic absurdity; the fact remains that in the play it *does* have this effect, and it is Lysistrata's intention that it should. She is as much applying physical coercion to the men as if she had led a besieging army to blockade and starve them, or as if she had sprayed their eyes with some non-lethal but painful chemical.<sup>6</sup>

However, 'that singular anomaly the violent pacifist' (to re-adapt a line of W. S. Gilbert's *Mikado* that has been adapted dozens of times before)<sup>7</sup> is a figure that we are all familiar with and for whom we are

<sup>5</sup> Henceforward all references by line number alone are to *Lysistrata*; unless otherwise stated, translations of this and other Aristophanic plays are taken from the volumes of my *Comedies of Aristophanes*.

<sup>6</sup> In *Frogs* 1437–41 Euripides suggests this as a tactic for naval warfare: 'If someone equipped Cleocritus with a pair of wings in the shape of Cinesias, and made him rise aloft on the breezes over the sea's flat expanses . . . if they carried vinegar-cruets, and then when they were fighting a naval battle, they sprayed it in the enemy's eyes.'

<sup>7</sup> This line (one of the entries in the 'little list of society offenders who . . . never would be missed' kept by Ko-Ko, the Lord High Executioner) was originally (in 1885) 'that singular anomaly, the lady novelist'; Gilbert himself substituted various alternatives in later years, and the line has often since been regarded as freely adaptable.

usually prepared to make allowances; and there is certainly a big difference between the kinds of violence Lysistrata practises, which are never going to be fatal to anyone, and the kinds routinely practised in actual warfare. But then it turns out that Lysistrata is not a straightforward hater of actual warfare, either.

Of course the women are consistently and passionately eager for the current war against Sparta to be brought to an end. There are, however, a considerable number of references in the play to military actions conducted in the past, or anticipated in the future, by the Athenian people and/or its allies against opponents *other* than Sparta. And *every one of these references is a favourable one*. And I am not speaking here of remarks made by the bellicose (and often stupid) male characters who deride and resist the heroine and her supporters. I am speaking of things that are said by Lysistrata herself, by her confederates, and later by Athenian and Spartan men who have accepted her demands and agreed to make peace with each other.

Most of these references are to past, or prospective, wars against Persia. To be sure, the Persian War of 480–479 was a defensive one, and it is likely, though it is not made explicit, that the future war against Persia envisaged in line 1133<sup>8</sup> is being thought of as defensive too. But to a genuine pacifist, that should be neither here nor there; and in any case the *first* time the women mention the Persian War, at 653, it is not as a patriotic struggle for independence but as a source of material gain, as having enabled Athens to enrich herself<sup>9</sup> (probably referring to the tribute paid by her allies,<sup>10</sup> many of whom had previously been paying it to the Persians). Later, too, when one of the Spartan men offers to sing a song ‘in honour of both the Athenians and ourselves’ (1243–4), one might have expected him to choose a subject appropriate to the mood of the moment, which is one of convivial celebration; and he does indeed end (1262–72) by calling

<sup>8</sup> ‘You . . . are now engaged, *though enemies are at hand with their barbarian hosts* (ἐχθρῶν παρόντων βαρβάρῳ στρατεύματι), in destroying Greek men and Greek cities’ (1133–4).

<sup>9</sup> ‘You wretched old men have . . . squandered the fund that came to you from your grandfathers, from the war with the Medes’ (652–4).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Wasps* 1114–16 ‘there are drones sitting among us [who] stay at home and eat up our crop of tribute (τοῦ φόρου τὸν γόνον) without toiling for it’.



on Artemis to bless the newly-made peace treaty ‘with everlasting friendship and prosperity’—but up to that point his song has been about battle, about Athens’ victory (rather generously so called) at Artemisium (1251–3) and Spartan heroism at Thermopylae (1254–61).

Before that, in the course of her successful attempt to persuade the Athenians and Spartans to end their conflict, *Lysistrata* mentions other good services that the two cities had performed for each other in the past, for which each of them (she says) ought to feel gratitude and act accordingly. And each time, the service she recalls is a military one; and more than that, each time *Lysistrata* edits history to make the service more altruistic and/or more effective than in fact it was.<sup>11</sup> The Athenian service to Sparta is Cimon’s expedition in 462 to assist Sparta against the Messenians at Ithome (1138–44), which according to *Lysistrata* ‘saved all Lacedaemon’; in fact, even supposing (which is doubtful) that Sparta was still seriously threatened at that stage, Cimon *failed* to capture the rebel stronghold, and shortly thereafter the Spartans sent his army home in circumstances that made the whole affair a humiliation for Athens and especially for Cimon, who at the next opportunity was ostracized. The Spartan service to Athens was her military intervention in 510 to impose a regime change by overthrowing the tyrant Hippias; it is not mentioned that Sparta hoped and expected that this would lead to the installation of a friendly aristocratic regime, and that when Cleisthenes established a democracy instead, Sparta intervened again to prevent this. Twice over, that is, *Lysistrata* twists and spins the facts to whitewash a military action of dubious motive or consequence.

This attitude of *Lysistrata*’s is not in the least abnormal, for Aristophanes. There is no passage in any of his surviving plays in which any character expresses opposition to any past, present, or prospective war against any opponent other than Sparta—*unless* that war either (i) has already ended in obvious failure or (ii) is being used as a stick with which to beat a politician whom the dramatist detests anyway for other reasons. The Sicilian expedition nicely illustrates both the exception and the rule. In *Lysistrata* it is recalled as an utter disaster—the decision to launch it was attended by evil omens, a

<sup>11</sup> For fuller discussion of these passages see Sommerstein (1990) 213–15.

politician who advocated it (Demostratus) is cursed (391–7)—and when Lysistrata speaks of women who suffer in wartime ‘by bearing sons and sending them out as hoplites’ (589–90) and is plainly about to continue ‘never to see them again’, the Proboulos hastily interrupts her, but all he can say is ‘be quiet’, because he has no counter-argument. But that is in *Lysistrata*, after it’s all over. In *Birds*, when it is still in progress and the prospects look good, the only complaint anyone makes about the campaign is that Nicias is taking too long to win it.<sup>12</sup> Elsewhere, not only the Persian War but sundry campaigns of imperial enforcement, at Naxos or Byzantium or on Euboea,<sup>13</sup> are mentioned with pride, and Melos, scene of a massacre that was remembered as a stain on Athens’ name for generations,<sup>14</sup> becomes material for a cheery joke (*Birds* 186).

The other type of exception that I mentioned can be illustrated by the case of Hyperbolus in the second parabasis of *Knights* (1300–15). It was alleged—with what measure of truth, we have no idea—that at this time (425/4 BC) Hyperbolus was advocating a large naval expedition against Carthage, and the ships of the fleet are represented as being appalled by this proposal and ready to go to considerable lengths to frustrate it. What Aristophanes’ opinion was about the political or strategic merits of such a scheme in the abstract, we cannot tell; what we *can* say is that he always expresses hostility to *anything* that he associates with the name of Hyperbolus. It has often been observed, indeed, that he likes to wind up a list of blessings by adding ‘... and getting rid of Hyperbolus’ or words to that effect.<sup>15</sup> So if Hyperbolus was the principal advocate of a particular campaign, Aristophanes (and most other comic dramatists, for that matter)<sup>16</sup> could be guaranteed to be against it. That shows that

<sup>12</sup> ‘It’s no time for us now, by Zeus, to nod off, or to get the shilly-shallies like Nicias (μελλονικιᾶν—which can also be understood as “to be pathologically slow in gaining victory”)’ (*Birds* 638–9).

<sup>13</sup> Naxos (c.470), *Wasps* 354–5; Byzantium (478), *Wasps* 235–8; Euboea (446), *Clouds* 211–13.

<sup>14</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3; Isoc. 4.100, 110; 12.63, 89; 15.113.

<sup>15</sup> *Ach.* 845–6; *Wasps* 1007; *Peace* 921, 1319.

<sup>16</sup> Hyperbolus is known to have been satirized by at least six comic dramatists, three of whom wrote plays in which he and/or his mother were central figures; cf. *Clouds* 551–9 and see Sommerstein (1996c) 332–3, 344, Sommerstein (2000) 438–9, 440–3, and Storey (2003) 197–214, 342–4.

they disliked Hyperbolus (or wanted to be perceived as disliking him); it shows nothing about their attitude to war.

Even if we confine our consideration to the war against Sparta, Lysistrata's strategy is decidedly hard-headed. Not for her the approach of the so-called peace women of Greenham Common, with whom she and her followers were famously compared by Tony Harrison;<sup>17</sup> there is no thought of unilateral disarmament or unilateral concession. Instead, she takes no action until she has secured the agreement of women in the enemy states to take corresponding action, and even after they have not merely agreed but sworn to do so (209–237),<sup>18</sup> she still does not trust them completely and takes all but one of their representatives as hostages (244)—while surrendering none herself. Clearly she is not seeking peace at any price. Can we say, at least symbolically, what her price actually is?

Well, before the peace treaty is finally agreed there is a short bout of negotiation between the leaders of the Athenian and Spartan delegations (1161–72). Now the negotiations are not designed for one moment to be thought of as a serious piece of diplomacy; the two sides' territorial claims are mapped out on the naked (or pseudo-naked) body of a personified feminine abstraction named Reconciliation, and the particular places mentioned are chosen for the sake of a series of ingenious and hilarious anatomical double entendres. Nevertheless, the scales of advantage are decidedly tilted. The Spartan makes the first demand, for Pylos (1164). The Athenian protests, but Lysistrata tells him to hand it over and 'ask for another place in return for that one'. He goes considerably further; he asks for *three* places—Echinus, the Malian Gulf, and the Long Walls of Megara (here called the Megarian Legs). Not surprisingly, the Spartan demurs. And what does Lysistrata do? She just says 'Let it be—don't go quarrelling (*μηδὲν διαφέρου*) about a pair of legs' (1172)—and that is the end of the negotiations. That last response of Lysistrata's has its verbs in the singular, not the plural, so it is addressed to only one of the two sides; I would have thought it obvious that it is the Spartan

<sup>17</sup> Harrison (1992).

<sup>18</sup> Note that when Lysistrata bids all the women take hold of the wine-cup upon which the oath is sworn—the ritual gesture that makes them participants in the oath—she makes especially sure that the Spartan Lampito binds herself to the pledge, addressing her, and her alone, individually by name (209).

(the last previous speaker) who is being told to concede,<sup>19</sup> but at least one astute scholar, the late Antonio López Eire,<sup>20</sup> has taken it the other way, so for the sake of argument I will accept that view. In that case, the Athenians are told to drop the third of their three demands, but they are given the other two, so they gain twice as much from the negotiations as the Spartans do; what is more, the place that is 'given' to the Spartans, Pylos in Messenia, had been Spartan territory for three hundred years until captured by Cleon and Demosthenes in 425, whereas Echinus and the Malian Gulf had never been under Athenian control and they had held the Megarian Long Walls only for two short periods.<sup>21</sup> That is from the geographical point of view. From the anatomical point of view, as all recent commentators observe, the Athenians are getting exactly what they desire, since their demand is for Reconciliation's vulva (and the surrounding district) while the Spartans, in accordance with the Athenian stereotype of Spartan sexual proclivities,<sup>22</sup> want her anus, so that in the end both are satisfied (and say so, this time in agricultural language, in 1173–4)—but the Athenians will certainly feel that they have made the better bargain.

In other words, the peace Lysistrata makes, while both sides accept it, is a peace that gives more advantages to Athens than to Sparta. That was certainly not the kind of peace that anyone could remotely envisage as possible in the real world early in 411, little over a year after the Sicilian disaster. Not long afterwards, when Peisander was arguing his case in the Assembly for his plan to recall Alcibiades from exile, negotiate an alliance with Persia and, if necessary, make major constitutional changes at Athens in order to get it, and was meeting

<sup>19</sup> Most commentators and translators simply leave the question undiscussed; I am not sure whether this means that they do not wish to commit themselves, or that they think the matter too obvious to waste space on. A slight mistranslation by Halliwell (1997) 137 may be significant: he translates the first word of line 1172, *ἐὰν*, as 'O let them!' (sc. have the legs), implying that it is addressed to the Spartan, when in fact, being plural, it must be addressed to *both* the delegation leaders and mean, more vaguely, 'let it be', 'let the matter rest'.

<sup>20</sup> López Eire (1994) 249 (s.d. '*Dirigiéndose al ateniense*').

<sup>21</sup> From c.460 to 446/5 (Thuc. 1.103.4, 1.114.1–115.1), and for a brief period in 424 (Thuc. 4.66–74).

<sup>22</sup> See Dover (1978) 187–8.

fierce opposition on political and religious grounds, he challenged his opponents to explain ‘what possible hope of safety they had for the city’ if his plan was not followed, and none of them could find an answer.<sup>23</sup> Not too long after that, when the Four Hundred had come to power (but without a Persian alliance, and without Alcibiades), Peisander discovered, not with pleasure, how right he had been, when the new regime sought to open negotiations with Sparta. Their first attempt came to nothing; sending an embassy to King Agis at Deceleia, they proposed peace on the basis of the *status quo*, but Agis replied that Athens’ maritime empire must be disbanded. The negotiations broke down, and Agis marched on the city, expecting to take it without a fight; on meeting resistance, he retreated, and began to encourage the Four Hundred to send a delegation to Sparta itself.<sup>24</sup> It seems to have been some time before they actually did so, and when they did they made the blunder of sending it on a state trireme with a strongly democratic crew, and the delegation ended up in prison at Argos.<sup>25</sup> Eventually, fearing (not without reason) that their fall was imminent, the Four Hundred sent a new, high-powered delegation post-haste to Sparta with instructions ‘at all costs to make any terms with the Spartans that were in any way endurable’. According to Thucydides<sup>26</sup> they—or at least the extremist faction among them—had three negotiating positions: firstly, the terms that Agis had originally rejected, with Athens allowed to retain control of its allies; secondly, if this was refused, at least for Athens to be independent and retain its walls and fleet; and thirdly, if even that failed, they were willing to accept any terms at all, even including a Spartan occupation of Athens, if only they could save their own skins. The delegation came home ‘having secured no terms on which all were willing to settle’;<sup>27</sup> which implies, as many scholars have seen,<sup>28</sup> that they *had* secured terms on which *some of them* were willing to settle—in other words, that ‘the extremists [had made] a treacherous secret agreement with Sparta’,<sup>29</sup> certainly sacrificing the empire, and

<sup>23</sup> Thuc. 8.53.2–3.      <sup>24</sup> Thuc. 8.70.2–71.3.

<sup>25</sup> Thuc. 8.86.9.      <sup>26</sup> Thuc. 8.90.2–91.3.

<sup>27</sup> Thuc. 8.91.1 οὐδὲν πράξαντες... τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν.

<sup>28</sup> e.g. (Gomme), Andrewes, and (Dover) (1981) 307–8; Kagan (1987) 192; Heftner (2005) 99–100.

<sup>29</sup> (Gomme), Andrewes, and (Dover) (1981) 307.

probably Athenian independence too, to their own preservation.<sup>30</sup> But it was too late, both for them and for the Spartans, and they were overthrown by internal resistance.

That final fiasco does not in itself prove that the Spartans might not have made a better offer at an earlier stage; by the time of the final negotiations they must have felt that they would probably in any case be in control of Athens, directly or indirectly, within the month. But it is surely unimaginable that *before* the takeover by the Four Hundred, with Athens still democratic and Sparta believing it had the stronger navy and the prospect of Persian support, there would have been any chance at all of Sparta agreeing to a peace under which Athens would retain her maritime empire. And that, we may be sure, was the only peace that most Athenians would have been prepared to countenance; we may be sure of that because initially even the oligarchs, when this proposal was rejected by Agis, did not put forward the extremists' later Plan B (let alone Plan C) but instead withdrew from the negotiations. A majority of the oligarchic leaders, at that stage, were simply not prepared to consider terms of peace that involved giving up the empire. Yet that was the best offer they were likely to get. And a democratic Athens would be very lucky indeed even to get that much—unless and until it managed to change the odds by gaining a naval victory or two.

Lysistrata's peace is thus a fantasy, and everyone knew it. Indeed, this is admitted within the play itself. After the two hostile choruses of men and women are reconciled and combine into one, they make a series of what may be called Magnificent Free Offers to the audience (1043–71, 1188–1215) each of which is neatly nullified in the small print: you're all invited to dinner—but my front door will be shut (1058–71); if your children are taking part in a procession, I'm happy for you to borrow all the fancy clothing and jewellery I own—only I don't own any (1188–1202); my servant has been ordered to hand out sacks of grain to all comers—but if you come anywhere near my door, beware of the dog (1203–15)! Those are the second, third, and fourth of the offers. The first one (1050–7) is as follows:

<sup>30</sup> Thuc. 8.92.1 points to certain features of the structure of the fort being built at Eëtioneia, and to the haste with which the work was being pressed on, as evidence that the extremists were indeed intending to secure their position with the aid of Spartan troops.

So let every man and woman notify us,<sup>31</sup>  
 whoever needs to have a spot  
 of money, two or three minas,<sup>32</sup> because it's in our homes  
 and we've got purses for it.  
 And if ever peace makes its appearance,  
 anyone who takes out a loan (*δανειζήτται*) from us now  
 will no longer have to repay it—if he's had it!<sup>33</sup>

What sounded like a gift has turned out to be a loan, and (as the verb *δανειζήτται* shows) an interest-bearing loan at that. It does seem to have one redeeming feature: the debt will be cancelled 'if ever peace makes its appearance'. But it must be remembered that these offers are all meant to be, in the end, worthless. The presupposition must therefore be that peace will either never come at all, or will take so long that by that time the lender will have got his money back, perhaps several times over, in the form of interest (rate not stated, but even a respectable banker might charge 36% on high-risk loans).<sup>34</sup> That is the chorus's, and the audience's, actual expectation, once they leave the theatre.

The objective of the play, therefore, is emphatically not to encourage the Athenians to take political or other action aimed at ending the war. The prospect of such action being successful was, and was known to be, not measurably different from zero. Unless, that is, you were a supporter of oligarchy, and hoped or expected, as the Four Hundred did, that the Spartans would offer better terms to an oligarchic regime than to 'the untrustworthy *demos*';<sup>35</sup> but whatever may have been Aristophanes' actual views on *that* subject,<sup>36</sup> he never expresses explicitly anti-democratic sentiments, or allows any sympathetic character to do so, in this play or in any other, and

<sup>31</sup> This is the one passage showing unequivocally that in Aristophanes' time the audiences for performances of comedy included at least some women. See A. Solomos (1974) 300 n. 11; Lévy (1976) 104; Henderson (1996) 219 n. 189 (tacitly withdrawing from the position he took in Henderson (1987*a*) ad loc.)

<sup>32</sup> Considerably more than 'a spot of money (*ἀργυρίδιον*)'; it would keep a family for the better part of a year.

<sup>33</sup> Translating ἦν λάβη (conj. Willems: *ἄν* codd.), as in Sommerstein (1990). The alternative is *ἄν* λάβη (Sophianus), giving the meaning 'will no longer have to repay what he's received'; this is preferred in Wilson's new Oxford text.

<sup>34</sup> Lys. fr. 1 Carey; for other attested interest rates see Millett (1992) 104–6.

<sup>35</sup> Thuc. 8.70.2.

<sup>36</sup> On this see Ch. 10 above.

indeed all but makes Lysistrata claim (falsely), in commendation of the Spartans, that they were responsible for the creation of Athenian democracy in the first place.<sup>37</sup> Rather, as is often the case in Old Comedy, the objective is to transport the audience into a dream world, where benevolent gods aid a determined human hero (or, as in this case, heroine) to rescue Athens or Greece or humanity from a perilous predicament.<sup>38</sup>

The gods, or rather goddesses, who aid Lysistrata's campaign are three in number. The first, and least important, is Artemis, who is of course among other things a goddess of chastity. Of the four women (if it is four) who confront the Proboulos in 435–48, two swear their defiance by Artemis (435, 447) and a third by Hecate (Phosphoros) who is sometimes identified with her<sup>39</sup> (443); in her celebrated non-seduction scene with Cinesias, Myrrhine too swears twice by Artemis (922, 949); the Spartan's song celebrating the Persian War and the new peace treaty ends with a prayer to Artemis Agrotera (1262–72), and a subsequent cletic hymn, probably sung by Lysistrata herself,<sup>40</sup> summons Artemis first among the major deities (1280); in addition, we are reminded indirectly of Artemis twice, once when the women are compared to Artemisia, the queen of Halicarnassus who fought at Salamis (675), and once when the Spartan sings of the battle of Artemisium (1251).

Secondly, and not surprisingly, Aphrodite, whose power is invoked at three crucial moments. Lysistrata begins her main speech in the *agon* (551–2) by expressing her confidence that the women will triumph 'so long as sweet-souled Eros and Cyprus-born Aphrodite breathe desire over our bosoms and our thighs', and the first cry of support she receives from another woman is an oath in the name of 'Paphian Aphrodite' (556); the first sight of a man in distress owing to the sex-strike—or, as Lysistrata puts it, 'crazed and possessed by

<sup>37</sup> 'Do you not remember how the Laconians . . . , when you were all wearing slaves' smocks, came in arms and killed . . . many comrades and allies of [the tyrant] Hippias? On that day they alone helped you to expel him; they liberated you, and instead of the slave's smock they clothed *your people* (τὸν δῆμον ὑμῶν) in a warm cloak once again' (1150–6).

<sup>38</sup> On the typical story-pattern of Old Comedy, see Sommerstein (1980c) 11–13; Sifakis (1992); Kloss (2001) 240–61.

<sup>39</sup> Aesch. *Supp.* 676; Eur. *IT* 21, *Phoen.* 109; *IG* i<sup>2</sup>. 310.192–4 = i<sup>3</sup>. 383.125–7.

<sup>40</sup> See Sommerstein (1990) 221–2 (on 1273–90), and Ch. 12 below, pp. 244–6.



the secret rites of Aphrodite' (832)—those rites which, as he later reminds his wife, she has not practised for a long time (898)—causes her to pray to the 'mistress of Cyprus and Cythera and Paphos' (833–4); and in the final cletic hymn, while all the gods are invited to *witness* the new-made peace, it is Aphrodite who is credited with actually *making* it (1290). And elsewhere, the women swear by Aphrodite in six passages scattered through the play (208, 252, 556, 749, 858, 939).

But the goddess who truly dominates this play, as everyone familiar with it knows, is Athena. When the setting is established (at about line 240), it is the west front of Athena's citadel, the Acropolis, and there is special mention of features like the Nike bastion (317) and the Promachos statue (751 ff.). In and around the *parodos* alone, the goddess is mentioned eight times, notably when the Acropolis is occupied (241) and when the women's chorus come to repel the men's attack on it (341, 344–5, 347);<sup>41</sup> and she is also prominent in the Spartan song that concludes the play (at least as we have it), in her Spartan guise as Athena Chalkioikos (1299, 1320–1). Most importantly of all, perhaps, as David Lewis first saw,<sup>42</sup> the heroine herself has a name, and to some extent a role, reminiscent of Lysimache, the current priestess of Athena Polias, to whom she explicitly compares herself and her followers at the beginning of her *agon* speech (554); and I have argued elsewhere<sup>43</sup> (on pp. 302–3 of the addenda to my 2001 edition of *Wealth*) that at the end of the play she is assimilated more closely to Athena herself and may even—as the priestess sometimes did—wear the goddess's distinctive garment, the aegis. This helps to explain why the gods summoned in the cletic hymn 1279–90 include Artemis and Apollo, Dionysus, Zeus and Hera, and by implication Aphrodite, but not Athena: because Athena is already there.

Athena can be a reconciler and unifier (as she is famously in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*), but she is also, especially at Athens, a warrior goddess—indeed *the* warrior goddess—and this is certainly not forgotten in the play. Indeed in the text as we have it the very last

<sup>41</sup> The other references are at 174, 262, 303, and 317.

<sup>42</sup> Lewis (1955) 1–12.

<sup>43</sup> Sommerstein (2001) 302–3, citing Sibley (1995) 61–2.

word is *πάμμαχον* ‘able to fight any foe’, as an epithet of Athena, and while it is likely that this word is not in its correct place (in its present position it plays havoc with the metre), it almost certainly still belongs in the final line.<sup>44</sup> And it should be remembered, too, that while the name of her priestess, Lysimache, can reasonably be read as ‘she who resolves strife’ (and is, indeed, so read in Aristophanes’ earlier play, *Peace* (992), as well as in this one), the actual name of the heroine, Lysistrate, would probably in the normal run of things be understood as meaning not ‘she who *disbands* armies’, i.e. the peacemaker, but ‘she who *scatters* armies’, i.e. puts enemies to flight—with a recollection of one of Athena’s own epithets, *Phobesistrate* ‘she who *routs* (or panics) armies’.<sup>45</sup>

Of course Athenians in 411 wanted the war to end. But as we have seen, most of them still regarded as unthinkable any terms for ending it that did not preserve their right to control, and raise revenue from, the states in their alliance; and since many of these states had already *de facto* seceded (though some had since been reconquered), the very bottom line of acceptability would be the *status quo*—which, as we have also seen, there was at that time no chance of their being offered.<sup>46</sup>

Lysistrata does considerably better. She coerces the Athenian males, but she also arranges for the coercion of the Spartan males; and as the Spartan Lampito had envisaged from the start (168–71), it is in fact the Spartans who crack first. After the long scene in which Cinesias is tantalized and tormented by his wife, he still does not say he is ready to surrender and make peace,<sup>47</sup> and it is the Spartans who

<sup>44</sup> The transmitted text ends with one complete iambic tetrameter line (1320), followed by an isolated iambic *metron* (*τὰν πάμμαχον*, 1321). Wilson (2007a) prints this as it stands, but adds three dots, implying that he assumes that three-quarters of a line (and perhaps further lines to follow) have been lost. Henderson (1987a), modifying a proposal by van Leeuwen, compresses 1320–1 into a single line (*τὰν δ’ αὖ σιὰν τὰν πάμμαχον, τὰν Χαλκίοικον ὕμνη*), and in my 1990 edition I follow him.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Knights* 1177; Athena’s aegis is called *φοβέστρατον* in [Hesiod] fr. 343.18 Merkelbach–West = 294.18 Most.

<sup>46</sup> They *were* offered it in 410, after their crushing naval victory at Cyzicus, and they rejected it (D.S. 13.52–3).

<sup>47</sup> His last word to her on the subject (951) is a non-committal promise to ‘think about it’ (*βουλευσομαι*), which she quite rightly treats as worthless; and after she has run away, he says much about his distress and her cruelty (954–79), but nothing at all about ending the war until 1009, when he has learned that the Spartans are in at least equally dire straits and desperate for a settlement.

make the first approach to seek a settlement. During Lysistrata's speech to the two delegations, both leaders are repeatedly distracted by the beauty of Reconciliation, but it is only the Spartan who is so far gone as to admit that his city is in the wrong (1148). And as we have seen, in the arguments over territorial issues the Athenians get the better of it—perhaps by a wider margin than I have cautiously assumed. Lysistrata in that final scene is usually, and rightly, thought of as a neutral figure above the conflict. But she is certainly, from an Athenian point of view, the right kind of neutral. How could she not be? She is Athenian herself, and she also represents the goddess who was Athens' very own, even if she *was* also worshipped at Sparta. And the peace that she creates is a peace that most Athenians, in the circumstances of 411, would be more than happy with, a peace *better* than they could have gained by normal diplomatic means. It is also a pipe dream.

I am not saying that Aristophanes the man did not strongly desire an end to the war with Sparta—probably a good deal more strongly than most of his fellow-citizens, to judge from the strong contrast between his approach to wars against Sparta and his approach to all other wars. Nor am I saying that Aristophanes the dramatist was not to some extent hoping to persuade his audience to take a similar view. All I am saying is, firstly, that Aristophanes neither believed, nor wished his audience to believe, that war was invariably, or even usually, a terrible evil to be avoided at all costs; and, secondly, that even when Sparta was the enemy, nothing in any of his plays suggests that he would have accepted a peace that did not leave Athens free to maintain her empire and indeed, where there was a good prospect of success, to expand it. And what is true for him is also true for his creation, Lysistrata: neither of them ever forgets that it takes two to make a peace.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> This paper is based on a lecture given to the North Staffordshire Branch of the Classical Association at Keele on 11 March 2008. In a slightly different version it is also appearing in D. Stuttard (ed.), *Looking at Lysistrata* (Brighton: Company Dionysus).

## Nudity, obscenity, and power: modes of female assertiveness in Aristophanes<sup>1</sup>

Midway in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* comes the point when in a typical Aristophanic comedy the chorus would come forward and address the audience in what is known as the parabasis. But in this play the chorus is divided into antagonistic half-choruses of men and women, and a normal parabasis is thus impossible. Instead, the two choruses snipe at each other in a sequence of four songs and four speeches (614–705) which, while not technically constituting a parabasis, are reminiscent of one in many ways, especially in their epirrhematic structure,<sup>2</sup> and which do include one passage addressed to the audience—to which we will return.

In this sequence, the first thing that each half-chorus does is to remove their outer garments (615, 637). The chorus of *Acharnians* do likewise at the beginning of that play's parabasis (627), and the ancient commentators say that choruses did so frequently<sup>3</sup> 'in order to dance'; one chorus does indeed remove its outer garments at *Wasps* 408 (revealing the famous wasp-costume below), another at *Thesmophoriazusaë* 656, both when about to engage in vigorous

[20] <sup>1</sup> This <paper> is based on a lecture delivered to the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies in London on 11 March 1999. I am most grateful to the Society, and particularly to Professor Pat Easterling and Dr Russell Shone, for giving me the opportunity to present it.

<sup>2</sup> That is, a structure comprising two or more subunits each consisting of a song followed by a speech; normally there is an even number of such subunits and the first [21] is metrically identical with the second, the third with the fourth, etc. If there are just two subunits, we have an epirrhematic *syzygy* (see text below).

<sup>3</sup> γυμνὸν γὰρ ποιούσι τὸν χορὸν οἱ κωμικοὶ ἀεὶ, ἵνα ὀρχῆται (Σ<sup>v</sup> *Peace* 729); cf. scholia to *Ach.* 627 and *Wasps* 408. See Sifakis (1971) 103–8.

dancing. Such divestment is equally appropriate for the half-choruses in [10] *Lysistrata*, whose pugnacious talk suggests that an actual fight may be imminent. But things do not stop there.

In Old Comedy, the normal unit of epirrhematic structure is the *syzygy*,<sup>4</sup> a sequence of two songs and two speeches delivered in alternation. Single free-standing epirrhematic *syzygies* are common, and if this substitute parabasis had consisted of a single such *syzygy*, we would not have thought it incomplete. The men accuse the women of conspiring with the Spartans and aiming to set up a tyranny (616–30), present themselves as the heirs and emulators of the ‘tyrannicides’ Harmodius and Aristogeiton (631–4), and threaten to hit the women in the face (634–5); the women, recalling the religious honours they received in their youth (640–8) and the essential contribution they make to the community (namely sons, 651), accuse the men of squandering the city’s funds, failing to pay their taxes, and endangering the community’s whole future (652–5), and threaten to *kick* them in the face. Suitably symmetrical, and, as is customary in comic conflicts, the team batting second wins. Only, the conflict proves not to be at an end. The old men start singing again, and we soon perceive that we are going to have a whole new *syzygy*. A moment later, affirming that ‘a man’s gotta smell like a man’ (662–3 trans. Henderson (1996)), the men produce their secret weapon: what is now known as the full monty.\* Ancient Greeks, both men and women, wore two basic garments, whose generic names were *chiton* and *himation*; the old men have already removed the latter, now they remove the former as well.

Male nudity (more precisely, simulated male nudity) is less frequent in Old Comedy than we might expect, considering how common actual male nudity was in appropriate contexts in everyday life. The phallus, to be sure, was regularly visible thanks to garments cut artificially short, but in surviving comedy these garments themselves almost always seem to stay on—though some vase paintings, like the Goose Play vases in New York and Boston,<sup>5</sup> on the face of it indicate that comic males often wore a padded bodysuit, a phallus, and nothing else. In the eleven Aristophanic plays we have, there are

<sup>4</sup> See n. 2 above.

<sup>5</sup> Conveniently reproduced in Taplin (1993) pl. 10.2 and 11.3.

only five passages, other than the one we are considering, in which male characters can be shown to undress completely;<sup>6</sup> and of the five persons involved, four are (stage-) naked<sup>7</sup> only briefly, usually while changing costume.<sup>8</sup> The prolonged stage-nudity of a whole semichorus is quite unlike anything else in the corpus.

[11] What is to be understood as their motive? Their words (661–70) make it plain: it is to assert their masculinity. ‘This . . . must be resisted by every man with any balls! . . . A man ought to smell like a man . . . [and not] be swathed up like a rissole. . . . Now, now we must become young again and revitalize our whole body.’ If the women aren’t stopped, they say, they will usurp such masculine activities as sea-fighting and horsemanship (672–9)—both of which have strong sexual connotations which the text duly stresses.<sup>9</sup> The act of stripping amounts to saying: these are our bodies; they are male, therefore superior, and we must ensure they remain so. In fact, of course, the bodies look anything but superior, being old, feeble, and doubtless grotesque.

How can the women respond? Female nudity in Aristophanes, unlike male, is neither rare nor necessarily temporary; indeed, most of the surviving plays contain one or more beautiful nude females<sup>10</sup> who normally come into the possession of a male character towards the end of the play, to be used at and for his pleasure. These, however, are always either divine or quasi-divine beings (like Theoria in *Peace*)

<sup>6</sup> Four of these (*Knights* 881–3; *Birds* 933–5; *Thesm.* 214–55, 636–40) are discussed by Stone (1981) 146–7; the fifth occurs in the Cinesias–Myrrhine scene in *Lysistrata*, where Cinesias presumably undresses before lying down (920) on the bed where he expects Myrrhine to join him. If, as is likely, his reluctant resumption of his clothes is covered by the anapaestic dialogue 954–79, he remains unclad for longer than anyone in the surviving plays of Aristophanes except for the two choruses with which we are concerned.

<sup>7</sup> Under their character costumes, theatre performers wore close-fitting, padded bodysuits; a ‘stage-naked’ performer is one who is wearing a bodysuit without any costume over it.

<sup>8</sup> The fifth, in *Birds* 933 ff., though identified by Stone as the Priest, is more likely one of Peisetaerus’ slaves—and even he may exit soon after he is stripped, since Peisetaerus had at least two assistants at 850 but, like Trygaeus in *Peace*, only really needs one to help with the sacrifice.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Henderson (1991a) 163, 164–5.

<sup>10</sup> See Zweig (1992). They were probably played by male performers wearing appropriately padded bodysuits adorned with nipples, pubic hair, etc.; see Stone (1981) 147–50 and Henderson (1987a) 195–6.

or else professional sex-workers (*hetairai*); indeed, some remarks made about Theoria<sup>11</sup> indicate that by appearing as she does, even though she comes from Olympus, she is automatically categorized as a *hetaira*. The women's chorus in *Lysistrata* are very far indeed from this type: they are women of citizen status, indeed of high birth (for in childhood they had been *arrephoroi* and *aletrides* (*Lys.* 641–4), religious positions reserved for girls from the old nobility), who ideally should not even be seen by men not of their family except on certain well-defined, mostly religious occasions. Once, to be sure, long ago, they had stripped off as part of the *arkteia* ritual (644–5),<sup>12</sup> but they were only 10 years old then, and the act had been part of their transition to proper civic womanhood. Now they are mothers and grandmothers; and yet, without hesitation, they strip off their inner garments and stand proudly bare, 'smelling like women' (687).

In context the symbolism of this is clear. In real life, men had the right to display their bodies in public; respectable women had not.<sup>13</sup> The men have just exercised this right in order to assert their superiority; the women accordingly do likewise in order to assert (at the very least) their equality, and follow this up with further threats of violence more extreme than anything heard before, first against the men's masculinity and then against their lives<sup>14</sup>—just as a little earlier *Lysistrata* and her companions had used an assortment of props to [12] convert the *Proboulos* first into a woman (531–8) and then into a corpse (599–613). And as that was the end of the *agon* (debate), so this is the end of the substitute parabasis.

The men, we know, remain (stage-)naked until 1021 when the women put on their *chitones* for them. What of the women? They are certainly still nude during the choral song 781–828. The men at

<sup>11</sup> Thus when Trygaeus' servant is told that Theoria has been brought 'from heaven', he says he will feel no respect for the gods in future 'if they go in for pimping just like us mortals' (*Peace* 848–9); later remarks of his (873–4, 892–3) imply that when Theoria was last on earth (before the war) she was available for the enjoyment of virtually everyone in Attica, from members of the Council down to slaves like himself.

<sup>12</sup> See Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 21–67, 136–48.\*

<sup>13</sup> How unthinkable public nudity was for a respectable woman (except at Sparta) is well documented by Walcot (1998).

<sup>14</sup> They threaten first (695) to 'midwife you as the beetle did the breeding eagle', viz. to smash the men's eggs (presumably meaning their testicles), and then (705) to break their necks.

one moment (799) kick a leg and reveal some thick body hair which the women seem to find amusing (800), though the men are proud of it because it is a sign of manliness; but in their response the women profess themselves perfectly ready to do the same thing themselves (though admittedly they seem not actually to do it) despite the men's warning that 'you'll be showing your man-bag' (824). As before they are prepared to match the men blow for blow, exposure for exposure, and as before they win the contest.

Nothing in the text explicitly indicates when the women resume their clothes; but there is good reason to believe that they have done so before they re clothe the men in 1019 ff. The two choruses had stripped in order to fight; the re clothing of the men is explicitly linked with their reconciliation; therefore when that reconciliation is sealed by the kiss of 1036 and the unification of the chorus at 1042, the women should be clothed again as well; but there is no opportunity for them to put on their clothes during their dialogue with the men in 1014–42, so they must have done so before it began.<sup>15</sup> In my 1990 translation I suggested that this was achieved inconspicuously by having both choruses retire to the edge of the *orchestra* during the Cinesias–Myrrhine scene,<sup>16</sup> when for over forty lines (909–51) the couple behave as though no one else were present.<sup>17</sup>

Thus these women, paradoxically, assert their dignity and inner strength by deliberately behaving in what would normally be regarded as a maximally undignified way—and then complete the men's humiliation by accusing *them* of looking 'ridiculous' in the nude (1020, 1024); and the men are so cowed that they actually apologize for having undressed (1023)! In the everyday world, men controlled what they themselves did or did not wear, and they also controlled what women did or did not wear. The women of this comic world have succeeded in reversing this pattern.

And the reversals continue. The Spartan and Athenian peace delegates, when they meet, both display their erections to the chorus-leader to show how frustrated, and how desperate for

<sup>15</sup> So Wilamowitz (1927), on 1020; Stone (1981) 387 less plausibly suggests that they re clothe themselves immediately before they offer to re clothe the men at 1019 ff.

<sup>16</sup> This solution has been adopted by Henderson (1996).

<sup>17</sup> Myrrhine objects to the presence of the baby (909) but says nothing about the presence of the chorus.\*



peace, they both are (1072–92), but they hastily cover them again when reminded that [13] to have them exposed may be embarrassing and (recalling the mutilation of the Herms a few years earlier) even dangerous (1092–6). They might as well not have bothered. When Lysistrata appears, she summons Diallage, ‘Reconciliation’, to come on the scene. Reconciliation, as the men’s remarks about her indicate (1148, 1157–8, 1162–70), is a beautiful young woman, and is stage-naked; but she is a mute nude like no other. Every other such female in Aristophanes is an object to be used and controlled by men; Reconciliation is an object used by a woman to control men, and although her body is notionally bargained for and divided up between Athenians and Spartans as part of the peacemaking process,<sup>18</sup> it is Lysistrata who directs the process, denying the men sexual access to Reconciliation in much the same terms as Myrrhine had denied Cinesias sexual access to herself (compare 1175 with 900–3), and Athenians and Spartans are finally united not with Reconciliation (who disappears from the scene) but, as Lysistrata had always desired and designed, with their own wives. But to return to the delegates and their phalli: their concealment avails them nothing. ‘If he doesn’t give you his hand,’ says Lysistrata to Reconciliation as she approaches the chief Spartan delegate, ‘lead him by the tool’ (1119). She has seen through the flimsy pretence. The delegates are well covered, much better covered than most male characters in comedy, but for all the good it does them they might as well have been naked all the time. I do not know whether Reconciliation actually does as Lysistrata suggests, or whether the mere threat intimidates the Spartan, and then the Athenian, delegates into letting themselves be led by the hand; but it is enough that the threat is made at all. In normal circumstances, a woman taking hold of a man’s penis (as a preliminary to giving him satisfaction without getting any herself) is emblematic of subordination: it is what *hetairai* do, as in *Acharnians* 1216–17 and on some vase-paintings.<sup>19</sup> Here, it is emblematic of superiority, and scarcely more erotic than leading a horse from the stable.

<sup>18</sup> A point too strongly stressed by Konstan (1995) 45–60 (esp. 45–4 and 59).

<sup>19</sup> See Kilmer (1993) 69 and pl. R47.1,A (‘manual stimulation to orgasm is one likely outcome’).

In clothing and gesture, women thus assert their independence and control in *Lysistrata* by brazenly flouting the conventions which normally restrain them from anything remotely resembling a sexual display. So too with language. Some years ago (see Chapter 1 above) I examined the ways in which women's speech in Attic Greek, especially though not exclusively in Old Comedy, differed from that of men; and I found that sexual or excretory taboo words like βυεῖν 'fuck' or χέζειν 'shit', πέος 'dick' or πρωκτός 'arsehole',<sup>20</sup> are [14] used proportionately much less by women than by men, and are almost never used by women in the presence of men. Of the four exceptions to this last rule, three are in the latter part of *Ecclesiazusae*, to which I will come presently; the fourth is when one of the women in *Lysistrata* (440) warns the Proboulos that if he lays a hand on Lysistrata he will 'shit all over the place' (ἐπιχέσει), and her language seems to shock him even more than the threat itself. It is significant that shortly afterwards, when Lysistrata summons a posse of market-women from the Acropolis to fight against the Proboulos' band of Scythian archers, she orders them (459–60) to 'drag, hit, thump, revile, and behave shamelessly (ἀναισχυντήσετε)': a woman's most powerful weapon against men, it seems, is to cast aside the ordinary constraints of proper womanly behaviour.<sup>21</sup> It is equally appropriate that Lysistrata is one of only two respectable women in Aristophanes who, contrary to a norm that apparently pervaded the whole of society, are addressed and spoken of by name in public by free men (1086, 1103, 1147)—which would ordinarily (Schaps 1977) stamp a woman almost automatically as either dead, or disreputable, or connected with one's enemies. The exception is Lysimache, the priestess of Athena Polias (554, *Peace* 992): David Lewis (1955) 1–12 famously argued that the character of Lysistrata is designed to call Lysimache to mind, and I suggested twenty-five years later (see Chapter 2 above, pp. 46–7) that this explains why she can be named, since a priestess was a public figure. I would not want to retract that suggestion, but the fact that all the references by name to Lysistrata occur within a space of 60-odd lines, and in the company

<sup>20</sup> The class can be fairly precisely characterized; see Bain (1991) 53.

<sup>21</sup> I have suggested elsewhere (see Ch. 3 above, p. 83) that ἀναισχυντήσετε 'refers euphemistically to some specific action such as the making of obscene gestures'.

of several other reversals of conventional power relations and taboos, may well point to another, complementary explanation: Lysistrata has acquired a name among men because she has broken through, and led other women to break through, the conventions of womanly restraint and self-effacement. At this moment she is effectively master of the whole Greek world, and the men admit as much (1104, 1110–11) and obey her every word,<sup>22</sup> right to the end of the scene (1187) when both the Spartans and the Athenians bid her ‘lead wherever you wish’. As the women’s chorus-leader had said long before (549) and as the male leader of the united chorus says now (1108), she is the most *manly* of all women.

After this, it would be extraordinary if without a word of explanation Lysistrata were suddenly, in the final scene, to be kept silent, perhaps even kept off-stage altogether, while the directing role was taken by one of the Athenian delegates who had cut so pathetic a [15] figure in the preceding scenes. Yet that remains the view of most critics, endorsed both in Henderson’s excellent Oxford edition and, without any indication that another view might be possible, in Halliwell’s recent scholarly translation.<sup>23</sup> It fits well, of course, with our usual concept of what was considered an Athenian woman’s proper role;<sup>24</sup> but Old Comedy is precisely about (among other things) the shattering of conventional hierarchies. In three of Aristophanes’ eleven surviving plays—*Peace*, *Birds*, and *Wealth*—Zeus himself is defied and defeated by a mortal; that a woman—and a woman with strong religious associations—should be shown

[22] <sup>22</sup> At one point they actually surprise her by their subservience: at 1176–7 she asks them to consider the peace terms and consult their allies, but they insist on accepting the terms at once, taking their allies’ agreement for granted.

<sup>23</sup> Henderson (1987*a*) 214–15; Halliwell (1997) 140.\* On the other hand Neuburg (1992), López Eire (1994), and Thiery (1997) have given the key passage 1273–8 to Lysistrata, to whom it is explicitly assigned in the manuscripts.

<sup>24</sup> Though its most influential proponent, Wilamowitz (1927, on 1216–41), justified it exclusively on formal grounds, arguing that the orders given at 1245, 1273 ff., and 1295 must come from the same person (male, as 1246 shows), ‘obwohl man [Lysistrates] Erscheinen vielleicht wünscht’. Unlike most of his recent followers (Russo (1994) 170–2 is an exception), he realized that this would require the wives of the Athenians and Spartans to come on-stage with their husbands at 1242; but comparison of 1241 with 1223–4 shows that only Spartans enter at that point. His argument is in any case fallacious, since at 1245, in contrast with 1273 ff. and 1295, the speaker does not give an order but makes an earnest request (note *πρὸς τῶν θεῶν*). It is the woman who speaks as one having authority!

presiding over the reunion of married couples is almost normal by comparison.<sup>25</sup> It is probably significant that, according to the Suda (α160), the priestess of Athena Polias went to visit newly-married women *wearing the aegis of the goddess*; my pupil Eleanor Sibley (1995) has suggested that this is what Lysistrata wore in this final scene, and that this explains why Athena, so prominent throughout the play, is not among the gods summoned in 1279–90 to join in the peace celebrations. She is not summoned because she is already there!<sup>26</sup> I would like to add one further argument to those I have deployed elsewhere.<sup>27\*</sup> The hero of an Aristophanic play is normally present in the final scene even when, as in *Clouds* or *Thesmophoriazusae*, the ending is something less than triumphant. Leaving *Lysistrata* aside for the moment, there is one certain and one possible exception. The certain exception is *Ecclesiazusae*, where, however, we are powerfully reminded of Praxagora thanks to the effusive *makarismos* of her delivered by her maid (1112–16). The possible exception is *Frogs*, where in the final scene (1500–33) Dionysus does not speak and is not addressed; but if Aristophanes had wanted to stage this scene without Dionysus, he would not have scattered reminders all through the scene just before (1415, 1421, 1470, 1480) that Dionysus was going to *take* (not send) his chosen poet back to earth. Against this background a final scene for *Lysistrata* in which the heroine was neither present nor mentioned would be highly anomalous. This argument in itself does not rule out the possibility (Henderson (1987a) 215) that Lysistrata appeared at 1272/3 but remained silent; but there is sufficient other reason to reject this view, above all the way in which the speaker of 1273–8 stands (to adopt a phrase from Goldhill (1984) 216) ‘between and against the opposition’ of Athenians and Spartans, just as Lysistrata had done in the peacemaking scene (and as Athena had done in respect of other oppositions in

<sup>25</sup> It is striking in this connection that in Plato’s *Laws* the only public office for which gender is a condition of eligibility is that of the Inspectors of Marriages (784a–c), who are to have far-reaching control over all matters connected with marriage, and who are to be exclusively female.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Ar. fr. 348 (from the lost *Second Thesmophoriazusae*): ‘Don’t summon the curly-haired Muses, or call the Olympian Graces to join the dance; *for they are here*, says our producer’.

<sup>27</sup> In Sommerstein (1990) 221–2.

Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, about which Goldhill was [16] writing). It is not her withdrawal from the action, but her assimilation to Athena, that renders her domination palatable to an essentially male audience: men may resent being ordered about by a woman, but they must needs obey the orders of a divinity—or of a divinity's representative.

*Ecclesiazusae*—the other surviving Aristophanic comedy that shows women exercising power in the public sphere—is a play of two halves, pivoting on the moment (at 557) when Blepyrus reveals to his wife Praxagora that the Assembly has voted to hand over control of Athens to its women, unaware that this decision was engineered by Praxagora herself. Up to that point, the women have taken enormous care to keep their plans secret. When they come into contact with men while preparing their revolution, they must either pretend to be men themselves, or behave with 'proper' womanly restraint, or make sure they are not noticed. The first is of course what happens in the (off-stage) Assembly meeting itself, and ahead of that crucial event Praxagora is rightly obsessed with the importance of not dropping the least clue to the conspirators' true gender (93–101, 132–5, 149–50, 156–69, 189–91, 204; cf. 298–9 where the chorus hastily correct themselves after referring to their comrades with a feminine adjective). The last is exemplified by repeated references to women furtively entering and leaving their houses, or removing and replacing men's clothing and accessories, while their husbands are asleep or otherwise occupied (26–7, 40, 54–5, 76–7, 275, 337, 340–9, 510–13, 526–7; cf. 62–4, on getting a suntan in the husband's absence), and especially by the *epiparodos* (478–503) when the women return from the Pnyx, still in disguise, and terrified of being discovered at the last moment, and are then urged by Praxagora to get back to looking like women 'as quickly as possible, before anyone sees you' (506). Only once in this half of the play does a woman, undisguised, meet a man—in the scene between Blepyrus and Praxagora, from 520 to the revelation. Here Praxagora is the perfect model of a proper wife—even to the extent of being impudent in small ways in order to conceal a much bigger transgression, like the wife of Euphiletus, whose husband took it as a pleasant joke when she accused him of fancying the maidservant and locked him in his bedroom (Lysias 1.12–13) when in fact her lover was

waiting downstairs. Praxagora, suspected of adultery, establishes her innocence (520–46), not without reminding her husband of his own near-impotence;<sup>28</sup> she claims to have been out at night for a thoroughly proper, thoroughly feminine purpose (to assist a friend in childbirth, 528–9), to have taken her husband's cloak because it was cold and she [17] was 'not strong or well-built' (539), to have taken his shoes and stick as well to protect *the cloak* from robbers (544—emphasizing not her own safety but the safety of her husband's possessions), and to have benefited the household materially through the present she received for assisting at the birth of a baby boy (549).<sup>29</sup> She presents herself, in fact, as a thoroughly conformist upholder of those values of family and property which, as will shortly appear, she actually intends to abolish for ever; and of course as having no interest whatever in anything political. She had been told yesterday about today's Assembly meeting, but had forgotten all about it (after all, it was not women's business), and has heard nothing of the sensational resolution just passed (550–3). When told of the resolution, she initially misunderstands it because—like the colleague she criticized earlier (88–94)—she cannot imagine the community asking women to do anything except traditional tasks like textile work (555–6).

All pretence, naturally, as becomes evident within seconds of the truth being spelled out to her. From this moment, the women rule Athens. Will they again assert their superiority by systematically behaving in ways traditionally regarded as shameful for a woman of citizen status? They certainly will.

Almost immediately Praxagora puts Blepyrus in his place when he asks a perfectly sensible, but unnecessary, question (595) and she retorts 'You'd want to eat shit ahead of me!'—an exchange which is pointless unless it shows that women are now claiming and exercising control over what men say, instead of the other way round. When, shortly afterwards, Blepyrus refers to sex as a problem area for a communistic society (611–13), Praxagora is happy to expand on the

<sup>28</sup> When she challenges her husband to see whether her head smells of perfume, he responds 'What, can't a woman get herself fucked even without perfume?' (525), to which she pointedly retorts '*I* certainly can't!'

<sup>29</sup> See Müller (1988).

subject, *in the presence of a male outsider* (the rather mysterious man who appears in the script without warning at 564), over a total of nearly forty lines (613–50); she avoids using taboo words,<sup>30</sup> but she can still be fairly earthy (e.g. *ὑποκρούσει*, lit. ‘you’ll knock below’ at 618), and she manages to refer (again) to Blepkyrus’ impotence (621–2).<sup>31</sup> Then at the end of the *agon* she reverts more vividly to the same subject (691–709), imagining the words that will be heard in the streets late at night, and this time, putting words into the mouth of an imaginary male, she has no hesitation in coming out with *βυεῖν* ‘fuck’ (706) and—as the very last word in the *agon*—*δέφεσθαι* ‘wank’ (709). And no man bats an eyelid. Finally, before she goes off to the Agora (not to be seen on-stage again), Praxagora announces that prostitutes and slaves are to be banned from having sex with citizens [18] (717–24)—so as to give citizen women a monopoly of the men’s attentions. There is to be nothing merely theoretical about the new universal (but egalitarian) promiscuity—and again no man complains: the husband who came on-stage intensely suspicious of his wife’s fidelity makes his exit basking in the reflected glory of being ‘the General’s husband’ (727) and apparently quite unconcerned that she, like every citizen woman, is now publicly available on demand.

The new sex laws are shown in operation in the long scene 877–1111. It is easy today to miss an important part of this scene’s comic effect. We see well enough the gender and age reversals whereby women dictate the rules of sex to men, an old woman can separate young lovers by demanding the man’s services for herself, and women fight in the streets over a young man just as in art and in life men often fought over a girl (or a boy). We are dealing, however,

<sup>30</sup> The only such words in the passage (*πέος* 620, *ἐπιχεσοῦνται* 640) are used by Blepkyrus, and between 613 and 629 there is an unusual concentration of euphemistic terms for sexual activity such as *συγκαταδαρθεῖν* ‘sleep with’, *συγκατακεῖσθαι* ‘lie down with’, <and> *χαρίζεσθαι* ‘grant favours to’.

<sup>31</sup> Probably with a gesture towards his unimpressive phallus: in 622b the operative word is *ὑπάρχει*, the point being ‘[you needn’t worry about your *πέος* becoming exhausted]—it’s in that state anyway *to begin with!*’ The allusion at 647 to the coprophilic habits of Aristyllus is not likely to come from Praxagora (so rightly Vetta (1989) *ad loc.*); she does not elsewhere, without necessity, draw attention to consequences of her social order that are certain to be uncongenial to the men she is addressing.

not just with a double but with a *triple* reversal. These are not merely women behaving like men and old people (most of them) behaving like young people; they are also *citizen maidens and widows behaving like prostitutes*.<sup>32</sup> On the one hand, the three old women—who with their heavy make-up and alluring dresses<sup>32</sup> will have looked much like the elderly *hetaira* we meet in *Wealth* 959 ff.—repeatedly remind us of their citizen status as they invoke the new laws of the *polis* in their favour. As early as 945 *δημοκρατούμεθα* ‘we are a democracy’ implies that the speaker is a citizen, and the same woman later quotes a decree verbatim (1013–20)—a decree made by the women but full of language both unladylike and unlawful—and, once again, calls it ‘our laws’ (1022). The second old woman likewise relies on the ‘letters’ of the law (1050), and parodies the words of a *cuckolded husband* in a recent *cause célèbre* (‘It’s not *me* dragging you off, it’s the *law*’, 1055–6, cf. *Lysias* 1.26);<sup>33</sup> her use of a taboo word (*χῆσει* ‘you’ll shit’ 1062) passes almost unnoticed. Even more startling is the portrayal of the teenage girl. She, needing no artificial aids to supplement her own charms, may very well have the typical mask and dress of a virtuous citizen maiden;<sup>34</sup> and when she starts singing in public, advertising her attractiveness and availability, talking about ‘my boyfriend’ (912), and advising her rival to order a dildo (915–17), it is as if one were to show, say, the future Queen Victoria at age 15 doing the same thing. The famous ‘love-duet’ (952–75) has great appeal to the modern mind (shorn of a reference or two to Eros and Aphrodite, it would do very well as a 1990s pop lyric), but for Aristophanes’ audience it was primarily a piece of topsy-turvy absurdity: the citizen [19] maiden not merely welcoming (that would be incredible enough) but *inviting* a young man to her bed (note that she sings *before* he does) and spelling out her desire in exactly the same terms as he does his. This lyric should perhaps really be

<sup>32</sup> The first old woman wears a *krokotos* (879), the saffron-dyed garment that a wife would wear when she wished to look particularly attractive to her husband (cf. *Lys.* 44–51, 219–20).

<sup>33</sup> Though neither *Lysias* nor his client *Euphiletus* was the inventor of this conceit, which goes back at least to *Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Tauris* (585–7).

<sup>34</sup> The alternative would be to suppose that she was masked and costumed to look like a young *hetaira*; but then it would be only too easy for the forgetful spectator to assume that she *was* one, and a crucial incongruity would fail to register.



compared not with any love-song in opera or musical or the current charts, but with the songs of the mad Ophelia in *Hamlet* IV. 6—except that this young woman doesn't have the excuse of being insane.

Up to this point I have had much to say about obscenity and power in *Ecclesiazusae*, but little about nudity; and indeed there hasn't so far been any, apart from the ubiquitous comic phalli. However, there are two or three more females in the play to be considered yet. Praxagora's maidservant (1112 ff.) is what you would no doubt expect of a maidservant who had had a rare opportunity to drink to her heart's content; but we should look, lastly, at the *meirakes* of 1138.

First of all, who are they? The scholia identify them with the women of the chorus, and Wilamowitz (1903) 452, and recently Thiery (1997) 1310, have followed their lead; but there are two strong objections to this view. In the first place, in 1151–2 Blepkyrus is again asked to come along and bring 'these women' (τασδὶ) with him. If 'these women', referred to here in the third person, were the chorus, then the chorus(-leader) could not be assigned 1151–3, nor the 'supper cantata' of 1163 ff. (which the speaker of 1153 says she will be singing), nor the intervening passage 1154–62 (since there is no indication whatever of a change of speaker at 1154). In fact, everything from 1151 to 1179 would have to be assigned to the Maid—and Thiery is prepared to do this. Not many others will be: in particular, explicit appeals to the contest judges, such as we find in 1154–62, are *invariably* in Aristophanes made by the chorus or its chief. In addition, *meirax* is never elsewhere used to denote a woman who is or has been married; it means a nubile *young* woman (cf. 611, 696). To be sure, marriage has now been abolished (though not everyone in the play remembers this all the time), but the women of the chorus are still mothers (92, 233–5), and no one ever called a mother a *meirax*.

The *meirakes*, then, cannot be the chorus. They must be two or more other (young, nubile) women who are to go with Blepkyrus to dinner in the Agora. It is not clear whether he already has them with him or whether the Maid has brought them to him, but in any case they correspond precisely to the familiar Aristophanic figure of the mute female sex-object, and we may assume that they are dressed in

the [20] fashion appropriate to that role, that is, very scantily or not at all. In one crucial respect, however, they differ. As we have seen, these mute females in Aristophanes are normally always either divine beings or *hetairai*. But the *meirakes* here are certainly not to be taken as divine, and we have already been told that *hetairai* no longer exist and that sex between free men and slave women has been prohibited. The *meirakes* must therefore be free young women, presumably of citizen status, now, like the Girl earlier on, sexually liberated and behaving like *hetairai*—except that they provide their services gratis. And here they are, not only appearing nude in public but cavorting around in a dance which, while part of its description is lost in a short break in the text at 1166/7, is at any rate described as involving nimble leg-work (1167) and may well have been of a sexually suggestive nature: a fine climax to the topsy-turvy world that this play has created.

This climax, however, will not produce its full effect unless the audience can *see* that these are free young women of citizen status; and since their costume (or lack of it) and behaviour will be signalling the exact opposite, this job can only have been done by the masks (a term which must be understood, as always, to include hair as well as face). The *meirakes* will thus have worn the demure, even severe masks and sober hair-styles associated typically with *korai*.<sup>35</sup> The naked maidens of *Ecclesiazusae*, like the naked matrons of *Lysistrata*, stand symbol for a comic world in which (if I may make an allusion to one of the few varieties of sexual recreation of which Old Comedy is or professes to be ignorant)<sup>36</sup> the woman holds the whip hand.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> For these, see Webster and Green (1978) 21–2 (mask types S and SS) and (1995) 41–2 (mask 33).

[23] <sup>36</sup> Probably because it was likewise unknown in contemporary society; the images presented by Kilmer (1993) 108–32 under the rubric ‘heterosexual sadism and masochism’ (cf. also Kilmer (1990)) are by any modern standards unbelievably mild to be so described.

<sup>37</sup> This paper was first published in S. Carlson and J. F. McGlew (eds.), *Performing the Politics of European Comic Drama* (= *European Studies Journal* 17.2–18.1 (2000–2001)) (University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Ia.) 9–24 (the last page was occupied by bibliography). The *European Studies Journal* having subsequently ceased publication, the paper is reprinted here by kind permission of its then editor, Prof. Michelle Mattson.

## ADDENDA

p. 238 ‘the full monty’: since this idiom may not last, it should perhaps be explained that it meant ‘complete (esp. male) nudity’ and owed its popularity to the 1997 film by Peter Cattaneo, *The Full Monty*, about a group of unemployed steel-workers who form a male striptease troupe.

p. 240 n. 12 There has been much subsequent discussion of the *arkteia*, and of the text of *Lys.* 643–5; for an excellent treatment, with full references, see R. C. T. Parker (2005) 232–49. It is certain, from the artistic evidence, that temporary nudity was a feature of the ritual, but it is not clear whether the women’s chorus here actually refer to this. Both Henderson (1998–2007) iii. 356 and Wilson (2007*a*) print T. C. W. Stinton’s emendation (εἶτ’ ἀλετρις ἢ δεκέτις οὔσα τὰρχηγέτι, | καὶ χέουσα τὸν κροκωτὸν ἄρκτος ἢ Βραυρωνίους: of the MSS, R, the oldest, reads *καταχέουσα*, the rest *κατέχουσα*); the passage is discussed by Wilson (2007*b*) 140–1.

p. 241 n. 17 Compare Chapter 2 above, p. 45 n. 10.

p. 244 n. 23 Halliwell also (by a slip, I am certain—but it is a revealing slip) omits from his translation the words *τάσδε τε ὑμεῖς* (1274–5), which show that the speaker is not only giving back the Spartan wives to the Spartan men, *but also giving back the Athenian wives to the Athenian men*, and that (s)he refers to both groups of men as ‘you’—strong evidence that the speaker is not a member of either of these groups. Henderson (1998–2007) iii. 436 has retained the attribution of the speech 1273–8 to the chief Athenian delegate, and Giuseppe Mastromarco, in Mastromarco and Totaro (2006) 428–9 n. 236, has defended it at length; Wilson (2007*a*), however, has given the speech to Lysistrata.

p. 245 ‘one further argument’: I added yet one more in Sommerstein (2001) 304, namely that the ancient prose Hypothesis specifically says

that Lysistrata, 'after entertaining the two sides, hands over the women to their respective menfolk to take away'. There is no evidence that anyone in antiquity doubted that it was she who did so.

**p. 249** 'citizen maidens and widows behaving like prostitutes': this feature of the scene is strongly stressed by Halliwell (2002).

## Kleophon and the restaging of *Frogs*

I begin with the two pieces of evidence we possess about public honours said to have been given to Aristophanes in connection with *Frogs*. The first appears in the prose Hypothesis to *Frogs* itself (Hypoth. I.39–40 Coulon <, Wilson = Ic.3–4 Dover>), directly after the didascalic notice:

οὕτω δὲ ἐθαυμάσθη τὸ δρᾶμα διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ παράβασιν<sup>1</sup> ὥστε καὶ ἀνεδιδάχθη, ὡς φησι Δικαίάρχος.

The play was so much admired because of the parabasis contained in it that it was actually restaged, as Dikaiarchos says.

The other appears in the principal ancient *Life of Aristophanes* (Aristophanes test. 1.35–9 KA), where the biographer, having asserted that the poet ‘was greatly praised and cherished by his fellow-citizens’, proceeds:

τούτου οὖν χάριν ἐπηρέθη καὶ ἐστεφανώθη θαλλῶ τῆς ἱερᾶς ἐλαίας, ὃς νερόμισται ἰσότιμος χρυσῶ στεφάνῳ, εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βατράχοις περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων

“τὸν ἱερὸν χορὸν δίκαιον πολλὰ<sup>2</sup> χρηστὰ τῇ πόλει  
ξυμπαραινεῖν”

[*Frogs* 686–7].

On account of this he was officially commended and crowned with a wreath of sacred olive, which is reckoned equal in honour to a gold crown, when he

<sup>1</sup> Weil’s conjecture *κατάβασιν* ‘descent’ (sc. to Hades), which Coulon prints, is refuted by the fact that the parallel notice in the *Life of Aristophanes* quotes precisely from the parabasis.

<sup>2</sup> In the text of the play itself the transmitted reading is *δίκαιόν ἐστι*.

had spoken these lines in the *Frogs* about the disfranchised: 'It is right that the sacred chorus should give much good counsel to the city'.

[462] The words quoted from the play are the opening of the epirrhema of the *Frogs* parabasis; since in these words themselves nothing is said about 'the disfranchised' it is evident that the biographer means to refer to the epirrhema as a whole, virtually all the rest of which is devoted to a plea for the restoration of their citizen rights.

There can be little doubt that both these notices go back to a common source. Neither can be dependent on the other, since each contains significant elements that the other omits; and it is hardly likely that two biographers would independently and *suo Marte* hit on the same passage in the same play as the most plausible occasion for Aristophanes to be publicly honoured. The common source is most likely (Wehrli (1944) 68–9) to have been Dikaiarchos himself (doubtless in his *Περὶ μουσικῶν ἀγώνων*), who will have mentioned both the restaging (as in the Hypothesis) and the commendation and crowning (as in the *Life*), as well as ascribing these honours to the advice given in the parabasis.

And what was Dikaiarchos' own source? Some have supposed that he found the record of a second production in the *Didaskaliai* and made up the rest; this was Wehrli's view, cited with approval by, for example, Russo ([1962] 1984) 335 and Gelzer (1970) 1484, but it has little probability. Why single out the parabasis (or its epirrhema) in particular as the admired feature of the play? If one is going to invent a public crowning of Aristophanes, would one not assume that the crown would be a gold one as it normally was? And how are we to explain the apparently otiose verb ἐπηνέθη in the *Life*? It is far simpler to adopt the explanation which Kassel and Austin (*PCG* iii.2 p.2) cite from Georg Kaibel's notes: that the ultimate source of the two notices was a state decree in Aristophanes' honour, which Dikaiarchos was able to cite (quite possibly *in extenso*) and which included the word ἐπαινέσαι (which is formulaic in honorary decrees), the award of an olive crown (such as was awarded in 403/2 to the heroes of Phyle),<sup>3</sup> and the order for the restaging of the play. For the last-mentioned provision there is no exact parallel; but one may

<sup>3</sup> Aischines 3.187: ἦν ἔδοτε δωρεὰν τοῖς ἀπὸ Φυλῆς φεύγοντα τὸν δῆμον καταγαγοῦσιν. . . στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ στεφάνῳ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον.

[463] compare on the one hand the reports of a decree permitting the posthumous restaging of plays by Aeschylus (see Aeschylus test. 1.48–9 and test. 72–6 Radt), and, on the other, the decree which, on the most plausible interpretation of Hdt. 6.21.2, *prohibited* the restaging of Phrynichos' *Capture of Miletos* by 'anyone',<sup>4</sup> that is, even at local deme celebrations of the Rural Dionysia.

When was the decree in Aristophanes' honour passed, and when was *Frogs* produced for a second time? At one extreme, Russo ([1962] 1984) 317 has argued that the second production was at the same festival as the first—that is, after an interval of a couple of days at the most; at the other, J. T. Allen (1932) put it after the democratic restoration of 403 (a position which I once tentatively endorsed: Sommerstein (1980c) 24 n. 10).

Crucial to the solution of this problem is the question whether the reference to the parabasis actually derives from the text of the decree. If it does, we can then date the decree to a time when it makes good sense that the Athenians should have honoured someone who had given them the kind of advice that is given in the *Frogs* parabasis and especially in 686–705. If not—if the specific association of the honours with the parabasis is mere speculation on Dikaiarchos' part—we may be driven back to more general considerations.

It was in fact not unusual for honorific decrees, in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, to include not only general praise of the honorand but also specific reference to particular actions or words of his that had benefited the Athenian people. I cite a few examples, all dated within twenty years of the time that concerns us.

In 424/3, Herakleides of Klazomenai was awarded privileges 'because the ambassadors returning from the King's court report that Herakleides cooperated wholeheartedly with them in regard to the treaty with the King and to anything else they instructed him to do'.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps in 409, Antiochides and Phanosthenes were honoured 'in order that it may be plain that the Athenian people values highly [464] those who ship in timber for oars'.<sup>6</sup> In 405/4 Epikerdes of

<sup>4</sup> καὶ ἐπέταξαν μηκέτι μηδένα χρᾶσθαι τούτῳ τῷ δράματι.

<sup>5</sup> IG i<sup>3</sup>. 227 ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ πρέσβες οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως ἤκ[οντες ἀγγέλλουσι Ἡρακ]λειδὴν συμπράτ[τεν] εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ἐς τὸ ἄλλο ὅτι ἐπαγγέ[λειαν, εἶναι Ἡρακ]λειδῆ] γῆς ἔγκτησιν...

<sup>6</sup> IG i<sup>3</sup>. 182 ἡ[ρόπος ἂν φαίνεται Ἀθηναίων ὁ δέμος]ος ἡος περὶ πολλοῦ ποι[όμενος τὸς ἐσάγοντας κο]πέας [κα]ὶ χάρην ἀποδόσον τὸ λ[οιπὸν].

Kyrene was commended and crowned because he ‘gave 100 mnai to the citizens who had been taken prisoner in Sicily, and was chiefly responsible for the fact that they did not all die of starvation.’<sup>7</sup> During and after the Corinthian War, the diviner Sthorys of Thasos was honoured in 394/3 for his correct interpretation of omens relating to a naval battle (possibly Knidos),<sup>8</sup> and one Phanokritos in 387/6 for having given the generals information that an enemy fleet was in the offing ‘and if the generals had believed him, the enemy triremes would have been captured.’<sup>9</sup> These decrees are all in honour of foreigners, as are most honorific decrees of this period; for a citation of this kind in honour of an Athenian one may instance the decree of about 402 for the herald Eukles, who ‘acted worthily for the Athenian people and for the return from exile of the Athenian people and for their freedom.’<sup>10</sup>

In view of this evidence it is arbitrary to deny that Dikaiarchos’ reference to the parabasis of *Frogs* is based on the actual text of the decree. We need not suppose that the citation referred explicitly to the parabasis: Dikaiarchos would have thought himself, and indeed [465] would have been, quite justified in interpreting some such clause as ‘because he has advised the Athenians that they should live in concord with one another and should restore rights to the disfranchised’ as alluding to the epirrhema.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> IG i<sup>3</sup>. 125 [ἐπ]ανέσαι Ἐπ[ικέρδει τῶι Κυρηναίῳ ὡς ὄντι ἀνδρ[ὶ ἀγαθῶι καί...αἰτ]ῶι γεγενημέν[ωι...15...]ας τὸς ἐξ Σικελ[ίας...13...]. τῶι πολέμῳι αὐ[τὸς γὰρ μνᾶς ἑκατὸν] ἐβελοντῆς ἐς σω[τηρίαν...10...]. ὡσιν Ἀθηναῖοι [... ἀτελείας δε]δομένης ὑπὸ τῷ δ[ήμῳ...10...τάλ]αντον ἀργυρίῳ α[... 15 ...]εὺ πεποίηκεν Ἀθη[ναίων τὸν δῆμον κα]ὶ ἂ νῦν ἐπαγγειλά[μενος ποιεῖ, στεφ]ανώσαι τε αὐτ[ὸ]ν... Cf. Demosthenes 20.42 οὗτος γὰρ ἀνὴρ, ὡς τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ τότε αὐτῷ γραφέν, τοῖς ἀλοῦσι τότε ἐν Σικελίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν... ἔδωκε μνᾶς ἑκατὸν καὶ τοῦ μὴ τῷ λμῷ πάντας αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν αἰτιώτατος ἐγένετο· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, δοθείσης ἀτελείας αὐτῷ... ὁρῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ σπανίζοντα τὸν δῆμον χρημάτων, τάλαντον ἔδωκεν αὐτὸς ἐπαγγειλάμενος.\*

<sup>8</sup> IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 17 (cf. SEG xvi. 42) [ἐπει]δὴ πρότε[ρόν τε διετέλει Σθόρυς πρόθυμος ὢν] Ἀθηναῖος [καὶ ὅ]τι προ[εῖπε τὰ σημεῖα τὰ γενόμε]να περὶ τῆς [ν]αυμαχίας [μαντευσάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἰε]ρῶν τῶν εἰσιτητηρίων ὧν ἀπέθυσεν καὶ ἐμ[πί]ασ[ιν] ἐσ[τι] ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τῆ[ν] πόλιν τὴν Ἀθη[ναίων] [καὶ ο]ἱ πρόγονο[ι] πρότερον...

<sup>9</sup> IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 29 ἀναγράψαι δὲ Φανόκριτο[ν] τὸν Παριανὸν πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργ[έτην... ἐπειδὴ π[α]ρ[ῆ]γγελε τοῖς στρατηγοῖς περὶ [τῶν ν]εῶν τῷ παράπλο, καὶ εἰ οἱ στρα[τηγοὶ] ἐπίθοντο, ἐάλωσαν ἂν α[ἰ] τρ[ί]ηρε[ῖ]ς αἰ πολέμια.

<sup>10</sup> IG ii<sup>2</sup>. 145 ἐπειδὴ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐγένετο περὶ τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς κάθ[οδον] τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθη[ναίων] καὶ τῆν ἐλευθερί[αν...].

<sup>11</sup> This is perhaps the place to draw attention to the fact that the *Life of Aristophanes*, presumably following Dikaiarchos and, at one remove, the original decree, speaks



If then there was indeed a decree in honour of Aristophanes, and if it was based on the grounds indicated by the two ancient notices, when can it have been passed? We can first say that the Athenians cannot have honoured the dramatist for giving them this particular advice at a time when they were not prepared to carry out the advice. The actual restoration of rights to (certain) disfranchised persons was effected by the decree of Patrokleides 'when the fleet had been destroyed and the siege had begun' (Andok. 1.73), that is, in the autumn of 405; the decree in honour of Aristophanes, therefore, was passed either at about the same time or at a later time—it cannot have been significantly earlier. It follows that the second official performance of *Frogs* cannot have taken place either at the Lenaia or at the City Dionysia of 405.

Nor is it likely to have happened in 403 or 402. A decree passed under the Thirty would have been destroyed at the restoration of democracy, and would not have been available to Dikaiarchos; while the restored democracy itself would certainly not have honoured Aristophanes for having been among the first to advocate a measure which, whatever its merits as an act of reconciliation, had conferred civic and political rights on men who within a few months had used them to overthrow the constitution and install the Thirty (cf. Henderson (1990) 291 n. 69). The safeguarding of the recent amnesty, which was of such great concern to Archinos and his associates in 403/2 (cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 40.1–2), would hardly have been promoted by a (literally) dramatic reminder to the public of another and an ill-fated amnesty only two years previously.

[466] If the restaging of *Frogs* cannot have taken place in 405, 403, or 402, the only plausible date remaining is 404;<sup>12</sup> and this makes good sense on other grounds, since of all possible dates for the

of *Aristophanes* being commended and crowned, although the official *didaskalos* of *Frogs* was Philonides (*Frogs* Hypoth. I.36 Coulon<, Wilson = Ic.1 Dover>); a piece of evidence relevant to the vexed question (Mastromarco (1979); Halliwell (1980); MacDowell (1982*b*); Perusino (1987) 37–57) of the extent to which a dramatist's name was publicly associated, close to the time of production, with a play which he had written but of which he was not himself the *didaskalos*.\*

<sup>12</sup> So, though without argument, Radermacher (1954) 3 ('ein Jahr darauf').

honorific decree, the most likely is a date close to the decree of Patrokleides by which the policy Aristophanes had advocated was put into effect. If the second production was authorized in the autumn of 405, it will have taken place at the first state dramatic festival thereafter, namely the Lenaia of 404; it may even have been the only comedy staged at that festival, since with Athens under siege and resources of all kinds extremely straitened it will have been even harder to put on new plays than it had been in 405,<sup>13</sup> whereas *Frogs*, quite cheap even at its first production,<sup>14</sup> would be even cheaper to stage again.

But if *Frogs* was indeed restaged at the Lenaia of 404, we are in the presence of some curious coincidences. This was a time when anti-democratic conspirators were exceedingly active, and it was very close to the time when they achieved one of their most signal early successes.

Since the reforms of Ephialtes in 462, each of the significant conspiracies against the democratic constitution had begun, as its first overt act, by engineering the death of one or more leading 'demagogues'. Ephialtes himself—or so democrats will certainly have believed—had been a victim of the plotters who four years later, at the time of the Tanagra campaign, nearly succeeded in betraying their city to the Peloponnesians.<sup>15</sup> The preliminaries to the *coup d'état* of 411 had been marked by the assassination of Hyperbolos at Samos and of Androkles at Athens.<sup>16</sup> And in 405/4 the conspirators' selected victim was Kleophon.

Unlike Ephialtes, Hyperbolos, and Androkles, Kleophon was not to be crudely murdered, but disposed of by judicial process. [467] Chremon, afterwards one of the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2), and Satyros, afterwards the most vicious of the Eleven who served them so faithfully and so bloodily (*ibid.* 2.3.54), 'persuaded the Council to arrest Kleophon and send him for trial' (Lys. 30.10); the involvement of the Council strongly suggests that the procedure employed was

<sup>13</sup> When the tragic and comic *choregiai* for the City Dionysia were all split, with two men combining to finance one production (Arist. ap.  $\Sigma$  *Frogs* 404).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Frogs* 404–7 on the costuming of the chorus; despite Dover (1972) 178 it is likely that the Frog chorus were not seen by the audience, cf. Allison (1983).\*

<sup>15</sup> On this conspiracy cf. Thuc. 1.107.4.\*

<sup>16</sup> Hyperbolos: Thuc. 8.73.3. Androkles: Thuc. 8.65.2.

*eisangelia*,<sup>17</sup> and one may therefore reasonably suspect that the charge was something more serious than the military misdemeanour which is all that our sources specify (Lys. 13.12). Under a little-known legal provision the Councillors themselves were added to the jury for the trial (Lys. 30.11), and Kleophon was convicted and executed. This happened at the time when Theramenes was away on his mission to Sparta to seek terms of peace (Lys. 13.11–13); that is, between about December 405 and March 404, or within a few weeks at most before or after the Lenaia. And it was at the Lenaia, as we have seen, that *Frogs* was produced a second time, a play in which the living person most singled out for hostile comment happens to be Kleophon—in that much-admired parabasis (where he has a whole strophe to himself, 674–685) and twice in the final scene of the play (1504 ff., 1532–3; the latter are the play's concluding words)—and in which his death is twice anticipated (684, 1504 ff.). To say the least, the oligarchs cannot have been sorry that the public should see a comedy in which a poet whom the Athenians had just signally honoured attacked so viciously a politician who had (or had had) the strong support of large sections of the population, and whom the oligarchs were about to eliminate, or had just eliminated, by highly dubious methods. Was it a happy accident for them, or had they engineered it?

We do not know who proposed the decree ordering honours for Aristophanes and the restaging of the play. But at any rate it is likely to have been based, as the majority of decrees were, on a recommendation from the Council; and the Council of 405/4 was sympathetic enough to the anti-democratic movement for Satyros [468] and Chremon (both of whom were members of it)<sup>18</sup> to be confident that its addition to the jury trying Kleophon would turn the scales against him. Nor do we know exactly when the decree was passed: it may have been proposed some time after the decree of Patrokleides and much closer to the Lenaia, when the plot against Kleophon was already in preparation. I suggest that the decree was either proposed

<sup>17</sup> On *eisangelia* see Harrison (1971) 50–7; Rhodes (1972) 162–71; Hansen (1975); MacDowell (1978) 163–6; Rhodes (1979); Hansen (1980); Sealey (1981); Hansen (1991) 212–18. It was normally associated with serious offences against the community and especially with those which could be regarded as amounting to treason.

<sup>18</sup> Lys. 30.10 and 14; cf. also the sweeping denunciation of this Council by Lys. 13.20.

or inspired by the plotters with the precise object of influencing public opinion against Kleophon.<sup>19</sup>

This will not, of course, have appeared in the actual speeches of those favouring the decree. They will have referred to the reconciliation achieved by the decree of Patrokleides, and to Aristophanes' 'courageous' advocacy of such a measure long before it became popular; of Kleophon no mention will have been made. One may compare the way in which, seven years earlier, Peisandros had secured the dismissal of the generals Phrynichos and (S)kironides (Thuc. 8.54.3), ostensibly for having betrayed Iasos and Amorges, but really in order to facilitate a plan of negotiation with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes which, according to the plausible reconstruction of Andrewes (in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1981) 186–7), he had not yet made public.

We cannot tell whether Aristophanes himself was a willing tool of the conspirators, or whether he too was deceived. He had certainly in the play expressed himself in terms very hostile to Kleophon, and to the whole class of democratic leaders which he typified; he had also (1466) allowed Dionysos to drop a remark strongly implying that [469] a crucial democratic institution, jury-pay, was a waste of money, and made Aeschylus (954–5, 1071 ff.) express the opinion that free speech and insubordination among the lower strata of the citizenry (including in particular those pugnacious democrats, the crew of the *Paralos*, with their deplorable tendency to hand over Athenian oligarchs for imprisonment in Argos when they ought to have been taking them to Sparta for negotiations)<sup>20</sup> was a pernicious novelty wickedly encouraged by Euripides.\* We cannot therefore

<sup>19</sup> Alternatively, as Jeffrey Henderson suggested in discussion on this paper <at the Nottingham conference in July 1990>, the restaging of the play may have been an attempt by the oligarchs to *test* public opinion. It would not have been altogether unreasonable for them to have believed, in the winter of 405/4, that the Assembly might already be moving towards a willingness to vote itself out of existence, as it had virtually done in 411 by accepting the plan to negotiate with Alkibiades and the Persians, knowing this would involve substantial changes in the Athenian constitution, *before* the oligarchs had begun their campaign of terror and intimidation. But in 405/4 the evident fear of Satyros and Chremon that a normal jury might acquit Kleophon suggests to me that they did not this time expect that the democracy would commit suicide of its own accord.

<sup>20</sup> Thuc. 8.73.5 (411).

exclude the possibility that the plotters took Aristophanes into their confidence. One might think, however, that it would have been safer for them not to do so; and they certainly had no need to, any more than in February 1601 the supporters of the Earl of Essex explained to the Lord Chamberlain's Company of Players why they were so interested in sponsoring a revival of the four- or five-year-old *Tragedy of King Richard the Second*.<sup>21</sup>

If something like this is the background to and explanation of the second production of *Frogs*, it should prompt us to re-examine the well-known doublets in the text of the play, which have from time to time been held<sup>22</sup>—plausibly in my view—to reflect changes made in the script at the time of this second production. Can we see in any of these passages evidence of alterations that reflect the specific circumstances of the winter of 405/4?

With regard to most of the relevant passages the answer must be negative. Whatever the truth may be about 151–3, or 1251–60, or even 1431, in none of these places do the variant versions reflect different attitudes on matters of civic concern. But with one passage, and a crucial one, it may be otherwise: the passage in which [470] Aeschylus and Euripides give their responses to Dionysos' request for 'one idea each' (1435) on how to save Athens. I here reproduce 1433–68 in their transmitted order; the speaker-assignments have, of course, no particular authority.

- Δι. νῆ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτήρα, δυσκρίτως γ' ἔχω·  
 ὁ μὲν σοφῶς γὰρ εἶπεν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος σαφῶς.  
 ἀλλ' ἔτι μίαν γνώμην ἑκάτερος εἴπατον 1435  
 περὶ τῆς πόλεως ἧντιν' ἔχετον σωτηρίαν.
- Ευ. εἴ τις πετερώσας Κλεόκριτον Κινησία,  
 αἴροισιν αἰραὶ\* πελαγίαν ὑπὲρ πλάκα—
- Δι. γέλοισιν ἂν φαίνοιτο. νοῦν δ' ἔχει τίνα;
- Ευ. εἰ ναυμαχοῖεν, κᾶτ' ἔχοντες ὄξιδας 1440

<sup>21</sup> Their aim was to prepare the ground for Essex's impending rebellion by recalling to people's minds a famous historical instance of the deposition of an ineffective and unpopular monarch. The players, who spoke of the play as 'old and . . . long out of use' and expected 'small or no company at it', had to be bribed with forty shillings before they would agree to perform it, and the official investigation which followed the collapse of the rebellion seems to have concluded that they were totally innocent parties. See Heffner (1930) 754–8, and Ure (1961) lvii–lxii.

<sup>22</sup> In addition to the works cited below in connection with 1437–53, see Zieliński (1885) 149–57, Rogers (1902) viii (and his notes on 1251, 1431, 1437).

ραίνουεν εἰς τὰ βλέφαρα τῶν ἐναντίων.  
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶδα καὶ θέλω φράζειν.

Δι. λέγε.

Εν. ὅταν τὰ νῦν ἄπιστα πίσθ' ἠγώμεθα,  
τὰ δ' ὄντα πίστ' ἄπιστα—

Δι. πῶς; οὐ μανθάνω.

ἀμαθέστερόν πως εἰπὲ καὶ σαφέστερον.

1445

Εν. εἰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἴσι νῦν πιστεύομεν,  
τούτοις ἀπιστήσαιμεν, οἷς δ' οὐ χρώμεθα,  
τούτοισι χρησαίμεσθα, σωθείημεν ἄν.

εἰ νῦν γε δυστυχοῦμεν ἐν τούτοισι, πῶς

τἄναντί' ἄν πράξαντες οὐ σωζοιμεθ' ἄν;

1450

Δι. εὖ γ', ὦ Παλάμηδες, ὦ σοφωτάτη φύσις.

ταυτὶ πότερ' αὐτὸς ἠῦρες ἢ Κηφισοφῶν;

Εν. ἐγὼ μόνος· τὰς δ' ὀξίδας Κηφισοφῶν.

Δι. τί δαι σύ; τί λέγεις;

Αι. τὴν πόλιν νῦν μοι φράσον

πρῶτον τίσι χρῆται; πότερα τοῖς χρηστοῖς;

Δι. πόθεν; 1455

μισεὶ κάκιστα.

Αι. τοῖς πονηροῖς δ' ἡδεταί;

Δι. οὐ δῆτ' ἐκείνη γ', ἀλλὰ χρῆται πρὸς βίαν.

Αι. πῶς οὖν τις ἄν σώσειε τοιαύτην πόλιν,

ἢ μήτε χλαῖνα μήτε σισύρα ζυμφέρει;

Δι. εὔρισκε νῆ Δι', εἶπερ ἀναδύσει πάλιν.

1460

Αι. ἐκεῖ φράσαιμι' ἄν, ἐνθαδὶ δ' οὐ βούλομαι.

Δι. μὴ δῆτά σύ γ', ἀλλ' ἐνθένδ' ἀνίει τὰγαθά.

Αι. τὴν γῆν ὅταν νομίσωσι τὴν τῶν πολεμίων

εἶναι σφετέραν, τὴν δὲ σφετέραν τῶν πολεμίων,

πόρον δὲ τὰς ναῦς, ἀπορίαν δὲ τὸν πόρον.

1465

Δι. εὖ, πλὴν γ' ὁ δικαστῆς αὐτὰ καταπίνει μόνος.

Πλ. κρῖνοις ἄν.

Δι. αὕτη σφῶν κρίσις γενήσεται.

αἰρήσομαι γὰρ ὄνπερ ἡ ψυχὴ θέλει.

[471] This is of course a scene whose textual constitution has been controversial ever since Aristarchos and Apollonios rejected 1437–41 and 1452–3 as spurious.<sup>23</sup> In recent decades the tendency has been

<sup>23</sup> Their views are cited in the scholia to *Frogs* 1437 (ἀθετεῖ δὲ τοὺς πέντε ἐφεξῆς στίχους... Ἀρίσταρχος· ὅτι φορτικώτεροί εἰσι καὶ εὐτελεῖς, διὰ τοῦτο ὑποπτεύονται· Ἀπολλώνιος δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσί τι ἐρομένων δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερος μίαν γνώμην λέγει), 1440 (ταῦτα δὲ ἡθητημένα μετρίως ἄν τις νομίσειεν ἐνδιεσκευάσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἔστι φορτικά· τὰ δὲ ἐξῆς κείμενα [1442 ff.]

(Dörrie 1956; MacDowell 1959; Newiger 1985; Del Corno 1985) to favour large-scale rearrangements based on the transposition of 1442–50 to follow 1462.<sup>24</sup> I continue to hold (cf. Sommerstein (1974) 24 n. 5) that this whole line of approach is misguided and unnecessary. All of the reconstituted texts, except that of Newiger, fly in the face of 1435, where Dionysos asks the two poets for ‘one more idea each’, by making one or the other of them offer *two* quite distinct ideas; even Newiger makes Dionysos contradict himself by in effect demanding a second response from Euripides at 1460 and 1462. All of the rearrangements have trouble with *μὲν* in 1442, which is either ignored altogether (as by Del Corno) or else given a convoluted explanation;<sup>25</sup> it is naturally taken (as I suspect [472] Aristarchos saw) as ‘*μὲν solitarium*’ (Denniston (1954) 381–2), conveying the message ‘*I’ve got an answer to give you [whether or not he has]*’, and thus indicating that 1442 introduces the *first* response to the challenge made in 1435–6. They have trouble likewise (see Del Corno (1985) 244) with the lack of an expressed object for *οἶδα* and *φράζειν* in the same line, an object which can easily be understood from 1436 but not from 1462. They are forced either to posit a lacuna between

*πρέποντα καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ καὶ τῇ ὑποθέσει*, and 1452 (*συναθετεῖται τοῖς ἄνω καὶ οὗτος· μένων γὰρ ἄκυροί τῆν ἐκείνων ἀθέτησιν*). The last of these notes reports a condemnation only of a single line at that point, but it is hard to believe that Aristarchos and Apollonios failed to see that 1452 and 1453 must stand or fall together; probably a later annotator was misled by the accidental omission of a critical sign opposite one of the lines.

<sup>24</sup> Dörrie, in addition to making this transposition, posits a lacuna between 1450 and 1463; alters the speaker assignments in 1455–62 (giving 1455b–6a, 1457, and 1461 to Euripides, and 1458–9 to Dionysos); and makes Aeschylus the interlocutor of Dionysos in 1442–50. Del Corno follows Dörrie except that he reverts to the traditional speaker assignments in 1455–62. MacDowell, while likewise accepting Dörrie’s transposition and lacuna, had not only rejected his speaker changes in 1455–62 but also retained Euripides as the interlocutor in 1442–8 (1449–50 he gave to Dionysos). Newiger, lastly, accepts the transposition but not the lacuna; instead he deletes 1463–6 so that Pluto’s intervention in 1467 directly follows 1450. He has Dionysos speak with Euripides in 1437–41 + 1451–3, with Aeschylus in 1454–7, with Euripides in 1458–62, and with Aeschylus in 1442–50.

<sup>25</sup> It is indeed theoretically conceivable (Newiger (1985) 436) that 1442 might be a case in which ‘the *μὲν* clause is contrasted with what precedes, not with what follows’ (Denniston (1954) 377 [Newiger actually refers to pp. 378–9 which seems to be a slip for 377–8]); but one might well hesitate to *introduce*, by a major transposition, so rare a usage of *μὲν* (of the few poetic instances cited by Denniston none occurs, as this one would, at a change of speaker).

1450 and 1463, or else (Newiger) to delete 1463–6. Nor have I mentioned all the difficulties that one, or another, or several, or all of these reconstructions run into.<sup>26</sup> We must take another road.

The signposts to this road are the observation (implicit in Aristarchos' and Apollonios' athetesis) that 1442–50 follow on naturally from 1436, and the correct perception of Dörrie and his followers that 1451–3 follow on naturally from 1437–41. In theory these two juxtapositions could be secured by transposing 1442–50 not forwards but backwards, to stand between 1436 and 1437; but this solution does not survive a moment's scrutiny, leaving us as it does with an impossible transition from 1450 to 1437. Rather we should go back to the solution proposed nearly a century ago by Tucker (1897), and earlier still, in slightly different forms, by Hermann and Dindorf:<sup>27</sup> that 1437–41 + 1451–3 on the one hand, and 1442–50 on [473] the other, form a doublet. Either 1437 or 1442 offers a good continuation from 1436; neither can be comfortably placed anywhere else; and there is no way to construct a plausible text containing both of them. The only remaining possibility is that the two continuations are alternatives to one another.\*

In principle it is possible that one version or the other is interpolated; but it is far from likely. 1442–50 continues important themes from elsewhere in the play (Dörrie (1956) 306–7; Sommerstein (1974) 27), while the other version contains topicalities (in particular the allusions to the physical peculiarities of Kinesias and Kleokritos)

<sup>26</sup> Newiger, for example, makes Euripides doubt whether the city can be saved (1458–9) after he has already made a proposal for saving it (1437–41); and by giving 1457 to Aeschylus (1456b being continued to Dionysos as a statement) he makes Aeschylus deny with confident assurance the proposition that the Athenians 'take pleasure in the wicked' when he has been away from Athens for half a century and when a moment previously (1454–5) he had no idea whether the Athenians favoured 'good' politicians or not.

<sup>27</sup> Dindorf (1829) 35 spoke of two 'editions' of the play, 1442–51 coming from the first and 1437–41 + 1452–3 from the second. A similar view was also expressed at one time by <G.> Hermann ('Diar. Lips. . . p. 1626'; I have been unable to trace the reference). Dindorf (1835–9) i. 515–24 showed that 1451 belonged to what he had previously called the second edition; he now regarded this version as either a rejected draft by Ar. or an actor's interpolation (he also deleted 1449–50 altogether, as incompetent and unworthy of Ar.). In the present century the doublet theory has been accepted by Radermacher (1954) and Erbse (1975), both of whom regarded 1442–50 as the earlier version.



which would simply never have occurred to a later interpolator (cf. Fritzsche (1845) ad loc.). Alternatively, one of the two versions might be a rejected draft (cf. Dover (1977) 156 on *Frogs* 1257–60).<sup>\*</sup> But if we accept the second production of the play as a fact, we are entitled to ask whether it sheds any light on the relationship between these two passages. And it certainly does.

If one of the two versions comes from 405 and the other from 404, there can be no doubt which is which. The original script had the Kleokritos–Kinesias version, 1437–41+1451–3. In this I follow in essence Tucker in his edition.<sup>28</sup> My reason for doing so, however, is certainly not the feeble one offered by Tucker ('since the troubles of Athens must have been rapidly increasing, it is perhaps to be guessed that the earlier edition would contain the lighter passage'). Nor even is it primarily the reason pointed out in another connection by Newiger (1985), that where one passage interrupts another in a transmitted text, it is the interrupting passage (i.e. here 1442–50), not the interrupted one, that is likely to be a later insertion. That consideration is indeed by no means to be ignored, but it can only establish a *prima-facie* probability. The really decisive argument, as it seems to me, is based on a quite specific point of content. The Kleokritos–Kinesias passage is about a fantastic 'secret weapon' to be [474] used *in naval warfare*; and therefore it cannot have been *freshly* written for a production in early 404 when Athens had effectively no navy.

But of course the virtual destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi would not in itself have been a reason for deleting and rewriting the passage; there are several other passages in the play that refer to the fleet as a going concern,<sup>29</sup> and there is no sign that any of them was altered for the second production. In this very scene, the advice of Aeschylus which wins him victory in the contest (1463–5), even if as I have elsewhere argued (Sommerstein (1974)) it is relevant to the actual situation in early 405, certainly is not relevant to that in

<sup>28</sup> Tucker (1906)—who, however, regarded 1442 as common to both versions (a view perfectly acceptable so far as concerns the structure of the dialogue, but open to the objection that we would then have expected 1442 to follow 1436 directly in the transmitted text). Tucker (1897) <had> not express<ed> an opinion on which version was the earlier. For the views of other scholars, see n. 27.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. 362–4, 702, 1065, 1076.

early 404. Why then should Aristophanes want to provide Euripides with a new γνώμη?

The substitution of 1442–50 for the earlier version has two notable effects. One is that it drastically alters the balance of this phase of the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides: Euripides, who in the original script had proposed an absurd fantasy, is now credited with a γνώμη which, however obscurely expressed, is plausible in itself and moreover is identical with advice given by the chorus in the parabasis (718–37). One cannot be sure exactly why Aristophanes might have wanted to make a change with this sort of effect, but one credible reason would be that he wished to maintain a degree of suspense about the result of the contest. At 1411–13 Dionysos had professed himself unwilling to decide, at 1431–4 unable; if Euripides is then made to offer a recommendation—about the safety of Athens, too—which no one could take seriously for an instant, Aeschylus really only has to get the ball back over the net to win the championship, and the tension may thus have dissipated too soon, despite the care the author took to sustain it by leaving it in doubt for nine lines (1454–62) whether Aeschylus would condescend to put racket to ball at all. With 1442–50 substituted the inferiority of Euripides becomes far less obvious (essentially it will consist—not for the first time in the long contest, cf. Sommerstein (1974) 27—in the fact that Euripides thinks in terms of words and persuasion, [475] Aeschylus in terms of action),<sup>30</sup> and it makes far better sense in the immediate context that Dionysos, while knowing *that* he prefers Aeschylus, is not at all clear in his own mind (certainly he makes no attempt to explain) *why* he prefers him.\*

But the introduction of 1442–50 has another effect as well. As the end of the play approaches, the message of the parabasis, the demand for a change of leaders, is recalled and reinforced. To say the least, the substitution will not have displeased the anti-democratic conspirators. And it may make one wonder whether Aristophanes may after all have been aware of how he was being used. Did someone suggest to him that an extra bit of underlining for that

<sup>30</sup> Or, to adapt a famous saying of Bismarck's, that Euripides lives in a world of 'resolutions and majority votes' and Aeschylus in a world of 'blood and iron'.

political message would not be unwelcome? It would make little difference that the words in question were put into the mouth of the contestant who was going to be the loser; as other evidence makes clear,<sup>31</sup> many if not most spectators could be relied on to be quite uncritical in ascribing the opinions of characters in a play to the author unless he took pains to ensure that someone else clearly refuted them\*—and while Euripides' advice here is in the end, in the play, judged not to be the best, nobody (and that includes Aeschylus) claims that it is *wrong*.<sup>32</sup>

In this paper I have tried to offer, firstly, some evidence for reconstructing an aspect of the internal political history of Athens in the last days of the Peloponnesian War, and secondly some further evidence (cf. Sommerstein (1989), Henderson (1993a)) for the proposition that whether or not comic dramatists themselves intended or expected that their works would have an impact on the course of public affairs (I believe they did, but that is not my present [476] concern), other people, and especially politicians, did believe that they could have such an impact.

But if the conclusion I have reached about the restaging of *Frogs* is a true one, it is one that many may well find regrettable. Artistically, after all, *Frogs* is one of Aristophanes' greatest achievements. Politically, if I am right, it helped to open the way for the most vicious régime Athens had ever experienced—and one may be tempted to feel that if Aristophanes didn't know it would have this effect, then he should have done. On the other hand, as W. G. Arnott (1991) reminds us, there were some who should have known far better and didn't. Plato, who was much more closely acquainted with some leading members of the Thirty than Aristophanes is at all likely to have been, had (or so he says)<sup>33</sup> no notion before the event of what their rule would prove to be like. Skill with words and

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Dover (1993a) < 452–4 = Dover (1993b) 16–18>.

<sup>32</sup> Bruce Heiden suggested, in discussion on this paper <at the Nottingham conference>, that Ar. might have been subtly undercutting the recommendation for a change of political leaders by putting it in Euripides' mouth (cf. now Goldhill (1991) 218–19). I once favoured this view myself, but I now feel such a ploy might have been *too* subtle for most of the Athenian audience, particularly when the same recommendation had already been made by the virtuous (456–9) and eternally blessed chorus of Eleusinian initiates.

<sup>33</sup> Pl. *Seventh Letter* 324d.

ideas—whether the skill of an Aristophanes or of a Plato—is one thing. Political understanding is another. They do not always go together—and, as Socrates noted,<sup>34</sup> the possessor of one kind of expertise is all too prone to be unaware that he lacks another kind!<sup>35,36</sup>

#### ADDENDA

This paper was completed before the appearance of Sir Kenneth Dover's edition of *Frogs* (Dover (1993*b*)), which was followed a few years later by my own (Sommerstein (1996*b*)); the introductions and commentaries to these editions should be consulted on all matters here discussed.

p. 257 n. 7 I should have made it clear that the man whose benefactions are described in Demosthenes 20.42 has been named just previously (§41) as Epicerdes of Cyrene.

pp. 257–8 n. 11 See Chapter 5 above, p. 119 n. 14 and Addenda.

p. 259 n. 14 The question of the *Frogs*' visibility has, I think, been settled by Marshall (1996), who argues that they can perfectly well have been visible to the audience but invisible to Dionysus (who—as I argued in my commentary on 205–6—would find it very difficult, inexperienced and flustered rower that he is, to turn round and look at them).

<sup>34</sup> Pl. *Apol.* 22c–e.

<sup>35</sup> When this paper was in press, I found that parts of its argument had been anticipated by Salviat (1989). It will be seen that I agree with Salviat's date for the second production of *Frogs*, and with his perception of a close link between it and the condemnation of Kleophon; I also find attractive his interpretation of 679 ff. (identifying the 'Thracian swallow' with Kleophon's mother; cf. MacDowell (1993) 369–70). I see, however, no reason to believe, as Salviat does, that the play underwent *major* revision for its second production, and some reason to believe it did not: if there were two very different versions of *Frogs*, how came it that the highly successful first version vanished without trace, when the unsuccessful first version of *Clouds* survived to Hellenistic times and possibly beyond?

<sup>36</sup> This paper was first published in A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. J. Henderson, and B. Zimmermann (eds.), *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis* (Bari: Levante Editori, 1993) 461–76. Reprinted here by kind permission of Levante Editori.

p. 259 n. 15 I have discussed the murder of Ephialtes and the anti-democratic conspiracies of that period (with special reference to possible allusions in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*) in Sommerstein (1993c) (to which Easterling (1993) is a response).

p. 261 on Aristophanes' possible anti-democratic views: see Chapter 10 above.

p. 262 *Frogs* 1438: ἄρπειεν αὔρα (MacDowell) or ἄρπειεν αὔραις (proposed in my 1996 edition) would improve the syntax; the latter has been adopted by Henderson (1998–2007) iv. 220 (his αὔρας appears to be a slip) and Wilson (2007a).

p. 265 Since 1993 attempted reconstitutions of *Frogs* 1435–66 have come even thicker and faster.

Dover (1993b) combined the doublet theory with the transposition theory; in his view the script of the first production had here 1435–41+1451–66 (as I had proposed) and that of the second 1435–41+1451–60+1442–50 (with Aeschylus as interlocutor, Dionysus speaking 1449–50), then proceeding to 1467 ff.

Von Möllendorff (1997) 142–9 defends the transmitted text in its entirety, as does Willi (2002) 17–20.

Thierry (1997) 1286–7 proposes the following arrangement: 1435–6+1442+1437–41+1451–66+1443–50 (with Aeschylus as interlocutor, Dionysus speaking 1449–50).

Sonnino (1999) reconstructs the script of the first production as 1435–6+1461–6 (Euripides)+1454–60 (Aeschylus)+1442–50 (Aeschylus); for the second production, he thinks that 1463–6 was replaced by 1437–41+1451–3.

P. Totaro, in Mastromarco and Totaro (2006) 96–8 and 694–6, follows Del Corno except that he does not posit a lacuna between 1450 and 1463.

All these proposals, like the earlier ones criticized in my paper, either make one of the two poets offer two suggestions instead of one, or place 1442 where its μέν makes no sense, or both, and some have further weaknesses also. Von Möllendorff and Willi try to get out of jail by arguing that Euripides in 1437–41 is not really answering Dionysus' question but (i) 'thinking aloud' (Willi) or (ii) giving a preliminary

demonstration of the absurdity of seeking a military solution to Athens' predicament (von Möllendorff); but (i) 1439–41 shows that Euripides is already in dialogue with Dionysus, (ii) 1442 represents the *beginning* of an argument, not a transition from one stage of it to another—otherwise it would contain a particle such as  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  or  $οὐ\acute{\nu}$ .

Meanwhile, Henderson and Wilson have both adopted (though in Wilson's case 'with hesitation'—Wilson (2007*b*) 183) the doublet arrangement advocated in the present paper. I do not quite know why Wilson says this arrangement 'presupposes two dislocations of the text at an early stage of the tradition'; all it presupposes is that a text containing author's variants was read and copied as if it were a continuous whole, and, as I wrote the first time I championed it (Sommerstein (1974) 25 n. 5), it 'makes transpositions, lacunae, and deletions alike unnecessary'.

p. 266 Dover (1977) on *Frogs* 1257–60: Dover (1993*b*) preferred to regard 1251–6 and 1257–60 as doublets from the first and second performance, with 1257–60 as the earlier version; in my edition I followed him, as have Henderson and apparently also Wilson (to judge from his apparatus note, 'duplicem recensionem *agnovit* Hamaker').

p. 267 effects of the insertion of 1442–50: Sommerstein (1996*b*) 290 added that Aristophanes 'probably also wished to maintain the consistency of the personality contrast between the two poets. In the original script, Euripides' last word in the contest had been a plan, however fantastic, for waging war; in the revised script it is a plan, however admirable, for waging politics. He [thus] ... makes it all the more apparent that he is the man of words and Aeschylus the man of action.'

p. 268 'unless he took pains to ensure that someone else clearly refuted them': and even that may often not have been enough; most scholars must have had the experience of finding themselves cited by students (and sometimes by other scholars) for arguments or conclusions which they had set out in one of their publications as a preliminary to refuting them, and which represented the exact opposite of their own views.

Platonios *Diff. Com.* 29–31 and 46–52 Koster:  
Aristophanes' *Aiolosikon*, Kratinos'  
*Odyssēs*, and Middle Comedy

Δι. τούτων ἔχεις ψέγειν τι;

Ευ. πλείν ἢ δώδεκα.

Δι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πάντα ταῦτά γ' ἔστ' ἀλλ' ἢ τρία.

Ευ. ἔχει δ' ἕκαστον εἴκοσίν γ' ἁμαρτίας.

DIONYSUS. Have you got anything in that you can criticize?

EURIPIDES. More than a dozen things.

DIONYSUS. But the whole piece is only three lines long!

EURIPIDES. Yes, but each one of them has a score of errors.

Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1129–31

1. TEXT<sup>1</sup>

(29–31)

τοιούτος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς μέσης κωμωδίας τύπος, οἷόν ἐστιν ὁ Αἰολοσίκων Ἀριστοφάνους καὶ οἱ Ὀδυσσεῖς Κρατίνου καὶ πλείστα τῶν παλαιῶν δραμάτων οὔτε χορικά οὔτε παραβάσεις ἔχοντα.

Such, then, is the form of Middle Comedy, of the kind exemplified by the *Aiolosikon* of Aristophanes and the *Odyssēs* of Kratinos and very many of the old plays which have neither choral songs nor parabases.

<sup>1</sup> The following footnotes do not constitute a critical apparatus (for which Koster (1975) and Perusino (1989) should be consulted) but merely indicate where the text I have given diverges from the manuscript tradition and/or from the text printed by Perusino (in whose edition the passages cited are lines 35–8 and 58–65).

(46–52)

ἡ δὲ μέση κωμωδία ἀφήκε τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ σκώπτειν ἱστορίας ῥηθείσας ποιηταῖς ἤλθεν.<sup>2</sup> ἀνεύθυνον γὰρ ἦν<sup>3</sup> τὸ τοιοῦτον, οἷον διασύρειν Ὅμηρον εἰπόντα τι < οὐκ εὔ ><sup>4</sup> ἢ τὸν δεῖνα τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητήν. τοιαῦτα δὲ δράματα καὶ ἐν τῇ παλαιᾷ κωμωδίᾳ ἔστιν εὔρειν, ἅπερ τελευταῖα ἐδιδάχθη λοιπὸν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας κρατυνθείσης. οἱ γοῦν Ὀδυσσεῖς Κρατίνου οὐδενὸς ἐπιτίμησιν ἔχουσι, διασυρμὸν δὲ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας τοῦ Ὀμήρου.

Middle Comedy abandoned such [political] plots and turned to the mockery of stories told by the poets, since there was no risk of punitive sanctions attached, for example, to making fun of Homer when he said something unskillfully, or of some tragic poet. Such plays are also to be found in Old Comedy, those which were produced last when oligarchy had already taken power. The *Odysseēs* of Kratinos, at any rate, has no censure of anyone [sc. contemporary], but parody of the *Odyssey* of Homer.

## 2. COMMENTARY

These two passages come from the little tract<sup>5</sup> by Platonios, *On the Different Forms of Comedy* [*Diff. Com.*] (*Περὶ διαφορᾶς κωμωδιῶν*) which, together with the even shorter work *On Difference of Styles* [*Diff. Char.*] (*Περὶ διαφορᾶς χαρακτήρων*, a *synkrisis* of Kratinos and Eupolis), appears as part of the *prolegomena de comoedia* in half a dozen Aristophanic manuscripts.<sup>6</sup> Nothing is known of Platonios, but since in the last sentence of *Diff. Com.* he refers to the appearance of Menandrian masks as something familiar to his readers, he must have been writing at a time when performances of comedy were still frequent, that is, probably not later than the fourth century AD; the fact that Old Comedy is for him represented not by one poet but by three (Kratinos and Eupolis as well as Aristophanes) might, though it need not, indicate a slightly earlier date, since after AD 300 the evidence of papyri indicates a very sharp drop in reader interest in

<sup>2</sup> ἤλθον codd.: corr. Brunck.

<sup>3</sup> ἦν ENp1: om. CGLV5 Ald.

<sup>4</sup> Suppl. Kaibel.

<sup>5</sup> Or rather, perhaps, epitome of a tract (Nesselrath (1990) 30).

<sup>6</sup> In Koster (1975) they are texts I and II. Hereafter, line references to the two texts are to this edition.



Old Comedy (except for the eleven plays of Aristophanes that survived into the Middle Ages).<sup>7</sup> On the other hand his profound ignorance of the political history of classical Athens makes it difficult to place him much earlier than this.<sup>8</sup>

Platonios' references to the *Odysseēs* of Kratinos, and his apparent belief that it pointed the way towards Middle Comedy, have been eagerly seized on by scholars interested in establishing continuities between Old and Middle Comedy and in stressing the diversity of comedy in the later fifth century;<sup>8a</sup> others, however,<sup>8b</sup> have rejected Platonios' statements on the ground of the gross factual errors he undoubtedly commits, but without adequately accounting for how he came to make them in the first place.

The two passages cited contain at least three major *prima-facie* errors.<sup>9</sup>

1. Platonios clearly believed that Kratinos' *Odysseēs* was a late play, contemporary with the last years of Aristophanes' career.<sup>10</sup> By then Kratinos was certainly long dead: there is no other positive evidence that he wrote any plays after his *Pytine* won first prize at the City Dionysia of 423, and whether or not Ar. *Peace* 700–3 is evidence that he was dead by 421,<sup>11</sup> the reference to him in Ar. *Frogs* 357, where he is spoken of as if he were a hero or a god, shows conclusively that he was dead by 405.

<sup>7</sup> There is only one surviving fragment of a copy of any other Old Comic text later than AD 300, namely *PCair* 43227 (of about AD 400) which together with (at least) five plays of Menander also included Eupolis' *Demes*.\*

<sup>8</sup> So too does his name: the free creation of personal names in *-ιος* is a phenomenon of the third and later centuries (see Fraenkel (1935) 1663–4; Kajanto (1963) 25–6; Salway (1994) 136).

<sup>8a</sup> For example Perusino (1987) 53–6, (1989) 80–4; Rothwell (1995) 115–16; Rosen (1995) 127–31.

<sup>8b</sup> For example Geissler (1925) 20; Bertan (1984); Nesselrath (1990) 30–4, 236–9.\*

<sup>9</sup> In addition, Platonios' characterization of *Odysseēs* as a play of Middle Comic type, lacking personal and political satire, is in apparent contradiction with his own description of Kratinos in *Diff. Char.* as being the most direct, virulent, and acerbic satirist among the leading Old Comic dramatists (*Diff. Char.* 1–5, 15, 16); but in the latter passages Platonios could be describing the *typical* style of Kratinos, as displayed in those comedies in which he was free to follow his own bent.

<sup>10</sup> *Aiolosikon* was produced by Aristophanes' son Araros some time after 388 (Hypothesis 3 (Chantry <= III Wilson>) to Ar. *Wealth*).

<sup>11</sup> <Of recent editors,> Platnauer (1964) and Sommerstein (1985) ad loc. take opposite views on this matter; Olson (1998) is non-committal. The problem is that Trygaios speaks of Kratinos as having died 'when the Lakonians invaded', and there had been no such invasion between 423 and 421.

2. Both in these passages and throughout *Diff. Com.* he associates the passage from Old to Middle Comedy<sup>12</sup> with the subjection of Athens to Macedonian domination,<sup>13</sup> the replacement of democracy by oligarchy,<sup>14</sup> and the disappearance of *choregia*,<sup>15</sup> that is, with developments of the period 322–307 BC, long after the death of Aristophanes as well as of Kratinos.

3. The statement that Aristophanes' *Aiolosikon* and Kratinos' *Odysseēs* 'have neither choral songs nor parabases'<sup>16</sup> does not appear to be borne out by the surviving fragments of these comedies, several of which, if found in any other play, would unhesitatingly be ascribed to choral songs.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The two texts between them contain only one mention of New Comedy, at *Diff. Com.* 59 where Middle and New Comedy are bracketed together with reference to mask styles. Nesselrath (1990) 30 supposes that the epitomator he posits has suppressed a fuller discussion of New Comedy; but the subject of *Diff. Com.* is the transition from Old to Middle, marked by the alleged disappearance of the chorus and of political satire, and New Comedy is mentioned only in order that an appeal can be made to the evidence of the masks still used for performances of Menander.

<sup>13</sup> *Diff. Com.* 60–3. He may, in fact, be fortuitously right to claim that political satire in comedy (virtually) ended at this time; as late as 324 a nine-line fragment of Timokles (fr. 4) accuses five politicians of receiving money from Harpalos (including Hyperides, who of course was not in the end indicted, as well as Demosthenes, who was), but after 322 there is nothing comparable, hostile remarks being directed only at safe targets (Archedikos fr. 4, attacking Demochares, and Demetrios jun. fr. 1, attacking Lachares, may both have been written when their targets were in exile; Philippides fr. 25 and 26, attacking Stratokles, was almost certainly written after the defeat of Stratokles' patrons the Antigonids by Philippides' own patron Lysimachos at Ipsos).

<sup>14</sup> *Diff. Com.* 13–16, 40–1, 51.

<sup>15</sup> *Diff. Com.* 20–6, 43–4, 55–6.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. also *Diff. Com.* 22–3 τὸν... Αἰολοσίκωνα Ἀριστοφάνης ἐδίδαξεν, ὃς οὐκ ἔχει τὰ χορικά μέλη.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Kratinos fr. 151 (paroemiacs; the chorus identifying itself, so presumably from the parodos), 153 (glyconics); Ar. fr. 8 (lyric trochaics), 9 (aristophaneans), 10 (choriambs); see Bertan (1984) 173–6, who discusses all these fragments except Ar. fr. 8. In addition, Kratinos fr. 152 νεοχρόν τι παρήχθαι ἄθυρμα—either another paroemiac, or the latter half of an anapaestic tetrameter—could well come from a parabasis in which the poet was praised for his innovations (cf. Ar. *Clouds* 547–8; *Wasps* 1044–5, 1053; Metagenes fr. 14; Pherekrates fr. 84), though it is going too far to assert with Bertan (1984) 175 that Kratinos' play *certainly* had a parabasis; the fragment could also come e.g. from a dialogue scene in anapaestic tetrameters between Odysseus and Polyphemus (attested by fr. 145), in which case the 'new toy' would not be a dramatic or theatrical innovation but wine.\*

Some but not all of these confusions reappear in other ancient writings on comedy. That the transition from Old to Middle Comedy was the result of a restrictive law or decree was a Hellenistic theory (it appears already in Horace, *AP* 282–4)—though other ancient statements about such enactments, however inconsistent with the known history of comedy,<sup>18</sup> at least date the transition to a period within the career of Aristophanes.<sup>19</sup> One of them, furthermore, associates the process with the disappearance, or at least the decline, of *choregia*,<sup>20</sup> and another asserts that Aristophanes' *Wealth* 'is devoid of choruses';<sup>21</sup> while Platonios' evident belief that Aristophanes, Kratinos, and Eupolis were exact contemporaries, so that one would expect to find features characteristic of Middle Comedy in the late work of all of them, is likewise shared by at least one other source.<sup>22</sup> The only features that are unique to Platonios are (i) the attempt to associate the end of Old Comedy with the advent of oligarchy and Macedonian domination and (ii) the specific mention of Aristophanes' *Aiolosikon* and Kratinos' *Odyssēs*.

<sup>18</sup> The conclusion of Körte (1922) 1233–6 remains valid, that all the reported decrees against comic satire can be shown to have been either fictitious, or ineffective, or (in the case of the decree of 440/39, reported by *Σ Ar. Ach.* 67) soon repealed (see further Halliwell (1984, 1991), Sommerstein (1986*a*), Atkinson (1991), MacDowell (1995) 25–6).\*

<sup>19</sup> A law was passed after Kleon had accused Aristophanes of *hybris* [*sic*] (*Σ Aristeides Or.* 46 (= *Or.* 3.8 Lenz–Behr) = *Proleg.* XXb 1–2 Koster); or a decree *κωμωδεῖν ἐσχηματισμένως καὶ μὴ προδήλως* was carried on the motion of Alkibiades after he had taken revenge on Eupolis for attacking him in *Baptai*, with results observable in the *συμβολικά* . . . *σκώμματα* of later works of Eupolis, Kratinos [*sic*], Pherekrates, Platon, Aristophanes and others (Tzetzes, *Proleg.* XIa I 87–104, cf. XIc 29–43); or there was a *ψήφισμα χορηγικόν*, prohibiting satire on anyone by name, which stimulated Aristophanes to write *Kokalos* (*Life of Aristophanes* = *Ar. test.* 1.47 KA). Other accounts concentrate on the motivation for the supposed decree: it was due to the increasing prevalence of wickedness and the desire of 'the rich and the magistrates' to avoid exposure in comedy (*Proleg.* IV 11–15, cf. XIa I 69–77, XIb 26–33, XVIIIa 29–39), or to the abuse of comic licence by dramatists who attacked blameless victims (Euanthius, *Proleg.* XXV I 53–7, cf. Horace loc. cit.).

<sup>20</sup> *Life of Aristophanes* = *Ar. test.* 1.47–8 KA *τῶν χορηγῶν οὐκ ἀντεχόντων πρὸς τὸ χορηγεῖν*.

<sup>21</sup> *Proleg.* V 24–6 *ὁ Πλούτος . . . χορῶν ἐστέρηται*.

<sup>22</sup> The source of Tzetzes, *Proleg.* XIa I 98–9 (cf. n. 19 above); this source, which mentions Pherekrates and Platon, is independent of Platonios, who gives no sign of knowing anything about any individual comic dramatist except Aristophanes, Kratinos, Eupolis, and Menander.

Of these features, (i) can safely be put down to Platonios' historical ignorance. His reading of secondary literature has told him that there were three kinds of comedy, Old, Middle, and New, and probably also that Middle Comedy specialized in burlesque of myth and poetry; but the only comedies to which he actually has access are those of Aristophanes, Kratinos, Eupolis, and Menander. Knowing that the first three lived in the time of Athenian democracy, and Menander in the time of oligarchy and Macedonian domination, and acquainted also with the theory that ascribed the decline of personal/political satire in comedy to legal constraints, he jumped to the conclusion that the introduction of these constraints was associated with the overthrow of democracy, and that both these events took place towards the end of the period of Old Comedy; it is not clear whether he took Middle and New Comedy to have originated more or less simultaneously at this time,<sup>23</sup> or whether he regarded them as successive stages and supposed that a considerable interval elapsed between the political revolution and the beginning of Menander's career. Alternatively, he may merely have telescoped the short-lived oligarchies of the late fifth century with the oligarchy imposed by Antipatros in 322.<sup>24</sup>

Platonios is certainly no historian, but equally certainly he would never have claimed to be one. He is, or at least he is trying to be, a literary scholar; and in that capacity he asserts, or seems to assert, that *Aiolosikon* and *Odyssēs*, as well as 'very many of the old [comic] plays', have no choral songs or parabasis, and furthermore that *Odyssēs* 'has no censure of anyone'. The latter statement is borne out, at least *ex silentio*, by our surviving fragments of the play; the former, *prima facie*, is not. If Platonios is wrong, why is he wrong? Or has he merely been misunderstood?

<sup>23</sup> The statement in the *Life of Ar.* (Ar. test. 1.46–51 KA, cf. ib. 4–6) that as a result of the alleged decree against personal satire, and of the decline of *choregia*, Aristophanes in *Kokalos* introduced 'rape and recognition and all the other things that Menander imitated' (cf. already Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.26.6 claiming that Philemon's *Hypobolimaios* was an adaptation of *Kokalos*) indicates that at least one tradition in antiquity traced the roots of New as well as Middle Comedy to the later works of Aristophanes.

<sup>24</sup> Influenced maybe by Pl. *Apol.* 32c και ταῦτα μὲν [Socrates' opposition to illegal measures during the Arginousai debate] ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο... which a careless reader might take to imply that Athenian democracy had ended for good by the time of Socrates' trial.

Several attempts<sup>25</sup> have been made to interpret either Platonios' statements, or the fragments of *Aiolosikon* and *Odyssēs*, or both, so as to resolve the apparent conflict between them. Kaibel (1895) 75, noting that Platonios does not directly state that *Odyssēs* had no choral songs, suggested that it was cited only 'as an example of non-political comedy... in [which] literary... parody took the place of political satire'; Perusino (1989) 55, like Bertan (1984) 173, is rightly sceptical, since Platonios would hardly have sandwiched *Odyssēs* between *Aiolosikon*, which he had already said lacked such songs, and a group of other plays which also lacked them, unless he believed that *Odyssēs* shared the same characteristic. Perusino herself (Perusino (1989) 51, cf. Perusino (1987) 71–2) suggests that the phrase (τὰ) χορικά (μέλη) is to be taken as excluding the parodos, as a parallel expression evidently does in the statement about Aristophanes' *Wealth* in *Proleg.* V 24–6.<sup>26</sup> This is plausible enough in itself, but it will make Platonios' statements true only if it can be shown that the surviving lyric fragments of the two plays under consideration either come from their parodoi or are not sung by the chorus.

This Perusino is not able to show. In the case of *Aiolosikon* she claims that fr. 9 and 10 belong to the parodos,<sup>27</sup> with fr. 9 as its opening lines; the only argument offered in support is the analogy with *Wealth* (Perusino (1989) 51, cf. Perusino (1987) 71), and there is nothing in the content of either fragment that particularly suggests it

<sup>25</sup> Reviewed by Bertan (1984) 172–3.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. n. 21 above. Our text of *Wealth* contains choral lyrics in the parodos at 290–321 (alternating with solos by Karion), with nothing after that except two brief dochmiac exclamations at 637 and 639–40; at several other points the indication χοροῦ (once κομμάτιον χοροῦ) appears in some MSS and/or scholia (as also at *Ekkl.* 729 and 876), and in three places (321/2, cf. 317 ἐπ' ἄλλ' εἶδος τρέπεσθ'; 770/1, cf. 771 καὶ προσκυνῶ γε where the particles indicate that the speaker is replying to an exhortation by someone else; and at the end of the play, cf. 1209 δεῖ γὰρ κατόπιον τούτων ἄδοντας ἐπεσθαι) the words of the text indicate that the chorus must have sung although their song is not included in the script. See further Handley (1953); Pöhlmann (1977); Hunter (1979) 23–33; Sommerstein (1984b) 139–45.\* That χορικά should be taken to exclude the parodos is also suggested, independently it would seem, by Sutton (1990) 87.

<sup>27</sup> Also Ar. fr. 715, if this belongs to *Aiolosikon* at all; but it probably does not. It is metrically similar to fr. 9 and 10, and both deal with sexual misbehaviour by wives; but whereas in fr. 9 a group of women are conversing among themselves, fr. 715 is part of an address (presumably an apostrophe) to a slave who is the lover of his owner's wife. For aristophaneans in sequence cf. also *Wasps* 535–7 = 639–41 (agon), *Peace* 785–7 = 806–8 (parabasis), *Lys.* 326–8 = 340–3 (parodos), Eupolis fr. 176.

comes from a parodos. On fr. 8 Perusino admits that ‘metre and text justify no hypothesis’ regarding the part of the play to which it belongs.<sup>28</sup> So far as *Odysseēs* is concerned, there is no serious doubt that fr. 151 comes from the parodos,<sup>29</sup> and the same *might* be true of fr. 152 if indeed it is lyric at all.<sup>30</sup> What though of fr. 153 (οὐκ εἰδυῖα τὰδ’ οὐκετ’ ὄνθ’ / οἶα τὰπὶ Χαρικλένης)? Perusino (1987) 82–3 assigns it, without argument, to an actor,<sup>31</sup> but these glyconics are much more likely to belong to the chorus.<sup>32</sup>

Other attempts to explain away the evidence of the fragments, particularly of Kratinos fr. 153, have been no more successful. Sutton (1990) offers no explanation of fr. 153 at all; nor more recently do Rothwell (1995) or Rosen (1995). Hubbard (1991) 24 n. 40 suggests that the fragment ‘could come from an agon or prologue’: the latter suggestion badly requires elaboration, and as to the former, if the fragment comes from an agon it could only come from the ode or

<sup>28</sup> So Perusino (1987) 72; two years later (Perusino (1989) 51) she says meiotically that ‘some doubt might arise’ about the assignment of the fragment to the parodos. Hunter (1979) 33 had pointed out that while there could be no absolute proof that fr. 8 was choral, the first person plural ὀρώμεν strongly suggested that it was.

<sup>29</sup> Kassel and Austin ad loc. well compare Kratinos fr. 171.9–26 where the chorus likewise explain who they are and what they are doing. In Aristophanes this information is invariably given *before* the chorus enter (e.g. *Ach.* 177–203, *Wasps* 214–29, *Wealth* 223–6).

<sup>30</sup> It could equally well come e.g. from the ‘anapaests’ or the *pnigos* of a parabasis (cf. n. 17 above).

<sup>31</sup> Her only comment is: ‘testo problematico. Si parla di una donna, se si deve leggere *εἰδυῖα* al v.1’. Perusino (1989) 55–6 added nothing. In discussion on this paper, Professor Perusino argued that *εἰδυῖα* indicated the speaker was female (whereas the chorus of *Odysseēs* was certainly male, cf. frs. 150, 151); but as the two other known comic references to τὰπὶ Χαρικλένης (see next note) tend to confirm, it is much more likely that the speaker(s) are accusing someone else of living in the past than that they are saying they are living in the past themselves.

<sup>32</sup> Though, as Eric Handley rightly pointed out in discussion on this paper, the lines certainly *might* come from an actor lyric, as do the glyconics in Ar. *Wasps* 319–22, *Frogs* 1311 ff., and possibly *Ekkl.* 915 = 921 (see L. P. E. Parker (1997) 540–3; on the other hand, to set against these three passages, there are ten choral songs in Aristophanes’ surviving plays in which glyconics figure). Incidentally, who might the female be who ‘doesn’t know that these things are no longer the way they were in the olden days’ (for τὰπὶ Χαρικλένης cf. Ar. *Ekkl.* 943, Theopompos fr. 51), and in what connection might either Odysseus or Polyphemos have occasion to refer to her? It may be that the chorus, always in Old Comedy much less closely anchored to the plot than the principals are, are here performing in their ‘function’ rather than their ‘role’ (cf. Dover (1993*b*) 58–60) and making a contemporary reference, either to an ageing hetaira (it is curious that Theopompos fr. 51 is about an αὐλητρίς while Ar. *Ekkl.* 943 is spoken by an old woman on a man-hunt) or maybe to ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις.

antode, that is, from a choral song. It would take very strong supporting evidence indeed to show convincingly that a play of the third quarter of the fifth century, by a dramatist noted for the quality and popularity of his lyrics,<sup>33</sup> contained no choral songs, and it is far more likely that Platonios is in error. If so, it follows that either he did not have available to him texts of the plays with which we are concerned,<sup>34</sup> or he did not trouble to check through the texts but trusted the statement of his secondary source—or what he thought was the statement of his secondary source (why I make this distinction will become clear at the end of this paper).

How did the error arise? How did Platonios come to believe that these two plays had no choral songs? Two explanations have been suggested; I wish to modify and combine them, and also to suggest a third possibility which will throw into doubt yet another of Platonios' statements.

Bertan (1984) 176–7 reconstructed the following chain of (mis)-reasoning on Platonios' part. His source, she supposed, had cited *Odyssēs* and *Aiolosikon* as comedies of pure literary parody with no political satire. Believing that both the disappearance of political satire and the decline of the comic chorus were due to the replacement of democracy by oligarchy, and therefore that these changes occurred at the same time, Platonios inferred that these two plays must have been devoid of choral songs, and stated this inference as a fact.<sup>35</sup> His further reference to 'very many of the old plays' is based on no evidence and is merely, as Bertan puts it, 'equivalent to a vague "etcetera"'.

This is an attractive hypothesis, and certainly cannot be ruled out, but it does require us to suppose that Platonios was not merely (as all agree) ignorant and incompetent, but dishonest. Moreover, his reference to *πλείστα τῶν παλαιῶν δραμάτων οὔτε χορικά οὔτε παραβάσεις ἔχοντα* seems to be to something that his readers are presumed already to know: he is not so much asserting *that* there are many plays like that, as explaining *why* they are like that. It is perhaps therefore more likely that Platonios found *two* relevant statements in his source:

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Ar. *Knights* 529–30.

<sup>34</sup> So Bertan (1984) 178, mistakenly regarding this as the only possibility.

<sup>35</sup> Kaibel (MS ap. *PCG* iii.2 p. 34) had taken a somewhat similar view: 'in errore abductus esse videtur grammaticus, qui legisset Aeolosiconem mediae comoediae indolem habuisse, mediae autem comoediae fabulas choricis fere caruisse'.

(i) that *Aiolosikon* and several other comedies had no choral songs; (ii) that *Aiolosikon*, *Odysseēs*, and many other Old Comedies were pure literary parodies with no political satire, close to the pattern of Middle Comedy. Combining in his own treatment these two statements about similar but not identical groups of plays, he illegitimately but excusably (perhaps, indeed, inadvertently) treated *both* of them as applying to *Odysseēs* as well as to *Aiolosikon*. If this is what Platonios did with his source, we now need to account for the statements made by the source itself. We may assume for now that statement (ii) was made because it was true; what about statement (i)?

Here we can combine our first line of explanation with a second, due to Wilamowitz.<sup>36</sup> Our ancient sources speak of a first and a second *Aiolosikon*,<sup>37</sup> and it is therefore possible that the first version contained choral songs and the second did not. It has usually been supposed that the play was produced twice, but after his experience with *Clouds*<sup>38</sup> it is not likely that Aristophanes would have let his son compete with a mere rehash of an old play;<sup>39</sup> more probably there

<sup>36</sup> Wilamowitz (1921) 396 n. 2.

<sup>37</sup> A surviving catalogue of Aristophanes' plays (Ar. test. 2a.12–23 KA) includes the entry *Αἰολοσίκων β'* (it similarly indicates that there are two plays each with the titles *Θεσμοφοριάζουσαι*, *Νεφέλαι*, and *Πλοῦτος*); and Choiroboskos (on Heph. *Ench.* 9 (p. 235.13–14 Consbruch)) states that there are 'a first and second play *Aiolosikon* of Aristophanes'. Most ancient quotations are cited simply as from *Aiolosikon*, but one (fr. 5, one and a half iambic trimeters) is ascribed (by Ath. 9.372a) to *Αἰολοσίκων δευτέρῳ*.

<sup>38</sup> The revised version of *Clouds* was never produced (*Clouds* Hypoth. I 3 Dover <= VI 3 Wilson>), and its incomplete state could be due to Ar.'s having abandoned work on it after being refused a chorus for it by the archon (cf. Hypoth. II 4–5 Dover <= V 5–6 Wilson> ἀτυχῶν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον [sc. than when he had been defeated with the original play]... οὐκέτι τὴν διασκευὴν εἰσήγαγεν); cf. Russo (1994) 107–8, and Sommerstein ap. Henderson (1993b) 601 n. 28. Lowe (1993) 82 n. 14 has suggested that the phrase ὑμῶν... τοῦς... δεξιούς in the revised parabasis (*Clouds* 527) indicates that the revised script was intended not for the general public but for 'a selective, elite audience', i.e. was designed from the start for written circulation only; note, however, that the addressees of this parabasis are repeatedly called 'spectators' (518, 521, 535), are identified with the audience of the original production (523), and are assumed to be in Athens (528 ἐνθάδ'). This is not the only place where Ar. singles out a portion of his audience as being intelligent with the implication that the rest are not (cf. e.g. *Knights* 228, and *Ekkl.* 1155–7 where a similar distinction is made among the contest judges), confident that every *individual* spectator will take it for granted that *he* is among those being flattered.\*

<sup>39</sup> And a rehash it would have to have been. One can write two entirely different plays called *Peace* or *Thesmophoriazousai* or even *Wealth*, but how much difference



was only one production in the author's lifetime, and the two texts were, respectively, a full script and a script which, like the one we have of *Wealth*, omitted most of the choral songs, marking their places with, at most, the word  $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon$ .<sup>40</sup> We know that in the case of tragedy such full and partial scripts did coexist, for there survive fragments of several partial scripts (with choral songs omitted) from the Ptolemaic period, and at least one of them is from a play (Euripides' *Hippolytos*) of which a full script also survives.<sup>41</sup> Alexandrian scholars, to be sure, would have been familiar with such duplicate scripts, and one would not normally expect them to account for the duplication by positing two separate plays; but it is possible that the partial script was a revised one prepared for a revival (either in Athens<sup>42</sup> or elsewhere) at a time or place when comic choruses were no longer capable of making the kind of contribution

could there be between two plays both of which were parodies of Euripides' *Aiolos* and both of which had a person called Sikon in the role corresponding to that of *Aiolos*?

<sup>40</sup> On *Wealth* cf. above, p. 278 and n. 26.

<sup>41</sup> *PSorb* 2252 (mid-3rd c. BC) contains fragments of Eur. *Hipp.* 1–106, but omits 58–72, leaving a gap in which the formula  $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon$  ( $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ) may or may not have stood. *PHib* 4 = *trag. adesp.* 625 *TrGF* (early to mid-3rd c. BC) contains parts of a play about the house of Oineus by an unknown imitator of Euripides (not Euripides himself, for the burial of Meleagros was part of the play's action (cf. lines 4–6), whereas the action of Euripides' *Oineus* took place much later, after the expedition of the Epigonoï (*Σ Ar. Ach.* 418, cf. Eur. fr. 559) or even after the Trojan War (Hyginus *Fab.* 175); nor Chairemon, cf. Collard (1970) 23–4), and has  $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon$   $\mu\acute{\epsilon}[\lambda\omicron\varsigma]$  between lines 8 and 9. *PHib* 174 = Astydamos II fr. 1h Snell (2nd c. BC) has  $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon$   $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  between lines 9 and 11. A much later papyrus, *PLitLond* 77 = *CGFP* 350 (2nd–3rd c. AD), of uncertain genre (probably satyric, despite having a chorus of [satyrs masquerading as?] women, in the view of Sutton (1987) 7–60 and Kassel and Austin in *PCG* viii. 518; the sustained poetic cast of the diction, over a very long stretch of spoken dialogue, is certainly unlike anything we know of comedy), has  $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon$  between lines 112 and 113. Pöhlmann (1977) 72 concludes that 'es gab... mindestens vom Frühhellenismus an Teilmanuskripte von Bühnenwerken, die sich auf die Rollen der Schauspieler oder gar nur auf die Wiedergabe der Sprechverse beschränkten': such MSS, which contained a whole play but merely marked the position of songs instead of recording their words (just as most MSS of forensic speeches marked the points where documents and depositions were read but did not reproduce their text), are to be distinguished from those, such as the principal papyrus of Menander's *Kolax* (*POxy* 409+2655; see Arnott (1996a) 153–5), which contain only excerpts for performance in non-theatrical contexts; in the latter  $\chi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon$  ( $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ) is not found.

<sup>42</sup> The first performance of an 'old' comedy at the City Dionysia was in 339 (Mette (1977) no. I col. 15.14–15). The only fourth-century instance in which we know what play was performed is that of Anaxandrides' *Thesaurus*, revived in 311 (Mette (1977) no. III B 2 col. 1.14–15), but a late play of Ar. might very well have been selected for

which the chorus of the original *Aiolosikon* had been required to make, and that the elimination of the choral songs had entailed further consequential changes which made the two texts different enough to be regarded for reference purposes as distinct plays.<sup>43</sup>

It is likely enough that the 'very many... old plays' which, according to Platonios, also had no choral songs or parabasis, were merely other late plays of Aristophanes (and perhaps of Platon and other contemporaries, though in this case Platonios' knowledge of them was probably second-hand) whose surviving scripts resembled those of *Wealth* or *Aiolosikon II*:<sup>44</sup> in addition to *Wealth* there are five lost plays of Aristophanes which certainly or probably belong to the 390s or 380s and which Platonios might have seen as tending towards Middle Comedy (no known choral fragments; little or no political satire; in most cases, myth-based plots).<sup>45</sup>

If we were sure that this explanation of the texts with which we began was correct, we could conclude that so far as concerns the structure and content (as distinct from the date and background) of the plays to which he was referring, Platonios erred only in supposing

performance in the 330s (when Timokles, an admirer and imitator of Ar., was one of the leading Athenian dramatists).

<sup>43</sup> The same might easily have happened with *Frogs*, three or four passages of which appear to have been revised on its restaging in 404 (see Dover (1993*b*) 73–6, 343–4, 372–6; Sommerstein (1996*b*) 21–3, 268–9, 285–8); it would seem, however, that all copies that survived into the Hellenistic age were based on a copy in which the new passages (the longest of which amounted to nine lines) had merely been written in without obliterating the lines replaced, so that ancient scholars were never faced with two different versions of the text to distinguish and compare.

<sup>44</sup> Alternatively or additionally, as was suggested by D. Del Corno (ap. Perusino (1989) 54–5), the reference might conceivably be to plays of Epicharmos; this is, however, unlikely, since Platonios' statement is part of an argument which seeks to explain the form of certain comedies as the consequence of changes in political conditions at Athens (cf. *Diff. Com.* 3, 14, 21).

<sup>45</sup> *Kokalos* was produced later than 388, and is said to have had a plot that anticipated New Comedy (see n. 23 above); all surviving fragments are iambic or anapaestic. *Storks* (*Pelargoi*) satirizes two men also mentioned in *Wealth*, Patrokles and Neokleides (Ar. fr. 454, 455); the fragments are iambic and anapaestic except for one trochaic tetrameter (fr. 448). For three mythological plays (*Lemniai*, *Phoinissai*, *Polyidos*) no *termini ante quos* earlier than 388 can be specified, and their 36 surviving fragments contain no reference to any contemporary individual and only two lyric fragments (fr. 573, 574), both of which may well come from a monody or monodies (573 is an apostrophe to a lamp, cf. *Ekkl.* 1 ff.; 574 parodies Eur. *Phoin.* 182 which is

(i) that the script of *Aiolosikon II* was a complete one<sup>46</sup> and (ii) that *Odysseēs*, because it resembled *Aiolosikon II* and Middle Comedy in one important respect, resembled them also in another. We could then take it as reasonably well established that *Odysseēs* was free of political satire, and seek to determine why Kratinos might have chosen to write a play of this kind and how it fits into the typology and evolution of comedy.<sup>47</sup> Unfortunately, at least as regards *Odysseēs*, the explanation may not be correct. The play that Platonios is describing, with no choral songs and no political satire, may not be the *Odysseēs* of Kratinos at all.

For we know of a play which is likely to have matched Platonios' description of the *Odysseēs* of Kratinos in every respect, save only that it was not by Kratinos. This is the *Odysseus* of Theopompos. Theopompos was a poet of the transition from Old to Middle Comedy; his earliest datable plays share *komodoumenoi* with Aristophanes' *Birds*,<sup>48</sup> his latest belong to the 370s.<sup>49</sup> If his *Odysseus* is later than (say) 390, it is likely enough that it had no parabasis and no choral songs (at least none that were included in the scripts that went into circulation) and no, or very little, satire on contemporaries;<sup>50</sup> and it certainly contained parody of the *Odyssey*.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, of four

part of a solo song by Antigone). As *Aiolosikon* itself proves, the fact that these plays are based on fifth-century tragedies does not prove that they were necessarily written within a few years after the tragedies in question.

<sup>46</sup> Precisely the same mistake, as we have seen, that the author of *Proleg.* V made about *Wealth*.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. on this Perusino (1987) 80–8, Rothwell (1995) 114–16, Rosen (1995) 127–31.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Theopompos fr. 25 (Leotrophides, cf. *Birds* 1406), 40 (Laispodias, cf. *Birds* 1569), 61 (Akestor, the 'Sakas' of *Birds* 31, cf. *Wasps* 1221). He probably won a City Dionysia victory before 402, since his name precedes that of Kephisodoros (for whom cf. *Lys.* 21.4) in the Dionysia victor-list (Mette (1977) no. V B 1 col. 3.2–3) and the obscure Kephisodoros, for whom we have only four play-titles and 14 fragments, is not at all likely to have won a Lenaian victory as well (and if he had, he would almost certainly have appeared in the run of twelve preserved Lenaian comic victors in Mette (1977) no. V C 1 col. 2.1–12).\*

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Theopompos fr. 1, 16, 17, 31. The titles *Nemea* and *Pamphile* might possibly carry his career into the 360s (cf. Körte (1934) 2176), but only if (i) these are the names of real-life hetairai (rather than of a mythical and a fictional character respectively) and (ii) these hetairai are identical with the Nemeas (*sic*) of Ath. 13.591e and the Pamphile who may have given her name to a play by Alexis.

<sup>50</sup> The quotation, with approval, of a line from Euripides (Theopompos fr. 35), decades after his death, of course belongs in another category altogether.

<sup>51</sup> In Theopompos fr. 34, with typical comic anachronism, a somewhat distorted version of *Od.* 19.232–3 is actually ascribed to Homer by Odysseus (or, as Kaibel

ancient references to the play, one (by Pollux 7.74) actually uses the plural title (*Θεόπομπος*. . . ἐν ᾽Οδυσσεύσιν),<sup>52</sup> which is evidence either that Theopompos' play actually was called ᾽Οδυσσῆς<sup>53</sup> or (more probably)<sup>54</sup> that it could on occasion be confused with Kratinos' play.<sup>55</sup>

It may be, therefore, that Platonios' statements about Kratinos' *Odysseēs* were not based on his own or his source's reading of that play, but on statements made about Theopompos' play, in the context of a comparison between Old and Middle Comedy, by a Hellenistic or later writer, from which the name of Theopompos happened to be omitted, whether through an accident of transmission or because the writer had had frequent cause to mention this particular play. Platonios or his source therefore assumed that these references must be to the play of that (or almost that) name written by one of the only three comic dramatists, other than Menander, who for him really counted—and (as we would have to assume whether or not the present hypothesis is accepted) he took the statements on trust and failed to check back with the text of the play.

The upshot of this inquiry is, then, that it is unsafe to use the texts with which we began as evidence for a variety of early Old Comedy in

suggested, by an impostor pretending to be Odysseus); in fr. 35 the Euripidean line 'the truly happy man dines on others' food' may be a cynical remark by one of Penelope's suitors who have been doing just that for several years (so Nesselrath (1990) 311 n. 69 + 70, comparing Diphilos fr. 74.6–9; his alternative suggestion, that Theopompos is remodelling *Od.* 9.5–11 and that the speaker is Odysseus addressing the Phaiakians, is hard to square with the setting presupposed by fr. 34).

<sup>52</sup> Another, by Erotian *Hippocratic Words* 22, has ἐν ᾽Οδυσσεεία.

<sup>53</sup> This possibility, suggested by Bergk, would be particularly attractive if Kaibel was right to imagine, on the basis of fr. 34, a scene in which the real Odysseus and an impostor impersonating him confronted one another before Penelope.

<sup>54</sup> More probably, because play-titles of this type (the pluralized name of an individual mythical or historical personage) are highly typical of Kratinos (*Archilochoi*, *Cheirones*, *Dionysoi*, *Kleoboulinai*, as well as *Odysseēs*) and of his contemporaries (Kallias, *Atalantai*; Telekleides, *Hesiodoi*) but are not known to occur in comedies of the later fifth and early fourth centuries. The same thing seems to have happened with Strattis' play *Atalantos*, which is cited several times (inevitably) as *Atalante* and once as *Atalantai*.

<sup>55</sup> Geoffrey Arnott was of course perfectly right to point out, in discussion on this paper, that Hellenistic scholars frequently err in regard to the endings of play-titles, whether as a result of expanding abbreviations or through sheer carelessness (for an instance in Aeschylus, see Sommerstein (1996a) 30 n. 10, cf. *ibid.* 57); but while one would certainly seek no special explanation for a corruption of ᾽Οδυσσεύσιν into ᾽Οδυσσεεία (or of either of them into ᾽Οδυσσεεία), no educated Greek of any period

which the role of the chorus was very restricted, or as evidence for anything at all about the nature of *Odyssēs* itself. We know that Platonios was wrong to say that *Odyssēs* is a late specimen of Old Comedy and that it was produced under an oligarchy. We know that if his statement that the play contained no choral songs is taken literally it is false, and even if we are meant to understand ‘after the parodos’ the evidence is against him. His statement that the play ‘has no censure of anyone’ is consistent with the surviving fragments, but the absence of personal satire from these fragments may be a mere accident of preservation;<sup>56</sup> there are three other comedies of Kratinos from which we have substantial numbers of quotation fragments and in which none of them includes overt satirical reference to any contemporary individual,<sup>57</sup> and we know that one of these was readily interpreted, both by most of those who saw it and by Hellenistic scholars, as a sustained satire on Perikles.<sup>58</sup> Of the things that Platonios asserts about *Odyssēs*, the only one of which we can be sure is that the play parodied Homer’s *Odyssey*—and that we knew already.<sup>59</sup>

would have pluralized the name of Odysseus by accident *unless* the plural form was already present to his mind—which it could only be if he was thinking about Kratinos’ play.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Carrière (1997) 418.

<sup>57</sup> *Dionysalexandros* (13 fragments totalling 87 words), *Nomoi* (15 fragments, 89 words), and *Trophonios* (13 fragments, 57 words); from *Odyssēs* we have 15 fragments amounting to 145 words. It may be added that the *quotation* fragments of Kratinos’ *Ploutoi* (9 fragments totalling some 82 words) also contain no contemporary satirical reference, though the papyrus fragment 171 (PSI 1212) gives us three *komodoumenoi*, all within the same short stretch of dialogue (lines 66–74).

<sup>58</sup> *Dionysalexandros*: cf. the end of the papyrus Hypothesis (POxy 663 = *Dionysalexandros* test. i KA) and Hermippos fr. 47 where Perikles is addressed as βασιλεὺ σατύρων. On how the audience could have been made aware that Dionysos represented Perikles, without anything explicit being said on the matter, see now Revermann (1997).

<sup>59</sup> This paper, which has not appeared previously, was presented *in absentia* at the *Jornadas Internacionales* held at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, in October 1997. I very much regret that for family reasons I was unable to attend the *Jornadas* <in person>. I am most grateful to Juan Antonio López Férrez for encouraging me to participate nevertheless, *a distancia*, and for supplying me with a recording of the discussion; and to Franca Perusino, Geoffrey Arnott, and Eric Handley, both for the acuity and for the auditory clarity of their comments. The paper appears here by kind permission of Prof. López Férrez.

## ADDENDA

p. 274 n. 7 There are in fact *five* papyri later than AD 300 containing Old Comic texts other than the eleven extant plays of Aristophanes, compared with at least 32 containing the text of these eleven plays or scholia thereon; this is still in very sharp contrast with the pattern before 300, where the corresponding figures are 32 and 16 respectively. For a full analysis see Trojahn (2002) 146–9; add *PColumbia* inv. 430 (late fourth or early fifth century), whose explicit reference, twice in successive lines, to the audience (*θέατρον*) makes an Old Comic origin very likely (see Barrenechea (2006)).

p. 274 n. 8b Add Casolari (2003) 61–2 and n. 4; Storey (2003) 46–7.

p. 275 n. 17 There is a full discussion of *Odysseēs*, including the role of the chorus, by Casolari (2003) 61–77; she does not, however, raise the issue of whether the play had a parabasis, even in discussing fr. 152 (pp. 72–4).

p. 276 n. 18 I have reviewed the whole subject of (actual and alleged) legal restrictions on comic freedom of speech in Sommerstein (2004*b*), with some afterthoughts in Sommerstein (2004*c*). Körte's conclusion stands.

p. 278 n. 26 On *χοροὺ* and choral performances in *Wealth*, see now Sommerstein (2001) on 321/2, 626/7, 770/1, 801/2, 958/9, 1096/7, and 1209 (also introduction, pp. 23–4).

p. 281 n. 38 On the revision of *Clouds*, see Chapter 8 above.

In conformity with the pattern of this volume, I have left the text in essentially the revised form in which it was prepared, after the conference, with a view to publication in a proceedings volume, and updated it as appropriate in the Addenda.

p. 284 n. 48 The argument about Cephisodorus perhaps needs clarification. We know from Lysias 21.4 that he won a victory (it is not specified at which festival) in 402. We know from the victor-list that he won at least one City Dionysia victory. It is not likely that so obscure a dramatist, with so small an output, would have won more than one victory in total. If he did indeed win only one victory, it follows from the above data that this must have occurred at the City Dionysia of 402, and therefore that Theopompus must have won a City Dionysia victory earlier than this.

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## General Index

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