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ΜΑΡΚΟΥ ΑΝΤΩΝΙΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΕΙΣ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ

THE MEDITATIONS OF THE EMPEROR MARCUS ANTONINUS

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



MARCUS AURELIUS

Cod. Vat. Gr. 1950, fol. 389 iterum recto (xi. 34–xii. 2)

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Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus

ΜΑΡΚΟΥ ΑΝΤΩΝΙΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΕΙΣ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ

THE MEDITATIONS OF THE EMPEROR MARCUS ANTONINUS

EDITED
WITH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY
BY

A. S. L. FARQUHARSON
(1871–1942)
FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

VOLUME II
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ERRATA

VOLUME II

p. 442. *The note on* **4.** 21 **ἐπιθυμῆσαι** *should precede that on* **4.** 21–2 **τῆς Ἑλλ. ἀγωγῆς**
p. 444, l. 6. *For* i. 1–39 *read* (i. 1–39 K)
p. 456, l. 37. *For* **τάς** *read* **τὰ κατὰ τάς**
p. 460, l. 3. *For* to *read* for
p. 497, l. 20. Delete *stop* after *Epictet.*
p. 498, l. 29. *For* **ἀρτηρίων** *read* **ἀρτηριῶν**
p. 832, l. 9. Delete μηδαμῶς

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COMMENTARY
BOOK I

Note. The headline references of the left-hand page, inner margin, are to pages of the text, of the right-hand page, inner margin, to books and chapters. The page and line of lemmas are given thus: **20. 7.**

The title. The *Meditations* are entitled *τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν* in the *Edit. princeps*, a description which is first known from a scholion of Arethas, *ἐν τοῖς εἰς ἑαυτὸν Ἠθικοῖς* (*Test.* viii. 37). It looks like a title given by an editor or bookseller; but, if given by the author, the word to be supplied is probably *ὑπομνήματα, commentarii*; cf. p. **46. 27.**

The exact meaning of *εἰς* is doubtful; in dedicatory inscriptions it often indicates the person to whom the work is addressed or in regard to whom it is composed. Thus Julian's *Oratio iv* is inscribed: *εἰς τὸν βασιλέα Ἥλιον πρὸς Σαλούστιον*, Salustius being the friend to whom the essay was sent. Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* is *τὰ ἐς τὸν Τυανέα Ἀπολλώνιον*, and the author himself says *βιβλία μὲν ξυνθέντι ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον τέτταρα V. Apoll.* i. 3, p. 3. An interesting title is S. Gregory Nazianzene's *Πρὸς Ἀρειανοὺς καὶ εἰς ἑαυτόν* Migne, *Patr. Gr.* xxxvi. 216. Julian's *Oratio viii* is *Παραμυθητικὸς εἰς ἑαυτόν.*

The ambiguity explains the variety of Latin sub-titles: De seipso seu vita sua, Xyl.; De Seipso et Ad Seipsum, Cas.; De rebus suis sive de eis quae ad se pertinere censebat, Gat.

Ménage first suggested that the title was modelled upon that of Solon's poem: *εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὑποθῆκαι Observ. in D. L.* i. 61. He pointed out that Simplicius speaks of the *Manual* of Epict. as *λόγοι γνωμονικοὶ κατὰ τὸ τῶν ὑποθηκῶν καλουμένων εἶδος in Epict. Ench.* p. 3b, thus the meaning of this title would be *Admonitions to Himself*, cf. *τὰ Μάρκου παραγγέλματα* Themistius, *Or. vi*, p. 81c.

The *Meditations* then would be a *προτρεπτικὸς λόγος*, the kind of work the growth of which has been discussed by Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos*, p. 81. Of such treatises Isoc. (ii. 3) says: *καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς . . . ὑποθήκας ὡς χρὴ ζῆν καταλελοίπασιν.* Ael. Arist. too says of Solon: *ἡγεῖτο γάρ, οἶμαι, τὰ εἰς αὑτὸν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἐγκώμια* (cf. Pl. *Lys.* 205d) *πεποιημένα λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι παραδείγματα* xxviii. 141.

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If this be the right interpretation, we may recall what Croesus said of Solon: *οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς ἑωυτὸν* (Croesus) *λέγων ἢ οὐκ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον* Hdt. i. 86, and suppose that these reflections addressed to himself by M. are intended for himself as *λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῷον*, that is, for Humanity.

A different explanation of the meaning of *εἰς ἑαυτόν* has been offered by Schekira;[1] he thinks what is intended is *ἀναχώρησις εἰς ἑαυτόν*, a *recueillement* such as is advocated by M. himself, iv. 3; cf. *ἐπάνιθι εἰς ἑαυτόν* p. **98.** 26; *εἰς ἑαυτὸν συνειλοῦ* p. **130.** 6; *εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφου* p. **190.** 9. Thus the title would indicate that these reflections are the outcome of the soul seeking refuge in itself, and there learning to know, not only itself, but the law of the Universe; a practice approaching the later 'introversion' of Neoplatonism.[2] This is, however, not the natural implication of *τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν*, and what Simplicius says of Epict.'s *Manual* (pp. 4b–5a) applies also to our book; it is not the work of a spirit which *βούλεται εἰς ἑαυτὸν συννεύειν*, but of one who lives in the world, *καὶ τούτῳ προσήκουσιν αἱ ἠθικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, ἐφ' ἃς οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι προτρέπουσιν.*

The alternative title, found in most of the X Excerpts, *τὰ καθ' ἑαυτόν* appears to mean *Soliloquies* or *Internal Consolations*. This may be derived from such an expression as *καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι* p. **238.** 10, or from the ordinary sense of *ὁ καθ' αὑτὸν λέγων, sotto voce*, p. **212.** 3.

Goethe, who was especially attracted by the autobiographical aspect of M.'s work, refers more than once to it as *τὰ περὶ ἑαυτόν*. Unconsciously, perhaps, he was rendering the old German title: *Betrachtungen über Sich Selbst*.[3]

Ch. 1: 4. 1 Παρὰ τοῦ πάππου Οὐήρου.[4] As *τὴν ἔννοιαν* p. **8.** 1 shows, *τὸ καλόηθες* is an accusative; for government *παρέλαβον* may be

---

[1] *De Imp. M. Aur. Antonini τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν*, Greifswald, 1919.

[2] E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*, p. 202.

[3] *Des Römischen Käysers M. Aur. Antoninus Erbauliche Betrachtungen über Sich Selbst*, Johann Adolf Hoffmann, 1723. Reche (1797) and Schultz (1799) say *mit Sich Selbst* in their versions.

[4] The compass of this book prevents any but occasional references to the historical and epigraphic evidence for the period. Reference may be made to *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, Klebs, Dessau, Rohden, and to *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. Wissowa and Kroll.

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understood or even δῶρα, χάριτας εἴληφα, as in ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μουσῶν δῶρα εἰληφώς p. **226.** 23–4.

That these were qualities to be admired and imitated, not that he himself acquired them, is clearly intended, see τὸ ἐπὶ παραδείγματος ζῶντος ἰδεῖν p. **6.** 15. M. is applying his maxim ἐνθυμοῦ τὰ προτερήματα τῶν συμβιούντων p. **118.** 3–4, where τὸ αἰδῆμον and τὸ εὐμετάδοτον (p. **4.** 3–4) occur to him as instances.

τὸ καλόηθες, an uncommon word, like χρηστοήθης Arist. *Rh.* 1395^{b}17; εὔηθες would have been equivocal, and, as καλός is the usual Stoic word for morally good, *honestus*, M. presumably intends what the Romans meant by *vir bonus*: 'iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur' Cic. *Off.* ii. 38. Honour and integrity are appropriate to his grandfather as Praefectus Urbi.

ἀόργητον, the domestic quality of *even temper*. The upper-class Romans were often violent in temper and brutal, see the story about Hadrian, Galen, v. 17.

τὸ ἀόργητον is a Stoic ideal: τὸ ἀνεκτικόν μου γυμνάζει, τὸ ἀόργητον, τὸ πρᾷον Epict. iii. 20. 9; οὐχὶ τὸ θυμοῦσθαι ἀνδρικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾷον καὶ ἥμερον ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπικώτερον, οὕτως καὶ ἀρρενικώτερον p. **226.** 27–8. M. is conscious of a tendency to anger in himself p. **18.** 10, and he dwells repeatedly upon its various remedies.

Ch. 2: 4. 2 **τῆς δόξης καὶ μνήμης,** a delicate reminder that, as a little boy, he lost his father.

τοῦ γεννήσαντος, emphasizing the tie of blood as in τὴν τεκοῦσαν p. **18.** 12, but also to distinguish his actual father from his father by adoption, παρὰ τοῦ πατρός p. **10.** 25.

4. 2–3 **τὸ αἰδῆμον καὶ ἀρρενικόν:** *verecundia* and *modestia* are retiring virtues, which *manliness* overcomes. Of M. it is said: 'quamvis esset constans, erat etiam verecundus' *H.A.* iv. 12. 6. The Attic poets regard modesty as partly inherited, partly the result of training: τὸ γὰρ εὐγενὲς ἐκφέρεται πρὸς αἰδῶ Eur. *Alc.* 600; τὸ γὰρ τραφῆναι μὴ κακῶς αἰδῶ φέρει id. *Supp.* 911. The Neoptolemus of Soph. may have been in M.'s memory:

ἔφυν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐκ τέχνης πράσσειν κακῆς,
οὔτ' αὐτὸς οὔθ', ὡς φασιν, οὑκφύσας ἐμέ *Ph.* 88;
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ φυτεύσαντος σύ γε
δρᾷς οὐδὲ φωνεῖς id. 904.

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Sallust says of Cato Uticensis: 'cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore . . . certabat' *Cat.* 54, cf. *infra* ii. 5 and 6.

Ch. 3: 4. 4 τὸ θεοσεβές, so of Pius: *μήτε περὶ θεοὺς δεισίδαιμον* p. **12.** 16; *θ. χωρὶς δεισιδαιμονίας* p. **110.** 8.

M. prefers *θεοσεβές* to *εὐσεβές*, a quality which Plu. says lies between *δεισιδαιμονία* and *ἀθεότης De Superst.* 171f. The coinage of Pius, especially, records a notable revival of religious usage and belief, and the *Meditations* bear the stamp of the writer's devotion: *πρὸς ὁσιότητα γὰρ καὶ θεοσέβειαν κατεσκεύασται (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν) οὐχ ἧττον ἢ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην* p. **230.** 4–5, cf. p. **234.** 19.

μεταδοτικόν, *τὸ ὁσάκις ἐβουλήθην ἐπικουρῆσαί τινι πενομένῳ . . . μηδέποτε ἀκοῦσαί με ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μοι χρήματα* p. **18.** 12–14. His generosity to his sister is recorded, see *ἀδελφήν*, p. **16.** 9 n.

4. 5 ἐπὶ ἐννοίας γίνεσθαι τοιαύτης, *thought* and therefore *intent*:

> *ὄμνυμι τῶν σῶν μήποθ' ἅψασθαι γάμων,*
> *μηδ' ἂν θελῆσαι, μηδ' ἂν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν* Eur. *Hipp.* 1026.

The importance of thought and innocency of thought is repeatedly emphasized by M. (see iii. 4. 2, xii. 4, and the beautiful passage viii. 51). Of Thales of Miletus it is recorded: *ἠρώτησέ τις αὐτὸν εἰ λήθοι θεοὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀδικῶν, "ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοούμενος" ἔφη* D.L. i. 36, cf. Epict. ii. 14. 11; iii. 23. 15; 'nihil Deo clusum est' Sen. *Ep.* 83. 1.

Contemporary Christian teaching is equally insistent upon the truth: *οὐ μόνον διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὁ ἅγιος λόγος τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρις ἐννοίας* Theoph. *ad Autol.* iii. 13; *μέχρις ἐννοίας κριθησομένοις* Athenag. *Leg.* 28.

4. 6 τὸ λιτὸν κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν, so, of Pius, *τὴν λιτὴν δίαιταν* p. **110.** 4; of Marcus, *δ. εὐτέλεια* Ael. Arist. xxxv. 29. Julian perhaps recalls the phrase: *τὴν ἐν βασιλείᾳ* (of Constantius) *τῆς διαίτης λιτότητα* p. 72; cf. *ἡ φυσικὴ καὶ λιτὴ καὶ ἀπέριττος δ.* Simpl. *in Ench.* p. 270a. Plu. opposes *τὰ λιτὰ καὶ ἁπλᾶ* to *λαμπραῖς τραπέζαις καὶ ποικίλοις ἐδέσμασι De Genio S.* 585a.

This simplicity is in contrast with the connoisseurship of the table displayed by Hadrian and L. Aelius Caesar *H.A.* i. 21. 4, ii. 5. 4, and by M.'s colleague Lucius v. 10. 8.

τῆς πλουσιακῆς διαγωγῆς, 'manner of life', luxury in dress, dwelling, and domestic servants, cf. p. **236.** 13. Pl. says that men

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get wedded to this kind of indulgence: *τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἔξουσιν, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες Tht.* 177a. The contrasted way of life is *διαγωγὴ ἐλευθέριος* Arist. *Pol.* 1339^{b}5.

Ch. 4: 4. 8 εἰς δημοσίας διατριβάς. Serious Roman families preferred home teaching for their sons, 'corrumpi mores in scholis putant' Quint. *Inst.* i. 2. 4; 'praeceptores domi habuit, ubi est erroribus modica vel etiam nulla materia' Plin. *Ep.* iii. 3. 3; Plu. says of his sons: *πάντων ἐκτεθραμμένων οἴκοι δι' αὐτῶν ἡμῶν Consol. ad Uxor.* 608c.

4. 10 ἐκτενῶς ἀναλίσκειν, in contrast with *πλουσιακῆς διαγωγῆς,* for rich men stinted on education:

> res nulla minoris
> constabit patri quam filius Juv. vii. 187.

Here *ἐκτενῶς* means 'lavishly', *ὁ μὲν ἐκτενῶς ποιῇ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπῃ* Arist. *M.M.* 1210^{a}27; *λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐκτενῶς καὶ ἀξίως (ἐκτελεῖν) C.I.G.* 2771, ii. 14; *τῷ φειδωλῷ μετ' ἐπαίνου ἐ., δαψιλής, λαμπρός* Poll. iii. 118.

The sense *ὁλοψύχως* Suid., e.g., *ἐκ καρδίας ἀγαπᾶν ἐκτενῶς* I *St. Pet.* 1. 22, may also be in the mind of the author.

Ch. 5: 4. 11 παρὰ τοῦ τροφέως, cf. *τοὺς τροφέας* p. **16.** 28; sim. **18.** 17, **92.** 22. His earliest teacher was Euphorion: 'usus est magistris ad prima elementa Euforione litteratore' *H.A.* iv. 2. 2; he is here, however, referring to his *educator*, who had general charge of him. Nicomedes, the *educator* of Lucius, *H.A.* v. 2. 8, is called his *nutritor C.I.L.* vi. 1598.

The man's name appears to have dropped out here, as it has also from the biography, where we read: 'cum M. mortuum educatorem suum fleret' *H.A.* iii. 10. 5.

The word *παιδαγωγός* has the sense *pedagogue* at pp. **82.** 5, **212.** 4, but it survived in the old sense: 'si collactaneus, si educator, si paedagogus' *Digest.* xl. ii. 13; see *C.I.L.* vi. 9739 sq.

Πρασιανὸς ἢ Βενετιανός. I have corrected a solecism and restored the right balance of the sentence.

The Roman passion for the Circus races and the *colours* of the drivers is familiar, especially from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, ch. 30. Sen. and Plin. speak contemptuously of this mad enthusiasm: 'Ecce Circensium obstrepit clamor; subita aliqua et universa voce feriuntur aures meae' Sen. *Ep.* 83. 7; 'si tamen

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aut velocitate equorum aut hominum arte traherentur, esset ratio nonnulla: nunc favent *panno, pannum* amant. . . . Tanta gratia, tanta auctoritas in una vilissima *tunica*' Plin. *Ep.* ix. 6. 2; 'de Prasino conviva meus Venetoque loquatur' Mart. x. 48. 23.

Of Lucius it is said: 'amavit et aurigas Prasino favens' *H.A.* v. 4. 7; 6. 3 and 6.

For the spelling *Βενετιανός* see Julian's note on '*οὔ*' *ἀντὶ τοῦ* '*βῆτα*' p. 72a.

4. 12 **Παλμουλάριος ἢ Σκουτάριος**: the Thrax with his *parma* and the Samnitis with his *scutum*, in the amphitheatre. Here, like the *Greens* and *Blues*, they are names for factions: 'alius percontanti, Theodoreus an Apollodoreus esset, "ego", inquit, "parmularius sum"' Quint. *Inst.* ii. 11. 2; the epitaph of an olearius, Crescens, says he had been 'Venetian(us) Parmul(arius)' *C.I.L.* vi. 9719.

Seneca is more than once roused to indignant eloquence by the brutality of these combats: 'illi quidem . . . parcebant adhuc etiam mutis animalibus: tantum aberat ut homo hominem non iratus, non timens, tantum spectaturus occideret' Sen. *Ep.* 90. 45, cf. 7. 3.

M. speaks of them with mere *ennui* p. 116. 14; he endeavoured, however, to reduce their scale and make them less inhuman, Dio Cass. lxxi. 29. 3; *H.A.* iv. 11. 4.

4. 12–13 **φερέπονον καὶ ὀλιγοδεές**: *τὸ φ., τὸ ἀφιλήδονον* p. 76. 14–15 show that M. uses *φερέπονον* for 'enduring pain', as *αὐτουργικόν* means 'enduring labour', cf. *δοκοῦντας καρτερικοὺς καὶ φιλοπόνους εἶναι τοὺς τῶν δεόντων τι ποιοῦντας* Isoc. ii. 45. *τὸ ὀλιγοδεές* is a Socratic ideal, developed in iv. 24. The lesson taught to children, to limit wants and appetites, was applied by philosophers to grown-up children. Education aims to wean man from desire for excess, in wealth, power, glory, Arist. *Pol.* 1323^{a}37, in material blessings, wine and good cheer, *E.N.* 1154^{a}18; the former by curbing desire, the latter by substituting pleasant ends which do not involve control over or enslavement of other selves. Arist. teaches that insatiate want leads to tyranny, *E.N.* 1134^{b}7, a lesson which M. reads from the history of an Alexander, *ὅσων πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων* p. 148. 2.

4. 13 **αὐτουργικὸν καὶ ἀπολύπραγμον**: St. Paul reverses the order,

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πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν 1 *Thess.* 4. 11. One side of the 'return to Nature' brought with it, as at other such periods of reaction, a laudation of agricultural life, *ὁ ἀπὸ γῆς πόρος*. We see this in the 1st cent. A.D. in Dio Chrys. and Muson. The latter speaks of country folk as *αὐτουργικοὶ καὶ φιλόπονοι* p. 57 H.: the moral is *ἐλευθεριώτερον αὐτὸν αὑτῷ μηχανᾶσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ παρ' ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν* p. 59. This Muson. generalizes: *τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ἄλλου πρὸς τὰς χρείας τὰς αὑτοῦ*. M. reads the same lesson: *τὸ ἀπροσδεὲς τῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπηρεσίας καὶ . . . ἡσυχίας ἣν ἄλλοι παρέχουσιν* p. 40. 19.

ἀπολύπραγμον, see *περιέργῳ* p. 20. 1. *τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν* is a Socratic motto, *τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί* Pl. *R.* 433a; *Ap.* 31c, 33a; *Grg.* 526c. The opposite, *curiosity*, is a child's trait, which education directs and curbs; it is a common vice of small communities, and Socr. suffered partly because the ordinary Athenian thought him a busybody, and *ἀδολέσχης* besides. The *πολυπράγμων* 'cares only to know things which lower the character, abate the felicity, or in some way tend to the depreciation and disparagement of others', Trench, *Four Lectures on Plutarch*, p. 103.

δυσπρόσδεκτον διαβολῆς, this good man was instructing a future Emperor, at any rate a favourite of Hadrian. He knew that his ears would be assailed by informers of every kind. We read of M.: 'calumniis quadruplatorum intercessit, adposita falsis delatoribus nota; delationes quibus fiscus augeretur contempsit' *H.A.* iv. 11. 1. Of Trajan it is said: *διαβολαῖς τε ἥκιστα ἐπίστευε* Dio Cass. lxviii. 6. 4; of Pius, M. says: *διαβολὰς οὐκ ἐδέχετο* p. 108. 29–30.

Ch. 6: 4. 15 **ἀκενόσπουδον**, a word difficult to render. M. is looking back in the light of larger experience, and means perhaps to carry on the lesson of the last ch.: 'Diognetus taught me to concentrate on worthy aims'; cf. *ἄλλῳ γὰρ οὐδενὶ τοῦ φιλοπόνου τὸν κενόσπουδον ἀφορίζομεν . . . ἢ τῷ τὸν μὲν εἰς ἀνωφελῆ πονεῖν καὶ ἀδιαφόρως, τὸν δὲ ἕνεκά του τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ λυσιτελῶν* Plu. *De comm. not.* 1061c.

The positive side of his youthful lesson he gives in a general form: *τί οὖν ἐστι περὶ ὃ δεῖ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεσθαι; ἓν τοῦτο· διάνοια δικαία καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαὶ καὶ λόγος, οἷος μήποτε διαψεύσασθαι,*

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καὶ διάθεσις ἀσπαζομένη πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ὡς ἀναγκαῖον pp. 64. 28–65. 3.

ἀπιστητικὸν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευομένων καὶ γοήτων . . ., the lesson is to be incredulous of quacks, esp. religious quacks; we are not to read into the words an implied reference to Christian preachers and teachers. The world was full of vain superstitions, which increased in the next centuries. Lucian's *Alexander* and *Peregrinus*, Philostratus' *Apollonius of Tyana*, and Origen's *True Logos* are enough to show the beliefs held in common by Christian missionaries and their pagan adversaries.

Clearly, from this passage and the general tone of the *Meditations*, M. must have been free from superstitious credulity, in spite of the stories in *H.A.* iv. 13. 1; xvii. 9. 1; Dio Cass. lxxi. 8. 4, where Xiph. adds: οὐδὲ γὰρ μάγων συνουσίαις καὶ γοητείαις ὁ *M.* χαίρειν ἱστορεῖται 9. 2. The ridiculous tale of the lions thrown into the Danube, with its romantic embroidery, Lucian surely did not expect to be credited by grave historians, *Alex.* 48.

What M. says of revelation vouchsafed in dreams belongs to a different order, see τὸ δι' ὀνειράτων p. 18. 18.

The following will illustrate the language: οὐ γὰρ ὄχλον τε γυναικῶν . . . ἐπαγαγεῖν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιίας καὶ τερατείας Strabo, i, p. 19; μήτ' οὖν ἀθέῳ τινὶ μήτε γόητι συγχωρήσῃς εἶναι Dio Cass. lii. 36. 3. The words γόης and γοητεία are continually used by Celsus, e.g., αὐτοὺς σέβειν ἀγγέλους καὶ γοητείᾳ προσκεῖσθαι Origen, *Contra Celsum* i. 26.

In the *Letter to Diognetus*, a Christian apology, which may have been sent to this Diognetus (κράτιστε Διόγνητε), there are words which look like a reply to pagan criticism: ταῦτα μὲν τερατεία καὶ πλάνη τῶν γοήτων ἐστίν ch. 8, where he is speaking of Heraclitus.

4. 16 περὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ [περὶ] δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς. I should omit περί with Suid. Both expressions refer to cures by magic; thus Lucian narrates the cure of a labouring man by a Chaldean of a viper's bite: ἐπῳδῇ τινι ἐξελάσας τὸν ἰόν *Philops.* 11 (the healed man took up his bed and walked), and speaks of τῶν πυρετῶν

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(fever-demons) *τὰς ἀποπομπάς* and *τοῦ πυρετοῦ δεδιότος ἢ ὄνομα θεσπέσιον ἢ ῥῆσιν βαρβαρικήν* ib. 9.

4. 17 **ὀρτυγοκοπεῖν.** As Suid. quotes this word, it is reasonable to suppose it to be authentic and that *ὀρτυγοτροφεῖν* displaced it. Similarly *ὀρτυγοκόπον* has been restored for *ὀρτυγοτρόφον* at Pl. *Alc.* 1. 120a, from Olymp. and the words of the Schol.

For the word in a gaming context, cf. *ἢ κυβεύεις ἢ ὀρτυγοκοπεῖς . . . μηδὲν μέγα φρονῶν μηδὲ ἄξιον τῆς εὐγενείας;* Plu. *Quomodo* 34d. The precise sense of the word is not clear from Suid. or Pollux ix. 102. The schol. to Pl. l. c. says: *οὗτος ἐπὶ κύκλου τοὺς ὄρτυγας παριστὰς κόπτειν αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλους ἐδίδασκεν*, so that perhaps an original phrase, *κόπτειν ἀλλήλους τοὺς ὄρτυγας*, was curtailed to *κόπτειν ὄρτυγας* 'fight cocks' and then to *ὀρτυγοκοπεῖν* 'cock-fight'.

4. 18 **ἐπτοῆσθαι**, 'to be all agog for'; the verb in the perf. middle is used to express excitement about an object of desire, accompanied by signs of bodily disturbance (*trepidare*); it expresses in man unreasonable transport, with a bodily thrill: *ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται* Pl. *R.* 439d; the opposed state of mind is *ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως Phd.* 68c. The physical side of the emotion is well exhibited by quails in the spring, Arist. *H.A.* 614ª26; *πάντων κοινὸν τῶν ζῴων τὸ περὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπτοῆσθαι* ib. 571ᵇ8.

ἀνέχεσθαι παρρησίας. Sextus is called *ἀνεκτικὸς τῶν ἰδιωτῶν*, he suffered fools gladly, p. **8.** 3. Here, too, the verb means to endure patiently, *ἀνάσχου λοιδορίας* Epict. iii. 21. 5; *ὕβριν οὖν φέρει . . . καὶ παιδιᾶς ἀνέχεται* Plu. *Quomodo* 64e.

παρρησία plain-speaking and therefore *rebuke*, the sense in which M. uses the word of the broad criticism of the Old Comedy p. **218.** 1.

4. 19 **οἰκειωθῆναι φιλοσοφίᾳ**, cf. *ὡς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεατῶν ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς*, growing *familiar* with, Arist. *Pol.* 1336ᵇ30. M. means a mode of life here, not a systematic study of philosophy, of which there is no trace in his correspondence until Rusticus' influence and his own reading of Stoic literature assert themselves.

4. 20 **Μαρκιανοῦ.** None of these three tutors is named by the

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biographer as a teacher of M. and there may be some such corruption as proper names are especially liable to.

Gat.'s emendation *Μαικιανοῦ* would mean M.'s law-tutor, L. Volusius Maecianus, *H.A.* iv. 3. 6; we have the *De distributione assis*, which he dedicated to M. as Caesar (A.D. 139–61); his law lessons are mentioned in the correspondence; M. excuses a hurried letter: 'quia Maecianus urgebat' Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 61. He was a member of the Privy Council of Pius, and of the Divi Fratres (A.D. 161–9), *H.A.* iii. 12. 1, *Digest* xxxvii. xiv. 17.

διαλόγους. As we see from Seneca's titles, the word had come to mean *essays*, not necessarily dialogues in the strict sense, so that M. intends literary exercises, probably on moral themes.

ἐν παιδί, a late use for *ἐκ παιδός*, Pl. has *ἐν παισί R.* 413e; cf. *πρότερον μὲν ἐν παιδὶ ποιμαίνων, ἐν ἀκμῇ δὲ . . .* Hdn. vi. 8. 1; *ἐν ἐφήβῳ ἔτι* Philostr., *V. Apoll.* i. 11; *ἐν μειρακίῳ ἀποθανόντι V. Soph.* ii. 25. 2, p. 266.

Rich. suggested *τὸ μὴ γράψαι*, comparing *μηδὲ τὸ συγγράφειν* p. 6. 1, *μηδὲ ἀποκαθίσαι* p. 18. 21. Here, however, M. is speaking of boyish attempts, 'philosophiae operam vehementer dedit et quidem adhuc puer' *H.A.* iv. 2. 6; cf. l. 19 n.

4. 21–2 **τῆς Ἑλλ. ἀγωγῆς**, so *τὰ σκληρότατα τῆς ἀγωγῆς*, of the Spartan training Plu. *Lyc.* 22; 'duodecimum annum ingressus habitum philosophi sumpsit et deinceps tolerantiam, cum studeret in pallio et humi cubaret, vix autem matre agente instrato pellibus lectulo accubaret' *H.A.* iv. 2. 6.

4. 21 **ἐπιθυμῆσαι**, 'to covet and desire', p. 18. 20 illustrates M.'s choice of words. He does not shun terms which, in another context, would convey a bad sense. See *ἀπολαύειν* p. 198. 15.

Ch. 7: 4. 23 Παρὰ Ῥουστίκου. 'Audivit . . . praecipue Iunium Rusticum, quem et reveritus est et sectatus, qui domi militiaeque pollebat, Stoicae disciplinae peritissimum (*τοὺς Ζηνωνείους λόγους μελετῶντα* Dio Cass. lxxi. 35. 1); cum quo omnia communicavit publica privataque consilia . . . quem et consulem iterum designavit' *H.A.* iv. 3. 3–4. Rusticus was not a professor, but a statesman. The second consulship, at this period, was usually conferred on the praef. urbi. As Prefect of Rome Rusticus tried and condemned Justin Martyr and four other Christians.

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τὸ λαβεῖν φαντασίαν, *φ. λαβεῖν πολιτείας* p. 10. 5, *φ. παρέχειν* pp. 10. 22, 242. 6, *φ. τοῦ συμφέρειν* p. 192. 22–3; *προτίθεσθαι τίς ὑμῶν δύναται μὴ λαβὼν φ. λυσιτελοῦς ἢ μὴ καθήκοντος;* Epict. iii. 22. 43. The word is used for the presentation by the understanding (*διάνοια*) of an object to itself p. 46. 5. Here we have popular idiom like our 'get an impression', 'form the idea'.

4. 23–4 **διορθώσεως καὶ θεραπείας τοῦ ἤθοῦς,** a favourite analogy in Greek; philosophy is to *ψυχή* what medical treatment is to *σῶμα*, Galen, *Consuet.* p. 125 Dietz. To be conscious of his ailment is needful: *ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας . . . συναίσθησις τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* Epict. ii. 11. 1; *ἰατρεῖόν ἐστι . . . τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον* iii. 23. 30, cf. ii. 21. 15, iii. 21. 20, 22. 73. Galen says *γέγραπται . . . καὶ Χρυσίππῳ . . . θεραπευτικὰ συγγράμματα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν* v. 3, and calls his own work on the *Passions* *διάγνωσίς τε καὶ θεραπεία* v. 58. Similarly: 'est profecto animi medicina, philosophia' Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 6, cf. 13; 'salutares admonitiones, velut medicamentorum utilium conpositiones' Sen. *Ep.* x. 8. 2.

διόρθωσις, cf. p. 10. 22, suggests setting a fracture or straightening a limb, orthopaedy, *θεραπεία* is general treatment such as M. describes in v. 8 and 9.

4. 24 **μὴ ἐκτραπῆναι,** met. of leaving the straight path: *τὴν κατύπερθε ὁδὸν πολλῷ μακροτέρην ἐκτραπόμενοι* Hdt. i. 104; *πρὸς ἄπρακτα πένθη ἐκτρέπεσθαι* Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 114c.

εἰς ζῆλον σοφιστικόν, *'Ασιανὸς ζῆλος τῶν λόγων,* enthusiasm for the Asiatic school of oratory Plu. *Ant.* 2, *Περσικὸς ζῆλος,* Alex.'s eastern ambition, id. *Eum.* 6.

σοφιστικόν here, unusually for M., means the quality of sophist, the common term at this date for a rhetorician. In his correspondence we can follow his conversion by Rusticus from rhetoric to philosophic study and moral endeavour. Especially he read the very strict treatises of Aristo of Chios: 'Aristonis libri . . . cum vero ostendunt quantum ab his melioribus ingenium meum relictum sit, nimis quam saepe erubescit discipulus tuus sibique suscenset, quod xxv natus annos nihildum bonarum opinionum et puriorum rationum animo hauserim' Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 75; cf. pp. 146, 150–5.

6. 1 **περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων,** 'mere large generalities', as frequently

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in Epict.: *τίνα δ'ἐστὶ ταῦτα; τὰ θεωρήματα· ἃ γὰρ λαλοῦσιν οἱ φιλοσόφοι μαθεῖν θέλομεν ὡς κομψὰ καὶ δριμέα* ii. 17. 3; *οὐδὲ τὸν ὄχλον τοῦτον τῶν θεωρημάτων ἀναληπτέον πάντως τοῖς νέοις* Muson. p. 60 H.

προτρεπτικὰ λογάρια, *λόγοι προτρεπτικοί*, were tracts inciting to moral progress, like Galen's *Π. ἐπὶ τέχνας* i. 1–39.

λογάρια, depreciatory, of the condensed arguments employed by the Stoics like that at p. **52.** 25 sq.; Cic. gives an example of these *ratiunculae*, and goes on: 'haec est copia verborum . . . definis tu mihi, non tollis dolorem . . . sed re succumbere non oportebat, verbis gloriantem: nihil bonum nisi quod honestum' *Tusc.* ii. 30. So Epict.: *Στωικὸν δὲ δείξατέ μοι, εἴ τινα ἔχετε . . . ἀλλὰ τὰ λογάρια τὰ Στωικὰ λέγοντας μυρίους* ii. 19. 22. Arrian has a ch. *πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκοντας καὶ διαλεγομένους ἐπιδεικτικῶς* Epict. iii. 23.

6. 2–3 **φαντασιοπλήκτως . . . ἐπιδείκνυσθαι.** Gat. takes the adv. as derived from *φ.* in the sense of *parade*, and the verb to mean 'exhibit myself as'. But does not M. mean 'to display my powers in praising a model hero, and so to impress the imagination'?

An epideictic oration was often an encomium, *ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος, τὸ δὲ ψόγος* Arist. *Rh.* 1358^{b}12. The speaker sometimes selected an Achilles (Pl. *Ap.* 28c; Arist. *Rh.* 1359^{a}3) to laud and magnify, e.g. Isocrates' *Praise of Helen*, *Or.* x.

Here the subjects are the 'ascetic' and the 'benefactor of mankind': *οὕτω γὰρ ποιῶν Διογένης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἀξίως θεῖοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἐλέγοντο Ench.* 15. Epict. discusses *ὁ ἀσκητικός* in iii. 12, *ὁ Κυνικός* in iii. 22.

εὐεργετικὸν ἄνδρα: *ἐνεργητικόν* was Xyl.'s emendation, but the MSS. are right (see last note); *τὸ θεῖον*, man's model, is *ἐλεύθερον, εὐεργετικόν* Epict. ii. 14. 13, cf. iv. 10. 12. *ἐνεργητικός*, the adj. of *ἐνέργεια* p. **156.** 18, does not occur in Epict. Of M. it is said *πλεῖστον ἐν εὐεργεσίᾳ διῆγεν· ὅθεν που καὶ νεὼν αὐτῆς . . . ἱδρύσατο* Dio Cass. lxxi. 34. 3.

§ 2: 6. 3 **ῥητορικῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς:** Fronto's letters give abundant evidence of M.'s study of these arts, cf. p. **16.** 26 n. He was pleased with his hexameters, a secret between him and his rhetoric tutor, Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 24. Though he renounced these

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hobbies, we can trace their influence in the *Meditations*, especially in a certain fastidious choice of words.

6. 4 **ἀστειολογίας**, *euphuism, preciosity*. Probably he is looking back on his early attempts at fine writing. He may even refer here to the *elocutio novella*, Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 153, which Fronto fostered and Hadrian encouraged, the strong reaction against Sen.'s style, with a return to the pre-Augustan vocabulary. Fronto writes: 'verbum aliquod adquiras, non fictum a te . . . sed usurpatum concinnius aut congruentius aut commodatius' *Ep.*, p. 162. In a lighter mood he sent M. his *Laudes Fumi et Pulveris*, p. 211.

Cic., like Fronto, was disgusted by the Stoic deliberate neglect of elegance: *οὐ μόνον, φησί (ὁ Χρύσιππος), ταῦτα* (avoidance of hiatus, etc.) *παρετέον τοῦ βελτίονος ἐχομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰς ἀσαφείας καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ νὴ Δία σολοικισμούς* Plu. *De Rep. St.* 1047b.

ἐν στολίῳ κατ' οἶκον περιπατεῖν, Suid. appears to have preserved the original reading. *στόλιον* like *στολή* depends on the context for its sense: *ἐν στολαῖς περιπατεῖν St. Mark* xii. 38; *δεῖ . . . ἐν κομψῷ στολίῳ ἀναβάντα διαγράφειν πῶς Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέθανεν* Epict. iii. 23. 35, where L. and S. can hardly be right in translating 'scanty garment', cf. 'scilicet haec populo pexusque togaque recenti' Pers. i. 15; *ἐπειδὰν δέ τινα ἴδωσιν ἀχίτωνα . . . εἰδότες ὅτι τοῖς καλουμένοις φιλοσόφοις ξυνήθης ἐστὶν ἡ στολὴ αὕτη*, where the costume is *ὁ τρίβων*, Dio Chry. lxxii, p. 382.

The reference here appears to be to ceremonial dress in the palace. M. as Caesar received visitors: *οὐχ ὅπως τὴν στολὴν τὴν καθήκουσαν ἐνδεδυκώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιωτικῶς ἐσταλμένος* Dio Cass. lxxi. 35. 4; cf. p. 16. 18–19.

6. 5 **τὰ ἐπιστολία ἀφελῶς γράφειν**, again a contrast between Fronto's teaching and the practice of Rusticus.

ἀφέλεια is a technical term of rhetoric for a simple style, e.g. that of Lysias; Cic. uses the adv. for *sincerely*: 'tu sceleste suspiceris, ego *ἀφελῶς* scripsi' *Att.* vi. 1. 8. M. means the simplicity which flows from sincerity, *ἰδίως δ' ἂν λέγοιντο ἀφελεῖς αἱ τῶν ἁπλάστων ἠθῶν* Hermog. *περὶ ἰδεῶν β.* 3. Cf. what M. says of speeches in the Senate p. 156. 5. His own epistolary style is described by Philostr. *Dial.* i, p. 364 K.

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§ 3 : 6. 7 **εὐανακλήτως**, of hounds coming promptly to heel, *ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς παϊνθῇ* Pl. *R.* 440d.

εὐδιαλλάκτως, *ὁ λόγος* (i.e. *ὁ 'Αντικάτων*) *οὐ δοκεῖ πράως ἔχοντος οὐδὲ εὐδιαλλάκτως σημεῖον εἶναι* Plu. *Caes.* 54; *οἱ δὲ χαλεποὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ φυλάττουσι τὴν ὀργήν . . . καὶ δυσδιάλλακτοί εἰσι* Asp. *in Arist. E. N.*, p. 120.

6. 9 **μὴ ἀρκεῖσθαι περινοοῦντα ὁλοσχερῶς**, like *τύπῳ* Arist. *E.N.* 1107^{b}14, opp. *ἀκριβῶς*. Asp. on *ὑποτυπῶσαι* says: *οἱ γραφεῖς πρῶτον μὲν περιγράφουσι ὁλοσχερῶς, εἶτα ἕκαστον ἀναγράφουσιν ἀκριβῶς in Arist. E.N.*, p. 19; *τὰ ὁλοσχερέστερα μέρη τῆς περὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα θεωρίας*, general *outlines* of castrametation, Polyb. vi. 42. 6.

Thus *ἀκριβῶς ἀναγινώσκειν* is not merely to read but to study accurately, cf. Epict. i. 26. 1 and 13; Philostr. *V. Apoll.* i. 14.

περινοοῦντα is used to correspond with *περιλαλοῦσι*, talking 'about and about'; he does not mean to consider on every side but to discuss: *ὅσον τοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα ταύτης περινοῆσαι* S. Emp. *Math.* ii. 9.

6. 11 **τὸ ἐντυχεῖν**, in its older sense, 'to come across', not 'to read', *ᾧ ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃς* p. 150. 20.

τοῖς 'Επικτητείοις ὑπομνήμασιν: the word was used at first of notes to refresh the memory, Pl. *Tht.* 143a, but at this date *commentarii*, informal pamphlets, contrasted with finished works, are meant: *ταῦτα αὐτὰ ἐπειράθην αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν γραψάμενος ὑπομνήματα εἰς ὕστερον ἐμαυτῷ διαφυλάξαι*, Epict. *praef.* 2, and M. speaks of his own *ὑπομνημάτια . . . εἰς τὸ γῆρας* p. 46. 27. Galen sends *a written summary* of his spoken words: *ἐπειδὴ δέῃ καὶ δι' ὑπομνημάτων ἔχειν* v. 1, cf. *περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ὑ. ἐν 'Ρώμῃ* xix. 11. Some pieces included in Plu.'s *moralia* are thought to be *ὑπομνήματα*, *notes* for projected essays, *ἀνελεξάμην . . . ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὧν ἐμαυτῷ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον De Tranq.* 464f.

οἴκοθεν, Suid. may refer to this passage, interpreting the word as *αὐτόθεν*, and M. probably means Rusticus' *own* notes of Epict.; Arrian's published books would surely be accessible to the Emperor.

For this sense, cf. *μὴ τολμῶντες δὲ προσθεῖναι οἴκοθεν* 'not

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having the face to add to Arist. glosses of their own' *Schol. in Arist.* 519^{b}43 Bk.

Ch. 8: 6. 12 Παρὰ Ἀπολλωνίου, 'Chalcedonius stoicus philosophus' *H.A.* iv. 2. 7; 'rhetor' id. v. 2. 5. M. mentions Apollonius, 'magistro meo', Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 86. The high respect in which M. held Apollonius enables us to correct the gossip about him in other sources. Lucian reports that Demonax met A. on his way to Rome, *μετὰ πολλῶν τῶν μαθητῶν ἐξελαύνοντα . . . ὡς ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ συνεσόμενος. . . . προσέρχεται, ἔφη, ὁ Ἀπ. καὶ οἱ Ἀργοναῦται αὐτοῦ Dem.* 31. The joke compared the journey from the Bosporus to Rome, to the quest of the Golden Fleece, celebrated by Apoll.'s namesake in his *Argonautica.* A similar *jeu d'esprit* is ascribed to Pius; Apoll. had refused to visit the Palatine, saying M. must call on his teacher: 'facilius fuit Ap. a Colchide (Calchide MSS.) Romam venire quam a domo sua in palatium: cuius avaritiam etiam in mercedibus notavit' *H.A.* iii. 10. 4. Pius playfully substituted Colchis for Chalcedon.

τὸ ἐλεύθερον, coupled with *ἀκύβευτον,* 'not the victim of chance', because the *sapiens* is above the accidents of Fortune. 'Quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi, ut velis. Quis igitur vivit, ut volt, nisi qui recte vivit . . . cui quidem etiam Fortuna ipsa cedit' Cic. *Paradox. St.* 34; *οἱ δὲ Στ. τὸν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντά φασιν εὐτυχῆ, ὃ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν τυχηρῶν ἀγαθῶν* Alex. Aphr. *in Arist. Top.*, p. 147; *τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἡγ. τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίν τινα . . . λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον* Plu. *De Virt.* 441c. The *sapiens* is *ἀμετάπτωτος* p. **82.** 19; he enjoys *τὸ ἄπταιστον καὶ εὔρουν* p. **82.** 13.

τὸ ἀκύβευτον then, like *ἀμετάπτωτον,* is a met. from dice-throwing. So Wordsworth says:

> Who, with a toward or untoward lot,
> Plays, in the many games of life, that one,
> Where what he most doth value must be won. *The Happy Warrior.*

ἀναμφιβόλως: A has preserved a variant *ἀναμφιλόγως,* but *doubt* is better than *dispute,* and M., in his etymological vein, alludes to the sense of *ἀμφιβολή, cast.* For the met. cf. *οἵτινες τἀγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο* Thuc. iv. 18. 4.

6. 14 τὸ ἀεὶ ὅμοιον, viz. *ἑαυτῷ,* 'unchanging'; but, in view of what follows, also 'equable'.

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This quality is ascribed to Pius p. **12.** 7, and to M. ὅμοιος διὰ πάντων ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν οὐδενὶ ἠλλοιώθη Dio Cass. lxxi. 34. 5; cf. 'praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate itemque de C. Laelio accepimus' Cic. *Off.* i. 90; 'nemo mutatum Catonem totiens mutata republica vidit: eundem se in omni statu praestitit' Sen. *Ep.* 104. 30.

ἐν ἀλγηδόσιν ὀξείαις, ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, of the momentary pains inflicted by a surgeon Pl. *Prt.* 354b; ὀξείαις 'sharp and short' is opp. to μάκραις. In the case of Pius, M. speaks of παροξυσμοὺς τῆς κεφαλαλγίας p. **14.** 13.

6. 15 **ἐπὶ παραδείγματος ζῶντος,** 'ut mutum in simulacrum ex animali exemplo veritas transferatur' Cic. *Inv.* ii. 1. 2.

Les exemples vivans sont d'un autre pouvoir,
Un prince dans un livre apprend mal son devoir. Corn. *Le Cid*, I. iv.

ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν Arist. *E.N.* 1170ª11, ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι Thgn. 35, cf. Pl. *Men.* 95d, X. *Mem.* i. 2. 20; 'plus tamen tibi et viva vox et convictus quam oratio proderit . . . Plato . . . plus ex moribus quam ex verbis Socratis traxit' Sen. *Ep.* 6. 5, cf. 33. 9.

M. says we are to dwell on the excellencies of contemporaries: οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως εὐφραίνει, ὡς τὰ ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐμφαινόμενα τοῖς ἤθεσι τῶν συζώντων p. **118.** 5–7.

6. 16 **σφοδρότατος καὶ ἀνειμένος.** Plu. says of the Delphic *afflatus*, ἀνέσεις δέ τινας ἴσχειν καὶ πάλιν σφοδρότητας *De Defectu* 437c; thus σφοδρός = συντεταμένος, *intentus*: εἰ οὕτω σφοδρῶς συνετετάμεθα περὶ τὸ ἔργον, *intent* upon our task, Epict. i. 10. 1; ἀνειμένοις τε σπουδάζειν καὶ σπουδάζουσι μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι Julian, p. 381c.

Of Pius, τὸ ἔμπειρον ποῦ μὲν χρεία ἐντάσεως, ποῦ δὲ ἀνέσεως p. **12.** 3–4; the same happy blend is ascribed by Tac. to his father-in-law: 'nec illi aut facilitas auctoritatem aut severitas amorem deminuit' *Agr.* 9. 4.

§ 2: 6. 17 **μὴ δυσχεραντικόν,** εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Pl. *Grg.* 450e; δυσχέρειαι λογικαί are nice difficulties in debate Arist. *Metaph.* 1005ᵇ22, cf. (δυσχέρεια) ἦν περὶ τὴν μακρολογίαν . . . ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς Pl. *Plt.* 286b. The meaning then is

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that, when teaching, he did not, as so many teachers do, create difficulties for his pupil, and was not himself disagreeable to his hearer.

6. 18 **τὴν ἐμπειρίαν,** not in the old depreciatory sense of knack gained by practice, but of knowledge arising from experience. Arist. uses *ἐμπειρία* and *ἐπιστήμη* of tactics, as equivalents, *Pol.* 1309^{b}5.

τὴν ἐντρέχειαν, a word used of Socr.'s dialectical dexterity p. **142.** 8–9.

6. 19 **παραδιδόναι,** to *communicate* to another, *π. τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν* Pl. *Men.* 93c.

θεωρήματα, not depreciatory as at p. **6.** 1, but *general truths.*

6. 20 **τὰς δοκούσας χάριτας**: cf. *τὰς δοκούσας τιμάς* p. **10.** 26. The sense is that the favours conferred were not real favours in Apollonius' view, because he knew that they were *ἀδιάφορα.* Presumably M. means presents in return for his teaching, which as material things are not in the same kind as the lessons he had given.

What then does *μήτε ἀναισθήτως παραπέμποντα* mean? Gat. says: 'neque citra sensum tamen omnem transmitterem', viz., presumably, 'not to *ignore* them without any appreciation', and most translators give some such interpretation. I suppose that *ἀναισθήτως* means 'tastelessly', and that the want of taste would be shown in 'returning them' either in the sense of sending the actual *χάριτας* back to the giver, or of making a return for them in kind; *παραπέμπειν* has a similar sense in *τὸ μὴ παραπέμπον αὐτήν,* not *reflecting* the light ray p. **168.** 14. M. Trannoy has 'ni les décliner grossièrement'.

The Stoics held: 'eum qui libenter accipit beneficium reddidisse' Sen. *Ben.* ii. 31. 1, and that is perhaps what is implied in the case of a man who regarded the gifts as a due return for his labours.

6. 21 **διὰ ταῦτα,** 'because of them', the generalizing neut. referring to *χάριτας,* not in the common sense of 'therefore'. The corrections *διὰ ταύτας, δι' αὐτάς* are not required.

Ch. 9. As the Book progresses, the writer appears to fluctuate between drawing lessons and making a character sketch. This

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will have been felt in Ch. 8; it becomes obvious here, at the beginning of §2, and is abundantly clear in Ch. 16. This consideration affects the interpretation of individual passages.

6. 22 Σέξτου: the manuscript reading *Ξέστου* recalls the variant Xystus for the name of Pope Sixtus.

'Chaeronensem, Plutarchi nepotem, Stoicum' *H.A.* iv. 3. 2. He was, like Rusticus, important enough to be consulted by the Emperor on matters of state, perhaps on questions of the free cities of Achaia: *τοσοῦτον πρὸς τιμῆς τῷ βασιλεῖ ἦν, ὥστε καὶ συνδικάζειν αὐτῷ* Suid. s.v. *Σέξτος*.

Sextus is one of the professors whose lectures the Emperor honoured by his presence, as later writers are proud to report: *λέγεται γὰρ καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ ὢν μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι ἐς διδασκάλου φοιτᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σέξτῳ προσιέναι τῷ ἐκ Βοιωτῶν φιλοσόφῳ* Dio Cass. lxxi. 1. 2; *ἐσπούδαζε μὲν ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ M. περὶ Σ., τὸν ἐκ Βοιωτίας φ., θαμίζων αὐτῷ καὶ φοιτῶν ἐπὶ θύρας* Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 1. 9, p. 240 K.

τὸ εὐμενές, *graciousness*, is a vital lesson for a ruler of men, indeed for all men. M. insists upon it very often, and especially at p. **108.** 19, just before he draws the portrait of Pius. A failure in this quality was, according to Plu., the undoing of Dio of Syracuse.

6. 22–8. 1 τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ πατρονομουμένου: this pattern of a house ruled by the *pater familias* is the old Roman ideal, preserved in this case from Greek tradition at Chaeronea, and inherited from Sextus' uncle, the great biographer and moralist. *πατρονομεῖσθαι* is used for the primitive patriarchate Pl. *Lg.* 680e, cf. Arist. *Pol.* i, ch. 2.

Did M. mean more? Was he thinking of his own political ideal as head of the Roman family of peoples? Plu. makes Dio endeavour to turn Dionysius from his father's tyrannical example to this pattern: *ὅσα νῦν ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ διοικοῦσι . . . ταῦτα σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ μετ' εὐμενείας πατρονομούμενα παρασχὼν καὶ γενόμενος βασιλεὺς ἐκ τυράννου.* Moreover, he is to model himself on the divine reason: *πρὸς τὸ θειότατον ἀφομοιωθεὶς παράδειγμα τῶν ὄντων καὶ κάλλιστον, ᾧ τὸ πᾶν ἡγουμένῳ πειθόμενον ἐξ ἀκοσμίας κόσμος ἐστί* Plu. *Dion*, 10.

Plu. is referring to the ideal Principate which was in men's

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minds in the first century A.D. Ael. Aristides in a speech at Cyzicus, delivered, it appears, before M. and Commodus, says: *ὁ γὰρ λογισμὸς αὐτῶν θεῖος καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνωθεν ἔχων τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνην ὁρῶν τὴν πολιτείαν Or.* xxvii. 35. This ideal, thus adroitly expressed by the orator, is M.'s own: *πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν* p. **46.** 3–4, cf. *πολιτείας ἰσονόμου* p. **10.** 5.

8. 1 **τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν**: the form of phrase confirms the tradition that Sextus was a Stoic. His uncle, though he attacks Stoicism, borrows freely from it both in the *Vitae* and the *Moralia*.

8. 2 **τὸ σεμνὸν ἁπλάστως**, 'dignity of bearing, without the assumption of a mask'; like the masks of Tiberius and Domitian: *ἁπλάστου σεμνότητος* p. **22.** 19; *οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλὰ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι* Pl. *Sph.* 216c; *ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί Lg.* 642c; *ἀκιβδήλους τοὺς σπουδαίους . . . ἁπλάστους τε· περιῳρηκέναι γὰρ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ τῷ εἴδει* D.L. vii. 118.

τὸ στοχαστικὸν . . . κηδεμονικῶς, he *humoured* his friends, but with *solicitude* for their true interests: *στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου*, one who consults them, Pl. *La.* 178b; *προσέχειν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ δήμου* Polyb. vi. 16. 1; *ὀρθῶς στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ ἀνδρός*, correctly appreciating his temper, Plu. *Cor.* 18; *οὐδὲν πράξω ἀκοινώνητον, μᾶλλον δὲ στοχάσομαι τῶν ὁμογενῶν* p. **194.** 11.

8. 3 **ἀνεκτικὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν**, *ἡδέως γὰρ ἀνέχεσθε τῶν ἀφρόνων, φρόνιμοι ὄντες* St. Paul, 2 *Cor.* xi. 19.

τῶν ἀθεωρητὶ οἰομένων. I have followed Gat.'s correction, but substituted *ἀθεωρητί* from Suid., who perhaps drew this lemma from M. The latter is fond of these adverbs in *ί*.

οἰόμενοι are men who are full of the conceit of knowledge, but without foundation, *ἀθεωρητί*, so that they are contrasted with the vulgar: *καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνδρας ἰδιώτας καὶ ἀναφανδὸν τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν ὁμολογοῦντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν, μετρίωτερον ἂν εἰκότως νομισθείη· τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν προσποιουμένων . . . τοῦτ' ἤδη τὸ δεινότατόν ἐστι* Luc. *Nigr.* 24, where sham philosophers are contrasted with honest vulgar folk.

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§ 2: 8. 4 εὐάρμοστον, *πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον* Isoc. xii. 32. M. usually employs *ἁρμονία*, and its allied words, in the sense 'fitting together', pp. **60.** 14, **80.** 4–5, **122.** 16. He is conscious, however, of the musical implication of the word, so familiar in Plato, at pp. **100.** 1, **104.** 15, where *εὐάρμοστον* and *σύμφωνον* are balanced.

8. 4–6 ὥστε κολακείας . . . τὸν καιρὸν εἶναι: the construction is difficult and the meaning condensed to obscurity.

M. is stating the lesson how the man of great position should behave in company, the reverse of the lesson Horace reads in *Epist.* i. 17 and 18. *κολακεία* is defined as *ὁμιλία αἰσχρά*, Theophr. *Char.* 2. 1, and M. compares Sextus as a companion to a toady, so far as agreeableness is concerned. Then *αἰδεσιμώτατον* agrees with *αὐτόν* understood from *αὐτοῦ*, as if he had written *κόλακος παντὸς προσηνέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι ὁμιλοῦντα*. The *αὐτόν* is omitted apparently for effect, *αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις* balancing *αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον*. *ἐκείνοις* are *τοῖς συγγινομένοις* or *πᾶσι* (from *πρὸς πάντας* above) *τοῖς ἄλλοις*, the rest of the company, as in *εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλέπων τοῖς ἄλλοις λαλεῖν* Theophr. l.c. 10 where the *κόλαξ* talks to the company with his eye on the great man. Here Sextus charms the very persons who are enjoying the privilege of his presence (*καιρόν*); *τὴν ὁμιλίαν αὐτοῦ* is both intercourse with him and *his* company, his behaviour and talk.

8. 6 καταληπτικῶς καὶ ὁδῷ: the adverbs qualify both verbals, he discovered *convincingly* and *methodically* the required rules, and enjoined them methodically and with conviction. The former is a technical Stoic word, see *τὸ καταληπτικόν* p. **60.** 13, the latter is familiar from Pl. Galen explains that *τὸ καταληπτόν* is equivalent to the Attic *τὸ βεβαίως γνωστόν* i. 41; *καταληπτικῶς* is opp. to *στοχαστικῶς* by Clem. Alex.: *ἀληθῆ μὲν στοχαστικῶς δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν λόγων ἀνάγκαις ἴσασι* (the Gentile teachers); *μαθητευθέντες οὖν* (when they have learned the Word) *καταληπτικῶς ἐπιγνώσονται Strom.* p. 378.

ὁδῷ: *δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διηρῆσθαι* Pl. *Phdr.* 263b; *ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν*, of systematic classification *R.* 533b; *ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ πάντων ἑνὶ λόγῳ διωρίκασιν* Arist. *G. et C.* $324^{b}35$. The word became a favourite with the Stoics: *Κλεάνθης λέγει ὅτι τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῷ πάντα ἀνύουσα*

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Olymp. *in Pl. Grg.* p. 53; Cicero's translation is *ratione et via Fin.* i. 29; *Or.* 116.

8. 8 **ἔμφασιν . . . πάθους παρασχεῖν,** like *φαντασίαν λαβεῖν,* an expression which has got into common use from philosophical language, *ποιοῦσαν ἔμφασιν καὶ δόκησιν ἐπιπόνου χρείας,* where *φαντασίαν ἐπάγεσθαι* is an equivalent Plu. *Quomodo* 63f.

8. 9 **ἀπαθέστατον . . . φιλοστοργότατον,** the common censure that conquest of passion meant atrophy of affection is met, M. thinks, by a living instance to the contrary; *ἀπαθέστατον,* least subject to passions like anger, is opposed to *φ.* most full of natural affection, cf. *ἀστοργότεροι* p. **8.** 19.

φιλοστοργία is affection arising from the bond of nature: *τοὺς τὸ φύσει . . . φιλόστοργον εἰς θηρία* (lap-dogs) *καταναλίσκοντας ἀνθρώποις ὀφειλόμενον* Plu. *Pericl.* 1.

8. 10 **τὸ εὔφημον ἀψοφητί:** this seems the best correction, and was implied by Xyl.: 'honestam famam sine jactatione'. The adjective means 'commending', as in *τὸ περὶ τῶν διδασκάλων ἐκθύμως εὔφ.* p. **8.** 27. *ἀψ.* is used of oil stealing silently along Pl. *Tht.* 144b; of fishermen rowing with muffled oars Arist. *H.A.* $533^{b}32$.

τὸ πολυμαθὲς ἀνεπιφάντως. Sextus' uncle too was a man of wise learning. The adv. reminds one of the Fool's words:

> Have more than thou showest,
> Speak less than thou knowest Shak. *King Lear,* i. 4.

Ch. 10: 8. 11 **Παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ γραμματικοῦ:** the adj. distinguishes the Homeric scholar from the Alex. of ch. 12, but M. may also allude to what Ael. Aristides says of Alex. in the Funeral Oration upon him which he sent to Cotiaea: *οὔτε τὸ σοβαρώτατον αὐτῷ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπεγράψατο,* he preferred to be called a grammarian, not a *κριτικός Or.* xxxii. 8. He is the only *Greek* grammarian of M.'s teachers mentioned by the biographer *H.A.* iv. 2. 3. What M. says of his lessons is interesting in relation to the Emperor's own composition, which avoids the excessive Atticism of vocabulary which a Phrynichus would have imposed, and is indifferent to the Neo-Atticism of construction, though his ear sometimes has led him to avoid disagreeable combinations.[1]

[1] E.g. *ταχύ* followed by a closed syllable, p. **64.** 25, but *ταχέως* before a vowel or *σ*, pp. **26.** 23, **98.** 26, **120.** 11, **196.** 13, **206.** 9.

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8. 11 **ἀνεπίπληκτον,** *μόνος δ' ἰδιώτας τε οὐκ ἤλεγχεν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς δεξιοῖς εἰς τὰ πρῶτα ἐθαυμάζετο* Ael. Arist. ibid. 11; *ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς διατριβαῖς δυσχεροῦς μὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδενὶ πώποτε τῶν πάντων αἴτιος γενέσθαι λέγεται* ibid. 15, cf. *δυσχεραντικόν* p. 6. 17.

8. 12 **βάρβαρον ἢ σόλοικόν τι,** *μιᾶς λέξεως κακία ἐστὶν ὁ βαρβαρισμός, ἐπιπλοκῆς καὶ λέξεων ἀκαταλλήλων ὁ σολοικισμός* Apollon. Dysc. *Synt.* iii. 4, cf. S. Emp. *Math.* i. 210; Quint. *Inst.* i. 5. 5 sq. Galen, who himself wrote with studious care, says: *ἀπαξιῶ μηδενὶ μέμφεσθαι τῶν σολοικιζόντων τῇ φωνῇ μηδ' ἐπιτιμᾶν. ἄμεινον γάρ ἐστι τῇ φωνῇ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ βίῳ σολοικίζειν τε καὶ βαρβαρίζειν* xix. 61, cf. what he says on clarity being more important than verbal purity, ii. 1.

8. 13 **ἀπηχές,** *discord*, e.g. hiatus, excessive alliteration, etc., avoidance of which is taught under *compositio* in Auctor *ad Herenn.* iv. 12. 18; Quint. *Inst.* ix. 4. The latter says: 'optime autem de illa (compositione) iudicant aures quae . . . fragosis offenduntur et levibus mulcentur' ibid. 116.

8. 14 **ἀποκρίσεως ἢ συνεπιμαρτυρήσεως,** the answer given to the learner, and the further illustration of the point at issue to confirm the answer: *καὶ μόνος πλήθει τε καὶ ἀκριβείᾳ μαρτύρων ἐνίκα* Ael. Arist. l.c. 11.

8. 15 **συνδιαλήψεως:** *ἐλθεῖν Ἀθήναζε χάριν τοῦ συνδιαλαβεῖν περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων* Polyb. xvi. 25. 1, so that *συνδ.* appears to be a technical word for a discussion, a *conférence.*

περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. Cicero justifies an occasional *hiatus*: 'quod indicet non ingratam neglegentiam de re hominis magis quam de verbis laborantis' *Or.* 77; and Quint. says: 'ac nescio neglegentia in hoc an sollicitudo sit peior' *Inst.* ix. 4. 35.

οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ ῥήματος, M. uses *οὐχί* often to give a slight emphasis, see p. 34. 1.

8. 16 **παρυπομνήσεως:** 'prompting incidentally' is the sense; *ὑπόμνησις* means a physical stimulus to which there is a subconscious response, e.g. when a foreign body touches a sponge: *ἔχει κίνησιν ἰδίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτόν, οἷον ὑπομνήσεως καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην,* it requires a stimulus or suggestion, Plu. *Terr. an Aquat. Anim.* 980c. Here the teacher neatly, *ἐπιδεξίως,* uses a tactful hint, which prompts the recollection.

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Ch. 11 : 8. 17 Παρὰ Φρόντωνος : his great-grandson, in an inscription at Pisaurum, styles M. Cornelius Fronto: 'oratoris: consulis: magistri imperatorum Luci et Antonini' *C.I.L.* xi. 6334. His eloquence and his tutorship of the two princes was rewarded by the consulship, 1 July–31 Aug. A.D. 143. He is called, 'Romanae eloquentiae non secundum sed alterum decus' Eumenius, *Paneg. Constantii* 14.

ἐπιστῆσαι, sc. *τὸν νοῦν, τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι λέγομεν* Arist. *Phys.* 247^{b}10. Galen always uses the fuller form, e.g. *ἐπιστήσειας τὸν νοῦν* i. 14. In M. the verb can always be translated: *stop and notice, stop and ask.*

ἡ τυραννικὴ βασκανία, the lessons refer to the besetting sins of an absolute ruler; *βασκανία* is his evil, jealous eye. M. notes of Pius: *τὸ παραχωρητικὸν ἀβασκάνως,* 'giving place without envy' to experts p. 14. 6; cf. 'ingrata temporibus quibus sinistra erga eminentis interpretatio' Tac. *Agr.* 5. 4;

> invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni
> maius tormentum Hor. *Ep.* i. 2. 58.

M. speaks of: *φιλονεικίας τινὸς ἢ βασκανίας καὶ ὑποψίας* p. 38. 14–15.

8. 18 ποικιλία, means either shifty and capricious *moodiness*: *ὁ εὐδαίμων . . . οὐ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος* Arist. *E.N.* 1101^{a}8, or else *complexity*, opp. to *ἁπλότης, ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἁπλοῦ* Pl. *Tht.* 146a; the wolf's friendship is *ἐπιτήδευσις ἁπλότητος* p. 222. 13.

ὑπόκρισις, the word is always used in M. in its later sense of *hypocrisy*: of the tyrant Domitian Tac. writes: 'paratus simulatione . . . nec erubuit beneficii invidia' *Agr.* 42. 3. M. addressing Fronto says: 'non hoc est quod me felicem nuncupo. Quid est igitur? quod verum dicere ex te disco . . . simul et audire verum me doces' Fronto *Ep.*, p. 49, and Lucius bears like testimony: 'simulare L. quicquam adversus Frontonem, a quo ego prius multo simplicitatem verumque amorem quam loquendi polite disciplinam didicisse me praedico' id. p. 130.

8. 18–19 οἱ καλούμενοι οὗτοι παρ' ἡμῖν εὐπατρίδαι, οὗτοι with ironical emphasis: 'nec enim ferre potero sermones istorum quicumque sunt; non sunt enim certe, ut appellantur, boni' Cic. *Att.* ix. 2a. 3; contrast the praise of the Optimates, forensically,

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in *Pro Sestio*, and Macaulay's comment in Trevelyan, *The Marginal Notes, etc.*, p. 48.

8. 19 **εὐπατρίδαι**, *Patricius*, since the time of the Flavians, was a mere ornamental title, a birthday honour conferred by the princeps; later it once more becomes a mark of birth, thus Herodian uses the word of Commodus: *βασιλέα τε καὶ εὐπατρίδην Ῥωμαίων* i. 7. 4.

ἀστοργότεροι: of this Gat. remarks 'oraculi vicem'. The statement is one of the most interesting in the *Meditations*, because of its confirmation by Fronto: '*φιλοστοργία* vero nescio an Romana: quippe qui nihil minus in tota mea vita Romae repperi quam hominem sincere *φιλόστοργον*: ut putem, quia reapse nemo est Romae *φιλόστοργος*, ne nomen quidem huic virtuti esse romanum' *Ep.*, p. 135; cf. 'Vale mi magister optime, *φιλόστοργε ἄνθρωπε*' p. 231.

Juvenal says of one who was related to Nero, *Teucrorum proles*:

> Rarus enim ferme sensus communis in illa
> fortuna *Sat.* viii. 73.

The Hebrew word for *godly* meant originally 'kind in contrast to the proud aristocratic oppressors' Driver, *Parallel Psalter*, p. 443.

Ch. 12: 8. 20 **Παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ**: probably the rhetor from Seleucia in Cilicia, a pupil of Favorinus, nicknamed *Πηλοπλάτων*, who was M.'s *ab epistulis Graecis*. He passed through Athens on his way to General Head-quarters in Pannonia: *ἐβάδιζε μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰ Παιονικὰ ἔθνη μετακληθεὶς ὑπὸ Μάρκου βασιλέως ἐκεῖ στρατεύοντος καὶ δεδωκότος αὐτῷ τὸ ἐπιστέλλειν Ἕλλησιν* Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 5. 3, p. 247. He had earlier gone to Rome on a mission for Seleucia, when Pius censured his dandyism and impertinence, ibid. 2.

8. 21 **ἐν ἐπιστολῇ γράφειν**, this gains point if Alexander was M.'s secretary, just as he may have chosen *Πλατωνικός* to correct tacitly the nickname *Πηλοπλάτων*, cf. Herodes Atticus' censure of that pseudonym, Philostr. l.c., p. 248.

8. 22 **διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου**, Suid. confirms P.'s text, cf. *ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης συμφωνίας* p. 180. 12.

8. 22–3 **τὰς πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας σχέσεις καθήκοντα**, the Stoic

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term is *τὰ καθήκοντα κατὰ περίστασιν*, 'offices arising from circumstances', D.L. vii. 109; cf. *ἡ δὲ* (sc. *σχέσις*) *πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας* p. **154.** 24–5.

8. 23–4 **τὰ περιεστῶτα πράγματα,** 'circumstances', esp. 'obstacles', *ἠνάγκαζε τὰ π.* Polyb. ii. 51. 4; *τὰ πράγματα καὶ τοὺς περιεστῶτας καιρούς* iii. 86. 7; *ὅταν ἀναγκασθῇς ὑπὸ τῶν περιεστηκότων* p. **98.** 25; cf. *περιστάσεσι* p. **10.** 14. He wrote *αὐτοχειρίᾳ* to his intimates Dio Cass. lxxi. 36. 2.

'Tardius rescribo ad epistulas tuas, non quia districtus occupationibus sum: hanc excusationem cave audias: vaco et omnes vacant, qui volunt' Sen. *Ep.* 106. 1.

Ch. 13: 8. 25 **Παρὰ Κατούλου,** only once mentioned elsewhere: 'audivit Cl. Maximum et Cinnam Catulum, Stoicos' *H.A.* iv. 3. 2.

8. 27 **τὸ περὶ τῶν διδασκάλων ἐκθύμως εὔφημον,** M. did more than commend his tutors heartily, he gave them the honours they coveted p. **16.** 28–9.

10. 1 **τὰ περὶ Δομετίου καὶ Ἀθηνοδότου ἀπομνημονευόμενα,** *Δομετίου* is the reading of A, the letters *μετ* being written precisely as in the word *μεταβολαί*, see facsimile, line 2.

Athen. was Fronto's master: 'ego, qui a meo magistro et parente Athen. . . . mediocriter institutus sum' Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 73; *ἥρων δὲ . . . Ἀθ. τοῦ σοφοῦ* id., p. 244. M. then probably means what is recorded of Fronto's gratitude to Athen. and of the latter's gratitude to Domitius Afer who may have been his master at the Roman bar, as he was Quintilian's, Plin. *Ep.* ii. 14. 10.

10. 1–2 **τὸ περὶ τὰ τέκνα ἀληθινῶς ἀγαπητικόν,** the attribute of domestic affection which M. calls *φιλοστοργότατον* p. **8.** 9; cf. *ἐχούσης τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαπητικὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ πεφυκυίας ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι . . . οὕτω καὶ φιλεῖν* Plu. *Solon* 7. 2.

περί with acc., as in *περὶ ὃ δεῖ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεσθαι*, of the bent of the mind, p. **66.** 1.

Ch. 14: 10. 3 **Παρὰ Σευήρου,** the MS. text here is a most certain case of interpolation. A.'s reading *Σευουήρου* is a contamination of *Σευήρου* and *Σεουήρου*. When the correction *ουηρου* was

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misunderstood to mean *Οὐήρου*, the gloss *τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου* was added in the margin.

If M. had actually ascribed these lessons to Lucius, he would have written *παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ*, like *παρὰ τοῦ πατρός* p. **10.** 25, and he would hardly have mentioned him, in a different way, at p. **16.** 22–4. Moreover, comparing the list of his teachers, given in the biographers, we require a Severus here, to go with Catulus and Maximus, 'Peripateticae vere studiosus audivit Cl. Severum' *H.A.* iv. 3. 3. This Severus is believed to be Cn. Cl. Severus Arabianus, cons. A.D. 146, whose son Cn. Cl. Severus married M.'s daughter, Dio Cass. lxxix. 5. 4; *C.I.G.* 4154. The younger Severus was, like his father, a Peripatetic student, and attended Galen's anatomical lectures in Rome, Galen, xiv. 613 and 647.

Thus M. was consocer of the elder Severus, and the appellation 'my brother' has been interpreted to mean 'my son-in-law's father', and so 'my brother', or to be at least a term of affection, because 'brother' is sometimes used in this loose way. All the instances, however, of this usage are in the vocative, cf. Epict. i. 29. 5; Hor. *Ep.* i. 6. 54; Phaedrus, i. 29. 5; Quint. *Decl.* 321; Juv. v. 135; Fronto, *Ep.* pp. 179. 185; Babrius, *Fab.* 145, and see Harnack, *Mission, etc.*, iii. 3, Exc. 1.

What is clearly an erroneous adscript cannot be defended on this ground.

Assuming that this Severus is the man called a Peripatetic philosopher in the biographer, we may understand him to have been a public man with leanings to the teaching of Aristotle, especially to his philosophy of Nature. That he should have interpreted to M. the political ideals of the Stoic opposition is remarkable, but not inconsistent with the eclectic tendency of Roman thought. M. has drawn a portrait of a man of weight, a public man, a patron of philosophy, not a professed teacher of philosophy; Severus is a Laelius of a later age, a thinker of liberal views to whom the younger man looked up.

10. 3 **τὸ φιλοίκειον**, a noticeable alliteration runs through the chapter, cf. *καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλοίκειοι καὶ φιλέταιροι* Arist. *Rh.* 1389ª37.

The first adj. refers to family affection; cf. *τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ*

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φιλοίκειον τῆς τοῦ Σκιπίωνος προαιρέσεως Polyb. xxxii. 14. 9, a reference to the great Scipio's generosity to his sisters. Love of truth and love of right imply the two other relations, to Nature and to one's fellows, which M. combines with duty to Self.

10. 4 τὸ δι' αὐτὸν γνῶναι, *thanks to him* I grasped the meaning of Thrasea's creed, the acc. as in *οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίαμαι, δι' ἐμαυτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ* Pl. *R.* 354a; *εἰ μὴ δι' ἡμᾶς* Dem. xxiii. 180; *διὰ σέ* is interpreted by *εἶ σὺ αἴτιος* Ar. *Plu.* 181.

Θρασέαν: the familiar heroes of the republican opposition: 'victrix causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni' Luc. *Phars.* i. 128; cf. Tac. *Hist.* iv. 8, *Ann.* xvi. 22;

> Quale coronati Thrasea Helvidiusque bibebant
> Brutorum et Cassi natalibus Juv. v. 36.

Δίωνα, not Dio of Prusa, but Dio of Syracuse. M. is looking back on statesmen, not writers; cf. *ποῦ γὰρ εὐτυχῆ καὶ μακάριον Κάτωνα φήσομεν; ποῦ δὲ Δίωνα τὸν Συκελιώτην εὐδαίμονα;* Julian, p. 256a. M. may recall Plu.'s parallel lives of Dio and Brutus, for by Brutus he clearly means Marcus, not Junius, Brutus.

10. 5 φαντασίαν λαβεῖν, 'to conceive the idea of a republic'; though it is possible that he means by *φαντασία* to suggest that it is a Utopia: *μὴ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε* p. **182.** 11.

πολιτείας ἰσονόμου . . . καὶ βασιλείας, the first group of words embodies the constitutional ideal of the opposition to Caesarism, the second the Antonine monarchy within the rule of law. M. never uses the hated word *βασιλεύς*, but is bold enough here to employ *βασιλεία*. The judiciously chosen terms are to be interpreted in the light of the Roman world-rule, but are expressed in the language of Greek political experience and theory.

πολιτεία ἰσόνομος, a balanced constitution, is an expression derived from mathematico-physical theory; *ἰσονομία*, 'balance of forces' opp. to *μοναρχία*, the predominance of one of the rival elements in the economy of the body: *τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ . . ., τὴν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικήν* Alcmaeon, *Fr.* 4, cf. *τὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν* opp. to *τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ δυναστείαν* Ph. ii. 242. As a political term it meant popular government

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opp. to unlimited power: *ἐὰν αἰσθάνωμαι . . . τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἢ τὴν ἰσονομίαν καταλύοντα* O.G.I. i. 229. 67, cf. Hdt. iii. 80; Th. iii. 82. 8; coloured, no doubt, by the claim to equal distribution to citizens. One explanation given by Plu. of *πολ. ἰσόνομος* is *ἡ μήτε πλουσίους ἄγαν μήτε πένητας ἔχουσα πολίτας Sept. Sap.* 154d-e; cf. the words put into M. Agrippa's mouth, Dio Cass. lii. 4. 2. The Epicurean *ἰσονομία*, physical equilibrium is, 'aequabilis tributio' or 'aequilibritas' Cic. *N.D.* i. 50 and 109. Transferring the terms to politics Cic. says: 'ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis' *R.* i. 43. He considered the ideal republic to be a balance of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, *R.* ii. 41; Polyb. vi. 3. 7, 18. 1. May we then presume that the Stoics of the first centuries B.C. and A.D. thought of the *respublica* as a balanced constitution; 'id quod Scipio laudabat coniunctum civitatis genus' Cic. *R.* iii. 23? Dio of Prusa, Trajan's contemporary, on the contrary makes the Princeps all important, and, like the rhetorician Ael. Aristides, calls him *βασιλεύς Orations* i–iv.

Cic. uses the word sometimes in a juristic sense: 'aequabilitatem communis iuris' *de Or.* ii. 209, cf. *Off.* i. 88; 'ius est quaesitum aequabile' *Off.* ii. 42. This legal aspect of ordered liberty expresses itself in the term *naturalis aequitas*, which covered the equitable interpretation of the statutes by the Imperial council of the second and third centuries A.D.

Widening the conception, M. calls man, as reasonable, *ζῷον ἰσόνομον θεῷ* p. 146. 23–4; he shares with God in the Eternal City, the law of which is equal and indifferent, as human law endeavours to be: 'lege quoque consociati homines cum dis'. Cic. *Lg.* i. 23.

10. 5 **κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ ἰσηγορίαν διοικουμένης**, 'administered according to equality and freedom of speech'. These are Greek terms, which further define popular government, but are here applied to the Roman administration. Roman citizens, and perhaps also persons of inferior status, enjoyed the right of access to the Courts, and of presenting a case themselves or through an advocate. The Athenians had cherished this, with other democratic liberties: *τί τούτου τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἢ δημοτικώτερόν ἐστι . . ., ἢ ὁπόταν τις ἰδιώτης . . . μὴ δύνηται ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπο-*

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λογεῖσθαι, τούτῳ τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξεῖναι ἀναβάντα βοηθῆσαι; Hyperid. iv. (iii) 11. The claim of St. Paul and the language of the *Acts* in this matter are striking: ἐπιτρέπεταί σοι ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ λέγειν *Acts*, xxvi. 1, cf. xxv. 16. So in a rescript of Severus and his son: 'neque enim inaudita causa quemquam damnari *aequitatis* ratio patitur' *Digest*, XLVIII. xvii. 1.

This right of free speech is dwelt upon by the Stoics: ἐναργεστάτη πίστις ἐλευθερίας ἰσηγορία . . . τοῖς δ' ἐλευθέροις ἡ ἐκ νόμου πᾶσιν ἰσηγορία δίδοται Ph. ii. 452–3.

The privilege is claimed by Athenagoras, when addressing M. and his son on behalf of the Christian communities: τὸ τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἴσον καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν . . . κρίνεσθαι *Leg.* 2; in opening his case, he says: οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕνα ἰσονομοῦνται, αἱ δὲ πόλεις πρὸς ἀξίαν τῆς ἴσης μετέχουσι τιμῆς καὶ ἡ σύμπασα οἰκουμένη τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ συνέσει βαθείας εἰρήνης ἀπολαύουσιν. So Ael. Arist. says of the Emperor: ἀλλὰ μένει δικαστὴς ἕτερος μέγας, ὃν οὔποτε οὐδὲν ἐκφεύγει τῶν δικαίων XXVI. 38, cf. XXXV. 17.

10. 6 **βασιλείας τιμώσης πάντων μάλιστα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων**: M. as Imp. Caesar Augustus is to respect and cherish before all else 'the liberty of the subject'. ἐλευθερία, opp. to the slavery, δουλεία, of the subjects of Julius and Alexander pp. **148**. 2, **182**. 16–18, means primarily individual liberty, but in the second place, civic freedom, local liberties as of the free cities of Achaia and Asia, and of the Gallic cantons. Tac. includes these aims in the programme of Nerva and Trajan: 'Nerva Caesar res olim dissociabilis miscuerit, principatum ac libertatem' *Agr.* 3; cf. Cic.'s saying: 'si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent, itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium' *Off.* ii. 27. This is the mission of Rome as conceived by Scipio and Laelius; it is expressed more than once by Polybius, and is the burden of T. Quinctius Flamininus' edict 196 B.C.: 'ne quod toto orbe terrarum iniustum imperium sit, ubique ius, fas, lex potentissima sint. Una voce praeconis liberatas omnes Graeciae atque Asiae urbes' Liv. XXXIII. 33. 7.

The ideal, which M. ascribes to Severus' teaching, he inherited from his predecessors: ἠλευθέρωσε τὰς ἁπάντων ψυχάς, ἐντελῆ καὶ ὁλόκληρον ἀποδιδοὺς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτοῖς Ael. Arist. XXXV. 21; ὁ *M.* πάντα τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου . . . ἔλεγεν εἶναι

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Dio Cass. lxxi. 33. 2: 'cum populo non aliter egit quam est actum sub civitate libera' *H.A.* iv. 12. 1, cf. 6. 10; 8. 1.

10. 6 **τιμώσης**, respecting and cherishing:

> *Ἰσότητα τιμᾶν, ἥ φίλους ἀεὶ φίλοις,*
> *πόλεις τε πόλεσι, συμμάχους τε συμμάχοις*
> *συνδεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἴσον μόνιμον ἀνθρώποις ἔφυ.* Eur. *Ph.* 536.

§ 2: 10. 7–8 **τὸ ὁμαλὲς καὶ εὔτονον**: Cas. interpreted the MS. *ἀμελές* by curis vacuus, Gat. by simpliciter vivere, corpore neglecto. Holst. thought of *ἐπιμελές*, comparing pp. 14. 3, 16. 23–4, where M. refers to care of health. Reiske proposed *ἐμμελές*, almost a tautology with *ὁμότονον*, Morus *ἀτενές*, which has the sense we expect. Cor.'s *τὸ ὁμαλὲς καὶ ὁμότονον* was no doubt prompted by *τὸ εὔτονον ἐκείνου καὶ τὸ ὁμαλές* p. 108. 23–4, from which I have taken my emendation. I suppose that *ὁμότονον* was originally substituted for *εὔτονον* by attraction to *ὁμαλές*, and the latter corrupted later to *ἀμελές*.

10. 8–9 **τὸ εὐποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ εὐμετάδοτον ἐκτενῶς**, cf. *μεταδοτικόν, ἐκτενῶς ἀναλίσκειν* p. 4. 4 and 10. The sense is close to *τῆς δὲ εὐποιΐας καὶ κοινωνίας μὴ ἐπιλανθάνεσθε Ep. Hebr.* xiii. 16.

10. 9 **τὸ εὔελπι**: the punctuation brings the three *εὐ-* compounds together, like the three *φιλ-* adjectives l. 3; then *τὸ πιστευτικόν* and *τὸ ἀνεπίκρυπτον* balance one another, instead of *τὸ εὔελπι* going with *τὸ πιστευτικόν*, almost tautologically.

10. 10 **τὸ ἀνεπίκρυπτον**: the active or middle use of the verbal, as is shown by *δῆλον εἶναι* below; cf. *ἀνεξέταστος* p. 40. 12.

10. 11 **τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῦ**: the expression has passed, cf. *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*, into portraiture, and, as in Ch. 16, the lessons are subordinated to the picture of his model.

10. 12 **δῆλον εἶναι**, *aperto erat pectore* Gat. The construction is *δῆλον εἶναι (αὐτὸν) θέλοντα ἢ οὐ*, the subject being supplied from *αὐτοῦ* as in *τὴν ὁμιλίαν αὐτοῦ, αἰδεσιμώτατον δέ* p. 8. 5. For the meaning, cf. *δῆλοι δέ*, sc. *οὐ μενοῦντες* Th. v. 10. 5: *οὐκ ἠξίου τὸν αὐταρχοῦντα κατάδηλον ὢν φρονεῖ εἶναι* Dio Cass. lvii. 1. 2.

A noble maxim repeated for himself, p. 168. 23–4; *οὐδὲ ἐμφωλεῦον* p. 44. 11; *λάνθανον, οὐχὶ κρυπτόμενον* p. 198. 15; *οὐ λανθάνει* p. 222. 16.

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Ch. 15 : 10. 13 Μαξίμου, 'Claudius Maximus, Stoicus' *H.A.* iv. 3. 2; mentioned again pp. **16.** 7, **18.** 2, **154.** 9. If, as is probable, the proconsul of Africa before whom Apuleius defended himself is meant, like Rusticus and Severus he was a Roman statesman with a leaning to Stoicism. The portrait is of the ideal *Sapiens* and appears designed to lead to the sketch of Pius in Ch. 16. Apuleius calls Cl. Maximus virum *sanctissimum Apol.* 85.

κατὰ μηδὲν περίφορον εἶναι: to be swayed by organic impulse is opp. to *τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ* cf. *περισπᾷ τί σε τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐμπίπτοντα;* p. **24.** 7; *περιφερόμενοι παντὶ ἀνέμῳ τῆς διδασκαλίας* St. Paul, *Eph.* iv. 14; what M. calls *πλανᾶσθαι* p. **46.** 27, *ῥέμβεσθαι, μὴ ἔχειν σκοπόν* p. **24.** 8 and 10.

10. 14 ταῖς ἄλλαις περιστάσεσι, ἐν νόσῳ . . . καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ περιστάσει p. **188.** 10; *ἐν τοιαύταις π. πραγμάτων,* of shipwreck, Galen, i. 4; of a *shock* ibid. i. 30; see p. **8.** 23–4 note.

10. 15 τὸ εὔκρατον τοῦ ἤθους, 'well-tempered', transferred to the mind from the due admixture in the body of the four elements, or the four qualities (hot, dry, moist, cold): *τῷ μὲν οὖν δὴ σώματι τοιοῦτος ὁ εὔκρατος ἄνθρωπος· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέσος ἀκριβῶς ἐστι θρασύτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, μελλησμοῦ τε καὶ προπετείας, ἐλέους τε καὶ φθόνου. εἴη δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος εὔθυμος, φιλόστοργος, φιλάνθρωπος, συνετός* Galen, i. 576. Brutus is described as *παιδείᾳ καὶ λόγῳ διὰ φιλοσοφίας καταμίξας τὸ ἦθος* Plu. *Bru.* 1.

καὶ μειλίχιον καὶ γεραρόν, usually interpreted to mean the qualities in the compounded *ἦθος,* but, in view of what Galen says, better understood as consequents, like *εὔθυμον* above, of the good temperament.

Both are Homeric epithets: the former M. uses of Pius p. **108.** 25, the latter, descriptive of the majesty of an Agamemnon, Plu. uses of Pompeius Magnus, *τὸ γ. καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν τοῦ ἤθους Pomp.* 2.

10. 16 τὸ οὐ σχετλίως κατεργαστικόν, with *τῶν προκειμένων,* like *ἐργαστικὸς (τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον)* X. *Mem.* iii. 1. 6. *οὐ σχ.* is translated 'without complaining'; Gat. compares *πόνει μὴ ὡς ἄθλιος* p. **178.** 4, but the evidence for this interpretation is lacking.

It is tempting to conjecture that M., with Homer in his head, wrote *σχετλίως,* alluding to: *σχέτλιός ἐσσι, γεραιέ· σὺ μὲν πόνου οὔ ποτε λήγεις Il.* x. 164, and that *οὐ* was added in error.

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§ 2: 10. 18 οὐ κακῶς πράττει. We expect M. to say that what he did, he did from conviction: *ἅττ' ἄν σοι λογιζομένῳ φαίνηται βέλτιστα, ταῦτα τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτέλει* Isoc. ii. 38. *οὐ κακῶς* seems a weak expression, unless it was a colloquialism for 'honestly', *χρηστῶς*. Nauck's *οὐκ ἄλλως* and Lofft's *οὐκ εἰκαίως*, do not give the required sense; *οὐκ ἀλόγως* Rich. may be justified by the variants at Isoc. v. 26, but here it is not the sense we expect.

The phrase *ὅσα τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς ἀλλ' οἰκείως* Arist. *Pr.* 947^{b}33, of verbal expression which fits the observed phenomena, has suggested to me that M. wrote *οἰκείως πράττει*, 'what he does, he does appropriately to character', cf. *οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι*, of advice which is not the disinterested expression appropriate to the man's appreciation of the situation, Th. ii. 60. 6.

10. 18–19 τὸ ἀθαύμαστον καὶ ἀνέκπληκτον: the familiar ideal, *nil admirari*, common to the Stoics and their opponents. The maxim is Democritean: *σοφίη ἄθαμβος ἀξίη πάντων, τιμιωτάτη οὖσα Fr.* 216; *τὴν ἀθαυμαστίαν . . . ἣν ὑμνεῖ Δ., . . . παράκειται γὰρ τῷ ἀθαμβεῖ καὶ ἀταράχῳ καὶ ἀνεκπλήκτῳ* Strabo, i, p. 61.

ἀνέκπληκτον is a corollary of *ἀθαύμαστον*, the wise man is imperturbable, because he sees what he foresaw, *παύσῃ . . . θαυμάζων ὡς ἀπροσδόκητα τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν γινόμενα* p. **236.** 6–7; 'sapientis est proprium . . . nihil cum acciderit admirari, ut inopinatum ac novum accidisse videatur' Cic. *Tusc.* v. 81.

10. 19–20 μηδαμοῦ ἐπειγόμενον κτλ. It is difficult to be certain of the grouping of these qualities. My punctuation makes two pairs, followed by three participles which describe fawning hypocrisy, anger, and suspicion.

ἐπειγόμενον ἢ ὀκνοῦν: cf. *μήτε σφύζειν μήτε ναρκᾶν* p. **144.** 13.

ἀμηχανοῦν ἢ κατηφές: the adj. describes the physical effect of *ἀμηχανοῦν*, *dejected and downcast* because of having no way of escape; *κατηφές* lit. hanging the head (esp. of horses) came to mean spiritless, *τὸ κατηφὲς καὶ ἄθυμον*, Arist. *Physiogn.* 808^{a}10; it is defined as: *λύπη κάτω βλέπειν ποιοῦσα* Plu. *De vit. pud.* 528e; 'vivere, neque submissum et abiectum neque se ecferentem' Cic. *Off.* i. 124. The mule, realizing she is not a thoroughbred, *ἄφνω δ' ἔπαυσε τὸν δρόμον κατηφήσας* Babr. 62. 5.

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10. 20 **προσσεσηρός**, primarily, like *κατηφές*, descriptive of animals (*σεσηρὸς αἰκάλλουσα*, of the Fox, Babr. 50. 14), the word came to imply fawning hypocrisy or 'foxiness', of the *κόλαξ, σεσηρώς, ὀρέγων δεξιάν* Max. Tyr. xiv. (20), 1; *σεσηρότων καὶ σαινόντων* id. xxxv. (6), 7; of Caligula, *σαρκάζων καὶ σεσηρώς* Ph. ii. 597; *κόλαξ . . . εἴποις δ' ἂν καὶ κύων προσσαίνων προσσεσηρώς* Poll. vi. 123.

M. says: *ἐὰν γνήσιον ᾖ καὶ μὴ σεσηρός* p. **226.** 12.

§ 3: 10. 21 **τὸ συγγνωμονικόν.** M. seems, in most of his models, to desire to emphasize those human traits which correct the coldness and apathy usually ascribed to the Stoic creed: '"Nihil ignoveris": Immo aliquid, non omnia' Cic. *Mur.* 65. Similarly Plin. says: 'vir mitissimus et ob hoc quoque maximus, Thrasea, crebro dicere solebat: "qui vitia odit, homines odit"' *Ep.* viii. 22. 3.

M.'s own teaching on pardon is expressed at vii. 26.

10. 21–2 **ἀδιαστρόφου**, *unwarped*, Arist. uses the met.: *τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες E.N.* 1109^{b}6; cf. *κανών, ἀστραβὴς καὶ ἀδιάστροφος* Plu. *Ad princip. inerud.* 780b.

M. has *διόρθωσις* of moral correction p. **4.** 23; cf. *ὀρθὸν οὖν εἶναι χρή, οὐχί ὀρθούμενον*, where the meaning is probably *upright*, though he may have the other met. in his mind, p. **40.** 20.

10. 24 **εὖχαρι ἐν τ . . ..** Leop. suggested *εὔχαρι ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις* thinking perhaps of Polyb. xxiii. 5. 7; M. would be repeating briefly what he said of Sextus p. **8.** 3–6. *χαριεντισμός* is mirth which the audience shares, opp. to *σαρκασμός*. Lucian has *τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιχαριεντισάμενος Symp.* 12. Possibly M. remembered *ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται* Pl. *Ap.* 24c, and invented *εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι* on the strength of *εὐτραπελεύεσθαι*. The Schol. to *Ap.* 24c. has *εὐτραπελεύεται, σκώπτει*, cf. Suid. in *Test.*

Ch. 16. The growing tendency to substitute a character study for a series of lessons is noticeable. It is worth while to compare M.'s sincerity and power with the weak little sketch in *H.A.* iii. 2. 1. Here, as in M.'s shorter portrait, a few living traits from the Emperor's daily habits are added. These cannot strictly be called lessons, they help to give life to his model.

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10. 25 τὸ ἥμερον: *τὸ πρᾷον καὶ ἥμερον ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπικώτερον, οὕτως καὶ ἀρρενικώτερον* p. **226.** 27–8. Cic. uses *mansuetudo* for this aspect of character, including 'modestia, temperantia, iustitia', the *virtutes leniores*, *Off.* i. 46; liberalitas, beneficentia, iustitia, fides, 'quae pertinent ad *mansuetudinem* morum ac facilitatem' ibid. ii. 32. Cf. 'ita civiliter se ambo egerunt, ut lenitatem Pii nemo desideraret' *H.A.* iv. 8. 1. Galen calls M. *εὐγνώμονά τε καὶ μέτριον, ἥμερόν τε καὶ πρᾷον* xix. 18.

μενετικὸν ἀσαλεύτως. That this was not mere obstinate adherence to decisions is shown by *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξητασμένως κριθέντων*, decisions reached no doubt after advice from his Council: *παντὶ τῷ κριθέντι ἀπαραβάτως ἐμμένειν, τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν* were tenets often exaggerated by the Stoics, Epict. ii. 15. 1 and 7. The adv. is used of the Roman phlegm exhibited against Hannibal: *ἔμειναν ἀσαλεύτως καὶ βεβαίως ἐπι τῶν ὑποκειμένων* Polyb. ix. 9. 8.

10. 26 τὸ ἀκενόδοξον περὶ τὰς δοκούσας τιμάς, a little play on words. M. employs δόξα usually for *reputation*, often with an allusion, as here, to the other sense *appearance*, cf. 'si fortunatum species et gratia praestat' Hor. *Ep.* i. 6. 49; *τὰς δοκούσας χάριτας* p. **6.** 20.

12. 1 τὸ φιλόπονον καὶ ἐνδελεχές: *φιλόπονος καὶ μακρόθυμος* p. **110.** 3. Of M. himself: *φιλόπονος γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἀκριβῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τῇ ἀρχῇ προσήκουσι προσεφέρετο* Dio Cass. lxxi. 6. 2. The two adj.s are used of the proverbial mule of Marius: *τὸν ἐνδελεχῆ καὶ τλήμονα καὶ φιλόπονον* Plu. *Mar.* 13.

τὸ ἀκουστικόν. One reason for regarding the portrait in vi. 30. 2–4 as a later draft is that this readiness to lend an ear is put there much more fully, *τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ⟨τῶν⟩ ἀντιβαινόντων παρρησιαστικῶς ταῖς γνώμαις αὐτοῦ καὶ χαίρειν εἴ τίς ⟨τι⟩ δεικνύοι κρεῖττον* p. **110.** 6–8. M. frames a maxim on this open-mindedness vi. 21.

12. 2–3 [εἰς] τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονεμητικὸν ἑκάστῳ: *εἰς* appears to be a dittograph from *-ως*. I suppose that *εἰς*, when inserted, caused the change of *τοῦ* to *τό*, and that the construction is like: *ἀπονεμητικὴ ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρὸς ἀξίαν* Galen, xix. 384. Arist. distinguishes the claims made to distribution of offices by different parties; all claim *κατ' ἀξίαν τινά*, but respectively put forward as their ground *ἐλευθερία, πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, ἀρετή E.N.*

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1131ª25; in the *Politics* he says the popular claim is *κατ' ἰσότητα* 1279ª9. M. says that Pius considered *worth*, and so implies that he had no partiality or favouritism. He himself adopts the ideal p. **46.** 13–14, as Nature herself is impartial pp. **54.** 26, **92.** 19, **170.** 27.

12. 4 **ἐντάσεως . . . ἀνέσεως**, cf. *σφοδρότατος* opp. to *ἀνειμένος* p. **6.** 16.

§ 2: 12. 4 **τὸ παῦσαι.** M. is contrasting Pius with Trajan and Hadrian. Their private lives were disfigured by this indulgence, with the consequent domestic unhappiness: 'puerorum quos Traianus inpensius diligebat' *H.A.* i. 2. 7: 'curasse delicatos, eosdemque ad se pellexisse', of Hadrian, ibid. 4. 5. The story of Antinous is notorious ibid. 14. 5, cf. Clem. Alex. *Protr.* p. 43; Origen, *Cels.* iii. 36. Julian emphasizes this point p. 311c–d.

M.'s note is important in view of the scandal of Zeno's attitude to this vice, Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh.* iii. 200; elsewhere Sextus says *παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγορεύεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν* ibid. i. 152, cf. 159–60.

12. 5 **ἡ κοινονοημοσύνη:** the word is not cited from elsewhere, and may be original. The context shows that M. means *sensus communis*, considerateness for others, illustrated here by the treatment of Pius' friends, amici Caesaris: 'imperatorium fastigium ad summam civilitatem deduxit' *H.A.* iii. 6. 4. The association of ideas is seen in: *ὡς φιλάνθρωπον καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ κοινὸν ἔχοντα νοῦν* Plu. *De vit. pud.* 529d: 'quemquamne existimas Catone . . . commodiorem, communiorem, moderatiorem fuisse ad omnem rationem humanitatis?' Cic. *Mur.* 66.

12. 5–6 **τὸ ἐφεῖσθαι τοῖς φίλοις.** The *amici principis* become a special class from this date, and *comes Caesaris* becomes increasingly common in inscriptions. These *friends* were of three kinds: official, privy councillors, personal intimates, and to these M. refers here respectively in the words *συνδειπνεῖν καὶ συναποδημεῖν, ἐν τοῖς συμβουλίοις*, and *τὸ διατηρητικόν.*

What M. says may be illustrated from the *Hist. Aug.* and from Fronto's letters. *The official society*: 'convivia cum amicis et privata communicavit et publica. . . . frequentavit et ipse amicorum suorum convivia' *H.A.* iii. 11. 4 and 7; 'neque

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domum vestram diluculo ventitat neque cotidie salutat neque ubique comitatur nec semper spectat' Fronto *Ep.*, p. 6; 'tu pro tua singulari humanitate omnes nostri ordinis viros, ubi praesto adsunt, honorifice adfaris, non omnes magno opere requiris absentes', Fronto to Lucius, *Ep.*, p. 117. *The Privy council*: 'neque de provinciis neque de ullis actibus quicquam constituit, nisi quod prius ad amicos rettulit, atque ex eorum sententia formas conposuit' *H.A.* iii. 6. 11. *The intimate circle*: 'amicis suis in imperio suo non aliter usus est quam privatus' *H.A.* iii. 11. 1; 'sed venies saepe et tecum celebrabimus, si dei volent, omnia festa nostra', M. to Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 89.

12. 7 ἀεὶ δὲ ὅμοιον: *τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ὅμοιον ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις* p. 110. 5–6; *ἐπὶ φίλοις καὶ παροῦσι καὶ ἀποῦσιν ὁμοίως* (Epicurus) D.L. x. 118.

διὰ χρείας τινὰς ἀπολειφθέντων, *left behind*, failing to attend his *profectiones*, cf. *συνακολουθεῖν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ἀπιούσῃ μὴ δυνάμενος ἀπολειφθῆναι* Plu. *De Alex. M. fort.* 339d.

12. 8 τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκριβῶς: see *Test.*

ἐν τοῖς συμβουλίοις, 'adhibitis in concilio suo optimis senatoribus (Hadrian)' *H.A.* i. 22. 11, cf. 18. 1; 'vocatis amicis et praefectis ut successorem eum (Marcum) imperii omnibus commendavit' *H.A.* iv. 7. 3, cf. 'ad amicos rettulit' iii. 6. 11.

12. 9 ἐπίμονον, ἀλλ' οὐ τό· προαπέστη: this is Xyl.'s punctuation in the Basel ed. Just possibly M. is citing a saying, 'You could not say of him: "He desisted" '. Xyl. says that P cod. had *οὐ μόνον τὸ προαπέστη*, and notes himself *μόνον τό* videntur abundare, yet P has *οὐ τὸ* . . ..

The parallel passage has: *οὐκ ἄν τι ὅλως παρῆκε, μὴ πρότερον εὖ μάλα κατιδὼν καὶ σαφῶς νοήσας* p. 108. 27–8, which again appears to be a later draft. For *ἐπίμονον*, cf. *ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμεν καὶ καρτερήσωμεν* Pl. *La.* 194a, and for the verb, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης (πρὶν εὑρεῖν) Smp.* 175d;

> *ἅπαντα τὰ ζητούμεν' ἐξευρίσκεται,*
> *ἂν μὴ προαποστῇς μηδὲ τὸν πόνον φύγῃς.*
>
> Alexis *Fr.* 30 K.

12. 9–10 ταῖς προχείροις φαντασίαις. Alex. Aphr. addressing Severus and Caracalla says: *πρὸς ἐξέτασιν τῶν προκειμένων ἀκριβεστέραν, ἣν καὶ ὑμᾶς πᾶσιν οἷς πράσσετε ὁρᾶν ἔνεστιν ἐζηλωκότας. οὐδεμίαν*

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γοῦν πρᾶξιν ὑμῶν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἢ τὴν φαντασίαν (first impression) *πρὸ τῆς ἀληθείας σκοπὸν πεποίηται De Fato*, p. 165. Elsewhere in M. *πρόχ.* means 'ready to hand'.

12. 11 ἀψίκορον μηδ' ἐπιμανές: M. recurs to *ἀεὶ δὲ ὅμοιον*. Pius was stable in affection, not fickle and fastidious nor governed by appetite. He may be contrasting the despot generally or again thinking of Hadrian's private character, 'semper in omnibus varius' *H.A.* i. 14. 11. Young men are *εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας* Arist. *Rh.* 1389ª6.

ἐπιμαίνομαι is used of irregular sexual appetite: *τὴν Σερβιλίαν ἐπιμανεῖσαν αὐτῷ* Plu. *Bru.* 5; *γυναῖκες (τισὶ) ἐπεμάνησαν* id. *Gryllus* 990f.

τὸ αὔταρκες ἐν παντί: *καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, . . . ὅπως, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα* D.L. x. 130; *ὀλιγοῖς ἀρκούμενος* p. **110.** 1–2, and Socrates p. **16.** 2. St. Paul says: *ἔμαθον, ἐν οἷς εἰμι, αὐτάρκης εἶναι Phil.* iv. 11, cf. 2 *Cor.* ix. 8, 1 *Tim.* vi. 6.

τὸ φαιδρόν, the outward expression of *τὸ αὔταρκες, τὸ εὔδιον τοῦ προσώπου* p. **108.** 25; 'vultu placidus' *H.A.* iii. 2. 1. This serenity was expressed in the image of Hermes: *ἔστι δὲ φαιδρὸς μὲν τὰς ὄψεις*, and reflected in his worshippers: *ἴδοις δ' ἂν τοὺς θιασώτας αὐτοῦ φαιδροὺς μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ καθηγουμένῳ θεῷ* Galen, i. 5.

12. 13 τὰς ἐπιβοήσεις, *acclamationes*, the practice of acclaiming the Emperor grew out of the applause natural in literary and artistic circles, Epict. iii. 23. 10; oriental in origin, id. iv. 1. 14. Augustus had restrained it, Suet. *Aug.* 53 and 56; it greeted Nero's artistry, id. *Nero*, 20 and 25; Dio Cass. lxi. 20. 4, and was established by Trajan's time Plin. *Paneg.* 75, being organized even in the law courts, id. *Ep.* ii. 14. 4. It ran to disgusting lengths later, and there are instances, apparently cited from the *Acta*, of outbreaks even under M.: 'hanc eius clementiam senatus his adclamationibus prosecutus est' *H.A.* vi. 13. 1.

12. 14 ⟨συ⟩σταλῆναι, Xyl.'s correction has been received generally, in view of *συστέλλειν ἑαυτόν* p. **16.** 20. The simple verb is used for 'staying' a flux: *ζήτησον πρῶτον σταλῆναί σου τὸ ῥεῦμα* Epict. ii. 21. 22.

12. 14–15 τὸ φυλακτικὸν ἀεὶ . . . ταμιευτικὸν τῆς χορηγίας, Pius was

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exact and scrupulous in his husbandry of the Empire: 'procuratores suos et modeste suscipere tributa iussit et excedentes modum rationem . . . reddere praecepit nec umquam ullo laetatus est lucro, quo provincialis oppressus est. Contra proc. suos conquerentes libenter audivit' *H.A.* iii. 6. 1–2; 'omnia et omnes, quasi sua essent, curaret' 7. 1; 'rationes omnium provinciarum adprime scivit et vectigalium' 7. 8; 'si quos repetundarum damnavit, eorum liberis bona paterna restituit, ea tamen lege ut illi provincialibus redderent quod parentes acceperant' 10. 7. He maintained a peaceful policy and left a large sum in the treasury Dio Cass. lxxiii. 8. 3.

12. 15–16 **ὑπομενετικὸν τῆς . . . τινῶν καταιτιάσεως,** the criticism that some persons (*τινῶν*) expressed by the nickname 'skinflint': *τῆς ἀκριβολογίας . . . ὅθεν αὐτὸν οἱ σκώπτοντες καὶ κυμινοπρίστην ἐκάλουν* Dio Cass. lxx. 3. 3. Julian repeats this censure, p. 312a. This is put more generally in what here again appears to be a reconsidered draft: *ὡς ἔφερεν ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἀδίκως αὐτῷ μεμφομένους, μὴ ἀντιμεμφόμενος* p. **108.** 28–9.

τὸ μήτε περὶ θεοὺς δεισίδαιμον: *θεοσεβὴς χωρὶς δεισιδαιμονίας* p. **110.** 8. In this Book the positive religion of Pius is not mentioned, unless that is covered by *τὸ τὰ πάτρια φυλάσσειν* p. **14.** 10. Here M. rather defines the attitude of Pius both towards the unseen powers and the seen human multitude, regarded as a collective potential danger. He was afraid neither of gods nor of men.

δεισιδαιμονία means superstitious fear of the gods, as the source of evil, with action which averts evil by dark practices *πολυπάθεια κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπονοοῦσα* Plu. *De Superstitione*, 167e (see 164e–171f). Both Pius and M. were men of devotion, scrupulous in the performance of state and family worship: 'pater vester divinus ille vir providentia, pudicitia, frugalitate, innocentia, pietate, sanctimonia, omnis omnium principum virtutes supergressus' Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 226; 'qui rite comparetur Numae, cuius . . . caerimoniasque semper obtinuit' *H.A.* iii. 13. 4; 'Optimo maximoque principi et cum summa benignitate iustissimo ob insignem erga caerimonias publicas curam ac religionem' *C.I.L.* vi. 1001, cf. *H.A.* iii. 11. 5.[1]

[1] See 'The Cognomen of the Emperor Antoninus Pius', Prof. C. H. Dodd, in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, Fourth Series, vol. xi, pp. 1–36.

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12. 17 δημοκοπικὸν ἢ ἀρεσκευτικὸν ἢ ὀχλοχαρές, three adjectives to define his attitude to the public.

δημοκοπικόν, cf. *δοξοκοπίαν* p. **224. 22**; M. speaks of him, as of one not *ἡδονῇ καὶ χάριτι τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, σπεύδων* Plu. *C. Gracch.* 9. M. may also be thinking of Aristoph. *Equites*.

ἄρεσκος, strictly a social humbug and flatterer, Arist. *E.N.* 1108ª28; Theophr. *Char.* 5; thus *ἀρεσκευτικόν* is *complaisance*.

ὀχλοχαρές refers to his refusal to humour the mob in the Amphitheatre or Circus; so M. resisted this temptation, and tried to make the shows less brutal and to cut down the expenses of the spectacles, Dio Cass. lxxi. 29. 3–4; *H.A.* iv. 11. 4; 27. 6. Neither Pius nor M. succeeded in avoiding the traditional extravagances of *congiaria* and *donativa H.A.* iii. 8. 1; iv. 7. 9.

12. 17–18 νῆφον ἐν πᾶσι καὶ βέβαιον: 'sobriety and firmness' summarize his public character, and lead to a description of his domestic excellence: 'sobrius, diligens agri cultor, mitis, largus' *H.A.* iii. 2. 1.

ἐν πᾶσι is colloquially attached to *νῆφον*. *νῆφε ἐν πᾶσι* 2 *Tim.* iv. 5.

12. 18 ἀπειρόκαλον μηδὲ καινοτόμον: both words refer to *taste*, in the first instance; the first implying vulgar expenditure, the second *parvenu* affectation of novelty.

Arist. couples *ἀπειροκαλία* with *βαναυσία*, expense which is vulgar, not for its amount, but for the way it is used and its mistaken object *E.N.* 1122ª31.

ἀπειρόκαλον was also used at this period for tasteless affectation in words, *τὸ γὰρ ἀπ. ἐν τῷ ἀττικίζειν βάρβαρον* Philostr. *V. Soph.* i. 16. 4, p. 213, cf. A. Gell. *N. Att.* xi. 7. 7. M. then may also be glancing at the *elocutio novella* of Hadrian and Fronto.

καινοτόμον is used antithetically to *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια πράσσων* p. **14. 9**, cf. *καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα* Pl. *Euthphr.* 3b; *πέφυκεν δὲ ἡ πόλεων ἐπιμειξία πόλεσιν ἤδη κεραννύναι παντοδαπά, καινοτομίας . . . ξένων ξένοις Lg.* 949e.

§ 4: 12. 20 ἀτύφως ἅμα καὶ ἀπροφασίστως, 'eloquentiae nitidae, litteraturae praecipuae . . . et omnia haec cum mensura et sine iactantia' *H.A.* iii. 2. 1.

τῦφος is a favourite word in M. for pride, p. **16.** 17 n.; *ἀτύφως*

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μὲν λαβεῖν, εὐλύτως δὲ ἀφεῖναι p. **156.** 22. The sense here is well shown in: *οἰήματος καὶ ἀλοζονείας . . . ἀπολυθεὶς εἰς βίον ἄτυφον καὶ ὑγιαίνοντα καταστήσεις σαυτόν* Plu. *De rect. rat.* 43b.

ἀπροφασίστως, 'without apology or excuse'; the adj. is used with *ἄοκνος καὶ πρόθυμος* Plu. *Quomodo* 62c; M. means not disguising from himself or others his satisfaction in creature comforts, *εὐμάρεια*.

12. 20–1 **παρόντων μὲν ἀνεπιτηδεύτως ἅπτεσθαι:** the adv. means 'without affectation': *ταῦτα σὺν τῷ ἀνεπιτηδεύτῳ φυλακτέα* p. **140.** 8. *ἅπτεσθαι, employ*, as in:

τῆς τύχης ὅπως
ἄψαιτ' ἄριστα. Eur. *I.A.* 56.

12. 21 **ἀπόντων δὲ μὴ δεῖσθαι:** *μήθ' ὥστε δεῖσθαι μήθ' ὡς ἀπόντων ἀδυνατεῖν ἡσυχάζειν . . . ἱκάνως ἔχειν παρυντος καὶ μὴ παρόντος* Arist. *Oec.* 1344ª13; cf. M.'s maxim vii. 27. The other version says: *ὡς ὀλίγοις ἀρκούμενος* p. **110.** 1–2.

The passage p. **16.** 2–7 seems to have got out of place, and would be better here, to illustrate what M. has just said; then the chapter would end well with *συμφώνως ἑαυτοῖς*, p. **16.** 1–2.

12. 22–3 **σοφιστής, οὐερνάκλος, σχολαστικός,** represented only by *οὐ σοφιστής* in the other sketch, p. **110.** 1.

The precise intention of the three epithets is difficult to discover. M. appears to contrast three kinds of *unreality* with *ἀνὴρ πέπειρος κτλ.*

σοφιστής, the unreal rhetorician, at home on the platform, abroad in real life; *ἀναστάντες γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ ἀποθέμενοι τὰ βιβλία . . . ἐν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς τοῦ βίου μέρεσι μικροὶ καὶ ὑπὸ χεῖρα φαίνονται τοῖς πολλοῖς* Plu. *De rect. rat.* 43f.

οὐερνάκλος, an impostor, aping the true *urbanus*. M. may be using in a bad sense what is called 'sapor vernaculus', 'urbanitatis color' Cic. *Brut.* 171–2. In this context he can hardly refer to the low buffoonery associated with the Roman *verna*. He may, however, allude to servility of character:

> verna ministeriis ad nutus aptus erilis,
> litterulis Graecis imbutus, idoneus arti
> cuilibet Hor. *Ep.* ii. 2. 6.

a trait which exhibits itself in a smattering of culture as well as

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in other superficiality. **οἰκογένης** is clearly a gloss to explain the Roman word to a Greek reader.

σχολαστικός perhaps 'bookish'; *ταῦτα δὴ τὰ 'Ρωμαίων τοῖς βαναυσοτάτοις πρόχειρα καὶ συνήθη ῥήματα, Γραικὸς καὶ σχολαστικὸς ἀκούων* Plu. *Cic.* 5; *σχολαστικόν . . . τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον οὗ πάντες καταγελῶσιν* Epict. i. 11. 39; cf. iv. 1. 138. When Pliny says of the *rhetor* Isaeus: 'adhuc scholasticus tantum est', *Ep.* ii. 3. 5, he appears to mean 'ignorant of the world'.

12. 23 ἀνὴρ πέπειρος, τέλειος, ἀκολάκευτος: *πέπειρος*, 'mellow', matches *τὸ μειλίχιον* p. **108. 25**; here he adds *ἀκολάκευτος*, 'standing above flattery', there he adds *ἀκενόδοξον*, 'free from vainglory'. In each case the additional epithet is a little puzzling in the context.

§ 5: 12. 25 τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφούντων: 'rhetoribus et philosophis per omnes provincias et honores et salaria detulit' *H.A.* iii. 11. 3. Pius granted immunities to certain professions: *περὶ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἡ αὐτὴ διάταξις τοῦ Πίου οὕτω λέγει· φιλοσόφων δὲ οὐκ ἐτάχθη ἀριθμὸς διὰ τὸ σπανίους εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας· οἶμαι δὲ ὅτι οἱ πλούτῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες ἐθελονταὶ παρέξουσι τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ὠφελείας ταῖς πατρίσιν, εἰ δὲ ἀκριβολογοῖντο περὶ τὰς οὐσίας (substantia), αὐτόθεν ἤδη φανεροὶ γενήσονται μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντες*, a dry jest, worthy of Pius, *Dig.* xxvii i. 6. 7.

The literature of the period (Lucian never tires of the theme) is full of references to the contrast between real and sham philosophers: *τοῖς οὐκ ὀνόματι μόνον ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφοις* Muson. p. 93; 'veram, nisi fallor, philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes' Ulpian, *Dig.* i. 1. 1. A most notorious quack was P. Egnatius Celer, Tac. *Hist.* iv. 10; *Ann.* xvi. 32; Dio Cass. lxii. 26; Juv. iii. 116.

τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις. M. delicately avoids saying 'fudge' talkers; the few stories about Pius and these gentry give a different impression; he may not have reproached them, but he was evidently short with them, see the stories about Apollonius, p. **6.** 12 n, and about Alexander, p. **8.** 20 n.

14. 1 εὐπαράγωγον: he is again thinking of Aristophanes's *Demos*: *ἀλλ' εὐπαράγωγος εἶ Eq.* 1115: in both cases the seductive power

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of words is in point, although at this date the philosophic sophist did not, like the demagogue in Greece, influence policy.

14. 2 τὸ εὐόμιλον καὶ εὔχαρι: *ἀνὴρ σεμνότατος . . . εὔχαρις δ' ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος* D.L. iv. 59; *εὔχαρις ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις* Polyb. xxiii. 5. 7, cf. p. **10.** 24 n. M. qualifies *τὸ εὔχαρι* by *οὐ κατακόρως*; Cicero permitted himself his wit and pleasantry in and out of season: *χρώμενος δ' αὐτῇ (εὐτραπελίᾳ) κατακόρως πολλοὺς ἐλύπει* Plu. *Cic.* 5.

14. 2–3 τὸ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ἐπιμελητικὸν ἐμμέτρως: his *λιτὴ δίαιτα* and its results are given in p. **110.** 3. Galen says of M. *ὁ γοῦν ὢν ἴσμεν αὐτοκρατόρων ἑτοιμότατα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλειαν ἀφικόμενος Ἀντωνῖνος*, describing his regularity in recreation vi. 406.

14. 5 φαρμάκων καὶ ἐπιθεμάτων [ἐκτός]. We may either exclude *ἐκτός* as a gloss, or take the full *ἐντὸς καὶ ἐκτός* from Suid., or treat *ἐκτός* as depending on the verbal notion in *ἐπίθεμα*, cf. *ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν περιχρίστων ἐπίθεσις* Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102a.

φαρμάκων here means 'doses' in opposition to *ἐπιθεμάτων*, but *φ.* was still used generically, as it is in *ἐπιθήσει φάρμακα Il.* iv. 190, e.g. *φ. χριστά, ἐπίπλαστα, βρωτά, πωτά* Artem. *Oneirocr.* iv. 22.

ἐπίθεμα covers a plaster or poultice and an ointment or salve, *ἔξωθεν ἐπιχριόμενά τε καὶ προσπλασσόμενα* Hipp. *V.M.* 15. Pius may have used them for neuralgia, a prescription being: *κέχρησο δὲ καὶ ἐπιθέμασι κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς* Paul. Aeg. iii. 5.

§ 6: 14. 6 ἀβασκάνως, cf. *βασκανία* p. **8.** 17.

14. 7 τὴν φραστικὴν (δύναμιν): the 'sermo facetus ac nulla in re rudis' of the public speaker is opposed to the expert knowledge of 'leges veteres moresque maiorum' Cic. *De Or.* i. 32 and 39–40. Cic. says that a great speaker may be 'ignarus legum, haesitans in maiorum institutis, rudis in iure civili'. At this period one task of the Emperor was by the help of his legal advisers to bring uniformity into the diversity of laws, *ἄλλος ἄλλοις ἔθεσι χρῶνται καὶ νόμοις* Athenag. *Leg.* 1.

14. 9 πάντα δὲ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια πράσσων. Pius showed his conservatism in his respect for the Senate, in his treatment of Italy,

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rescinding Hadrian's innovations, and above all in his regard for religious usages, cf. *τὸ μήτε περὶ θεοὺς δεισίδαιμον* p. **12.** 16.

The long series of his coins reviving early Roman legends illustrates this conservatism. Of M. the biographer says: ius autem magis vetus restituit quam novum fecit, no doubt a legal fiction, *H.A.* iv. 11. 10.

Augustus makes the like claim: *ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν παρὰ τὰ πάτρια ἔθη διδομένην ἀνεδεξάμην Mon. Anc.* (Gr.) 3. 17; Dio represents Maecenas advising him: *τὸ μὲν θεῖον πάντῃ πάντως αὐτός τε σέβου κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* Dio Cass. lii. 36; Domitian claims *μηδενὸς μέρους τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐθῶν παρενχειρουμένου S.I.G.* 821. C. 3.

14. 10 **τὸ τὰ πάτρια φυλάσσειν** has been suspected to be a gloss, but something is needed to explain *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* and to complete the tribute or lesson.

§ 7: 14. 11 **τὸ μὴ εὐμετακίνητον καὶ ῥιπταστικόν,** recurring to *μηδὲ καινοτόμον* p. **12.** 18. The words refer to change of place and change of mind, being amplified by *καὶ τόποις καὶ πράγμασι*: 'in suis propriis fundis vixit varie ac pro temporibus; nec ullas expeditiones obiit, nisi quod ad agros suos profectus est ad Campaniam, dicens gravem esse provincialibus comitatum principis' *H.A.* iii. 7. 10.

Hadrian, on the contrary, was the pilgrim of the Empire *H.A.* i, chs. 10–11. 2; 12–14. 4.

ῥιπταστικόν, shifting his views, *τῇ γνώμῃ πολλὰ ῥιπτασθεὶς ἐπ' ἀμφότερα* Plu. *Cic.* 37; Hadrian was 'semper in omnibus varius' *H.A.* i. 14. 11.

14. 14 **πολλὰ τὰ ἀπόρρητα:** 'recusantibus (i.e. indignantibus) aulicis ministris, qui, illo nihil per internuntios agente, nec terrere poterant homines aliquando nec ea, quae occulta non erant, vendere' *H.A.* iii. 6. 4.

14. 16 **ἔν τε θεωριῶν ἐπιτελέσει,** of public spectacles, 'sumptum muneribus gladiatoriis instituit' *H.A.* iii. 12. 3. Cf. *H.A.* iv. 11. 1 and 4, for M.'s similar economy.

ἔργων κατασκευαῖς: his public works are enumerated, *H.A.* iii. 8. 1–3.

14. 17 **διανομαῖς,** viz. *congiaria* et *frumentationes*: 'congiarium populo', *H.A.* iii. 4. 9; 'congiarium populo, militibus donativum'

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iii. 8. 1. An example of the second kind of distribution is: 'vini, olei et tritici penuriam per aerarii sui damnum emendo et gratis populo dando sedavit' iii. 8. 11. Coins of various dates are marked *Liberalitas*.

14. 18–19 **οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς πραχθεῖσιν εὐδοξίαν:** *οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τοῦ δόξαι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ πεπρᾶχθαι καλῶς* Epict. iii. 24. 50; 'nihil ad ostentationem, omnia ad conscientiam refert recteque facti non ex populi sermone mercedem sed ex facto petit', of Titius Aristo, the jurist, Plin. *Ep.* i. 22. 5.

§ 8: 14. 19 **οὐκ ἦν ἀωρὶ λούστης:** this is Xyl.'s proposal (or *ἀωριλούστης*). It explains the corruption *ἐν ἀωρὶ* (*ἐν ἀωρεί* P) better than the *οὐκ ἀωρὶ* of Saumaise.

The indulgence is often mentioned by the satirists, Hor. *Ep.* i. 6. 61; Pers. iii. 98; Juv. i. 142; Caligula took *θερμολουσίαι ἄκαιροι* Ph. ii. 548; Commodus 'lavabat per diem septies atque octies' *H.A.* vii. 11. 5.

14. 20–1 **περὶ σωμάτων ὥρας,** the physical charm of his slaves, *σώματα δ' ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποις, ἀλλὰ δοῦλα σώματα* Poll. iii. 78. The word is chosen for its ambiguity, cf. *οἱ πρὸς τἀφροδίσια τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολαύοντες* X. *Mem.* i. 2. 29. These boys were *exposed* for sale: 'nudari iuberes et ipsum tibi corpus ostendi' Sen. *Ep.* 80. 9.

14. 21 **ἡ ἀπὸ Λωρίου στολή:** 'natus est in villa Lanuvina, educatus Lori in Aurelia, ubi postea palatium extruxit' *H.A.* iii. 1. 8. The meaning appears to be: 'points that deserve to be commended and imitated are that his dress was brought to Rome from Lorium, from his villa there; most of his way of life at Lanuvium . . . and the rest of his habits', but the text is corrupt.

Saum.'s brilliant *χιτών* for *καὶ τῶν* has been generally accepted, in the sense that the Emperor did not wear the toga in the country, but that, after all, was the usual practice of Roman nobles.

14. 22–3 **τῷ τελώνῃ . . . παραιτουμένῳ.** Saum., continuing the notion of costume, wrote *τῷ φελόνῃ . . . παραιτουμένως* [*ὡς*] *ἐχρήσατο*, 'he apologized for using the *paenula* at Tusculum', in the hill country; cf. 'cum . . . multo stillaret paenula nimbo'

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Juv. v. 79; 'paenula solstitio, campestre nivalibus auris' Hor. *Ep.* i. 11. 18.

As the text stands, M. may recall a tale about a *publicanus*, who called on Pius, at Tusculum, and apologized for not being suitably dressed. There is a story of the Emperor Severus, in relation to M.: 'cum rogatus ad cenam imperatoriam palliatus venisset, qui togatus venire debuerat, togam praesidiariam ipsius imperatoris accepit' *H.A.* x. 1. 7.

§ 9: **14. 24 ἀπηνὲς . . . ἀδυσώπητον . . . λάβρον,** referring apparently to his leniency and equal temper: 'vere natura clementissimus et nihil temporibus suis asperum fecit' *H.A.* iii. 2. 7. *ἀπηνές* and *λάβρον* are perhaps reminiscences of Homer's language; *ἀδυσώπητος* Suid. explains as *ἀπροσωπόληπτος*, which cannot be the meaning here. Plu. couples with it *ἄτεγκτος*, hard-hearted, *Quomodo* 64f., so that it refers to a merciless expression, cf. 'nec erubuit beneficii invidia', of Domitian, Tac. *Agr.* 42. 3: *λάβρος* is well illustrated by Plu.'s remark that man should copy the delays of divine judgement: *ἡμῶν τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας θηριῶδες καὶ λάβρον ἀφαιρῶν, καὶ διδάσκων μὴ σὺν ὀργῇ . . . ἀλλὰ μιμουμένους τὴν ἐκείνου πρᾳότητα De his qui sero*, 550f.

14. 25 ἕως ἱδρῶτος: *ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔσπευδεν* is the less vigorous phrase p. 108. 29.

The expression 'to the sweating point' unfortunately is not proverbial in English, still we may take it to be an image from physical exercise. The interpretation of *οὔπω μέχρις αἵματος Heb.* xii. 4 presents a parallel difficulty. The usual explanation there is that the writer passes in mind from running races to prize-fighting: 'you have not resisted until your blood is shed' (1 *Cor.* ix. 26). Gat. mentions that his theology tutor, Thomas Plaifir, took *μέχρις αἵματος* to mean *ad ruborem*, from a medical proverb 'ad ruborem non ad sudorem'. Gat. had not A before him, with its lacuna *οὐ μ . . .*, yet he had perhaps divined the true text: *οὐ μ⟨έχρις ἐρυθήματος⟩, ἕως ἱδρῶτος*; Pius was cool and collected; you would not say of him, he went so far as not only 'to get red, but even to perspire'.

διειλημμένα λελογίσθαι: the participle is a favourite with Pl. for methodical distribution: *ὑπὸ θεῶν . . . τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη δ.*

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Plt. 271d; *ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μησὶν* δ. *Lg.* 886a, so that M. chooses it happily for the Latin *distinguere*: 'ipse dies pulchro distinguitur ordine rerum' Juv. i. 127; 'nihil . . . illo vitae genere distinctius', where the old man's daily method is compared with the order of the heavens Plin. *Ep.* iii. 1. 1.

16. 1 ἐπὶ σχολῆς, perhaps of the order of the *lecture room*, in any case opp. to *ἕως ἱδρῶτος*.

τεταγμένως, 'marshalled duly', *τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον* Pl. *Grg.* 504a, opp. to *εἰκῇ* like *λόγους κεκοσμημένους Ap.* 17c; 'placida omnia et ordinata' Plin. l.c.

ἐρρωμένως, 'with energy and firmness', cf. constantia, in the next note.

16. 1–2 συμφώνως ἑαυτοῖς: 'ostendit (virtutem) . . . ordo eius et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia' Sen. *Ep.* 120, 11.

16. 2–3 τὸ περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους μνημονευόμενον. One would suspect that this passage should be inserted after *ἀπόντων δὲ μὴ δεῖσθαι* p. **12.** 21, but it may be an iteration, by way of afterthought.

The account of Socr. is traditional. M. may be thinking of Xen., as the participle *μνημονευόμενον* suggests: *ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν . . . ὡραιοτάτων ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν . . . ἀωροτάτων* X. *Mem.* i. 3. 14, or again of Plato's *Banquet*, with which M. was familiar, p. **142.** 11, *ὁπότ' ἀναγκασθείμεν . . . ἀσιτεῖν, οὐδὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν· ἔν τ' αὖ ταῖς εὐωχίαις μόνος ἀπολαύειν οἷός τ' ἦν τὰ τ' ἄλλα . . . Smp.* 219e.

καρτερεῖν is a synonym of *τινὸς ἀπέχεσθαι* in Pl. *Lg.* 840b.

16. 4–5 πολλοὶ . . . ἐνδοτικῶς ἔχουσι. It is not necessary to supply *οἱ* with *πολλοί*, unless we are to emend many other places in Gk. literature.

For the general sense, cf. *τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλήθη . . . δεόμενά τε ἀμετρῶς δεῖται καὶ ἐξὸν κερδαίνειν τὰ μέτρια, ἁπλήστως αἱρεῖται κερδαίνειν* Pl. *Lg.* 918d.

With the two adverbs, cf. *πάντων τῶν φαύλων οὕτω πραττόντων ἀποστατικῶς καὶ ἐνδοτικῶς . . . ἀσθενῶς καὶ κακῶς ἕκαστα πράττειν ἂν λέγοιντο* Chrysippus, ap. Galen. v. 406, p. 380 Mü. We too speak of *giving in*, cf. *ἐνδοῦναι πρὸς ὕπνον* Plu. *Sull.* 28.

§ 10: 16. 5 τὸ δὲ ἰσχύειν, the generic expression for strength of

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character: *αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος*, Antisth. Cynicus, D.L. vi. 11: *ἡ δὲ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος . . . περὶ δὲ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη*, Cleanthes, Plu. *De Rep. St.* 1034d.

ἔτι καρτερεῖν. I have kept the MS. reading, in preference to *ἐγκαρτερεῖν*, partly because of *καρτερεῖν*, Pl. *Smp.* 219e; *καρτερεῖν*, (*ἀπέχεσθαι*) and *ἐννήφειν* (*ἀπολαύειν οὐκ ἐνδοτικῶς*) are the *species* of *ἰσχύς*.

ἑκατέρῳ: Dr. Rendall suggested *νήφειν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ*. The two cases are abstinence and indulgence: *ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀμφότερα, ὥστ' ἐξαρκέσει αὐτῷ ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῶμεν* Pl. *Smp.* 176c.

16. 6 ἄρτιον καὶ ἀήττητον: *ἄρτιον* is equivalent to *τέλειος* p. **12.** 23: *ἵνα ἄρτιος ᾖ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος* 2 *Tim.* iii. 17.

ἀήττητον, τίς οὖν ὁ ἀήττητος; ὃν οὐκ ἐξίστησιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων . . . οὗτός μοί ἐστιν ὁ ἀνίκητος ἀθλητής Epict. i. 18. 21–3.

16. 7 τὴν Μαξίμου: the MS. reading *τῇ* has naturally been questioned. By reading *τήν*, the sense is 'like the *ψυχή* of Maximus, invincible in his sicknesses'; cf. *τὸ εὔθυμον ἐν ταῖς νόσοις*, of Maximus, p. **10.** 14–15.

Ch. 17: 16. 9 ἀδελφήν: his only sister, Annia Cornificia Faustina, wife of Ummidius Quadratus. She is believed to have died before M.'s accession; M. mentions her serious illness, Fronto, *Ep.*, p. 41. 'Patrimonium paternum sorori totum concessit' *H.A.* iv. 4. 7; 'bonorum maternorum partem Ummidio Quadrato, sororis filio, quia illa iam mortua erat, tradidit' id. 7. 4.

16. 10 ἅπαντα. I have left the generic *ἅπαντα*, and we need not supply *ἀγαθά*, cf. *πρὸς διδασκάλους, πρὸς πατέρας, πρὸς κηδεμόνας, πρὸς πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα* Julian, p. 212b.

16. 11 διάθεσιν, the word which the Stoics preferred to *ἕξις* for *habit* is here used untechnically for *disposition*; so *ἕξις*, in the same sense, p. **224.** 21.

16. 12 εὐποιία, the pred. of *τὸ γενέσθαι*, cf. *εἰ μήτε κακία ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐμή* p. **96.** 6, where some critics have, as here, substituted the dative.

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16. 13 **ἐλέγξειν**, *expose*, after scrutiny: *ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα* Pl. *Tht.* 171d; *εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθήσεται . . . ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών* X. *Mem.* i. 7. 2; cf. *Od.* xxi. 424.

§ 2: 16. 14 **τῇ παλλακῇ**, *mistress* gives a wrong sense, and *concubine* will not do in English. She was, no doubt, a lady with whom Annius Verus, after his wife's death, contracted *concubinatus*. Pius made a similar union after the elder Faustina's death, *C.I.L.* vi. 8972. This is not mentioned in the biographer, so that I suspect that *H.A.* iv. 29. 10 is a mistake and should apply to the second marriage of Pius since the two first Antonini are so often confused in later writers.

16. 14–15 **τὴν ὥραν διασῶσαι**, the bloom of youth for the flower of chastity, 'purpureus pudor et sine labe iuventus': *ὅσοι δ' ἂν τὴν αὑτῶν ὥραν διαφυλάξωσι, ἄβατον τοῖς πονηροῖς ὥσπερ ἱερὸν ποιήσαντες* Isoc. x. 58; *εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὥραν ἄνθος ἀρετῆς* Chrysippus, D.L. vii. 130. Cf. Hippolytus' opening speech and Milton, *Epit. Dam.* 212, English Commentary, p. 276.

16. 15 **τὸ μὴ πρὸ ὥρας ἀνδρωθῆναι.** It is a surprise to find *ὥρα* used in a different sense, so immediately. Cf. *τὴν ἐμὴν ὥραν γάμου* Eur. *Heracl.* 579; *ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος* Pl. *Lg.* 669d. Tac. says of the Germans: 'sera iuvenum venus, eoque inexhausta pubertas' *Germ.* 20. M. did not marry until his 25th year, A.D. 146.

16. 15–16 **ἐπιλαβεῖν τοῦ χρόνου**, perhaps read *⟨τι⟩ τοῦ χρόνου*, cf. *τι ἔτι τούτου* p. 18, line 6. For the verb, cf. *ἐνίαι δ' ἐπιλαμβάνουσι καὶ τοῦ ἑνδεκάτου μηνός*, some delay beyond the normal ten lunar months and *take a part* of the eleventh Arist. *H.A.* 584ª37; *ἐπιλαβόντα τῆς ἀρχῆς*, taking *more* of the magistracy, Paus. ix. 14. 5; *διὰ τὸ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιλαμβάνειν τι*, steal part of the day for sleep, Alex. Aphr. *Apor.*, p. 34.

§ 3: 16. 16 **τὸ ἄρχοντι καὶ πατρὶ ὑποταχθῆναι**, 10 July A.D. 138–7 March 161, 'per viginti et tres annos in domo patris versatus' *H.A.* iv. 7. 2; 'pro instituto patris volens agere, dicere, cogitare' id. 5. 8; 'erat in summis obsequiis patris' id. 6. 8.

Fronto says: 'nulla umquam te neque vigiliae neque cibi neque itineris tua tempora habuisse, sed patris temporibus servisse' *Ep.*, p. 103.

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16. 17 τὸν τῦφον: 'adoptatus in aulicam domum . . . erat haut secus rei suae quam in privata domo parcus ac diligens' *H.A.* iv. 5. 7; 'aulico fastigio renitentem' id. 6. 3. For *τῦφος*, see p. **26.** 25 n.

16. 18 δορυφορήσεων χρῄζειν, a military guard and escort, for show and for protection. That Pius had at least a cohort on duty at Lorium follows from the account of his death: 'signum tum tribuno Aequanimitatis dedit' *H.A.* iii. 12. 6.

16. 18–19 ἐσθήτων σημειωδῶν, *σημεῖον*, *clavus*, a (purple) stripe on the tunic: *θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον· ἰδοὺ στενόσημος. θὲς καὶ ταύτην. ἰδοὺ ἱμάτιον μόνον* Epict. i. 24. 12. The *clavi* are called 'coccineae lineae', cf. *ἐν κοκκίνοις περιπατοῦντα* Epict. iii. 22. 10; *οὐ δεῖ φορεῖν κόκκινα* iv. 11. 34:

> quem coccina laena
> vitari iubet et comitum longissimus ordo,
> multum praeterea flammarum et aenea lampas Juv. iii. 283.

'quid confert purpura maior | optandum?' id. i. 106; 'quemadmodum clavi aurei et purpurae pars sunt vestimentorum' *Dig.* xxxiv. ii. 19. 5.

16. 19 λαμπάδων καὶ ἀνδριάντων, candelabra and statues holding lamps were familiar in the palaces at Rome:

> si non aurea sunt iuvenum simulacra per aedes
> lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris,
> lumina nocturnis epulis ut suppeditentur Lucr. ii. 24; cf. v. 295.

Some have seen in *λαμπάδων* a reference to the torch carried in front of the Emperor: 'servus praelucens' Suet. *Aug.* 29; *τῷ φωτὶ τῷ προηγουμένῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐχρήσατο* Dio Cass. lxxi. 35. 5, but, if M. had meant this, he would have used the singular.

16. 19–20 ⟨καὶ⟩ τοιῶνδέ τινων [καὶ] τοῦ ὁμοίου κόμπου. I have thought it the simplest remedy to suppose that *καὶ* has been misplaced, and that the meaning is 'such symbols of a like parade'; this would include the torch mentioned in the last note.

§ 4: 16. 22–3 τὸ ἀδελφοῦ τοιούτου τυχεῖν: L. Aurelius Verus, adopted by Pius at Hadrian's desire, son of L. Ceionius Commodus, who became L. Aelius Caesar by Hadrian's adoption. (For the adoption of Lucius the elder and his son into the

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imperial family, see *Classical Quarterly*, vol. ii, p. 1, 1908.) He is omitted in § 1, where M. is speaking of blood-relations.

Some have thought that Lucius cannot be meant, as the biographer gives him such an odious character, *H.A.* v. 2. 9; 4. 4–6. But there is no reason why M. should not recall, where he is remembering good, some profit that he gained from his colleague, at least when they were young men together. Some good there is even in the biography: 'amavit Antoninus Pius simplicitatem ingenii puritatemque vivendi, hortatusque est, ut imitaretur, et fratrem (sc. M.)' v. 3. 7; 'erat morum simplicium et qui adumbrare nihil posset' id. 1. 5; 'graviter se et ad Marci mores egit' id. 4. 3.

We get a favourable picture of him from his correspondence with Fronto, *Ep.* pp. 119–38. Galen mentions that he ridiculed M.'s crop-headed *entourage*, and says, rather markedly, that the latter was 'good and kind' xiv. 650; he does not, however, say that L. was a dissolute man, even where he records his sudden death and apotheosis xix. 18.

16. 23–4 πρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ἐμαυτοῦ: this may mean to care for my *health*, the sense of *ἐπιμελητικόν* p. **14.** 3, but, with *διὰ ἤθους ἐπεγεῖραί με* just preceding, he should mean *θεραπεία τοῦ ἤθους* p. **4.** 24.

16. 24 τιμῇ καὶ στοργῇ: 'habuit hanc reverentiam Marci Verus ut nomina (his eastern titles) . . . cum fratre communicaret' *H.A.* v. 8. 5. L. tells Fronto in a letter that he has learned from him: 'prius multo simplicitatem verumque amorem quam loquendi polite disciplinam' *Ep.* p. 130.

16. 25 ἀφυῆ . . . μηδὲ κατὰ τὸ σωμάτιον διάστροφα, happiness of issue, *εὐτεκνία*, includes *νεότης ἀγαθὴ κατ' ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἷον μέγεθος, κάλλος, ἰσχύν . . . ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία* Arist. *Rh.* 1361^{a}2.

16. 26 προκόψαι ἐν ῥητορικῇ: *προκόψαι*, this Stoic term for moral progress, is not elsewhere employed by M. For his own conversion from rhetoric and poetry to the practice of moral reform see *εἰς ζῆλον σοφιστικόν* p. **4.** 24.

16. 28 εὐόδως προιόντα, a technical Stoic term, used here in its primary sense, *ire recta via*, Sen. *Ep.* 94. 54, *προιοῦσα εὐοδεῖ* p. **104.** 20.

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§ 5: 16. 28–9 **τοὺς τροφέας ἐν ἀξιώματι καταστῆσαι.** *ἀξίωμα*, like honos, means *office*, *ἀξ. βουλευτικόν* Plu. *Cic.* 17; *τροφέας*, *magistros meos*: 'tantum autem honoris magistris suis detulit, ut imagines eorum aureas in lararío haberet ac sepulchra eorum aditu, hostiis, floribus semper honoraret' *H.A.* iv. 3. 5; cf. 2. 2.

Herodes Atticus was cons. ord., A.D. 143. Fronto ('cui et statuam in senatu petit' *H.A.* iv. 2. 5) was cons. suff., 1 July, A.D. 143; Rusticus was cons. ii, A.D. 162, and praef. Urbi shortly afterwards.

§ 6: 18. 2–3 **τὸ φανταsθῆναι . . . ἐναργῶς**: M. lays great stress on the need for vivid presentation of precepts and doctrines to the mind, see vii. 2.

ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βίος is what the Stoics called *τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*.

18. 4 **ταῖς ἐκεῖθεν διαδόσεσι**, 'transmission of influences from the gods' or 'from the other world', a sense in which M. uses *ἐκεῖθεν*, where other writers say *ἄνωθεν*, cf. p. **22.** 6.

διάδοσις was orig. a synonym for *ἀνάδοσις* (pp. **68.** 1; **90.** 19), in the sense of distribution and presentation of nutriment to the bodily parts, *ἡ τῆς τροφῆς* δ. Arist. *Inc. An.* 705ª32. Erasistratus preferred δ., in this sense, to *ἀνάδοσις* Galen, ii. 104. Epicurus employs δ. for diffusion of a momentum D.L. x. 105; Epict. says: *εἰ μηδεμία* δ. *εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ἐξ αὐτῶν (τῶν θεῶν)* i. 12. 6; so, *ταῖς ἀρίσταις διαδόσεσι κινεῖσθαι*, of virtuous men, Phld. *De piet.* 68. Cf. similar developments in sense of *permanare* Cic. *N.D.* ii. 137; i. 3, *Pro Cluent.* 173.

συλλήψεσι, 'assistance', *τοῖς δεομένοις τῶν φίλων αἱ συλλήψεις* Plu. *Praec. ger. reip.* 808f; similarly the verb: *εἰς τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ συλλαμβάνουσιν* p. **186.** 22–3.

18. 5 **ἐπιπνοίαις**, 'inspiration': *πρὶν ἂν . . . ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ* Pl. *R.* 499c, *οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιπνοίας θεῶν Lg.* 811c; 'nemo . . . vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino umquam fuit' Cic. *N.D.* ii. 167; '(Sibylla) adflata est numine quando | iam propiore dei' Virg. *Aen.* vi. 50.

18. 5–6 **ἀπολείπεσθαι δέ τι ἔτι**, I have printed A's text, only taking *ἔτι* from P for *ἐπὶ*.

18. 7 **ὑπομνήσεις καὶ μονονουχὶ διδασκαλίας**, *promptings*, see

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παρυπομνήσεως p. 8. 16 n. where Plu. is cited as coupling *ὑπόμνησις* and *παιδαγωγία*, ii. 980c. These reminders might be by dreams, *τὸ δι' ὀνειράτων βοηθήματα δοθῆναι* p. 18. 18, cf. 'monitu Serapidis dei' Tac. *H.* iv. 81, a kind of language frequent in inscriptions: *Διονύσου κατὰ πρόσταγμα C.I.G.* 5959; 'Dianae sanctae ex monitu' *C.I.L.* vi. 134; 'Ex praescripto Asclepii' id. iii. 1614.

§7: **18. 7–8 τὸ ἀντισχεῖν μοι τὸ σῶμα.** The accounts of M.'s health differ; the general impression left by the literary sources, combined with his marble effigy as a boy, is that he was delicate. The physical discipline which he underwent may or may not have benefited him, and the fact that he hunted and played ball is no evidence of vigorous health. Nor is it certain that his studies, as a young man, injured his body. In later years he felt the cold of the NE. frontier very much, Dio Cass. lxxi. 6. 3. As a youth, he had curtailed the hours of sleep, as an older man he got drowsy at his daily work, until he omitted the opiate from his daily dose of *θηριακὸν φάρμακον* with honey, Galen xiv. 3–5, Dio Cass. l.c. 4; but Galen says distinctly that he managed his regimen sensibly and with success xiv. 216–17. If Julian has preserved the tradition, he was worn out towards the end: *σεμνὸς ἄγαν, ὑπὸ τῶν πόνων ἔχων τά τε ὄμματα καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ὑπό τι συνεσταλμένον . . . καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνδείας τῶν τροφῶν ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ σῶμα διαυγέστατον καὶ διαφανέστατον* p. 317c.

18. 8–9 τὸ μήτε Βενεδίκτης ἄψασθαι μήτε Θεοδότου. This and what he says about his bad temper with Rusticus are almost the only touches of confession in the *Meditations*. The two names, presumably of slaves, at first suggest that they were Christians, but at this date the Christians bore, normally, ordinary pagan names (Harnack, *Mission, &c.*, p. 422).

Θεόδοτος was an Attic name, Pl. *Ap.* 33e; *Θεοδότη* X. *Mem.* iii. 11. 1.

18. 11–12 νέαν τελευτᾶν τὴν τεκοῦσαν. Domitia Lucilla was still living A.D. 155, *C.I.L.* xv. 1090. If she was 16 when M. was born, she at least lived to be 50, so that *νέαν* is a problem. M. may have chosen *τεκοῦσαν* to emphasize the natural bond (cf. p. 4. 2), but the word is common in the New Comedy for mother. His mother's name recurs frequently in the correspondence;

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'deinde cum matercula mea supra torum sedente multum garrivi' Fronto *Ep.* p. 70, the text for an elegant drawing by Arthur Hughes.

§ 8: **18. 14 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μοι χρήματα**: as the *ὅτι* marks a quotation, we expect *σοι*: 'you haven't the means', said by his *dispensator* or his mother.

18. 16 πειθήνιον. M. writes of Faustina, when she had a fever: 'sed deis iuvantibus aequiorem animum mihi facit ipsa, quod se tam obtemperanter nobis accommodat' Front. *Ep.* p. 80.

18. 17 φιλόστοργον, of natural human affection, to himself, to her children (she was the mother of thirteen) and to her father. After Faustina, her mother, was dead, Pius writes: 'nam ita se res habet: mallem mehercule Gyaris cum illa quam sine illa in Palatio vivere' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 164. She went to the front with M., and was styled *mater castrorum.*

ἀφελῆ, *simple, artless*: 'abest enim frater *ἀφελέστατος* et amantissimus' Cic. *Att.* i. 18. 1; *ἀφελὴς ὁ παῖς ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοϊκός* Lucian, *Dial. D.* iv. 3. Her features and her simple *coiffure* are familiar from her coins and busts. See *Hair-dressing of Roman Ladies as illustrated on coins*, Lady Evans, *Numismatic Chronicle*, Fourth Series, vol. vi.

18. 17–18 τροφέων εἰς τὰ παιδία, like *τροφέας* p. **16.** 28 of their *educatores et magistri.* We know the names of those of Commodus: Peitholaus, his *τροφεύς*, Galen xiv. 650; Onesicrates and Capella Antistius, his Greek and Latin *litteratores*; Ateius Sanctus, his rhetoric master, *H.A.* vii. 1. 6. 'Commodum M. et suis praeceptis et magnorum atque optimorum virorum erudire conatus est' ib. 1. 5; *τὸν υἱὸν καὶ θρέψας καὶ παιδεύσας ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν ἄριστα, πλεῖστον . . . διήμαρτε* Dio Cass. lxxi. 36. 4.

§ 9: **18. 18 τὸ δι' ὀνειράτων βοηθήματα**, 'homines qui somniis eum multa praedixisse . . . vera concinuerunt' *H.A.* iv. 18. 7. Artemid. uses *ὄνειρος* of a true, *ἐνύπνιον* of a false dream. The belief in the divine origin and the importance of dreams, *ὅναρ ἐκ Διός ἐστι*, was almost universal in antiquity, Cic. *Div.* i. 84. Socrates credited this source of inspiration, Pl. *Ap.* 33c; *Cri.* 44a; *Phd.* 60e. Arist. examines the question in the *Parva Naturalia.* Cic. says that Dicaearchus and Cratippus, *Div.* i. 53

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ii. 100, and Chrysippus, ib. i. 39–59, allowed divination by dreams. Guidance in sickness, vouchsafed by Aesculapius to sleepers near the shrine, was gained by suppliants at Epidaurus. The belief was related to a very primitive theory that the *ψυχή* was released in slumber from the body's bonds, and might wander at liberty.

18. 19–20 **τὸ τοῦ ἐν Καιήτῃ "ὥσπερ χρήσῃ".** I have followed Dr. Rendall in adopting Lofft's correction, though Xyl.'s *τοῦτο ἐν K.* may be correct. The words *ὥσπερ χρήσῃ* will be the oracular response of Apollo's priest at Caieta. The verb is used similarly: *χρήσῃ γὰρ καλῶς* p. **138.** 29.

18. 20 ⟨**τὸ**⟩ **ὅπως ἐπεθύμησα,** resuming the construction of *τὸ ὁσάκις ἐβουλήθην,* and to be interpreted 'in whatever way I aspired to philosophy'.

The *τε* in both P and A perhaps represents a correction: *ὁπότε.*

18. 21 **μηδὲ ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ τοῦ συγγραφάς.** I suppose that the proximity of *συλλογισμούς* caused *συγγραφάς* to be changed to *συγγραφεῖς* with a consequent change of *τοῦ* to *τούς.* Sch. too supposed that a subject of study was mentioned, suggesting *ἐπὶ τοῦ γρίφους. ἀποκαθίσαι* is equivalent to *desidere*: 'ibi homines adolescentulos dies totos desidere' Suet. *De rhet.* 1, from an edict of the censor.

There may be a verb, say *συντιθέναι,* missing, yet *ἀναλύειν* might be used for the analysis of *orationes,* a training which M. practised under Fronto in respect of the speeches of Cato and Gracchus, Fronto, *Ep.* pp. 56, 99, 223. Ael. Arist. says of Alex. Cotiaensis *μὴ εἰς συγγραφάς τε καὶ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα ἀναχωρῆσαι,* meaning by *συγγραφάς* orations, *Or.* xxxii. 10, and Julian has: *ἐφ' ἕτερον παιδείας εἶδος καὶ λόγων ξυγγραφὴν οὐ δήμῳ κεχαρισμένην* p. 2.

18. 21–2 **συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν:** Epict. continually rebukes his listeners for preferring logical adroitness to real advance in conduct: *τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἀναλῦσαι καὶ τὸν ὑποθετιμὸν* (conditional argument) *ἐφοδεῦσαι* iv. 4. 14.

18. 22 **περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ καταγίνεσθαι:** *περὶ τὸν τελευταῖον κατεγίνου τόπον, τὸν τῆς ἀμεταπτωσίας* Epict. iii. 26. 14.

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M. is thinking of *τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς*, the supposed diversion of Soc.'s scholars in Aristoph. *Nubes*, cf. Pl. *Ap.* 19c, 23d, study which M. himself depreciates in the words: *τὰ νέρθεν γᾶς ἐρευνῶντος* p. **28.** 11–2. The Stoic Aristo, whom he studied under Rusticus, Fronto, *Ep.* 75–6, taught: *ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τὰ φυσικά· ἀδύνατα γὰρ ἐγνῶσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 8.

18. 23 θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται. I have followed Leop. in printing this as though it were a verse fragment, but M. may have fallen into the rhythm by inadvertence. The close resembles the ending of some of Plu.'s short essays, e.g. *ἀλλὰ σωφροσύνης γε, κἂν μόνος δειπνῇ, δεῖται, κἂν εὐωχίας De cupid. divit.* 528b.

Difficulty has been felt about this reference to *τύχη*, as though it were an inconsistency in a Stoic. M. is, however, speaking in accordance with common usage, *καλῶς τὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἔχει* Eur. *Ph.* 1202; *θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρός* Pl. *Lg.* 709b; *θεός . . . μετ' ἀγαθῆς τύχης* ib. 732d. So *τύχη* is often called *divine*, *ἀγαθῇ μοίρᾳ καὶ θείᾳ τινι τύχῃ* Pl. *Ep.* 337e; and Dio Chrys., a Stoic, has: *οὐκ ἄνευ θείας τύχης οὐδ' ἄνευ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιπνοίας* liii. 6, p. 277. Similarly M. himself says *τὰ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ἄνευ φύσεως* p. **22.** 4.

BOOK II

This Book is marked off from its neighbours by the inscriptions at the beginning and the end, is composed in a manner which distinguishes it from the rest of the *Meditations*, and, if read attentively, will be seen to be a connected series of reflections, with a recurrence of words and terms and of slightly varied expressions for thoughts which, though naturally repeated elsewhere, appear to have a special bearing on the topics uppermost at the moment in the writer's mind. What these topics are may be seen from xii. 26, which is a summary of the subject-matter more fully presented here.

Ch. 2 explains that the particle of the divine mind of Ch. 1 manifests itself in the temporal body as *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*. Ch. 3 takes up *τὸ εἱμαρμένον* of Ch. 2 and explains the Stoic doctrine of necessity. Ch. 4 resumes *τοῖς θεοῖς*, with which Ch. 3 closed, by

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the words *παρὰ τῶν θεῶν*, and Ch. 5, which is continuous with Ch. 4, ends with a sentence beginning: *οἱ θεοί*.

Chs. 6 and 8 form a unity, interrupted by Ch. 7, which appears to be related to Ch. 9. Ch. 9 ends with *πράσσειν τε ἀεὶ καὶ λέγειν*, words resumed by *ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν* in the first sentence of Ch. 11.

Ch. 10 in its present position interrupts the sequence, and is hardly to be connected with the rest of the Book. It might be justified as a note on the Peripatetic view of the relation of Anger to Appetite, prompted by the mention of anger in Ch. 1 and the contrast in Ch. 16 of sins of anger with sins of appetite.

Ch. 12 gives M.'s view of the world of generation and passing away, with special reference to death, as a moment in the whole process. It ends by a return to the subject of the connexion of the Divinity in man with God, Chs. 1 and 4, a subject continued by Ch. 13. Ch. 14 takes up what was said in Ch. 12 from a new angle, introducing two favourite paradoxes. Ch. 15 briefly states a favourite maxim, which reappears in this form in xii. 22, but is connected here with the thoughts of Ch. 14.

Ch. 16 summarizes much that is in the early chapters, especially in Chs. 5 and 6, and its opening words, *ὑβρίζει ἑαυτήν* seem intended to recall Ch. 6.

Ch. 17 is an epilogue, in which M.'s main attitude to life and death, to Nature and to human dispensation, is briefly outlined.

Instances of the recurrence of words and terms and of slightly varied expressions are:

i. The origin of man's mind and its relation to the Universe: *νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας μέτοχος* p. **20.** 6; *τίνος διοικοῦντος τὸν κόσμον ἀπόρροια* p. **22.** 15; *τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ, οὗ μέρος εἶ* p. **22.** 6–7; *τίνος κ. μέρος εἶ* p. **22.** 15; *ὁποῖόν τι μέρος ὁποίου τοῦ ὅλου* p. **24.** 16; *πῶς ἅπτεται θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος καὶ κατὰ τί ἑαυτοῦ μέρος* p. **28.** 8–9.

ii. Self-reverence and its opposite: *τιμῆσαι, αἰδεῖσθαι* p. **24.** 3–5; *ὑβρίζεις ἑαυτήν* pp. **24.** 3; **30.** 19; **32.** 5; *τὸν δαίμονα καθαρόν* p. **28.** 15; *τὸν δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον* p. **32.** 18.

iii. The identity of Fate and Providence: *εἱμαρμένον* p. **22.** 3; *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* p. **22.** 6; *συμμεμοιραμένα* p. **22.** 25; *ἀπόμοιρα* p. **20.** 6; *εὐμοιρία* p. **24.** 6; *ἀπονεμόμενα* p. **32.** 21.

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iv. Resignation to God's will:
δυσχερâναι p. **22.** 3; δυσαρέστησις p. **22.** 24; ἵλεως pp. **22.** 11, **32.** 23; δεχόμενος p. **32.** 21.

v. Self-determination to an end contrasted with aimlessness:
σκοπός pp. **24.** 10, **32.** 8; πάντα κύκλῳ ἐκπεριερχόμενος p. **28.** 11; εἰκαιότης and its cognates: pp. **22.** 23, **28.** 15, **32.** 8, 19.

It will be observed how limited the compass of ideas is in this Book and generally in Book III, compared with Books IV and V, and that the doctrine of the δαίμων differentiates Books II, III, and perhaps XII from the remaining Books.

Ch. 1. Τὰ ἐν Κουάδοις πρὸς τῷ Γρανούᾳ α'. This title is a puzzle, see Introd. pp. lxx, lxxiii. I have followed Gat. in regarding it as the sub-title of Book II, leaving the figure α' standing, though it should perhaps be altered to β'.

πρὸς τῷ Γρανούᾳ refers to the Gran, a northern tributary of the Danube, which falls into that river a little west of its big southern bend to Buda-Pest. The Gran was one of the chief rivers in the south of ancient Bohemia, then occupied by the Quadi. Unfortunately we cannot fix the date of the campaign in question, but it is natural to think of the celebrated battle with which the miracle of the Thundering Legion is associated in Christian legend. On one of the scenic tablets of M.'s column the rain is pictured falling from the arms and hair of a rude figure, which seems to represent Jupiter Pluvius (see p. **114.** 16)[1].

Τὰ ἐν Κουάδοις in form is like Τῶν ἐν Κιλικίᾳ, the title to Dio Chrys. *Or.* lxxx.

20. 1 **Ἔωθεν.** *E*, the capital letter in A, looks very like *Ει*, which is some evidence that P cod. was a MS. of the same period as A, since Xyl. read the word in that cod. as εἴωθεν, *solebat*. See Ἔθισον p. **212.** 20, Ἔθιζε p. **240.** 1; and Hobein on ἔχε, *Max. Tyr.* p. 129, app. crit. For the morning meditation, cf. εὐθὺς ἐξ ὕπνου p. **200.** 14; ὄρθρου p. **74.** 1, and εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς ἔωθεν ἐνθυμοῦ Epict. iv. 6. 34.

προλέγειν ἑαυτῷ: the imperatival infinitive is a favourite usage

[1] The Chronology of the Danubian wars is discussed by Prof. C. H. Dodd in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, Fourth Series, vol. xiii, pp. 162–99, 276–321.

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with M., and the copyists, not understanding it, have occasionally inserted δεῖ, see p. **24.** 15 n.

The reflexive ἑαυτῷ for the second person is fairly frequent; the MSS. vary in their evidence, and we are not able to fix M.'s usage, which may have been partly directed by a sense of euphony. The principal passages concerned are enumerated in the *Index verborum*, under ἑαυτοῦ, see also σχολὴν ἑαυτῷ p. **22.** 20–1 n.

20. 1 **συντεύξομαι**: the form of the sentence recalls: 'placidus itaque sapiens et aequus erroribus, non hostis, sed corrector peccantium, hoc cotidie procedit animo: multi mihi occurrent vino dediti, multi libidinosi, multi ingrati. . . . Omnia ista tam propitius adspiciet quam aegros suos medicus' Sen. *De Ira*, ii. 10. 7.

M. seems to have started the Book with the problem of the right remedy against anger and hatred, a favourite subject in contemporary moralists, and then to have been led off to a consideration of the divine element in man, the claim to which forbids one to meet uncharitableness except by charity. The subject of anger is treated in more detail in ix. 42 and xi. 18; it was handled by Plu. in two tracts, by Seneca in his *De Ira*, by Epict. in two chapters, i. 18 and i. 28, by Maximus Tyrius, *Or.* xii, and there are considerable fragments of an Epicurean treatise, by Philodemus, *De Ira*; cf. p. **24.** 19 sq.

περιέργῳ. This word, like *πολυπράγμων* p. **40.** 14, meant, at this date, a worse quality than mere *inquisitiveness*. Theophr. has drawn a fussy, tiresome busybody, *Charact.* 13, a fool rather than a knave. Epict., however, says that no one would own to being *φθονερὸς ἢ περίεργος*, ii. 21. 3. Socr., he says, was accused of *περιεργία*, which means being a bad citizen, kinsman, or neighbour, iii. 1. 21. Socrates, like the Cynic, was not *περίεργος* or *πολυπράγμων*, iii. 22. 97.

Plu. has an essay, *De curiositate*, where he says: *κακῶν οὖν ἱστορίας ὁ πολυπράγμων ὀρεγόμενος, ἐπιχαιρεκακίας συνέχεται πάθει, φθόνου καὶ βασκανίας ἀδελφῷ* 518c. Galen couples *περιεργία* with vile faults: *λιχνείας καὶ λαγνείας, οἰνοφλυγίας τε καὶ περιεργίας καὶ φθόνου καθαρεύειν* v. 31. It is much the same in N.T.: *ἀργαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ φλύαροι καὶ περίεργοι* 1 *Tim.* 5. 13;

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φονεύς, ἢ κλέπτης, ἢ κακοποιός, ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος 1 Pet., 4. 15.

The informer and *agent provocateur* belonged to this class of men: *τὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν γένος ἐκ τῆς τῶν πολυπραγμόνων φρατρίας καὶ ἑστίας ἐστίν* Plu. o.c. 523a.

ἀχαρίστῳ, coupled with *ἀπίστῳ* p. **190.** 8, where M. says that to do a kindness is its own reward, we must not look for gratitude besides.

20. 2 **ὑβριστῇ**: see *ὑβρίζεις* p. **24.** 3.

δολερῷ, βασκάνῳ: the two go closely together, cf. *βασκανία καὶ ὑπόκρισις* p. **8.** 17–18.

ἀκοινωνήτῳ: summing up, as the *genus* of which the preceding are *species*. Cas. remarks that the word corresponds with our 'uncharitable'. The bachelor is *ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀκοινώνητος* Pl. *Lg.* 774a. The word was familiar at Rome in the sense *selfish* or *egotistical*, Cic. *Att.* vi. 1. 7, 3. 7; Plin. *Ep.* iii. 9. 8; Juv. vii. 218. Lucian puts into Diogenes the Cynic's mouth: *μόνος καὶ ἀκοινώνητος εἶναι θέλε Vit. Auct.* 10.

20. 3 **παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν**: the famous paradox that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance, which the Stoics adopted from Socr., Pl. *Prt.* 345d, *Lg.* 860d, *De Iusto*, 374a sq. Arist. discusses it *E.N.* iii. 5.

M. says: *τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ τοῦ συμφύλου καὶ συγγενοῦς καὶ κοινωνοῦ, ἀγνοοῦντος μέντοι ὅ τι αὐτῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν* p. **46.** 10; cf. *τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν με; ἡ ἄγνοια* Epict. i. 26. 6; 'peccantis vero quid habet cur oderit, cum error illos in eiusmodi delicta conpellat?' Sen. *De Ira*, i. 14. 2. Even some Christian writers say the same: 'mali sunt ignoratione recti ac boni' Lact. *Inst.* v. 8.

20. 4 **τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ**: *φύσις* is not used paraphrastically here; M. means 'the *essential* nature of goodness', as *τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντος φύσιν*, line 5, shows.

20. 4–5 **καλόν . . . αἰσχρόν,** not 'fair and foul', nor even 'noble and ignoble', but 'right and wrong': *λέγουσι δὲ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο ἀρετήν* D.L. vii. 101.

Cicero translates *καλόν* by *honestum*: 'honestum id intelligimus

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quod tale est ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis praemiis fructibusve per se ipsum possit iure laudari' *Fin.* ii. 45; 'doctores sapientiae secutus est, qui sola bona quae honesta, mala tantum quae turpia, potentiam, nobilitatem ceteraque extra animum neque bonis neque malis adnumerant', of Helvidius Priscus, Tac. *Hist.* iv. 5; 'ergo hoc unum (sc. honestum) est bonum hominis, quod qui habet, etiamsi aliis destituitur, laudandus est' Sen. *Ep.* 76. 12. Lactantius uses *rectum* for *honestum*, *Inst.* v. 18, cf. 'Aristo Chius praefractus, ferreus, nihil bonum nisi quod rectum et honestum est' Nonius, s.v. *Praefractum*, Cic. *Fragm.* p. 1319, Nobbe.

The consequences of this doctrine are shown in Ch. 11. 4, where we are told why pleasure and pain, glory and dishonour, life and death, wealth and poverty are 'indifferent'.

20. 5 **τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντος φύσιν**, the *real nature* of the offender, i.e. his reason, which makes him akin to me.

ἁμαρτάνειν embraces the two senses *do wrong* and *err*, because wrong originates in ignorance of the true path: *πεπλανημένα καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἀγνοοῦντα* p. **106.** 13.

20. 6 **οὐχὶ αἵματος ἢ σπέρματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ**, my kinsman though not of the same mother's blood nor from the same paternal seed: *οὐ γὰρ αἱματίου ἢ σπερματίου, ἀλλὰ νοῦ κοινωνία* p. **246.** 8–9; *συγγενὲς πᾶν τὸ λογικόν* p. **40.** 5.

Gat. seems mistaken in saying '*τὸ μόνον* hic subintelligendum'; M.'s point is that men are of one *mind*, whatever their descent. Blood we have in common with the animals: *ἡ μὲν οὖν κοινὴ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα δύναμις οὐσίαν ἔλαχεν αἷμα* Ph. i. 207.

σπέρμα is not used by M. except of the semen; Epict. employs it for the divine spark, *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σπερμάτων γέγονεν καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄνωθεν καταβολῆς* i. 13. 3, as Eur. speaks of *σπέρμα τῆς θείας φρενός Heracl.* 540 (where Pearson says there is a reference not only to the divine birth of Hercules but also to the divine origin of the human *νοῦς*, cf. Adam, *Cambridge Praelections*, p. 38).

St. Paul uses 'one blood' of a common descent from Adam: *ἐποίησέ τε ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων. . . . Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν Acts* 17. 26; but of the kinship of believers, St. John says: *οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων, οὐδ' ἐκ θελήματος σαρκός, οὐδ' ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν St. John* 1. 13, the point

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which M. makes here (St. Augustine took *σαρκός* to refer to the mother).

Lactantius says: 'nam si ab uno homine quem Deus finxit omnes orimur, certe consanguinei sumus; et ideo maximum scelus putandum est odisse hominem, vel nocentem . . . item si ab uno Deo inspirati omnes et animati sumus, quid aliud quam fratres sumus? Et quidem coniunctiores quod animis quam quod corporibus; itaque non errat Lucretius cum dicit: Denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi: omnibus ille idem pater est' (Lucr. ii. 991) *Inst.* vi. 10; cf. *τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας* p. **136.** 7.

νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας: the *καί* of equivalence: *ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγέμονα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ* p. **90.** 25. See *ἐκεῖθεν δέ* p. **54.** 4 n.

ἀπόμοιρα, like *ἀπόσπασμα*, means a part broken off from the divine mind. The word occurs, in a cognate sense, in a Christian writer of the fourth century: *πόθεν δὲ αὕτη* (sc. *ἡ ψυχή*) *καὶ εἴτε ἀπόμοιρά τις τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς . . . εἴτε ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἥκει . . .* Anon. *Hermippus*, ii. 3. 33. Pl. uses *θεία μοῖρα* sometimes for the divine element in man: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας Prt.* 322a; so, *κάλλους τ' ἔσπακεν ἀπορροὴν καὶ μοῖραν ἐκ τοῦ φρονοῦντος* Plu. *De Iside*, 382b; *ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τινος* Iambl. *Protrept.* 8, p. 138 K.

M. may, however, wish to suggest by the word what is apportioned, *συμμεμοιραμένα* p. **22.** 25, so he later uses the notion of the *μοῖρα* given by the Birth goddess p. **48.** 23.

20. 7 **μέτοχος**: the word combines the senses 'participating in' and 'sharing in with others'; an example of the former sense is *ἀληθείας μέτοχος* Pl. *Lg.* 730c; of the latter: *μέτοχος ἂν εἴην τοῦ φόνου δράσας τόδε* Eur. *H.F.* 721.

οὔτε βλαβῆναι . . . δύναμαι. M. here is alluding to Socr.'s affirmation (*Test.*). Many contemporary writers refer to it, e.g. Plu. *De Tranqu.* 475e; Epict. i. 29. 18; ii. 2. 15; iii. 23. 21; *Ench.* 53. 4; Max. Tyr. xii. 8; Dio Cass. lxi. 15. 4; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 599; Origen, *Celsus*, viii. 8, p. 748; Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 161 = Plu. *De Amic.* v. 828 Wytt.

The independence of the good man's will against any assault by circumstance is a central principle in M., p. **26.** 11. The

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converse is *βλάπτεται δὲ ὁ ἐπιμένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπάτης καὶ ἀγνοίας* p. **106.** 10–11, cf. p. **174.** 11.

20. 7–8 **αἰσχρῷ . . . περιβαλεῖ,** continuing the statement of moral independence: *οὐδεὶς οὖν κύριος οὔτ' ἀγαθόν μοι περιποιῆσαι οὔτε κακῷ με περιβαλεῖν* Epict. iv. 12. 8; *ἡ τύχη δύναται νόσῳ περιβαλεῖν . . . κακὸν δὲ . . . οὐ δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀγαθόν* Plu. o.c. 475e. Sen. has a whole essay, *De Constantia Sap.*, the text being: 'nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.'

20. 8 **οὔτε ὀργίζεσθαι,** the kernel of the ch., see the opening and closing words: similarly, *αἴσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι,* of *συγγενεῖς,* Pl. *R.* 378c.

20. 9 **γεγόναμεν πρὸς συνεργίαν,** as we might say: 'We are designed to work in company', *τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν γέγονε* p. **50.** 22; *πρὸς κοινωνίαν γεγόναμεν* p. **86.** 27; *ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν γεγόναμεν* p. **166.** 23.

The analogy is between social union and the unity of an organism, so that we are not merely parts, but *members* of society: *οἷόν ἐστιν ἐν ἡνωμένοις τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον ἐν διεστῶσι τὰ λογικά, πρὸς μίαν τινὰ συνεργίαν κατεσκευασμένα* p. **124.** 9–11, cf. p. **218.** 12–13.

Socr. stated the analogy in reference to strife between brothers and it is laboured by Hierocles (temp. Hadriani) Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 663. St. Paul uses it: *ἵνα . . . τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσι τὰ μέλη. καὶ εἴτε πάσχει ἓν μέλος, συμπάσχει πάντα τὰ μέλη* 1 *Cor.* 12. 25; and Sen.: 'ita homines singulis parcent, quia ad coetum geniti sunt' *De Ira,* ii. 31. 7; 'homo in adiutorium mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium' id. i. 5. 2; 'membra sumus corporis magni' *Ep.* 95. 52.

ὡς χεῖρες, perhaps from X. *Mem.* (*Test.*); of the hands, Galen says: *σύμμαχον ἑκατέρᾳ τὴν ἑτέραν ἡ φύσις ἐποίησεν, . . . ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας νενεύκασιν, ἀλλήλων γὰρ ἕνεκα γεγένηνται* iii. 10.

20. 10 **βλέφαρα:** the eyelids protect the eyes almost automatically. Socr. too used them to illustrate Nature's protective purpose, X. *Mem.* i. 4. 6; cf. Arist. *P. An.* 658^{b}17.

20. 11 **ἀντιπράσσειν:** for the association of the word with hatred, cf. *πράττει δ' ἐναντία ὅστις θεοῖς ἀπεχθάνεται* Pl. *Smp.* 193b.

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ἀγανακτεῖν: *δίδασκε καὶ δείκνυε μὴ ἀγανακτῶν* p. **108.** 11.

20. 12 **ἀποστρέφεσθαι**: *ὅταν ἄνθρωπόν τινα ἀποστραφῇ* p. **32.** 4; *μισήσας καὶ ἀποστραφεὶς* (*τὸν πλησίον*) p. **218.** 14–15.

The conclusion of the sorites is left unexpressed, as is often the case in these arguments, it is: 'to have a grievance is to tend to act contrary to Nature's purpose', a purpose which is exhibited in the construction of the parts of an organism. Notice how M. repeats the words in a positive form at the close of this Book: *οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν* p. **32.** 27.

Ch. 2. M., like Pl. and other Greek writers, frequently opposes *ψυχή* to *σῶμα, ἐκ σωματίου εἰμὶ καὶ ψυχῆς* p. **110.** 13. Here he uses for the true self *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, the *reasonable will*, *ἡ διάνοια ἡ κυβερνῶσα*, p. **140.** 22, and by contrast divides the body into *πνευμάτιον*, vital spirit, and *σαρκία*, flesh; cf. *τὸ προαιρετικόν, τὸ πνευμάτιον, τὸ σαρκίδιον* p. **166.** 21.

This distinction of *τὸ ἡγεμ.* from *ψυχή* corresponds to the distinction, in Aristotle for instance, of *νοῦς* from *ψυχή*. Thus, at p. **236.** 15, we have *σωμάτιον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς*, and *νοῦς* is there paraphrased by *νοερὰ δύναμις*, and *τὸ ἡγ.* Occasionally M. speaks of *τὸ ἡγ.* as a *part* of the *ψυχή*, e.g. *τὸ ἡγ. καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς σου μέρος* p. **90.** 16. For the analogous distinctions in regard to the Universe, see p. **22.** 7–8 n.

20. 13 **ὅ τί ποτε τοῦτό εἰμι**: *τίς αὐτός; ὁ λόγος* p. **160.** 8. The passages from Epict. (*Test.*) show that M. is not here indulging in speculation about *personality*; he is content to say that what controls or steers the body is the man himself, *ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔνδον ἐγκεκρυμμένον. . . . ἐκεῖνο, εἰ δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἄνθρωπος* p. **212.** 23–4.

Similarly *αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὡμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι . . . οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχήν* [Pl.] *Alc.* i. 130a–d.

Arist. tends to regard the self as *νοῦς* or *διάνοια*: *τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ E.N.* 1166[a]16, *ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα* ibid. 22 *τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος* id. 1168[b]35, *τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος* (sc. *ἥδιστος*), *εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος* 1178[a]6. Similarly 'mens cuiusque is est quisque' Cic. *Rep.* vi. 26.

The Greeks, like the Hebrews and other peoples, referred to

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the self as 'my soul', and this may have led to the abstract use in philosophers and to the employment of *ψυχή*, in contrast to *σῶμα*, for the real self; but no doubt mystical religions also had their influence on speech.

σαρκία, *flesh* opposed to *νοῦς*, as in *γέροντα τὸν νοῦν, σάρκα δ' ἠβῶσαν φύει* Aesch. *Sept.* 622; *σάρξ* is *ἀρχὴ καὶ σῶμα καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν ζῴων* and the seat of sensibility Arist. *P. An.* 653^{b}21. M. elsewhere uses *σάρξ* or *σαρκίδιον*, the collective sing., for the body as the origin of sensations, esp. of *κίνησεις* which cause *πάθη* and *ὁρμαί*. This is derived from Epicurean usage, where *σάρξ* is employed because *σῶμα* includes the bodily *ψυχή*, *anima*, as in this ch. it includes *πνεῦμα*, D.L. x. 140, 144–5.

The word has a slightly depreciatory sense, perhaps originating in the criticism of athleticism: *πολλὰς ἔχων σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας* Pl. *R.* 556d; *τὸν τῶν σαρκῶν ὄγκον Lg.* 959c; *ὑπερπιάναντές τε καὶ διασάξαντες αἵματί τε καὶ σαρξίν* Galen, i. 32.

Once M. uses *σάρξ* in the sense familiar from the N.T. and early Greek Fathers: *ἡ πρὸς τὴν σάρκα λειτουργία* p. **108.** 13–14 (see Bonhöffer, *Epictet und d. N.T.* p. 160).

πνευμάτιον, i.e. the *connatural spirit*, *σύμφυτον πνευμάτιον* p. **236.** 20, called by some writers *ψυχικὸν πν. animal* spirit.

M. is adopting the language of the pneumatist physicians, of whom the most distinguished, Athenaios and Archigenes, flourished under Trajan. Galen explained nervous phenomena, both sensation and motion, by the *πνεῦμα* which connected the brain through the nerves with the muscles and sense-organs. 'He has never been able to make up his mind whether the pneuma itself passes down into the nerves, or whether some kind of messenger descends from the brain so as to alter the constitution of the nerves, and this alteration is propagated to the parts which are moved. Again, some think, he says, that the action of the brain takes place by force (*δύναμις*) without matter, so that there is a flowing down of force from the brain . . . nervous action consisting in a transmission of molecular change through the nerve (Galen, v. 611, 617)' J. Payne, *Harveian Oration*, 1896, p. 38.

M. evidently refers here to the doctrine of the pneumatists (who were influenced by Stoicism and influenced it) that

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breathing, ἀναπνοή, served to cool the innate warmth of the body and also to feed the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα.

διαπνοή, to which M. recurs at pp. **34.** 6–7, **102.** 20, was distinguished from ἀναπνοή; in animals it supplied and distributed atmospheric air through the arteries, and eliminated impurities through the pores of the skin; see Wellman, *Die pneumatische Schule*, pp. 131 sq.

20. 13–14 **τὸ ἡγεμονικόν**, defined by Zeno as τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέμπεται D.L. vii. 159; thus it stands for the unity of consciousness, including both the rational and non-rational aspects of psychical activity.

M. says: τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἐγεῖρον καὶ τρέπον καὶ ποιοῦν μὲν ἑαυτὸ οἷον ἂν καὶ θέλῃ, ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτῷ φαίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον, οἷον αὐτὸ θέλει p. **98.** 13–15. Cognate expressions are τὸ λογικὸν ἡγ. p. **130.** 6, διάνοια κυβερνῶσα p. **140.** 22, νοῦς δικαικός p. **180.** 4, ὁ νοῦς ἡγεμών p. **48.** 11.

Bonhöffer has shown, by a parallel table, the equivalent expressions both to τὸ ἡγ. and ἡ ψυχή as employed by M.; see his *Epictet. und die Stoa*, p. 110.

The Stoics appear to have derived the term ἡγ. from the language of Pl. and Arist. Thus: δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγ. οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι Pl. *Prt.* 352b; the three types of good things are only truly useful if φρόνησις is our *guide*, *Men.* 88c. Pl. puts the faculty of reason, λόγος, in the head ἵνα, ὅτε ζέσειεν τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ μένος, τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος . . . τὸ βέλτιστον οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμονεῖν ἐᾷ *Ti.* 70b; again, reason, the immortal element in man, he calls θεῖον ἡγεμονοῦν τε ib. 41c, cf. νοῦν δέ γε πάντων τούτων ἡγεμόνα *Lg.* 963a. Arist. has similar phrases: τὸ ἡγούμενον, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον *E.N.* 1113ª6, cf. p. **166.** 21; βέλτιον δὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχικώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἡγ. Arist. ap. Iambl. *Protrept.*, ch. 7, p. 116 K.

Galen, like the Pneumatists, uses τὸ ἡγ., τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν, for the central sensorium of the physiological self, which he located in the *brain*, the Stoics, following Aristotle, in the *heart*: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καρδίαν, ὁ δὲ τὰς μήνιγγας (*membranes*), ὁ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ φησιν ἔχειν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονοῦν Galen, iii. 20;

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τὸ φαντασιούμενον καὶ μεμνημένον καὶ λογιζόμενον, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἡγ. iii. 641; *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγ., ὀργάνου λόγον οἱ μύες ἔχουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ὀστοῦν ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦτον μέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ* iv. 347.

20. 14 λύθρος: *ἐστί* is omitted for literary effect, like *γράσος πᾶν τοῦτο καὶ λύθρον ἐν θυλάκῳ* p. **160. 2**; *τὸ πρᾶγμα τεράστιον, ὁ αὐτὸς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ* Lucian, *D. mar.* iv. 3.

The word is perhaps an archaism, the uncertainty of gender, which we meet in Homer, reappears at p. **160. 2**.

M. wanted a word to express *cruor*:

> nervorum corpora parva
> ossaque et omnino venas partisque cruoris Lucr. i. 862.

The word *λύθρος* suggests defilement: 'my glory smear'd in dust and blood' Shak. *III Henry VI*, 5. 2; cf. *Il.* vi. 267:

> *οὐδέ πῃ ἔστι κελαινεφεῖ Κρονίωνι*
> *αἵματι καὶ λύθρῳ πεπαλαγμένον εὐχετάασθαι.*

Plu. in connexion with the ceremonial impurity of childbed describes an infant as *αἵματι πεφυρμένος καὶ λύθρου περίπλεως De amore prolis*, 496b; Max. Tyr., deriding man for gratifying his appetite by the slaughter of animals, says: *αἵματι καὶ φόνῳ καὶ λύθρῳ παντοδαπῷ γαστριζόμενοι* xxxvi. 2.

20. 15 κροκύφαντος, a *network*, like a lace mantilla, Galen, xiv. 472. Arist. has *κεκρύφαλος* for the net-like structure in the paunch of ruminants *H. An.* 507^{b}6. Similarly T. H. Huxley describes the capillaries as 'a small meshed net-work'.

The scribe of P took the word to be attributive to *πλεγμάτιον*, an interpretation which may be correct. Eustathius gives it as a subst. = *κεκρύφαλος* 1280. 59.

ἐκ νεύρων, φλεβίων, ἀρτηρίων. In view of Galen's distinction of these three kinds of vessels from the muscles and tendons, iii. 45 K., and his terminology *ἢ ἀρτηρίαν ἢ φλέβα ἢ νεῦρον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐκ τούτων πεπλέχθαι* ii. 14; *(ἀγγεῖα) νεῦρα καὶ φλέβας καὶ ἀρτηρίας* xiv. 697, I assume that M. was aware of the existence of the nerves and of the distinction between the venous and the arterial systems. He may well have been present at some of Galen's anatomy demonstrations.

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A triplicity of grouping is common in Greek and Latin, especially in reference to bodily parts:

per venas et viscera mixtim,
per nervos atque ossa Lucr. iii. 566;

so, 'ossa nervique et articuli' Sen. *De Ira*, ii. 1. 2.

20. 16 πνεῦμα . . . ἄνεμος: the second word is selected to suggest transitoriness, and because of its likeness to anima:

et se scire animae naturam sanguinis esse
aut etiam venti Lucr. iii. 43;

'ipse autem animus ab anima dictus est' Cic. *Tusc.* i. 19; 'anima vel animus nomen accepit, quod Graece ventus ἄνεμος dicitur' Lact. *Opif. Dei* 17, where the learned Christian writer corrects Varro for making the same mistake as M., saying 'anima non est aer ore conceptus'. Conway states that animus and ἄνεμος are the same word, Virg. *Aen.* i. 57 n.

20. 17 ἐξεμούμενον καὶ πάλιν ῥοφούμενον: M. limits his description to breathing, the most conspicuous function connected with πνεῦμα, and writes scornfully, cf. 'iam istum spiritum exspuimus interim, dum trahimus' Sen. *De Ira* iii. 43. 4. Elsewhere he is more correct: ἑλκύσαι τὸν ἀέρα καὶ ἀποδοῦναι p. **102.** 16–17.

For ἐξεμούμενον cf. αἷμ' ἐμέων *Il.* xv. 11; 'purpuream (v.l.) vomit ille animam' (blood and spirit mixed) Virg. *Aen.* ix. 349.

M.'s imagery may have been suggested by the *gurgle* of the water-clock: αἰθέρος εὐθὺς ῥεῦμα κατέρχεται οἴδματι θῦον Emped. 100. 24. Arist. employs ῥοφούμενον, an Attic comedy word, of Charybdis, *Mete.* 356^{b}15; again, of the air expelled from the clock: τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν ταύτῃ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐρυγμός *Prob.* 915^{a}7.

20. 18 ἄφες . . . ἀποθνῄσκων. I suppose that these words got into the margin and were marked to follow the second ἡγεμονικόν, and were so displaced.

There is a similar self-hortatory interruption: τὴν δὲ τῶν βιβλίων δίψαν ῥῖψον p. **22.** 10. See the parentheses at pp. **22.** 18, **50.** 12, **142.** 21, **148.** 27.

μηκέτι σπῶ: the expression seems colloquial, 'don't be upset': μηδ' ἂν βραδέως τὸν ἐπίδεσμον ὁ παῖς φέρῃ, κραύγαζε καὶ σπῶ

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Epict. i. 18. 19; *μὴ σπῶ, μηδὲ κατεντείνου* p. **52.** 16, *τί οὖν ἐντείνῃ;* p. **206.** 18.

20. 18 **οὐ δέδοται:** Gat. takes this to be a rhetorical question, 'annon est in tua potestate positum?' He cites '⟨Everything is foreseen and⟩ freewill is given', in illustration, *Pirqe Aboth*, iii. 24.

The phrase, in the Stoics, sometimes means 'you are not permitted' by the precepts of the school: *οἶμοι, μὴ λέγε. καὶ οὐ λέγω ὅτι οὐ δέδοται στενάξαι, ἀλλὰ ἔσωθέν τοι μὴ στενάξῃς* Epict. i. 18. 19; 'ingemescere non numquam viro concessum est' Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 55. This would make good sense here, 'your maxims prevent you'.

I suppose, however, that M. expresses resignation to what God allows, with the further sense, consistent with his habitual modesty, 'you have not the gift' as in: *οὔ τοι, τέκνον ἐμόν, δέδοται πολεμήϊα ἔργα Il.* v. 428; cf. *μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται* p. **206.** 2.

The sense 'permitted by God' is seen in *ὅρμησον, ἐὰν διδῶται* p. **182.** 10; *τὸ παιδίον ζητῶν, ὅτε οὐκέτι δίδοται* p. **232.** 18–19; *οὕτω κἂν τὸν υἱὸν ποθῇς, ὅτε οὐ δέδοταί σοι* Epict. iii. 24. 87; *ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ* Muson. xliii.

In other writers we have, *τοῦτο δέ μοί πως ἐκ θεοῦ δέδοται* Pl. *Ly.* 204c; *ἄν ποτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς εὖ δῷ* Polyb. iv. 21. 11; *αἱ τύχαι, ὅπως ἂν ὁ δαίμων διδῷ, πάρεισι* Plu. *Cleom.* 22; and, in the sense of what is permitted by *law* or *precept*, *δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἄνευ ὀνείδους πράττειν* Pl. *Smp.* 183b; *ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ δίδωσιν ὁ νόμος* Plu. *Pomp.* 14.

ὡς ἤδη: cf. *ὡς ἤδη δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἐξιέναι τοῦ βίου* p. **26.** 5;

ἐκπνέων τ' ἤδη
βέβρωκα, φησίν, καὶ πέπωκα Babrius 60. 2.

22. 1 **γέρων εἶ.** If the Book was composed in A.D. 173, M. would be 52; in Roman eyes a man became senex at 40. Writers in antiquity often take 50 as the period of middle age. Frederick the Great writing in A.D. 1765 (he was born in 1712) speaks of 'ma vieillesse'.

22. 2 **δουλεῦσαι,** contrast *ἐλευθερία* p. **22.** 20. *δουλεία* is constantly used by M. (as, for instance, by Dio Chry.) for enslavement of the will or higher nature, by passion and circumstance, esp. to

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the body as the origin of sense and impulse: *λατρεύων χείρονι* p. **36.** 22; *μήποτε ἡττᾶσθαι μήτε αἰσθητικῆς μήτε ὁρμητικῆς κινήσεως* p. **138.** 15–16; *δοῦλος πέφυκας, οὐ μέτεστί σοι λόγου* p. **232.** 15.

Especially the contrast is brought out in regard to great rulers, *δουλεία πόσων* p. **148.** 2.

22. 2 καθ' ὁρμὴν ἀκοινώνητον, impulse injurious to society, *εἰς τοῦτον πάσας τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς ἀπευθύνων* p. **230.** 13–14. The adj. points back to *ἀκοινωνήτῳ* p. **20.** 2 as *εἱμαρμένον* points forward to *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* p. **22.** 6.

νευροσπαστηθῆναι, 'to be pulled by the *strings* of impulse', a frequent image from marionettes, *σιγιλλάρια νευροσπαστούμενα* p. **122.** 1; *ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσίν τε ἡμᾶς* Pl. *Lg.* 644e.

22. 3 εἱμαρμένον, *Fatum, εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων* Chrysippus, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 79; *infra*, pp. **52.** 4, **114.** 24.

The Stoics were much criticized for their bold identification of Providence with Destiny or Fate. In the next generation Alex. Aphr. devoted a whole essay, *περὶ εἱμαρμένης*, to the subject at issue between the Peripatetics and the Stoics.

δυσχερᾶναι: δυσχ. *τινὶ τῶν γινομένων* p. **32.** 2. The word primarily denotes physical repugnance, for which M. also uses *σικχαίνειν* p. **82.** 1.

ὑπιδέσθαι. Wil.'s correction was suggested perhaps by *διὰ τί ὑπίδηταί τις* p. **32.** 26. Sch. adopts Dr. Rendall's *ἀποδύρεσθαι*, but *ἀποδύρασθαι* to match *δυσχερᾶναι* would be better. Gat. proposed *ὑποδείσασθαι*, Cor. *ὑποδεῖσαι*.

ἀποδ. rather means to lament a *present* situation, *πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι* Pl. *R.* 606a; *γῆρας, πενίαν, τέκνα ἀποδυρόμενον* Herm. ad Pl. *Phdr.* 267c.

Ch. 3: 22. 4 Τὰ τῶν θεῶν, the visible phenomena of the universe, especially the movement of the visible gods, the heavenly luminaries, and the orderly course of the seasons, which depends upon the sun. This is contrasted with the work of Fortune, a name for conditions hidden from man's power of calculation:

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οἱ Στωικοὶ (τὴν τύχην) ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογίσμῳ Aet. *Plac.* i. 29, *Dox. Gr.*, p. 326.

22. 4 προνοίας μεστά: a striking phrase which means that the laws of nature give a copious exhibition of divine thought for the well-being of the animal creation: ἡ δὲ ἄνωθεν σοφία . . . μεστὴ ἐλέους καὶ καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν *St. James*, 3. 17. M. speaks of πρόνοια ἱλάσιμος p. **240.** 23–4.

22. 4 τὰ τῆς τύχης: that Fortune is subordinate to Nature is held by Arist. *Phys.* 198ª10; *Metaph.* 1065ᵇ3.

M. here identifies Fortune with Nature, meaning the secondary causes which are, he says, part of the web of providential dispensation: 'sic nunc Naturam voca, Fatum, Fortunam: omnia eiusdem Dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate' Sen. *Ben.* iv. 8. 3; 'ideo fortiter omne patiendum est, quia non, ut putamus, incidunt cuncta, sed veniunt' id. *Prov.* 5. 7. In Boethius' *Consolatio*, Fortuna is regarded as ultimately subject to Divine rule, whatever strange freaks she may display to man. In the Middle Ages the extracts from Arist.'s *Eth. Eud.*, called *De Bona Fortuna*, was a popular book in connexion with this human problem.

22. 5 συγκλώσεως: this semi-mythical idea often recurs in M., especially in the earlier Books. He uses it to express the web of natural causes, accommodating his language, in Stoic fashion, to ancient belief: ἑκὼν σεαυτὸν τῇ Κλωθοῖ συνεπιδίδου, παρέχων συννῆσαι οἷστισί ποτε πράγμασι βούλεται p. **66.** 5–6; τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ συγκλωθόμενα αὐτῷ p. **48.** 15–16.

Chrysippus, in the passage quoted at εἱμαρμένον p. **22.** 3, says: Μοίρας δὲ καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰς διαμερισμοῦ . . . Κλωθὼ δέ, ὅτι ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην διανέμησις καὶ τὰ γεννώμενα τοῖς κλωθομένοις παραπλησίως διεξάγεται. So, too, Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσά τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἑκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα [Arist.] *De Mundo*, 401ᵇ21.

ἐπιπλοκῆς, ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν αἰτίων συνέκλωθε τὴν σὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐξ ἀιδίου p. **192.** 27; πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπέπλεκται καὶ ἡ σύνδεσις ἱερά p. **122.** 24.

διοικουμένων, dispensed providentially; the word is taken up in τίνος διοικοῦντος τὸν κόσμον l. 15; cf. λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα δ. p. **68.** 20; ἡ τὰ ὅλα δ. φύσις p. **128.** 18.

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The word was employed by Zeno: *εἱμαρμένην τε εἶναι καὶ γένεσιν ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται* Epiph. *Haeres.* i. 5, cf. Aristocles ap. Eus. *Praep. Evang.* xv. p. 816.

The statement of Alex. Aphr. shows how this view of the web of divinely dispensed causes fits in with *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*: *τὸν κόσμον τόνδε . . . ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς, ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀίδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προιοῦσαν . . . τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν αἰεί, κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον . . . τὴν δὲ εἱμαρμένην αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν λόγον, καθ' ὃν διοικεῖται τὸ πᾶν, θεὸν εἶναί φασιν De Fato,* pp. 191–2.

22. 6 **ἐκεῖθεν,** *from the other world,* from the divine reason: *ταῖς ἐκεῖθεν διαδόσεσι* p. **18.** 4; *πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ἔρχεται, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἡγ.* p. **112.** 6; cf. Epict. i. 9. 13 (*Test.*).

Dio Chrys. says *κἂν λόγων τις ἀκούσῃ φρονίμων, ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιπεμφθῆναι . . .* as health-giving water *ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἐκ δαιμονίου τινὸς πηγῆς κάτεισι Or.* xxxii. 15, p. 660, where Arethas has the note cited in *Test.*; cf. *ἄνθρωποι νοερᾶς μετέχουσι δυνάμεως κἀκεῖθεν αὐτὴν σπάσαντες* Sext. Emp. *Math.* ix. 87.

M. uses *ἄνωθεν* in the logical sense of 'from a precedent cause': *ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων αἰτίων* p. **80.** 20, not in the religious sense.

πρόσεστι, suggests *προσέτι,* a favourite way of adding a point, pp. **104.** 13, **144.** 16, **150.** 2, **152.** 23. The sense would then be: 'moreover from Nature flows necessity. . . .'

τὸ ἀναγκαῖον: *οὗτος* (sc. *Χρύσιππος*) *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ εἱμαρμένης βιβλίῳ βουλόμενος δεικνύναι τὸ δὴ πάνθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κατειλῆφθαι* Diogen. ap. Eus. *Praep. Evang.* vi. 261.

22. 7 **ὃ φέρει,** a favourite play on *συμφέρον*: *οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτό τινι ἔφερεν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέφερεν* p. **80.** 16, cf. p. **244.** 15–16.

22. 7–8 **ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις:** this, and the still commoner *ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις* p. **26.** 15, are usual in M. when he refers to Nature as a whole of subordinated parts. Epict. uses *ἡ φύσις, τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα,* once *φύσις ἡ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἡ τῶν ὅλων* i. 20. 16; for Zeno and Chrysippus, see D.L. vii. 150.

M. prefers phrases which appear less pantheistic than *τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα,* thus: *ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις* p. **128.** 18, *τὸ ὅλον ὑπὸ φ. διοικούμενον* p. **194.** 1–2, *ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φ.* p. **170.** 10.

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ἡ φύσις is used differently by rival schools and is therefore sometimes ambiguous, see *κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι* p. **194.** 25; and, further, it was used by the Stoics for growth, the principle of *τὰ φυτά* opp. to *ψυχή*, the principle of animal life. There is often a similar difficulty in the interpretation of Galen.

When M. is distinguishing the causal and material aspects of the universe, he uses *ὁ διοικῶν λόγος* opp. to *ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία* p. **96.** 20–1, p. **124.** 4–5. The ruling reason he calls *τὸ κοινὸν ἡγ.* p. **112.** 6, *τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγ.* p. **146.** 3, *τὸ διοικοῦν* p. **98.** 24, *ὁ τὰ πάντα διοικῶν* p. **204.** 10, *ὁ τὰ ὅλα δ.* p. **114.** 13, *ὁ τοῦ ὅλου λόγος* p. **196.** 4.

The universal is opposed to the individual nature, as *ἡ κοινὴ φ.* to *ἡ ἐμὴ φ.* pp. **90.** 14–15, **120.** 8–9, **248.** 27 or to *ἡ ἰδία φ.* p. **76.** 4.

22. 8 **ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωστικόν**: this law of preservation, as he says in the next sentence, involves the coming to be and passing away of everything individual, *ἵνα ἀεὶ νεαρὸς ᾖ ὁ κόσμος* p. **128.** 20; it works *ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τοῦ τελείου ζῴου*, viz. of the universe, p. **192.** 5; cf. *μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων περαινομένη σωτηρία διὰ τέλους . . . φύλαττει τὸ σύμπαν* [Arist.] *De Mundo*, 397^{b}5; *ἃ δὲ ἡμεῖς καλοῦμεν κακὰ καὶ φθοράς, . . . ταῦτα ὁ τεχνίτης καλεῖ σωτηρίαν τοῦ ὅλου. μέλει γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦ ὅλου, τὸ δὲ μέρος ἀνάγκη κακοῦσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου* Max. Tyr. xli. 4.

22. 9 **τῶν συγκριμάτων**, the bodies compounded of *τὰ στοιχεῖα*, earth, air, fire, and water in the system which M. adopts, *τὰς ποικίλας μορφὰς στοιχείων τε καὶ συγκριμάτων* Ph. ii. 488; Death is *λύσις τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον ζῷον συγκρίνεται* p. **32.** 23–4.

22. 10 **ἀεὶ δόγματα ἔστω.** In the textual uncertainty I have followed PC, with some doubt.

The word *δόγμα* in the sense of a *doctrine* or a judgement of reason, occurs in *ἐμμεῖναι τούτῳ τῷ δόγματι* Pl. *Lg.* 875b, where Ritter remarks that Pl. anticipates a Stoic formula, *Platos Gesetze*, p. 290. M. also employs *κρῖμα* p. **50.** 22.

τῶν βιβλίων δίψαν: *ἀναγινώσκειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν* p. **148.** 27. Epict. is fond of contrasting book learning and logical subtlety with the art of life: *εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις ἕξιν τέταται . . . λέγω αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν πορεύεσθαι εἰς οἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ* i. 4. 22.

Julian writes: *ἐμοὶ δὲ βιβλίων κτήσεως ἐκ παιδαρίου δεινὸς ἐντέτηκε πόθος* p. 378a.

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22. 11 γογγύζων: *μὴ ἀντίτεινε μηδὲ γόγγυζε* Epict. iv. 1. 79; *ἐγόγγυζον St. Matt.* 20. 11, *St. John*, 6. 41; *γογγυσμός Acts*, 6. 1. M. uses the verb several times, and the subst. p. **186.** 3. It seems to be a word of the people, like 'growch', 'grouse'.

ἵλεως, *propitius*, a ritual word, which goes well with *ἀπὸ καρδίας εὐχάριστος*, cf. *ἄπιθι οὖν ἵλεως, καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀπολύων ἵλεως* p. **250.** 17.

We are reminded of: 'that so with serene conscience he may offer a pure prayer unto Thee, and may be worthy to stand among the choirs angelical' *Imit. Christi*, iv (iii), 48. 6.

22. 11–12 ἀπὸ καρδίας: although the original sense may have been different, the expression had come to be almost exactly equivalent to our 'from the heart', to express, that is, entire and sincere devotion, cf. *οὔπω ἀπὸ κ. φιλεῖς* p. **124.** 14. It may be strengthened by *ὅλος, οὐχ ὅλας φιλέειν μ' ἐθέλησθ' ἀπὸ καρδίας* Theocr. 29. 4. The more usual phrase is *ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς* pp. **38.** 22, **64.** 3, **248.** 5; Epict. ii. 23. 42. The two are combined in the expression so familiar to us from its frequent use in *Deut.*: 'with all thy (your) heart and with all thy (your) soul' 4. 29, 6. 5 al., literally translated in *St. Mark*, 12. 30 *ἐξ ὅλης τῆς κ. σου καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψ. σου*. St. Paul has *ἐκ ψ. Col.* 3. 23, *Eph.* 6. 6.

22. 12 εὐχάριστος: *χάριν εἰδυῖα* p. **70.** 21; cf.

> *ὄφρ' ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,*
> *ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές.*
>
> Cleanthes, *Hymn.* 36; Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 25.

Epict. has some beautiful sayings upon this Duty: *χάριν εἰδότα οὗ ἐχρήσατο χρόνου* ii. 16. 28; *ὅταν σ' ἐξάγῃ, πορεύεσθαι προσκυνήσας καὶ εὐχαριστήσας* iv. 1. 105; *ἔξελθε . . . ὡς εὐχάριστος, ὡς αἰδήμων* ib. 106.

Ch. 4: 22. 13 μέμνησο. This word stands at the beginning of several chapters in Epict. *Ench.* and often recurs in M.; he may have associated it with the word *ὑπομνήματα, οὔτε τὰ ὑπομνημάτιά σου μέλλεις ἀναγινώσκειν* p. **46.** 27.

ταῦτα ἀναβάλλῃ: *εἰς ποῖον ἔτι χρόνον ἀναβάλλῃ τὸ τῶν βελτίστων ἀξιοῦν σεαυτόν* Epict. *Ench.* 51; *σὺ δὲ οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὔριον κύριος ἀναβάλλῃ τὸν καιρόν* Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 488; Epicur. *Sent. Vat.* 14.

ὁποσάκις προθεσμίας, sc. *ἡμέρας*. Suid. says *ἀπὸ τοῦ προθεῖναι τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ τόδε γενέσθαι δεῖ*, that is, in this passage, a given

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date or term for reformation of life. The context shows that the word retains something of the old legal sense of a prescribed term, after which action is no longer permitted. The meaning 'days of grace' comes from the fact that the gods have allowed you to postpone more than once. The following passage from Lucian illustrates M.'s statement: *μηδ' ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ποιεῖν προθεσμίας ὁριζομένους ἑορτάς . . ., ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἀρξομένους . . . τοῦ τὰ δέοντα ποιῆσαι Nigr.* 27.

22. 14 **ἤδη ποτέ**, after delaying so long: *ἤδη ποτὲ ἁπλούστερος γενοῦ* p. **186.** 6; St. Paul writes: *εἴ πως ἤδη ποτὲ εὐοδωθήσομαι . . . ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς Rom.* 1. 10.

22. 15 **ἀπόρροια**: *ἀπορρόη* is Empedocles' name for the particles given off by objects of sense, which penetrate the organs of sight, hearing, &c. Pl. *Men.* 76d.

The *δαίμων* is *ἀπόσπασμα* from Zeus p. **92.** 1; cf. *ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης Wisdom* 7. 25; *ἐνέστακταί τις ἀπόρροια θεϊκή* Clem. Al. *Protr.* p. 59.

22. 15–16 **ὑπέστης**, *ἐννπέστης ὡς μέρος, ἐναφανισθήσῃ* p. **56.** 12.

22. 17 **ἀπαιθριάσαι**: *ἀπαιθριάζει*: *ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐδίαν ἄγει* Suid. citing: *ἀπαιθριάζει τὰς νεφέλας ἢ ξυννέφει;* Arist. *Av.* 1502. Cf. *αἰθρία καὶ γαλήνη* p. **154.** 27.

οἰχήσεται καὶ οἰχήσῃ. In view of the omission of *καί* in A, Leop. treats *οἰχήσῃ* as a duplicate reading and expels it, with Dr. Rendall. P's reading, however, makes a vigorous effect, which closely resembles the Psalmist's: 'it has passed soon, and we shall have flown' *Ps.* 90. 10, although there the same verb is not used. With *οἰχήσεται* cf. *εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν οἰχήσεται* p. **128.** 16–17; *ἐὰν ἡ προθεσμία ἐξήκῃ I.G.* 1^2. 41. 9.

22. 17 **οὐκ ἐξέσται**: cf. *ἕως ἔξεστιν* pp. **48.** 4, **56.** 20; *ὡς οὐκέτ' ἐξὸν εἰς αὖριον* Pl. *Lg.* 858b. Perhaps a reminiscence of Lucretius 'iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit' iii. 915. The reflection appears already in: *ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λεϊστή Il.* ix. 408, and is often repeated: *θανεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἔξεστι τοῖς αὐτοῖσι δίς* Soph. *Fr.* 67 P; *γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ, δὶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι* Epicur. *Sent. Vat.* 14; *ἅρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνῄσκειν, ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνῄσκειν σοι παρῇ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς μηκέτι ἐξῇ* Muson. xxviii.

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Ch. 5: 22. 18 **Πάσης ὥρας,** more emphatic than *ἔωθεν* p. **20.** 1; M. wishes to express the momentary passing of life, 'pereunt horae et imputantur'; he must fulfil the demand of the hour.

στιβαρῶς: the adj. is common in Hom. and Hes. in its literal sense, here metaphorical. Xyl. and Gat. construct it with *πράσσειν*, Cas. with *φρόντιζε*.

Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην: 'non est viri minimeque Romani dubitare' Cic. *Phil.* 10. 20; 'vir ac vere Romanus', of Camillus, Liv. xxii. 14. 11; 'quod viros, quod Romanos deceret' id. i. 59. 4.

M. used *τὸ ἀρρενικόν* of his father. The word suggests *ἀνδρεία*, the virtue of action, whereas *θῆλυ ἦθος* stands for effeminacy in a man p. **62.** 16. The Roman satirists repeatedly deplore, like Sen. and Epict., the feminine affectations of the nobles: 'vanus et Euganea quantumvis mollior agna' Juv. viii. 15. Hadrian, Pius, and M. wore the full beard as *men* not as philosophers.

22. 18–19 **τὸ ἐν χερσί:** *ἐὰν τὸ παρὸν ἐνεργῇς* p. **46.** 15; *ποίησον ὃ νῦν ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ* p. **182.** 10; *ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ ἐν ἔργοις δήπου ἐστίν* Lucian, *Herm.* 79.

22. 19 **τῆς ἀκριβοῦς:** a subst. appears to have dropped out, for *σεμνότης* can hardly be termed *exact*; *ἀκριβής* is used of the inquiry of Pius, *τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκριβῶς* p. **12.** 8, *ἀκριβὴς ἐξεταστής* p. **108.** 30. M. says *πότε δὲ σεμνότητος; πότε δὲ τῆς ἐφ' ἑκάστου γνωρίσεως (ἀπολαύσεις;)* p. **198.** 16. He may then have written *τῆς ἀκριβοῦς γνωρίσεως* here, and thus, in the group of virtuous activities, have mentioned something to correspond with *σοφία*, or again *ἐξετάσεως*, cf. *μετὰ πλείστης σπουδῆς καὶ ἀκριβοῦς ἐξετάσεως* Iambl. *V. Pyth.* 4. 18.

ἁπλάστου σεμνότητος: *τὸ σεμνὸν ἁπλάστως* p. **8.** 2. The Roman *gravitas* is here complemented by *φιλοστοργία*, which the governing class lacked p. **8.** 19.

Pl. opposes *πεπλασμένως* to *ἀληθῶς R.* 485d.

22. 20 **ἐλευθερίας,** 'freedom from passion', corresponding with *ἀπηλλαγμένος* l. 22.

δικαιότητος: chosen to give verbal contrast with *εἰκαιότης*. *δικαιότης* recurs only at p. **184.** 4.

22. 20–1 **σχολὴν ἑαυτῷ.** The MS. evidence for the use of the 2nd

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pers. reflex. ἑαυτῷ: σεαυτῷ and the other oblique cases is conflicting. On the whole it points to the use of initial ἑ after ν and σ, of initial σ after an open syllable. The contracted forms αὑτῷ: σαυτῷ κ.τ.λ. are rare and found only in the later books. I have printed the uncontracted forms also at pp. **130.** 6, **150.** 20, **164.** 5, **190.** 4, **196.** 11 and 27, **240.** 26, **242.** 1.

σχολὴν . . . φαντασιῶν, like *σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* (sc. *σώματος*), i.e. *ἀπ' ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας* Pl. *Phd.* 66d. The word *σχολή* in this moral sense is repeated p. **24.** 7.

22. 22 **ἐσχάτην:** *οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἐνεστηκυῖαν ἡμέραν καλῶς βιῶναι μὴ προθέμενον αὐτὴν ὡς ἐσχάτην* Muson. xxii; 'sic ordinandus est dies omnis tamquam cogat agmen et consummet atque expleat vitam' Sen. *Ep.* 12. 8.

ἀπηλλαγμένος: *οὐκ ἴσην αὐτοῖς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην* Thuc. iii. 63. 4. The five kinds of faults are repeated in ii. 16.

22. 23 **εἰκαιότητος,** conduct without a definite aim, see note v at the beginning of this Book, and cf. pp. **50.** 9, **152.** 7.

Cicero says: 'omnis actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia' *Off.* i. 101. This aimlessness implies scepticism as to Nature's purpose, the Epicurean belief in Chance: *εἰκῇ κράτιστον ζῆν ὅπως δύναιτό τις,* as Jocasta says, Soph. *O.T.* 979.

ἐμπαθοῦς ἀποστροφῆς, *πάντες δ' οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 89; *μικρὰ ἀποστροφὴ τοῦ λόγου* may be as disastrous as a slight turn of a vessel's helm Epict. iv. 3. 4.

22. 23–4 **τοῦ αἱροῦντος λόγου:** *πάθος δ' εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 88; *λέγεσθαι δ' ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται* Plu. *De virt. mor.* 441c.

In the Stoics the meaning is 'the ordaining reason', and *λόγος* is said *αἱρεῖν,* to ordain, like the categorical imperative: *τἀναγκαῖα πράσσειν καὶ ὅσα ὁ τοῦ φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου λόγος αἱρεῖ καὶ ὡς αἱρεῖ* p. **60.** 20–1; *μέχρις ἂν οὗ ὁ λόγος αἱρῇ συνεῖναί με τῷ σωματίῳ* Epict. i. 29. 28. This remarkable phrase developed from

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ὁ λόγος οὕτω αἱρέει Hdt. ii. 33, *οὐδὲ λόγος αἱρέει* iii. 45; vi. 124, *ἢν μὴ ἡμέας λόγος αἱρέῃ* iv. 127, cf. i. 132; vii. 41, where the meaning is *decides, decides us*, into the usage of Pl. of which the following is a central instance: *σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου; ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα, αἱροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν*, 'when reason decides that *θυμός* should not resist' *R.* 440b. Similarly, Socr. tells Crito that we must not listen to lower arguments, but *ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ*, 'in view of reason's decision, we must do what is just and right' *Crit.* 48c. Similarly, *ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν R.* 604c, cf. 607b; *Parm.* 141d. In *ὁ λ. αἱρεῖ Phlb.* 35d, the context shows that *ὁ λόγος* means reason, as personified in the argument, *οὗ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος* 35c, cf. *Lg.* 663d. The interpretation of p. **208.** 4 is doubtful.

The Romans used *vincere rationem* in this sense: 'nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque' Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 115.

22. 24 **ὑποκρίσεως**, contrasted with *ἁπλάστου* l. 19. The words are taken up again: *ὅταν ὑποκρίνηται καὶ ἐπιπλάστως καὶ ἀναλήθως τι ποιῇ ἢ λέγῃ* p. **32.** 6.

φιλαυτίας, opp. to *φιλοστοργία*. Pl., in his inquiry into self-love, says: *τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε Lg.* 731e. Arist. distinguishes two aspects of self-love, *E.N.* ix. 8, and concludes *ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει* 1169ª11, with which the teaching of M. agrees p. **124.** 15–16.

δυσαρεστήσεως, looking back to *τὸ εἱμαρμένον δυσχερᾶναι* l. 3. The contrast is with *ἐλευθερία* l. 20, since 'ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt' Sen. *Ep.* 107. 10.

22. 25 **συμμεμοιραμένα**: the word does not occur elsewhere in M. Coraes' *συμμεμηρυμένα* is attractive, cf. pp. **46.** 9, **154.** 5, but see *εὐμοιρίαν* p. **24.** 6.

πῶς ὀλίγα, 'few and brief', viz. *τὰ δόγματα* l. 10; *βραχέα δὲ ἔστω καὶ στοιχειώδη* p. **50.** 18–19.

ὧν κρατήσας, *mastering*, so familiar to us for grasping a principle, is rare in Greek: *ἐξετάζων . . . εἰ κρατοῦσιν . . . τοῦ σαφῶς καὶ δεόντως διδόναι τὰ παραγγέλματα* Polyb. x. 23 (21). 9, *πάντων*

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κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν id. xvi. 20. 2. The pass. is used in this sense in Arist. *Pol.* 1331^{b}38; *Po.* 1456^{a}10.

M. may further allude to the sense *assimilate*, of digestion, which absorbs and masters its material, like a fire, for *ἐπικρατεῖν* = *ἐξοικειοῦν* p. **50.** 7, cf. p. **206.** 22; *κρατεῖ καὶ μεταβάλλει καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ* Galen ii. 22.

24. 1 **εὕρουν**: *ἀνάγκη τὸν βίον εὑροεῖν, ὡς ἂν καὶ πολίτου βίον εὕρουν... ὅπερ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἀπονέμῃ, τοῦτο ἀσπαζομένου* p. **194.** 13–16.

The *settled* life is one which accepts the laws of the Eternal City: *εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν* Chrysippus, D.L. vii. 88, or, as M. says, *τὰ ἀπονεμόμενα δεχόμενον ὡς ἐκεῖθέν ποθεν ἐρχόμενα* p. **32.** 21–2.

θεουδῆ. This life is *θεουδής*, *god-fearing*, since it respects the will of the ruler of the Universe. M. does not elsewhere use this epic word:

> *ὥς τέ τευ ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅς τε θεουδὴς*
> *εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι* *Od.* xix. 109, 111; cf. 364.

and he may be employing it in its late sense of *godlike* (Long), *godly* (Rend.).

Ch. 6: 24. 3 **ὑβρίζεις, ὑβρίζεις ἑαυτήν.** I have adopted Gat.'s emendation. For the error, cf. *ἀπείκαζε καὶ δείκνυε*, where the context requires *ἀπεικάζῃς καὶ δεικνύῃς* Longinus, *Ars rhet.* p. 131 Bake, 555 Walz. The MS. reading could only mean 'do wanton injury to thyself, my soul'. If this were meant literally, it would be contrary to M.'s teaching, not only in the present Book but everywhere else.

Casaubon's translation is: 'ignominia te ipsum affice, anime, contemne te ipsum, inquam.' That he found this tolerable is due to an ambiguity, which is assisted by the words 'contemne te ipsum'. He evidently took M. to mean what à Kempis meant by 'tantum proficies quantum tibi ipsi vim intuleris' *Imit. Christi*, i. 25. 11, or, more generally, what is involved in Christian humility.

But the meaning of doing violence to self in the *Imit.* is explained by: 'qui sibi ipsi violentiam frequenter facit et *carnem* omnino spiritui subiugare conatur' i. 24. 2: à Kempis did not mean doing violence to the *Spirit*. Nor could the words

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be taken in the more general sense of 'humble yourself'. In civil life, *ὕβρις* meant wantonness or the injurious treatment of another, which is the outcome of *ὕβρις* as a temper of mind. M. repeatedly says that such violence cannot be inflicted upon the self, except by its own act. Moral wrong is wanton injury inflicted by the self on itself. This is clear from the words, obviously written with reference to the present chapter: *ὑβρίζει ἑαυτὴν ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή* p. **30.** 19, cf. *ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ* p. **174.** 11. The meaning here would then be 'Do evil, that is, outrage thyself, my soul', and why? 'because the time is far spent, and you will have little time left to respect yourself'.

An alternative, to suppose the words to be ironically spoken, is also plainly impossible. Irony is out of place here.

Dr. Rendall suggests *ὑβρίζῃ; μὴ ὕβριζε . . .*, 'Is violence done you? Then do not violence to thyself, my soul.' This makes the verb to be used first of literal wrong, then, in contrast, metaphorically. An excellent sense, but difficult to justify on textual grounds.

For the form of the sentence, cf. *σὺ μέν, ἔφη, λοιδορῇ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λοιδορῇ* Pl. *Euthyd.* 284e, where the MS. corruption *λοιδορεῖ* vel *λοιδόρει* (*bis*) is interesting.

24. 3 **τοῦ δὲ τιμῆσαι σεαυτήν**: this expression and *αἰδουμένῃ σεαυτήν* are opp. to *ὑβρίζεις ἑαυτήν*, cf. *ἡ τῆς ἰδίας διανοίας αἰδὼς καὶ τιμή* p. **104.** 14.

Pl. opens *Lg.* Bk. V with a remarkable passage upon the *τιμή* proper to man's *ψυχή*, and upon the false honour we pay to ourselves. After contrasting wrong objects of respect with that due to *ψυχή*, he says that a man who does not reverence the right: *οὐκ οἶδεν ἐν τούτοις πᾶσιν . . . ψυχὴν θειότατον ὂν ἀτιμότατα . . . διατιθείς* 728a; and *τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν . . . τοῖς μὲν ἀμείνοσιν ἕπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ χείρονα . . . ὡς ἄριστα ἀποτελεῖν* 728c.

24. 4 **καιρὸν ἕξεις**: cf. *αὖθις οὐκ ἐξέσται* p. **22.** 17 and Epicur. *Sent. Vat.* 14 cited there.

ἀκαριαῖος, the codd. *οὐ γάρ, εὖ γάρ* seem to be a misreading of this rather rare word. In ii. 14 it is written *ἀκάρᾶι* by A, and a compendium in the exemplar might have been still briefer; notice too the proximity of *καιρόν*. Boot's *εἷς* is adopted by

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Rend. and Leop., the explanation being that ἕξεις absorbed the εἷς. For ἀκ. cf. ἀκ. ὁ ἀνθρώπειος βίος p. **226.** 1–2.

24. 5 **μὴ αἰδουμένῃ σεαυτήν.** This phrase is found first in Democr. (*Test.*), cf. p. **238.** 12. In M.'s contemporaries we meet it in Muson. and Galen (*Test.*). The latter, like M., treats it as an equivalent to τιμή: *ἀεὶ φύλαττε, προῃρημένος γε τιμᾶν σεαυτόν* v. 25.

ὕβρις, M.'s word for failure in self-reverence, is in Pl. opp. to *σωφροσύνη*: *ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονάς . . . ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη Phdr.* 238a. This is close to Stoic teaching, e.g. *τὸν σοφὸν ἀνύβριστον εἶναι· οὔθ' ὑβρίζεσθαι γὰρ οὔθ' ὑβρίζειν . . . (ἀδικητικῶς μέντοι γέ τινας αὐτῷ προσφέρεσθαι καὶ ὑβριστικῶς), καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο δικαιοπραγεῖν*, viz. by resisting evil by good, Chrysippus ap. Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 110.

24. 6 **εὐμοιρίαν**, *ἀγαθὴν μοῖραν* p. **96.** 17; M. is perhaps recalling *συμμεμοιραμένα* p. **22.** 25. He avoids *εὐδαιμονία*, partly because of its popular associations, partly because of its employment by Arist. and his interpretation of the word. He prefers *εὐαρέστησις, εὐοδία, εὐροεῖν, εὐσταθεῖν*, yet since *εὐμοιρία* is connected with *μοῖρα*, and *μοῖρα* is connected in sense with *δαίμων*, p. **48.** 23, the *word* is not far removed from *εὐδαιμονία*, see M.'s etymology p. **126.** 5.

Ch. 7: 24. 7 **περισπᾷ τί σε . . .; καί**: Gat. corrected to *μὴ περισπάτω σε* and took *καὶ σχολὴν πάρεχε* as adversative. Xyl. printed the first sentence as interrogative, translating: 'non patere . . . te circumagi, sed otium tibi para.'

As the chapters stand, the sense is continued perhaps like this: 'The soul allows its happiness to depend upon the souls of others, instead of reverencing itself.' The thought then passes to the general relation of the self to what is outside it. 'Does what befalls you from outside in some way distract you?' he asks; the answer is: 'give your leisure to learn a good lesson and cease from erring;' *συγχρῶ εἰς ἄλλην ἀρετὴν τῇ κωλύσει* p. **118.** 16; 'excerpere ex his ipsis (sc. malis), si quid inesset boni' Cic. *Off.* iii. 3.

For *τί* in the sense of *quodammodo* cf. *πῶς ἐμὲ οὖν τι ὠφελήκασιν;* Epict. ii. 21. 21; *ὅταν ἐμποδισθῇ τι, ἑαυτῷ ἐγκαλεῖ Ench.* 48. 2.

The *καί* with the imperative expresses urgency, as in *καί μοι*

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δὸς τὴν χεῖρ' *Il.* xxiii. 75; *καὶ ὑμεῖς μὴ ζητεῖτε . . . καὶ μὴ μετεωρίζεσθε* *St. Luke* 12. 29.

τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐμπίπτοντα: *πρὸς τὰ ἐμπίπτοντα . . . ἕτοιμος* p. **140.** 11; *ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν προσπιπτόντων μέμνησο ἐπιστρέφων ἐπὶ σεαυτὸν ζητεῖν, τίνα δύναμιν ἔχεις πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτοῦ* Epict. *Ench.* 10; cf. id. i. 6. 28; ii. 16. 14; iv. 1. 109, pp. **50.** 5, **88.** 18. This is, I presume, the original sense of 'fac de necessitate virtutem' Jerome, *Epist.* 54. 6, and has been corrupted to our mod. usage.

σχολὴν πάρεχε σεαυτῷ, recurring to *σχολὴν ἑαυτῷ . . . πορίζειν* p. **22.** 20–1, where *σχολή* is used, like *ἀταραξία περὶ τὰ ἀπο τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας συμβαίνοντα* p. **184.** 3, of the undisturbed state of the trained intelligence in contrast with the implied *πράγματα παρέχειν*. Here it is left to *παῦσαι ῥεμβόμενος* to express the tranquillity, and the words *σχολὴν κ.τ.λ.* are almost equivalent to 'make the *πράγματα* an opportunity for learning'.

24. 8 **ῥεμβόμενος**, 'wandering at large', used as in *ἀπορρέμβεσθαι τῆς τοῦ ἰδίου ἡγ. παρατηρήσεως* p. **38.** 7–8, where, as in ii. 6, M. is thinking of wasting time *ἐν ταῖς περὶ ἑτέρων φαντασίαις* l.c. 3–4, and so neglecting oneself. As *τὴν ἑτέραν περιφοράν* shows, the word includes *aimlessness*, *ὁπόταν μὴ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐπί τι κοινωφελὲς ποιῇ* l.c. 4. Thus it is equivalent to *πλανᾶσθαι*, in the sense of moral error: *ῥεμβόμεθα πάντες, ἀσχημονοῦντες καὶ κακοδαιμονοῦντες* Plu. *De Comm. Not.* 1067e, cf. the use of a whale losing its bearings, *ῥ. καὶ πλανᾶται* *De sol. an.* 981a.

This moral meaning came from military language: *ῥεμβόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου καὶ τὴν τάξιν ἐκλείποντα* Plu. *Fab.* 20. It was thus used in ordinary speech: *Σεραπίωνα μὴ ἀφῇς ἀργεῖν καὶ ῥέμβεσθαι*, 'play truant', *Oxy. Pap.* xii. 1581.

24. 9 **τὴν ἑτέραν περιφοράν**: the word appears to be associated with *περιφέρεσθαι* in the sense of *random* movement: *περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι* Arist. *Metaph.* 985^{a}15; thus *ἐρρέμβοντο* is interpreted *φοράς τε πάσας πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀκρίτως ἐφέροντο* Plu. *De his qui sero* 564b; *ἐρρέμβετο . . . ὑπ' ἀναρχίας*, explains *τὰς χεῖρας ἐπ' οὐδένα σκοπὸν φερομένας* *De Alex. fort.* ii. 336f.

Cf. 'quibusdam nihil quo cursum dirigant placet, sed marcentis oscitantisque fata deprehendunt' Sen. *Brev. Vit.* 2. 2; 'sine proposito vagantur, quaerentes negotia nec quae destinaverunt

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agunt, sed in quae incucurrerunt' *Tranq.* 12. 3. They are never in one stay:

imus huc, hinc illuc: cum illuc ventum est, ire illuc lubet;
incerte errat animus, praeter propter vitam vivitur Ennius, *Iph.* 240V.

ληροῦσι γὰρ καὶ διὰ πράξεων: not only διὰ λόγων but also by acts. For διὰ π. cf. πολίτου . . . προιόντος διὰ πράξεων p. **194.** 14, where the sense is by the series of his actions.

24. 9–10 **οἱ κεκμηκότες τῷ βίῳ**: κεκμηκότες means not merely *worn out*, but also *dead*. M. is perhaps thinking of:

mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti,
. . . . .
ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis,
atque animi incerto fluitans errore vagaris. Lucr. iii. 1046.

Seneca has the same idea: 'delicati idem timent mori, cui vitam suam fecere similem; multum interest inter otium et conditivum (the rest of the tomb)' *Ep.* 82. 2; 'non est ergo hic otiosus; aliud nomen imponas: aeger est, immo mortuus est' *Brev. Vit.* 12. 9.

24. 10 **μὴ ἔχοντες σκοπόν**: 'they shoot at rovers' Gat. Pl. says of one kind of so-called philosophers: σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὗ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν *R.* 519c. The image is familiar from Arist., e.g. καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος *E.N.* 1094ª23; cf.

est aliquid quo tendis et in quod dirigis arcum,
an . . . atque ex tempore vivis? Persius iii. 60;

'veluti navigantibus ad aliquod sidus dirigendus est cursus; vita sine proposito vaga est' Sen. *Ep.* 95. 45–6.

24. 11 **καθάπαξ**: ἡδονικῶν ἢ καθάπαξ ἀπολαυστικῶν φαντασμάτων p. **38.** 14; the adv. means 'to speak more generally', cf. p. **242.** 20.

ἀπευθύνουσιν. M. says that man's end is ἀπευθύνειν (τὸ παρόν) πρὸς ὁσιότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην p. **234.** 19.

Ch. 8. There has been, I think, a displacement here; Ch. 8 would follow Ch. 6 excellently, ἐν τῇ ἄλλου ψυχῇ taking up ἐν ταῖς ἄλλων ψυχαῖς, and τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς and κακοδαιμονεῖν responding to τὴν σὴν εὐμοιρίαν. Then the mention of κινήματα would lead to the *stimuli*, τὰ ἔξωθεν, which prompt the movements, and to their proper treatment, Ch. 7.

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24. 12 ἐφιστάνειν: M. writes *ἐφιστάναι* p. **28. 2**. He has, if the MSS. are correct, the former 5 times, the latter 3.

24. 14 παρακολουθοῦντας, 'attending to', with the further sense here of 'waiting upon', in the medical sense, cf. pp. **78. 11**, **122. 5**, **128. 15**. See *τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα* p. **32. 18**, and the description of *θεραπεία δαίμονος* as being *τὰς οἰκείας ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι* Pl. *Ti.* 90c.

κακοδαιμονεῖν: the variant *κακοδαιμονᾶν* is interesting. Socr. asks, in respect of an adulterer: *ἆρ' οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν;* X. *Mem.* ii. 1. 5. M., however, nowhere speaks of an evil genius, even metaphorically. Contrast Dio Chrys. xxiii. 6, p. 514; Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* Book v.

Ch. 9: **24. 15 ἀεὶ μεμνῆσθαι**: the *δεῖ* appears to be an intrusion, cf. *ἀεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνῆσθαι* p. **68. 17**; *τῶν δύο ἀεὶ μεμνῆσθαι* p. **30. 9–10**. See *J. Phil.* xxxv, pp. 135–6, for parallels.

τίς ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις. M. briefly states the fundamental principle of the subordination of the individual, as a part, to the whole, *ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις* p. **22. 7–8**.

In xii. 26, which is a summary of this Book, he puts this principle first: *ὅτι πάντα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν γίνεται*, and at the end of that ch. *ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴδιον οὐδενός*, p. **246. 4, 10**.

24. 16 ὁποῖόν τι μέρος: *τίνα μὲν ἔχει ἀξίαν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον;* p. **46. 2**; *οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἄνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὖ πράξεις οὔτ' ἔμπαλιν* p. **46. 25–6**.

24. 17 οὐδεὶς ὁ κωλύων, the central tenet, so strongly expressed by Epict., of the independence of man as a reasonable will, *οὐδεὶς ὁ τοῦτο κωλῦσαι δυνάμενος* p. **46. 20**. M. has already implied it by *οὔτε βλαβῆναι . . . δύναμαι* p. **20. 7**.

ἧς μέρος εἶ: the change of person, after *ἡ ἐμή* is a surprise, but there are other places where M. abruptly changes the person, e.g. p. **118. 18–19**. Cor.'s *πράσσειν σε ἀεί* does not remedy the real difficulty.

Ch. 10. This ch. must be out of place, since the continuity of chs. 9 and 11 is so plainly marked by *πράσσειν τε ἀεὶ καὶ λέγειν* p. **24. 18** followed by *ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι* p. **26. 5–6**.

The problem how much of the whole is *verbally* taken from Theophr. is not easy to determine. Wimmer, in his collection of

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Theophr.'s fragments lxxvii, supposed *βαρύτερα . . . ἁμαρτίαις* to be the extract. Yet *τὸν λόγον ἀποστρεφόμενος* has a Stoic ring, cf. *ἀποστροφὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἱροῦντος λόγου* p. **22.** 23. I am inclined to think that it is all a summary or paraphrase of the original, cf. the extracts from Heraclitus, iv. 46.

24. 19 **ἐν τῇ συγκρίσει**: M. elsewhere uses *σύγκρισις* for the assembling of the elements of the composite individual, pp. **32.** 24, **54.** 11, **244.** 23, **250.** 16. Here he seems to refer to a part of Theophr.'s *Moralia* known as 'A comparison of offences'. Arist. uses the word *σύγκρισις* for a comparison between honour and expediency, virtue and self-indulgence *Top.* 102^{b}15.

24. 20 **ὡς ἄν τις κοινότερον.** M. reminds himself or his reader that the strict view was 'omnia peccata esse paria', a Stoic paradox so brilliantly ridiculed by Cic. *Pro Mur.* 61 sq., cf. *Fin.* iv. 74; *Paradox. St.* iii. So Horace says: 'quis paria esse fere placuit peccata' *Sat.* i. 3. 96.

At this period the regular idiom in this phrase is *κοινότερον*, as will be seen, e.g. in the Platonic Scholia.

M. opposes *τὰ κοινότερον καλὰ λεγόμενα* to *τὸ ὄντως καλόν* p. **58.** 13, and says *κοινότερον δὲ νῦν τὸ συμφέρον . . . λαμβανέσθω* p. **116.** 12; so here 'as men commonly do compare' is contrasted with what is strictly correct. Similarly *εἰ δὲ κοινότερον ἐθέλοι τις ταῦτα μεταλαβὼν ὑπογράψαι* Plu. *De Fato*, 568d; 'loquimur nunc more communi' Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 66. It will be noticed that in referring to Theophr. he uses a form of speech *ὡς ἄν τις συγκρίνειε* which is characteristically Peripatetic.

24. 20 **βαρύτερα εἶναι**, are more *grave*, *grievous*, met. from sound and smell (heavy, unwholesome), *βαρὺ τὸ χωρίον* of silver-mines X. *Mem.* iii. 6. 12.

Arist. says *ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν E.N.* 1149^{a}24, cf. ^{b}21.

24. 22 **μετὰ . . . λεληθυίας συστολῆς**, cf. *μετά τινος σπασμοῦ* p. **100.** 12–13; M. means a *contraction* which is, according to Arist., the physical concomitant of pain, as expansion is of pleasure.

λεληθυίας means subconscious, cf. *κἄν που λάθῃ* of a subconscious impression producing false judgement p. **222.** 22.

24. 22–3 **τὸν λόγον ἀποστρεφόμενος**: notice that Theophr. has

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retained Pl.'s division of the soul into *λόγος*, *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, but the last has been narrowed from a general expression for the emotional self into one for its special manifestation, *anger*.

24. 24 θηλύτερος. M. has a different view of anger: *οὐχὶ τὸ θυμοῦσθαι ἀνδρικόν . . . ὥσπερ τε ἡ λύπη ἀσθενοῦς, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ὀργή* pp. **226.** 27, **228.** 3.

26. 2 προηδικημένῳ: anger is caused by injury and the sense of wrong suffered, *οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας* Arist. *E.N.* 1135^{b}26, *ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν* ^{b}28. M.'s view is that anger is mistaken because the good man cannot be hurt by the evil intended, p. **20.** 7; *ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ μὴ βλαβῶ* p. **226.** 16–17.

διὰ λύπης. Theophr. confuses the pain at the wrong or fancied slight, which is psychical, with the hidden pain, which accompanies contraction associated with anger. There is a similar confusion in Arist. *E.N.* 1149^{a}34, ^{b}20.

26. 2–3 ἠναγκασμένῳ, opposed to *αὐτόθεν*, sponte sua. The view that compulsion underlies angry conduct was illustrated by Chrysippus from Medea: *ἡ δέ γε Μήδεια βιασθεῖσα πρὸς τοῦ θυμοῦ . . .*

> *καὶ μανθάνω μέν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,*
> *θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμοῦ βουλευμάτων*
>
> (Eur. *Med.* 1078) Galen v. 408.

26. 3 ὥρμηται, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία . . . ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν Arist. *E.N.* 1149^{a}34; *φερόμενος* (like *ἐναντία φέρηται ὡς βλάψουσα* p. **32.** 4, of anger) shows that, in M.'s opinion, the action in both cases is due to a surrender of the will, is indeed an example of ideomotor response to the suggestion whether of anger or appetite.

Ch. 11: 26. 5 ὡς ἤδη δυνατοῦ ὄντος ἐξιέναι, 'ut qui confestim e vita hac possis discedere' Gat., taking *δυνατοῦ* as masculine, and the construction to be one which is common in Greek writers of this date.

It is, however, preferable to take *δυνατοῦ* as neuter and to translate 'as it is possible you may depart at once', *ἤδη* going with *ἐξιέναι* by a slight hyperbaton.

The sense is that all your activities are to be related to the possibility that death may call you at any moment: *ἂν ὡς*

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ἐσχάτην τοῦ βίου ἑκάστην πρᾶξιν ἐνεργῇς p. **22.** 22; *ὡς ἐξελθὼν ζῇν διανοῇ* p. **92.** 11.

δυνατόν, like our word *possible*, refers sometimes to ability, power, sometimes to contingency. Thus *ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν* means that a solar eclipse can occur only when the moon is in her first phase (the position of the moon which permits an eclipse) although it may not occur, Thuc. ii. 28; *ταῦτα (τὰ δυνατὰ) δὲ διχῶς ἐστί, τά τε γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥᾳδίως γιγνόμενα* Arist. *Rh.* 1363^{a}21; *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔφθαρται, ἐνδέχεται δὲ φθαρῆναι, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἂν εἴη δυνατὸν καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον An. Po.* 74^{b}36; cf. *πρὸς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ διδόμενον* p. **50.** 2.

The *Meditations* are, in one aspect, a *μελέτη θανάτου*, a *commentatio*: *ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως* Pl. *Phd.* 80e; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 74.

26. 5–6 **ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.** Our acts and words and thoughts must be in accord with Nature, and appropriate to our own nature, which, as reasonable, is a part of Nature. To follow Nature demands a right attitude to death as well as to life, that is, an understanding of the righteous government which arranges as much our end as our beginning; cf. *μέγιστον . . . τὸ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀρθῶς διανοηθέντα ζῆν καλῶς ἢ μή* Pl. *Lg.* 888b.

26. 6 **ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀπελθεῖν**, cf. *ἐξιέναι τοῦ βίου* p. **198.** 2–3, sim. p. **92.** 11, *οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι* Pl. *Ap.* 40e; *μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ . . . εἰς ἄλλον τόπον* 40c; 'magis feliciter de vita migrare quam mori' Vell. Paterc. i. 11. 7; 'aut finis aut transitus' Sen. *Ep.* 65. 24. These and many more such synonyms are no mere euphemisms, but evidence, as Gat. says, of a common consciousness that death is a passage to another life (see his copious illustration of St. Paul, *Phil.* 1. 23; *De N.I. stylo*, pp. 45–9).

Such phrases are familiar in treatises of consolation: *καθάπερ τῆς εἰς κοινὴν πατρίδα πορείας προκειμένης πᾶσιν ἀναγκαίας* Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 113c.

M. usually leaves the question of an after life an open one: *εἰ μὲν ἐφ' ἕτερον βίον* p. **36.** 21, *εἴτε σβέσιν, εἴτε μετάστασιν* pp. **94.** 18–19, **130.** 20–1.

26. 7 **οὐδὲν δεινόν**, death is not to be feared: *οὐδὲν θεῶν κενὸν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ* p. **36.** 21.

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οὐκ ἂν περιβάλοιεν, the expression looks back to *αἰσχρῷ γάρ με οὐδεὶς περιβαλεῖ* p. **20.** 7–8.

Here too M. holds that the good man is immune from evil, because God is the author only of good, *παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον,* as Cleanthes said, S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 91 or, as M. says: *ὁ διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν* p. **96.** 20–1.

26. 7–8 **εἰ δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ οὐ μέλει.** M. follows closely the line of thought of Pl. in the *Laws*: *τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι μέν, φροντίζειν δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων* 888c sq. where Pl. had first treated of the entire atheist.

26. 8 **τί μοι ζῆν;** not 'let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die', but let us depart at once from a life which is worthless without faith in Providence and God's goodness: *τί καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ . . . φυρμῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνδιατρίβειν;* p. **98.** 20–1.

The words *τί . . . ἀνθρωπείων* are written in the margin of A in the same handwriting. That they are omitted by C seems to show that that group is derived from an archetype in which the loss had already occurred, and not from A or the immediate source of A.

§ 2: 26. 9 **ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰσί.** M.'s belief and its grounds, the argument from the visible gods, the heavenly luminaries, and from the ordered universe to its unseen cause, is only once stated (xii. 28). Elsewhere he assumes the existence of a graded series of ordered existences which culminates in man and the gods, a rational commonwealth which points to divine ordinance, e.g. iv. 3. 2; iv. 4; ix. 9. He usually prefers to leave the matter open, and to point to the consequences which follow, if we accept the Epicurean view.

The arguments used by the Stoics to establish their belief in a Universe governed by goodness were mainly developed from Socr.'s reasoning in X. *Mem.* i. 4. 11–18 and iv. 3. 12 sq. This is noticed by S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 101 (he has given the arguments ix. 92 sq.). Cf. *inter alia,* Cic. *N.D.* ii. 16–39.

The most interesting proof, in view of Descartes's use of the same line of thought, is that from the imperfection of the creature to the perfection of the Creator.

καὶ μέλει αὐτοῖς: see Pl. *Ap.* 41c (*Test.*), *οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε*

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ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι . . . *R.* 613a, cf. *Lg.* 905d; *παντάπασιν ἐοίκασιν οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι* X. *Mem.* iv. 3. 12; *ἀγαπᾷς γὰρ τὰ ὄντα πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν βδελύσσῃ ὧν ἐποίησας, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μισῶν τι κατεσκεύασας* *Wisdom* 11. 24.

26. 10 **τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς**: *ἴδε αὐτά, ὁποῖα κατ' ἀλ. ἐστιν* p. **56.** 2; *ἀλήθεια* and *ἀληθής* often stand for what is *real*. M. by real evils means moral evils, *τὰ αἰσχρά*.

26. 11 **ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο**, a central tenet of Stoicism: *αὐτάρκη τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν* (sc. *τὴν ἀρετήν*) *πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν . . . καταφρονοῦσα καὶ τῶν δοκούντων ὀχληρῶν* D.L. vii. 127, cf. 88; *ἅπερ ὅλα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ σοί* p. **76.** 14, *ταῦτα πάντα ἐπ' αὐτῇ ἐστιν* p. **110.** 16; *οὐδείς σε ἀναγκάσει οὐδέποτε, οὐδείς σε κωλύσει . . . ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἕν, οὐδείς σε βλάψει, ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ἕξεις, οὐδὲ γὰρ βλαβερόν τι πείσῃ* Epict. *Ench.* i. 3, cf. Epict. i. 1. 12, 4. 11; ii. 17. 22; iii. 24. 79.

26. 12 **τὸ μὴ περιπίπτειν.** The minor and the conclusion of the hypothetical argument are omitted: 'But it is not in any man's power to avoid these so-called evils:' ergo, 'they are not real evils.'

§ 3: 26. 14 **κατ' ἄγνοιαν**: this, the first member of the disjunctive proposition, 'neither by ignorance nor with knowledge', is assumed. The Universal nature takes the place of the gods and is assumed to be all-knowing. M. follows Pl.'s statement: *πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο* (sc. *ὁ θεός*); *γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ἔφη* *R.* 382d.

οὔτε εἰδυῖα: ability to produce good may fail in man's case from lack of power or lack of skill; *παρ' ἀδυναμίαν ἢ παρ' ἀτεχνίαν* is equivalent to *μὴ δυναμένη προφυλάξασθαι ἢ διορθώσασθαι*.

Cas. considered that M. is correcting a statement of Epict.: *τὸ κράτιστον . . . οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν, τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἆρά γε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι, εἰ ἠδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψαν· ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο* Epict. i. 1. 7; cf. 'quicquid nobis negatum est dari non potuit' Sen. *De Ben.* ii. 29. 3.

Another possible limitation of divine power is called *παρ' ἀτεχνίαν*. Here M. is referring to the view that the divine

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artificer has sometimes failed from the resistance of the material in which he works: 'non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, saepe inobsequens arti est' Sen. *Nat. Qu.* i. Prol. 16. This M. rejects, because, in his view, the matter of the universe is penetrated throughout by the causal principle or *λόγος*: *ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής* p. **96.** 20. Moreover, Nature is superior to Art, and accordingly *ἡ πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων τελεωτάτη φύσις οὐκ ἂν ἀπολείποιτο τῆς τεχνικῆς εὐμηχανίας* p. **220.** 8–10.

Thus what men commonly call goods and evils befall good men and bad alike by Nature's will, not because she does not know that they are good and evil (thus, incidentally, he rules out the Epicurean view of the gods), nor because she is overruled by necessity or by the resistance of matter.

26. 17 **ἐπίσης**: *θάνατον καὶ ζωὴν . . . οἷς ἐπίσης ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις χρῆται* p. **170.** 25–6, cf. p. **66.** 24. This Homer expressed as the will of Zeus:

> *Ζεῦς δ' αὐτὸς νέμει ὄλβον Ὀλύμπιος ἀνθρώποισιν,*
> *ἐσθλοῖς ἠδὲ κακοῖσιν, ὅπως ἐθέλῃσιν, ἑκάστῳ* *Od.* vi. 188.

Tac. states, in his own way, the same doctrine: '(Asclepiodotus) exutus omnibus fortunis et in exilium actus, aequitate deum erga bona malaque documenta' *Ann.* xvi. 33.

26. 18 **πεφυρμένως**, lit. in a jumble, *ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα* Aesch. *P.V.* 450; *ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* Pl. *Grg.* 465d; *ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω Phd.* 97b, where Socrates is about to touch on Anaxagoras' theory of *νοῦς* which brought order into chaos.

M., then, means that prosperity and adversity happen to men without any to them reasonable explanation ('fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt bona' Sen. *Ep.* 87. 12), so that the word is not equivalent to but adds a further point to *ἐπίσης*. Polak therefore was mistaken in bracketing *ἐπίσης* as a gloss on *πεφυρμένως*.

§ 4: **26.** 18–19 **θάνατος δέ γε καὶ ζωή**, examples of opposites, called *ἀδιάφορα*: *τῶν δὲ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. . . . ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ζωήν, θάνατον, . . .* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 57; Epict. ii. 9. 15, 19. 13. They are not essential to happiness and unhappiness, although our use of them tends to happiness and the reverse, D.L. vii. 104.

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In form, the continued chiasmus shows the care with which this chapter was written.

26. 21 **οὔτε καλὰ ὄντα οὔτε αἰσχρά,** that is *ἀδιάφορα ὄντα,* or, as M. says, not in themselves morally good or evil. Then, as I would arrange the order, he adds: 'what then does not make a man morally worse, cannot make his life worse, i.e. unhappy.' Consequently, they are *οὔτ' ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά.*

In the MSS. order, the words interrupt the sense, and can only mean what they would mean later, by anticipation. If put at the close, they explain the progressive argument of the whole chapter, and the transition from *οὔτε καλὰ ὄντα οὔτε αἰσχρά* to *οὔτ' ἄρ' ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά.* The relation between a man's character and its outcome in his life is later expressed by the words *κακῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, τῷ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν βιοῦντι* p. **66.** 24–5.

Ch. 12: 26. 23 **ταχέως ἐναφανίζεται:** *πᾶν τὸ ἔννυλον ἐναφ. τάχιστα τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ* p. **124.** 4. This is M.'s first reference to the flux of all phenomena, the theory which Zeno adopted from Heraclitus, see iv. 36.

26. 24 **τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι:** Time, which is unlimited, is regarded as vanishing into *τῷ ἀιδίῳ* p. **248.** 24. *χρόνος* is for Chrysippus *διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως,* Simpl. *in Arist. Cat.* p. 350. Thus, the passing of the moving individual existences back into *ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία* is extended by analogy to the disappearance of the moments, which measure the movement, into Time, regarded as everlasting.

αἱ μνῆμαι, the plur. appears to mean the *memorials* which preserve the record of *σώματα,* especially of individual persons. This is put generally: *πᾶσα ἡ μνήμη ἀποσβῇ* p. **58.** 3, since the memory is handed down through a series of beings who are kindled and then extinguished.

That *σώματα* should be narrowed from all physical bodies to persons is natural in view of the introduction of *μνῆμαι,* cf. *πάντα ὅσα ὁρᾷς τάχιστα φθαρήσεται καὶ οἱ φθειρόμενα αὐτὰ ἐπιδόντες τάχιστα καὶ αὐτοὶ φθαρήσονται* p. **184.** 14–15. As will be seen from *πῶς εὐτελῇ κ.τ.λ.,* M. is dwelling here upon the moral implication of transience; remembrance is as transient and worthless as the persons and things remembered.

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26. 24 τὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, all sensible objects, in contrast with *νοερὰ δύναμις* below. M. is thinking of the bodily sensations upon which appetite and impulse depend for their suggestion, see p. **90.** 16 sq.

26. 25 ἡδονῇ δελεάζοντα ἢ τῷ πόνῳ φοβοῦντα: for pleasure as a bait, see Pl. *Ti.* 69d (*Test.*); *ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς ἢ δόξης . . . δελεασθέντες* Julian, p. 185a.

26. 25–28. 1 τῷ τύφῳ διαβεβοημένα, a condensed and difficult phrase, the parallelism with *ἡδονῇ* and *πόνῳ* suggests that the dat. is instrumental, so that the sense would be 'objects applauded by vanity'. It may, however, be modal, 'vainglorioously shouted abroad'.

Suid. says *τῦφος: ἀλαζονεία, μανία,* cf. *οἰήματος καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀπολυθείς, εἰς βίον ἄτυφον καταστήσεις σαυτόν* Plu. *De recta rat.* 43b. M. couples *τ.* with *ψευδολογία, ὑπόκρισις, τρυφή* p. **172.** 6–7. In a parallel passage, at p. **94.** 4, M. uses *ἔνδοξα* for what he here calls *τῷ τ. διαβεβοημένα,* i.e. objects which create applause or glory and in which vainglory is interested.

The moralist contrasts the pomp and vanity of the world with its swift transience, 'yet is their vainglory but travail and sorrow' *Ps.* 90. 10, cf. 1 *St. John* 2. 16.

τῦφος, which is almost a synonym of the older *οἴησις,* was adopted into Latin. In occurs frequently both in Arnobius: 'mentis elatio et typhus, qui appellatur a Graecis' *Contra gentes* ii. 3; Migne, v. 815 (cf. 829, 839, 856), and in St. Aug.: 'gaudebam superbe et tumebam typho' *Conf.* iii. 6. The latter associates the word with *tumidus,* cf. *τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος* 1 *Tim.* 6. 4.

28. 1 ῥυπαρά: *ἐφήμερα τῷ χρόνῳ, ῥυπαρὰ δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ* p. **178.** 9–10; *ῥύπα* are stains which are wiped off *Od.* vi. 93, and M. uses *ἀποκαθαίρειν* with *ῥύπος* p. **134.** 19.

The notion of terrene foulness is expressed by Galen: *ἐν τοσούτῳ βορβόρῳ σαρκῶν τε καὶ χυμῶν ὅμως ἐνοικοῦντα νοῦν* iv. 360.

28. 2 νεκρά, compared with *τὸ ἡγ., τὰ λοιπὰ νεκρὰ καὶ καπνός* p. **250.** 2. Epict. affects the word *νεκρά* for all bodily and sensible things.

28. 2 νοερᾶς δυνάμεως ἐφιστάναι, the indirect questions, including

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πῶς ἅπτεται (l. 8), depend on these words, thus introduced into the clause very awkwardly. See *ἐπίστησον* p. **218.** 5.

τί εἰσιν οὗτοι: a recurrent reflection, iii. 4. 4; vi. 59; vii. 62; viii. 53; ix. 34; x. 13 and 19.

M. was acutely sensible of the hollowness of praise and the unworthiness of his critics. Here and there he appears to stop short of satire only by an effort. Where he does approach that vein, he leaves the colour to be supplied by the imagination; see, for instance, the powerful reproof of p. **200.** 16, the censure is heightened by the reticence.

28. 3 **αἱ ὑπολήψεις,** *thoughts*, contrasted with *φωναί*, cf. *κακία ἀλλοτρία . . . ὑπόληψις . . . φωνή* p. **234.** 23.

εὐδοξίαν, 'bubble reputation', as at p. **14.** 19. Following Gat.'s lead I have supplied *καὶ τὴν ἀδοξίαν παρέχουσι*, see p. **26.** 19.

28. 4 **καὶ ὅτι:** the construction is again awkward. For *ὅτι*, see p. **50.** 22 sq.

28. 5 **μερισμῷ:** for the dissection or analysis intended, see *ἱστορία* p. **60.** 10, *ἀπογυμνοῦν* p. **100.** 16, *γυμνόν* p. **44.** 24.

τὰ ἐμφανταζόμενα αὐτῷ, the colour that imagination lends to death: *ὅπου λίαν ἀξιόπιστα τὰ πράγματα φαντάζεται, ἀπογυμνοῦν αὐτά* p. **100.** 16; cf. *τῇ φαντασίᾳ συναρπάζεσθαι* p. **96.** 9 n. Lucr. makes the same point more than once:

> ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim
> nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum
> se fingit sensuque suo contaminat adstans iii. 881.

Sen., thinking of the instruments of torture and execution, says: 'maximus huius rei timor est, cuius et varietas magna et adparatus terribilis' *Ep.* 14. 6; 'non hominibus tantum, sed rebus persona demenda est et reddenda facies sua' id. 24. 13. Epict. says: *ἀλλ' ἄταφος ῥιφήσῃ· εἰ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ νεκρός, ῥιφήσομαι. εἰ δ' ἄλλος εἰμὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, κομψότερον λέγε ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα* iv. 7. 31.

28. 6–8 **φύσεως δὲ ἔργον . . . καὶ συμφέρον αὐτῇ:** the gravest human experience, man's inevitable lot, is to the eye of imagination destruction; wisely regarded, it is part of the renewing process of Nature:

> *οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον,*
> *οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ* Cleanth. *H.* 15.

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σῴζουσι δὲ κόσμον, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν στοιχείων, οὕτως καὶ αἱ τῶν συγκριμάτων μεταβολαί p. **22.** 8–9. Death is *μία τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν* p. **172.** 21; the word *ἀποθανεῖν* is *φυσικοῦ τινος ἔργου σημαντικόν* p. **234.** 1.

28. 7 **παιδίον ἐστί**: under the simple expression there is perhaps an allusion to Pl. *Phd.* 77e (*Test.* p. **230.** 18). Pl.'s remark was interpreted to refer to the unreasonable part of the Soul: *παῖς μέν, ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀλογία, τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον μὴ ὁρῶσα* Simpl. *in Ench.* p. 70b, commenting upon: *ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα· οἷον, ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου Ench.* 5.

Perhaps he is thinking too of the fable of the Boy and the Mask, cf. *τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα Λαμίας . . . παιδίων δείματα* p. **230.** 18; but, more generally, he refers to fear caused by ignorance, which in children is fear of the dark and the unwonted: 'nemo ausus est ad id, quo perturbabatur, accedere et naturam ac bonum timoris sui nosse: itaque res falsa et inanis habet adhuc fidem, quia non coarguitur . . . Talis est animorum nostrorum confusio, qualis Lucretio (ii. 55) visa est:

> nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis
> in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus' Sen. *Ep.* 110. 5.

τοῦτο μέντοι, the particle in its progressive, not its adversative sense.

28. 8 **πῶς ἅπτεται θεοῦ**. Man has contact with God by his *νοερὰ δύναμις* and conversely: *μόνῳ γὰρ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ νοερῷ μόνων ἅπτεται (ὁ θεὸς) τῶν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ταῦτα ἐρρυηκότων* p. **236.** 9–10.

28. 9 **ὅταν πῶς [ἔχῃ] διακέηται**: the text is doubtful; *ἔχῃ* seems to be a marginal gloss. Sch., however, excludes *διακέηται*. Holste's correction appears to mean 'and how, when it holds fast to God, it is itself disposed'.

M. explains his meaning at *τηρεῖν* p. **32.** 18 and, again, where he speaks of *τὰ ἡγ. γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν . . . καθαρμάτων* p. **236.** 8–9. The soul has to be *καθαρός*, as Pl. says at *Phd.* 67b (*Test.*). The language, and perhaps the thought, of M. is influenced in these places by Pl., cf. *φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα, ἅπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ' ὅσον δ' αὖ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν Ti.* 90c. The emphasis in Pl. is upon intellectual, in M. upon moral, purity.

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28. 10 τοῦτο μόριον. Man being *νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας μέτοχος*, is conceived as an organ which touches God. By 'touch' is meant a communion approaching to identification: *αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν* Arist. *Metaph.* 1072ᵇ20. The purer, the more free from earthly dross, the self becomes, the closer it can grow to the divine. Thus Galen says of the heavenly luminaries: *ἐν οἷς εἰκός, ὅσῳπέρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ τοῦ σώματος οὐσία καθαρωτέρα, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐνοικεῖν πολὺ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ γήϊνα σώματα βελτίω* iv. 359.

Ch. 13: 28. 11 οὐδεν ἀθλιώτερον: the generic neuter strengthens the effect.

πάντα κύκλῳ ἐκπεριερχομένου: the compound verb expresses 'out and about', *ὁ μὲν τὴν σύντομον ἐλθεῖν δυνηθεὶς ῥᾷον ἐκπερίεισι τὴν κύκλῳ* Julian, p. 225c.

There may be a reminiscence of:

> nec quicquam tibi prodest
> aerias temptasse domos, animoque rotundum
> percurrisse polum, morituro Hor. *Od.* i. 28. 4.

M. here adopts the narrow view of Aristo: *ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ μετεωρότεροι τοῦ Περσέως ἀρθέντες . . . κατίδοιμεν τὸν πάντα κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν ἥτις δήποτέ ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ διά γε τοῦτο φρονιμωτέρους . . . ἡμᾶς ἔσεσθαι* Aristo Chius ap. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* xv. 62. Cic. similarly depreciates speculation: 'alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficilis conferunt easdemque non necessarias' *Off.* i. 19. Contrast M.'s language in p. **214. 11 sq.**

28. 11–12 τὰ νέρθεν γᾶς. Pindar's words, as quoted or paraphrased in the *Tht.*, seem to have become a familiar synonym for the inquiries of astronomy, geometry, and kindred sciences. Galen (*Test.*) applauds, M. disdains (in this passage) such studies. As at p. **18. 22** he is following the tradition of Socr.'s postponement of speculation to moral inquiry and practice. He may even have blended the *Tht.* passage with *τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς* Pl. *Ap.* 18b, cf. 19b. That he, however vaguely, recalled the *Tht.* context seems to follow from what he says about prying into a neighbour's business (*Tht.* 174b, *Test.*), but he has misunderstood or forgotten Pl.'s meaning in the whole passage, that the true philosopher ignores for

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wisdom's sake the affairs of his city and his neighbours. This detachment is what made the Christian and Neoplatonic writers so often cite Pl.'s splendid words, the former as descriptive of the true believer; see, Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 707; Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 602d, 673a; Theodoret. *Gr. aff. cur.* xii. 169; Porphyr. *De Abst.* i. 36; Iambl. *Protrept.* 14, p. 212.

28. 13 διὰ τεκμάρσεως ζητοῦντος. M. has censured curiosity about things 'above and below the earth', he now condemns astrology and other doubtful arts of the curious and ambitious, who peep into the future in hope to uncover the destiny of a relative or rival.

τέκμαρ is a *symptom*, and *τέκμαρσις* is used by Hipp. for diagnosis by symptoms, with which he contrasts divination by augury, *Acut.* ii. 26 K. Plu. inveighs against such quacks, *De Curios.* 515b, sq., and M. glances at them twice, see *Χαλδαῖοι*, p. **36. 13**, *μαθηματικοί*, p. **70. 9**. The extent of the evil at Rome is abundantly evident; Plin. illustrates it from the *delator* and *captator* Regulus: 'sacrificium facit, adfirmat exta cum siderum significatione congruere' *Ep.* ii. 20. 5, cf. Tac. *Hist.* i. 22; Juv. iii. 42, and 'nota mathematicis genesis tua' xiv. 248.

ἀρκεῖ: he is recalling *ἀρκείτω*, p. **22. 10**.

28. 14 τῷ ἔνδον ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονι. M. calls this divine element in man: *τὸν ἔνδον ἐν τῷ στήθει ἱδρυμένον δαίμονα* p. **48. 16–17**; *τῷ σαυτοῦ δ.* p. **238. 6**; *ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεός* p. **40. 14**; *τὸν ἐμὸν θεὸν καὶ δ.* p. **84. 3**. Elsewhere he identifies it with man's reason, a portion of the divine reason, given to protect and guide: *ὁ δ. ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ· οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος* p. **90. 25**. Very much the same is said by Epict., see p. **40. 14** (*Test.*).

The belief is expressed by Roman poets:

denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi Lucr. ii. 991;
quem denique in unum
descendit deus atque habitat, seque ipse requirit Manil. ii. 107;
ille deo plenus, tacita quem mente gerebat Lucan. *Phars.* ix. 564.

Similarly, 'cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit, memincrit deum se adhibere testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius' Cic. *Off.* iii. 44; 'mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura quae digito

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demonstrari potest; deum te igitur scito esse' *Rep.* vi. 26; 'is deus, qui est animus suus cuique' Apul. *De deo Socr.* 15; 'prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est . . . sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos' Sen. *Ep.* 41. 2; 'deum in corpore humano hospitantem' *Ep.* 31. 11, where *hospitantem* recalls Hadrian's

> animula vagula blandula
> hospes comesque corporis *H.A.* i. 25. 9.

This belief in something divine, dwelling in man, goes back, in Greek thought, at least to Pindar. M. seems to have been thinking of a passage in Pl., where the mention of 'touching' the divine is followed, as it is here, by language which expresses the cult of the δαίμων: ἅνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται . . . ἅτε δὲ ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν εὖ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἑαυτῷ . . . θεραπεία δέ . . . *Ti.* 90c, cf. p. **28.** 14 n.

There the mind is distinguished from the self, as a superior to be observed and tended with worship. This is the animistic point of view, which we meet in such a passage as that cited from Men. *Fr.* 550 K. at p. **90.** 25, *Test.*, cf. id. *Epitrep.* 527, Jensen.

The language of Posidonius, Cicero's teacher, resembles this: ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ δαίμονι, συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι Galen v. 469. This is one view expressed by Socr. in the *Phaedo*: τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ . . . εἰς Ἅιδου 107d, cf. 108b.

The rationalizing tendency is, in the evidence we possess, even older: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων Heraclit. 119 D., 121 B.; ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώποισι δαίμων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακός Epicharm. 17 D.; ψυχή, οἰκητήριον δαίμονος Democrit. 171. Going further in the direction of identifying the δαίμων with νοῦς, Eur. says: Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν *Troad.* 886, cf. id. *Fr.* 1018, cited at p. **246.** 9; and to this doctrine Arist. appears to refer: τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον *Gen. An.* 736^{b}27, cf. ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς θεὸς καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐρρύηκεν p. **246.** 9–10.

Pl. expresses the identity of δαίμων and ἦθος: οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε *R.* 617e, and of δαίμων with

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τὸ κυριώτατον παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδος *Ti.* 90a; cf. M.'s τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον p. 50. 1.

Xenocrates, who was head of the Academy said: εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα Arist. *Top.* 112ᵃ37, cf. p. 126. 5. This saying has been generally interpreted in the *animistic* sense by recent writers, but the evidence is inconclusive.

M. keeps an open mind on this matter, sometimes writing in terms which accord with the religious and animistic view, as he does here and in Books iii and xii; sometimes, as in Book v, adopting the rationalizing attitude. He never takes up the position, which is e.g. expressed in Plu., that the δαίμων is able to leave the body it inhabits, to give information about events remote in place and time, and to forecast future events (*De genio Socr.* chs. 22–4, esp. 591d, 592c, 593d). Even less does M. hold the doctrine of an evil genius, such as we meet with in Plu. *Brut.* 36, id. *Caesar* 69, in Dio Chrys. (see p. 24. 14 n), and in Hor. *Ep.* ii. 2. 187.

The old Roman belief was that the *genius* is the *numen* residing in a man, that is, the man's own power. The Greek belief in the δαίμων gave to the Romans the novel idea of an indwelling deity coming from outside, and their native belief in *genius* and *numen* made it easier for them to use δαίμων in the double sense which we meet with in Stoic literature. Similarly, we ourselves find it easy to interpret and to accept two quite different conceptions, expressed by: 'Conscience, this deity in my bosom' (Shak. *Temp.* ii. 1) and, in Tennyson's *Crossing the Bar*, by: 'I hope to see my pilot face to face.' The doctrine in M., however obscure, affords a kind of compromise between reliance upon the higher or idealized self, which is the spur to individual moral progress, and the assurance of divine grace and protection, the conviction of the religious consciousness. So Bonhöffer remarks of the similar doctrine in Epict.: 'doch wir können ihm dies nicht verübeln, da ein die Vernunft befriedigender Ausgleich zwischen göttlicher Gnade und menschlicher Freiheit auch heute noch nicht gefunden ist' loc. cit. vol. i, p. 85.

28. 14 γνησίως θεραπεύειν: the adv. means *genuinely*: τῷ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν . . . γν. ᾠκειωμένῳ p. **36.** 10; ὑμῖν . . . γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος

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honestly standing up to you Pl. *Ap.* 31e; *πεπεισμένοι γν.* Epicur. D.L. x. 130, cf. 125.

θεραπεύειν is used of cult and worship: *οὐκ ἀνωμάλως οὐδ' ἀτάκτως οὔτ' ἐθεράπευον οὔτ' ὠργίαζον* Isoc. vii. 29; *τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* Arist. *E.E.* 1249b20; see *τὰ ὄργια* p. **42.** 22.

Pl. has *ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον Ti.* 90c, where Dr. Taylor says: 'he is the "true worshipper" who is paying *λογικὴ λατρεία* (*Rom.* 12. 1) to God.'

28. 15 **θεραπεία δὲ αὐτοῦ**: Pl. similarly continues *θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία Ti.* l.c. This care of the genius is *τηρεῖν ἀνύβριστον καὶ ἀσινῆ* p. **32.** 18–19; the self is to be purged of alien and disturbing passions: *ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ* Epict. ii. 18. 19.

θεραπεία here retains some of its sense of psychical therapy combined with the notion of ceremonial purity. Similarly, the Socratic *ἔλεγχος* is a psychical purgative: *οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς . . .* Pl. *Sph.* 230c.

28. 17 **δι' ἀρετήν**, *excellence, greatness* of the gods, cf. *τὰ ὄργια τῆς τούτου ἀρετῆς* of the *δαίμων* p. **42.** 22. So Pl. speaks of the *οὐρανός, δι' ἀρετὴν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον συγγίγνεσθαι Ti.* 34b. The term in this sense occurs in N.T.: *τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς ἰδίᾳ δοξῇ καὶ ἀρετῇ* 2 *Pet.* 1. 3; *ἀρεταί* are the excellent attributes of the Godhead, 1 *Pet.* 2. 9; *τὰς θεοῦ ἀρετὰς τὰς ἀρρεπεῖς* Ph. i. 606.

28. 17–18 **διὰ συγγένειαν**, contented with what comes from man, because he is our kinsman; M. looks back to *μοὶ συγγενής* p. **20.** 5, cf. *συγγενὲς πᾶν τὸ λογικόν* p. **40.** 5.

28. 18 **τρόπον τινὰ ἐλεεινά**, in a way they are to be pitied because of their blindness: *ἐνθυμοῦ τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαβὼν ἥμαρτεν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδὼν ἐλεήσεις αὐτόν* p. **128.** 21–2.

τρόπον τινά is used because of the orthodox Stoic view: 'neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum' Cic. *Mur.* 61; 'non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret' Sen. *Clem.* ii. 6. 3. Pl.'s attitude illustrates the difference between his teaching and the Stoics' in this matter. He says: *ἐλεεινὸς μὲν πάντως ὅ γε ἄδικος*

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καὶ ὁ τὰ κακὰ ἔχων, ἐλεεῖν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἰάσιμα ἔχοντα ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὸν θυμὸν πραῦνειν . . . τῷ δ' ἀκράτως καὶ ἀπαραμυθήτως πλημμελεῖ καὶ κακῷ ἐφιέναι δεῖ τὴν ὀργήν· διὸ δὴ θυμοειδῆ πρέπειν καὶ πρᾳόν φαμεν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν *Lg.* 731c.

Contrast: *τί οὖν χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῇ* ('Medea ferox invictaque' of tragedy) *ὅτι πεπλάνηται . . . οὐχὶ δ', εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖς, ὡς τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν;* Epict. i. 28. 9; 'omnibus dignis proderit et deorum more calamitosos propitius respiciet' Sen. *Clem.* l.c. Again Epict. says: *χαλεπαίνειν οὖν δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐλεεῖν αὐτούς; ἀλλὰ δεῖξον τὴν πλάνην καὶ ὄψει* i. 18. 3, where the meaning is: 'No, you must indicate their error.' So we do pity Medea, but pity her as blinded. M. then means that we are not to be touched by human infirmity, but to have the reasonable *emotion* if it may be so termed, which the physician entertains, when he tries to relieve an ailment.

δι' ἄγνοιαν: *παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν* p. **20.** 3. In the larger treatment at xi. 18. 2, M. says *ἄκοντες καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες* p. **224.** 15, so that he is not making the subtle distinction here between *δι' ἄγνοιαν* and *ἀγνοῶν* which Arist. uses in *E.N.* iii. 1, 1110^{b}25.

30. 2 τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα: see Epict. *Test.*

M., like many, perhaps most, religious and moral thinkers is fond of the analogy between the bodily vision and the mind's eye; *ἑτέρᾳ τινὶ ὄψει* p. **48.** 7.

Ch. 14: 30. 3 τοσαυτάκις μύρια: *τρὶς μύριοι* is a familiar manner of speech:

> *τρὶς γὰρ μύριοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ*
> *ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων* Hes. *Op.* 252.
>
> *τρεῖς δ' ἄρα χιλιάδες τρισσαῖς ἐπὶ μυριάδεσσι*
> Theocr. xvii. 83.

M. may, however, be thinking of the fanciful periods of transmigration: *τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι* Emped. 115. 6; *τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι* Hdt. ii. 123; cf. line 11.

30. 6–7 τὸ ἀπολλύμενον οὖν ἴσον. Gat.'s correction is necessary for the sense; *τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἕκαστος ζῇ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποβάλλει* p. **246.** 12–13. Sch.'s emendation, I suppose, is intended to refer to the familiar: 'nil esse in vita *proprium* mortali datum'

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Lucil. xxvii. 664 Lachm., cf. Lucr. iii. 971; Sen. *Ep.* 72. 7. However, the remark would be irrelevant here.

30. 7 **ἀκαριαῖον**: one of M.'s *inopinata verba*.

ἀκαριαῖος means (*a*) *trifling, weak*, as of a flame easily blown out *ἀκαριαίας καὶ μικρᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ φλογὸς ἐνούσης* Arist. *Resp.* 479ª19; a sense appropriate to this present feeble, flickering life; cf. *ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἅπτεται... ἀποσβέννυται* Heraclit. 26 D., 77 B.; pp. **44.** 17, **70.** 18, **90.** 11, **226.** 1; (*b*) *a hair's breadth*, of space or time, as here: *τοῦ οἴακος ἀκ. τι μεθισταμένου* Arist. *De Motu*, 701ᵇ26; *ἀκαρῆ διαλιπών*, 'waiting a tick', Aristoph. *Nu.* 496; *πόσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀκ. χρόνον* p. **106.** 23.

30. 7. 8 **ἀναφαίνεται**, with the inferential *οὕτως*, 'turns out to be'. The word *ἀναφαίνεσθαι* conveys a suggestion of paradox: *ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής* Pl. *Hipp. Mi.* 369b, cf. *R.* 334a; *Ion*, 541e.

§ 2: **30.** 10 **ἀεὶ μεμνῆσθαι.** I have restored *ἀεὶ* for *δεῖ*. *ἀεί*, *ἄν*, *δή*, and *δεῖ* are often written for one another.

ἑνὸς μέν. This argument is intrusive, the main reflection continues at *ἑτέρου δέ*. The notion *πάντα ἐξ ἀιδίου ὁμοειδῆ* recurs at pp. **112.** 12, **116.** 16–17, **120.** 15, **184.** 21–2, **204.** 20–1, **246.** 6–7. The sad thought is intended to reconcile himself to death.

30. 11 **ἀνακυκλούμενα.** The thought of everlasting cycles was doubtless suggested by *τρὶς χίλια ἔτη* line 3, cf. *ταὐτά ἐστι τὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐγκύκλια, ἄνω κάτω, ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνα* p. **180.** 26. If M. glances at the notion of a cycle of existences for the soul, the motive for this digression will have been to remind himself that such a series of lives would, like an infinitely long life here, bring no new experience.

The sense that there is nothing new under the sun belongs to the pessimistic vein which made Heraclitus, in popular belief, the *weeping* philosopher. To M. this sameness is one of the lessons of history: *ὅλως ἄνω κάτω τὰ αὐτὰ εὑρήσεις, ὧν μεσταὶ αἱ ἱστορίαι αἱ παλαιαί, αἱ μέσαι, αἱ ὑπόγυιοι· ... οὐδὲν καινόν* p. **120.** 15–17.

The image of the wheel is one of everyday thought, 'the whirligig of time brings in his revenges'; *κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπηίων ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων* Hdt. i. 207; *κύκλον εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα* Arist. *Ph.* 223ᵇ24; the verb is sometimes used of Fortune's

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wheel; *τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς* id. *E.N.* 1100b3, an image M. avoids, though he refers, without emphasis, to the Stoic doctrine of recurrent cycles of the life of the Universe pp. **86.** 1, **94.** 8, **196.** 5.

30. 12 **τὰ αὐτά τις ὄψεται:** *ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα* p. **64.** 5–6. No doubt M. had Lucr. in mind as he was writing this ch.: 'eadem tamen omnia restant' iii. 947.

30. 13 **ὁ πολυχρονιώτατος:** cf. pp. **72.** 22, **184.** 15–16. This is a common topic of the literature of consolation. He seems again to be thinking of Lucr.:

> proinde licet quot vis vivendo condere saecla;
> mors aeterna tamen nilo minus illa manebit iii. 1090.

Sen., writing to Marullus on the loss of his little son, says: 'nulla, inquam, res eum laedit, qui nullus est: vivit, si laeditur. . . . omnes, quantum ad brevitatem aevi, si universo compares, et iuvenes et senes, in aequo sumus. . . . hoc quod vivimus proximum nihilo est: et tamen, o dementiam nostram! late disponitur' *Ep.* 99. 30.

Ch. 15: 30. 16 **ὅτι πᾶν ὑπόληψις.** The *ὅτι* is not intrusive, as it is continually in C, but introduces M.'s citation, cf. the use of *ὅτι* for inverted commas, as in *ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς ἥκω παρὰ σέ* Th. i. 137. 4; *τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς* Pl. *Ap.* 23d. That M. again, p. **244.** 1, introduces this saying with *ὅτι* leaves little room for doubt that other places opening with *ὅτι* are quoted from authors not named by him. See pp. **54.** 24, **148.** 3, **242.** 10, and 25, **244.** 1.

30. 16 **πρὸς τὸν Κυνικὸν Μόνιμον.** This Cynic philosopher held sceptical views (see *Test.*); he meant that there is no criterion to distinguish what is true and false in man's imagining. That he had impressed his contemporaries is clear from *Test.* Man's beliefs he compared to the painted perspective of a theatre: *σκηνογραφίᾳ ἀπείκασαν τὰ ὄντα, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ ὕπνους ἢ μανίαν προσπίπτουσι ταῦτα ὡμοιῶσθαι ὑπέλαβον* S. Emp. *Math.* vii. 88, they are no more real than a dream or delirium.

M. here adopts his words, employing them in his own sense, cf. *ὅτι πάντα ὑπόληψις καὶ αὕτη ἐπὶ σοί* pp. **244.** 1, **246.** 12. This

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is the *kernel* of Hamlet's saying, 'for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so'.

Everything depends upon man's judgement and he can control this: *τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἡ ὀδύνη γίγνεται, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν οὕτως ὑπολάβῃς περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκ ὀδυνήσῃ· ἐὰν δὲ ὡς ἑτέρως, ἀνιάσῃ . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τρόπων καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης* Bion, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 41; *ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα* Epict. *Ench.* 5, the text of Montaigne, *Essais*, i. 40.

ὑπόληψις is difficult to render, since M. uses the word generically to cover *judgement*, *opinion*, and *imagination*. As a phil. term, it could stand for *mental conception* in general: *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων* Arist. *De An.* 427^{b}24. The verb means to take something to be true, whether it be true or not, so that the substantive is commonly employed for mere opinion, fancy: *ὑπολήψει καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι*, id. *E.N.* 1139^{b}17. Mon. took advantage of this ambiguity and said: 'everything is *fancy*.'

The text, *πρὸς τὸν K.*, has been suspected, although the idiom is the same as in *ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται*, which is equivalent to *ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος*, Pl. *Prt.* 345c, 344b, cf. *ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους R.* 464d. No doubt the retort was the familiar weapon against the sceptic: 'your saying too is merely fancy: on your own showing the maxim conveys no more than *your* belief.'

30. 18 **τὸ νόστιμον**, *palatable*, *containing grist*: 'et nucleum celat arida testa bonum' Anon. *Fab. Praef.* M. means that he can use the saying of Monimus profitably, implying perhaps that he accepts its other sense that *τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄνειρος καὶ τῦφος* p. **32.** 16.

Mon. composed a *Προτρεπτικὸς Λόγος* and two volumes *Περὶ ὁρμῶν*, but also *παίγνια σπουδῇ λεληθυίᾳ μεμιγμένα* D.L. vi. 83, that is, he resembled on this side Menippus and the others, whom M. calls *τῆς ἐπικήρου καὶ ἐφημέρου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς χλευασταί* p. **116.** 26–7. It is said of him: *ἐμβριθέστατος ἐγένετο ὥστε δόξης μὲν καταφρονεῖν, πρὸς δ' ἀλήθειαν παρορμᾶν*. D.L. l.c.

Ch. 16: 30. 19 **ὑβρίζει ἑαυτήν**: he looks back to p. **24.** 3.

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ἀπόστημα καὶ οἷον φῦμα: *ἀπόστημα κόσμου ὁ ἀφιστάμενος καὶ χωρίζων ἑαυτὸν τοῦ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως λόγου* p. **62.** 23–4; a play upon the verbal likeness of *ἀπόστημα* to *ἀπόστασις*.

Epict. uses *ἀπ.* and *φύματα* for *growths* which philosophy cuts out of a man's system i. 11. 35. Both Greek and Latin writers have the image: *λαβὼν ἔτεμεν ἀφεστηκός τι τοῦ σώματος* Dio Chry. xxxiii. 6, p. 3. Catiline was a *νόσημα καὶ ἀ. πόλεως* Plu. *Praec. gerend. reip.* 809e; 'ii medentur reip., qui exsecant pestem aliquam, tamquam strumam civitatis' Cic. *Sest.* 135; Augustus 'haec ulcera cum ipsis membris absciderat' Sen. *De brev. vit.* 4. 6; he termed his daughter Julia and her two children 'tria carcinomata sua' Suet. *Aug.* 65. So Lear says:

> Thou art a boil,
> A plague-sore, an embossed carbuncle
> In my corrupted blood Shak. *King Lear*, ii. 4. 220.

32. 1 ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ: *(τὴν ὀργὴν) ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὅσον ἐφ' ἑ.* Philod. *De Ira*, p. 78. Man's will cannot ultimately prevail: *ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα* Epict. iii. 11. 3; if there is apparent evil, the explanation is *καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρῃζεν ὁ κόσμος* p. **114.** 11.

32. 2–3 ⟨ὑφ'⟩ ἧς ἐν μέρει. With the MS. text Xyl. translated: 'cuius quidem naturae una in parte reliquae singulorum naturae omnes continentur'; Gat.: 'in cuius parte aliqua reliquorum omnium cuiusque natura continetur.'

This is unsatisfactory because the doctrine is that in Universal nature (not in one or another part of it) all particulars are embraced. Accordingly, if any is rebellious it disturbs *ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ* the general consent. Moreover, *ἐν μέρει* with *ἕκαστ-* following it surely points to a distributive sense, either 'each in turn', or 'each regarded as a particular', and *ἔν τινι περιέχεσθαι* is not a known construction. Again *⟨αἱ⟩ ἑκάστου τῶν λοίπων φύσεις*, Cor.'s emendation, is not intelligible Greek.

Dr. Rendall proposed *ἧς ἑνώσει*, 'by the uniting power whereof', but that is very far from the tradition, though it gives an excellent meaning, cf. p. **248.** 14.

I suggest that *ἐν μέρει ἑκάστου* is a corruption of *ἐν μέρει ἕκασται*, the adverbial expression being used like *ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, severally and in succession*, Pl. *Lg.* 819b; *τὸ μὲν γένει εἶναί ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ πολλῶν . . . κατηγορεῖσθαι, τὸ δ' ἐν μέρει*

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εἶναί ἐστι τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν εἶναι ὑφ' ἕν τι ἢ γένος ἢ εἶδος Alex. Aphr. *Quaest.* p. 24. To complete the construction I read ⟨ὑφ'⟩ ἧς.

The sense may be illustrated by St. Paul's ὑμεῖς δέ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους, members *severally*, each for his part 1 *Cor.* 12. 27.

32. 8 **ἐπ' οὐδένα σκοπόν**: recurring to μὴ ἔχοντες σκοπόν p. **24.** 10, and rendered by εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπαρακολουθήτως, 'at random and without a conscious end to pursue', cf. ἀπαρ. αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι p. **78.** 10.

32. 9–10 **κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀναφοράν.** This is repeatedly urged in Book xii, see chs. 8, 10, 18, and 20.

32. 10 **τὸ ἕπεσθαι**, *follow*, that is, *obey*: ὁ τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ πᾶν ἑπόμενος p. **200.** 13; τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ p. **248.** 20.

32. 10–11 **τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας**: the καί is of identity; cf. πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν Pl. *R.* 449a, 541a; πολιτείαν δ' αὖ συγχωροῦντες πόλιν οὐκ ἂν ἀποτρέποιντο ὁμολογεῖν ἤ τι τούτῳ παραπλήσιον τὸ πολιτευόμενον Dio Chrys. xxxvi. 37, p. 91 R.; 'mundum . . . esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 64. Again λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ is almost an identity; θεσμός, like our *ordinance*, is an old-fashioned word reappearing in this period, e.g. ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος, ὃς κυριωτέρᾳ κλήσει προσονομάζεται θεσμός, νόμος θεῖος ὤν Ph. i. 34.

32. 11 **τῆς πρεσβυτάτης**: like *antiquissima*, the word expresses dignity and preference even more than antiquity; ἡ πρεσβυτάτη τῶν θεῶν is Δίκη and Ἀλήθεια p. **170.** 4. Pollux says: πρεσβεύειν τὸ τιμᾶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι, καὶ τὸ οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον (*Smp.* 218d) ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐδὲν τιμιώτερον ii. 12.

For the comparison of the Universe to a venerable commonwealth, see ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις p. **52.** 5, and pp. **46.** 3, **54.** 2–5, **60.** 18. The phrase and idea is common in these centuries, e.g. 'universus hic mundus una civitas communis deorum atque hominum' Cic. *Lg.* i. 23; 'urbem dis hominibusque communem' Sen. *Ad Marc.* 18. 1; 'patria mea totus hic mundus' id. *Ep.* 28. 4; 'hanc communem omnium mundi civitatem' Minuc. Fel. *Oct.* 17. 2; (ἄνθρωπος) μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων Epict. ii. 5. 26.

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Epict. continues: *μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἥτις ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα,* and to this temporal city, imperial Rome, M., at other places, pp. **116.** 8, **250.** 9, refers.

Ch. 17: 32. 12 **τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου,** *mortal* life, since *ἄνθρωπος* and its adjectives are so often used in Greek writers with a stress upon mortality: *ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ' ἀνθρώπων Il.* v. 442; *ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἥμαρτον· οὐ θαυμαστέον* Menand. *Fr.* 499 K. So M. employs *ἄνθρωπε* in contrast with *τῇ μεγάλῃ ταύτῃ πόλει* p. **250.** 9.

στιγμή. 'His time a moment, and a point his space' Pope, *Essay on Man,* i. 72; *πᾶν τὸ ἐνεστὼς τοῦ χρόνου στιγμὴ τοῦ αἰῶνος* p. **112.** 4–5; *τὰ μύρια . . . ἔτη στιγμή τίς ἐστιν ἀόριστος, μᾶλλον δὲ μορίου τι βραχύτατον στιγμῆς* Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 111c; *στιγμὴ χρόνου πᾶς ἐστιν ὁ βιός* Plu. *De Educ.* 13a; *στιγμὴ καὶ στιγμῆς εἴ τι χαμηλότερον Anth. Pal.* vii. 472; 'punctum est quod vivimus et adhuc puncto minus' Sen. *Ep.* 49. 3.

οὐσία ῥέουσα, with a reference to Heraclitus, as at *ποταμός τις καὶ ῥεῦμα βίαιον ὁ αἰών* p. **68.** 6, cf. pp. **102.** 11, **126.** 16, **182.** 9. M. extends the 'flux' idea to time p. **26.** 23–4, and here to man also, the microcosm.

32. 13 **αἴσθησις ἀμυδρά:** Suid. says *ἀμυδρά· ἀφανῆ, σκοτεινά.* The word is well chosen for the uncertainty of sensible objects, as of things seen through a watery or misty medium; we see 'in a glass darkly'. M. follows Pl. in transferring the adj. to man's senses: *δι' ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν . . . θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος* Pl. *Phdr.* 250b; *τὰ δὲ αἰσθητήρια ἀμυδρὰ καὶ εὐπαρατύπωτα* p. **94.** 16.

32. 13–14 **ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ῥόμβος.** Xyl. and Gat. prefer the variant *ῥεμβός vaga*; I. Cas. in his note to *H.A.* i. 25 says that you might turn 'animula vagula, blandula' literally by *ῥόμβον, χαρίεν ψυχάριον,* 'anima vaga *ῥόμβος ψ.* apud M. imperatorem'. M. Cas. read *ῥομβός* and translated 'vaga'. Xyl. compares *παῦσαι ῥεμβόμενος* p. **24.** 8, and refers to *ῥεμβόμενον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν Περπένναν καταμαθών* Plu. *Pomp.* 20, and to a sim. use in id. *Fab.* 20.

Xyl. remarked that the *ψυχή* could not well be called a *rhombus,* and Sir Thomas Browne says: 'if any shall further query . . . why

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the noble Antoninus in some sense doth call the soul it self a Rhombus' *Cyrus*, ch. 5, vol. 3, p. 209 Sayle.

ῥόμβος is used for a child's toy p. **96.** 12, either a *top* or a *bull-roarer*, a piece of notched wood swung round the head to make a booming noise.

M. is perhaps thinking of *ψυχή* as *anima*, and means an *eddy* of breath, deriving the image from the toy which gives the visual impression of a circle or from the spinning top.

32. 14 **τύχη δυστέκμαρτον**: Schultz read *ψυχὴ δυστ. . . . τύχη ῥόμβος*, and there is some disorder in the MSS.

P's *τύχη* δ. is supported by *δυσπαρακολούθητόν τι πρᾶγμ' ἐστὶν Τύχη* Menand. *Fr.* 490 K., which Holste cites; cf.

ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἔφυ τι ποικίλον
καὶ δυστέκμαρτον Eur. *Hel.* 712.

M. may be thinking of the *τέκμαρσις*, prying into the future, of astrologers, p. **28.** 13 n.

32. 14 **φήμη ἄκριτον**: *φήμη* is used, instead of his usual *δόξα*, for assonance with *ψυχή*, *τύχη* and to lead on to *ὑστεροφημία* l. 17.

As *ἄκριτον* is distinguished from *εὐμετάβολον* p. **52.** 11, the word here would mean 'without judgement', though the want of balance leads to the sense *fluctuating* in its praise and blame, Dryden's 'still discordant, *wavering* multitude': *μηδὲ φοβοῦ πολλῶν ἄκριτον καὶ ἀναιδέα δόξαν* Cleanthes, Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 655; *νῦν μὲν ἡδόμενον, νῦν δὲ λυπούμενον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἄκριτον οὖσαν, ὥσπερ τὸν ἀέρα ἐν ταῖς τροπαῖς*, 'showery with intervals of sun', Dio Chrys. *Or.* iv. 78, p. 164; *οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν τὸ τοῦ φαύλου ἡγ., ἀβέβαιόν ἐστιν, ἄκριτον, ἄλλοθ' ὑπ' ἄλλης φαντασίας νικώμενον* Epict. ii. 22. 25; 'non est enim consilium in vulgo, non ratio, non discrimen' Cic. *Planc.* 9; 'ex errore inperitae multitudinis pendet' id. *Off.* i. 65.

The worthlessness of popular opinion is a remedy against both love of glory and fear of blame: *τί δὲ δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν;* Pl. *Prt.* 353a.

32. 16 **τῦφος**: associated with *ὄνειρος*, the word means *delirium*, *nightmare*, p. **30.** 16 n.

ὁ δὲ βίος πόλεμος: *ὁ βίος ἡμῖν κινδυνεύει μακρός τις εἶναι καὶ*

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πολυετὴς πόλεμος Hierocles, Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 663. The image is familiar from the Scriptures, see *στρατείας* p. **72.** 25.

32. 17 **ὑστεροφημία.** M. often recurs to this topic, as if he were conscious in himself of the 'last infirmity of noble mind'; see, *ἡ μηκίστη ὑ.* p. **44.** 19, cf. pp. **52.** 9, **58.** 1, **64.** 28, **122.** 17, **152.** 22.

§ 2: 32. 17 **παραπέμψαι:** he may be thinking simply of an *escort* giving *σωτηρία*:

καί νύ κε τὴν ἔνθ' ὧκα βάλεν μεγάλας ποτὶ πέτρας,
ἀλλ' Ἥρη παρέπεμψεν, ἐπεὶ φίλος ἦεν Ἰήσων *Od.* xii. 71.

32. 18 **φιλοσοφία:** *ἁπλοῦν ἐστι καὶ αἰδῆμον τὸ φιλοσοφίας ἔργον· μή με ἄπαγε ἐπὶ σεμνοτυφίαν* p. **182.** 20–1.

τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα: *τήρησον οὖν σεαυτόν* p. **108.** 17 n., Pl. *Ti.* 90c.

ἀνύβριστον: the word recalls the *ὕβρις* motive of chs. 6 and 16.

32. 19 **ἀσινῆ,** *scatheless*; an old-fashioned word such as M. affects, especially in this Book:

τίς ποτ' ἂν εὔξαιτο βροτῶν ἀσινεῖ
δαίμονι φῦναι; Aesch. *Ag.* 1341.

where *δαίμων* means birth-destiny, cf. *μοῖρα* p. **48.** 23; *ἀπέπεμψε ἀσινέα* Hdt. ii. 181.

For the meaning, cf. 'sancta ad vos anima, atque istius nescia culpae' Virg. *Aen.* xii. 648, where *sancta* is interpreted *incorrupta*.

The language is expressive of ceremonial purity, cf.

τὰν εὔσεπτον ἁγνείαν λόγων
ἔργων τε πάντων ὧν νόμοι πρόκεινται
ὑψίποδες,

where the antistrophe contrasts *ὕβρις* with this holiness Soph. *O.T.* 863.

32. 19 **κρείττονα:** here, and at p. **142.** 7, I have printed the Attic form, since M. uses it in 24 other places. *κρείττονα* means overcoming pleasure-pain.

εἰκῇ: see prefatory remarks (v).

32. 20 **ἀνενδεῆ τοῦ ἄλλον ποιῆσαί τι:** cf. *μήτε ὅρκου δεόμενος, μήτε ἀνθρώπου τινὸς μάρτυρος* p. **40.** 17–18.

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32. 22 ἐκεῖθέν ποθεν . . . ὅθεν αὐτός: cf. *πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ* p. **22.** 5–6 and see prefatory remarks (i).

32. 23 ἵλεῳ τῇ γνώμῃ, 'purpose which is *sanctified*', *propitia*, again a ritual word. I have translated *satisfied* because of the use of *ἵλεως* p. **250.** 17 for both worshipper and worshipped.

32. 24 συγκρίνεται: see *συγκριμάτων* p. **22.** 9. *λύσις* or *διάλυσις* has left its trace in our word *dissolution* for death.

32. 27 οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν. M. has converted the negative 'nothing natural is evil' in order to end on the words *κατὰ φύσιν*. He thus gets an enthymeme in the second figure, leaving unexpressed the conclusion 'the change of all and its dissolution is no evil.'

BOOK III

The characteristic features of this Book I have outlined at p. 297. The impression which it leaves upon a reader of continuous composition at one distinct period is confirmed, I think, by an analysis of its relatively limited circle of ideas, by the employment of some 108 words not met with elsewhere in the *Meditations* and by certain unique turns of phrase, which are shown below in heavier type. The remarkable study in ch. 2 of a certain aesthetic and moral reaction to experience is also without exact parallel in the rest of the author's work. The following are the dominant motives of the Book:

(i) The Deity or *genius* within the breast, already mentioned in Book II, and now identified with man's birth *μοῖρα*: *νοῦς καὶ δαίμων* pp. **38. 2, 42.** 21; **τῷ ἔνδον ἱδρυμένῳ αὐτοῦ** p. **38.** 18; **ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεός** p. **40.** 14; **αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνιδρυμένου ἐν σοὶ δαίμονος** p. **42.** 3; *ἐὰν . . . τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονα καθαρὸν ἑστῶτα τηρῇς* p. **46.** 15; **τὸν δὲ ἔνδον ἐν τῷ στήθει ἱδρυμένον δαίμονα** *μὴ φύρειν* p. **48.** 16; *ἡ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ νεμομένη μοῖρα* **συνεμφέρεταί τε καὶ συνεμφέρει** p. **40.** 3; *τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μοίρᾳ συνηρμοσμένον* p. **48.** 23.

(ii) Dedication of the higher self and care for it: **τὸ ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι** p. **34.** 8; **τῆς τοῦ ἰδίου ἡγεμονικοῦ παρατηρήσεως** p. **38.** 7; *τῇ ψυχῇ . . . χρήσεται* p. **42.** 25; **ἱερεύς τίς ἐστι καὶ ὑπουργὸς θεῶν** p. **38.** 17; *μόνα γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* p. **40.** 1; *τὸ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ τὴν διάνοιάν σου* p. **40.** 22; *εἴ τί σοι μέλει σεαυτοῦ* p. **48.** 4.

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(iii) Glad contentment with Nature's dispensation: **μόνῳ** (sc. **πιθανὰ**) **τῷ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν . . . γνησίως ᾠκειωμένῳ** p. **36.** 10: *ἀσπαζόμενον . . . τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἀπονεμόμενα πάντα* p. **38.** 22; *τὸ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ τὴν διάνοιάν σου . . . τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ . . . ἐν τοῖς . . . ἀπονεμομένοις* p. **40.** 22; *ἀσπάζεσθαι τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ συγκλωθόμενα αὐτῷ* p. **48.** 15, cf. p. **40.** 2; *κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀρθὸν πράσσοντά σε* p. **40.** 23; *ἑπόμενος τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ* p. **46.** 15.

(iv) Preparation for approaching death: *χρὴ οὖν* **ἐπείγεσθαι . . .** *τῷ ἐγγυτέρῳ τοῦ θανάτου ἑκάστοτε γίνεσθαι* p. **34.** 11; *μέρος ἔλαττον (τοῦ βίου) καταλείπεται* p. **34.** 2; *τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον τοῦ βίου μέρος* p. **38.** 3; **εὔλυτος** pp. **40.** 17, **44.** 2, **48.** 22; *ὡς εἰ καὶ ἤδη ἀποδοῦναι (τὸν δαίμονα) δέοι* p. **46.** 17; *ἕως ἔξεστιν* p. **48.** 4; *σπεῦδε οὖν εἰς τέλος* p. **48.** 3; *ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τοῦ βίου* p. **48.** 22.

(v) Frankness opposed to concealment: *μετὰ παρρησίας . . . ἂν ἀποκρίναιο* p. **38.** 11; *τοίχων καὶ* **παραπετασμάτων** p. **42.** 20; *οὐδὲ* **ἐμφωλεῦον** p. **44.** 11; *ἐπειδὰν* **κλείσωσι τὰς θύρας** p. **48.** 14; **τῇ ἡρωικῇ ἀληθείᾳ** p. **46.** 19; *μήτε φθεγγόμενόν τι παρὰ τὰ ἀληθῆ* p. **48.** 18.

(vi) The definition of philosophy as *ἡ ἐμπειρία* **τῶν τε θείων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων** p. **34.** 5, **τὸ τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα** *εἰδέναι* p. **46.** 23.

Ch. 1: 34. 1 δεῖ λογίζεσθαι. In making up our *account* we are to estimate the diminishing balance of our days, *τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον τοῦ βίου μέρος* p. **38.** 3, but also to take into our reckoning that time is measured by the worth of the objects upon which it is expended, and therefore by our ability or inability to employ it well.

34. 1–2 καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀπαναλίσκεται: cf. *ἐάν τι ἀπαναλίσκηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτόν I.G.*^{2} i. 91. 26.

34. 3–4 εἰ ἐξαρκέσει . . . πρός: *πότερον ἐξαρκεῖ ἡ διάνοιά μου πρὸς τοῦτο;* p. **122.** 9; cf. *πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ βραχύ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ γεωμετρίας μόριον* Pl. *R.* 526d.

ὁμοία αὖθις, the words combine two senses: (*a*) *unaltered, ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον* Pl. *Cri.* 48b, where the adv., as in *αὖθις αὖ πάλιν* Soph. *Ph.* 952 means *ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς*; (*b*) *a match for,* thus strengthening *ἐξαρκέσει,* cf. *αἱ γνῶμαι πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους ὁμοῖαι* Th. ii. 89. 11.

34. 4 τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων: *τὰ πράγματα* are (i) the realities

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of sense experience, as in *αἱ φρένες γηράσκοντι συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται* Hdt. iii. 134; (ii) reality generally, *τῶν πραγμάτων ἀΐδιος ἔσσα* Philol. 6, cf. Democr. 164. This is a sense Aristoph. plays upon: *τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα Nu.* 228, cf. ib. 741; so *πρ.* are opp. to *χρόνος*, the period of their occurrence, Arist. *Mete.* 379^{a}32,^{b}1, *Ph.* 226^{b}30, 227^{b}28, *τὰ πρ. φυόμενα Pol.* 1252^{a}24; (iii) the events which underlie moral experience, so that M. adds *καὶ τῆς θεωρίας . . .*, cf. p. **88.** 9 sq.

34. 5 **καὶ τῆς θεωρίας τῆς συντεινούσης.** Reiske's substitution of the acc. is not needed, for *καί* is virtually epexegetic. The grasp of realities has as its correlate to understand the manner of estimating them.

θεωρία, as at *ἐγὼ δὲ τεθεωρήκως* p. **20.** 3, is insight resting upon scientific principles; cf. *τῇ διὰ τοῦ λόγου θεωρίᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων* opp. to *τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρουμένου* Epicurus ap. D.L. x. 59.

συντείνειν means *contribute to*, with no implication of effort, *σ. εἰς τὸ κοινῇ χρήσιμον* p. **122.** 16.

34. 5–6 **τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῶν τε θείων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων:** *ἐμπειρία*, not in the common Arist. sense but as an equivalent to *ἐπιστήμη*, p. **6.** 18 n., 'knowledge based upon insight into natural law', cf. *ἐμπειρία τῆς τῶν θεῶν θεραπείας = ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θ.* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 68, D.L. vii. 119.

With *τῶν τε θείων καὶ τῶν ἀνθ.* supply *πραγμάτων*. The term was already familiar in the fifth century B.C., e.g. *βούλει τὰ θεῖα πράγματ' εἰδέναι σαφῶς | ἅττ' ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς;* Aristoph. *Nu.* 250. So, *ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους . . . καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθ. τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θ. ὅσια* Pl. *Grg.* 507a.

The Stoics defined *φιλοσοφία* as *ἐπιστήμη* (or *κατάληψις*) *θ. τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 13, Galen, xix. 231. To this they sometimes added *καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων* Ph. i. 530, Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 333; 'sapientia rerum div. et hum. causarumque scientia' Cic. *Off.* ii. 5, cf. *Tusc.* iv. 57; v. 7; 'sap. est nosse divina et humana et horum causas' Sen. *Ep.* 89. 5.

Quint. requires of the orator a 'knowledge of things divine and human' *Inst.* xii. 2. 8, and the term appears as part of the

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def. of Jurisprudence: 'div. atque hum. rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia' Ulpian, *Dig.* 1. i. 10. 2, cf. Justinian, *Inst.* 1. 1. 1, see also pp. **46.** 25, **230.** 4 n.

34. 6 **ἐὰν παραληρεῖν ἄρξηται,** sc. *τίς*, cf. 'si coeperit (senectus) concutere mentem' Sen. *Ep.* 58. 35, and Lucr. iii. 451.

34. 6–7 **τὸ μὲν διαπνεῖσθαι.** The gradual stages of functional activity, the *Scala Naturae*, are combined in man's mature being, developing in the individual's life-history. The earlier functions are to be subordinated to the later and nobler: *οὔτε τὸ διαπν. ὡς τὰ φυτὰ τίμιον, οὔτε τὸ ἀναπνεῖν ὡς τὰ βοσκήματα* p. **102.** 20. *τὸ διαπν.* is an activity which man shares with plants, the lowest of living organisms. At some time between Theophr. and the maturity of Stoicism, the functional activity, whereby the sap ascends in land-plants and is evaporated from the leaves, must have been recognized. When the Pneumatist physiology developed in the first to second centuries A.D., *perspiration* was compared with this evaporation, and the doctrine was evolved that in animal economy the arteries serve a purpose analogous with and subsidiary to the lungs; by the mechanism of pulsation, the arteries draw air through the skin pores to the heart, in exchange for the soot-like superfluities exuded in perspiration. In animals this process was termed *τὸ διαπν.*, Galen, v. 161, viii. 712. Thus M. couples *τὸ ἀναπνεῖν*, respiration, with *τὸ διαπν.* p. **102.** 20, as here he treats *nutrition* as an allied vital function.

34. 7 **φαντάζεσθαι καὶ ὁρμᾶν.** Next above vegetative life, *φύσις*, comes *ψυχή, φύσις προσειληφυῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν* Ph. i. 71. This stage of animate life involves perception and imagination, and impulse, the rudimentary stage of volition, D.L. vii. 86.

34. 8 **τὸ ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι,** i.e. *ὀρθῶς, κατὰ λόγον*, right and reasonable self-employment, cf. *χρώμενος καὶ τῷ ἔνδον ἱδρυμένῳ* p. **38.** 18. For the omission of an adv., cf. *ὃς δὴ ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι μὴ γινώσκοι, δούλῳ ἄμεινον ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ διάγειν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν βίον* Themist. xxxvi, p. 321b; 'vivit is qui multis usui est, vivit is qui se utitur' Sen. *Ep.* 60. 4.

34. 8–9 **τοὺς τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀριθμούς:** see *Test.* and cf. *πᾶν καθῆκον ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τινῶν συμπληροῦται* p. **108.** 3; 'officium, quod rectum idem appellant . . . omnis numeros habet' Cic. *Off.*

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iii. 14, id. *N.D.* ii. 37, *Div.* i. 23; 'virtus habet numeros suos, plena est' Sen. *Ep.* 71. 16.

Is. Cas. derived this phrase from the technical lang. of dancing (ad Pers. v. 122), Lipsius thought it came from wrestling, cf. Quint. *Inst.* xii. 2. 12. For the Pythagoreans *ἀριθμοί* were numbers expressing the ratio between two magnitudes, so that numbers would express the proportions of beauty, as they did in Polycleitus' canon of the human frame. Pl. uses the word of an artist making a copy and as it were measuring his model: *οἷον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν τὰς θέσεις Lg.* 668d; and Arist. of the relations of the movements of the planets to the length of human lives *G. An.* 778^{a}4. Thus *τὸ καλόν* is *τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς ἐπιζητουμένους ἀριθμοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τὸ τελέως σύμμετρον* Zeno, ap. D.L. vii. 100. This *proportion* between the elements of duty is called *ἁρμονία* p. **100.** 1.

34. 9 **ἀκριβοῦν,** to ascertain exactly: *καὶ τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς;* Pl. *Chrm.* 156a; *ἀκριβῶσαι καὶ καταμαθεῖν* Epict. i. 17. 8.

τὰ προφαινόμενα διαρθροῦν: cf. *πολλά γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτι σοὶ μὲν οὐ φαντάζεται* Pl. *H. Ma.* 300c.

διαρθροῦν means to *articulate* by means of the analysis of *τὸ φανταστόν,* which is described at p. **44.** 23; in this way the material given by sense is fashioned by the understanding, as the mother shapes the embryo, as the *ψ.* frames itself, p. **214.** 4, and as the organs of speech articulate the ideas which are expressed: *οὕτω καὶ κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη* Pl. *Lg.* 645c.

34. 10 **εἰ ἤδη ἐξακτέον αὐτόν,** sc. *ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν,* cf. *μέχρι δέ με τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐξάγει,* of suicide, p. **92.** 13 n.; *διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίνεταί ποτε καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτούς* Chrysippus ap. Plu. *De St. rep.* p. 1042d; 'educere animum laborantem' Sen. *Ep.* 58. 34.

34. 11 **λογισμοῦ συγγεγυμνασμένου:** cf. *συγγυμνάσθητι,* in connexion with *θεωρητικὴ μέθοδος* p. **198.** 24. M. may be thinking of a passage which is in his mind elsewhere in connexion with the *δαίμων*: *τῷ δὲ . . . περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν αὐτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα* Pl. *Ti.* 90b.

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προαποσβέννυται, the flame in life's lamp is gradually dying down and flickering: *κἂν εἰς γῆρας ἔλθῃ, κατὰ βραχὺ νεκρούμενον καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον* Max. Tyr. xli. 3; cf. *προαπολήγειν* l. 14, *τὸ λήγειν* p. **248.** 18 n., and the lamp used fig. p. **242.** 3.

34. 12 **ἐπείγεσθαι**: cf. *λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται* Pl. *Grg.* 484e; like *ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεῦδε* p. **224.** 1, *press on* rather than *hasten*.

34. 12–13 **ἑκάστοτε γίνεσθαι**, i.e. *καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν* l. 1, cf. 'cotidie enim propius ab ultimo stamus' Sen. *Ep.* 120. 17, and, with the figure of the hour-glass, id. 24. 20.

34. 13 **ἐννόησιν τῶν πραγμάτων**: he used *σύνεσιν* l. 4; here the unusual subst. is chosen perhaps for alliteration. The meaning is close to that of *ἔννοιαν βαθυτέραν* p. **36.** 3, *ἐννοεῖ* p. **40.** 2.

34. 13–14 **τὴν παρακολούθησιν**: it is difficult to find an English synonym for this word. It implies an attitude of will in response to *ἐννόησις*, which is intellectual apprehension. By the two words M. endeavours to express compendiously what is expounded at ll. 8–11; we are to understand our world of experience and to *follow* or *conform to* what reason discovers of its laws. The uncompounded word is so used in this sense in *ἐγκράτεια, ἀκολούθησις τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ* [Pl.] *Def.* 412b. See the distinction between *χρῆσις* and *παρακ. τῶν γινομένων* in Epict. i. 6. 12 sq., where the latter is attained *ἂν κατὰ τρόπον . . . καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου φύσει πράττωμεν* ib. 15; man's nature begins where *τὰ ἄλογα* begin, it ends *ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακ. καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει* ib. 21; see also, id. ii. 8. 6. *παρακολούθησις* then in M. expresses the reverse of *εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπαρακολουθήτως* (*ἐνεργεῖν*) p. **32.** 8, it is what Epict. intends by *δεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις* ii. 14. 7; cf. *συνεργοῦμεν . . . εἰδότως καὶ παρακολουθητικῶς*, where my translation is not adequate to the twofold meaning, p. **114.** 6.

Ch. 2: 34. 15 **τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα**, like *ἐπιγεννήματα* p. **112.** 9, a technical word for the subordinate effects which ensue *κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν* upon *τὰ προηγούμενα*, i.e. *αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῆς φύσεως: τὰ ἐξῆς ἀεὶ τοῖς προηγησαμένοις οἰκείως ἐπιγίνεται* p. **68.** 12. The terms are part of the Stoic endeavour to explain or justify failure and evil: *αὐτοὶ δὲ κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην ἑτέρας τε περὶ σῶμα*

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μυρίας ἀτοπίας καὶ δυσχερείας . . . κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν Plu. *De An. procr.* 1015c; 'incommoda . . . per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν*' Chrysippus ap. Aul. Gell. *N.A.* vii. 1. 9. M. correctly employs *κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν* pp. **36.** 4, **112.** 7, **114.** 24, **146.** 2, **182.** 3, for this objective sequence, but *παρακολούθησις* as explained in the last note. Contemporary Platonists, giving another explanation (the resistance of *ὕλη*), employ similar language: *ὥσπέρ τινας ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἑπομένας φύσεις* Max. Tyr. xli. 4, see Hobein's *Test.* ad loc.

34. 16 **εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγόν:** the works of craftsmen bear utility on their face, and, besides, *τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἔχει τι καὶ ἀγωγὸν καὶ ἐπίχαρι* Epict. ii. 14. 3, cf. *ψυχαγωγεῖ* p. **36.** 2.

34. 18 **παρὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα:** cf. *ἤ τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα . . . ἑτέρως πως τῶν εἰωθότων γενόμενα* Pl. *Plt.* 295d, *τὸ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην λεγόμενον ἁμάρτημα* ib. 296b. Sim., in relation to the problem of evil: *τὰ μὲν ἡ τέχνη προηγουμένως δρᾷ . . . τὰ δὲ ἕπεται τῇ χειρουργίᾳ, οὐ τέχνης ἔργα ἀλλ' ὕλης πάθη* Max. Tyr. xli. 4. Galen says of organisms: *τὰ πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ εὑρήσει κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ διά τι τῶν ἑπομένων* iii. 26.

34. 18–19 **ἐπιπρέπει πως,** 'are conspicuous': *ὅ τε ὀφθαλμὸς ἐπιπρέπει τῷ μετώπῳ,* of the Cyclops, Lucian, *D. Mar.* i. 1. For the observation, cf. 'It strikes at first sight, and attracts without a reason' Berkeley, *Alciphron,* iii. 3.

34. 19 **ἰδίως ἀνακινεῖ,** as we say 'specially'. *ἴδιον* is the distinguishing difference, as *ἰδιόν τι κάλλος* of the ripe olive's *peculiar* beauty, l. 21. The adj. came to be used of *special* traits, *unique* characters in Nature: *ὄντος δὲ περιττοῦ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἰδίου τοῦ τῶν μελιττῶν* Arist. *Gen. An.* 760^{a}4; cf. *τὸ ἴδιον* p. **74.** 8 n.

§ 2: 34. 19–20 **τὰ σῦκα . . . κέχηνεν,** he implies that the gaping is like the cracks on the loaf, l. 17, an allurement to the appetite.

34. 21 **τὸ ἐγγὺς τῇ σήψει:** *πέπανσις, ripening,* is an approach to decay, so that *πεπαινόμενον* and *σηπόμενον* are sometimes equivalents, Arist. *Mete.* 379^{b}28. Thus *δρυπεπέσιν ἐλαίαις* is associated with *σῆψις*: *καὶ γὰρ ἡ δρυπεπὴς ἐν σήψει* Theophr. *C.P.* vi. 8. 4. This approach to decay has a beauty attractive to the appetite and to the eye: 'gratissima sunt poma cum fugiunt; pueritiae maximus in exitu decor est' Sen. *Ep.* 12. 4.

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34. 22 ἐπισκύνιον. M. means either that the loose overhanging skin of the lion's brow assists his vision, by concentrating the visual rays, Arist. *Gen. An.* 780^{b}22, *Pr.* 959^{a}3, or that it protects his eyes from the sun's fierce light, id. *Pr.* 960^{a}21.

34. 23–36. 1 κατ' ἰδίαν, 'in isolation from the general laws of Nature': *τὸ οὖς ἀκίνητον κατ' ἰδίαν,* the ear cannot move *independently* of the skull, Arist. *H.A.* 492^{b}15.

36. 2 συνεπικοσμεῖ, bestows an adornment on some natural species *further* to their general character: (*κέρκους*) *ἐπικεκόσμηκεν ἡ φύσις θριξί,* of the horse, Arist. *P.An.* 658^{a}32; the verb is used abs. as in *καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν* id. *E.N.* 1100^{b}26; the specific characters lend them, at the same time, a *further* beauty, *ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα* Arist. *E.N.* 1174^{b}33.

ψυχαγωγεῖ, in this transf. sense of *entrance,* employed esp. of artistic objects: *ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι,* where Socr. shows that a statue's charm resides in its power to express *τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα* X. *Mem.* iii. 10. 6–8; thus M. has *ψυχαγωγεῖσθε,* of tragic scenes p. **216.** 15.

Here it is used absolutely, as in: *τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳδία* Arist. *Po.* 1450^{a}33. Throughout the ch. M. transfers words proper to the mind's response to *aesthetic* suggestion to express the understanding of one habituated by *θεωρία* to sympathy with Nature.

§ 3: 36. 3 εἴ τις ἔχει πάθος ... πρός: this bold expression, with no qualifying adj., seems to be an exact equivalent of our 'has a feeling for', cf. *τὸ κοινωνικὸν πάθος* p. **248.** 16.

36. 3–4 ἔννοιαν βαθυτέραν πρὸς τὰ ... γινόμενα: *πρός* does duty with both *πάθος* and *ἔννοιαν* to express the direction of the affection and of the thought; *πρὸς ... τὰ ταύτης ἔργα* l. 10 takes up again *πρὸς τὰ γ.* Arist. remarks that those who have tasted the real sweetness of what is right can frame a notion of it, whereas the mass of men *τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες E.N.* 1179^{b}15. So M. believes that he who is familiar with Nature and her workmanship is able to enter more deeply into all that comes to pass; he sees, in

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Wordsworth's phrase, 'into the life of things', pierces below the surface to the meaning and purpose.

βαθύς in this sense is not common in Greek, though familiar in English; cf. *δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου, | δίκην κολυμβητῆρος, ἐς βυθὸν μολεῖν | δεδορκὸς ὄμμα* Aesch. *Supp.* 407.

36. 5 **διασυνίστασθαι.** The general sense is that what at first seems repulsive is found, when we look deeper, to commend itself agreeably. Gat. interprets 'commendare sese', taking the verb as the reflex. of *συνιστάναι*, cf. *παραινῶν ἐπιμελέστερον . . . ἐξετάζειν οὓς συνίστησιν* Plu. *De vit. pud.* 533c; Cas. says: 'non invenusta sic concinnata et coagmentata'. The double compound in the act. voice is frequently used by Ph.: *τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια δικαιοσύνης . . . ἐναργέστατα διασυνίστησιν ὅταν λέγῃ . . .* i. 495; *πέφυκε . . . ἡ ἐλπὶς ὡσανεὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγαθοῦ προγεύεσθαι καὶ διασυνιστάνειν αὐτὸ ψυχῇ τῇ βεβαίως κτησομένῃ*, i.e. *ἐλπίδι τῆς ἀπολαύσεως προπληροῦται* id. i. 603, where he means 'presents its substance' to the *ψυχή*. Similarly *συνίστανε τὴν εὔνοιαν* means that the speaker represented the reality of the goodwill likely to result from the action recommended, Polyb. iv. 5. 6. So Ph. says: *τὸν δ' ἀμφοτέροις πολεμωθέντα τοῖς γονεῦσι διασυνίστησιν εἰσαγαγὼν λέγοντα* i. 368. Thus *διασυνίστασθαι* here may combine the two senses of *arranging* and of *representing* themselves: the apparently injurious effects arrange themselves in a pleasing order to a man of sound understanding, and so represent themselves to his mind as substantially good and gratifying.

Dr. Claude Jenkins pointed out to me the use of the verbal in: *ἡ πολυμαθία διασυστατικὴ τυγχάνει τοῦ παρατιθεμένου τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν δογμάτων πρὸς πειθὼ τῶν ἀκροωμένων . . . καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν συνίστησιν* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 327, as illustrative of the meaning here. He added: 'One or two verbal similarities have made me wonder whether Clem. had M. Ant. iii. 2 running in his head.' Were this indeed the case, we should have evidence of an acquaintance with the *Meditations* by an almost contemporary writer, for these *ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς* are dated to A.D. 193–211 by Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* vi. 6.

The similarities to M.'s thought in the passage of Clement are: (*a*) the idea of causes subordinate or contributory to a whole,

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πολλὰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ συμβαλλόμενα εἰς τέλος συγκοσμεῖ τὸν τεχνίτην; (*b*) *διασυστακική*, followed almost immediately by *ἀξιόπιστος δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχαγωγία*; and (*c*) Clem.'s contention that Greek philosophy opens a hidden truth to the Christian believer.

Notice further that he says, l.c. p. 322: *ἥδε ἡ πραγματεία . . . μοι ὑπομνήματα εἰς γῆρας θησαυρίζεται, λήθης φάρμακον*, a reminiscence of Pl. *Phdr.* 276d, like M.'s words at p. **48. 2**.

36. 5 **οὗτος δὲ καί**, taking up *εἴ τις ἔχει* l. 3. A D's reading is preferable to *οὕτως δέ* P, both as more vigorous, and because M. always writes *οὕτω δέ*.

36. 6 **ἀληθῆ χάσματα.** The transferred sense of the adj. occurs especially by contrast with the *imitated* works of the artist: *μιμεῖσθαι μὲν ἂν ἐπιχειροῖεν τὸ ἀληθές . . . τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι μίμημα, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐκεῖνο;* Pl. *Plt.* 300d; *τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις* Arist. *Pol.* 1340^{a}19, cf. ib. 1281^{b}12; *μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων* Alcid. *Soph.* p. 88. The transf. may have been mediated by phrases like *ἀληθῶς ὄντα*, e.g. *ἡ δ' οὖσ' ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἥδε σὴ δάμαρ*; Eur. *Hel.* 709.

χάσματα are instances of *τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φ. γινομένοις* p. **34. 15**, cf. p. **112. 7**, where *τὸ χ. τοῦ λέοντος* is *ἐπιγέννημα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν*.

The admiration of *realistic* subjects in art preceded the appreciation of beauty in natural objects, Arist. *Po.* 1448^{b}10, and was promoted by aesthetic pleasure in the technique. It is a further step, as M. points out, to admire the living originals, because they exhibit Nature's providence. His reasoning is derived from Socr., through Arist.: *πάντα ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλά ἐστι πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς* X. *Mem.* iii. 8. 7; *οὗ ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἴληφεν* Arist. *P.An.* 645^{a}25, cf. p. **112.** 20 sq. Galen insists that the criterion of beauty is the adaptation of the structure of an animal or of any one member to its function: *αὕτη γάρ σοι κανὼν καὶ μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον εὐφυΐας τε καὶ κάλλους ἀληθινοῦ* iii. 24.

Sir T. Browne perhaps had M.'s words in mind when he wrote: 'there is a general beauty in the works of God and, therefore, no deformity in any kind or species of creature whatsoever. I cannot tell by what logic we call a toad, a bear, or an

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elephant ugly,' *Rel. Med.* i. 16. He is, however, echoing a medieval doctrine inspired, it appears, by Hermes Trismegistus. This view combines the Stoic notion of purposiveness with the Platonic and Neoplatonic representation of Nature as the mirror of the unseen. Cf. 'Si rectum cor tuum esset, tunc omnis creatura speculum vitae et liber sanctae doctrinae esset. Non est creatura tam parva et vilis quae Dei bonitatem non repraesentet' à Kempis, *Imit. Chr.* ii. 4. 1; 'The cedar is no better a glass to see God in than the hyssop upon the wall' Donne, *Serm.* i, p. 415, Alford, a passage which perhaps inspired Tennyson's 'Flower in the crannied wall', cf. ib. p. 557.

36. 6 γραφεῖς καὶ πλάσται. Arist., pleading for the study *τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων*, makes a point which remarkably resembles M.'s argument here; the few words cited from that eloquent passage (*Test.*) contain the phrase *οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν*, which perhaps lingered in M.'s memory.

36. 7–8 ἀκμήν τινα καὶ ὥραν, a word to match *ἡδέως ὄψεται* appears to have fallen out after *ὥραν*, since it is absurd to suppose, as some have done, that M. means that the disciplined mind will be able to regard beauty in age with sober eyes. He must surely have said: 'he will discover (with the inward eye) a kind of prime in old age'. Mr. Marchant suggests *καθορᾶν*.

He chooses *ἀκμὴν καὶ ὥραν* paradoxically, because, though used for age as well as for early manhood, they naturally suggest to a reader the bloom of youth: see Arist. *E.N.* $1174^{b}33$ cited at l. 2. So Plu. says that age has not withered the beauty of Periclean Athens: *κάλλει μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον εὐθὺς ἦν τότε ἀρχαῖον, ἀκμῇ δὲ μέχρι νῦν πρόσφατόν ἐστι καὶ νεουργόν Per.* 13.

The Greeks were children and had a childlike repugnance to age; see what Pl. says of old men in the gymnasia: *ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὅμως φιλογυμναστῶσιν R.* 452b; cf. *οὐδεὶς γὰρ γερόντων καὶ ἀκμῆς ὥραν μὴ ἐχόντων ἐρᾷ* S. Emp. *Math.* vii. 239.

36. 8 τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ: the unusual order is perhaps determined by the wish to bring *ἐπαφρόδιτον* next to *παισίν*, whereas *παισὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ* would suggest 'his own children'. M. is thinking (cf. p. **12.** 4) of the abuse to which boy attendants were exposed in Rome, of the 'agmina exoletorum per nationes coloresque

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descripta' Sen. *Ep.* 95. 24. The transition of thought, which is abrupt, was prompted by the word **ὥραν**. M. means that to recognize the charm as a further consequence of adolescence will efface the *φαντασία*, the lust of the eye, which prompts to evil *ὁρμή*; in a slightly different context Clem. Alex. says: *προσβλέπων τὸ κάλλος οὐ τὴν σάρκα ἡγεῖται ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καλήν, τὸ σῶμα, οἶμαι, ὡς ἀνδριάντα θαυμάσας δι' οὗ κάλλους ἐπὶ τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν παραπέμπει Strom.* p. 616. Sir Thomas Browne may have been pondering this passage of M. when he wrote: 'Upon sight of beautiful persons to bless God in his creatures, to pray for the beauty of their souls and to enrich them with inward graces to be answerable unto the outward', *Op.* v, p. 289, Keynes. Some confirmation of this suggestion is that the very next entry in the *Commonplace Books* opens: 'M. Antoninus Philosophus wanted not the advice of the best physicians . . . '.

36. 8–9 **σώφροσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρᾶν.** M. is thinking of the *φαντασία* and *ὁρμή* which are excited by the eye of sense: *αἱ γὰρ ἀντιβλέψεις τῶν ἐν ὥρᾳ καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐκπίπτον, εἴτ' ἄρα φῶς εἴτε ῥεῦμα, τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐκτήκει καὶ ἀπόλλυσι* Plu. *Conv. Disp.* 681b; with this M. contrasts **ἔννοιαν βαθυτέραν**; cf. *τὸ ὁρᾶν . . . ὃ οὐκ ὀφθαλμοῖς γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἑτέρᾳ τινὶ ὄψει* p. **48.** 6 n.

πιθανά, *pleasing* Gat. The context, however, demands the sense *convincing*: *ὧν οὐδὲν ἔστι πεισθῆναι μὴ διὰ βάθους ἐγκραθέντα τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις* Plu. *De Repugn. St.* 1035c; *τίς δὲ οὕτω πιθανός ἐστί σοι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ;* Epict. iv. 6. 7; *ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡγεῖται τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ᾖ ψεῦδος*, of the drama, Polyb. ii. 56. 12.

36. 10 **ᾠκειωμένῳ**; cf. *τὸ οἰκειωθῆναι φιλοσοφίᾳ* p. **4.** 19. He may again be thinking of Arist.: *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν* (unsightly creatures) *κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις P.An.* 645^{a}7.

36. 11 **προσπεσεῖται**, cf. *ἡ τούτου νόησις προσπεσεῖται* p. **124.** 11; *ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων* Pl. *Lg.* 854b.

Ch. 3: 36. 12 **Ἱπποκράτης.** M. was versed in the older Latin literature (Fronto, *Ep.* pp. 11, 74), so that we may reasonably suppose that he had in memory, as he wrote: 'Postquam lumina

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sis oculis bonus Ancu' reliquit' Enn. *Ann.* 149 Vahl., and the magnificent passage inspired by it, beginning: 'Hoc etiam tibi tute interdum dicere possis' Lucr. iii. 1024. He recurs to the theme, enumerating *ἰατροί, μαθηματικοί, φιλόσοφοι, ἀριστεῖς, τύραννοι, πόλεις ὅλαι* p. 70. 8, and *ῥήτορες, φιλ., ἥρωες, στρατηγοί, τύραννοι,* and then three great scientists, p. 116. 20.

Hippocrates is *τὸν Κῷον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν* Pl. *Prt.* 311b, belonging, that is, to the medical guild of the island of Cos. Born *circ.* 460 B.C., he soon became recognized as the father of scientific medicine. Galen devoted scholarly labour to his texts and their exegesis. His fame is seen from 'Ippocrate, Avicenna e Galieno' Dante, *Inf.* iv. 143, and our own Chaucer's: 'Old Ypocras, Haly, and Galien' *Prol.* 431. M. may have recalled here the celebrated aphorism: *ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή* Hipp. iii. 706; 'illa maximi medicorum exclamatio est: vitam brevem esse, longam artem' Sen. *Brev. Vit.* i. 1.

36. 13 **Χαλδαῖοι,** called *μαθηματικοί* p. 70. 9, *προγνωστικοί* p. 154. 12, i.e. astrologers who cast horoscopes. Tiberius was 'addictus mathematicae plenusque persuasionis cuncta fato agi' Suet. *Tib.* 69, and Juv. pictures him at Capri 'cum grege Chaldaeo' x. 94; cf. 'nota mathematicis genesis tua' id. xiv. 248. M. is said, in one of the most incredible stories in the biographer, 'ad Chaldaeos rettulisse' *H.A.* iv. 19. 3.

No doubt M. refers here to the quacks at Rome, but the name Chaldean is derived from the real observers, whose data, extending over so many years, were made accessible, by Alexander's conquests, to the Alexandrian astronomers, thus enabling them to advance the science:

> ut Babylonica Chaldaeum doctrina refutans
> astrologorum artem contra convincere tendit. Lucr. v. 727.

36. 14 **τὸ πεπρωμένον**: this, like *νοσήσας* applied to Hipp., carries the sting of the sentence. The Stoics themselves were criticized for their belief in a determined order of events, which was not easy to distinguish from the astrologers' faith in the stars: 'alii fatum quidem congruere rebus putant, sed non e vagis stellis, verum apud principia et nexus naturalium causarum' Tac. *Ann.* vi. 22, cf. 'fato et sorte nascendi' id. *Ann.* iv. 20.

36. 14 **κατέλαβεν,** like deprendit, with a suggestion of surprise:

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κατὰ μοῖρ' ἔλαβεν . . . θανάτοιο Od. xvii. 326; *ἡ πεπρωμένη καταλαμβάνει* p. **44.** 8, cf. pp. **96.** 16, **214.** 10. The use of the word may have been suggested to M. by: *πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινέει καὶ καταλήψεται* Heraclit. 66 D., 26 B.

Ἀλέξανδρος. The same three great soldiers are again selected at p. **146.** 25; they follow one another in the *Lives* of Plu., from which M. perhaps took the phrase *ἄρδην ἀνελόντες*: *τὴν δὲ στρατιὰν ἄρδην ἀνεῖλεν Iul.* 50; *παῖδας καὶ γένος ἄρδην ἀνῃρηκότα*, of Pompey's family, ib. 56, cf. *Πομπηΐων* p. **156.** 10 n.

36. 17 **Ἡράκλειτος,** with Democritus and Socr., to match the three generals. For Democr. he substitutes Pythagoras at p. **116.** 23, and Diogenes at p. **146.** 25.

The reason for the selection of Heraclit. (p. **68.** 17 n.) and Socr. is not only that they were recognized by the Stoics as forerunners of Zeno, but also that, at this date, they were popularly known as eminent philosophers, just as Hippocrates was the typical physician. Democr. was, in Roman literature, contrasted with Heraclit., the 'laughing' with the 'weeping' philosopher. In a profounder sense, Democr., as founder of atomism and parent of Epicurean physics, is the counterpart of Heraclit., the forerunner of Stoic physics. Having selected D. for these reasons, M. goes on, by a lapse of memory, to confuse his manner of death with that of Pherecydes, who was traditionally said to have been 'eaten of worms'. As H., the prophet of flux, died of a dropsy, so D., the prophet of atomism, is made to fall a victim to the minute vermin which are the correlate of his physical atoms, he was devoured by *microscopic* organisms. This unhappy and unhistorical allusion enables M. to lead up to his final point that Socr. was destroyed by human vermin, not perhaps by Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon, but by the ignoble Athenian multitude, cf. *οἱ δὲ (ἡμῶν) θηρίδια κακοήθη καὶ μικρά* Epict. ii. 9. 6.

36. 17 **τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἐκπυρώσεως.** The doctrine of the ultimate absorption of the Universe, at the end of the *great* year, in the primal fire was, when M. wrote, generally ascribed to H.: *γεννᾶσθαί τε αὐτὸν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ πάλιν ἐκπυροῦσθαι κατά τινας περιόδους ἐναλλὰξ τὸν σύμπαντα αἰῶνα* D.L. ix. 8. The Christian writers thought this a prophetic forecast of the Last Judgement,

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and cited in confirmation Heraclit. *Fr.* 66 D., 26 B.; Hippolyt. *Ref. haer.* ix. 10.

The hypothesis corresponded to the nineteenth-century doctrine that all the energy of the universe is irreversibly passing into the form of heat, and that ultimately all matter will approximate to the same temperature. But these ancient theorists supposed that the universe would not continue thenceforward in a state of rest; in some way the heat would begin again to pass into the forces of generation with which we are familiar: 'magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo' Virg. *Ecl.* iv. 5. M. mentions this doctrine, as adopted by some of his school, but himself keeps an open mind, pp. **86.** 1, **94.** 8, **196.** 4.

36. 18 **φυσιολογήσας**, a word used by Epicur. for the scientific study of Nature: *οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας φυσιολογητέον* D.L. x. 86, cf. p. **188.** 5.

ὕδατος . . . πληρωθείς. He was reported to have died of dropsy, in allusion to his doctrine, and to his saying: *ψυχῇσι γὰρ θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι* 36 D., 68 B. The story was that he tried to induce perspiration by plastering himself with cowdung: *Ἕρμιππος δέ φησι λέγειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ἰατροῖς εἴ τις δύναται τὰ ἔντερα πιέσας τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐξεραῦσαι. ἀπειπόντων δέ, θεῖναι αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ κελεύειν τοὺς παῖδας βολίτοις καταπλάττειν. οὕτω δὴ κατατεινόμενον δευτεραῖον τελευτῆσαι* D.L. ix. 4.

36. 19 **Δημόκριτον δὲ οἱ φθεῖρες.** D., whose physical doctrines influenced Epicur. so powerfully, was an elder contemporary of Socr., born *circ.* 470 B.C. The usual account of his death is: 'sponte sua leto caput obvius obtulit ipse' Lucr. iii. 1041. Death by *morbus pedicularis*, *φθειριᾶν*, is ascribed *inter alios* to the poet Alcman and to the Syrian Pherecydes, e.g. by Arist. *H.A.* 557a3; Plu. *Sulla* 36; Paus. i. 20. 7. Cf. *νοσεῖ σῶμα καὶ ταράττεται καὶ φθείρεται* (alluding to *φθεῖρες*) . . . *ὡς Φερεκύδης ὑπερεφρόνει ἐν Σύρῳ κείμενος, τῶν μὲν σαρκῶν αὐτῷ φθειρομένων, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἑστώσης ὀρθῆς* Max. Tyr. vii. 4. The question whether H. and Ph. should not have preferred suicide to a painful death was debated in the schools: *καὶ γὰρ Ἡρ., φασί, καὶ Φ. καθήκειν ἄν, εἴπερ ἠδύναντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφεῖναι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, ὥστε παύσασθαι φθειριῶντας καὶ ὑδρωπιῶντας* Plu. *De comm. not.* 1064a.

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36. 20 **τί ταῦτα**; sc. *διαφέρει*, cf. *τί τοῦτο; τί τοῦτο διαφέρει;* Pl. *Prt.* 309a, 331c. The sense here is shown by *τί οὖν τοῦτο δεινὸν αὐτοῖς;* p. **116.** 28, where M. means: 'What matters it now to the famous dead?'

ἐνέβης, ἔπλευσας, κατήχθης· ἔκβηθι. The form is like the famous close of Lysias, *Or.* xii. Death as the haven is a natural simile: *τὸ γῆρας ὅρμος τῶν κακῶν* Bion, ap. D.L. iv. 48. There was a popular belief that, after death, the soul sailed west, to the setting sun. M. once refers to the *Islands of the Blest*, p. **196.** 28.

36. 21–2 **ἐφ' ἕτερον βίον . . . ἐν ἀναισθησίᾳ**: the alternatives which Soc. suggests, Pl. *Ap.* 40c, and which were current in writings of consolation, cf. pp. **26.** 6 sq., **168.** 15.

οὐδὲν θεῶν κενόν: the word *κενόν* appears to allude to the Epicurean doctrine of the void, as well as to their doctrine of divine beings removed to another realm. The Stoics held that the Universe was one, filled and sustained by God: *κόσμος τε γὰρ εἷς ἐξ ἁπάντων καὶ θεὸς εἷς δι' ἁπάντων* p. **122.** 26 sq. When speaking more popularly, they said: *πάντα θεῶν μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων* Epict. iii. 13, 15; *πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι θεῶν πλέα* [Arist.] *Mu.* 397^{b}17. M. says that the *κόσμος* implies the presence of gods, and *ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἀποθανὸν οὐ πίπτει* p. **152.** 9. See also p. **244.** 26 sq.

οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ: possibly an allusion to the story of Heraclitus in the kitchen: *εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς* Arist. *P.An.* 645^{a}21.

36. 22 **ἐν ἀναισθησίᾳ**: the construction is difficult, see Mr. Marchant's suggestion.

ἀναισθησία is the current name for the state before conception and after dissolution, esp. in Epicur.: *οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα* Pl. *Ap.* 40c; *αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι* Epicur. ap. D.L. x. 81, *τὸ ἀναισθητοῦν* ib. 139; *πάλιν τέ που φησι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χάλκεον ὕπνον* (*Il.* xi. 241), *τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἡμᾶς διδάξαι πειρώμενος* Plu. *Cons. ad Ap.* 107e; 'at dimissa anima corpus caret undique sensu' Lucr. iii. 356.

36. 22 **παύσῃ πόνων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἀνεχόμενος.** The emotions, the pleasure–pain states, depend upon the sensibility: *ἀεὶ πονεῖν τὸ ζῷον διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων* Anax., ap. Aspas. *in E.N.* (1154^{b}7), p. **156.**

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Anax. seems to have pointed out that sensations provoke in the organism an uneasiness which issues in impulse to movement. Heracl. too had explained the changes of the universe, by an organic analogy: *μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται* 84 D., 83 B.

That death is release from suffering is still a common reflection, and it colours with its melancholy much Greek literature: *τοὺς γὰρ θανόντας οὐχ ὁρῶ λυπουμένους* Soph. *El.* 1170; *θανόντων δ' οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἅπτεται O.C.* 955; *τοῖς γὰρ θανοῦσι μόχθος οὐ προσγίγνεται Tr.* 1173; *ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς . . . ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν* Pl. *Phd.* 84b. Indeed *ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων* was the current term for deliverance from mortal ills, Aristoph. *Ach.* 269; Pl. *R.* 406e. This also is the message of Lucr.: 'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi | quod superest cunctis privatu' doloribus aegris' iii. 904.

36. 22–38. 1 λατρεύων . . . τῷ ἀγγείῳ: a hired servant of this vessel, the body; the sentiment is close to that of Pl.: *δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ Phd.* 66d, just as is the idea of *enduring* pleasures and pains; but the point of view is not Platonic in essence, rather it reflects an attitude of the common consciousness. It is, M. says, an inversion of the true order that man's reason should be subject to the sensibility, which Nature intended to be its servant; Death sets the servant free.

λατρεύειν and *ὑπηρετεῖν*, like *δουλεύειν* and *διακονεῖν*, are ritual words, used of the service of the gods, and applied here fig. to the soul's service of the flesh. Thus M. says: *μηκέτι τοῦτο ἐάσῃς δουλεῦσαι* p. **22.** 1, and, more generally, he calls death *ἀνάπαυλα . . . τῆς πρὸς τὴν σάρκα λειτουργίας* p. **108.** 12. Epict. expresses the same notion: *πρᾶγμα ᾧ τοσαῦτα λειτουργοῦμεν καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν Fr.* 23; *ὅταν ἐκεῖνος . . . ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας* id. i. 9. 16, cf. p. **72.** 24.

For *λατρεύειν*, cf. *πῶς οὐκ εὐδαιμονίζειν μᾶλλον προσήκει τοὺς ἀπολυθέντας τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ λατρείας* Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 107c; *ἡ ψυχὴ νῦν μὲν τρέφει τὸ σῶμα πολλοῖς πόνοις καὶ ἀσχολίαις, εἰ δ' ἀπαλλαγείη τῆς λ., αὐτὴν . . . θρέψει* id. *Sept. Sap.* 160c; *ἀπαλλαγεὶς τῆς τοῦ σώματος δουλείας καὶ τῆς τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς διὰ τὸ σῶμα λ.* Porph. *De Abstin.* iii. 27.

38. 1 ἀγγείῳ, 'the vessel' containing the soul, like *σκεῦος*, 1 *Thess.* 4. 4 (if St. Paul there means the body), cf. *ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα ὡς*

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ἀγγεῖον φρονήσεως καὶ λόγου Dio Chrys. xii. 59, p. 404; *τὸ ψυχῆς ἀ., τὸ σῶμα,* Ph. i. 223, sim. 466. See M.'s figures at pp. **42.** 25, **172.** 24.

The origin of the simile is uncertain; Arist. employs *ἀ.* for the vessels, esp. the blood-vessels, of the body. The word may then have been consciously adopted for the body itself as the receptacle of *ψυχή*, just as the arteries were believed to convey *spirituous* blood. This would suit: 'corpus, quod vas quasi constitit eius' Lucr. iii. 440; a wider sense underlies: 'corpus quasi vas est aut aliquod animi receptaculum' Cic. *Tusc.* i. 52.

Again, the word may have originally meant the *shelter* of the living principle, cf. (*οἰκία*) . . . *ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν σωμάτων* Arist. *Metaph.* 1043^{a}16, or even the cage in which the spirit is confined, the prison of the *ψ*. In this case the simile would be related to the Orphic belief, *σῶμα: σῆμα,* Pl. *Grg.* 493a; *Cra.* 400c.

38. 1 **ὅσῳ περίεστι τὸ ὑπηρετοῦν**: this (or *ὅσῳπερ περίεστι*) is a possible correction of the MSS., which come both here and at line 5 from a damaged original. The scribe, we presume, substituted *ἤ* for *ὅσῳ*, under the influence of *χείρονι*. If Cas.'s proposal be accepted, M. used *περίεστι* instead of *κρεῖττόν ἐστι* to lay stress upon the excellent superiority of *νοῦς καὶ δαίμων* to the earthly vessel in which it is detained. For *ὅσῳπερ* cf. p. **86.** 16.

Rewriting, like Morus's *ὅσῳ κρεῖττον τὸ ἡγ.* or Sch.'s *ἤ ᾧ περιέκειτο ὑπηρετοῦν,* is too hazardous, and Holste's and Reiske's *ἤπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπηρετοῦν,* which we now know to have been adopted by D and which Leop. printed, gives the awkward sense: 'serving a vessel worse by so much than the servant is . . .', where the reader has to choose between supplying *χεῖρον* or *κρεῖττον*, and *ἐστί* is superfluous.

τὸ ὑπηρετοῦν: cf. *τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα* X. *Mem.* ii. 1. 28; *εἰ δύναται τὸ διακονοῦν κρεῖσσον εἶναι ἐκείνου ᾧ διακονεῖ* Epict. ii. 23. 16.

38. 2 **νοῦς καὶ δαίμων,** identified, p. **28.** 14, with the higher self. So *νοῦς* is a synonym of *τὸ ἡγ.* and called *ἡγεμονικός* p. **242.** 1; cf. *ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς θεός* p. **246.** 9.

γῆ καὶ λύθρος: cf. *λύθρος* p. **20.** 14 n., *λύθρον ἐν θυλάκῳ,* of the dead body, p. **160.** 2. Heraclit. said *νέκυες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι* 96 D., 85 B.; sim. *ὡς σκεῦος ἄχρηστον, ὡς κόπριον* Epict. ii. 4. 5.

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Ch. 4: 38. 3 **τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον**, resuming *μέρος ἔλαττον* p. **34.** 2, cf. *τὸ λοιπόν* p. **138.** 21.

38. 3–4 **ἐν ταῖς περὶ ἑτέρων φαντασίαις.** These thoughts or fancies are of three sorts: (*a*) idle curiosity, ll. 8, 23–4; (*b*) malice, hypocrisy, indulgence of self, rivalry, envy, suspicion, ll. 10–15; (*c*) vain-glory p. **40.** 6. Cf. pp. **24.** 12, **28.** 12, **56.** 21, **66.** 18, **76.** 3, **138.** 7, **182.** 10.

38. 4 **τὴν ἀναφοράν**: cf. p. **32.** 9; explained by *μηδὲ χωρὶς . . . ἀνάγκης* ll. 23–4; the parenthesis justifies the verbal inconsistency between the inquiry into a neighbour's thoughts (here and at pp. **66.** 16, **168.** 23) and the doctrine of the passages cited in the last note.

38. 5 **τί γὰρ ἄλλου ἔργου στέρῃ.** I have followed Dr. Rendall and Mr. Jackson in writing *τί γάρ*, because M. always uses *ἤτοι* with the first member of a disjunctive. Dr. Rendall also suggested *τοιοῦτον ἔτι* (as an alternative to his *οὕτως ἔτι*), and Mr. Jackson *τοιοῦτό τι*, and *ἀνθρώπου* for *ἄλλου*.

Perhaps *ἤτοι . . . στέρῃ*, which look intrusive where they stand and are omitted by D, have been transferred from their original position, and what M. wrote was *ἀπορρέμβεσθαι ποιεῖ· ἤτοι γὰρ . . . στέρῃ ⟨ἢ⟩ τῆς . . . παρατηρήσεως*. If they were omitted from the text and marked in the margin to follow *ποιεῖ* (not *ποιῇ* l. 5), the transference would be explained. Then *ἄλλου* will have been equivalent to *κοινωνικοῦ* and opp. to *ἰδίου ἡγ.*, cf. *κοινωφελές* l. 4, *κοινωφελοῦς* l. 24, and *μὴ φοβοῦ μὴ, . . . παραλίπῃς τι ἔργον κοινωνικόν* p. **78.** 16.

38. 7 **ἀπορρέμβεσθαι**: cf. pp. **24.** 8, **60.** 12, where the verb is used absolutely; the construction with the genitive is unnatural in view of the meaning of the word.

38. 8 **παρατηρήσεως**: cf. *παρατήρει* opp. to *περιεργάζου*, p. **192.** 10 and 15, and *εὐλαβούμενος*, p. **44.** 4; *οὔτε προσοχὴ οὔτ' ἐπιστροφὴ ἐφ' αὑτὸν καὶ παρατήρησις* Epict. iii. 16. 15.

§ 2: τὸ εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην: cf. *ἐπ' οὐδένα σκοπόν . . . ἀλλ' εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπαρακολουθήτως*, opp. to *κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀναφοράν* p. **32.** 8.

38. 9 **τῷ εἱρμῷ**, used for the connected series of vital activities, p. **244.** 9, as it was by the Stoics for the chain of causes and effects, what M. terms *ἐπισύνδεσις* p. **112.** 13 n.

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M. is thinking of the tendency of imagination to lead attention off, upon a track uncontrolled by reasonable purpose. This results in random impulse and so in act, pp. **164.** 8, **228.** 11; cf. Epict. ii. 18. 16 and 23.

περιίστασθαι, *avoid* or *inhibit*, a late usage, e.g. *shunned*, Galen, iii. 837, Lucian, *Herm.* 86; of vices, 2 *Tim.* 2. 16, *Tit.* 3. 9; of taboo, Porphyr. *De Abst.* iv. 7. The word is discussed by Gat. *Adv. Misc.* p. 427.

38. 10 **τὸ περίεργον καὶ κακόηθες**: see *περιέργῳ* p. **20.** 1 n.; *κακοήθης* is peculiar to this Book: *ἔστι κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα*, a fault of old age, Arist. *Rh.* 1389^{b}20; *θηρίδια κακοήθη*, malignant insects, Epict. ii. 9. 6.

38. 12 **ἀποκρίναιο**: cf. Galen, v. 26, *Test.* p. **168.** 23; 'talis vir non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam audebit, quod non audeat praedicare' Cic. *Off.* iii. 77; 'si honesta sunt quae facis, omnes sciant: si turpia, quid refert neminem scire, cum tu scias?' Sen. *Ep.* 43. 5; 'nullum est enim factum meum dictumve quod clam ceteris esse velim: quin cui rei mihimet ipse conscius sim, ceteros quoque omnes juxta mecum scire velim' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 182.

38. 14 **ἢ καθάπαξ ἀπολαυστικῶν φαντασμάτων**: *καθάπαξ* is used by M. in the sense of *καθόλου*, to speak *generally*. Thus 'luxurious imaginings' include pleasurable ideas, cf. pp. **40.** 22, **224.** 18.

38. 15 **ἐρυθριάσεως ἐξηγούμενος**, i.e. *ὅτι νῦν διανοῇ*, cf. *εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας . . . εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν* Pl. *Prt.* 312a.

§ 3: 38. 16. The alliteration, noticeable in §§ 1–2, becomes more marked, and the effect is heightened by the cumulative asyndeta. This ardent assertion of the ideal cannot easily be conceived to be a mere memorandum for himself.

ὁ γάρ τοι ἀνὴρ ὁ τοιοῦτος: the only place where M. has used *γάρ τοι*: the emphasis is like that in: *αὗται γάρ τοι μόναι εἰσὶ θεαί* Aristoph. *Nu.* 365.

38. 17 **οὐκ ἔτι ὑπερτιθέμενος**; *ἐκ πόσου ταῦτα ἀναβάλλῃ* p. **22.** 13; *ἀεὶ δ' εἰς ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον εἴωθας ὑπερτίθεσθαι τὸ εὑροεῖν* Epict. iv. 12. 2.

τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις ἤδη εἶναι: the hyperbaton resembles the usage in

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ὡς ἐν ἐχυρωτάτῳ X. *Cyr.* i. 6. 26. The *ἄριστοι* are *οἱ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει βιοῦντες* p. **40.** 7.

38. 17–18 **ἱερεύς τίς ἐστι καὶ ὑπουργὸς θεῶν.** M. substitutes this worthy claim for the well-known Stoic assertion that the sapiens is rex etc.; for parallels cf. *λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἱερέα μόνον εἶναι τὸν σοφόν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 67; D.L. vii. 119; Porphyr. *Epist. ad Marc.* 16.

ὑπουργός, cf. *ὡς τοῦ Διὸς διάκονον ἔδει . . . ἅμα δ' ὡς τῷ θεῷ ὑποτεταγμένος* Epict. iii. 24. 65; *οἷον ὕπαρχοί τινες καὶ ὑπηρέται τοῦ θεοῦ* Galen, i. 8. The word *ὑπουργός*, which does not occur elsewhere in M., is used by Polyb. for a labouring-man, and for an inferior servant.

38. 18 **χρώμενος**: cf. *ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι* p. **34.** 8, the usage is justified by the close identification of the inward Divinity with the self. Gat. says *rite* utatur, cf. *τιμῆς ἐὰν τῆς προσηκούσης αὐτῇ παρ' ἑκάστου τῶν χρωμένων λαγχάνῃ* Pl. *Lg.* 775e, but here *familiariter* is rather the meaning: *ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ* X. *Mem.* iv. 8. 11; *συνήθεις τῷ θείῳ* p. **238.** 17.

καὶ τῷ ἔνδον ἱδρυμένῳ αὐτοῦ: a remarkable expression, used three times in this Book, but not elsewhere, cf. *ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἱδρυμένη* Pl. *Lg.* 775e; 'sacer intra nos spiritus sedet' Sen. *Ep.* 41. 2. At pp. **42.** 3, **48.** 17, the participle agrees with *δαίμων*, here the sense is impersonal, 'that too which is established within him', unless we are to supply *θείου* out of *θεῶν*. Although M. has *αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνιδρυμένου* at p. **42.** 3, A's *αὐτῷ* puts an unnatural emphasis on the pronoun.

38. 18–19 **ὃ παρέχεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον**, emphasizes the contrast with the Divinity within; it gives a suggestion of mortal frailty, cf. *ἄνθρωπε* p. **250.** 9 n.

38. 19 **ἄχραντον ἡδονῶν**, cf. *καθαρὸν πάθους διατηρεῖν* p. **28.** 15.

38. 19–20 **πάσης ὕβρεως ἀνέπαφον, πάσης ἀναίσθητον πονηρίας.** Gat. interprets this to mean 'contumelia intactum, improbitatis ne sentientem quidem', referring to Sen.'s dialogue entitled 'Nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem'. Cas. takes *ὕβρις* to mean 'wrong done by a man to himself', cf. *ὕβρις* opp. to *αἰδεῖσθαι ἑαυτόν* p. **24.** 3. The latter view is supported by *ἀλλ' ὕβριν ἀνείργειν ἔξεστιν· ἀλλ' ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων καθυπερτερεῖν*

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ἔξεστιν p. **148.** 27, and by ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πάθους καταβληθῆναι l. 21. If this be so, does πονηρίας also refer to the agent's state of mind? Dr. Rendall's 'innocent of all baseness' implies this view, but the natural meaning is *unconscious* of any and every wickedness and, although the underlying religious belief is different, the state described resembles St. Paul's λογίζεσθε ἑαυτοὺς νεκροὺς μὲν εἶναι τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ *Rom.* 6. 11. M. holds that evil depends on man's will, so that the good man moves in an evil environment which cannot affect him: he can be immune from sin.

38. 20–1 **ἀθλητὴν ἄθλου τοῦ μεγίστου**: the comparison of the moral struggle to the arena with its 'dust and heat' is so familiar to us esp. from St. Paul, *Phil.* 3. 14, 1 *Tim.* 6. 12, 2 *Tim.* 4. 7, that the words seem at first sight commonplace. They may have been suggested to M. by Pl. (*Test.*), although the simile is as early at least as: ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων | ἀνδρῶν ἠδ' ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη Xenoph. 2. So God is spoken of as a young man's trainer: ἵνα Ὀλυμπιονίκης γένῃ· δίχα δ' ἱδρῶτος οὐ γίγνεται Epict. i. 24. 2.

38. 21 **τοῦ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πάθους καταβληθῆναι**, in app. to ἄθλου. He wrestles with the passions: ἔτι δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλῶν ὥσπερ πάλαισμα ὥρμα . . . τὸν νεανίσκον Pl. *Euthd.* 277d; ὅταν ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαίων, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων ὡς οὐ πέπτωκε νικᾷ Plu. *Per.* 8.

38. 21–2 **βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος**, 'dyed to the core', a frequent image of good and evil treatment of the soul, pp. **86.** 2, **108.** 17; cf. ὃ μὲν ἂν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῇ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται τὸ βαφέν Pl. *R.* 429e; δι' ὧν ἡ βαφὴ διελήλυθε Arist. *Col.* 793^{a}29; οὐκ ἄχρι τοῦ ἐπικεχρῶσθαι μόνον, ἀλλ' ἐς βάθος δευσοποιοῖς τισι φαρμάκοις (tinctures) ἐς κόρον καταβαφεῖσα Lucian, *Im.* 16; 'incoctum generoso pectus honesto' Pers. ii. 74; 'haec (disciplina), nisi alte descendit . . . et animum non coloravit, sed infecit' Sen. *Ep.* 71. 31. The fig. is familiar from 'Persons lightly dipt, not grain'd in generous honesty' Browne, *Chr. Mor.* i. 9.

38. 22 **ἀσπαζόμενον**: cf. δεχόμενον p. **32.** 21, where the reason given is that the changes and chances of this mortal life come from God. Sometimes M.'s attitude is more 'stoical'; we bear what is inevitable and familiar pp. **66.** 3, **68.** 9. His name for the state of mind is τὸ εὐαρεστεῖν pp. **138.** 4, **174.** 15.

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38. 22 ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς: cf. *ἀπὸ καρδίας* p. **22.** 11 n.

40. 1 τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἔχει: possibly corrupt; *ἕξει* leads Sch. to say 'exspectes *ἐξεγείρει* vel *ἐξάγει*'. A small mutation and emendation would make the sense easier: *μόνον γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνέργειαν ἔχει*, cf. *ἰδίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν, ἰδίαν ἐνέργειαν* p. **90.** 13.

As the text stands in P, *ἔχει* combines two senses: (*a*) he considers as his own to do, and (*b*) he guides to fulfilment, *καλὰ παρέχεται* l. 3.

40. 2 συγκλωθόμενα: cf. *συγκλώσεως* p. **22.** 5 n.

40. 3–4 ἡ ἑκάστῳ νεμομένη μοῖρα. Here, as at p. **48.** 23, M. appears to use *μοῖρα* as an equivalent for the *δαίμων* or *genius* allotted to every man at the hour of birth, cf. *εὔμοιρος* p. **96.** 16; *Μοίρας ἄνω ἐπικλωθούσας ἑκάστῳ τὸν ἄτρακτον* Lucian, *Charon* 16. *μοῖρα* means a birth goddess in *Μοῖραν ἡγοῦνται τὴν Καρμένταν εἶναι* Plu. *Qu. Rom.* 278c, where Prof. Rose remarks: 'The Moirai are still in Greece not Fates in general but spirits charged with looking after the personal destiny of individuals' *Rom. Qu.* p. 195.

40. 4 συνεμφέρεταί τε καὶ συνεμφέρει, a verb which is known only from this passage. Both Cas. and Gat. take *μοῖρα* to be *τὸ εἱμαρμένον*, the former interpreting: 'as it is unavoidable and necessary, so it is always profitable', the latter, after Boot, 'et conducit ei et in eum finem est eidem collata'. Does not M. mean that the genius accompanies the man and carries him with it? There may be an etymologizing glance at Fors Fortuna, if *μοῖρα* means the Fate allotted to a man, for the Romans associated that goddess with nativity, W. W. Fowler, *Rel. Experience*, pp. 235, 245; *Rom. Fest.* p. 167.

For the play on the act. and pass. voices, cf. *Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ προσφέρων καὶ προσφερόμενος*, 'the offerer and the offering', *Liturg. Constantin.* vii a: Hammond, *Liturgies, &c.* p. 101.

§ 4: 40. 5 συγγενὲς πᾶν τὸ λογικόν: the kinship rests on the common gift of reason, p. **20.** 6. The doctrine alluded to is set out at p. **52.** 25 sq.

40. 6 δόξης δὲ οὐχὶ τῆς παρὰ πάντων, οὐχί with emphasis, p. **8.** 15 n. This attitude, which is usual in the Stoics, follows the

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teaching of Socr.: *χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων* (sc. *δόξαι*), *πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;* Pl. *Cri.* 47a; we are to look to what is approved by *ὁ εἷς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια* ib. 48a; *ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι* Arist. *E.N.* 1095^{b}28; *οὐ τὴν τοῦ τυχόντος τιμὴν ἀποδεκτέον, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἐμφρόνων, ὧν τῇ μαρτυρίᾳ πιστεύειν ἀσφαλές* Simpl. *in Ench.* p. 140c. Men of the world criticized the extreme doctrine: 'adhibenda est quaedam reverentia, et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti' Cic. *Off.* i. 99; 'contemptu famae contemni virtutes' Tac. *Ann.* iv. 38; 'ille, qui esse quam videri bonus maluit, fortunis parum prosperis usus est . . . verum est illum, qui opinionem virtutis neglegat, ipsam quoque neglegere virtutem' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 195.

40. 7 τῶν ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει βιούντων. M. nowhere else employs this, the best-known Stoic formula for virtue: *Κλεάνθης προσέθηκε "τῇ φύσει" καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 76; *τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί ἐστι; φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως* Epict. iii. 1. 25.

40. 8 οἱ δὲ μὴ οὕτως βιοῦντες. M. is commonly criticized for excessive charity to evil men. Yet he certainly does not shut his eyes to their existence as a class; he is merciful to the individual, but his condemnation of evil and of evil-doers is as uncompromising as that of the Christian moralist, see, e.g., pp. **24.** 13, **48.** 5, **166.** 10, **174.** 3, and the references in the next note.

40. 9 οἷοι μεθ' οἵων: a favourite idiom in regard to evil men. See pp. **52.** 14, **66.** 16, **120.** 10, **178.** 20, **184.** 17, **200.** 18, **202.** 11, **224.** 11. The sense is equivalent to *κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες* Pl. *Tht.* 177a.

φύρονται: *μὴ φύρειν μηδὲ θορυβεῖν ὄχλῳ φαντασιῶν* p. **48.** 17; *ὅλως πεφύρθαι* p. **104.** 12; *πέφυρσαι οὖν* p. **146.** 8. Although the word may mean *mix with*, it appears normally to be used by M. for *contaminate themselves with*; *συμπεφυρμένη . . . ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ* Pl. *Phd.* 66b, p. **174.** 3. Shak. uses a similar expression: 'smear'd thus and mir'd with infamy' *Much Ado* IV. i. 135.

40. 11 οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκονται: *οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς*

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περὶ ὧν λέγουσι Pl. *Tht.* 177b; M. puts the same thought differently at pp. **166.** 11, **224.** 17.

Ch. 5: 40. 12 **Μήτε ἀκούσιος.** The sense in which this and the three adjs. which follow are used is shown at p. **42.** 2 sq. and p. **138.** 12 sq.; i.e. of loyal obedience to God's will, recognition of social obligation, scrutiny of imagination and thought, deliverance from the various impulses of passion.

ἀκούσιος seems chosen for rhythm; elsewhere *ἄκων* and *ἑκών* are employed by M., and L. and S. give no instance of *ἀκούσιος* used of a person. M. is repeating *ἀσπαζόμενον . . . τὰ ἀπονεμόμενα* p. **38.** 22, cf. *ἑκὼν σεαυτὸν τῇ Κλωθοῖ συνεπιδίδου* p. **66.** 5; *μηδ' ἄκοντες ποιήσειν τι ἢ πείσεσθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων* Epict. i. 14. 16; 'soli hoc contingit sapienti, ut nihil faciat invitus, nihil dolens, nihil coactus' Cic. *Paradox. St.* v. 34.

ἀκοινώνητος: see p. **20.** 2; cf. *τὸ προηγούμενον ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρ. κατασκευῇ τὸ κοινωνικόν ἐστι* p. **138.** 12; 'alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere' Sen. *Ep.* 48. 2.

ἀνεξέταστος, a rare use of the verbal for the person scrutinizing himself or thus scrutinized, cf. *σαυτὸν πρῶτον ἐξέταζε* p. **212.** 22. For the meaning here and the reminiscence of Socr.'s *ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ* Pl. *Ap.* 38a (where the meaning is rather a life which 'does not pursue examination' than one which is 'not scrutinized') see *τὰς φαντασίας ἐξετάζοντος* p. **42.** 4, *τὸ ἐλέγχειν . . . ἕκαστον* p. **44.** 27.

40. 13 **ἀνθελκόμενος,** 'pulled in diverse directions' or 'allowing divergent impulses to pull one', interpreted by *τὸ ἀνένδοτον πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς πείσεις* p. **138.** 13. The same image is used of *withdrawal* from sense affections, at *ἑαυτὸν ἀφειλκυκότος* p. **42.** 5, and is expressed by *νευροσπαστηθῆναι* pp. **22.** 2, **122.** 1 n. The fig. is used by Pl.: *ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοι . . . ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσι Lg.* 644e, *εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει,* of thirst, *R.* 439b; and by Arist.: *τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα E.N.* 1166^{b}21; cf. *ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος* St. James, *Ep.* 1. 14.

μήτε κομψεία τὴν διάνοιάν σου καλλωπιζέτω. M. elsewhere uses δ. for understanding, the mind's organ. Here he must mean what is in the mind, thoughts and their expression: *τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων διανοίας* Pl. *Cra.* 418a.

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καλλωπιζέτω, like *καλλωπισμός* p. **14.** 3, refers to bodily 'make up', so that he says strictly 'do not let subtlety decorate your thoughts', but implies their expression with a sophistry which disguises the true intent, cf. *καλλωπίζει τὰ ὀνομάτια . . . ὥσπερ οἱ κομμωταὶ τὴν κόμην* Epict. ii. 23. 14.

κομψεία suggests artificiality, even sophistry, as in: *ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεὶς σοφίσματα* Eur. *Fr.* 188 N^2, quoted against Socr., Pl. *Grg.* 486c. M. may be thinking of the involved obscurity of Tiberius or of the verbal refinement of his old tutor, cf.: 'ubi illud acumen tuum? ubi suptilitas?' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 146.

40. 14 **πολυρρήμων, πολυπράγμων**, 'neither a great talker nor a great undertaker', Cas. The neat verbal antithesis suggests that M. here means a busybody by *πολυπράγμων*, a sense he usually expresses by *περίεργος*, pp. **20.** 1, **38.** 10; the former he rather employs for a man with a diffusion of interests, see *'Ολίγα πρῆσσε* p. **60.** 19.

ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεός, i.e. *τὸν ἔνδον . . . ἱδρυμένον δαίμονα* p. **48.** 16; cf. *ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δ. ἐστί* Epict. i. 14. 14; 'est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo' Ovid, *Fast.* vi. 5, of the poet's inspiration.

40. 15 **προστάτης**, cf. *ὁ δ., ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν . . . ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος* p. **90.** 25, cf. p. **246.** 9; *ἐπίτροπον ἑκάστῳ παρέστησεν τὸν ἑκάστου δ.* Epict. i. 14. 12. Sim. Socr. says: *τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγεσθαι τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους* Pl. *Phd.* 62b.

ἄρρενος: cf. *'Ρωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην* p. **22.** 18 n.

πρεσβύτου: cf. *γέρων εἶ* p. **22.** 1. Ph. makes *πρ.* a man of 49–56, after that age he is *γ.*, i. 26.

40. 16 **ἄρχοντος**: the *princeps* is, according to constitutional precedent, Rome's first *magistrate*.

ἀνατεταχότος ἑαυτόν, another rare word in this sense and peculiar to this Book. With the military metaphor *ἀνακλητικόν* immediately following and echoing the form, it is natural to suppose that M. refers to Socr.'s words cited at p. **134.** 8.

40. 16–17 **περιμένων τὸ ἀνακλητικόν**: cf. *τὸ ἐνδόσιμον τῆς διαλύσεως* p. **228.** 23. The simile of the *Retreat*, our sunset bugle-call, is

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a favourite with Epict., e.g. i. 29. 29, ii. 6. 15, iii. 13. 14, 24. 101, 26. 29, in two of which places he connects it with Socr. M., even though he speaks of suicide as reasonable, does not contemplate it for his own release, herein following Socr., Pl. *Phd.* 62b; cf. Cic. *De Sen.* 72, id. *Rep.* vi. 15.

40. 17 εὔλυτος, εὔλυτος ἄπεισιν p. 44. 2. The met. is Pythagorean: *Εὐξίθεος ὁ Πυθαγορικὸς . . . ἐνδεδέσθαι τῷ σώματι . . . ἕως ἂν ἑκὼν αὐτοὺς λύσῃ . . . πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης* Athen. iv. 157c. For the meaning 'easily released' cf. *πρὸς τὸν τόκον εὐλυτώτερα*, Hippocr. i. p. 448. For the image cf. *τοῦ ἑλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται* p. **172. 24**; *εὐλύτως*, which Gat. prefers, would mean 'readily', as at p. **156. 22**.

40. 17–18 μήτε ὅρκου δεόμενος μήτε ἀνθρώπου τινὸς μάρτυρος. Gat. considered that three meanings are here combined: (1) he need take no oath, his word is enough; (2) he does not require an oath of service, like a legionary; (3) he need not swear in order to convince those whose opinion he disdains, and he is independent of the witness that others may give.

M. is thinking that he need take no oath that he has served faithfully, for his *δαίμων*, that is, his conscience, approves him; he needs no *man* to witness to his past life; he is *καθαρός, ἡσύχιος, εὔλυτος* p. **48. 22**. The sentiment is like that of: 'qui nullum extrinsecus pro se testimonium quaerit, liquet quod totaliter se Deo commisit' à K. *Im. Chr.* ii. 6. 4. Possibly M. has in mind Pl.'s myth of the trial of the soul in the world below: *ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες*, yet the man must stand his trial alone, *ἔρημος πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν Grg.* 523c–e.

40. 18 ἐνέστω δὲ τὸ φαιδρόν. This, one of Gat.'s suggestions, has the advantage of continuing the constr. of *ἔσο* and *ἔστω* l. 14; *τὸ φ. καὶ τὸ ἀπροσδεές* recall *τὸ αὔταρκες ἐν παντὶ καὶ τὸ φ.* p. **12. 11**, and point forward to *τοῦ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ* l. 22.

40. 19 τὸ ἀπροσδεὲς ἡσυχίας. The repetition of the adj. is both clumsy and superfluous, but the paradox, 'the peace that other men bestow', can hardly be a gloss. If M. wrote *τὸ ἀνενδεὲς τῆς ἡ.*, he would repeat *ἀνενδεῆ τοῦ ἄλλον ποιῆσαί τι* p. **32. 20**.

ἡσυχία, repose from disturbing phantasms, can be given only

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by the ruling faculty to itself, *οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ . . . ἡσυχιώτερον . . . ἀναχωρεῖ ἢ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψ.* p. **50.** 14, *τὸ γοῦν κρῖμα τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν ἡσυχαζέτω* p. **220.** 16; *ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἀταραξίᾳ* Epict. i. 10. 2. The devotional implication recalls: 'pax firma et requies secura' à K. *Im. Chr.* iii (iv). 47. 2.

40. 20 **οὐχὶ ὀρθούμενον**: cf. p. **124.** 8 n., *ἑστῶτα* p. **46.** 17. The sense of *ὀρθός* is frequently *balanced*, *poised*, e.g. *ὠρθοῦθ' ὁ τλήμων ὀρθὸς ἐξ ὀρθῶν δίφρων* Soph. *El.* 742; *μηκέτι δύνωνται ὀρθούμενοι ἐξιέναι* X. *Cyr.* viii. 8. 10; *τὰ βάρη τὴν ὀρθότητα μόνιμον καὶ ἀκλινῆ διαφυλάττει* Plu. *Ad Princ.* 780a. Sim. of a ship on an even keel: *ταύτης ἔπι | πλέοντες ὀρθῆς* Soph. *Ant.* 189; *πόλιν . . . ὀρθουμένην* Thuc. ii. 60. 2.

In a moral sense, therefore, the word conveys more than *straight*; man, unlike other animals, walks *erect*, keeps a balanced course in adversity, *ὀρθὸς περιπάτει ἐλεύθερος* Epict. i. 18. 20; *πέρας εὐδαιμονίας τὸ ἀκλινῶς καὶ ἀρρεπῶς ἐν μόνῳ Θεῷ στῆναι* Ph. ii, p. 669.

The met. is frequent in the O.T.: e.g. 'We are risen and stand upright' *Ps.* 20. 8.

Ch. 6: 40. 21 **Εἰ μέν κρεῖττον εὑρίσκεις**: an ironical hypothesis to which he returns at p. **42.** 14. The figure of speech is like: *εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο κρεῖσσον, αὐτόθεν ἀπόνευσον ἐπὶ τοῦτο* Epict. iv. 2. 4; 'habes quae fortissime de beata vita dici putem, et, quo modo nunc est, nisi quid tu melius attuleris, etiam verissime' Cic. *Tusc.* v. 82. The whole ch. has a resemblance to Hor. *Ep.* i. 6, with its urbane envoy:

> Vive, vale. Si quid novisti rectius istis,
> candidus imperti: si non, his utere mecum.

40. 22 **ἀληθείας**: wisdom's *object*, substituted for the fourth cardinal virtue, cf. 'veri inquisitio atque investigatio', an equivalent for *prudentia*, Cic. *Off.* i. 13, 'cupiditas veri videndi' id. *Fin.* ii. 46.

καθάπαξ τοῦ ἀρκεῖσθαι: generalizing (p. **38.** 14) the four virtues in *αὐτάρκεια*, i.e. *ἕξις ἀρκουμένη οἷς δεῖ καὶ δι' αὐτῆς πορισττικὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καθηκόντων* Andron. Rhod. *De Pass.* p. 24; sim. Clem. Alex. *Paed.* p. 247.

40. 23 **κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀρθόν**: see *τῷ ὀρθῷ λ.* p. **46.** 15; and for

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life so directed, pp. **148.** 14 sq., **192.** 1 sq. Cf. *ἡ ἐγκράτεια διάθεσίς ἐστιν ἀνυπέρβατος τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λ. φανέντων* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 470.

42. 2 **ἀπόλαυε**, as often, ironical: *πᾶσα οὕτως ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύῃ τῶν ἀσεβῶν* Pl. *Lg.* 910b; *τῆς σῆς ἀκαθαρσίας σὲ μόνον ἀπολαύειν* Epict. iv. 11. 16. Even the words: *ἀπόλαυσιν γὰρ δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν πᾶν ὃ ἔξεστι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἐνεργεῖν* p. **208.** 11 have a slightly ironical implication on a Stoic's lips; cf. 'nobis voluptas est dare beneficia' Sen. *Ben.* iv. 13. 2.

§ 2: 42. 3 **τοῦ ἐνιδρυμένου ἐν σοὶ δαίμονος**, see p. **38.** 18.

42. 3–4 **τὰς τε ἰδίας ὁρμὰς ὑποτεταχότος ἑαυτῷ**: 'your private impulses' appears to be his meaning, since 'its own impulses' would be tautologous and opposed to the sense of the passage. The 'present deity' subjects private impulses and private impressions to the general law; however difficult the conception, M. describes here the higher self as something not himself that makes for right, i.e. for *τὸ κοινόν*, see p. **52.** 25 sq.

42. 4 **τὰς φαντασίας ἐξετάζοντος**: see *ἀνεξέταστος* p. **40.** 12. We must supply *ἰδίας*, as the mind scrutinizes the imaginations of the lower self.

Gat.'s transposition rested upon his belief that M., as his language resembles it, recalled Epict. (*Test.*); with the phrase cited in his head, M., he supposed, inexactly thought of Socr. as meaning by *ὁ ἀνεξ. βίος* a life which accepts *φαντασίαι* without due scrutiny.

42. 5 **ἑαυτὸν ἀφειλκυκότος**. As the text stands the 'divinity' is regarded as withdrawing from contact with the senses. The ref. may be to Socr.'s doctrine of *ἐγκράτεια*, e.g. at X. *Mem.* iv. 5–6, but M. more probably has in mind passages like: *ἡ φιλοσοφία . . . πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν*, i.e. from *αἰσθήσεις*, for the true philosopher's *ψ.*: *ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων*, i.e. from the four principal *πάθη* (*πείσεις*) of the Stoics, Pl. *Phd.* 83a–b.

πεῖσις is a synonym of *πάθος*, see *τὰς σωματικὰς πείσεις* p. **138.** 14; *ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτῷ πείσεων καὶ παθῶν* S. Emp. *Math.* vii. 384.

ἀφειλκυκότος, Gat. suggested *ἀνθειλκυκότος*, supposing that M. is thinking of *μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων συνεπόμενον*

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ἀεί . . . ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον Pl. *Lg.* 644e. He pointed out that the nearest *linguistic* equivalent to *αἱ αἰσθ. πείσεις* in Pl. is *τὰ παθήματα ὅσα αἰσθητικά Ti.* 61d, but added that that could not be in M.'s mind here, since the *Ti.* passage does not concern a withdrawal from sense-affections.

42. 6 **τοῖς θεοῖς ὑποτεταχότος ἑαυτόν.** The repetition from l. 4 may be deliberate, but he has *ἀνατεταχότος* at p. **40.** 16. Epict. has: *τούτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ γενέσθαι τούτοις ὑποτεταγμένον* iv. 3. 12. M. clearly thinks again of Socr.'s words, see p. **134.** 9.

42. 8 **μηδενὶ χώραν δίδου:** the uncommon meaning of 'give way to': *οὐ δώσει χώραν τοῖς παροξυσμοῖς* Ael. Arist. xxiv. 37.

ῥέψας ἅπαξ καὶ ἀποκλίνας: both verbs are employed by Arist. in a moral sense: *ῥέπειν τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτήν E.N.* 1172ª31, *πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν*, of declension towards pleasure, ib. 1121ᵇ10. M. means, then, abandoning rectitude, *ὀρθότης* p. **40.** 20 (see Ph. cited there, and Arist. *P.An.* 686ª32) and turning or going downhill to lower objects, like fame or pleasure.

42. 9 **ἀπερισπάστως:** at this date the adv. had come to mean 'without disturbance', *ἀ. καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν*, 'with undivided attention', Epict. i. 29. 59, cf. *τὴν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὸ ἀπερίσπαστον*, of the quiet of night, Plu. *De Curios.* 521d, cf. St. Paul, 1 *Cor.* 7. 35; St. Ign. *Eph.* 20. M. contrasts *περισπᾷ τί σε τὰ ἔξωθεν;* with *σχολή* p. **24.** 7, and, both here and there, probably remembers its literal meaning, cf. p. **40.** 13.

§ 3: 42. 10 **ἀντικαθῆσθαι:** the meaning appears to be 'arrayed in rivalry to', inasmuch as *τὸ ἑτερογενές* is 'in a different camp' from reasonable good. Corssen proposed *ἀντικαθίστασθαι*, in the sense 'to be substituted for', cf. Thuc. ii. 13. 5, so that M. would mean that it is not meet for fame or pleasure or wealth to be taken in exchange for true good. Even with that interpretation, however, *ἀντικαθῆσθαι* could stand as the pass. of *ἀντικαθιστάναι*. Notice that *ἀντικαθημένων* and *ἀντικαθισταμένων* are vv.ll. at Max. Tyr. xxxv. 4.

τῷ λογικῷ καὶ πολιτικῷ, a favourite combination in M. e.g. p. **144.** 9. His view is: *ἔστι τὸ λογικὸν εὐθὺς καὶ π.* p. **192.** 14, since man's reason enables him to recognize *τὸ κοινόν*.

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42. 11 οὐ θέμις, 'neque fas est'. Never used by Epict. and here only by M., who prefers *οὐχ ὅσιον* p. **114. 26**.

ἑτερογενές: an expression which he uses only here, cf. the rare word *αὐτοειδής* p. **220. 19**. The man who proposes to himself *ἀδιάφορα* or *ἀπροαίρετα* is aiming at goods of a kind *alien* to moral well-being and therefore not to be held in honour: *μῶν οὐκ, ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής* (sc. *ὁ βίος*) . . . *κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;* Pl. *Phlb.* 11e.

42. 12–13 κἂν . . . ἐναρμόζειν δόξῃ: cf. *πρᾶξις . . . ἐναρμόσουσα εἰς τὴν σύνθεσιν*, 'fitting into a system', p. **156. 20**. The word is used with reference to *ἑτερογενές*, naturally discrepant; thus Pl. speaks of: *ἤθη . . . ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα*, 'traits which harmonize with the inward qualities', whereas evil passion is *συγγενὲς ἀκολασίας R.* 402d, 403a.

42. 13 κατεκράτησεν ἄφνω καὶ παρήνεγκεν: *παρενήνεκται καὶ ἄλλο παραφέρεται*, by a torrent, p. **68. 7**.

κατεκράτησεν points to *κρεῖττον*, for the man is no longer master of himself: *μήποτε ἡττᾶσθαι μήτε αἰσθητικῆς μήτε ὁρμητικῆς κινήσεως . . . μὴ κατακρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνων* p. **138. 15–17**. Similarly, of *πάθος*: *κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον* Arist. *E.N.* 1145^{b}24.

42. 13–14 σὺ δέ, φημί, resuming *φημί* from l. 1, and introducing the dialogue between the parts of the soul, which speak for the rival goods, *τὰ ἀντικαθημένα* l. 10.

42. 14 ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως: so of prayer, *ἁ. καὶ ἐ.* p. **78. 23**; *ἁπλῶς* is another way of expressing *ἀπερισπάστως* l. 9, for simplicity excludes divided allegiance.

ἐλευθέρως, of the liberty of one who is master of himself, opp. to *ἀκούσιος ἐνέργει* p. **40. 12**.

ἑλοῦ τὸ κρεῖττον, an allusion to the Pythagorean maxim (*Test.*), with conscious omission of the second member; M. does not need to remind himself of the sweetness of the good life.

42. 15 κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ συμφέρον, the reply of the lower self, in terms of the sophistical paradox that *expediency* is best: *ἄλλο δ' ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον;* X. *Mem.* iv. 6. 8; *ἆρ' οὖν ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, ἃ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα;* Pl. *Prt.* 333d; *τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν* id. *R.* 457b.

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The paradox leads to the definition of public right as *τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον*, upon which the opening of the *Republic* turns Pl. *R.* 338c. M. meets and parries the reply by reference to the Stoic argument: *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου*, p. **86.** 25. Nature prescribes an end to animals, and to man, as animal; this animal good is subordinated to the reasonable end of man, as a rational animal: 'if then you choose to regard yourself as an animal, say so, only see that you abide by your decision!'

References to the various grades of conscious life are recurrent: e.g. pp. **160.** 11, **174.** 19. On man's utility and man's good as identical, the Stoic tenet was: 'nihil utile quod non idem honestum: nihil honestum quod non idem utile' Cic. *Off.* iii. 34, cf. iii. 11, and the whole of *Off.* Book iii.

42. 16 **ἀτύφως φύλασσε τὴν κρίσιν.** The exact sense of the adv. is difficult to catch; he seems to mean that if you decide that your animal nature is to be preferred, you are not to parade your choice, like the Epicureans, nor to boast about it.

42. 17 **τὴν ἐξέτασιν,** ironically, we are reminded of the trial of lives in the *Republic*: *ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται* Pl. *R.* 580b, and the contest between pleasure and wisdom in Pl. *Phlb.*

Ch. 7: 42. 18 **Μὴ τιμήσῃς . . . : ὡς συμφέρον.** The reference to the last ch. is clear; he now gives his own judgement.

42. 19 **τὴν πίστιν . . . τὴν αἰδῶ.** *πίστις καὶ αἰδώς* are personified at p. **94.** 12, in connexion with Hes. *Op.* 197, and here *ἐγκαταλιπεῖν* (which is used with *τὴν πατρίδα* p. **48.** 13, cf. Epict. iv. 1. 154) suggests a semi-personification of *pudor*. *αἰδεῖσθαι* meant self-reverence p. **24.** 5, here *αἰδώς* stands for *honour*, as in 'summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori' Juv. viii. 83. The word is associated frequently, in M., with truth and faith, sometimes with simplicity, and, in general, with *ἡ τῆς ἰδίας διανοίας τιμή* p. **104.** 14.

42. 20–1 **τινὸς τοίχων καὶ παραπετασμάτων δεομένου.** *τοίχων* alludes to a proverbial saying, see *Test.* Cf. *αἰδοῖ πανταχοῦ κεκοσμημένον ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι τοίχοις καὶ θύραις καὶ θυρωροῖς* Epict. iv. 8. 33; 'te parietes tui tegent, non abscondent' Sen. *Ep.* 43. 3.

παραπέτασμα, like *παρακάλυμμα*, is frequently fig. for a *veil*, a *cloke* upon evil. The words suggest the curtains in a Roman

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palace: 'non crepabit subinde ostium, non adlevabitur velum' Sen. *Ep.* 80. 1; 'inter praetenta foribus vela' Suet. *Claud.* 10; 'vela tegant rimas, iunge ostia, tollite lumen' Juv. ix. 105.

42. 22 **τὰ ὄργια,** *rites* or *mysteries*, *τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' ἄν* Pl. *Lg.* 717b; *ὡς θεὸν . . . κατακοσμεῖ, ὡς τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργιάσων Phdr.* 252d; *θεαῖς ταῖς μεγάλαις τελοῦντες τὰ ὄργια* Paus. iv. 14. 1. This true worship is thus expressed by Lactant.: 'hic verus est cultus, in quo mens colentis seipsam Deo immaculatam victimam sistit' *Inst.* vi. 2.

The final stage of philosophic initiation is termed by Chrysippus: *ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς προσηγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις* Plu. *De rep. St.* 1035b, cf. *ἣν* (sc. *τελετὴν*) *ὠργιάζομεν* Pl. *Phdr.* 250c; *γνησίως θεραπεύειν* p. **28.** 14 n.

42. 22 **ἀρετῆς,** 'excellent greatness', majesty, see *δι' ἀρετήν* p. **28.** 17 n.; *γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν* Pl. *Ti.* 34c.

τραγῳδίαν οὐ ποιεῖ: cf. *ἀτραγῴδως* pp. **12.** 13, **216.** 7; *τί λέγεις ἀποθανεῖν; μὴ τραγῴδει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' εἰπὲ ὡς ἔχει* Epict. iv. 7. 15.

42. 23 **οὐκ ἐρημίας, οὐ πολυπληθείας δεήσεται**: cf. *ἀναχωρήσεις* p. **50.** 11 n.; 'miscenda tamen ista et alternanda sint, solitudo et frequentia: illa nobis faciet hominum desiderium, haec nostri, et erit altera alterius remedium: odium turbae sanabit solitudo, taedium solitudinis turba' Sen. *De Tranq.* 17. 3.

42. 24 **ἐπὶ πλέον διάστημα χρόνου**: *μὴ διαφέρου πρὸς τὸ πόσῳ χρόνῳ ταῦτα πράξεις* p. **106.** 17. The Stoics firmly maintained that neither length of years nor the converse adds to happiness, herein opposing Arist.'s view of the *βίος τέλειος E.N.* 1098ª18; *παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπίσης τοῖς τὸν ἀμερῆ χρόνον εὐδαιμονίας μετασχοῦσιν* Plu. *De rep. Stoic.* 1046c; '"At ille obiit viridis." Sed officia boni civis, boni amici, boni filii exsecutus est: in nulla parte cessavit. Licet aetas eius inperfecta sit, vita perfecta est' Sen. *Ep.* 93. 4. M. often returns to this, see e.g. p. **30.** 13.

42. 25 **τῷ σώματι περιεχομένῃ τῇ ψυχῇ.** The body is *τὸ ἀγγεῖον* p. **38.** 1 n., in which *ἡ ψυχή* is contained: *εἰ . . . καὶ ἔνεστιν ἡ ψ. τῷ σώματι, καθαπερεὶ ἀσκῷ πνεῦμα, περιεχομένη* Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 384; *ἃ γα φύσις ἀνδρῶν τί ὤν; ἀσκοὶ πεφυσιαμένοι* Epicharm. *Fr.* 10 D.

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44. 1–2 **οὕτως εὔλυτος**: the adj. was evidently altered by attraction to *οὕτως*. For the interpr. see p. **40.** 17 n.

44. 2 **κοσμίως**: cf. *κ. ἑπόμενον θεῷ* p. **48.** 18; joined with *αἰδημόνως*, the adv. combines the ideals of sobriety, gravity, quiet, and regularity. Originally describing the bearing which is an index of good breeding, it was transferred to express a corresponding inward temper, without ceasing to indicate its outward expression in tone and word and movement. Pl. has given a subtle account of its compass in *Plt.* 307a. The Stoic def. of *κοσμιότης* is *ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὸ πρέπον ἐν κινήσει καὶ σχέσει* Andron. Rhod. *De Pass.* p. 24. A sim. def. is closely associated with *εὐταξία* Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 61, cf. *infra*, p. **140.** 5 sq. The Romans spoke of 'ordo et constantia et moderatio' or of 'honestas et decus' Cic. *Off.* i. 17; 'ordo, modus, decor' Sen. *Ep.* 92. 3. Cic. translates *εὐταξία* by 'modestia', 'moderatio et temperantia' *Off.* i. 142–3. Spurinna was a living exemplar of the virtue, his life resembled 'certus siderum cursus', Pl. *Ep.* iii. 1. 2.

44. 3 **ἐνεργήσειεν**. Holste's emend. is confirmed by *ἐνεργήσειν* A, which he had not seen. Xyl.'s trans. indicates that he made the same correction. I have added *ἄν*, cf. *ὡς ἂν . . . ἐνήργησεν* p. **244.** 19.

44. 4 **εὐλαβούμενος**. The Stoics recognized three *εὐπάθειαι*: *εὐλάβεια* (*εὔλογος ἔκκλισις*), *βούλησις*, *χαρά*, Andron. Rhod. *De Pass.* p. 20.

44. 4–5 **ἔν τινι ἀνοικείῳ . . . τροπῇ**, a difficult expression, variously interpreted. M. mentions four *τροπαὶ τοῦ ἡγ.*, also called *φαντάσματα*, p. **228.** 9. He writes *ἀγαθαὶ τροπαὶ ψυχῆς* p. **96.** 18, and *πνεύματος δυσκρασία καὶ τροπή* p. **172.** 12. In these places *τροπή*, which he often uses for *change*, appears to mean a *moment* in a shifting system, as we speak of a *change* of heart or of the weather, where we mean a *state* ensuing upon change. *τροπή* was used by Democrit. for *position*, *διαφέρειν τροπῇ, ὅ ἐστι θέσις* Arist. *Metaph.* 1042^{b}14. M. then means here 'beware that your mind does not shift into *a change of position*, incongruous with a social creature'.

νοερoῦ πολιτικοῦ: for the asyndeton, cf. *κοινῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως* p. **176.** 5, *λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζῴου* p. **178.** 14.

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Ch. 8: 44. 6 **τοῦ κεκολασμένου καὶ ἐκκεκαθαρμένου:** *κεκολασμένον* is used of the chastening of appetites: *κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον. . . . διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς* (sc. *τὰς ἐπιθυμίας*) *καὶ ὀλίγας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον* Arist. *E.N.* 1119^{b}3–12. The word may be used in this moral sense, but in view of the context, there may have been a use of the verb for some form of medical treatment. Certainly *ἐκκεκαθαρμένου* is a medical figure: *τὸν ἐλεγκτικὸν λόγον ὥσπερ καθαρτικὸν ἔχων φάρμακον ὁ Σωκρ.* Plu. *Quaest. Pl.* 999f, *οὐ γὰρ σώματος ἡ Σωκρ. ἰατρεία, ψυχῆς δὲ ἦν ὑπούλου καὶ διεφθαρμένης καθαρμός* ib. 1000c.

44. 7 **μεμωλυσμένον.** Dr. Rendall's emendation is felicitous, in view of *πυῶδες* and *ὕπουλον*, which describe conditions of a *ψ.* which is not *καθαρά*. One state of an abscess, *simmering*, is denoted by *μεμωλυσμένους* (*μεμολ.* codd.) Galen xix. 121, cf. vv.ll. Arist. *Mete.* 381^{a}21. If, however, we keep the text, *μεμολυσμένον* may mean a *dirty* wound, full of foreign matter, cf. *μολύνεσθαι . . . μεστοὶ λύθρου* p. **196.** 23 sq.

44. 7–8 **ἀσυντελῆ . . . καταλαμβάνει:** cf. *ὅπου ἂν καταληφθῇ, πλῆρες καὶ ἀπροσδεὲς ἑαυτῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ποιεῖ* p. **214.** 10, and *κατέλαβεν* p. **36.** 14 n. Statius says: 'dubio quem non in turbine rerum | deprendet suprema dies, sed abire paratum' *Silv.* ii. 2. 127.

44. 9 **τὸν τραγῳδόν.** The figure is used by the Stoics in two senses: (*a*) Man must assume the *persona* which God assigns him: *εἶναι ὅμοιον τὸν σοφὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ, ὃς ἂν τε Θερσίτου ἂν τε Ἀγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἑκάτερον ὑποκρινεῖται προσηκόντως* Aristo Ch. ap. D.L. vii. 160, cf. Bion ap. Stob. *Ecl.* iii. p. 37. (*b*) Man makes his exit when God so decides: *κωμῳδόν* p. **250.** 12; *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑποκριτής, παυόμενος ὅτε δεῖ* Epict. iv. 1. 165; the good man plays well, be it the prologue, the central act, or the close, Stob. *Ecl.* iii. p. 47; 'neque enim histrioni, ut placeat, peragenda fabula est, modo in quocumque fuerit actu probetur, neque sapienti usque ad PLAUDITE veniendum est' Cic. *Sen.* 70; 'tantum bonam clausulam inpone' Sen. *Ep.* 77. 20.

πρὸ τοῦ τελέσαι καὶ διαδραματίσαι: cf. *πρότερον μὲν μόνος ὁ χορὸς διεδραμάτιζεν*, of tragedy before Thespis, D.L. iii. 56; *ἐς τέλος διαπομπεῦσαι*, 'to share in life's pageant to the close', Lucian, *Menipp.* 16.

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44. 10 **οὐδὲν δοῦλον οὐδὲ κομψόν.** The four attributives which follow are grouped in pairs and the pairs are seemingly opposed; in this case, however, the opposition is difficult to determine precisely. The translations all follow Xyl.'s 'nihil servile, nihil fucatum', Gat.'s 'nec servile aut affectatum', Cas.'s 'nothing that is either servile or affected', whereas one would expect *arrogance* to be contrasted with servility. The word *κομψόν* and its associated substantive occur frequently in Pl., and the Greek *scholia* show that, when they were written, *κ.* had a bad connotation, cf. also Hesychius, Suidas, and other grammarians. Thus Suid. has *κομψόν: περίτρανον, περίλαλον, πανοῦργον, ἀπατητικόν, πιθανόν, τεχνικόν,* and *Schol.* ad Pl. *R.* 376a, *κομψόν: νῦν τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀγαθόν· σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ πανοῦργον . . .*, cf. *Schol.* ad Greg. Naz. cited in Gaisford's *Suid.* The word, then, may be confirmatory, not antithetic, *artificial, crafty.*

προσδεδεμένον . . . ἀπεσχισμένον. He seems to refer to a *member* of society, who is like a limb which works freely, is not adherent nor severed, cf. *ὅλης τῆς κοινωνίας ἀποπέπτωκεν* p. **218.** 13, and what Arist. says of man's limbs, e.g. *τὰ ἀριστερά . . . ἀπολελυμένα μάλιστα Inc. An.* 706ª23.

44. 11 **ὑπεύθυνον . . . ἐμφωλεῦον,** not liable to impeachment or even to punishment, cf. *τούτων ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἀτιμίαις ὑπευθύνων* Plu. *Apophth. Lac.* 214b, and not 'hiding from justice, as the serpent slides into crannies' Ph. i. 315. Cf. *λανθάνον, οὐχὶ κρυπτόμενον* p. **198.** 15.

Ch. 9: 44. 12 **ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ πᾶν, ἵνα . . . ἐγγένηται.** With P.'s punctuation, the *ἵνα* clause is the complement of *ταύτῃ*, sc. *τῇ ὑπολ. δυνάμει*, cf. *ἐν τούτῳ ἐδοξάσθη ὁ πατήρ μου, ἵνα καρπὸν πολὺν φέρητε St. John* xv. 8. The sense, then, is that everything depends on this faculty, i.e. on its becoming subordinated to Nature. For the general sense, cf. *πῶς ἑαυτῷ χρῆται τὸ ἡγ.; ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν* p. **250.** 1.

With A's punctuation: *τὴν ὑπ. δύναμιν σέβε, ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ πᾶν· ἵνα ὑπόληψις . . .*, the *ἵνα* clause will be imperatival, cf. *ἵνα ἔρχηται* p. **216.** 5 n.

44. 13 **ἀνακόλουθος.** *μαχόμενος τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φύσει* p. **170.** 10 is a stronger expression; the meaning is made clear by *τὴν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀκολουθίαν* l. 15.

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44. 13–14 **τῇ . . . κατασκευῇ**, to avoid *φύσει* being repeated; cf. *ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει τῇ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ* p. **76.** 4.

44. 14 **αὕτη δὲ ἐπαγγέλλεται**, i.e. the constitution of a reasonable creature, *ἐν τῇ λογικῇ κατασκευῇ τὸ ἀπρόπτωτον* p. **138.** 18.

ἐπαγγέλλεται, 'holds out promise of' as at p. **86.** 9; cf. *ἐπάγγελμα* p. **34.** 18 n.

ἀπροπτωσίαν, a technical term: *ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή* D.L. vii. 46; *διάθεσις ἀσυγκατάθετος πρὸ καταλήψεως* Papyrus 1020, *Hermes* xxv, p. 473; cf. *συγκατάθεσιν ἀπρόπτωτον* Epict. ii. 8. 29. Deliberateness prevents one's jumping to conclusions on insufficient evidence, the error is *τὸ προπίπτειν* p. **16.** 10, cf. *προπτωτικοί* p. **220.** 14.

44. 15 **τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἰκείωσιν**: cf. *τὸ προηγούμενον ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ τὸ κοινωνικόν ἐστι* p. **138.** 12.

τὴν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀκολουθίαν: cf. *φίλησον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος. ἀκολούθησον θεῷ* p. **130.** 16.

Ch. 10: 44. 16 **Πάντα οὖν ῥίψας**: the reference may be general, as in *ἀσχολίας δὲ πάσας καὶ σπουδὰς ἀφῆκε* p. **200.** 3, or the metaph. may refer to a race or combat: *ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια, γυμνοὺς . . . θεῖν διατεταμένους* Pl. *R.* 474a; 'proice omnia ista, si sapis, immo ut sapias, et ad bonam mentem magno cursu ac totis viribus tende. Si quid est, quo teneris, aut expedi aut incide' Sen. *Ep.* 17. 1. So *ὄγκον ἀποθέμενοι πάντα*, with reference to a race, *Ep. Hebr.* 12. 1.

ταῦτα μόνα τὰ ὀλίγα σύνεχε, i.e. *δόγματα*, as in *τὰ δόγματα σὺ ἕτοιμα ἔχε* p. **46.** 22, but in neither place does he say what the doctrines are. The reference then must be to the principles which have been laid down in chs. 4–6, and ch. 9.

σύνεχε, perhaps *keep alive*: *ἡ ψυχρότης . . . συνέχειν δοκεῖ καὶ φυλάττειν* Plu. *Conv. Disp.* 725a; *ἡ φύσις . . . ζωπυρεῖ καὶ συνέχει τὸ ζῷον*, 'keeps body and soul together', id. *De Facie* 940c.

44. 17 **τὸ παρὸν τοῦτο, τὸ ἀκαριαῖον**: *τὸ γὰρ παρὸν πᾶσιν ἴσον . . . ἀκαριαῖον* p. **30.** 6 n.; the present moment, like man's whole life, is a *στιγμή* p. **32.** 12, relatively to infinite time; so the corner man lives in, like the whole globe, is a point, relatively to the universe p. **52.** 13 n.

44. 18 **ἢ βεβίωται**, used familiarly to mean 'dead and gone', 'homini

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non recta sed voluptaria quaerenti nonne *βεβίωται*?' Cic. *Att.* xii. 2. 2; Sen. *Ep.* 12. 8 (cited at p. **138.** 21).

ἢ ἐν ἀδήλῳ: cf. *τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν | βίον λογίζου σόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τῆς τύχης* Eur. *Alc.* 788; the sentiment frequently recurs, as is natural, in the literature of reflection.

44. 19 **ἡ μηκίστη ὑστεροφημία.** M. often passes in thought from man's brief present to the brevity even of the longest fame; the order is reversed at p. **152.** 22.

44. 20 **κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθρωπαρίων.** The image of *relays* is developed into the figure of a torch-race, where the dead man's memory is handed on like a torch, and at last goes out p. **58.** 1–4. Cic. says: 'ipsi autem, qui de vobis loquuntur, quam loquentur diu? . . . non modo non aeternam, sed ne diuturnam quidem gloriam adsequi possumus' *R.* vi. 22.

44. 21 **οὐκ εἰδότων οὐδὲ ἑαυτούς**: cf. *οἳ οὔθ' ὅπου εἰσὶν οὔτε οἵτινές εἰσι γινώσκουσιν* p. **166.** 10.

τὸν πρόπαλαι τεθνηκότα: recalling perhaps: 'mensibus atque annis qui multis occidit ante' Lucr. iii. 1094.

Ch. 11: 44. 22 **παραστήμασιν**, 'monitis salutaribus' Gat., cf. *ἀνυστικὸν βοήθημα* p. **72.** 15, *πρόχειρα βοηθήματα* Epict. i. 27 tit. The exact sense is uncertain; M. uses *παριστάναι* with *ἐλέγχειν* for 'to convince', and the verb in Greek of this period is used commonly for 'to prove', so that the meaning may be equivalent to *δόγμα, approved* maxim, or *παράγγελμα* p. **232.** 3. Mr. Marchant suggests that it originated in the sense of *παρέστη*, implying what *occurs* to one's thought: *εἰ . . . παρέστη μοι* Lysias vii. 17, xii. 62; *ἀπορῆσαί μοι . . . παρέστη* Julian, p. 263b.

I have supposed that the fig. is from *props* in architecture, so that M. would mean *supports*. Mr. M. N. Tod referred me to Lattermann's *Griechische Bauinschriften* p. 87 sq. for *παραστάματα* in this sense.

44. 22–3 **ὅρον ἢ ὑπογραφήν**: the latter word means an *outline*, without colour, *σχήματος ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς* Pl. *Lg.* 737d, cf. 803a; *οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον* Arist. *Gen. An.* 743^{b}23. *ὅρος* then, which M. uses elsewhere in its temporal sense, here means the boundary of surface, *σχῆμα . . . ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται* Pl. *Men.* 75c.

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44. 23 τοῦ ὑποπίπτοντος φανταστοῦ: cf. *φανταστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν* Plu. *Plac.* 900e; *φανταστὸν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινόμενον ἐγκατάλειμμα* Alex. Aphr. *De An.* p. 68.

ὑποπίπτειν is equivalent to *κινεῖν, stimulate*: *τὰ ὄντα* (objects) *μὴ τοιαῦτα οἷα ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ* Epict. i. 6. 4; *οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι*: the recipients being different, the impressions made by objects, assumed to be identical, vary, S. Emp. *Pyrrh.* i. 40.

44. 24 κατ' οὐσίαν: opp. to *κατὰ δόξαν*: *τὴν μὲν κρίσιν λέγειν τῷ προπίπτοντι* (cf. *ὑποπίπτοντι* l. 8)· "*τοῦτο ὑπάρχεις κατ' οὐσίαν, κἂν κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλοῖον φαίνῃ*" p. **144.** 6.

γυμνόν: see *ἀπογυμνοῦν αὐτά* p. **100.** 16, where this method of analysis is amply illustrated; so *διαλύσῃ τὰ ἐμφανταζόμενα αὐτῷ* p. **28.** 5; cf. pp. **214.** 22, **236.** 11.

ὅλον δι' ὅλων διῃρημένως βλέπειν, sim. *ἐὰν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν θεωρῇ διῃρημένως καὶ ὁλικῶς* p. **222.** 18; *ἕκαστον δι' ὅλου αὐτὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν, τί μὲν αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑλικόν· τί δὲ τὸ αἰτιῶδες* p. **248.** 4; cf. pp. **60.** 10, **130.** 10. The adverb recalls Descartes's 'clearly and distinctly'; in interrogating experience we are to regard the whole and parts, the entirety, and further to see it *distinctly*, dividing *τὸ ποιοῦν* from *τὸ πάσχον*, cause from inert matter.

ὅλον δι' ὅλων (sc. *τῶν μερῶν*) is here used in a popular sense, not with reference to the Stoic doctrine of *κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων*, see *ἥνωται ἡ οὐσία* p. **98.** 7 n. Galen uses the term for the *entire* modification of living tissues by *φύσις*, opp. to the mere superficial handiwork of the human statuary: *καὶ γὰρ ὅλα δι' ὅλων, οὐκ ἔξωθεν μόνον, αὐτὰ διαπλάττει* ii. 82.

44. 25 τὸ ἴδιον ὄνομα, the *precise* name, which belongs to its *οὐσία*, opp. to the fictitious label put upon it by *φαντασία*, when not controlled by judgement: *ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία* Pl. *Prt.* 349b.

The method is illustrated in Epict. i. 27, especially by *ἀκούεις τῶν ἰδιωτῶν λεγόντων*· "*τάλας ἐκεῖνος, ἀπέθανεν*" . . . *ἄκουσον τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, ἀπόσπασον σεαυτὸν τούτων τῶν φωνῶν, ἀντίθες τῷ ἔθει τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος* § 5. M. himself explains it: *μηδὲν πλέον ἑαυτῷ λέγε ὧν αἱ προηγούμεναι φαντασίαι ἀναγγέλ-*

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λουσιν, i.e. you are to give the experience its true name "νοσεῖ", not to add "κινδυνεύει" p. 164. 5.

44. 25–6 **συνεκρίθη . . . ἀναλυθήσεται**: cf. ἐξ οἵων ἡ σύγκρισις καὶ εἰς οἷα ἡ λύσις p. 244. 23, i.e. the elements out of which τὸ γινόμενον is composed, and into which it passes again; τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τίνων συγκέκριται καὶ πόσον χρόνον πέφυκε παραμένειν; p. 46. 4. M. gives examples of less entire analysis at p. 184. 27 sq.

§ 2: 44. 26–7 **οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως μεγαλοφροσύνης ποιητικόν**: one of the few phrases which are repeated *verbatim* (p. 198. 25). The recognition of the continual flux of phenomena is said to produce elevation of soul, τὸ φύσει μεγαλόφρων εἶναι καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων καταφρονητικός Epict. iii. 24. 12.

M. prefers the word to μεγαλοψυχία, which is ἕξις ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσα τῶν συμβαινόντων κοινῇ φαύλων τε καὶ σπουδαίων D.L. vii. 93; 'animi excellentia magnitudoque . . . in his ipsis (i.e. rebus externis) despiciendis' Cic. *Off.* i. 17, cf. ib. 66.

44. 27 **τὸ ἐλέγχειν ὁδῷ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ**: cf. ἀνεξέταστος p. 40. 12 n. ἀληθείᾳ is equivalent to καταληπτικῶς, which he joins with ὁδῷ, p. 8. 6 n.

46. 1 **συνεπιβάλλειν**: equivalent to συνορᾶν S. Emp. *Math.* vii. 348; μὴ συνεπιβάλλοντες αὐτοῦ τῷ πλάτει, abstracting from its breadth, id. iii. 58. M., like Sextus, also uses ἐπιβάλλειν in this sense, τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλων p. 206. 8 n.

ὁποίῳ τινὶ τῷ κόσμῳ, i.e. a Universe ruled by Providence, cf. l. 8, and p. 22. 15.

46. 2 **τίνα μέν ἔχει ἀξίαν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.** M. here distinguishes *value* by its contribution to the Universe and to society; the Stoics recognized three senses: ἀξίαν δὲ τὴν μέν τινα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἣ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον (e.g. πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια), and, thirdly, exchange value of material goods D.L. vii. 105, cf. Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 83. M.'s division is based on the first sense; he refers to the second in the words ἐν τοῖς μέσοις l. 13.

46. 3 **πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης**, τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ p. 32. 11 n.

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46. 4 **ὥσπερ οἰκίαι**: cf. *ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις* p. **52.** 5 n.; of that City actual cities are like family groups in this world.

46. 5 **πόσον χρόνον πέφυκε παραμένειν.** We meet this analysis into a time relation again at p. **242.** 17. The exact meaning is uncertain; M. seems to mean that man is to remind himself of the transitory character of what is relatively painful or harmful. Cf. Epicurus' maxim at p. **130.** 22, and generally, *ὅτι ὀλίγου χρόνου ἔσται ἡ τοιαύτη προσοχή, καὶ λοιπὸν πεπαύσεται ὁ βίος* p. **222.** 23.

τὸ τὴν φαντασίαν μοι νῦν ποιοῦν. Gat. considered that *ποιοῦν* is from *ποιόω*, cf. *ὁποῖόν ἐστι (τὸ φανταστὸν) κατ' οὐσίαν* p. **44.** 24, with the sense 'that gives my imagination at the moment a specific character'; cf. p. **242.** 16.

46. 6 **οἷον ἡμερότητος κ.τ.λ.**: the six virtues run in pairs, so that *αὐτάρκεια*, though it may be a general and inclusive term, *τοῦ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ* p. **40.** 22, suggests *frugality*: *αὐτάρκεις αὐτοὺς παρεσκεύασε καὶ λιτούς* Polyb. vi. 48. 7; *Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον τίς πλουσιώτατος εἶπεν· ὁ ἐλαχίστοις ἀρκούμενος. αὐτάρκεια γὰρ φύσεώς ἐστι πλοῦτος* Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 265; *τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν . . . ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρκώμεθα* Epicur. D.L. x. 130.

Contentment is an ideal of Stoic and Epicurean alike, and although the word implies an attitude of self-dependence, in the midst of wealth or poverty, in health or sickness, the sense 'contentment with little' tends to prevail, cf. St. Paul, *Phil.* 4. 11.

§ 3: 46. 8 **παρὰ θεοῦ ἥκει.** Ultimately all circumstances come from God; although man may distinguish primary and secondary causes, and refer to the second as *τύχη*, yet *τὰ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ἄνευ φύσεως ἢ συγκλώσεως* p. **22.** 4; cf. *τὰ ἐπιγίνομενα* p. **34.** 15.

46. 8–9 **κατὰ τὴν σύλληξιν.** Morus proposed to read *σύννησιν*: there is, however, an etymological play upon Lachesis and Clotho, cf. pp. **40.** 2, **48.** 16, **66.** 5, **80.** 20, and the similar allusion at *Λάχεσις, εἰς πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν μένει λῆξις* [Arist.] *Mu.* 401^{b}20.

M., when he uses *τύχην*, l. 10, recalls perhaps the misunderstanding of the ignorant in Pl. *Ti.* (*Test.*).

46. 9 **τὴν συμμηρυομένην σύγκλωσιν**: cf. *οἷα τις ἡ σύννησις καὶ συμμήρυσις* p. **68.** 2; *πάντα τὰ γινόμενα συμμηρύεται* p. **154.** 5; *συνδέσεως* p. **46.** 24.

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46. 11 ἀγνοοῦντος μέντοι. The thought and expression agree closely with ii. 1.

46. 12–13 τὸν τῆς κοινωνίας φυσικὸν νόμον, an uncommon expression for a familiar thought: *κοινωνίαν δ' ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος* Arius Did. 29, Euseb. *P.E.* xv. 15; Diels, *Dox.* p. 464. Cic. (or the source which he used) may have influenced M.: 'Zeno autem . . . naturalem legem divinam esse censet' *N.D.* i. 36.

46. 13 εὔνως καὶ δικαίως. For the Stoics, beneficence and justice are twin virtues: 'ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur, cuius partes duae sunt: iustitia . . . et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet' Cic. *Off.* i. 20.

46. 13–14 τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐν τοῖς μέσοις συστοχάζομαι. *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν* is what is justly ascribed to a man according to his value or worth: *τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονεμητικὸν ἑκάστῳ* p. **12.** 3. The mind of the Universe *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπένειμεν ἑκάστοις* p. **92.** 19, cf. p. **54.** 26.

M., as *ἅμα μέντοι* shows, is adding a new point to his preceding discussion of the right treatment of one who offends through ignorance of the right. He says that he further aims at giving him what he deserves in the field of *τὰ μέσα*, i.e. of the good things which are morally indifferent.

His meaning is clear from *εὐνοεῖν μέντοι αὐτοῖς δεῖ· φύσει γὰρ φίλοι* (i.e. by the natural law spoken of above), *καὶ οἱ θεοὶ . . . αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦσι . . . πρὸς ἃ ἐκεῖνοι διαφέρονται* p. **180.** 22. Even as the gods assist them in the sphere of their claims and their interests, so he, who as Emperor has these things in his gift, should award to them what they deserve among these indifferent goods; and this he will do, in spite of the fact that they are mistaken in the value they put on them.

Ch. 12: 46. 15 ἑπόμενος τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ: cf. p. **40.** 23. The meaning of *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* in Arist. has been disputed (see e.g. Sir David Ross's note, at his trans. of Arist. *Ethica Nic.* 1095[a]10); in the Stoics it stands for the *right law* incumbent upon men and gods because of reason, and is also identified with Zeus, the guide and ruler of the Universe: *οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λ. διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ*

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αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι Chrysippus ap. D.L. vii. 88; cf. p. **52.** 25 n. Thus M. says: *τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ* p. **248.** 20; sim. p. **200.** ll. 5 and 13.

46. 16 **μηδὲν ⟨παρίῃς⟩ παρεμπόρευμα.** A verb appears to be missing, since to suppose that *ἐνεργῇς* governs the substantive is awkward. Gat. suggested, *inter alia*, *ἐπιζητῇς* or *ποιῇ π.* and I have ventured to supply *παρίῃς*, in the sense in which Pl. writes *μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψ. Phd.* 90e.

παρεμπόρευμα means what is subsidiary, e.g. the secondary service rendered by an organ, Galen, iii. 654; physical benefit arising from labour in the fields, *παρ. οἰκονομικὸν γυμνασίου γεωργικοῦ* Clem. Alex. *Paed.* p. 283. Some *side issues* are enumerated at p. **38.** 8 sq.

46. 17 **καθαρὸν ἑστῶτα τηρῇς:** cf. *ἱλέων διατηρεῖν*, of the *genius*, p. **48.** 18, sim. p. **32.** 18.

καθαρόν, transferred to mean 'freed from *πάθη*', as *καθαρὸν πάθους διατηρεῖν* p. **28.** 15. *ἑστῶτα*, cf. p. **50.** 1–2 n., *ἀπτὼς ἑστάναι* p. **140.** 11; *ἐν μόνῳ Θεῷ στῆναι* Ph. ii. 669. St. Paul uses the image of the believer delivered from subjection to sin: *σταθήσεται δέ· δυνατεῖ γὰρ ὁ Κύριος στῆσαι αὐτόν Rom.* 14. 4, cf. *στῆτε οὖν Eph.* 6. 14.

ἀποδοῦναι. The notion of *restoring* the *δαίμων* is remarkable, for it involves an identification of the *genius* with the *ψ.*, perhaps rather with the *νοῦς*, for *τὸ νοερὸν ἥκει ποθέν* p. **54.** 10. M. may have thought, like Pl., that reason in man depends upon *ψ.*, cf. *σοφία καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψ. οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην Phlb.* 30c; he may, like Arist., have considered that *νοῦς* alone survives dissolution. In any case he connects *ἀποδοῦναι* both with the function of breathing and with the restoration of the 'spirit' to the source from which it came, he couples, that is, *τὸν ἀέρα ἀποδοῦναι* with *τὴν ἀναπνευστικὴν δύναμιν . . . ἀποδοῦναι ἐκεῖ ὅθεν . . . ἔσπασας* p. **102.** 16–19. Does he also mean here both to breathe one's last and to return the *genius* to Him who gave it? The expressions *vitam, spiritum, animam reddere* are Roman rather than Greek, see Lucr. vi. 1198; Cic. *Phil.* x. 20; Virg. *Georg.* iii. 495; Vell. Pat. ii. 123.

46. 18 **ἐὰν τοῦτο συνάπτῃς.** *τοῦτο* resumes *τὸ παρόν* l. 15, as *μηδὲν περιμένων* and *τῇ παρούσῃ* indicate. It seems that *συνάπτῃς* is

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used, like *σύνεχε* p. **44.** 16, in a sense not exemplified in L. and S. With the idea of securing the present, cf. *τοῦτον ἰδοὺ τὸν χρόνον σεαυτῷ χάρισαι* p. **160.** 27. To read *τούτῳ* with Cas. (si illi adhaereas) gives no satisfactory meaning, for M. nowhere speaks of 'cleaving unto' the *δαίμων*.

46. 18 **μηδὲν περιμένων**, cf. *μήτε διώκων μήτε φεύγων* p. **42.** 24. Elsewhere M. uses *π.* to mean *wait for*, here it means *expect*, almost *require*, like *attendre*.

46. 19 **ἡρωικῇ ἀληθείᾳ**: difficulty has been expressed about this use of *ἡρ.* Mr. R. G. Bury suggested that M. is translating *heroica*, in the sense 'old-world truthfulness', like 'opinio ab heroicis ducta temporibus' Cic. *Div.* i. 1, and M. Trannoy explains: 'des temps héroïques'. May not M. mean what Arist. intends by *τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν E.N.* 1145^{a}19?

46. 20 **εὐζωήσεις**: elsewhere, e.g. p. **96.** 1, he prefers *εὑροεῖν, εὐοδεῖν*. Arist. has *εὐζωία* as a syn. of *εὐδαιμονία E.N.* 1098^{b}21, and the subst. is defined as: *κτῆσις σπουδαία ⟨τῷ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντι⟩* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 74.

οὐδεὶς ὁ τοῦτο κωλῦσαι δυνάμενος. This is the tenet of the *αὐτάρκεια* of the reasonable will, already similarly stated at p. **24.** 17; so *φύσιν ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ἡγ. ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖσθαι δικαιοπραγοῦντι* p. **130.** 6, *ἵνα δὲ τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἀπέχῃ, οὐδὲ εἷς σε κωλῦσαι δύναται* p. **156.** 15.

Ch. 13: 46. 21 **Ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροί.** The parallel is familiar: 'est profecto animi medicina, philosophia' Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 6. M. elaborates it at v. 8 and 9. Cic. too uses this figure from 'first-aid' equipment: 'iam doloris medicamenta illa Epicurea tamquam de narthecio proment' *Fin.* ii. 22.

πρόχειρα: sim. *ἑκάστου δόγματος ὅταν ἡ χρεία παρῇ, πρόχ. αὐτὸ ἔχειν δεῖ* Epict. iii. 10. 1; *ἀεὶ πρόχ. ἔχειν δεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς αὐταρκείας δόγμα* Galen v. 51; Simpl. says that the *Manual* is called *Ἐγχειρίδιον*: *διὰ τὸ πρόχ. ἀεὶ αὐτὸ δεῖν in Ench.* p. 2a; cf. 'non enim reposita illa esse oportet, sed in promptu' Sen. *Ep.* 94. 26.

46. 23 **τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα**: referring back to p. **34.** 5, so that Gat. suggests *καὶ ⟨τὰ⟩ ἀνθρ.*

46. 24 **συνδέσεως**: elsewhere of the *bond* which unites and interrelates the Universe, *ἡ σύνδεσις ἱερά* p. **122.** 24.

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46. 25–6 τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς . . . οὔτ' ἔμπαλιν: cf. 'quod ipsum explorare . . . sine universitatis inquisitione non possumus, cum ita cohaerentia, conexa, concatenata sint ut nisi divinitatis rationem diligenter excusseris, nescias humanitatis' Minuc. Fel. *Oct.* 17. 2. M. makes the reference reciprocal.

Ch. 14; 46. 27 Μηκέτι πλανῶ: like *μηκέτι σπῶ* p. **20.** 18, a reminder to abandon all side-tracks, every *παρεμπόρευμα* l. 16, including literary recreation. The passage is one of those which suggest that the *Meditations* at least began in self-colloquy.

τὰ ὑπομνηματιά σου, recalling, as *εἰς τὸ γῆρας* suggests, Pl.'s words (*Test.*); cf. Clem. Alex. cited at p. **36.** 5 n., and *τὴν αὑτῶν εἰς μνήμην συμβουλὴν περὶ βίου κατέθεντο συγγράψαντες* Pl. *Lg.* 858d.

48. 1 τὰς τῶν ἀρχαίων Ῥωμαίων . . . πράξεις: possibly intended for Commodus' instruction, as Cato the elder: *τὰς ἱστορίας συγγράψαι φησὶν αὐτὸς . . . ὅπως οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχοι τῷ παιδὶ πρὸς ἐμπειρίαν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ πατρίων ὠφελεῖσθαι* Plu. *Cato Ma.* 20. Nicephorus says: *ὁ Μάρκος Ἀντωνῖνος οὗτος καὶ βιβλίον παιδείας τῷ παιδὶ Μάρκῳ συντάττει . . .* *Hist. Eccl.* iii. 31, see Introd. p. **xx**, n. 2.

48. 2 τὰς . . . ἐκλογάς. M. writes: 'feci per hos dies excerpta ex libris lx, in quinque tomis' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 34, and Fronto sends him extracts from Cic.'s letters, ib. p. 107; cf. 'Populi Romani . . . facta simul ac dicta memoratu digna . . . ab inlustribus electa auctoribus deligere constitui' Val. Max. *Mem.* i, praef.; Plin. *Ep.* iii. 5. 17.

48. 3 σπεῦδε οὖν εἰς τέλος. Xyl.'s emend. is supported by *ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος* l. 22; cf. *ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεῦδε* p. **224.** 1; *ἐφιεμένην . . . τοῦ τέλους, ἐφ' ὃ σπεύδειν ἀναγκαῖον* Ph. ii. 158.

48. 4 ἕως ἔξεστιν: cf. *αὔθις οὐκ ἐξέσται* p. **22.** 17 n.

Ch. 15: 48. 5 Οὐκ ἴσασι, πόσα σημαίνει. The aphorism appears to be an attempt to write like Heraclit., and his model has influenced M.'s style, cf. *οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως* id. 51 D., 45 B., and *ὁ ἄναξ . . . οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει*, i.e. Apollo's words conceal a deeper meaning than appears at first sight, id. 93 D., 11 B.; sim. *Σωκρ. δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν* X. *Mem.* i. 1. 4.

τὸ κλέπτειν. Cas. referred to *οἷα δὲ κλέπτουσιν κ.τ.λ.* p. **200.** 19

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for the explanation, where M. says that theft and rapine may be used of wrong done by one soul to another; presumably as we speak of *robbing* a man of his good name.

The emendations that have been suggested for *κλέπτειν* (*σκάπτειν* Reiske, *συλλέγειν* Cor.), like Rich.'s *κινεῖσθαι* for *ὠνεῖσθαι*, are necessarily vain attempts in the absence of any MSS. evidence of variation, and of precise clues to the writer's reasons for his choice of instances.

τὸ σπείρειν, to be explained by *σπέρμα* as interpreted at p. **66.** 10 sq.

48. 7 **ἑτέρᾳ τινὶ ὄψει**, the underlying thought is that expressed in *ὁρᾶν δυνήσεται* p. **36.** 9. The converse is *τυφλὸς ὁ καταμύων τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι* p. **62.** 21.

The analogy of the inner to the outer eye is familiar from Pl., e.g. *κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν R.* 519b; similarly *ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ* Arist. *Top.* 108a11. It is a favourite use with Ph., Clem. Alex., Max. Tyr., and later with the Neoplatonists.

Ch. 16: 48. 8. The chapter opens with an analysis of the self which is suggested by *σαυτῷ βοήθει*, l. 4, points out what *τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, l. 15, is in relation to this analysis, and ends by a verbal reference in *τὸ τέλος τοῦ βίου*, l. 22, to *σπεῦδε εἰς τέλος*, l. 3.

The language is only roughly consistent with Stoic psychology, and with the terminology used elsewhere by M., and the form of proof is loose and unsatisfactory, although it is stated as a proof. M. gives once more what he considers to be *τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, but does not show that the characteristics he lays down are the whole or the necessary attributes of rightly guided reason.

Σῶμα, ψυχή, νοῦς, a comparison of this tripartite division of the self with that into *σαρκία, πνευμάτιον, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν* p. **20.** 13 or *σωμάτιον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς* p. **236.** 15, shows that *ψυχή* means here the 'animal spirit' which distinguishes man and the animals from the vegetable creation with its *φύσις*, and from inorganic bodies with their *ἕξις*, p. **100.** 23 n. M. next assigns to *body*, the senses, and to *spirit*, the impulses, speaking as though the external senses, sight, &c., were independent of nervous energy, the latter being manifested in motor action and

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reaction. The distinction, even if it were tenable, has no bearing on the argument which follows.

48. 9 **τὸ μὲν τυποῦσθαι φανταστικῶς.** Pl. and Arist. both illustrate sensation from the imprint of a seal, *Tht.* 191d; *De Mem.* 450^{a}31, and Zeno said: *φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. . . . νοεῖται δὲ φαντασία ἡ . . . ἐναποτετυπωμένη*, explaining, however, that the simile is not to be taken literally D.L. vii. 50.

καὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων: *ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄγεσθαι παθῶν ἡμᾶς καθάπερ βοσκήματα* Galen ii. 29. All M. means is that man's *specific* character cannot be what is common to him with cattle.

48. 10 **τὸ δὲ νευροσπαστεῖσθαι ὁρμητικῶς,** i.e. *καθ' ὁρμήν* p. **102.** 22 as *φανταστικῶς* stands for *κατὰ φαντασίαν* ib. l. 21. The effect of impulse is like the pull of a string, pp. **22.** 2, **122.** 1 n.

τῶν θηρίων. *τὰ βοσκήματα* too are governed by *ὁρμαί*, but as they are domesticated, these impulses are trained by man's intelligent will. The wild and dangerous animals are not so subordinated, and are brought in here for rhetorical effect as comparable to tyrants, like Phalaris and Nero.

ἀνδρογύνων: see Pollux vi. 126, s.v. *Κίναιδος*; Suid. s.v. *'Ανδρόγυνος*. Theopompus used *ἀνδρόπορνοι*, Polyb. viii. 11. 12.

48. 11 **Νέρωνος.** He is coupled with *Σαρδανάπαλλος* Epict. iii. 22, 30.

τὸ δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν. Gat. thought it impossible that M. should make *νοῦς* the guide of these unbelievers. He therefore offered with confidence his transference (*app. crit.*). As, however, the terminology of the passage is loose, and as M. uses *νοῦς* for *τὸ ἡγ.* at p. **236.** 15, and recognizes at p. **184.** 17 that evil men are guided by their *ἡγ.*, we may leave the text as it stands, in a form too which suits the rhetorical purpose; cf. *καὶ γὰρ αἱ μοχθηραὶ πράξεις . . . ἐφέσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γίνονται* Aspas. *in Arist. E.N.* p. 4, cf. p. 78, and *ὁ δοκῶν νοεῖν νοῦς εὑρίσκεται πολλάκις ἄνους* Ph. i. 78.

For M.'s distinction here, between ordinary men and men of consummate moral purpose, cf. *ψυχὴν δὲ ζῴων ἁπάντων, ἀνθρώπων δὲ νοῦν καὶ λόγον, ἀρετὴν δὲ σπουδαίων τελειοτάτην* Critolaus ap. Ph. ii. 496; and, for *τὰ φαινόμενα καθήκοντα, αἱ τέλειοι ἀρεταὶ μόνου τοῦ τελείου . . . κτήματα, τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν καθηκόντων ἐφαρμόττει καὶ τοῖς ἀτελέσι* Ph. i. 169.

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48. 13 καὶ τῶν ⟨ὁτιοῦν⟩: *τῶν ⟨πᾶν⟩* Wil. Possibly M. wrote *καὶ πᾶν ποιούντων.*

48. 13–14 ἐπειδὰν κλείσωσι τὰς θύρας: cf. *ὅταν κλείσητε τὰς θ. καὶ σκότος ἔνδον ποιήσητε* Epict. i. 14. 13, sim. iii. 22. 14. Similar charges were made against the Epicureans and the Christians, *ταῦτα δεῖται σκότους τὰ τέλη*, of the former, Plu. *An recte* 1129b; 'lucifuga natio', 'pravae religionis obscuritas', of the latter, Min. Fel. *Oct.* 8. 4, 10. 1. M. is, however, thinking of evil men generally, cf. *τὰ γὰρ κρυφῇ γινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ λέγειν* St. Paul, *Eph.* 5. 12.

§ 2: 48. 14 κοινά ἐστι πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, sc. *τῷ ἀγαθῷ.* We should perhaps understand *ἤθη* with the participle, cf. *μεθ' οἵων ἠθῶν* p. **174. 3.**

48. 15 λοιπόν. What remains over is the *proprium* of the truly righteous servant of God. The use of *λοιπόν*, with *τὰ λ.* preceding, makes one suspect the text, and perhaps Gat. was right in omitting *τό*, l. 15, since *ἴδιόν ἐστι* is parallel with *κοινά ἐστι* l. 14.

48. 17 μὴ φύρειν. The meaning is clearly *pollute*, cf. p. **40. 9** n.

θορυβεῖν ὄχλῳ φαντασιῶν: cf. *μὴ ὀχλεῖσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ* p. **118. 22.** The striking met. was perhaps suggested by Pl.'s image of the despot's soul; he is *πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός R.* 579b.

48. 23 τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μοίρᾳ συνηρμοσμένον: cf. *οἷς συγκεκλήρωσαι πράγμασι, τούτοις συνάρμοζε σεαυτόν* p. **112. 18.** *μοῖρα* appears to combine the sense of 'destined portion' with that of *birth-spirit*, p. **40. 3** n.

BOOK IV

Ch. 1: 50. 1 Τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον: cf. *τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψ. σου μέρος* p. **90. 16**, where it is said to be able to be *ἄτρεπτον* by the flesh, cf. p. **52. 5.** Here the emphasis is upon its power of meeting circumstance and adapting itself accordingly, *τρέπει δὲ καὶ κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν μόνη* p. **88. 11.** For the whole ch. cf. p. **88. 9–21.**

κατὰ φύσιν, i.e. when it judges and acts *κατὰ λόγον, ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει*, p. **40. 7** n.

50. 2 πρὸς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ διδόμενον μετατίθεσθαι. M. is thinking of the case where the will appears to be hindered or anticipates

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opposition. *τὸ δυνατόν* refers to the *reservation* with which the wise man sets out, see *μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως* l. 4 n., and cf. *ὅτι μεθ' ὑπεξ. ὥρμας καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὐκ ὠρέγου* p. **118.** 16.

διδόμενον, because the good man does not choose the sphere of his offices but accepts what is given, even if it be *τὸ ἀντεισαγόμενον*. In that case the will preserves its moral independence *τῇ ἐπὶ τὸ διδόμενον εὐγνώμονι μεταβάσει* p. **156.** 19, or by using a different virtue to meet the obstacle, p. **118.** 15. For the construction, cf. *τῷ νῷ δ' ἕκαστος . . . τρέπειν ἑαυτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μεταβάλλειν ῥᾷστα πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν πέφυκεν* Plu. *Per.* 1.

50. 3 **ὕλην γὰρ ἀποτεταγμένην οὐδεμίαν φιλεῖ.** The analogy is with the craftsman who imposes a form upon *matter* which is *διδόμενόν τι*, cf. *τὸν γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν . . . ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν . . . καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας* Arist. *E.N.* 1100^{b}35; 'non ex ebore tantum Pheidias sciebat facere simulacra . . . : si adhuc viliorem materiam obtulisses, fecisset quale ex illa fieri optimum posset: sic sapiens virtutem' Sen. *Ep.* 85. 40. So M. says: *ἀεὶ γάρ μοι τὸ παρὸν ὕλη ἀρετῆς . . . καὶ τέχνης ἀνθρώπου* p. **144.** 8; cf. *δεῖ γὰρ πάντως περί τινα τῶν ἔκτος ὑλῶν φιλοτεχνεῖν, [ἀλλ'] οὐκ ἐκείνην ἀποδεχόμενον, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν ᾖ ἐκείνη, τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν ἐπιδεικνύοντα* Epict. ii. 5. 21.

Thus virtue consists not in the objects of activity as such but in the purpose which the good will displays: 'non quid sed quemadmodum feras interest' Sen. *Prov.* 2. 4; *ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορον . . . ἡ ὕλη οὐ διαφέρουσα* Epict. l.c. 7, and indeed virtue is especially displayed in overcoming or reconciling obstacles and opposing persons p. **88.** 14.

50. 4 **πρὸς τὰ ⟨προ⟩ηγούμενα**: cf. *εἰς τὸ προηγούμενον*, in the parallel passage, p. **88.** 19. In both places the word appears to be used as an equivalent of *προκείμενα* (*-ον*), pp. **108.** 6, **168.** 22, with reference to such *objects* as, in general, guides to conduct, in distinction from any *ὕλη ἀποτεταγμένη*, cf. *οὐ τὴν ὕλην δεῖ τιμᾶν, τὰ σαρκίδια, ἀλλὰ τὰ προηγούμενα· τίνα ἐστὶ ταῦτα; . . . καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι . . . ὁρμᾶν . . . ὡς πεφύκαμεν* Epict. iii. 7. 25. (The word *προηγούμενος* and its cognates is discussed by Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, pp. 38–40.) Gat.'s alternative *προηγμένα* is unsatisfactory textually, and its sense, *praeposita*, would contradict what M. has just said, l. 3, cf. p. **56.** 8 n.

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μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως, with the *reservation*: *εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι*, the Stoic equivalent for the Christian 'D.V.' *ἐὰν ὁ Κύριος θελήσῃ St. James*, 4. 13. The connexion with *τὸ ἀντεισαγόμενον* is seen in: *μήτε παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν . . . γίνεσθαί τι περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον, διὰ τὸ μεθ' ὑ. πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἀπρόληπτον προσπίπτειν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 115; 'ad omnia cum exceptione venit: si nihil inciderit quod inpediat' Sen. *Ben.* iv. 34. 4, 'inprimis autem cogitavit aliud posse *propositis* suis resistere' id. *Tranq.* 13. 3.

50. 5 **ὕλην ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖ**. *Material* is now used, not as opposed to *form*, but for *nutriment* or fuel, the analogy being with organic or physical processes. The figure, original to M., suggests that good is maintained, even nourished, by the evil which it meets and overcomes. Thus he makes his theory of conduct analogous with the Stoic view of the relation in Nature between the causal and the material, p. **60.** 10 n., and implies the falsity of the common hypothesis that moral evil arises from 'matter', see *οὔτε εἰδυῖα* p. **26.** 14 n.

ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ, following the suggestion of: *πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινέει* Heraclit. 66 D., 26 B., and perhaps Aristo Ch.'s image of fire as the physical correlate of virtue: *τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον* ap. Plu. *De Virt. mor.* 441a.

50. 7 **ἐξῳκείωσεν ἑαυτῷ**: cf. *μέχρι ἐξοικειώσῃς σεαυτῷ*, where the activity of reason is compared with a strong digestion, p. **206.** 22. Sim. Galen has: *κρατεῖ καὶ μεταβάλλει καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ* (transforms) *καὶ χρηστὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν αἷμα συνίστησιν* ii. 22.

κατηνάλωσε: cf. *τὸ πῦρ ποιητικώτατον λέγομεν, ἐπειδήπερ πάσης ὕλης ἧς ἂν ἐπιλάβηται ταύτην ἀναλίσκει καὶ αὐτῷ τροφὴν παρέχει* Alex. Aphr. *Mant.* p. 111.

Ch. 2: 50. 9 **Μηδὲν ἐνέργημα εἰκῇ μηδὲ ἄλλως**: cf. *μήτε εἰκῇ* (sc. *ἐνεργεῖν*) *μήτε ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἂν ἡ Δίκη αὐτὴ ἐνήργησεν* p. **244.** 18. He is giving the rule of life which enables *τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον*, l. 1, to confront its present experience, as he said: *ἐὰν τὸ παρὸν ἐνεργῇς ἑπόμενος τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ* p. **46.** 15.

50. 9–10 **κατὰ θεώρημα συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς τέχνης**. The principle of reason, *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος*, corroborates or is the *completion* of the art of good living: *τίς σου ἡ τέχνη; ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ πῶς*

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ἄλλως γίνεται ἢ ἐκ θεωρημάτων; p. **216.** 10, where M. makes the *θεωρήματα* embrace the law of the whole as well as the law of the individual's conduct. As he regards the rule of right here as the *complement* of practical maxims, so every moral act is conversely *συμπληρωτικὴ ζωῆς πολιτικῆς* p. **180.** 8; cf. the general statement at p. **156.** 14.

Ch. 3: 50. 11 **Ἀναχωρήσεις,** *secessus*; the sing. of both words was already used in the abstract meaning of *retirement*, see l. 18. The Epicureans used *ἀναχ.* for life with philosophic friends: *διαγωγὴν ἐπιτερπῆ καὶ μετὰ φίλων ἀναχ. εὔσχολον* Philod. *Oec.* p. 64; Philo for *religious* withdrawal: *ἐγὼ πολλάκις . . . εἰς ἐρημίαν ἐλθών, ἵνα τι τῶν θέας ἀξίων κατανοήσω, οὐδὲν ὤνησα, ἀλλὰ . . . ὁ νοῦς . . . ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τἀναντία* i. 81; cf. 'in philosophiam secede' Sen. *Ep.* 103. 4, cf. id. 82. 4.

ἀγροικίας καὶ αἰγιαλοὺς καὶ ὄρη, *country seats*, by the sea or in the hills, cf. *τοῖς ἐν ἀκρῷ τῷ ὄρει ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ*, where M. again mentions the two scenes of such retirement, p. **202.** 24. For the sea-side, 'gratum litus amoeni | secessus', of Cumae, Juv. iii. 4; 'ad ferias in secessu maritimo fruendas', of M. at Alsium, Fronto, *Ep.* p. 224. For the highlands, cf. 'rure meo possum quidvis perferre patique' Hor. *Ep.* i. 15. 17; 'Tusculanum aut Tiburtinum paraturus salubritatis causa et aestivi secessus' Sen. *Ben.* iv. 12. 3.

50. 13 **ἰδιωτικώτατον**: cf. *ἰδιωτικόν* p. **72.** 15; *θέασαι ὡς φαῦλον καὶ ἰδιωτικόν ἐστι καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι ὃ ἔλεγον* Pl. *Ion* 532e. The *ἰδιώτης*, for Stoicism, is the unenlightened man; he looks to externals, the philosopher turns inward for his good: *ἰδιώτου στάσις καὶ χαρακτήρ· οὐδέποτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προσδοκᾷ ὠφέλειαν ἢ βλάβην, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξω· φιλοσόφου στάσις καὶ χ.· πᾶσαν ὠφ. καὶ β. ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προσδοκᾷ* Epict. *Ench.* 48. 1; *ὁ δὲ φ. εἰς ἑαυτὸν . . . ἐπιστρέφεται, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκει* Simpl. *in Ench.* 317c.

50. 13–14 **εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναχωρεῖν.** The form *ἑαυτόν* for the 2nd person after *εἰς* and *πρός* seems to be M.'s usage, cf. pp. **98.** 26, **124.** 11, **130.** 6, **190.** 9.

The use of *ἀναχωρεῖν* for inward meditation is common to Stoics and Epicureans, cf. *εἰς ἑαυτὸν συνειλοῦ* p. **130.** 6; 'quod idem suadet Epicurus: tunc praecipue in te ipsum secede, cum esse cogeris in turba' Sen. *Ep.* 25. 6, cf. ib. 7. 8. The phrase is

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used of a jay rehearsing to itself its mimicry, Plu. *De Soll. anim.* 973d. Simplicius distinguishes from this retirement the Neoplatonic ideal of him who *φεύγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος βούλεται . . . καὶ εἰς ἑ. συννεύειν in Ench.* 4b, cf. ib. 317c; and Arethas (*Test.* ll. 11 and 14) appears to understand the passage in the less mystical sense. (These *scholia* are believed to be in the archbishop's own hand; a specimen of his writing may be seen in the autotype reproduction of Clem. Alex. *Strom.*, Par. gr. 451. 6^{v} in Stählin's ed. vol. iii, Table I: A.'s hand begins at l. 3 of the footnote, *διεξοδικώτερον.*)

For the hypothesis that the title *τὰ εἰς ἑ.* refers to *retreat* from the world, see p. **434** above.

50. 16 **εἰς ἃ ἐγκύψας**: cf. *ὁ δὲ παρακύψας εἰς νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας St. James*, 1. 25; the believer becomes, by the help of *ὁ ἔμφυτος λόγος, ποιητὴς ἔργου, μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ* ib.

50. 16–17 **τὴν δὲ εὐμάρειαν**: see Suid. *Test.* M. adds 'ordered conduct' to exclude the interpretation that either a hedonist or a mystic might give to his words. **εὐκοσμία** is a species of *σωφροσύνη*, see *κοσμίως* p. **44.** 2 n.

50. 19 **στοιχειώδη**: *κομματικοὶ δέ εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι καὶ γνωμονικοί* Simpl. *in Ench.* 3b; *τί τέλος; . . . γνῶναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν* Epict. iv. 8. 12; 'restat ut his ego me ipse regam solerque elementis' Hor. *Ep.* i. 1. 27; M. gives instances in §§ 2–4 below.

εὐθὺς ἀπαντήσαντα: cf. *ἵνα ἀεὶ πρόχειρον ἀπαντᾷ* p. **216.** 8.

50. 19–20 **πᾶσαν λύπην ἀποκλύσαι.** Most of the corrections were suggested before AD's *ἀποκλεῖσαι* (A has *ει in litura*) was known. Is. Cas. (ap. *Persius*, p. 275) proposed *πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν, perfundere*, but Gat. pointed out that the verb should mean *wash away*, as in *ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἷον ἁλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι* Pl. *Phdr.* 243d; *ἁλμυροὺς λόγους . . . ἀποκλύζεσθαι* Athen. iii. 121e; this sense probably suggested *ἅλμην*, one of Reiske's many proposals. Xyl.'s *molestiam* led Gat. to read *ἀνίαν* which, like *ἄσην* Wil., is one species of *λύπη*, Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 92. In favour of Holste's correction is M.'s *εἰς λύπην* p. **72.** 12, and, e.g., Arist. *E.N.* 1170^{a}25, where the oldest MS. K^{b} has *αὐτῆς* for the accepted reading *λύπης*.

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Leop. and Sch. adopt Lofft's *πᾶσαν αὐλὴν ἀποκλεῖσαι*. This, in view of the opposition of *αὐλή* and *φιλοσοφία* at p. **100.** 5, is at first sight attractive. The image '*excluding* the palace', with the following words 'to send you back', is, however, inappropriate to the context, the point being that retirement is to give relief from *δυσχέρεια* and so to ease the return to the world. Notice too that what troubles him is not the court life but the larger problems of man's life here on earth, see l. 21 sq. A further objection to this reading is the absence of the article.

§ 2: 50. 21 **δυσχερανεῖς**; the fut. is probable in view of *ἅψεται ἔτι*; and *περισπάσει*; p. **52.** 6 and 9.

τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακίᾳ. The grounds for leniency are given more fully here, and at p. **224.** 14, than at p. **20.** 8.

50. 22 **τὸ κρῖμα.** The word, as the instances show, is equivalent to what M. usually calls *δόγμα*, e.g. p. **72.** 13; he uses the two as synonymous at p. **162.** 17, 19.

50. 23 **τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι**: cf. *εὖ ποιητέον αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνεκτέον* p. **88.** 14, sim. p. **94.** 20. Cic.'s Stoic authority, Panaetius, made *beneficentia* and *benignitas* aspects of *iustitia*, *Off.* i. 20, and M. adds forbearance or patience, in these passages, to beneficence as a part of justice. The words *εὐμένεια* and *clementia* perhaps embrace what he intends; *clementia* is 'inclinatio animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda' Sen. *Clem.* ii. 3. 1.

52. 2 **διαδορατισθέντες**, *warfare*, perhaps rather *rivalry*; the verb means *skirmishing*, e.g. Polyb. v. 84. 2, and then fig. *challenging*, 'provoking to combat', as it is used of Plato: *ἴσως μὲν φιλονεικότερον καὶ οἱονεὶ διαδορατιζόμενος* Longin. *De Subl.* 13. 5.

παύου ποτέ, sc. *δυσχεραίνων*, the words have to be supplied mentally after *πόλις* l. 5 and *συγκατέθου* l. 9, and are actually inserted by C after *περιγράφεται* l. 12.

52. 3–4 **ἀνανεωσάμενος**, continuing the construction of *ἀναλογισάμενος* p. **50.** 22, cf. *ἐννοήσας* and *ἀπιδών* ll. 6, 9. The verb is coupled with *μεμνήμεθ'* Eur. *Hel.* 722, cf. *ἀναζωπυρεῖν* p. **120.** 19.

52. 4 **τὸ διεζευγμένον**, sc. *ἀξίωμα*, a *disjunctive* proposition, on which, as a so-called major premiss, a disjunctive syllogism relies. The logical principle is thus stated: *διεζευγμένον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ "ἤτοι" διαζευκτικοῦ συνδέσμου διέζευκται . . . ἐπαγ-*

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γέλλεται δ' ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ψεῦδος εἶναι D.L. vii. 72; *τῇ προσλήψει θατέρου τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἔπεσθαι τοῦ λοιποῦ τῆς συλλογιστικῆς συμπλοκῆς* Alex. Aphr. *in Arist. An. Pr.* p. 19. The process is illustrated in A. Gell. *N.A.* xvi. 8. 9–13. The 'disjunctive' may include more than two members: *οὐκ ἐκ δυοῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τριῶν* Galen, ii. 106, see an instance at p. 240. 23. For hypothetical inference from a 'conjunctive', cf. *ἀεὶ πρόχειρον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸ . . . δόγμα συνημμένον* Galen, v. 51, see p. 52. 25.

52. 4 **ἤτοι πρόνοια ἢ ἄτομοι**, a laconic summary of the opposed Stoic and Epicurean or Atomist hypotheses, see the fuller disjunction at p. 98. 19. For *πρόνοια* he uses *θεός* p. 182. 3, *φύσις* pp. 194. 1, 224. 9. By *ἄτομοι* he indicates that the advocates of the Atomic doctrine excluded a governing providence and divine intervention in the Universe: *Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκ. οὔτ' ἔμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι* (sc. *τὸν κόσμον*), *φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ, ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστῶτα* Aët. ii. 3. 2, Diels, *Dox.* p. 330; *ἄτομα σώματα· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι φύσιν ἐκάλουν* Simpl. *In Arist. Ph.* p. 1318, cf. Democr. 168; Arist. *Ph.* 265^{b}25. For this sense of *φύσις* see p. 194. 25 n.

52. 4–5 **ἐξ ὅσων ἀπεδείχθη ὅτι**: not in the *Meditations* as they are at present arranged, for the proof is first given in ch. 4, below, so that the meaning is: 'the proofs you have received', cf. *ὅσα ἀκήκοας* ll. 8–9, *πάλαι δέδεικται* p. 86. 27.

52. 5 **ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις**: the implication is that in accepting this doctrine the citizen will willingly accept *τὰ ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀπονεμόμενα*, cf. *τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζῴων τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως . . . λόγῳ* p. 32. 10; *τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχεν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως* Epict. i. 12. 7, cf. id. iii. 24. 107, sim. p. 208. 26, and often elsewhere.

τὰ σωματικά: what are called *αἱ σωμ. πείσεις*, p. 138. 14, where M. says: *νοερᾶς κινήσεως ἴδιον . . . μήποτε ἡττᾶσθαι μήτε αἰσθητικῆς μήτε ὁρμητικῆς κινήσεως*. The choice of the word *ἅψεται* cf. *ἅπτεται* l. 19, shows that M. is here looking at the matter as a question of the function of the central consciousness in the psychophysical mechanism. That consciousness is affected by the flow of cognitive and emotional elements and, if master

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of itself, can control and direct their influence, and even inhibit them altogether.

52. 6–7 **λείως ἢ τραχέως κινουμένῳ πνεύματι**: cf. *τῆς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λείας ἢ τραχείας κινήσεως* p. **90.** 17 n.; *λείαν ἢ τραχεῖαν κίνησιν τῆς σαρκός* p. **196.** 18. The *passions*, pleasant and painful, are here regarded as originating in the smooth or broken current of the *animal spirit*.

52. 7 **ἑαυτὴν ἀπολάβῃ**: cf. *περιορίζειν* p. **138.** 15, cited at ll. 5–6, and see *κατ' ἀπόληψιν* p. **130.** 23 n.

52. 8 **γνωρίσῃ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐξουσίαν.** *ἰδίαν* means its *characteristic* power, cf. p. **62.** 6.

ἐξουσία is frequently used by Epict. to mark the contrast of moral freedom to mere physical strength or temporal authority: *δείξωμεν αὐτοῖς* (sc. *τυράννοις*) *ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν* Epict. i. 9. 15; similarly *μέμνησο ταύτης τῆς ἐξουσίας κατὰ φύσιν* p. **156.** 4. In this sense, Butler says of *conscience*: 'had it strength, as it has right, . . . it would absolutely govern the world', *Serm.* ii. 19; the Stoic teacher says: *προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νικῆσαι δύναται, πλὴν αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν* Epict. i. 29. 12.

§ 3: 52. 9 **τὸ δοξάριόν σε περισπάσει**; cf. *περισπώμενος ἐπ' ἀμφότερα*, 'drawn in diverse directions' by the world and by your true self, Epict. iv. 10. 25; *περιεσπᾶτο περὶ πολλὴν διακονίαν St. Luke*, 10. 40. Notice that *glory*, 'the last infirmity', closes the series.

52. 10 **τῆς πάντων λήθης**, of all *men*: *ἐγγὺς μὲν ἡ σὴ περὶ πάντων λήθη· ἐγγὺς δὲ ἡ πάντων περὶ σοῦ λήθη* p. **128.** 1.

52. 10–11 **τὸ χάος τοῦ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ἀπείρου αἰῶνος.** This famous saying is repeated variously at pp. **72.** 21, **90.** 7, **240.** 5. Cf.

μυρίος ἦν, ὤνθρωπε, χρόνος πρὸ τοῦ, ἄχρι πρὸς ἠῶ
ἦλθες, χὠ λοιπὸς μυρίος εἰς Ἀΐδην.

Leon. Tar. *Anth. Pal.* vii. 472.

We are reminded of the Psalmist's 'from everlasting and to everlasting' of the God of Israel, *Ps.* 41. 13, and that may have prompted Pascal's reflection which I have, at p. **334**, compared with M.'s language about Time.

52. 11 **τὸ κενὸν τῆς ἀπηχήσεως**: cf. *τὸ δὲ ὄνομα, ψόφος καὶ ἀπήχημα* p. **94.** 10.

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52. 11–12 τὸ εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἄκριτον τῶν εὐφημεῖν δοκούντων: *ἡ δὲ φήμη ἄκριτον* p. **32.** 14 n.; *τὸ τοῦ φαύλου ἡγ. ἀβέβαιόν ἐστιν, ἄκριτον* Epict. ii. 22. 25.

52. 12 τὸ στενὸν τοῦ τόπου, ἐν ᾧ περιγράφεται: 'exsilium autem illis, quibus quasi circumscriptus est habitandi locus' Cic. *Paradox. St.* ii. 18; 'sermo autem omnis ille et angustiis cingitur iis regionum, quas vides, nec umquam de ullo perennis fuit et obruitur hominum interitu et oblivione posteritatis exstinguitur' id. *Rep.* vi. 25.

52. 13 ὅλη τε γὰρ ἡ γῆ στιγμή. The Greek astronomers treated this earth as a point for their observations and calculations: *τὴν γῆν σημείου τε καὶ κέντρου λόγον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν τῆς σελήνης σφαῖραν* (the moon's orbit) Aristarch. Sam. *De Magn., Hyp.* 2; *ἡ γῆ σφαιροειδής, . . . σημείου δὲ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πρὸς τὸ πᾶν* (the stellar sphere) *λόγον ἔχουσα* Theo. Sm. p. 120, cf. p. 128, Hiller; *ἡ γῆ στιγμιαία ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κόσμου* Cleom. *De Motu circ.* p. 58, cf. p. 97 Balf. From the astronomers it passed into common knowledge: 'terram . . . quasi puncti instar obtinere quod *κέντρον* illi vocant', Cic. *Tusc.* i. 40; Plu. *De Exil.* 601c; Sen. *Cons. ad Marc.* 21. 2, *Qu. Nat.* i, praef. 11.

52. 14 πόσοι καὶ οἷοί τινες οἱ ἐπαινεσόμενοι; The variation from *πόσοι* to *οἷοι* has been suspected, like the similar variations at pp. **94.** 4, **148.** 2, **202.** 13–14. The change, the motive for which escapes us, may be illustrated by: *ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά* Pl. *Grg.* 500a, cf. *ποῖος* and *ὅποσος* id. *R.* 578e; *οἷος ἐξ οἵου γέγονε καὶ ποίας ἀφίει φωνάς* Julian, 23d.

§ 4: 52. 15 λοιπὸν οὖν. The whole ch. might be a letter of counsel and, in closing, M. uses *λοιπόν* as it was used to close an epistle: *τὸ λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί μου, χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ* St. Paul *Phil.* 3. 1, cf. 4. 8. So 'quod superest' is used by Lucretius, whose poem is addressed to a friend, and 'proinde' by Sen. and Plin. before a summary.

τῆς ὑποχωρήσεως: the retreat is now described as to a refuge; with a slight change, it becomes a citadel: *ἀκρόπολίς ἐστιν ἡ ἐλευθέρα παθῶν διάνοια* p. **164.** 1.

τοῦτο τὸ ἀγρίδιον ἑαυτοῦ, the gen. of apposition, 'this hermitage which is yourself'. He may be thinking of the garden of

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Epicurus or have used *ἀγρίδιον* in allusion to 'mihi me reddentis agelli' Hor. *Ep.* i. 14. 1.

52. 16 **μὴ σπῶ μηδὲ κατεντείνου.** M. has *κατενταθέντες* with *κενὰ σπώμενοι* p. **64.** 14; Pl. writes: *μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον*, opp. to the *relaxation* of jest, *R.* 536c, a relaxation expressed by *ἀνειμένος* p. **6.** 16, *νῆφε ἀνειμένος* p. **62.** 11.

52. 16–17 **ἐλεύθερος ἔσο**: the famous Stoic ideal of the wise man's liberty. M. just touched upon it at p. **24.** 1, here he is leading up to the statement in ch. 4 of the common or universal law, which makes man a free citizen of the Eternal city. M. has, at p. **104.** 10, *ἐλεύθερος, αὐτάρκης, ἀπαθής* and ib. l. 14, *ἡ τῆς ἰδίας διανοίας αἰδώς*. At p. **186.** 21 *ἐλευθερία* is contrasted with *δουλεία καὶ ταπεινότης*.

The ideal or paradox is elegantly handled by Cic. in *Parad. St.* v. 33–41; by Ph. in his tract *περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἐλεύθερον* ii. 445 sq.; by Dio. Chrys. xiv. 17, p. 442 and by Epict. in iv. 1.

The connexion of thought is illustrated by: *ὅσοι δὲ μετὰ νόμου ζῶσιν, ἐλεύθεροι· νόμος δὲ ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* Ph. ii. 452. The extravagances of the doctrine are entirely absent from the *Meditations*, extravagances which were the familiar target of Lucilius and of Horace, e.g. *Ep.* i. 1. 106.

52. 17 **ὅρα τὰ πράγματα**: *ἴδε πάλιν τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἑώρας· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ ἀναβιῶναι* p. **120.** 23, cf. p. **110.** 11, and '"Terribiles visu formae, letumque labosque": minime quidem, si quis rectis oculis intueri illa possit' Sen. *Ep.* 104. 24.

ὡς ἀνήρ, ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Contrast the ideal here of humanity, as such, with the national ideal of *ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην* pp. **22.** 18, **40.** 15.

52. 18 **ἐν δὲ τοῖς προχειροτάτοις.** These two points are an afterthought, and are summed up in the closing words: *ὁ κόσμος ἀλλοίωσις, ὁ βίος ὑπόληψις*, in the reverse order, ll. 23–4.

52. 20 **ἔξω ἕστηκεν ἀτρεμοῦντα**, a remarkable expression, which recurs in a slightly varied form at pp. **178.** 11, **220.** 15, **222.** 20. The sense is clear from *τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ψυχῆς ἅπτεται οὐδὲ ἔχει εἴσοδον πρὸς ψυχήν* p. **88.** 9.

For *τὰ πράγματα*, see *τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων* p. **34.** 4 n.;

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here *ὀχλήσεις* shows that M. is referring to the events of moral life, the occasions which arouse *πάθη*.

αἱ δὲ ὀχλήσεις: cf. *οὐκ ἐκεῖνό σοι ἐνοχλεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρῖμα* p. **162.** 16; *ὄχλῳ φαντασιῶν* p. **48.** 17.

Epicur. uses *ὄχλησις* of the disturbing events which lower pleasure *K.Δ.* 8.

52. 20–1 **τῆς ἔνδον ὑπολήψεως**: opp. to *τὰ πράγματα ἔξω θυρῶν* p. **178.** 11, as *ὀχλήσεις* to *ἀτρεμοῦντα*. M. foreshadows this doctrine at p. **30.** 16. For the relation of *λύπη* to *ὑπόληψις* (opinio, iudicium), see Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 61 sq.

52. 23 **ὁ κόσμος ἀλλοίωσις, ὁ βίος ὑπόληψις.** See *Test.* for this aphorism.

ἀλλοίωσις is *μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ ἀλλαγὴ τῆς προϋπαρχούσης ποιότητος*, the qualitative transformations take place in a perceptible material, which preserves its quantity unchanged, Galen, x. 46–7, cf. Arist. *Gen. Corr.* 319^{b}10, see p. **196.** 5 sq.

Ch. 4: 52. 25 **εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ... κοινός.** The mind in which we participate is prior to *λόγος*, its expression: 'principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis dei' Cic. *Leg.* ii. 8. The Stoic doctrine is foreshadowed in Heraclit.: *ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν. ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις* 113 D., 91 B.

M.'s reasoning closely resembles: 'est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius eaque ⟨est⟩ et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas; inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est: quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus; inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est; quibus autem haec sunt communia, ei civitatis eiusdem habendi sunt ... ut iam universus hic mundus una civitas communis deorum atque hominum existimanda ⟨sit⟩' Cic. *Lg.* i. 23. Again, to prove that all men, as rational beings, are ruled by one law: 'quibus enim ratio a natura data est, isdem etiam recta ratio data est, ergo etiam lex, quae est recta ratio in iubendo et vetando; si lex, ius quoque; et omnibus ratio: ius igitur datum est omnibus' ib. 33.

52. 26 **ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μή**: cf. 'in iubendo et vetando' supra; *ἡ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόπολις ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ καὶ μιᾷ*

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χρῆται πολιτείᾳ καὶ νόμῳ ἑνί· λόγος δέ ἐστι φύσεως προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν πρακτέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον Ph. ii. 46; the term survived in juristic theory: 'sed et philosophus summae Stoicae sapientiae Chrysippus sic incipit libro, quem fecit *περὶ νόμου*: *ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων . . . προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγ. δὲ ὧν οὐ π.*' *Dig.* I. iii. 2.

54. 2 πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν: this was anticipated in the words: *τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας . . . λόγῳ* p. **32.** 10–11 n.; cf. *ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ καὶ ἀρίστῳ πολιτεύματι τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου* Ph. ii. 51, id. i. 421. St. Paul uses the term: *ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει Phil.* 3. 20; and Sen. has: 'haec societas . . . nos homines hominibus miscet et iudicat aliquod esse commune ius generis humani' *Ep.* 48. 3.

ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις: resumed from p. **52.** 5. Cic. limits its compass to this world, 'omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem esse' *Paradox. St.* ii. 18; M. means the Universe of all rational beings.

54. 4–5 ἐκεῖθεν δὲ . . . αὐτὸ τὸ νοερὸν . . . ἡμῖν: sim. *πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ* p. **22.** 6. Chrysippus said: *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως, ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν* Plu. *De St. rep.* 1035c; *τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος* D.L. vii. 143. See *νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας*, p. **20.** 6 n.

Since the constitution of the body is derived from the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, which are the (passive and active) constituents of the universe, there must, on the principle of sufficient reason (stated as *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς κτλ.* l. 8), be a source or ground of the intelligence, which governs the body. This source, which Chrysippus calls *Ζεὺς καὶ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις*, is here said to be *ἡ κοινὴ πόλις*, that is, by implication, *ὁ λόγος* which rules the city of gods and men. The form of proof is like that used at p. **48.** 15, and implies the disjunctive principle 'either earth or water etc. is the cause', and the removal of each possible cause so that there remains the *νοῦς* of the whole as source of a mind which was assumed at p. **22.** 15 to be *τινὸς διοικοῦντος τὸν κόσμον ἀπόρροια*.

54. 6 τὸ γεῶδές μοι ἀπό τινος γῆς. The Stoics often speak of the

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four elements as *τὸ ξηρόν, τὸ ὑγρόν, τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ θερμόν*, so that *τὸ γεῶδες* here is equivalent to *τὸ ξηρόν*. Cf. 'aliud a terra sumpsimus, aliud ab umore, aliud ab igni, aliud ab aëre eo quem spiritu ducimus. Illud autem quod vincit haec omnia, rationem dico . . ., ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus?' Cic. *N.D.* ii. 18.

54. 7 ἀπὸ πηγῆς τινος: equivalent to *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος*: *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοιαύτης καὶ πηγῆς ῥέον* p. **66.** 4. The met. is found in the Ionian philosophers, e.g. *πηγὴ δ' ἐστὶ θάλασσ' ὕδατος, πηγὴ δ' ἀνέμοιο* Xenoph. 30; so also in Pl.: *πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως Phdr.* 245c. Cic. has 'hic fons, hoc principium est movendi' *Rep.* vi. 27.

ἀπὸ γῆς τινος AD is an instance of a common MS. corruption of *πηγῆς* or *αὐγῆς*, so Sch.'s *πνοῆς* is unnecessary, esp. in view of *πηγῆς* l. 8.

54. 8 τὸ θερμὸν καὶ πυρῶδες. The sun is the source of both heat and light in our universe, 'the fountain light of all our day', cf. 'Heraclitus fontem coelestis lucis appellat (solem)' Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* i. 20. 3; 'Epicharmus . . . ait: istic est de sole sumptus ignis' Varro, *De ling. lat.* v. 59.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἔρχεται: *εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν . . . . οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* p. **84.** 23.

This axiom, which Descartes calls 'propositio aeternae veritatis' *Princ.* i. 75, came from the Ionian physicists, Arist. *Ph.* 191ª27, D.L. ix. 44, and was held by the Epicureans also, D.L. x. 38–9. The Stoics correctly combined it with the axiom of sufficient reason: *ὁμοιόν τε εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως* (sc. *γίνεσθαί τι*) *τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος* Alex. Aphr. *De Fato*, p. 192.

When the original sense of *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, the *void*, was absorbed in the more general formula, *τὸ μηδέν* could stand for *τὸ μὴ ὄν*: *εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι πρὶν γενέσθαι εἶναι μηδέν, εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲν ἦν, οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός* Meliss. 1, cf. Parm. 6. 1. A Latin form is found in: 'non . . . erit aliquid, quod aut ex nihilo oriatur aut in nihilum subito occidat' Cic. *Div.* ii. 37, cf. Lucr. i. 150, 205; Pers. iii. 83: Boeth. says: 'nam nihil ex nihilo exsistere vera sententia est, cui nemo umquam veterum refragatus est' *Consol.* v, Pr. 1. The second part of Nauck's

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emendation is possibly to be accepted in view of normal usage and of p. **84.** 23.

54. 10 **ἥκει ποθέν,** i.e. *ἐκεῖθεν,* as M. said l. 4, cf. *εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία νοερὰ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται* p. **174.** 19; *πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγ.* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 102.

M. may recall Pl.'s discussion of the origin of man's *ψυχή,* from that of the Universe: *πόθεν . . . λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε; Phlb.* 30a.

M. distinguishes *ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς κίνησις* from the *φοραὶ τῶν στοιχείων,* as *θειότερόν τι* p. **104.** 18, so that he may be thinking of the view that *ψ.* is an *ἀπόσπασμα* from *αἰθήρ,* a fifth element, see Ph. i. 514. The Stoics called the *ψ. πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον* D.L. vii. 157, and Epict. derived it from Fire: *ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πυρὸς εἰς πῦρ ἄπεισιν* iii. 13. 15; that cannot be M.'s view here, see l. 8.

The conclusion would be less flat if we might read *ἥκει ἐκεῖθεν· ἢ πόθεν;* cf. Cic. *N.D.* cited at p. **54.** 6 n.

Ch. 5: 54. 11 **Ὁ θάνατος τοιοῦτον, οἷον γένεσις:** *τὸ ζῷον* is *σύγκριμά τι τῶν στοιχείων* p. **22.** 9; death is *λύσις* or *διάλυσις τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον ζῷον συγκρίνεται* p. **32.** 23. Clearly then *λύσις* must be supplied, cf. *ἐξ οἵων ἡ σύγκρισις καὶ εἰς οἷα ἡ λύσις* p. **244.** 23. C's *τοιοῦτον* is surely correct.

φύσεως μυστήριον. To decide exactly what M. intends by *μ.* is difficult. St. Paul uses the word of what is incomprehensible by man, 1 *Cor.* 15. 51, *Eph.* 5. 32, and, secondly, of truth revealed at length to the saints, *Rom.* 16. 25, *Col.* 1. 27. M. seems to mean the former. Plu., quoting an unnamed poet, calls Sleep "*τὰ μικρὰ τοῦ θανάτου μυστήρια*"· *προμύησις γὰρ ὄντως ἐστὶ τοῦ θανάτου Cons. ad Apoll.* 107e. Thus Death is the great initiation, where the truth that the *ψ.* is deathless is manifested.

There is, however, nothing, here or elsewhere, to suggest that M. means that life, the prelude to death, is an initiation; he is asserting the common character of 'coming to be', a process kept up from day to day, and of 'passing away', which is also daily, p. **178.** 26; for him living and dying are moments in an eternal process, the reality of which is a *secret* known to Nature, and revealed to the philosopher only thus far that he recognizes

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with Heraclit. 21 D., 64 B., that 'birth and death are one', see p. **202.** 10 n.

54. 12–13 **οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ ἄν τις αἰσχυνθείη**: cf. *οὐ κακὸν μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲ αἰσχρόν, . . . ἀγαθὸν δὲ εἴπερ τῷ ὅλῳ καίριον* p. **244.** 14, just as here M. says: *οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸ ἐξῆς τῷ νοερῷ ζῴῳ.*

The sense of shame is properly attached to acts which are *αἰσχρά*, 'morally dishonourable': death then is no ground for shame, and therefore not evil. Further it is good, because it follows, like birth and life, upon the ordinance of the Universe (*τῷ νοερῷ ζῴῳ*, cf. *τοῦ τελείου ζῴου* p. **192.** 5 n.), and because it is not contrary to *τὸν λόγον τῆς κατασκευῆς*, cf. *ἀνακόλουθος τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κατασκευῇ*, where *τῇ φύσει* is equivalent to *τῷ νοερῷ ζῴῳ*, p. **44.** 13.

54. 14 **τῆς κατασκευῆς**: cf. *κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς τῇ ἰδίᾳ κατασκευῇ* p. **162.** 6.

Everywhere else M. uses *κατασκευή*, not *παρασκευή*, in this sense of the constitution of the individual; so that the correction is justified. The scribe's hand was betrayed by his eye, which ran on from *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* to *παρασκευῆς*.

Ch. 6: 54. 15 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης: *ἀναγκάζεται οὕτως ποιεῖν* p. **150.** 24, where, as here, it is a law of necessity that you should not be able to make 'a silk purse out of a sow's ear', since *ἀδύνατον τὸ τοὺς φαύλους μὴ τοιαῦτά τινα ποιεῖν* p. **88.** 3 n. The proverb is familiar: *μήτι συλλέγουσιν ἀπὸ ἀκανθῶν σταφυλήν, ἢ ἀπὸ τριβόλων σῦκα; St. Matt.* 7. 16, cf. *St. James* 3. 12.

54. 16 **ὀπὸν μὴ ἔχειν**: see p. **242.** 11; *ὀπός* is the sap of the fig, which was used as a rennet to curdle milk, *Il.* v. 902. The point here is the acid taste: *τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς διαλυτικὸν τῷ κάειν . . . ὀπὸς ἐπωνομάσθη* Pl. *Ti.* 60 b.

54. 17 **τεθνήξεσθε**: repeated almost verbally at p. **128.** 5, the proverbial consolation of 'it will be all the same a hundred years hence'. Gat. thought the reference to be more particular, i.e. to the many forms of the proverb: *ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν* Arist. *Rh.* 1394^{b}21; 'nec ulla res magis proderit quam cogitatio mortalitatis. . . . quid iuvat tamquam in aeternum genitos iras indicere?' Sen. *De Ira*, iii. 42. 2.

54. 18 **οὐδὲ ὄνομα ὑμῶν**: the text of the meditation upon Mortality, p. **64.** 21 sq.

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Ch. 7: 54. 19 **Ἄρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν.** This wholesome maxim is variously repeated at pp. **124.** 19, **160.** 7, **162.** 16, **226.** 5. Epict. continually enforces it: *σὲ γὰρ ἄλλος οὐ βλάψει, ἂν μὴ σὺ θέλῃς· τότε δὲ ἔσῃ βεβλαμμένος, ὅταν ὑπολάβῃς βλάπτεσθαι Ench.* 30, cf. ib. 20, id. iv. 5. 28.

Ch. 9: 54. 23 **ἡ τοῦ συμφέροντος φύσις.** This appears to be more than a paraphrase of *τὸ συμφέρον*, to mean, in fact, *τὸ φύσει συμφέρον*, cf. *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον* p. **22.** 6 n. M. means that the experience, hard though it may seem, is dictated by the benefit of the Whole; he is expressing the converse of *ὅσα ἑκάστῳ συμβαίνει, ταῦτα τῷ ὅλῳ συμφέρει* p. **116.** 10, and continues the thought in ch. 10.

Ch. 10: 54. 24 **Ὅτι "πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον."** *ὅτι* appears to indicate a quotation, see p. **30.** 16 n., and M. proceeds to expound the meaning he puts upon *δικαίως* in the saying.

54. 25 **κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς.** The meaning is clear at p. **170.** 22 sq. where it is explained that *ἡ κοινὴ φύσις ἐπίσης ἔχει* to the pains and pleasures which it assigns; i.e. that these *κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς συμβαίνει ἐπίσης τοῖς γινομένοις* p. **172.** 1. Thus *δικαίως συμβαίνει* means in the first instance *κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς συμβαίνει, inexorably*, according to the dependence of effect upon cause.

This is often the meaning of *just* in Hippocr., e.g.: *δικαίαν ὀνομάζων* (sc. *φύσιν*) *καὶ μόνην ἐξαρκεῖν εἰς ἅπαντα τοῖς ζώοις φησίν, αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀδιδάκτως πράττουσαν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα* Galen, ii. 38.

54. 25–6 **κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ὡς ἂν ὑπό τινος ἀπονέμοντος τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν:** the *καὶ* is explanatory. Nature, he says, is just also in the sense of assigning, like a personal judge, *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν* to the individual. Sim. he says: *τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ πάντα διοικοῦντος τεταγμένα, ὅς ἐστι νόμος, νέμων ὅσα ἑκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει* p. **204.** 9. *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμειν* is a Stoic definition of *human* justice, Aristo Ch., Galen, v. 596.

54. 28 **νενόηται ἰδίως ὁ ἀγαθός:** cf. 'proprie et ad legem ipsam veritatis' opp. to 'secundum communem loquendi consuetudinem' Quint. *Inst.* xii. 1. 19, i.e. *κοινότερον*. M. has *ὄντως* opp. to *κοινότερον* p. **58.** 14.

Ch. 11: 56. 1 **Μὴ . . . ὑπολάμβανε.** The words take up *τὴν ὑπόληψιν*

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p. 54. 19, as *ὁ ὑβρίζων* resumes *ἡ βλάβη* l. 20, so that ch. 11, which breaks the sequence of ch. 12 on ch. 10 may have been displaced. M. is expressing more simply the thought: 'genus ultionis est eripere ei qui fecit factae contumeliae voluptatem. . . . adeo fructus contumeliae in sensu et indignatione patientis est' Sen. *De Const. Sap.* 17. 4.

Ch. 12: 56. 3 ἑτοιμότητας. Gat. interprets as *ἕτοιμα δόγματα*, i.e. as equivalent to *πρόχειρα* p. 46. 21. *τὸ ἕτοιμον* is used for *readiness*, so that M. means rather 'prepared disposition'.

56. 4 ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς λόγος, a phrase which recalls: *τῆς καλλίστης ἀρετῆς καὶ μεγίστης ἐφίεσαι τέχνης· ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη καὶ καλεῖται βασιλική* X. *Mem.* iv. 2. 11; *ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι* Pl. *Euthd.* 291c, cf. *Plt.* 259d, 266e, 274e. As M. says the royal precept is *ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρ.*, so *St. James* 2. 8 has: *εἰ μέντοι νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικόν, κατὰ τὴν γραφήν· Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε.* The term *νόμος βασιλικός* is used at [Pl.] *Min.* 317c.

ὑποβάλλῃ: the verb refers to the god's *prompting*: *ὑποβάλλοντα τῇ Πυθίᾳ τοὺς χρησμούς* Plu. *Cur Pyth.* 404b.

56. 7 ἀπό τινος πιθανότητος: the subst. is chosen, I think, in allusion to the familiar saying from Hes. (*Test.*), which is cited at Arist. *E.N.* 1095^{b}10. Zeno altered this line to *κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς* . . . D.L. vii. 25; Julian, p. 245a; Themist. viii. p. 108c. Thus Z. interpreted *πίθηται* to mean 'is reasonably convinced', not *obeys*, so that we may suppose that M. has slightly extended the sense of *πιθανότης* to mean *conviction*; not far removed from this is: *τινὰ λόγον ἐχόμενον πιθανότητος εἰπεῖν τινος* Pl. *Lg.* 839d.

M. does not follow Z.'s order, putting in front of it the royal precept which he prefers to Hes.'s *ὃς αὐτῷ πάντα νοήσῃ*.

56. 8 τὰ προηγμένα. I have supposed that *παραπαίονα, παραπλίονα, παραπλήσια* are three stages of corruption from *προηγμένα* written compendiously. If this be read, M. is saying that a changed conviction, in the case of *τὰ μέσα* (no change being permissible in regard to *τὰ καθήκοντα*), must be according to reasonable grounds: *προηγμένον . . . ὃ ἀδιάφορον ⟨ὂν⟩ ἐκλεγόμεθα*

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κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 84, cf. Cic. *Fin.* iii. 51. The change of purpose must be reached for the sake of justice or social advantage, and the things preferred must be chosen on similar grounds, not for pleasure or show.

M. Minucius, of whom M. may be thinking, cited Hes.'s maxim: '*secundum* eum qui bene monenti obediat' Liv. xxii. 29. 8, and chose military subordination, not fame. If M. is thinking of Neoptolemus, he remembers Arist.'s *δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν E.N.* 1151^{b}19, and *διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος* ib. 1146^{a}21. M. would reject the explanation 'a noble pleasure', and ground N.'s change of conviction, as Soph. does, upon *αἰδώς*: *αἰσχρὸς φανοῦμαι· τοῦτ' ἀνιῶμαι πάλαι Ph.* 906.

Ch. 13: 56. 10 **"Λόγον ἔχεις"**; one of his little semi-satirical dialogues, cf. pp. **72.** 1, **74.** 5, **96.** 14. The occasion may be the changed purpose of ch. 12, the removal of a sense of injury, ch. 7, or, more generally, any difference of opinion. Cf. p. **234.** 12.

Ch. 14: 56. 12 **ὡς μέρος**, i.e. a part of the Whole, *τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ οὗ μέρος εἶ* p. **22.** 6. The underlying implication is materialistic, in accordance with the physics of his School: *τίνος . . . ἀπόρροια ὑπέστης* p. **22.** 15, but room is left for a loftier, perhaps even a mystical, interpretation.

τῷ γεννήσαντι, i.e. *κόσμῳ*, cf. *ἄξιος τοῦ γεννήσαντος κόσμου* p. **236.** 5. The Laws of Athens say to Socr.: *πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς*, 'your birth was governed by our ordinances', Pl. *Cri.* 50d.

56. 13 **ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικόν**, i.e. *τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ γενν.* The *λόγος* is the generative source out of which all life and all reason in this world proceed; by it, as by *Σοφία* (*Prov.* 3. 19 sq., 8. 22 sq.), the *κόσμος* was begotten, by its inherent law. In the Stoics this begetting was out of fire. This creative principle is an efficient cause, and M., accordingly, often speaks of man's mind as a causal element, which returns at death to the Universal Reason. Parallel passages to this are pp. **60.** 1, **124.** 5, **196.** 4. For *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, see p. **106.** 21 n., and cf. *δυνάμεις γονίμους* p. **172.** 4 n.

ἀναληφθῆναι is used for the assumption into the tissues of the blood-material from food which is being digested, Galen, ii. 22, so that, so far as the word goes, this change might imply an *ἀλλοίωσις* of the *ψυχή*.

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The following is a summary of the Stoic doctrine, referred to above: *κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι' ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιόνδ' ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, εὐεργὸν αὑτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν* . . . D.L. vii. 136.

Ch. 15: 56. 14 λιβανωτοῦ βωλάρια. M. perhaps chooses the *poor* worshipper's offering to emphasize the point about man's life:

ὁ λιβανωτὸς εὐσεβές
καὶ τὸ πόπανον· τοῦτ' ἔλαβεν ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ
ἅπαν ἐπιτεθέν. Menand. *Fr.* 129 K.

ὁ πένης πόπανον, ὁ δ' ἔτι πενέστερος λιβανωτοῦ χόνδρους Alciphron iii. 35. M. uses the metaphor *τὰ ὑποκείμενα . . . ἐκθυμιαθήσεται* p. **98.** 6.

56. 15 διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν. One grain is like another, an offering of piety: life is measured by the quality, not the quantity, of its days, pp. **30.** 14, **72.** 22; *πλείονι ἢ ἐλάσσονι χρόνῳ οὐ διαφέρει* p. **250.** 7.

Ch. 16: 56. 16 θεὸς αὐτοῖς ⟨τούτοις⟩ δόξεις. Many corrections have been offered, some of which depend on an interpretation of the text which is uncertain. My supplement was suggested by *αὐτοιτὸς δόξεις οἷς* Cv.

M. uses the language of proverbial speech, cf. *ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός* Arist. *Pol.* 1253ª29, to express the effect of a fortnight's life according to principle. 'Try it,' he says, 'and the change in you will be from a wild-beast to a god.' He hardly means to accept *au pied de la lettre* the Stoic ideal *θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυμοῦντα γενέσθαι* Epict. ii. 19. 27, of which Plu. speaks satirically (*Test.*). Unfortunately Bernays took M. to be referring to Heraclit.'s saying: *ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος* Pl. *Hipp. Ma.* 289b, and the mistake has been repeated. Heraclit. meant that compared with God a human Hyperion is a satyr, almost the reverse of what M. is saying. M. intends what Arist. says: *εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις E.N.* 1145ª23.

56. 17 ἐὰν ἀνακάμψῃς ἐπὶ τὰ δόγματα. Epict. says much the same: *ἐὰν μὲν ἐμμείνῃς τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἱ καταγελῶντές σου τὸ πρότερον*

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αὐτοί σε ὕστερον θαυμάσονται Ench. 22 (where I have written *αὐτοί* for *οὗτοι* MSS., with Simpl. p. 139b).

Ch. 17: 56. 19 Μὴ ὡς μύρια μέλλων ἔτη ζῆν. Gat. completes the sentence by supplying 'te geras'; as the text stands, we must suppose that *ζῆν* is the principal verb and is supplied in thought with *μέλλων*. See Mr. Marchant's suggestion in app. crit.

τὸ χρεὼν ἐπήρτηται: *πᾶσι δὲ . . . τοσοῦτος ἐπήρτηται φόβος* Dem. xxiii. 140, and cf., for the image, 'stat supra caput fatum' Sen. *De Ira*, iii. 42. 4.

56. 20 ἕως ἔξεστιν: *σαυτῷ βοήθει . . . ἕως ἔξεστιν* p. **48. 4.** The words have some pathos, as at *διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἔξεστιν* Pl. *Ap.* 39e.

Ch. 18: 56. 21 δσην εὐσχολίαν κερδαίνει. The change of *ἀ-σχ.* to *εὐσχ.*, and conversely, occurs more than once in our MSS. Schultz[2] however kept *ἀσχολίαν*, taking *κερδαίνει* in the sense *avoids*, as in: *πᾶς γὰρ πένης ὢν μεγάλα κερδαίνει κακά* Philem. *Fr.* 92 K.; *κερδῆσαί τε τὴν ὕβριν ταύτην καὶ τὴν ζημίαν Acts*, 27. 21, 'lucrique facere' Vulg.

56. 23 κατὰ τὸν ἀγαθόν. Xyl.'s suggestion, *κατὰ τὸν Ἀγαθῶνα* which Nauck[2], p. 766, approved, would, presumably, explain the uncommon phrase *μὴ μέλαν ἦθος περιβλέπεσθαι*. Gat. supposed that ch. 28, where the expression *μέλαν ἦθος* is paraphrased, has been detached from its original place immediately after ch. 18.

At pp. **76. 3, 138. 7,** *μὴ περιβλέπου* is used of looking about at our neighbours, and thus leaving the path of duty. Here, the runner in life's race is distracted by looking round at an evil character. If, as Xyl. thought, M. is quoting, the words selected are probably, according to his wont, few, e.g. *μὴ μ. ἦθος περιβλ.*, the rest is his own comment.

56. 24 ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμῆς, towards the *linea*, i.e. death, cf.

πρὶν ἂν πέλας
γραμμῆς ἵκηται καὶ τέλος κάμψῃ βίου
Eur. *El.* 955,

and: *μόνον τοῦ πρόσω ἐφιέμενος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀποτείνας πρὸς τὸ τέρμα* Lucian, *Calumn.* 12; 'mors ultima linea rerum est' Hor. *Ep.* i. 16. 79.

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ὀρθόν, μὴ διερριμμένον. Gat. referred the part. to *περιβλ.* and interpreted 'wandering', cf. *οἱ ὀφθαλμοί σου ὀρθὰ βλεπέτωσαν Proverbs* iv. 25. The contrast with *ὀρθόν*, however, suggests that M. refers to the runner's frame, cf. *τὸ σῶμα . . . μὴ διερρῖφθαι* p. 140. 5. For this use, cf. *διερριμμένοις πλησίον λίθοις*, of a rough stone structure, compared with a disjointed style, Dem. Phal. *de Interpr.*, *Rh. Gr.* iii, p. 263 Speng., and *οὗτος πρῶτος τὴν κωμῳδίαν διερριμμένην ἀνεκτήσατο Com. Gr. Fr.* i, p. 7 Kaibel.

Ch. 19: 58. 1 ἐπτοημένος: cf. *ἐπτοῆσθαι*, p. 4. 18 n.; *περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη* Pl. *Phd.* 108a, where the *ψ.* excited about the body and its desires is opp. to one which, as in ch. 18, follows a path familiar to it. M. uses *πτοία* of the little mouse, p. 230. 16.

58. 3–4 διὰ ἁπτομένων. The scribe seems to have carried on *ἐπτοημένος* from l. 1. M. here transfers a familiar figure from men's lives to the fame which is in the mouths of those who hand it on, as one life is lit up in succession to another: *καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων* Pl. *Lg.* 776b.

The simile from *ἡ λαμπαδηφορία* would be familiar to M. from Latin literature, apart from any suggestion in Heraclit. (*Test.*), e.g. 'cursu lampada tibi trado' Varro, *R.R.* iii. 16. 9; 'et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt' Lucr. ii. 79; cf. Auctor *Ad Herenn.* iv. 59; Pers. vi. 61. A coin, illustrative of the race, is figured on the title-page of Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, vol. i, cf. *Rep.* 328a.

58. 4 καὶ σβεννυμένων. The form of expression, as well as the content, seems to have been suggested by Heraclit. *Test.*

58. 5 ἡ μνήμη. Of M. Hdn. says: *ἐγκαταλιπὼν ἀρετῆς ἀίδιον μνήμην ἐς τὸν ἐσόμενον αἰῶνα Hist.* i. 4. 7.

58. 7 δι' οἰκονομίαν τινά. The precise interpretation, in the absence of any specific illustration, is difficult. Moreover *οἰκ.* has a variety of senses, which are determined by the context. M. writes here as though he were employing a recognized term, cf. p. 224. 25. Generally speaking, he is clearly considering the weight which a good man should allow himself to attach to one of the 'indifferent things', i.e. to reputation. The Stoics were accused of compromise, that is of making a distinction in

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practice, which in principle they had denied, p. **26.** 18, between various 'indifferent' objects. We have already seen, p. **56.** 5, M.'s rule for a change of judgement and therefore of conduct, the conviction that the change is just or for the common benefit, not that it is *ἡδὺ ἢ ἔνδοξον*. Here he raises the subtle problem of the influence to be permitted upon the mind to *τὸ ἔνδοξον*, cf. Cic. *Fin.* iii. 57, where the same problem is touched upon.

Epictet. gives four considerations subordinate to 'absolute' duties, *τὰ προηγουμένως πραττόμενα*, i.e. *τὰ κατὰ περίστασιν, τὰ κατ' οἰκ., τὰ κατὰ συμπεριφοράν, τὰ κατ' ἔνστασιν* iii. 14. 7. He appears to mean (*a*) bodily conditions, e.g. health and sickness, cf. p. **188.** 10; (*b*) public claims; (*c*) social considerations; (*d*) actual material obstacles, cf. p. **88.** 21. M. may have this or a similar grouping of subordinate claims in mind. He may therefore refer specifically to (*b*), meaning that a man, especially a ruler and magistrate, should consider *τὸ ἔνδοξον*, where the public interest is directly involved. He may, however, be using **δι' οἰκ.** to cover all secondary considerations, where (as he says, p. **38.** 23) the governing self must not be influenced *χωρὶς μεγάλης καὶ κοινωφελοῦς ἀνάγκης*. I have accordingly given a more general interpretation, 'some practical purpose'. Certainly there is no suspicion of compromise with the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, no suggestion of 'economy' in the later and morally ambiguous sense.

St. Paul uses *οἰκ.* of God's government from the beginning, *Eph.* i. 10, as the Stoics spoke *τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκ. προαγούσης* Plu. *de St. rep.* 1049f, and Epicur. says *τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν κυριώτατων οἰκ.* D.L. x. 79; cf. Alex. Aphr. cited at p. **68.** 14–15.

58. 8 **τὴν φυσικὴν δόσιν**, a unique term, to be explained by *μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται* p. **206.** 2. He means *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ σόν* p. **42.** 9, that which makes you independent of other men p. **40.** 19. Cf. *τὴν φ. λύσιν* p. **82.** 26.

58. 8 **ἄλλου τινὸς ⟨οὐκ⟩ ἐχομένην λόγου.** Gat.'s *ἐχόμενος* makes good sense but is not a probable correction; Mr. Marchant's insertion of *οὐκ* is simpler and suits the meaning which is developed in ch. 20. Even so, however, the ch. breaks off oddly.

58. 9 **λοιπόν.** Boot suggested that this is the first word of ch. 20, but M. generally uses it to sum up what has gone before,

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pp. **52.** 15 n., **114.** 11. Indeed *ἄλλου . . . λοιπόν* looks somewhat like a marginal note which has dispossessed the orig. ending of the ch.

Ch. 20: 58. 10–1 **ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ καταλήγει**: the use of *καταλήγειν*, which ordinarily, like *ἀπολήγειν*, refers to processes which begin and end, pp. **96.** 5, **184.** 5, is here extended to mean 'is completed in itself', as if the underlying figure were that of a circumference returning on itself.

58. 12 **τὸ ἐπαινούμενον**: the word includes *τὸ ψεγόμενον*, to go with *χεῖρον*, cf. ll. 16–17. There is a similar brachylogy at p. **166.** 9–10.

58. 13 **κοινότερον**: see p. **24.** 20 n. [Cic. has: 'quod communiter appellamus honestum' *Off.* iii. 17. For *τὸ ὄντως καλόν*, l. 14, see *νενόηται ἰδίως* p. **54.** 28 n.

58. 14 **τὸ δὲ δὴ . . . .** Kron. reads *τὸ γὰρ δὴ* in order to make *τὸ γὰρ δὴ . . . αἰδώς* a parenthesis; *τί τούτων* then resumes the subject of *material* beautiful things. This, however, involves a tautology with *οὔτε γοῦν . . . τοῦτό φημι* ll. 11–12, and further we require this same thing to be explicitly stated about moral goods. M. returns with *σμαράγδιον γάρ* to material objects, in order to illustrate his point about beauty, both moral and aesthetic, for it is only in the latter that the truth is perspicuous. Cf. *ἐμὲ δεῖ σμάραγδον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ χρῶμα ἔχειν* p. **124.** 23.

58. 15–16 **ἡ νόμος . . . ἡ αἰδώς.** M. has *πίστις, αἰδώς, ἀλήθεια, νόμος* at p. **200.** 20.

58. 18 **λύρα**, the lyre is used by Pl. also as an example of beauty: *τί δὲ λύρα καλή; οὐ καλόν; H. Ma.* 288c. M.'s keen sensibility to beauty appears here as at iii. 2 and elsewhere.

58. 19 **ἀνθύλλιον, δενδρύφιον**; these, like *μαχαίριον*, are probably *objets d'art*, introduced by *λύρα*. The diminutive is usual for such pieces, which were often actually small: *ὄργανα ἑκατέρῳ σμικρά, τῶν ἀληθινῶν μιμήματα* Pl. *Lg.* 643c. Thus *ἱππάριον ἔπλασε* p. **128.** 8; a poem about a cup, *εἰς ποτήριον, Anacreont.* 3, *P.L.G.* iii, p. 298 Bergk; *πεπλασμένον ἐκ τῶν ἀλεύρων κυνίδιον ἢ βοΐδιον . . . ζῴδιον ἀργυροῦν* Plu. *Conviv. Disp.* 673e. Similarly: *μαγειρίσκιον, ἱερακίδιον* and *ἱερακάδιον, νικίδιον* and *νικάδιον, Τριτωνίσκος* (L. and S. sub vv.). Galen gives a lively account of Phaethon in his *quadriga*, engraved *ἐν δακτυλίῳ* iv. 361, and

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Statius of a Hercules: 'et cum mirabilis intra | stet mensura pedem' *Silv.* iv. 6. 38.

It is then a mistake in interpretation to suppose that M. necessarily uses dim. forms in derision of the world's vanity. Diminutives may indeed express endearment or depreciation, Arist. *Rh.* 1405^{b}28, and M. uses them in both ways. More often he is employing words in current use, as we use *lancet* or *violoncello*, with no emphasis upon the form; thus he says *σμαράγδιον* l. 17, *σμάραγδος* at p. **124.** 23.

Ch. 21: 58. 20 **Εἰ διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί.** The problem raised by an opponent of the survival of souls, 'how can there be room for them if an infinite number pass into the atmosphere?' is answered by the analogy of the change of bodies into earth, which has room for *them*. 'Qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper' Cic. *Tusc.* i. 18; *dissipari* is the answer of the atomist, 'permanere diu vel semper' is the Stoic alternative, the former of which M. here tentatively accepts. The souls or spirits rise at death into the lunar atmosphere, *ἐνθάδε* (in that region) . . . *πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 73; thence they move into a higher region, eventually becoming pure fire, *ἐξάπτονται*, as M. says, p. **60.** 1.

58. 22 **⟨μετὰ⟩ ποσήν τινα ἐπιδιαμονήν.** The reading is doubtful; this correction of Cas. and Gat. preserves *ἐπιδιαμονήν*, which means a continuance over an indefinite period, cf., of the Stoics, *δογματίζουσι περὶ τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν ἐπιδιαμονῆς* Cl. Alex. *Strom.* p. 712, and the frequent use in this sense of *ἐπιδιαμένειν* by Olympiod. *in Pl. Phd.*, e.g. p. 57 Norvin.

The corrections all endeavour to get a parallel to *ἐπὶ ποσὸν συμμείνασαι* l. 24. Dr. Rendall's *ἐπὶ ποσήν τινα διαμονήν* is the neatest, but it removes the characteristic *ἐπιδιαμονή*. Perhaps *⟨πρὸς⟩ ποσήν τινα* would be easier than *⟨μετὰ⟩ ποσήν τινα*.

58. 23–4 **εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μεθιστάμεναι**, a survival of the primitive (or at least early) belief that the spirit left the body with the last breath; the popular credence in the fifth century B.C. is expressed by: *αἰθὴρ μὲν ψυχὰς ὑπεδέξατο σώματα δὲ χθών* *I.G.*^{2} i. 945, of those Athenians who fell at Potidaea.

60. 1 **χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται.** *χύσις* is a term used for the gradual

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return of the Universe to the elemental fire, *διὰ τὸ . . . εἰς αὐτὸ ἔσχατον πάντα χεόμενα διαλύεσθαι . . . τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ* Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 129.

ἐξάπτονται, i.e. *ἐκπυροῦνται*: *ὅπως δὲ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνεται καὶ ἐκπυροῦται*, says Clem. Alex., of the Universe, commenting upon *θάλασσα διαχέεται*, Heraclit. 31 D., 23 B., *Strom.*, p. 712.

60. 1 εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον: cf. *ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπ. κατὰ μεταβολήν* p. **56.** 13. This is the sense which Clem. Alex. gives to *λόγον* in *μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* Heraclit. 31 D., 23 B., *Strom.*, p. 712.

§ 2: 60. 5–6 τῶν . . . ἐσθιομένων ζῴων, an illustration now from the changes of solid nutriment by digestion into *τὸ ἀερῶδες ἢ πυρῶδες*, into warm blood and animal spirit, *καὶ γὰρ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς ὑφίστανται τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν τὸ πνεῦμα*, of the Stoics, Alex. Aphr. *De Mixt.*, p. 225.

60. 8–9 τὰς ἐξαιματώσεις, a physiological term for a special kind of *ἀλλοίωσις*. Food, relatively a solid, is altered into blood, which conveys air and fire to the organs, *καὶ τὴν πέψιν ἀλλοίωσίν τιν' ὑπάρχειν καὶ μεταβολὴν τοῦ τρέφοντος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ τρεφομένου ποιότητα, τὴν δ' ἐξαιμάτωσιν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι* Galen, ii. 89.

60. 10 ἡ ἱστορία τῆς ἀληθείας, a corollary to the preceding ch. M. means that the above inquiry is an instance of the investigation of the truth of things by distinguishing the material and causal elements, i.e. in the present case, the body and the soul (spirit): *δοκεῖ . . . τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν* D.L. vii. 134; so, by analogy: 'quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est' Sen. *Ep.* 65. 24.

Ch. 22: 60. 12 Μὴ ἀπορρέμβεσθαι: cf. *παῦσαι ῥεμβόμενος* p. **24.** 8; *μηκέτι πλανῶ* p. **46.** 27; the opposite of *τὸ ἡγ. εὐθεῖαν περαινέτω* p. **138.** 20. M. states at p. **138.** 3 three conditions of the self which correspond with what he says here, chs. 22–3.

ἐπὶ πάσης ὁρμῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδόναι: cf. *τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ δικαιοσύνην προσφέρεσθαι* p. **138.** 4, to justice in impulse and therefore in act are to correspond in thought *σῴζειν τὸ καταληπτικόν* l. 13, as he says: *τῇ παρούσῃ φαντασίᾳ*

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ἐμφιλοτεχνεῖν, ἵνα μή τι ἀκατάληπτον παρεισρυῇ p. **138.** 5, i.e. we are to maintain the power of apprehension and of comprehension of the truth.

With *τὸ καταληπτικόν* cf. *ἀρκεῖ ἡ παροῦσα ὑπόληψις καταληπτική* p. **174.** 14. The attributive is best known from the Stoic phrase *φαντασία καταληπτική*, by which is meant a presentation which grasps reality, so that M. intends by *τὸ καταληπτικόν* the power of comprehending the world by such *φαντασίαι καταληπτικαί*.

Ch. 23: 60. 14 Πᾶν μοι συναρμόζει, the temper of mind enjoined by: *τῇ παρούσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν* p. **138.** 3, cf. *εὐαρεστικὴ πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς αἰτίαν συμβαῖνον* p. **174.** 15.

60. 15–16 ὃ φέρουσιν αἱ σαὶ ὧραι. There is probably, here and at p. **172.** 18, a reference to Heraclit. (*Test.*). The saying is, however proverbial: *ἐν ἄνθεσιν εἰαρινοῖσι, | οἷα φοροῦσ' Ὧραι Cypria, Fr.* iv. 2; *ἀπέχεσθαι ὧν ὧραι φέρουσι* X. *Ven.* 5. 34; sim. with *φύουσι* id. *Anab.* i. 4. 10; *ὅσοις αἱ ὧραι, φασί, φύουσιν* Ael. Arist. xxxii. 25, cf. id. xxvi. 11, xliv. 16; Julian, 101c.

60. 16 ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σὲ πάντα. St. Paul's words (*Test.*) are remarkably close, cf. *Eph.* 4. 6, and *πάντα γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ πάντα περὶ αὐτοὺς ὑφέστηκε καὶ πάντα τῶν θεῶν ἐστι πλήρη* Julian, 178b, a polytheistic parallel.

Ch. 24: 60. 19 "Ὀλίγα πρῆσσε . . . εὐθυμήσειν", a neat summary of Democrit. 3 (*Test.*). Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 907 adds: *μηδὲ ἅσσ' ἂν πράσσῃ ὑπέρ τε δύναμιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑωυτοῦ καὶ φύσιν.* The Epicureans, to whom M. is tacitly referring, adopted it as a maxim: *οὐδὲν οὕτως εὐθυμίας ποιητικόν, ὡς τὸ μὴ πολλὰ πράσσειν, μηδὲ δυσκόλοις ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασιν, μηδὲ παρὰ δύναμίν τι βιάζεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ* Diog. Oen. lvi W.; *καὶ εὐπορία εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια* Epicur. D.L. x. 143; *K.Δ.* 14. Sen. has: 'Qui tranquille volet vivere, nec privatim agat multa nec publice' *Tranq.* 13. 1, 'aut maiora viribus nostris egerimus' *De Ira*, iii. 6. 3. M. recurs to the topic at pp. **98.** 11, **118.** 1, **154.** 19, **160.** 23, **208.** 11.

μήποτε ἄμεινον, a rhet. question, the sense being: 'perhaps it is better', cf. *μήποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται;* Arist. *E.N.* 1172ᵃ33; *μήποτε οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα;* Epict. iii. 22. 80. The scholiasts especially affect this colloquialism.

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60. 20 τοῦ φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου. Arist.'s celebrated definition of man (*Test.*), cf. *φύσει πολιτικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος E.N.* 1097ᵇ11.

60. 20–1 ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ: see *τοῦ αἱροῦντος λόγου* p. **22.** 23 n.

62. 1–2 ἀλλὰ καὶ φαντασίας. M. is well aware of what is now called ideo-motor action, arising from the suggestion to movement excited by impressions and images. They are to be controlled by judgement: *πολλὰ περισσὰ περιελεῖν . . . ὅλα ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει σου κείμενα* p. **184.** 7.

62. 2 παρέλκουσαι: *φαμὲν δέ γε καὶ λόγους ποτὲ παρέλκειν πρὸς οὐδὲν συντείνοντας* Apoll. Dysc. *Synt.*, p. 11 Sylb.; *παρέλκει τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα πάντα* Epict. i. 7. 29.

Ch. 25: 62. 4 πῶς σοι χωρεῖ, i.e. *εὖ χ.*, cf. *καί σφι χωρήσειν τὰ βούλονται* Hdt. v. 89.

62. 4–5 τοῦ ἀρεσκομένου: *ψυχὴν ἀρεσκομένην τοῖς ἀπονεμομένοις* p. **90.** 24; a stronger expression is *ἀσπαζόμενον . . . τὰ ἀπονεμόμενα πάντα* p. **38.** 22.

62. 6 τῇ ἰδίᾳ πράξει δικαίᾳ: *ἰδίᾳ*, opp. verbally to *τῶν ὅλων*, is used of *appropriate* conduct, cf. p. **52.** 8 n.

Ch. 26: 62. 7 Ἑώρακας ἐκεῖνα, ἴδε καὶ ταῦτα. *ἐκεῖνα* appears to refer to the superfluous imaginations and acts of ch. 24, with which the good life of ch. 25, and the maxims of this ch., are contrasted. Similarly in *βλέπε ταῦτα, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἔβλεπες* he contrasts the unreal world of dreams with reality p. **110.** 11; see *πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσει;* p. **146.** 16.

62. 7–8 ἁπλωσον σεαυτόν. The contrast with *σεαυτὸν μὴ τάρασσε* shows that *ἁπλωσον* is used in a special sense. Some have thought that M.'s usage is approaching that of Plotinus, who uses *ἁπλωσις* for a state akin to unification with God: *ἔκστασις καὶ ἁπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφήν* Plot. *Enn.* vi. 9. 11.

Pl. uses the word to describe the freedom of the soul from division: *οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις R.* 554d; *οὐκέτι ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς . . . ἀλλὰ μεικτούς* 547e. So M. may here mean, by *simplification*, an exclusion of conflicting impulses and emotions, *ὄχλος φαντασιῶν*, p. **48.** 17.

ἁπλοῦς and *ἁπλῶς* are commonly used by him for *simple, open, candid.* Now *διπλόη* means not only a two-foldness, but

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also a flaw, the result of a fold in a material: *ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διπλόη τις ὕπουλος*, 'a crack in the state' which widened into a *τομή*, Plu. *Per.* 11, cf. Pl. *Sph.* 267e; *ἄπλωσον* then may here mean 'unfold yourself', and so get rid of 'kinks' in the moral consciousness, as Plu. says: *τὸ κακόηθες καὶ τὸ ὕπουλον ὥσπερ τινὰς διπλόας ἀναπτύσσει τῆς ψυχῆς Conviv. Disp.* 715f. Like the modern psycho-analyst, these Stoic physicians of the soul may have recommended the patient, by conscious recognition of it, to get rid of a 'complex'; thus a deliberate *spreading out* of the soul would be achieved, and the childlike simplicity, which *ἁπλότης* suggests, be acquired by self-discipline.

ἁπλοῦν in contemporary Greek is used for *opening out* a net, Alciphr. iii. 3. 1; for *spreading* a liver *out* to inspection, Babr. 54; cf. *ἁπλώσας τὸν κόλπον, ἀφῆκε τὸν ὄρνιν* Ael. *V.H.* xiii. 31; *τὰς χεῖρας ἁπλώσας* Hermes ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 402.

62. 8 **ἑαυτῷ ἁμαρτάνει**: the dative is like that in *οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑαυτῷ ζῇ* St. Paul, *Rom.* 14. 7; the sense is explained by *εἰ μὲν ἥμαρτεν, ἐκεῖ τὸ κακόν*, p. **186.** 8.

62. 8–9 **συμβέβηκέ σοί τι; καλῶς.** An hypothesis is suggested and answered by *καλῶς* (*ἔχει*), then this is supported by a statement; cf. *ἐρεῖς οὖν· ἐξεκλάσθησαν. . . . καλῶς* St. Paul, *Rom.* 11. 20.

62. 9 **συγκαθείμαρτο καὶ συνεκλώθετο**: cf. *συγκλώσεως* p. **22.** 5; and pp. **46.** 9, **66.** 5.

62. 11 **σὺν εὐλογιστίᾳ καὶ δίκῃ.** The qualities are personified and regarded as working with the agent: *σὺν μνήμῃ θεοῦ* p. **98.** 12. Crossley compares *σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ᾤετο δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων μή* X. *Anab.* ii. 6. 18; sim. *σὺν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν* St. Paul, I *Cor.* 5. 4.

εὐλογιστία, reasonableness, takes the place of *διάθεσις εὐμενής* l. 6; cf. *δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ εὐλογίστως* p. **156.** 17.

νῆφε ἀνειμένος. The form resembles the Epicurean *λάθε βιώσας Fr.* 551 Us., and may be a tacit rejoinder. M. appears to be expressing epigrammatically the burden of his admonition in ch. 24; so that 'use your leisure with sobriety' is what he means.

Ch. 27: 62. 12–13 **Ἤτοι κόσμος διατεταγμένος ἢ κυκεὼν . . . ἀλλὰ κόσμος.** Difficulty has been felt about this, the MSS. reading, by recent editors. Dr. Rendall does not hesitate to say that it is

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nonsense. The obstacles to accepting it are: (*a*) the form, since we expect *κόσμος διατεταγμένος* to be balanced by *κυκεὼν συμπεφορημένος*, cf. *ἤτοι πρόνοια ἢ ἄτομοι* p. **52.** 4, and pp. **130.** 20, **152.** 5, **194.** 1. There are, however, instances where one member of the disjunction is qualified but not the other, e.g. *εἰ μὴ ἄτομοι, φύσις ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα* p. **224.** 9; (*b*) materially, it is surprising to find *κυκεών*, which elsewhere appears to stand for a medley of atoms thrown together by chance, here characterized as an *order*, contrast *εἴτε θεός . . . εἴτε τὸ εἰκῇ* p. **182.** 3, *ἤτοι . . . τάξις ἢ πρόνοια . . . ἢ φυρμὸς εἰκαιότητος ἀπροστάτητος* p. **240.** 23, see also pp. **98.** 19, **186.** 11; (*c*) the argument by which the first sentence is supported, i.e. from an order in the self to the ordered whole, is the one generally used to affirm the principle of a government of the Universe, not a rule of law in the worlds of the Atomic hypothesis.

It is nevertheless possible that M. is here occupied with the reflection that the Democritean world of atoms does exhibit an order to which he and his follower Epicurus appeal in their reasoning about the world. He is probably led to choose the word *κυκεών*, medley, by its use in Heraclit. (*Test.*). The latter implies that if we recognize that even a posset sustains itself because it is kept stirred, we can understand that continual motion is a necessity of the universe. Further M. may have used, as I have tried to express in my translation, *κόσμος* in the two members in a slightly different sense, according as its meaning is determined by the participles: 'a *universe* that is ordered . . . a medley which results in *order*.' That is not inconsistent with the use of *κόσμος* in Greek authors (see notes below). Finally, in another place, M. appears to make a point against Democrit. by a kind of *double entente* on two senses of *νόμος*, *law* and *convention*, p. **130.** 17.

62. 12 **κυκεὼν συμπεφορημένος**, sc. *ἀτόμων*, cf. *ἢ ἄτομοι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κυκεὼν καὶ σκεδασμός* p. **186.** 11; 'eadem illa atomorum . . . turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit' Cic. *Fin.* i. 20.

The participle may have been suggested by: *οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἡ τοιαύτη . . . συμφορά* Pl. *Phlb.* 64e, where, as here, *συμπεφυρμένη* has been mistakenly suggested.

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Heraclit. appears to have criticized some early form of this theory: *ὥσπερ σάρμα εἰκῇ κεχυμένον ὁ κάλλιστος . . . κόσμος* 124 D.

62. 13 **ἀλλὰ κόσμος.** For the two senses of *κόσμος*, cf. *κόσμος μὲν οὖν ἐστι σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, . . . καὶ ἑτέρως κ. ἡ τῶν ὅλων τάξις τε καὶ διακόσμησις, ὑπὸ θεοῦ τε καὶ διὰ θεὸν φυλαττομένη* [Arist.] *Mu.* 391^{b}9.

M. is justified in treating the worlds of the atomic theory as *κόσμοι* in the second sense by the language of Epicur. Thus Lucr. speaks repeatedly of 'naturae *foedera*', and of 'validas aevi *leges*', and, describing the outcome of the concourses of atoms: 'tandem deveniunt in talis disposituras, | qualibus haec rerum consistit summa creata' i. 1027. Galen remarks that it is indifferent to practical life whether or not the Universe was formed by a god or by a blindly working cause, provided that it behaves as if in accordance with design, v. 780. Again Arist. had said of the formation of the world by chance conjunctions of moving atoms: *εἰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκινεῖτο, ἀνάγκη κόσμον εἶναι Cael.* 300^{b}19.

62. 14 **ἀκοσμία.** The Stoics frequently use the analogical argument from the microcosm to the macrocosm, and Pl. reasons to government of the Universe by law partly by assuming the *κόσμος* to be a *ζῷον* informed by *ψυχή Ti.* 34b.

ἀκοσμία is opp. to *κ.* in: *τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν* Pl. *Grg.* 508a; *εἰ δὲ πολλαί* (sc. *αἱ ἀρχαί*), *ἢ τεταγμέναι ἢ ἄτακτοι· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄτακτοι . . . οὐκ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ κ. ἀλλ' ἀκοσμία* Arist. *Fr.* 17; cf. Plu. *Dion*, 10, cited at **6.** 22–8. 1 n.

62. 14–15 **οὕτως πάντων διακεκριμένων καὶ διακεχυμένων καὶ συμπαθῶν.** For the two participles, cf. *τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν* Pl. *Phlb.* 46e.

M. is assuming the hypothesis of *ἕνωσις*, pp. **98.** 19 n., **112.** 17. He is not entitled to this, if he is demonstrating the second half of his disjunction. The Universe is assumed to be a whole of distinguishable members or parts, *διακεκριμένα* (cf. *διεστηκότων τρόπον τινὰ ἕνωσις ὑπέστη* p. **176.** 14); though distinct, they are *διακεχυμένα*, i.e. either intermingling and intermingled so that one body penetrates another, yet neither loses its specific properties, or penetrated by mind and spirit.

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If the former is intended, M. refers to the doctrine of *κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων*, and *διάχυσις* will mean the third kind of *μῖξις*, called by Chrysippus *κρᾶσις* and distinguished from *σύγχυσις* (chemical combination) and from mere mech. mixture. I prefer to take the verb in the passive sense, the middle meaning of which is employed in: *ἡ νοερὰ δύναμις πάντῃ κέχυται καὶ διαπεφοίτηκε* p. **166.** 15; cf. *διαχεῖται τὸ αἷμα ἐκ τῆς καρδίας εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος* Arist. *Fr.* 243. This doctrine is familiar from:

> spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
> mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet Virg. *Aen.* vi. 726.

The passive perfect is illustrated by: *διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένον* Plu. *Quomodo quis* 82f.

συμπαθῶν. The several parts or members are responsive, just as the parts of the human organism are governed by reciprocal feeling and mutual response: *διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας* p. **112.** 16 n.; *οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; . . . τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;* Epict. i. 14. 2.

Ch. 28: 62. 16 **Μέλαν ἦθος**. What follows is an interpretation of 'blackness of temper', so that Gat. suggested that this ch. was originally in place after ch. 18, where *μέλαν ἦθος* is used without explanation.

The metaphor is familiar in English from such expressions as a *black* sheep. M.'s commentary reaches a climax in the word *τυραννικόν*, and he is perhaps thinking throughout of aspects of the corruption of the despotic monarch. The epithets tend to be grouped in an antithetic or complementary manner.

θῆλυ . . . περισκελές, *effeminate*, not used in the *Meditations* elsewhere, except in the extract from Theophr. at p. **24.** 24; it is the opposite of *ἀρρενικόν* p. **4.** 3. Here it is the correlate of *stubborn*, cf. *σίδηρον ὀπτὸν ἐκ πυρὸς περισκελῆ* Soph. *Ant.* 475.

62. 16–17 **θηριῶδες, βοσκηματῶδες**. *βοσκήματα* and *θηρία* at p. **48.** 9 illustrate the government of life by mere animal sense and impulse, according to popular usage on which much of Greek physiognomy was based: *βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται* Pl. *R.* 586a, cf.

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Aristoph. *Eq.* 256; *τὸν νεόν, ὅτῳ μὴ παντάπασιν ἡ ψυχὴ βοσκηματώδης ἐστί* Galen, i. 39. *θηριώδες* had, at this date, come to mean *dangerous, noxious, θηρίον* being used commonly for a poisonous creature: *ἀποτινάξας τὸ θηρίον εἰς τὸ πῦρ Acts*, 28. 5.

62. 17 **παιδαριῶδες**, *irresponsible*, of a grown man who retains the uncontrolled temper of a child, like *ἀκόλαστος*: *δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἄτοπον καὶ παιδαριώδη* Plu. *Ages.* 26; *τὸ δὲ ἀκόλαστον ἀφεὶς καὶ παιδαριῶδες*, id. *Cato Min.* 7.

βλακικόν, κίβδηλον: these two attributes appear to be coupled, *βλακικόν* being used in its older sense of *witless, unstable*, an attribute of the mentally degenerate which may accompany the hollowness and insincerity of the *σαπρὸς καὶ κίβδηλος* p. **222.** 7.

βωμολόχον, καπηλικόν. Neither word is used again in the *Meditations*. M. means *vulgar*, perhaps *ribald* in speech, and *low-class*. He uses *βάνανσος*, which has an origin and sense very much like *καπηλικός*, at p. **110.** 25.

Ch. 29: 62. 19 **ξένος κόσμου**: *ξένος ὢν τῆς πατρίδος* p. **236.** 6; *ἄτιμον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπαίνων . . . ὡς ὄντως ὄντα ξενικόν* Pl. *Lg.* 841e; 'ne in nostra patria peregrini atque advenae esse videamur' Cic. *De Or.* i. 249.

τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα: *τὰ ὄντα* opp. *τὰ γινόμενα* as at p. **68.** 15. The antithesis belongs to the language of Pl. and Arist. rather than to that of the Stoics of whom it is said: *τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίσαντες εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, εἶτα αὐτῶν τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλληλα φοβηθέντες τὸ μένον ὑπ' αὐτὰ τοῦτο ᾠήθησαν τὸ ὂν εἶναι* Plotin. *Enn.* vi. 1. 28. Here, however, M. appears to mean by *τὰ ὄντα* the principles of reason in the Universe, ignorance of which makes a man misunderstand its daily phenomena.

62. 20 **φυγάς**: called *δραπέτης* p. **204.** 7. M. may be thinking of what the personified Laws say: *πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν* Pl. *Cri.* 52d.

62. 21 **τυφλὸς ὁ καταμύων τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι**, a favourite image of Pl.: *ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως R.* 484c. Ph. says: *τοὺς τυφλοὺς διάνοιαν . . . καμμύσαντες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα* i. 645; cf. *St. Matt.* 13. 15.

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62. 21–2 **πτωχὸς ὁ ἐνδεὴς ἑτέρου,** the converse of *ἀνενδεῆ τοῦ ἄλλον ποιῆσαί τι* p. **32.** 20, cf. p. **40.** 18; *ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι* X. *Mem.* i. 6. 10.

62. 22 **πάντα ἔχων παρ' ἑαυτοῦ.** Ultimately these good gifts are from God: *πάντα σοι εὖ ἔχει κ.τ.λ.* p. **192.** 3.

62. 23 **ἀπόστημα κόσμου ὁ ἀφιστάμενος:** the pun is repeated from *ἀπόστημα καὶ οἷον φῦμα* with *ἀπόστασις* p. **30.** 19 n. Cic. compares 'communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor' with 'proditor patriae' *Fin.* iii. 64.

62. 25 **φέρει τοῦτο, ἢ καὶ σὲ ἤνεγκεν:** cf. *οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτό τινι ἔφερεν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέφερεν* p. **80.** 15, *σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερεν καὶ σὲ τούτῳ* p. **234.** 20.

62. 25–6 **ἀπόσχισμα πόλεως:** *ἀπεσχισμένον* p. **44.** 10; *νῦν δὲ σεαυτὸν ἀπέκοψας* p. **156.** 27; *ἄνθρωπος ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀποσχισθεὶς ὅλης τῆς κοινωνίας ἀποπέπτωκεν* p. **218.** 12; sim. p. **180.** 12.

Ch. 30: 62. 27. M. now takes up *πτωχὸς ὁ ἐνδεὴς ἑτέρου* l. 21.

χωρὶς χιτῶνος, a reference to the *τρίβων* of the professed Cynics, who in this habit followed Socr.: *ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς* X. *Mem.* i. 6. 2. Muson. says: *ταῦτα μὲν ποιῶν εὐθὺς φιλοσοφοίης ἄν, καὶ οὔτε τρίβωνα πάντως ἀμπέχεσθαι δεήσει σε οὔτε ἀχίτωνα διατελεῖν Fr.* 16, p. 88 H. Cato Utic. often appeared in public *ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἀχίτων,* Plu. *Cat. Min.* 6, 'quid si quis ... pede nudo | exiguaeque togae simulet textore Catonem?' Hor. *Ep.* i. 19. 12.

The Stoics avoided the eccentricity:

> Et qui nec Cynicos nec Stoica dogmata legit
> a Cynicis tunica distantia Juv. xiii. 121.

χωρὶς βιβλίου. It is unnatural to suppose a reference to p. **20.** 18: the meaning is straightforward.

62. 27–8 **ἄλλος οὗτος ἡμίγυμνος.** Gat. compared *ἄλλος οὑτοσί τις ἀναιδής* Dem. xxi. 185; he thought M. was referring to the habit of leaving the arms bare to the shoulder, cf. *ὁ ἐξωμίας* Lucian, *Vit. Auct.* 7. Hdn. describes a *soi-disant* philosopher: *βάκτρον γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ μετὰ χεῖρας, ἡμιγύμνῳ τε αὐτῷ ἐκκρεμὴς πήρα* i. 9. 3. M. does not trouble to mention the staff, the scrip, and the beard.

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62. 28 ἄρτους οὐκ ἔχω: cf. 'licet ad philosophiam etiam sine viatico pervenire' Sen. *Ep.* 17. 7; 'mea | virtute me involvo probamque | pauperiem sine dote quaero' Hor. *Od.* iii. 29. 54.

ἐμμένω τῷ λόγῳ: cf. *οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο ἐμμεῖναι τούτῳ τῷ δόγματι* Pl. *Lg.* 875b.

62. 29 ἔχω καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένω, adopting M. Trannoy's restoration; *τροφάς* must surely be metaphorical, not a mere repetition of *ἄρτους*, cf. *ἵνα μὴ θεωρῇ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρέφηται τῷ θεωρεῖν* Plu. *Per.* 1. M. blames himself because, with ample opportunity of learning, he still neglects *τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα* 1 *St. Pet.* 2. 2.

Ch. 31: 64. 1 Τὸ τεχνίον ὃ ἔμαθες φίλει: *ἔμαθες* takes up *μαθημάτων*, cf. *τίς σου ἡ τέχνη; ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ πῶς ἀλλῶς γίνεται ἢ ἐκ θεωρημάτων;* p. **216.** 10; *ποῖα θεωρήματα; . . . γνῶναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα*, the alphabet of the Word, Epict. iv. 8. 12, sim. Hor. *Ep.* i. 1. 27.

τὸ τεχνίον is not depreciatory, as *φίλει* shows; elsewhere, M. appeals for an example to the devotion of *ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς τέχνας ἑαυτῶν φιλοῦντες* p. 74. 15.

Gat. sees a reference to the proverbial *ἔρδοι τις ἣν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην* Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1431; 'quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat' Cic. *Tusc.* i. 41; cf. Hor. *Ep.* i. 14. 44; St. Paul, 1 *Cor.* 7. 20.

τούτῳ προσαναπαύου: cf. *ἐνὶ τέρπου καὶ προσαναπαύου* p. **98.** 11. The word combines 'rely upon' with 'refresh yourself in'; the former sense is implied in *φίλον ᾧ προσαναπαύομεθα* Epict. iii. 13. 2; *τὸν μιᾷ τούτων* (sc. *τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον τεχνῶν*) *προσαναπαυσάμενον* S. Emp. *Math.* xi. 178. St. Paul says: *εἰ δὲ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ καὶ ἐπαναπαύῃ νόμῳ Rom.* 2. 17; cf. *ἐπὶ τὸν Κύριον ἐπανεπαύοντο* Micah, 3. 11. In English we have:

> That spirit upon whose weal depends and rests
> The lives of many. Shak. *Hamlet* III. iii. 14.

64. 2 θεοῖς μὲν ἐπιτετροφὼς τὰ σεαυτοῦ: *ἐὰν τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προνοίᾳ* p. **234.** 18; *ἄλλῳ τούτων ἐμέλησεν· ἐκείνῳ ἐπίτρεψον* Epict. iii. 1. 43. The old formula *ἐπίτρεψον δὲ θεοῖσιν Od.* xix. 502 had already acquired a deeper sense in *ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ* Pl. *Grg.* 512e, a passage which M. cites,

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p. 134. 15. There is a similar change from 'permitte divis cetera', Hor. *Od.* i. 9. 9, to 'permittes ipsis expendere numinibus, quid | conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris' Juv. x. 347. More vehement and personal is *πᾶσαν τὴν μέριμναν ὑμῶν ἐπιρρίψαντες ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὅτι αὐτῷ μέλει περὶ ὑμῶν* 1 *St. Peter*, 5. 7; referring to *Ps.* 54 (55). 22.

64. 3 ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς. This whole-hearted resignation is a mark of freedom: *συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει . . . δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν τούτους τοὺς στίχους ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς· ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη* Epict. ii. 23. 42; St. John Chrys. remarks upon *ὃ ἐὰν ποιῆτε, ἐκ ψυχῆς ἐργάζεσθε*, St. Paul, *Col.* 3. 23: *τὸ ἐκ ψ. . . . τὸ μετ' εὐνοίας, μὴ μετὰ δουλικῆς ἀνάγκης, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐλευθερίας καὶ προαιρέσεως*, words which suggest Stoic influence.

64. 3–4 μήτε τύραννον μήτε δοῦλον, a corollary to the attitude of free acceptance of God's will: our relation to men must be that of a freeman to freemen. The contrast is at p. **222.** 5. As to M.'s personal station, he speaks of: *βασιλείας τιμώσης πάντων μάλιστα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων* p. **10.** 6, cf. *ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἀλλ' ἄρχεσθαι δουλικὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δ' ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, ἄρχειν δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν. γίνεται οὖν δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν πόλις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλευθέρων* Arist. *Pol.* 1295^{b}19. Sen. develops the point about despotic rule in a world of slaves, like Rome: 'eodem tempore servos despicis et colis, imperiosus intra limen atque inpotens, humilis foris et tam contemptus quam contemnens' *De Ben.* iii. 28. 6, cf. id. *Ep.* 47. 20. Gat. refers to *ὁ γὰρ ἐν Κυρίῳ κληθεὶς δοῦλος ἀπελεύθερος Κυρίου* St. Paul, 1 *Cor.* 7. 22.

Ch. 32: 64. 5–6 ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα. Gat. suggested *ταὐτά* or *τὰ αὐτά*, the latter is preferable in view of the repetition at l. 12. For the reflection cf. *πάντα ἐξ ἀιδίου ὁμοειδῆ* p. **30.** 10 n.

64. 6 γαμοῦντας, παιδοτροφοῦντας. The participles are arranged in pairs in sense as far as to *ἐπιβουλεύοντας* after which there is a set of pairs balanced in form. For the spectacle suggested see p. **134.** 22. So Lucian has *τοὺς πλέοντας αὐτῶν, τοὺς πολεμοῦντας, τοὺς δικαζομένους, τοὺς γεωργοῦντας, τοὺς δανείζοντας, τοὺς προσαιτοῦντας Charon* 15. Max. Tyr. often has similar enumerations, but with puerile antitheses.

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64. 8 **κολακεύοντας, αὐθαδιζομένους,** the extremes of servile flattery and self-assertion: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν ⟨ἀλλὰ⟩ καταφρονητικός, αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων, ἄρεσκος* Arist. *E.E.* 1233^{b}35.

64. 9 **ἀποθανεῖν τινας εὐχομένους.** Like the prayer in the satirist: 'illa sibi introrsum et sub lingua murmurat: "O, si | ebulliat patruus, praeclarum funus"' Pers. ii. 9; 'alius donum promittit, si propinquum divitem extulerit' Petron. 88.

§ 2: 64. 13 **τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιγραφὰς χρόνων.** Gat. explained as 'tempora regis alicujus imperio designata', like the epoch of Vespasian l. 5. Is it not a bold use of *ἐπιγραφάς*, like *monumenta* in 'ut annales populi Romani et monumenta vetustatis loquuntur' Cic. *Pro Domo* 86? Cf. *τὰς ἀναγραφὰς τῶν χρόνων*, 'registers of the times', St. Clem. *Cor.* 25.

καὶ ὅλων ἐθνῶν: cf. *βαρβάρων ἔθνη* p. **134.** 24. *ὅλων*, 'root and branch', *αὐλὴν ὅλην . . . Κροίσου*, 'Croesus and all the Lydian court', p. **204.** 24.

64. 14 **κατενταθέντες:** cf. *κενὰ σπωμένους* l. 16; *μὴ σπῶ μηδὲ κατεντείνου* p. **52.** 16.

64. 18 **ἡ ἐπιστροφή,** of attention devoted to objects; it is not to be confined only to *τἀναγκαῖα*, as he said at p. **60.** 20, but to be related to their importance. At. p. **246.** 21 he gives individual instances of *τὸ κατεντεινόμενον*, absorption in lower ends, of men who neglected man's proper duty.

64. 19 **ἰδίαν ἀξίαν ἔχει καὶ συμμετρίαν,** i.e. the value of the attention is proportionate to the object in view, 'vita concors sibi est, ubi actio non destituit inpetum, inpetus ex dignitate rei cuiusque concipitur, proinde remissus acriorque prout illa digna est peti' Sen. *Ep.* 89. 15. The sense is *ἀξίαν ἔχει ἰδίαν κατὰ συμμετρίαν τῷ προηγουμένῳ.*

64. 19–20 **ἀποδυσπετήσεις,** employed again at p. **82.** 1 with *ἀπαυδᾶν*, cf. *ἀπήλπισας* and *ἀπογνῶς* p. **142.** 21.

Ch. 33: 64. 21 **Αἱ πάλαι συνήθεις λέξεις γλωσσήματα νῦν:** cf. *ἡ γλῶττα παλαιόν ἐστιν ὄνομα τῆς συνηθείας ἐκπεπτωκός* Galen, xix. 66; *glossemata*, id est voces minus usitatas' Quint. *Inst.* i. 8. 15; 'multa renascentur quae jam cecidere, cadentque | quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus' Hor. *A.P.* 70, and

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'vocabula rerum . . . nunc situs informis premit et deserta vetustas' id. *Ep.* ii. 2. 118.

64. 22 **τῶν πάλαι πολυυμνήτων:** used in its strict sense, as *τούτους ὑμνήσαντες* p. **122.** 18 shows. Originally a word of poetry it is employed by Ael. Arist., e.g. xviii. 7, in the sense *famous, storied*, of cities, not, as here and at p. **122.** 17, of persons. M. perhaps chose it for a certain old-time flavour, to illustrate *γλωσσήματα*; the old republican heroes, *τῶν ἀρχαίων Ῥωμαίων* p. **48.** 1, are *τὰς τῶν παρ' ἅπασιν ᾀδομένων ψυχάς . . . καὶ τῶν ὅσοι δόξης ἀειμνήστου τετυχήκασιν* Plu. *De Liber. educ.* 2c.

64. 23 **Κάμιλλος, Καίσων, Οὐόλεσος:** 'Caeso ille Quinctius et M. Furius Camillus' Cic. *Pro Domo* 86; 'Camillos, Fabricios, Curios, omnisque eos qui haec ex minimis tanta fecerunt; verum haec genera virtutum . . . vix jam in libris reperiuntur. Chartae quoque quae illam pristinam severitatem continebant obsoleverunt' id. *Pro Cael.* 39; 'At vos, Troiugenae, vobis ignoscitis, et quae | turpia cerdoni, Volesos Brutumque decebunt' Juv. viii. 181.

Δεντάτος. Dentatus (instead of Alexander's general, Leonnatus). He is the best known of the Curii, typical old Romans of tradition: 'Et maribus Curiis et decantata Camillis' Hor. *Ep.* i. 1. 64; 'Si Curios his fata darent, reducesque Camillos | temporibus' Lucan. *Phars.* vii. 358. Cic. *De Sen.* 55 couples M'. Curius Dentatus, the incorruptible conqueror of the Samnites, Sabines and Pyrrhus, with L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, 'quem trepida ante boves dictatorem induit uxor' Pers. i. 74, cf. Liv. iii. 26. 8. The Greek form of the latter's name *Κικιννᾶτος* might be represented by *Λεοννάτος* here.

We need not look for an individual Volesus, the point is that the old family is nearly extinct. A cruel Volesus Messala (temp. Aug.) is pilloried in Sen. *De Ira*, ii. 5. 5, cf. Tac. *Ann.* iii. 68.

64. 24 **Σκιπίων καὶ Κάτων.** The old Cato is in his mind, not the Stoic hero of p. **10.** 4: 'quid duo propugnacula belli Punici, Cn. et P. Scipiones . . . quid Africanus maior, quid minor? quid inter horum aetates interiectus Cato?' Cic. *Paradox. St.* i. 12.

64. 25 **Ἀντωνῖνος.** He is thinking of his adoptive father, whose name he himself bore, and which for a time became a dynastic title. When M. Aurelius Severus Alexander became Augustus

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in A.D. 222, the senate acclaimed him: 'Antonine Pie, di te servent: Antonini nomen suscipias rogamus', and, 'quomodo Augustus, sic et Antoninus' *H.A.* xviii. 7. 1, 10. 3.

ἐξίτηλα γὰρ πάντα, 'obsoleverunt' Cic. *Pro Cael.* 40; *ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται* Hdt. i. 1; *ἀσπὶς ὑπὸ χρόνου ἐξίτηλος* Max. Tyr. x. 2.

μυθώδη: cf. *οἱ δὲ εἰς μύθους μεταβαλόντες· οἱ δὲ ἤδη καὶ ἐκ μύθων ἐξίτηλοι* p. **154.** 15.

64. 26 **παντελὴς λήθη κατέχωσεν:** *τό τε Ἡρκουλάνεον καὶ τοὺς Πομπηίους . . . κατέχωσε* Dio Cass. lxvi. 23; a vigorous met., cf. the illustration from the desert sands, p. **132.** 2 n. Soph. combines the idea of fading with oblivion: *χρόνος δ' ἀμαυροῖ πάντα κἀς λήθην ἄγει Fr.* 868 N.², 954 P.; so Ausonius says: 'miremur periisse homines? monumenta fatiscunt. | mors etiam saxis nominibusque venit' *Epigr.* 35. 9.

64. 26–7 **ἐπὶ τῶν θαυμαστῶς πως λαμψάντων:** *ἄστρον ὡς λάμψειν ἔτι* Soph. *El.* 66; *ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανός* Pl. *Smp.* 197a; *τὴν δὲ Φωκίωνος ἀρετὴν . . . αἱ τύχαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμαυρὰν καὶ ἀλαμπῆ πρὸς δόξαν ἐποίησαν* Plu. *Phoc.* 1. The image is a favourite in Latin authors: 'lumina civitatis exstincta' Cic. *Cat.* iii. 24; 'viros, lumina reipublicae' id. *Phil.* ii. 37; 'lumina tot cecidisse ducum' Virg. *Aen.* xi. 349.

64. 27–8 **ἄιστοι, ἄπυστοι:** see *Test.*, and parallels, *Engl. Comm.*, p. 321.

66. 4 **ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοιαύτης,** i.e. an origin and source which is *ἀναγκαῖον καὶ γνώριμον.*

Ch. 34: 66. 5 **τῇ Κλωθοῖ,** cf. *συγκλώσεως* p. **22.** 5; Clotho rules the present time: *κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὼς Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσά τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἑκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα* [Arist.] *Mu.* 401ᵇ21.

Ch. 35: 66. 7 **τὸ μνημονεῦον,** a summary of iv. 19.

Ch. 36: 66. 9 **φιλεῖ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις.** Although *φιλεῖ*, like *βούλεται ἡ φύσις*, may mean *is wont* or *tends*, M. uses the word as if of a personal agent: *τί δὲ φίλτερον ἢ οἰκειότερον τῇ τῶν ὅλων φ.;* p. **126.** 10; *τούτῳ δὲ χαίρει ἡ τῶν ὅλων φ.* p. **184.** 20, cf. p. **112.** 15. For M.'s semantic explanation, see p. **202.** 19.

66. 9–10 **τὰ ὄντα μεταβάλλειν.** *τὰ ὄντα* are explained immediately

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as the seeds of the future, i.e. as the momentarily existent in the stream of *πάντα κατὰ μεταβολὴν γινόμενα*.

66. 10 **ποιεῖν νέα ὅμοια**: *ἵνα ἀεὶ νεαρὸς ᾖ ὁ κόσμος* p. **128.** 20, cf. pp. **164.** 20, **244.** 12.

ἥ τε γῆ . . . τὴν ἀγήρω φ. ὁμοίως τηρεῖ [Arist.] *Mu.* 397ᵃ24; *μεταβολὴν σωμάτων, καινουργίαν τοῦ ὅλου* Max. Tyr. xli. 4. Pausanias, moralizing upon the ruins of Megalopolis, writes: *θαῦμα οὐδὲν ἐποιησάμην, εἰδὼς τὸ δαιμόνιον νεώτερα ἀεί τινα ἐθέλον ἐργάζεσθαι* viii. 33. 1.

σπέρμα γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ πᾶν τὸ ὄν: *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων . . . οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη· . . . καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται . . . οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων* [*εἰς*] *ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, ὁδῷ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου* Cleanthes ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 153; *Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλ. καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν, οἵα πρότερον ἦν,* of successive re-integrations of the Universe from Fire, id. i, p. 171. The *λόγος* is regarded as the quickening *seed*: *τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον . . . οἷόν περ καὶ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα* Zeno ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 133.

66. 12 **ἰδιωτικόν**: cf. *ἰδιωτικώτατον* p. **50.** 13 n.

Ch. 37: 66. 13 **οὔτε ἁπλοῦς οὔτε ἀτάραχος**: cf. *σεαυτὸν μὴ τάρασσε· ἄπλωσον σεαυτόν* p. **62.** 7 n.; the sense is *single-minded* rather than *simple*, free from *ταραχή* p. **156.** 3 and *ὑποψία* p. **242.** 21.

Ch. 38: 66. 16 **καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους.** Gat. felt two difficulties here: (i) M. has more than once urged us to ignore our neighbour's opinion; now, however, he is regarding his neighbours' thoughts. The inconsistency, if there is one, has been touched upon, *Engl. Comm.*, p. 378, cf. pp. **178.** 19, **180.** 5. (ii) the parallel passage at p. **184.** 17 is concerned with the praise or blame of evil men, whereas, here, we are to observe the vain imaginations even of the wise. If that is the meaning *τοὺς φ.* will be ironical.

As I understand him, M. is not here concerned with the opinion of other men about ourselves, but with the infirmity of judgement of all men, even of those who are deemed or who count themselves to be *wise*. The closest parallel to the present passage, then, is at p. **182.** 13, and it will be observed that p. **184.** 17 is not far distant from that. See also p. **82.** 22.

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Crossley remarks that the construction, *τοὺς φ. . . .*, is the familiar prolepsis of the subj. of the dependent clause. But even so there is an asyndeton, for *καί* means *even*, hence Kron.'s proposal ⟨*ἴδε*⟩. If it be necessary to supply a word, Mr. Marchant suggests that ⟨*βλέπε*⟩ would be more plausible.

Ch. 39: 66. 19 τοῦ περιέχοντος. M. is carrying on the thoughts prompted by his remark in ch. 38; your own judgement is the crucial point, not your *environment*; your circumstances broadly distinguished from those of your neighbours, cf. *τοιοῦτο γὰρ τὸ περιέχον, τοιοῦτοι οἱ συνόντες* Epict. iii. 24. 29.

M. like Epict. is making an extreme claim, *περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προσπάσχειν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν* iii. 24 Tit., cf. *εἰ μὲν διά τι τῶν ἐκτὸς λυπῇ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνό σοι ἐνοχλεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρῖμα* p. **162.** 16; *κρίσει περὶ τῶν περιεστηκότων ἀληθεῖ* p. **144.** 4.

66. 21 κἂν τὸ ἐγγυτάτω αὐτοῦ, τὸ σωμάτιον. The body is clearly closest of *τὰ ἔκτος* to a man, but over even its ailments the judgement can prevail, and be at rest.

66. 22 διαπυίσκηται, σήπηται. Although M.'s point would be made if these words merely described extreme conditions of bodily suffering, he is probably referring to medical treatment.

τέμνειν and *καίειν* are surgical remedies, frequently mentioned in connexion with what is in M.'s mind here, i.e. that we suffer them patiently, as pains leading to relief; cf. Heraclit. 58 D., 58 B.; Pl. *Plt.* 293b; *Grg.* 521e; *R.* 426b; X. *Mem.* i. 2. 54.

διαπυίσκεσθαι will mean to have an ulcer kept suppurating: *χρὴ διάπυον μὲν ποιῆσαι τὸ ἕλκος ὡς τάχιστα* Hippocr. *De Vuln.* iii. 368, and *σήπεσθαι* will refer to some curative treatment of an abscess: *ἰατρικὴ τέχνη, μιμουμένη τὴν φύσιν, σήπει τὰ ἀποστήματα καὶ τέμνει καὶ καίει* Simpl. *in Ench.*, p. 83c.

66. 23 ἡσυχαζέτω. In this point the Stoics are at one with Epicurus: *ἡ διάνοια . . . ἀταρακτεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τηροῦσα* p. **188.** 6; *τῷ μὲν οὖν σωματίῳ πάντα ἀδιάφορα* p. **110.** 13.

τουτέστι. The MSS. have *τοιοῦτόν ἐστι*, which Xyl. corrected in his version. M.'s comment *κρινέτω κ.τ.λ.* extends to all 'indifferent' things what he has said about the relation of the judgement to bodily ailments, on the same grounds as he used at p. **26.** 20.

Ch. 40: 66. 27 Ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The transition of thought

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depends on the reflexions in ch. 39 on the relation in man of mind and body.

This is the first of many assertions of the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the *κόσμος* as a living creature, with an indwelling spirit or soul, cf. pp. **122.** 26, **192.** 5. It is expressed by the School as *τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν* D.L. vii. 139, *νοερόν* is added ib. 142.

S. Emp. derives the doctrine from Pl. *Ti.*: *δυνάμει δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ Ζήνωνι λόγον ἐξέθετο. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ πᾶν κάλλιστον εἶναί φησι, κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειργασμένον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον* (*Ti.* 55d), *ζῷον ἔμψυχον, νοερόν τε καὶ λογικόν Math.* ix. 107. Pl.'s teaching, however, referred to this visible universe, beyond which is a transcendent creator and a world of ideas; Zeno made the entire system a pantheistic unity.

66. 28 **εἰς αἴσθησιν μίαν τὴν τούτου.** The whole, being alive, is conceived as possessing a common sentience: *ζῷον μὲν οὕτως ὄντα, οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν* D.L. vii. 142–3.

68. 1 **ἀναδίδοται,** a met. use of a medical term for the distribution of concocted food to the liver, and thence by the veins to the tissues, where it is absorbed: *τὴν διὰ τῶν φλεβῶν φορὰν τῆς τροφῆς ἀνάδοσιν καλεῖ* Erasistratos ap. Galen, ii. 104, cf. id. ii. 7.

ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πάντα πράσσει. Like the microcosm, the Universe has *ὁρμή*, as well as *αἴσθησις*, 'natura mundi omnis motus habet voluntarios conatusque et adpetitiones, quas *ὁρμάς* Graeci vocant; et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet, ut nosmet ipsi' Cic. *N.D.* ii. 58.

ὁρμῇ μιᾷ is not to be pressed, although M. says *τοῖς γινομένοις ὁρμῇ τινι ἀρχαίᾳ τῆς προνοίας* p. **172.** 2, as if the world were started originally by Providence and then ran of itself, as in the Cartesian cosmology.

68. 2 **συναίτια.** The hypothesis is of continuity through all, in the whole, cf. *συμπαθῶν* p. **62.** 15 n.

ἡ σύννησις καὶ συμμήρυσις, met. expressions, like *συγκλώσεως* and *σύλληξιν* pp. **22.** 5, **46.** 9.

Ch. 41: 68. 3 **Ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζον νεκρόν.** His thought seems to recur to p. **66.** 21, and he is oblivious of the inconsistency of this attitude with what is implied in ch. 40. The saying agrees with

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τὸ σωμάτιον, τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, τὸ φύσει νεκρόν Epict. iii. 10, 15, except that Epict. is not recorded elsewhere as stating the view that the *ψυχή* lifts the body, like a dead weight. In antiquity the body is more often regarded as the vehicle of the soul, *ὄχημα* Pl. *Ti.* 69c, whereas in Chr. literature the opposite view is familiar: 'quamdiu istud fragile corpus gerimus' à K. *Imit. Chr.* i. 22. 5.

Pl. employs the image once: *τὴν φύσιν παντὸς τοῦ σώματος . . . τί σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὀχεῖν ἄλλο ἢ ψυχή; Cra.* 400a; and Ph. says: *μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νοήσῃς ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ποιεῖν ἢ νεκροφορεῖν, τὸ νεκρὸν . . . σῶμα ἐγειρούσης καὶ ἀμοχθὶ φερούσης τῆς ψυχῆς* i. 101. Galen, alluding to Milo's athletic feat, has: *πρὸ βραχέος τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σῶμα, τοῦ ταύρου ζῶντος, ἐβάσταζεν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῴου* i. 34; cf. (evidently from a Stoic source) *τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον διὰ φλεβῶν καὶ ἀρτηριῶν καὶ αἵματος κινεῖ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ὥσπερ τρόπον τινὰ βαστάζει* Hermes, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 305. St. Ign. says that he who does not confess that the Lord is *σαρκοφόρος* is himself *νεκροφόρος Smyrn.* 5, where Lightfoot explains by *vespillo* (Polyb. xxxv. 6. 2), and cites many passages, esp. from Ph., which, have I think, the same sense as this Epict. fragment.

Ch. 42: 68. 4 οὐδέν ἐστι κακόν. When speaking of change, which is a law of the universe, M. usually says that no alteration is fearful or harmful, and therefore death, an aspect of alteration, is not to be feared, see p. **180.** 1. Here he seems to speak differently, saying that in regard to changing phenomena the terms good and evil are inappropriate, cf. *τί δὲ ἀγαθὸν τῇ πομφόλυγι συνεστώσῃ ἢ κακὸν διαλυθείσῃ;* p. **152.** 18. The point is not that of ch. 39, but agrees with the doctrine of Heraclit., to another aspect of which he passes in ch. 43, that good and evil are human notions, relative not absolute terms: *τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν, ἃ δὲ δίκαια* Heraclit. 102 D., 61 B.; *ὁκόσα δὲ θεοὶ διέθεσαν αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, καὶ τὰ ὀρθὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθά* Hippocr. *De Victu*, i. 640, p. 64 of Bywater's *Heraclitus.*

Ch. 43: 68. 6 Ποταμός τίς ἐστι. Following Leop. I have adopted Nauck's correction, as *ἐκ* gives no satisfactory sense. The thought of change in ch. 42 leads to an image from Heraclit. *Test.* The parallel between phenomena which pass in Time and

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Time itself as a series of moments, each being likened to a river, is so familiar in M.'s pages, *τοῦ ὅλου αἰῶνος καὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας συνεχῶς φαντασία* p. **202.** 5, cf. pp. **26.** 23, **32.** 12, **90.** 4, **102.** 10, **126.** 16, that I take him here to say the same, not as all the interpreters take it: 'Time is a kind of river and a violent torrent.' Apart from tautology, that makes *ὁ αἰών* to be concretely conceived as 'the stream of Life', as in Tennyson's: 'We plant a solid foot into the Time', or in the hymn's: 'Time . . . bears all its sons away'.

M. always uses *αἰών* of Time or Eternity in distinction from the events in Time, it is never for him *τῶν γινομένων ῥεῦμα*. The abstraction, if that is the correct word, does not appear in Heraclit., but is recognized in mythological terms by Pl., where he makes Socr. say that Hom. gives the parents of the gods the names *Ῥέαν τε καὶ Κρόνον, ῥευμάτων ὀνόματα*, Cra. 402b, where *Κρόνον* suggested *χρόνον*, and *Ῥέαν* the current of *things*, cf. *Κρόνου δὲ παῖς καὶ χρόνου λέγεται* [Arist.] *Mu.* 401ª15.

ῥεῦμα βίαιον: the adj. anticipates the description of a devouring current, cf. 'fluviosque rapaces' Lucr. i. 17.

68. 6–7 **ἅμα τε γὰρ ὤφθη:** cf. *ἅμα γίγνεται πάντα καὶ φθείρεται . . . τοῦ χρόνου, καθάπερ ῥεύματος, ἕκαστα παραφέροντος* Plu. *De Def.* 432a; Sen., after translating Heraclit. l. 6 *Test.*, has: 'nos quoque non minus velox cursus praetervehit' *Ep.* 58. 23.

68. 7–8 **τὸ δὲ ἐνεχθήσεται:** *παρα-* is omitted idiomatically, though even the simple verb may be used in this sense: *τὸν δ' Ἀχιλεὺς ποταμόνδε λαβὼν ποδὸς ἧκε φέρεσθαι Il.* xxi. 120.

Ch. 44: 68. 9 **σύνηθες καὶ γνώριμον:** *γν.* is opp. to *καινόν* p. **144.** 10. The wise man has read the lesson and is prepared for life's changes and chances. This is a commonplace of consolation, e.g. 'communia esse haec, fieri posse, ut ne quid animo sit novum' Ter. *Phorm.* ii. 1. 245. So Plu., *Cons. ad Apoll.* 112d, cites and Cic., *Tusc.* iii. 29, translates:

ἵν' εἴ τι πάσχοιμ' ὧν ἐδόξαζον φρενί,
μή μοι νεῶρες προσπεσὸν μᾶλλον δάκοι Eur. *Fr.* 964 N².

Similarly:

non ulla laborum,
o virgo, nova mi facies inopinave surgit;
omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi Virg. *Aen.* vi. 103.

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68. 9–10 **ὡς τὸ ῥόδον ἐν τῷ ἔαρι.** The rose bloomed last and faded first: *πρῶτον δ' ἀπολείπει τῶν ἐαρινῶν· ὀλιγοχρονία γὰρ ἡ ἄνθησις* Theophr. *H.P.* vi. 8. 2. Spring and autumn were distinguished by the flowering of the rose and the garnering of the grapes:

> praeterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,
> vitis autumno fundi suadente videmus Lucr. i. 174.

See our own Spenser's beautiful words, *The Faerie Queene*, II. xii. 74–5.

68. 11 **τοὺς μωροὺς εὐφραίνει,** a rare allusion in M. to the 'fools' of Stoic traditional teaching; so he speaks of *φαύλους* p. **228.** 6. The foolishness is to be glad or sorry at events.

Ch. 45: 68. 12 **Τὰ ἐξῆς ἀεὶ τοῖς προηγησαμένοις οἰκείως ἐπιγίνεται.** The Stoic doctrine of continuity is put by Alex. Aphr. as follows: *μήτε οὕτως τινὸς ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένου, ὡς μὴ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ συνῆφθαι ὡς αἰτίῳ ἕτερόν τι, μήτ' αὖ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τινὸς ἀπολελύσθαι δυναμένου τῶν προγεγονότων, ὡς μή τινι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖν ὥσπερ συνδεόμενον, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γενομένῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ⟨ἐξ⟩ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου De Fato*, p. 192.

In this statement *τὰ προγεγονότα* are what M. calls *τὰ προηγησάμενα* and *τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα* are M.'s *τὰ ἐξῆς*: *συνῆφθαι* and *συνδεόμενον* express what he calls *συνάφεια εὔλογος*.

68. 13 **καταρίθμησίς τίς ἐστιν ἀπηρτημένων.** We must accept Gat.'s correction of *ἀπηρτημένως*, because even if, with Schultz, we exclude *καί*, *ἀπηρτημένως* has no construction, and, if *καί* stands, *ἔχουσα* has to be employed with *ἀπηρτημένως* and again with *τὸ κατηναγκασμένον*. With Gat.'s *ἀπηρτημένων*, on the other hand, we obtain an explanation of what *καταρίθμησις* means, i.e. an addition of units which are *ἀπηρτημένα*, *discreta*, opposed to *συνεχῆ*, *continuous* elements, connected by *συνάφεια εὔλογος*, by a *θαυμαστή τις οἰκειότης*, a reciprocal correspondence, expressed as *τῷ δίκην ἀλύσεως τοῖς πρώτοις συνηρτῆσθαι τὰ δεύτερα* Alex. Aphr. l.c., p. 193.

68. 13–14 **μόνον τὸ κατηναγκασμένον**: the stress is on *μόνον*, *mere* external mechanical compulsion of atoms, opp. to necessity, *εἱμαρμένη*.

68. 14 **συνάφεια εὔλογος,** cf. *τῆς συναφείας καὶ συνεχείας ὥσπερ τῶν μορίων, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῶν αἰτίων* p. **80.** 23.

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68. 14–15 **συντέτακται συνηρμοσμένως τὰ ὄντα**: *τὰ ὄντα*, here opp. to *τὰ γινόμενα*, are the realities lying behind the phenomenal; that M. is following his teachers is shown by *τὴν δὲ εἱμαρμένην αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν λόγον, καθ' ὃν διοικεῖται τὸ πᾶν, θεὸν εἶναί φασιν, οὖσαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσίν τε καὶ γινομένοις ἅπασιν καὶ οὕτως χρωμένην ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομίαν* Alex. Aphr. l.c., p. 192.

68. 16 **οἰκειότητα**: cf. *οἰκείως* l. 12, and the association of *τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει* with *οἰκονομίαν* in the Stoic doctrine as set out by Alex. Aphr. in the last note. M. uses the word and its cognates for the *affinity* of the individual to Nature, pp. **4.** 19, **36.** 10; of ourselves to others p. **194.** 2; of phenomena to one another, and to the reality which must be presupposed in order to make them intelligible. That is the sense here, cf. *εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητός τε ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως* Pl. *R.* 537c. Galen contrasts *οἰκειότης ποιότητος* with mere mechanical attraction, being in agreement with the Stoics, at least on this point, that mechanism is inadequate to account for physiological process, see e.g. ii. 210, 213.

Ch. 46: 68. 17 **Ἀεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνῆσθαι.** The motive for the introduction of these fragments, and the reason for their selection, are obscure; the first was suggested, no doubt, by chs. **42** and **43**, and by the exposition of the doctrine of continuity in ch. **45**.

Whether Heraclit.'s *περὶ φύσεως* survived entire at this date is uncertain, and equally uncertain how far M. is citing the exact words; his choice mainly illustrates the topics of transience, and of man's blindness to experience.

68. 18 **ἀέρα γενέσθαι.** The doctrine of Heraclit. relies, in the first instance, upon the interchange of three forms of matter: the gaseous, the liquid, the solid. There is, however, some ancient evidence for his use of the four elements, see *Test.* l. 17, esp. Plut. *De EI*, 392c; 25 B.

M.'s *καὶ ἔμπαλιν* is unique, representing (the *ὁδός*) *ἄνω κάτω* p. **180.** 26.

68. 19 **τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου.** Byw. supposed M. to refer to the *Fr.* cited in *Test.*, cf. *τὴν ὁδὸν ἀγνοοῦντα* p. **106.** 13. Heraclit. may have made the parallel drawn in: 'sed ad hominum studia

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revertor, quorum animus etsi caligante memoria tamen bonum suum repetit, sed velut ebrius domum quo tramite revertatur ignorat': *caligante* suggests the cold humour of this life, darkening the soul, Boeth. *Consol.* iii. *Pr.* 2. Certainly human ignorance of true good, of providence, and of fortune, which Boeth., and Chaucer after him, use this simile to illustrate ('We witen nat what thing we preyen here' *Knights Tale*, A. 1260), accords well with what M. may have read into the obscure Ephesian.

68. 20 **ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι.** How much, if any, of this fragment is genuine is doubtful. Diels treats *λόγῳ* as part of the original, but all are agreed that *τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι* is a Stoic gloss. *τούτῳ διαφέρονται*, if *λόγῳ* is omitted, will mean *τῷ ξυνῷ*, which is *λόγῳ* in Stoic phrase.

The last half of the saying may be M.'s paraphrase of Heraclit. (*Test.*). If *ξένα φαίνεται* was written by Heraclit., we have the origin of a favourite image in M.

70. 1 **ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας.** The meaning is the sleep of one immersed in the sensible world, which is the condition of those stigmatized in Heraclit. (*Test.*). M. uses the image more than once, e.g. *πάλιν ἐγρηγορὼς βλέπε ταῦτα* p. **110.** 11; *ἀναβιῶναί σοι ἔξεστιν* p. **120.** 22.

70. 2–3 **οὐ δεῖ ⟨ὡς⟩ παῖδας τοκεώνων.** M. interprets to mean blind acceptance of tradition instead of following reason. The subject would be a natural one for discussion, cf. *πότερον ἅπαντα δεῖ πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πάντ' ἀπειθεῖν;* Arist. *Soph. El.* 174^{b}2; Muson. *Fr.* 16 H. asks *εἰ πάντα πειστέον τοῖς γονεῦσιν.* M. does not return to the point elsewhere. Pascal said: 'Qu'est-ce que nos principes naturels, sinon nos principes accoutumés? Et dans les enfants, ceux qu'ils ont reçus de la coutume de leurs pères, comme la chasse dans les animaux?' *Pensées*, ii. 92 Br.

Ch. 47: 70. 5 **εἰς τρίτην.** He alludes perhaps to the dream of Socr.: *πρὸς Αἰσχίνην ἔφη· Εἰς τρίτην ἀποθανοῦμαι* D.L. ii. 35; the vision had cited *Il.* ix. 363: *ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοιο* Pl. *Cri.* 44b.

70. 7 **εἰς πολλοστὸν ἔτος**, until the *n*th year, the remotest term in a series.

μηδὲν μέγα εἶναι νόμιζε: *μέγα* repeats *παρὰ μέγα ἐποίου* l. 5, and is taken up by *ὥς τι μέγα* l. 10.

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νόμιζε is a familiar term in monitory discourses, Isoc. i. 42, ii. 39; Arist. *Fr.* 57; pp. **104.** 28, **228.** 13.

Ch. 48: 70. 8 **ἰατροί.** For the order of the illustrations, cf. pp. **36.** 12, **116.** 21.

70. 9 **μαθηματικοί,** i.q. *Χαλδαῖοι* p. **36.** 13 n.

70. 11 **μυρία διατεινάμενοι:** cf. *διατείνου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ σαυτῷ προσέχειν* X. *Mem.* iii. 7. 9; *ἀλλὰ τί διατείνομαι;* Plin. *Ep.* ii. 20. 12.

πόσοι δὲ ἀριστεῖς, foll. by *τύραννοι,* as *ἥρωες* by *στρατηγοί* p. **116.** 23. Dio Chrys. uses the epic word for *patriots, ἀριστεῖς καὶ τυραννοκτόνοι,* xxxii. 48, p. 676; cf. *ἀ. ἀγαθοί* Max. Tyr. xxvi. 9. *πολλοὺς ἀποκτείναντες* well expresses the effect upon a reader of the *ἀριστεία* of Diomedes or Agamemnon or Menelaus.

70. 12–13 **ἐξουσίᾳ ψυχῶν,** a notable phrase to express their power over human *lives,* verging upon licence, cf. *οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι . . . ἐξουσίαν ἔχω . . . σταυρῶσαί σε; St. John,* 19. 10, or else their resources in *men, ψυχαί* being often so used.

μετὰ δεινοῦ φρυάγματος, originally the pride of a brute in mere strength, e.g. *ἀφῆκε τὸ φ. καὶ τὸν θυμόν,* of the mule in the fable, Plu. *Sept. Sap.* 150b; *ἡ τῶν ὁπλῶν* (heels) *κροῦσις ἐς φ. καὶ τῦφον ἀνάγει* Ael. *Nat. An.* ii. 10; *τοῦ δουλικοῦ φ. ἀνασχόμενον,* of Felicio, the freedman, Epict. iv. 1. 150. See *καταφρυαττόμενον* p. **122.** 2.

ἀθάνατοι, like *ἀθανασίας* l. 11, is a happy touch of irony.

70. 13–14 **πόλεις ὅλαι . . . τεθνήκασιν:** cf. *ἀποθνῄσκουσι γὰρ καὶ πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι* Lucian, *Charon,* 23;

> non ti parrà nuova cosa, nè forte,
> poscia che le cittadi termine hanno Dante, *Parad.* xvi. 77.

The ancients more often moralize upon the decline of once-powerful cities (Nineveh and Babylon, Paus. viii. 33. 2, 3; Lucian, l.c.; Sulpicius Rufus to Cic.) than upon cataclysmic ruin. The sudden destruction of Helice and Boura, 373 B.C., was, however, a favourite topic.

ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, a phrase that has been called a Latinism; cf., however, *καί, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα* Chrysippus ap. Plu. *De Rep. St.* 1050f; *ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ*

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Pl. *R.* 507d; *ἵνα συντέμω ταῦτα* Dem. xlv. 5; *ἡμεῖς, ἵνα μὴ λέγωμεν ὑμεῖς* St. Paul, 2 *Cor.* 9. 4.

70. 14 Ἑλίκη. Boura is omitted, either because its ruin was less overwhelming or in order to preserve the triad of examples. Paus. narrates the stories, when he reaches Achaia, vii. 24. 12, 25. 8; cf. Polyb. ii. 41. 7, and *πόλεις καταποθείσας . . . Αἴγειραν Βοῦράν τε καὶ ὑψηλὴν Ἑλίκειαν* Ph. ii. 514. The remains of H. were visible to Paus. beneath the sea: 'si quaeras Helicen et Burin, Achaidas urbes, | invenies sub aquis' Ov. *Met.* xv. 293. So Sen.: 'Helicen Burinque totas mare accepit: ego de uno corpusculo timeam?' *Nat. Qu.* vi. 32. 8, cf. ib. 26. 4, vii. 5. 3.

Πομπήιοι καὶ Ἡρκλᾶνον. The most famous eruption of Vesuvius, 24 Aug. A.D. 79, is described by Plin., an eyewitness, *Ep.* vi. 16 and 20; cf. Tac. *Hist.* i. 2; Dio Cass. lxvi. 23; Stat. *Silv.* iv. 4. 79, v. 3. 205.

§ 2: 70. 16 τοῦτον κηδεύσας εἶτα ἐξετάθη. Both verbs are customarily used for the last rites paid to the dead.

70. 18 μυξάριον: cf. *μυξαρίου ἔκκρισις* p. **100.** 13 (and *Test.*); 'a fetid drop' *Pirqe Aboth*, iii. 1; *ἔπλασέ σε ἐξ ὑγρᾶς οὐσίας μικρᾶς καὶ ἐλαχίστης ῥανίδος* Theoph. Ant. *Ad Autolyc.* i. 8; 'formatus est homo . . . de spurcissimo spermate' Innocent III, *De Miseria*, i. 1, cited by Skeat, at Chaucer, *Cant. Tales*, B. 3199.

τάριχος ἢ τέφρα. The former, strictly an embalmed body, is here, as in Hdt. ix. 120, a buried corpse: *ὅσον οὐδέπω σποδὸς ἢ σκελετός* p. **94.** 9; *τετέφρωνται* p. **52.** 2; *θνῆσκε καὶ τέφρη γίνευ* Herond. *Fr.* 60 Crus.; 'tabesne cadavera solvat | an rogus, haud refert' Lucan. vii. 809.

τὸ ἀκαριαῖον: see pp. **44.** 17 n., **226.** 1.

70. 19 ἵλεων καταλῦσαι: cf. *περιμένειν ἵλεων* p. **94.** 18, the adj., like *propitius* is, at this date, used both of the god and of his worshipper, p. **250.** 17.

καταλῦσαι, like our 'depart life', was used originally with *τὸν βίον*, and later abs.: *ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ μάρτυσι καταλύοι* Philostr. *V. Apoll.* viii. 28.

70. 20 εὐφημοῦσα τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν: cf. *θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν καὶ εὐφημεῖν* p. **94.** 20; *ἐπαινῶ τε γὰρ αὐτοὺς . . . ὧν τε διδόασιν ἀεὶ αὖ παρέχομαι εὐφημῶ τε* X. *Smp.* 4. 49.

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The olive lauds the earth goddess: *τῇ τε βοσκούσῃ χθονὶ | καὶ τῇ τεκούσῃ νῦν τιν' ἀρκέσαι χρεών* Eur. *Heracl.* 826.

The ripe olive falls, blessing the earth and grateful *τῷ φύσαντι δένδρῳ*. If we cut out *δένδρῳ*, with Wil., the sense will be 'its mother and father', i.e. the earth and the sky-god or the sun. This seems to be unnatural and spoils the cadence entirely.

Ch. 49: 70. 22 τῇ ἄκρᾳ, a simile made celebrated by Hom. (*Test.*) and Virg.'s imitation: 'ille velut pelagi rupes immota resistit' *Aen.* vii. 586. M.'s words *τὰ κύματα προσρήσσεται* seem to recall *τά τε προσερεύγεται αὐτήν*, and the use of the image for one fortified by phil. may be related to the original of: 'quemadmodum proiecti quidam in altum scopuli mare frangunt . . . ita sapientis animus solidus est' Sen. *De Const.* 3. 5.

70. 23 περὶ αὐτὴν κοιμίζεται. Ph. has elaborated the simile, ending: *νηνέμῳ εὐδίᾳ χρωμένη γαληνιάζει* i. 276, but M. has added to the picture a delicate observation derived from nature. His moral lesson is that the passions are lulled, as Pl. says that when a man is chastened and corrected *τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἥμερον ἐλευθεροῦται R.* 591b.

72. 1 Ἀτυχὴς ἐγώ. The passage down to *τὰ ἴδια*; l. 12, is ascribed by Dr. H. Fränkel (*Introd.*, p. lxxx) to Epict., mainly on grounds of expression.

The connexion between *ἁμάρτημα, ἀπότευγμα*, and *ἀτύχημα* is well illustrated by a fragment of a dialogue between Stilpo of Megara, a contemporary of Zeno, and the Cynic Metrocles, preserved or composed by Plu. *De Tranq.* 468a. It concerns S.'s dissolute daughter: *Σ. Ἐμὸν οὖν ἁμάρτημα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἢ ἐκείνης; Μ. ἐκείνης μὲν ἁμάρτημα, σὸν δ' ἀτύχημα. Σ. οὐχὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ διαπτώματ' ἐστί; Μ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ. τὰ δὲ διαπτώματ' οὐχ ὧν διαπτώματα, καὶ ἀποτεύγματα; συνωμολόγησεν ὁ Μ. Σ. τὰ δ' ἀποτεύγματ' οὐχ ὧν ἀποτεύγματ', ἀτυχήματα;* (I have supplied the *personae dialogi*.)

οὐμενοῦν. Dr. Fränkel observes that this use of *οὖν*, common in Epict., occurs nowhere else in M.

72. 2–3 ὑπὸ παρόντος θραυόμενος: cf. *οὐ θραύει οὐδὲ ποιεῖ κακὸν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν* p. **208. 21**; the word is used of what shakes or overwhelms the judgement: *ἐτέθραυστο τῆς τόλμης τοῦ Ἀριοβίστου*

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Plu. *Caes.* 19, *ὑπὸ τοιούτων θρανύμενος λογισμῶν* id. *Mar.* 45. *θραύειν* occurs nowhere in Epict. and is therefore a negative instance in regard to authorship.

72. 5 **ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἀτύχημα ἢ τοῦτο εὐτύχημα;** *ἐκεῖνο* is the *σύμβαμα* or *ἁμάρτημα*, *τοῦτο* the good man's equanimity. *ἀτύχημα* occurs five times and *εὐτύχημα* once in Epict., neither elsewhere in M.; but many quite ordinary words only occur once in M., and the ratio of Epict.'s text to the *Meditations* is large.

72. 6–7 **τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου:** cf. *τὴν φύσιν ἅν σου καὶ τὸ βούλημα ταύτης* p. **74.** 14. Notice that Epict. always uses *τὸ β. τῆς φύσεως* of Nature's purpose, not of man's, cf. p. **112.** 24.

§ 2: 72. 8–9 **τί οὖν; τὸ βούλημα μεμάθηκας.** In spite of *τί οὖν* and *μήτι οὖν*, this appears to be by M., whatever we may say of what precedes. Notice the characteristic enumeration, like *ἀγαθός, αἰδήμων, ἀληθής, κτλ.* p. **196.** 11, and the phrase *ἀπέχει τὰ ἴδια*, cf. pp. **190.** 17, **214.** 11.

72. 10 **ἔμφρονα:** *τὴν ἐφ' ἕκαστα διαληπτικὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ τὸ ἀπαρενθύμητον* p. **196.** 15, i.e. attending to and scrutinizing the *φαντασίαι*, so that action is deliberate, and results in *ἀπροπτωσία* p. **44.** 14 n.

ἀδιάψευστον: cf. 'viros fortis et magnanimos eosdem bonos et simplicis, veritatis amicos minimeque fallacis esse volumus' Cic. *Off.* i. 63.

72. 14 **γενναίως.** In view of *ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, M. may mean *true to type*: *γενναῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως* Arist. *H. An.* 488^{b}19.

Ch. 50: 72. 15 **βοήθημα:** cf. *παράστημα, παράπηγμα* pp. **44.** 22, **174.** 1.

72. 16 **γλίσχρως:** like our colloquialism 'sticking to life'. In Hadrian's reign, Phlegon's *περὶ μακροβίων* gave a list from the Roman census rolls of such veterans; there is also a list of aged kings, philosophers, and historians, entitled *Μακροβίοι*, ascribed to Lucian.

72. 17 **τοῖς ἀώροις.** Untimely death is a favourite theme in *Consolations*. The passage from Eur. cited by M. at pp. **132.** 16, **216.** 24 is thus used in Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 110f.

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72. 17 **Καιδικιανός**: perhaps Q. Aburnius Caedicianus, who was *legatus* of Dacia, *circ.* A.D. 123–40, *C.I.L.* iii. 1089, may be intended.

72. 18 **Φάβιος**: perhaps identical with Fabius Catullinus p. **246.** 18; a consular, governor of Numidia, of this name, is recorded *C.I.L.* viii. 2609, 2610.

Ἰουλιανός. Among Fronto's familiar friends is a Claudius Julianus, *Ep.*, pp. 177, 185. A proconsul of Asia of this name is commemorated by a Smyrna coin of A.D. 145–61, with the legend: *Οὐῆρος Καῖσαρ Φαυστεῖνα Σε* (i.e. *Σεβαστή*).

72. 19 **τὸ διάστημα.** Between conception and death: *βραχὺ μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ γενέσεως μέχρι διαλύσεως* p. **184.** 11.

δι' ὅσων: sc. *κόπων* l. 25 or *πόνων*. Julian, in a letter, uses the colloquialism: *ὁ τούτου κηδεστὴς ἐξ ὅσου* p. 401b.

72. 20 **ἐξαντλούμενον**: cf. *βίον | ὡς οἰκτρὸν ἐξαντλοῦσιν* Menand. *Fr.* 74 K.; *ὑπὸ πόνων ἐκείνων οὓς νύκτωρ τε καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐξήντλει* Marinus, *V. Procli*, 3; and *exanclare* Enn. *Scen.* 102 V.; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 118.

72. 20–1 **μὴ οὖν ὡς πρᾶγμα**, perhaps supply *δοκεῖν*; cf. *τί αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δοκεῖς;* p. **92.** 13. For the colloquialism, cf. *εἰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πρᾶγμα* Pl. *Smp.* 198e, cf. id. *Euthphr.* 3c, e, 4d.

72. 21 **τὸ ἀχανές**: cf. *τὸ χάος* p. **52.** 10, and pp. **184.** 12, **240.** 5.

72. 22 **ὁ τριήμερος τοῦ τριγερηνίου**, a play of words upon *Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ* Hom. *Il.* ii. 336, and *Νέστωρ τριγέρων Anth. Pal.* vii. 144, 157. I have been reminded of a saying of H. W. Burrows: 'a whole life in three days, yet long enough to win love, endure pain, and receive blessing. Few lives accomplish more.'

Ch. 51: 72. 23 **σύντομος δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν**: cf. *διὰ περιόδου ἐλθεῖν*, the converse, p. **234.** 16, *οὐ τὴν σύντομον, ἣν σὺ φῄς, ἀλλὰ τὴν κύκλῳ* Julian, p. 235d.

72. 23–4 **κατὰ τὸ ὑγιέστατον**: cf. *κατὰ τὸ ὑγ. πραχθῆναι ἢ ῥηθῆναι*, p. **208.** 5, and pp. **156.** 6, **218.** 25.

72. 24–5 **ἀπαλλάσσει γὰρ . . . κόπων**: *πραγμάτων τε καὶ μαχῶν . . . ἀπαλλαγείς* Aristoph. *Ach.* 269; *ἐν κόποις, ἐν ἀγρυπνίαις* St. Paul, 2 *Cor.* 6. 5; *ὅσος ὁ κόπος ἐν τῇ διαφωνίᾳ τῆς συμβιώσεως* p. **174.** 8.

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The word κ., like the three following substantives, appears to be met., M. is thinking perhaps of Heraclit. (*Test.*), cf. pp. **36.** 22–**38.** 1 n.

στρατείας, *service*, as we say. See Teles (*Test.*), where the word seems to be met., cf. *ὁ βίος . . . μακρός τις εἶναι καὶ πολυετὴς πόλεμος* Hierocles, Stob. *Ecl.* iv. p. 663; *ἄν τε στρατεία προσπεσοῦσα ποιήσῃ τὸν χωρισμόν* (sc. *τῆς φιλοσοφίας*) Plu. *Quomodo* 77c; *στρατεία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος ἑκάστου καὶ αὕτη μακρὰ καὶ ποικίλη* Epict. iii. 24. 34; *χαλεπὸν στρατεία κἂν ἑτέρων ἀρχῇ* Diog. Oen. *Fr.* 57 W.; cf. Heraclit. (*Test.*) for *ἀρχῇ*.

The image is frequently used in Latin: 'sit modus lasso maris et viarum | militiaeque' Hor. *Od.* ii. 6. 7; 'vivere, Lucili, militare est' Sen. *Ep.* 96. 5; 'nobis quoque militandum est, et quidem genere militiae quo numquam . . . otium datur' ib. 51. 6.

We are reminded of: 'Is there not a warfare to man upon earth?' *Job*, vii. 1, cf. xiv. 14; *Is.* xl. 2.

οἰκονομίας, *care*, i.e. *ἀσχολίας*, cf. *οὐκ οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὀλίγα μὲν δεῖ οἰκονομεῖν* Epict. iii. 24. 36; *ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα ἀναγκαῖα ἡμῖν γίνεται εἰς οἰκονομίαν . . . τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ* id. i. 9. 11.

κομψείας, collectively used for *superfluity*, the opp. of *ἀφέλεια* in life, cf. *μή μοι τὰ κομψ', ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει δεῖ* Eur. *Fr.* 16 *N*², cited by Arist. *Pol.* 1277ᵃ19, and *κομψεία* p. **40.** 13 n.

BOOK V

Ch. 1: 74. 1 Ὄρθρου, earlier than *ἑωθεν* p. **20.** 1, see Pl. *Lg.* 951d, but used at this period as an equivalent for it, Phryn. *Ecl.* 242 Ruth., p. 275 Lobeck.

Roman statesmen and students rose betimes; Plin. says that his uncle 'ante lucem ibat ad Vespasianum imperatorem' *Ep.* iii. 5. 9. M. writes: 'ego hodie ab hora nona noctis in secundam diei . . . studivi', and 'ab undecima noctis in tertiam diei partim legi ex agricultura Catonis partim scripsi' Fronto, *Ep.* pp. 68–9.

δυσόκνως ἐξεγείρῃ, *reluctantly*, not *lazily*; cf. *δυσαποσπάστως τε καὶ δυσόκνως καταλειπόντων τέκνα* Hdn. vi. 7. 1. M. has *δυσχερῶς ἐγείρῃ* p. **150.** 13.

74. 2 ἔτι οὖν δυσκολαίνω; Ménage's *τί οὖν*, which I have translated by an oversight, is not necessary. Epict. often uses *ἔτι* in an

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interrogative sentence without a pronoun: *ταῦτ' οὖν δεδοικότα ἐπιθαρρεῖν οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς;* iii. 22. 18, *ἔτι οὖν . . . ταρασσόμενος οἴει πεπεῖσθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν;* iv. 6. 10. Here the participles are equivalent to M.'s clause with *εἰ*, cf. *τί οὖν ἔτι . . . εἴ γε . . .*, with the pronoun, p. **94.** 15.

εἰ πορεύομαι: the verb is well chosen to express the daily path, cf. p. **76.** 6 n.

74. 4 **κατεσκεύασμαι:** the implied answer is actually given in the parallel passage: *κατὰ τὴν κατασκευήν σου ἐστὶ . . . τὸ πράξεις κοινωνικὰς ἀποδιδόναι* p. **150.** 13. He goes so far as to say that it is a *luxury*: *ποιεῖν τὰ οἰκεῖα τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ* p. **208.** 10.

74. 5 **ἐμαυτὸν θάλπω.** Cf. *ῥιγῶν ἢ θαλπόμενος . . . νυστάζων ἢ ἱκανῶς ὕπνου ἔχων* p. **96.** 24.

74. 5–6 **πρὸς τὸ ἥδεσθαι οὖν γέγονας;** The answer is that man has *his* work, like the Sun, the horse, the vine: *σὺ οὖν πρὸς τί; τὸ ἥδεσθαι;* p. **152.** 13.

74. 6 **ὅλως δὲ πρὸς πεῖσιν, οὐ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν;** AD's *πεῖσιν* is correct, as M.'s usage elsewhere shows, e.g. *οὐκ ἐν πείσει ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ . . . ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν* p. **178.** 14, cf. p. **118.** 20. Xyl. gives the true sense, translating *πρὸς τὸ ἥδεσθαι . . . ἐνέργειαν;* by the condensed equivalent: 'ergone ad voluptatem natus es, non ad agendum?' Upton, with P only before him, read, *οὐ πρὸς ποιεῖν, οὐ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν;* I have supposed that the scribes transferred *οὐ* because they saw that the underlying sense is '*not* for feeling', and overlooked the fact that the sentence is a question. In A the note of interrogation after *ἐνέργειαν* has been squeezed in later by the scribe or a reviser.

ὅλως δέ introduces a generalization from *ἡδονή* to *πεῖσις*, all emotional sensibility; cf. M.'s words at pp. **124.** 29, **246.** 20. Wil.'s *πρὸς ποίησιν* would imply an anticipation of the appeal to the *τεχνῖται* l. 15. M. however does not here mean that we are to prefer either a craft or moral activity to self-indulgence, and he never uses *ποίησις* in opposition to *πρᾶξις*.

The emendation *σὺ πρὸς πεῖσιν*, independently proposed by Fournier and Schmidt, was adopted by Leop., Mr. Haines, and Sch., but the stress upon the pronoun is unnatural and *ἤ* is difficult in construction and sense; we expect *οὐ*.

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With the doctrine cf.: *οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας* Arist. *E.N.* 1177[a]1; even Epicurus teaches: *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως* D.L. x. 132.

74. 8 **τὸ ἴδιον ποιούσας:** one of the very rare cases of an omission of a group of words by P. Xyl.'s version is again condensed, but his words 'singula haec suo intenta officio' suggest that the omission was made in printing.

τὸ ἴδιον is the specific *ἔργον* of each, cf. p. **152.** 12; hence Aelian's *N.A.*, where traits of animal intelligence are collected, is entitled *περὶ ζῴων ἰδιότητος*.

τὸ καθ' αὑτάς. After *κατά* M. normally uses the contracted forms of the 3rd pers. reflex. pron. I have therefore printed *καθ' αὑτάς* p. **86.** 4, *καθ' αὑτόν* p. **238.** 10. As to *ἑαυτοῦ*: *αὑτοῦ*, and the like, the uncontracted prevail over the contracted, in our sources for the text, in the ratio of 131 : 13, and of the latter 9 are preceded by a prep., see Ghedini, *La Lingua Greca* &c., p. 57.

συγκοσμούσας κόσμον. At first sight *συγκροτούσας* AD is attractive, as suggesting that M. has chosen a vigorous Attic word, cf. *καὶ ξυγκροτοῦσιν ἄνδρες αὖτ' ἐκεῖθεν αὖ* Aristoph. *Eq.* 471. In favour of P's reading is the characteristic play on words, which recurs at *συγκοσμεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν κόσμον* p. **122.** 25, and the fact that *συγκροτεῖν* is so common a word in later Greek that it might easily supplant the original verb. Ruskin speaks of 'man as a being living in flocks, and *hammering out*, with alternate strokes and mutual agreement, what is necessary for him' *Harbours of England*.

§ 2: 74. 12 **ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα:** cf. *μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι* Hes. *Op.* 694; the older form occurs too in *πάθος, ὁρμὴ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα* Clem. Alex. *Strom.*, p. 460. For M.'s interpretation by *τὰ ἀρκοῦντα* cf. *μέτρια δ' ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφη* Eur. *Supp.* 866. For the asyndeton cf. l. 8.

§ 3: 74. 13 **οὐ γὰρ φιλεῖς ἑαυτόν:** more than a rhetorical paradox. The Stoics asserted an original self-love which is the foundation of reasonable self-love; cf. Hooker, cited at p. 353 above, and see: *οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι* Plu. *De St. rep.* 1038b; 'principium ductum esse a se diligendo' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 16; 'natura . . . induit nobis inolevitque in ipsis statim principiis,

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quibus nati sumus, amorem nostri et caritatem' A. Gell. *Noct. Att.* xii. 5. 7. Accordingly *ὁ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου τούτων* (soul and body) *τελειότητος κατὰ φύσιν στερόμενος οὐδ' ἂν κατὰ φ. βιοῖ* (*τὸ γὰρ κατὰ φ. τὸ κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τῆς φ. ἀκούεται*)· *εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ εὐδαιμόνως* Alex. Aphr. *Mantissa*, p. 163.

74. 15 **τὰς τέχνας ἑαυτῶν φιλοῦντες:** craftsmen plainly exhibit their disinterestedness, cf. the argument in Pl. *R.* 341c–342e. This and its consequences are favourite reflections in M., e.g., pp. **64.** 1, **110.** 26, **124.** 14 and 21, **190.** 18.

συγκατατήκονται: no other instance of this compound is given in the lexicons. The interpretation 'pine away over' in L. and S. comes from 'intabescunt', Cas., Gat. Xyl. has 'incumbunt', the usual equivalent of *προστετήκασι*. The latter word Gat. considers to imply not only to be wedded to an object but also to be consumed by its pursuit. He also cites *πᾶσα γὰρ ἀγαθὴ γυνή, | ἥτις ἀνδρὶ συντέτηκε, σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται* Eur. *Fr.* 909 N², comparing *προσκολληθήσεται* St. Paul, *Eph.* 5. 31, for the sense 'to become one with'. Perhaps this sense of 'welding with' is the simile involved at p. **204.** 5, and in *ἐφλέγετο καὶ κατετήκετο*, of a lover, Ael. *V.H.* xii. 1. It seems then as if the two senses 'wear themselves out' and 'are wedded to' meet in the word: they are *absorbed* in their work.

74. 16 **ἄλουτοι καὶ ἄσιτοι.** Many stories illustrate this devotion, e.g.: *Νικίας ὁ ζωγράφος τοσαύτην περὶ τὸ γράφειν σπουδὴν εἶχεν, ὡς ἐπιλαθέσθαι πολλάκις αὐτὸν τροφὴν προσενέγκασθαι, προστετηκότα τῇ τέχνῃ* Ael. *V.H.* iii. 31; he would inquire: *εἰ λέλουται καὶ ἠρίστηκεν* Plu. *An seni* 786c, where the author adds: *ἆρ' οὐκ ἐπινοοῦμεν ἡλίκας ἡδονὰς αἱ ἀρεταὶ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν . . . κοινωνικῶν ἔργων . . . παρασκευάζουσιν;*

74. 18 **ὁ φιλάργυρος . . . ὁ κενόδοξος:** thus *ὁ φιλήδονος* is coupled with *ὁ φιλόδοξος* p. **118.** 20; cf. *τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον . . . καὶ τὴν παρὰ τούτων κενὴν δόξαν* Galen, i. 25.

M. treats the money-grubber and the lover of glory as *τεχνῖται* here, quite in the spirit of Socrates.

74. 19 **ὅταν προσπαθῶσιν:** we should expect *πρός τι προσπαθῶσιν*. The verb is, however, used absolutely, e.g. *βίᾳ λοιπὸν προσπαθοῦσα ἐχρῆτο*, of the culmination of Potiphar's wife's passion, Ph. ii. 48.

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Epict. uses the word even of good affections, like *φιλοστοργία*, which are unreasoning, see, e.g., iii. 24. 82 sq. Gat. p. 421 has a long and interesting note on *ἐκ προσπαθείας* p. **236.** 25.

74. 20 **πρὸς ἃ διαφέρονται,** used in the sense explained at p. **180.** 24–5 n.

74. 21 **ἥσσονος σπουδῆς ἄξιαι:** cf. *περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον . . . τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν* Arist. *E.N.* 1174ª4.

Ch. 2: 74. 22 **Ὡς εὔκολον,** perhaps means 'how agreeable', referring to *δυσκολαίνω* l. 2. An impulse to wrong conduct normally follows upon acquiescence in false or obscurely apprehended *φαντασίαι*, but *φύσις λογικὴ εὐοδεῖ ἐν μὲν φαντασίαις μήτε ψευδεῖ μήτε ἀδήλῳ συγκατατιθεμένη* p. **148.** 14.

ἀπαλεῖψαι: a met. from the painter's sponge, cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1329, Eur. *Fr.* 621 N². If wrong impressions are not rejected or wiped away, if momentarily entertained, they in the end dye the *ψυχή*, p. **86.** 20.

74. 23 **ὀχληράν,** used with a play upon *ὄχλος*, cf. *θορυβεῖν ὄχλῳ φαντασιῶν* p. **48.** 17. The *ψ.* which rejects the mob of *φ.* remains *ἀτάραχος* p. **126.** 3.

ἀνοίκειον, *foreign* to a reasonable creature, p. **44.** 4, and implying perhaps also *unsocial*, as in *ἀνοικείωτα ἀλλήλοις* p. **248.** 13–14.

ἐν πάσῃ γαλήνῃ: a favourite image for the Stoic *ἀταραξία* p. **184.** 3, cf. pp. **98.** 22, **144.** 4, **244.** 2. The calm is from the waves of anger and appetite, an image used by Pl.: *γαλήνην τούτων* (sc. *ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν*) *παρασκευάζουσα Phd.* 84a; *γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν τε ἐν τῇ ψ. φαίνεσθαι ἀπεργασαμένη Lg.* 791a.

Ch. 3: 76. 1 **μή σε παρειπάτω:** perhaps a reminiscence of the usage in Homer, see *Test.* It is appropriate with *λόγος*, cf. *μηδεὶς μήτε λόγῳ σε παρείπῃ μήτε τι ἔργῳ πρῆξαι μηδ' εἰπεῖν* Hierocl. *in Aur. Carm.* xviii. 39. Xyl. made the same emendation, no doubt, as Cor.

76. 2 **μὴ σεαυτὸν ἀπαξίου,** referring to *ἄξιον* p. **74.** 24; cf. *οὐδ' αὐτὴν τῶν καλλίστων ἀπηξίωσεν*, said of philosophy, [Arist.] *Mu.* 391ª6. M. means that he is to assert his claim to enjoy right word and speech, as he says *ἴδιον δὲ λογικῆς ψυχῆς . . . τὸ μηδὲν ἑαυτῆς προτιμᾶν* p. **214.** 17, cf. *ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων* Arist. *Pol.* 1284ª9.

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76. 3 ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν: by *ἐκεῖνοι* are meant *οἱ πολλοί*, whose private judgements and impulses run counter to natural law. M. alludes to the teaching of Heraclit. *Test.*; cf. *πολιτικῇ καὶ ἀληθεῖ τέχνῃ οὐ τὸ ἴδιον ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἀνάγκη μέλειν κτλ.* Pl. *Lg.* 875a. The many are *ἄτεχνοι καὶ ἀμαθεῖς* p. **94.** 5. The same truth is expressed at pp. **90.** 13, **112.** 1, **138.** 7.

μὴ περιβλέπου: cf. p. **138.** 7, where too, as here, he looks to Nature as a guide.

76. 4 εὐθεῖαν πέραινε ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει: cf. p. **200.** 4, and *Test.* there, for the original in Pl. of which he is thinking.

76. 5 μία δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἡ ὁδός, words which recall and may well allude to Heraclit. *Test.* The fuller's brush, which rotated while it was pushed up and down, is an ingenious illustration of the doctrine of the reconciliation of apparent opposites. Here M. makes the point that the path of him who observes right reason is one with the movement of *τὸ κοινόν*. So he says: *οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτό τινι ἔφερεν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέφερεν* p. **80.** 16.

The article with *ὁδός* is correct; the subject of the sentence 'the path of two', i.e. of the individual and of Nature, is *μία*, *coincident*; cf. *δύο ἄρα κύκλων τεμνόντων ἀλλήλους τὸ αὐτό ἐστι κέντρον, τὸ* ○ (sc. *σημεῖον*)· *ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον*, Eucl. *Elem.* iii. 10.

Ch. 4: 76. 6 πορεύομαι διὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, resuming *ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει* l. 4, and pointing back to p. **74.** 2. The verb combines the senses of walking along the path of duty, *εὐθεῖαν* l. 4; *ταυτῇ πορευτέον ᾗπερ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς σχεδὸν ἄγει* Pl. *Lg.* 968b, and following by Providence's guidance the road to death: *πορεύονται τὴν εἱμαρμένην πορείαν* id. *Menex.* 236d; and, perhaps, *πορεύομαι ἑτοιμάσαι τόπον ὑμῖν St. John*, 14. 2. The former use is frequent in the LXX (e.g. *Ps.* 85 (86) 11) and N.T. to translate the equivalent Heb. verb.

διὰ τῶν κατὰ φ.: cf. *διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι*, 'to progress by a series of propositions' Pl. *Sph.* 253b; each step is to be agreeable with Nature, as the last will be, p. **212.** 18.

μέχρι πεσὼν ἀναπαύσωμαι: for the mood as emended cf. pp. **58.** 3, **242.** 3. Hdn. says of M.: *νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐπιβιώσας μιᾶς ἀνεπαύσατο* i. 4. 7. Here there is the further sense: 'I shall find

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rest'. He may recall: *ἐθέλουσι . . . ἀναπαύεσθαι* Heraclit. 20 D., 86 B., cf. 84a D., 83 B.

76. 7 **ἐναποπνεύσας μὲν τούτῳ,** i.e. *τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι* p. **166.** 14, cf. *ἀναπνευστικὴν δύναμιν . . . ἀποδοῦναι ἐκεῖ ὅθεν τὸ πρῶτον ἔσπασας* p. **102.** 18.

76. 7–8 **πεσὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο,** repeating the simile of the ripe olive, p. **70.** 20, although l. 10 suggests rather the image of *Ps.* 1. 3. For 'mother earth' cf. *ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ* Xenoph. *Fr.* 27; 'terra . . . novissime complexa gremio iam a reliqua natura abdicatos, tum maxime, ut mater, operiens' Plin. *H.N.* ii. 154.

76. 8 **τὸ σπερμάτιον,** recurring to the old view, beyond which the Stoic physiology had advanced, that the father conveys the quickening spark or seed, the mother merely bestows the nutriment of blood p. **204.** 13.

76. 10 **ὃ φέρει με πατοῦντα:** this is not, I think, paralleled in classical literature. Early Christian writers used it to show that the earth is not divine since it suffers such indignity: *καταπατεῖται ὑπό τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων* Aristid. *Apol.* 4, p. 242, cf. Melito, *Or.* p. 42.

Ch. 5: 76. 12 **Δριμύτητά σου.** M. contrasts intellectual ability here with right conduct: *δριμύτητα δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν* Pl. *R.* 535b.

76. 13 **οὐ γὰρ πέφυκα,** like the plea: 'I am not made that way', cf. *τὸ ἀφυῶς* l. 21. Even if not intellectually gifted, we must still observe the claims of the mind, l. 24. For the omission of *τοιοῦτος* or *οὕτως* cf. *ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες* Arist. *Po.* 1448^{b}22.

76. 14 **τὸ ἀκίβδηλον,** coupled with *τὸ σεμνόν*, cf. *ἀκέραιον, σεμνόν* p. **108.** 18. Similarly, *τὸ φερέπονον* goes with *τὸ ἀφιλήδονον*, but is joined with *ὀλιγοδεές* at p. **4.** 12.

76. 15 **τὸ ἀμεμψίμοιρον,** followed by *τὸ ὀλιγοδεές*, so that it means 'contented with one's portion' rather than 'not repining at destiny'.

76. 16 **τὸ ἀπέρισσον,** almost a synonym of *ἀφέλεια* which is *ἕξις ἀφαιρετικὴ τῶν περιττῶν* Clem. Alex. *Paed.*, p. 286; cf. *τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν λιτῶν καὶ ἀπερίττων προηγουμένως ποιεῖσθαι προστάσσων* Zeno, ap. Athen. vi. 233b.

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τὸ ἀφλύαρον, opp. to *περπερεύεσθαι* l. 20; *φλύαρος εἶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύνασαι κατασχεῖν* Epict. iv. 13, 17.

τὸ μεγαλεῖον, equivalent to *μεγαλόψυχον* p. **72.** 10, *μεγαλόφρων* p. **116.** 25. He closes the catalogue with a general word for the high-mindedness exhibited in the specific attributes. If, however, its meaning is affected by *τὸ ἀφλύαρον*, M. will be using it in its frequent sense 'elevation of language', cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 14.

76. 17 **ἀφυΐας καὶ ἀνεπιτηδειότητος:** cf. *τὸ ἀφυῶς κατεσκευάσθαι* l. 21, and Epict. cited at *ἀσκητέον* ll. 23–4. Ph., using *τὸ βραδὺ πρὸς γένεσιν*, allegorically, of mental barrenness, says it is *διὰ τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀνεπιτηδειότητα* i. 521.

76. 18 **κάτω μένεις ἐκών:** the implied meaning is like *διὰ τοῦτο ἀπογνῷς* p. **142.** 22, but the met. underlying *κάτω* is obscure. Perhaps he means 'hang behind' in the race, cf. *ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω*, for the first half of the course, Pl. *R.* 613b.

76. 19 **γλισχρεύεσθαι**, 'somewhat near and a great husband', Gat.; cf. *πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος* Pl. *R.* 553c. We are hardly prepared, by the context, for the mention of this failing.

κολακεύειν: this word should precede *ἀρεσκεύεσθαι* immediately; the *κόλαξ* is the toady for his own profit, the *ἄρεσκος* is the obsequious friend, Arist. *E.N.* 1108ª28. This consideration, and the antithesis of *σωμάτιον* and *ψυχῇ* l. 21, strongly support Morus' change of order.

76. 20 **περπερεύεσθαι.** The precise meaning is uncertain. Suid. has *πέρπερος: ὁ μετὰ βλακείας ἐπηρμένος, οἷον λάλος, προπετής, μηδὲν λογισμῷ ποιῶν.* Polyb. employs the adj. with *στωμύλος καὶ λάλος* of a smatterer in letters, xxxix. 1. 2. Pedantry, which is *πέρπερον καὶ περιεργοτέραν*, is displayed by *οἱ τετυφωμένοι τῶν γραμματικῶν* S. Emp. *Math.* i. 54. Gat. discusses the verb in connexion with St. Paul's use of it, 1 *Cor.* 13. 4. He compares: 'quo modo *ἐνεπερπερευσάμην* novo auditori Pompeio' Cic. *Att.* i. 14. 4, and concludes that the apostle's meaning is: 'non est jactationi aut vanae ostentationi dedita'. The opposed attribute, then, would be *ἄκομψον* p. **108.** 18, cf. *κομψοὺς ἔλεγον οὓς ἡμεῖς περπέρους καὶ περιλάλους Schol.* ad Soph. *Ant.* 324.

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76. 23–4 καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀσκητέον: cf. *ἔθιζε καὶ ὅσα ἀπογινώσκεις* p. **240. 1**; *τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ ἀφυὴς εἰμι, ἀποστῶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τούτου ἕνεκα; μὴ γένοιτο* Epict. i. 2. 35.

76. 24 μὴ παρενθυμουμένῳ: cf. *πολλὰ παρενθυμώμεθα* p. **106. 5**; *ἀκούοντες οὐκ ἀκούομεν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ νοῦς μικρὸν ὅσον ἑτέρῳ νοητῷ προσενεχθῇ παρενθυμούμενος* Ph. i. 78.

μηδὲ ἐμφιληδοῦντι: cf. *ἐμφιληδεῖν τὰς ψυχὰς οἷς* (sc. *σώμασι*) *ἀπολείπουσι* Porph. *Abst.* ii. 47, the only parallel which L. and S. cite for this verb.

Ch. 6: 78. 2 λογίσασθαι αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν: cf. *ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι* Arist. *Rh.* 1381^{b}35.

78. 3 ἀλλὰ μέντοι: P's reading *ἄλλως μέντοι* gives a wrong sense. Should we read *ἅμα μέντοι*, cf. p. **46. 13**?

ὡς περὶ χρεώστου: cf. *τούτου μισθὸν ζητεῖς;* p. **190. 14**; 'numquam illa vir bonus cogitat nisi admonitus a reddente; alioquin in formam crediti transeunt; turpis feneratio est beneficium expensum ferre' Sen. *De Ben.* i. 2. 3, cf. id. iv. 3. 3.

78. 4 οὐδὲ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν: cf. *οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐλεῶν ὅτι ἐλεεῖ γινώσκειν ὀφείλει* Clem. Alex. *Strom.*, p. 627, thinking, no doubt, of *μὴ γνώτω ἡ ἀριστερά σου St. Matt.* 6. 3.

78. 5–6 μηδὲν ἄλλο προσεπιζητούσῃ: cf. *τί ἔτι ζητεῖς τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα;* p. **144. 22**; *σὺ δὲ ζητεῖς ἔπαθλον ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια πράττειν;* Epict. iii. 24. 51.

§ 2: 78. 7 μέλισσα μέλι ποιήσασα: the lesson from insects as at p. **74. 7**; cf. 'sic vos non vobis mellificatis apes' Virg. ap. *V. Virg.*, app. p. 31, Brummer; where, as here, there is repetition of examples.

78. 8 οὐκ ἐπίσταται, the correction relies upon: *οὐδὲ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν* l. 4; so 'quam dulce . . . si dedisse, dum dat, oblitus est' Sen. *De Ben.* ii. 6. 2.

The MSS. confuse *ἐπισπᾶται* and *ἐπίσταται* at Arist. *S.E.* 169^{a}33; Galen, v. 853.

μεταβαίνει ἐφ' ἕτερον: cf. pp. **98. 11**, **248. 6**.

78. 10 ἀπαρακολουθήτως, used at p. **32. 8** of action which has no aim or purpose. Here, with the qualification *τρόπον τινά*, it

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describes *spontaneous* activity of plant life and subconscious movements of animals; it is what Arist. expresses by the adv. in *ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτομάτως δοκούντων γίνεσθαι P. An.* 640ª27.

78. 10–11 "ναί· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεῖ παρακολουθεῖν": the dialogue resembles: '"Volo", inquis, "sciat." Debitorem quaeris. "Volo utique sciat." Quid, si illi utilius est nescire . . . non in aliam partem abibis? "Volo sciat." . . . alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam' Sen. *De Ben.* ii. 10. 3.

Ch. 7: 78. 18 Εὐχὴ Ἀθηναίων: an incantation used perhaps in connexion with *Γῆς ἄγαλμα ἱκετευούσης ὅσαί οἱ τὸν Δία* Paus. i. 24. 3.

78. 23 ἁπλῶς, *generally*, i.e. without limiting the petition to a special request or to oneself; cf. *καὶ ηὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἁπλῶς τἀγαθὰ διδόναι . . . τοὺς δ' εὐχομένους χρυσίον . . . ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὔχεσθαι ἢ εἰ κυβείαν . . . εὔχοιντο* Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 2.

ἐλευθέρως, i.e. not as a slave nor as one trafficking with the gods. I. Cas., ad Pers. ii. 3, understood M. to mean an *oratio liberalis*, as opp. to 'prece poscis emaci', and compared the *ἐμπορική* of Pl. *Euthphr.* 14e. This interpretation limits M.'s meaning unduly. Cas. also proposed *ἐλευθερίως*, but even in Attic *ἐλευθέρως* is used for *liberaliter*, see, e.g., *ἐλεύθεροι ἐλευθέρως* Pl. *Lg.* 919e. Moreover Epict. never uses *ἐλευθέριος*, M. only twice, i.e. p. **42.** 14 P, p. **146.** 19 A, and in each case the other MSS. or MS. have the form in *-ος*.

Ch. 8: 78. 24 συνέταξεν ὁ Ἀσκληπιός. Galen told M. that he had been warned by the god of medicine, in a dream, not to accompany the emperor to the Danube front: *τἀναντία κελεύειν τὸν πάτριον θεὸν Ἀσκληπιόν* xix. 18.

78. 28 ἔταξε τούτῳ τοῦτο ὡς κατάλληλον εἰς ὑγίειαν: see Lofft's supplement at p. **80.** 1.

Epict. similarly uses *κατάλληλον* as a synonym of *καθῆκον, οἰκεῖον*, and *πρέπον*, e.g. *τὸ πρέπον καὶ κατάλληλον* i. 25. 14.

80. 2 εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην: *εἰς* is preferable to *πρός*, cf. p. **158.** 10.

The argument is that what is congruent to the whole is congruent to the part; this is further illustrated by the analogy from medicine which follows.

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§ 2: 80. 2 οὕτως γὰρ καὶ συμβαίνειν αὐτὰ ἡμῖν: he is etymologizing on the verb, as Pl. does in an argument from medicine: *ἀγνοῶν ὅπῃ τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ συμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως Lg.* 903d.

80. 4–5 συναρμόζοντας ἀλλήλοις τῇ ποιᾷ συνθέσει. Arist. compares *ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις* in the building process with the completed temple, *E.N.* 1174ª23. The image is also used in a rhetorical treatise of the 'bonding' of the members in a period: *οὐκ ἔχουσι σύνδεσιν οὐδ' ἀντέρεισιν . . . ἔοικε γοῦν τὰ μὲν περιοδικὰ κῶλα τοῖς λίθοις κτλ.* Demetr. *Eloc.* 12.

80. 5 ἁρμονία ἐστὶ μία. Heraclit. likens the hidden *structure* of the universe to the composite bow: *ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείσσων* 54 D., 47 B. M. has said *συντέτακται συνηρμοσμένως τὰ ὄντα* p. **68.** 14; here he regards the Whole as a system of material bodies (cf. Pl. *Phlb.* 29e) and of connected causes, which compose *ἡ εἱμαρμένη*; cf. 'cum Fatum nihil aliud sit quam series inplexa causarum' Sen. *De Ben.* iv. 7. 2.

§ 3: 80. 8–9 τοῦτο ἔφερεν αὐτῷ, like *φιλεῖ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι* p. **202.** 19, an appeal to the evidence of language. The usage resembles: *τὸ φέρον ἐκ θεοῦ καλῶς* Soph. *O.C.* 1693; 'quod fors feret, feremus' Ter. *Phorm.* i. 2. 138. Plu. has: *ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν . . . ἡ φ. ἤνεγκεν ἡμῖν De Fort.* 98b, and M. often inserts *ἡ φύσις* as subject, e.g. pp. **162.** 14, **202.** 15.

80. 11 τραχέα, rigours inflicted to promote bodily recovery, a favourite paradox in Pl. and elsewhere, cf. *διαπυίσκηται* p. **66.** 22 n. The illustration may be traced to Heraclit. 56b D, 58 B.

§ 4: 80. 12 ἄνυσις καὶ συντέλεια: cf. *οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ συμβάλλεται* Pl. *Lg.* 905b.

80. 12–13 τῶν τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δοκούντων: the meaning shifts from 'should *appear* to you' to 'should be your good pleasure', as it is Nature's pleasure, and thence to *οἷον* (sc. *δοκεῖ*) *ἡ σὴ ὑγίεια*, i.e. 'as the conditions of your well-being are seen to be'.

80. 14 διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖσε ἄγειν: Leop. has *ἐκεῖ σε*, without remark, and Dr. Rendall prefers that division. The sense is that you accept your portion because it conduces to the good of the universe; cf. *εὖ δέ πως ἀναστρέφει | ἐκεῖσε κἀκεῖσ' ἀναφέρων*, of Fortune's

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disposal of man's days, Eur. *Hel.* 712 (extracted at Stob. *Ecl.* i. 91).

80. 16–17 ἡ τυχοῦσα φύσις: cf. *εἰλήφθω τυχὸν σημεῖον*, 'take *any* point', Eucl. *Elem.* vi. 9. He means by *φύσις* the natural principle governing the life-history of any plant or animal in its sub-conscious activity; cf. *ὑπὸ μὲν ψυχῆς θ' ἅμα καὶ φύσεως τὰ ζῷα διοικεῖσθαί φαμεν, ὑπὸ δὲ φύσεως μόνης τὰ φυτά* Galen, ii. 2; see also *πᾶσα φύσις* p. **148.** 14, and p. **192.** 10, where your *nature* is regarded as governed in the first instance by bare natural principle.

§ 5: 80. 18 στέργειν χρὴ τὸ συμβαῖνόν σοι. Leibniz remarks: 'ce précepte n'est pas le plus raisonnable de ceux de ce grand Empereur' *Théod.* ii. 217. He contends that an evil for me is none the less an evil because it is necessary or because it is for the good of my lord and master unless 'il rejaillit sur moi'. That he used Gat.'s version is shown by the curt dictum: 'un *diligas oportet* (*στέργειν χρή*) ne vaut rien.'

The principal fault, however, which he detects is in the doctrine of ll. 21–2. The Stoics fancied that the good of the Universe could please God, because they conceived Him to be *anima mundi*. But He is *intellegentia supramundana*; He acts to do good, not to receive good. His felicity is eternally perfect, it can receive no addition from within or from without.

Gat. says: 'hoc inter Stoicorum non *παράδοξα* tantum sed *παράλογα* etiam merito reputes', adding however that a Christian may hold that human ills conduce to illustrate God's glory, and that the Apostles thus urge His servants to endure ills with fortitude, equanimity, and alacrity. The reader will observe that M. says *τὸ συμβαῖνον*, not *τὸ κακόν*. If he kisses the rod, the reason is that he regards it as a good; he could say: 'il rejaillit sur moi'; cf. pp. **98. 14, 194.** 4.

80. 19 πρὸς σέ πως εἶχεν. Fournier points out that *πρός τί πως ἔχειν* is the Stoic term for the *γένος* of *relation*, so that *πως* is, he thinks, a constituent of the phrase, not a modification. See, however, *τέτακταί πως αὐτῷ* l. 1, and *τρόπον τινά* l. 25.

80. 20 ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων αἰτίων. M. uses *ἄνωθεν* primarily, in its logical sense, *a priori*, cf. p. **224.** 8, and, similarly, *τῶν πρεσβυτάτων αἰτίων* are the ultimate grounds, the august causes,

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of reality. They are also 'most ancient', since the creation of the world, or its maintenance, involves for human understanding a time series, cf. *ὁρμῇ τινι ἀρχαίᾳ τῆς προνοίας* p. **172.** 2. Lucan has put this temporal view in: 'at simul a prima descendit origine mundi | causarum series' vi. 611.

80. 20 **συγκλωθόμενον:** cf. *τοῦτό σοι ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατεσκευάζετο καὶ ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν αἰτίων συνέκλωθε τὴν σὴν ὑπόστασιν* p. **192.** 26.

80. 22 **τῆς συμμονῆς αὐτῆς:** cf. *ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τοῦ τελείου ζῴου* p. **192.** 5 n.

καὶ τὸ ἰδίᾳ εἰς ἕκαστον ἥκον, the only considerable phrase which the X excerpts alone have preserved. The lacuna was not noticed by the early editors, as *τὸ συμβαῖνον ἑκάστῳ* was understood from ll. 1 and 18. The importance to the Whole even of the least part or member (a necessary consequence of the pantheistic *ἕνωσις*) is not again stated so clearly; cf. p. **112.** 13.

ἥκον: cf. *παρὰ θεοῦ ἥκει* p. **46.** 8; it conveys a suggestion of destiny: *ὡς αὐτὸν ἥξοι* (MSS.) *μοῖρα πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν* Soph. *O.T.* 713; *καλῶς μὲν αὐτοῖς κατθανεῖν ἥκον βίου* Eur. *Alc.* 291.

80. 23–4 **τῆς συναφείας καὶ συνεχείας:** cf. *συνάφεια εὔλογος* p. **68.** 14. The *bonding* of the Whole is called *ἁρμονία μία* l. 5, cf. *τὴν ἐπισύνδεσιν* p. **112.** 13, *ἡ σύνδεσις ἱερά* p. **122.** 24. The difficulty of reconciling *ἡ εἱμαρμένη*, l. 7, the necessary causal connexion of Nature, with 'in nobis consilii iudiciique nostri arbitrium' was recognized by the Stoics, see, e.g., the condensed statement in A. Gell. *N.A.* vii (vi) 2, where we read that Chrysippus held: 'quamquam ita sit ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque conexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas' ib. 7. M. is content to state the two extremes.

80. 24–5 **διακόπτεις . . . ἀναιρεῖς:** cf. *ἀπέρριψαί πού ποτε ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἑνώσεως* p. **156.** 26; "omnia fata laborant | si quicquam mutare velis' Lucan. vi. 612; imitated by Pope:

> From Nature's chain, whatever link you strike,
> Tenth or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.
>
> *Essay on Man*, i. 245.

Ch. 9: 82. 1 **Μὴ σικχαίνειν,** a met. from revulsion to food: *ὡς οἱ κακοστόμαχοι πρός τι βρωμάτιον, ὃ μετὰ μικρὸν σικχαίνειν μέλλου-*

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σιν Epict. iv. 8. 34. Both this image and that from the jaundiced vision are elaborated at p. **210.** 16.

μηδὲ ἀποδυσπετεῖν: cf. p. **64.** 19; *ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀποδυσπετοῦσιν οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι* Arist. *Top.* 163^{b}19; the word expresses intellectual impatience, an inferiority arising from a sense of *ἀφυΐα*, p. **76.** 17.

82. 1–2 **εἰ μὴ καταπυκνοῦταί σοι,** borrowed from Epicurean language about pleasure, e.g. *εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονή* D.L. **x.** 142, *K.Δ.* ix (see Dr. Bailey, *Epicurus*, p. 353). The word is used technically by Arist. and Aristoxenus, and we cannot recover its popular sense; perhaps the modern *to implement* is an equivalent, 'to carry out to detailed completion'; M. may mean 'if you do not *embrace* conduct', see Alciphron, iii. 55. 8.

82. 3 **ἐκκρουσθέντα πάλιν ἐπανιέναι,** originally a met. from the *ring*, see Heindorf on Pl. *Prt.* 336c and *σφάλλει* l. 10; *πέπτωκε τὸ παιδίον· ἀναστάς, φησί, πάλιν πάλαιε* Epict. iv. 9. 15; here the return is to philosophy: *τῷ συνεχῶς εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπανέρχεσθαι . . . ὧδε πολλάκις ἐπάνιθι* p. **100.** 1.

82. 4–5 **πρὸς παιδαγωγόν:** cf. p. **212.** 4; 'Paeto Thraseae tristior et paedagogi vultus' Suet. *Nero* 37.

82. 5 **ὡς οἱ ὀφθαλμιῶντες,** a natural and familiar illustration: 'non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus, | non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus inungi' Hor. *Ep.* i. 1. 28.

82. 6 **σπογγάριον,** either *penicillum* or an application, douche, Alex. Trall. 2.

82. 6–7 **ὡς ἄλλος πρὸς κατάπλασμα, ὡς πρὸς καταιόνησιν.** Dr. Rendall calls these 'disjointed intruders', cf. however: *καταπλάττων καὶ καταιονῶν* Dio Chrys. lxxvii. 11, p. 417, *τὰ γοῦν φλεγμαίνοντα τῶν σωμάτων οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐνέδωκε πρὸς τὴν πρώτην καταιόνησιν. . . . οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πολλῶν φλεγμονὴν ἀγαπητὸν εἴ τις δύναιτο πραῦναι διηνεκῶς τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος* id. xvii. 6, p. 464.

82. 7 **οὐδὲν ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ πειθαρχεῖν:** the difficulties that have been felt about this expression arise from the fact that, if we translate 'you will not make a parade of obedience', cf. pp. **6.** 3, **88.** 6, the statement seems inconsecutive and hardly agreeable with 'rather you will find repose in it'. I have adopted Couat's interpretation, taking *οὐδέν* to be equivalent to *οὐδὲν μέγα*, and

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the verb to be used as in *ἐπεδείκνυτο . . . ὅτι* X. *An.* i. 9. 10. M. is summing up all that goes before, not merely the similes of the schoolboy and the patient: 'if you do and feel as I say, life according to Reason will be no burden, nay rather a rest to the spirit'.

82. 8 **προσαναπαύσῃ αὐτῷ:** cf. pp. **64.** 1 n., **100.** 6.

82. 8–9 **μόνα, ἃ θέλει:** this slight change of order is made in view of the MSS. variations. For the identification of the wills of the indiv. and of the Universe, cf. pp. **90.** 14, **92.** 15, **100.** 1.

82. 9 **ἄλλο ἤθελες οὐ κατὰ φύσιν.** Gat. suggested *ἢ κατὰ φ.*, Reiske *ἄλλα ἤθελες οὐ τὰ κατὰ φ.*, Schultz *οὐ τὸ κατὰ φ.* If a change is expedient, *ἄλλο ἤθελες τοῦ κατὰ φ.* seems simplest.

82. 9–10 **τί γὰρ τούτων προσηνέστερον;** Once more the connexion has been found difficult. M. continues from l. 8, and insists that reasonable conduct is more than a relief from a burden and a refreshment, it is actually a sweetness. The reference of *τούτων* is to *μόνα, ἃ θέλει ἡ φύσις σου*, that is to what philosophy, speaking for Nature, wills. There is *ἁρμονία* between the two wills p. **100.** 1, and *ὃ δὲ κατὰ φ. ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο . . . προσηνέστερον* p. **150.** 16.

He uses an adj. which is frequent in Epicur., e.g. *τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα καὶ "λεῖα καὶ προσηνῆ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός", ὡς αὐτοί φασιν οὗτοι* Plu. *Adv. Colot.* 1122e, cf. *An seni* 786c, cited at p. **90.** 17, and this leads him to remark that Pleasure, the Epicurean end, trips our steps by reason of just this sweetness, cf. *πρόσεχε, μὴ ἡττήσῃ σε τὸ προσηνὲς αὐτοῦ . . . καὶ ἐπαγωγόν* Epict. *Ench.* 34.

Dr. Rendall, Mr. Jackson, and Mr. Haines make *τί γὰρ . . .*; the reply of the appetitive self, 'What is more agreeable than what you call *οὐ κατὰ φ.*?' and the following words are then M.'s answer: 'Isn't this the way that Pleasure ensnares us?' This involves a change of *ἄλλο* to *ἄλλα* or of *τούτων* to *τούτου*, and gives a strained sense to the second question.

82. 12 **εὐγνωμοσύνη:** the adj. means *kind* at p. **94.** 4, and at p. **156.** 19 *good-tempered*; in Dio Chrys. iii. 39, p. 112, it is a royal quality: *εὐγνώμων καὶ φιλάνθρωπος*. Here a relation to our neighbour is put next to *ὁσιότης*, right relation to the gods, a

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virtue with which M. usually pairs δικαιοσύνη, e.g. at pp. **56.** 23, **230.** 4. We may compare: καὶ δικαιοσύνην διατηρῶν καὶ ἔλεος *Ex.* xxxiv. 7, where ἔλεος represents the Heb. word for *kindness*.

φρονήσεως, this word, so familiar from the moral systems of Pl. and Arist., occurs in this Book only. At p. **84.** 12 it is one of the four cardinal virtues which the Stoics took over from their predecessors, Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 60. Here M. employs it for the elevated understanding, ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, Stob. ib. p. 59, which is the fountain from which the five virtues just enumerated flow.

82. 13 **τὸ ἄπταιστον καὶ εὔρουν**, an expression which is reminiscent of Pl. *Test.* The meaning is related to the Epicurean notion of smooth and broken currents in the organism, p. **52.** 6, cf. Plu. cited at l. 9–10 n.

παρακολουθητικῆς, of understanding which obeys, and adapts itself to, the dispensation of Nature, p. **34.** 14 n.

Ch. 10: 82. 15 **Τὰ μὲν πράγματα:** cf. ἡ σύνεσις τῶν πραγμάτων p. **34.** 4 n. Ultimate 'reals' are here opp. to τὰ ὑποκείμενα l. 19.

ἐγκαλύψει, met., as in our expression 'behind the veil', of what is visible to the inward eye, p. **204.** 17. The word is used of investiture by the body, which is the envelope or veil of the soul, τὴν τῆς ψ. ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐγκ. Plu. *Qu. Rom.* 266e; 'hoc quoque natura ut quamdam vestem animo circumdedit; velamentum eius est' Sen. *Ep.* 92. 13.

82. 17 **ἀκατάληπτα**, a ref. to the 'suspense of judgement' of the New Academy, περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφήναντο . . . καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδημαϊκοί S. Emp. *Pyrrh.* i. 3. M. does not return again to this doctrine, which is criticized with vigorous common sense in Epict. i. 5 and ii. 20.

82. 18 **συγκατάθεσις:** a technical term for *assent*, expressed by a judgement duly formed upon the data of experience. Epict. makes an Academic professor say: συγκατάθεσθε ὅτι οὐδεὶς συγκατατίθεται, using a familiar method of reducing such an opponent to self-contradiction, ii. 20. 5.

μεταπτώτη. A striking self-revelation, since M., on many large questions, is accustomed to adopt an attitude of suspense. His school was *par excellence* dogmatic, believing in ἐπιστήμη as

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κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 73.

82. 19 **αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα,** opp. to *τὰ πράγματα,* ultimate realities, l. 15, as *τὰ ὑπάρχοντα* are to *τὰ ὄντα* p. **170.** 5. The usage may be compared with that in the Stoics' theory of the proposition where the sound-symbol *Δίων* is distinguished from *τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον,* i.e. the man himself, Dion, who is the subject of the properties assigned in the predicate, Sex. Emp. *Math.* viii. 12. Epicurus speaks of *ὅσα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ζητοῦμεν* D.L. x. 72, where Dr. Bailey explains *ὑποκείμενον* as 'the actual thing, which is the cause of sensation and from which the *εἴδωλα* &c., which stir our senses are derived'. See *τὰ προσυφεστῶτα* p. **88.** 12.

82. 19–20 **ὀλιγοχρόνια καὶ εὐτελῆ:** cf. *συνήθη καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνια* p. **120.** 17, *ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ εὐτελῆ* p. **70.** 17.

82. 20 **ἐν κτήσει κιναίδου:** therefore not real goods, 'quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est' Sen. *Ep.* 87. 15.

82. 21 **τὰ τῶν συμβιούντων ἤθη:** there is the same transition, from the objects of experience to the characters of the men we leave, at p. **174.** 2, where M. uses the reflection to console himself at death's approach.

82. 21–2 **καὶ τοῦ χαριεστάτου:** cf. *τοῦ σπουδαίου* p. **212.** 6, *τοὺς φρονίμους* p. **66.** 16. In view of the rest of the sentence, it is clearly the objective genitive.

§ 2: 82. 23 **ζόφῳ καὶ ῥύπῳ:** cf. *τὸν δὲ ἐντὸς εὐρῶτα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ζόφον* Plu. *De rect. rat.* 48d; *τὸν ῥύπον τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου* p. **134.** 20. Galen, writing in the spirit of M.'s own words at p. **36.** 3, says that we can detect the *νοῦς ἐνοικῶν* even in the *βόρβορος σαρκῶν* iv. 360, cf. p. **38.** 2.

τοσαύτῃ ῥύσει: cf. *ἐν διηνεκεῖ ῥύσει* p. **90.** 5; *τὸν δὲ Ἡράκλειτον ὀξείᾳ ποταμοῦ ῥύσει τὴν εὐκινησίαν τῆς ὑμετέρας ὕλης ἀπεικάζειν* S. Emp. *Pyrrh.* iii. 115.

82. 26–7 **περιμένειν τὴν φυσικὴν λύσιν:** cf. *περιμένειν ἵλεων τὴν εἴτε σβέσιν εἴτε μετάστασιν* p. **94.** 18. *τὴν φ. λύσιν,* cf. *ἡ φ. δόσις* p. **58.** 8, means the *λόσις* granted by Nature. The words are usually taken here to mean *dissolution,* but that sense requires the addition of *των στοιχείων* (e.g. p. **32.** 23) or the clear implication

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of them, p. **244.** 24. Here, therefore, it is equivalent to *ἀπαλλαγή* p. **174.** 6, a release from these present ills, cf. *ὅταν ἐκεῖνος . . . ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας* Epict. i. 9. 16; *ὁ ἀπολύων ἴλεως* p. **250.** 17, *ἀλλὰ νῦν διαλύει* p. **212.** 17.

82. 27 **μὴ ἀσχάλλειν τῇ διατριβῇ:** rather than to chafe, he is to be at rest (*προσαναπαύεσθαι* is taken up from l. 8), to enjoy a smooth current, cf. *οὐδὲ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀσχάλλοντες· πότε γὰρ εὕροια πραγμάτων μείζων;* Polyb. xi. 29. 1.

84. 2 **ἔξεστί μοι.** M. now adds to the first of the two consolations of p. **80.** 18, an expression of the freedom of man's spirit, a cardinal point in his creed as it is a conviction often emphasized by Epict., see p. **234.** 5 and *Test.* there.

84. 3–4 **τοῦτον παραβῆναι:** for the use of the verb with a personal object cf. *τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες τάδε ἀναπίμπλαμεν;* Hdt. vi. 12. 3.

Ch. 11: 84. 5 **Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα νῦν χρῶμαι;** A formula repeated at p. **204.** 4, see note there.

84. 6 **ἐπανερωτᾶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐξετάζειν,** the duty of self-examination was one of Socr.'s principal lessons, Pl. *Ap.* 38a; cf. pp. **42.** 4 n., **146.** 21, **212.** 22.

84. 7 **δ δὴ ἡγεμονικὸν καλοῦσι,** ironically, for it has ceased to rule, like the head of the snake in the Fable, *τὸ φρονοῦν δ' ἐνικήθη | τῷ μὴ φρονοῦντι* Babrius, 134. 8.

84. 9 **μήτι κτήνους; μήτι θηρίου;** cf. *τεθηρίωσαι . . . συναγελάζῃ, βόσκῃ;* p. **186.** 12; *οὐδὲ πρόβατον ἢ ὄνος, ἀλλά τί ποτε ἄγριον θηρίον* Epict. iv. 5. 21.

Ch. 12: 84. 13 **τό· "ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν":** see *Test.* and cf. the story of Diogenes' spitting in a rich host's face: *μόνον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτὸν κατάπτυστον εἶναι* Galen, i. 20.

84. 16–17 **καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ φαντάζονται τὴν διαφοράν:** cf. *πάμπολλοι καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας* Pl. *Lg.* 950c.

84. 22 **"οὐκ ἔχειν ὅποι χέσῃ",** a proverbial saying which may have been originally a parody of: *γέμω κακῶν δή, κοὐκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅποι τεθῇ* Eur. *H.F.* 1245, upon which Longinus remarks: *σφόδρα δημῶδες τὸ λεγόμενον De Subl.* 40.

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Ch. 13: 84. 23 Ἐξ αἰτιώδους καὶ ὑλικοῦ: cf. p. **60.** 10 n. So far as the *ψυχή* is regarded as the causal element, its *μεταβολή* is discussed at p. **58.** 22. M. is, however, here thinking of that which in the individual is the active element, corresponding to *Ζεύς* or *λόγος* in the Universe, p. **86.** 3.

84. 23–4 εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν: cf. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἔρχεται* p. **54.** 8 n.

84. 27 κἀγὼ ὑπέστην: the self is regarded as *τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν* in union with a continually changing material body, p. **196.** 9. It results from the generative activity of the father, and the *αὐξητικὴ δύναμις* of the mother p. **204.** 13; the explanation M. leaves as a *φύσεως μυστήριον* p. **54.** 11.

86. 1 κατὰ περιόδους πεπερασμένας. M. reserves judgement on this hypothesis, which the Stoic teachers held to be an open question, cf. p. **196.** 4. The view generally adopted is stated at p. **214.** 13. If there is a periodic palingenesis, then, according to Stoic principles, the whole history of the world and its persons is repeated; if you accept this view, M. says, *ἀλλοῖον ζῷον ἔσῃ* p. **168.** 17; he does not entertain the Pythagorean view of a renewed life of the individual, see p. **238.** 18.

Ch. 14: 86. 3 Ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ λογικὴ τέχνη. *ὁ λόγος* was represented at p. **52.** 25 as dependent upon *τὸ νοερόν*, the source of our reasonable life and, as such, prescribing the general law of human society. Here this practical reason, and its expression, the systematic art defining rules of conduct, is considered to be self-originative and self-determined, i.e. it lays down for itself acts to be done out of pure regard for the law of duty, *κατορθώματα* as the Stoics named them, *κατορθώσεις* as M. calls them, l. 5.

ἑαυταῖς ἀρκούμεναι, almost 'self-determined'. He returns to this at pp. **96.** 4, **148.** 21, and, in detail, at p. **214.** 4. He summarized the four cardinal virtues as *τὸ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ τὴν διάνοιάν σου* p. **40.** 22 n.

86. 4–5 ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς, this appropriate principle is the law of duty, especially of social duty, which dictates the end, and so determines the right path of human endeavour: *τὸ ἐν τῇ δικαϊκῇ διαθέσει καὶ πράξει ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν* p. **96.** 4 n. Cf. *τίς οὖν ψυχὴ ἔντεχνος; . . . ἡ εἰδυῖα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος* p. **94.** 6.

86. 5 ὁδεύουσι: cf. *ὁ νοῦς . . . φέρεται κατ' εὐθὺ . . . ἐπὶ τὸ προκεί-*

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μενον p. **168.** 20. Here M. uses *ὀδεύουσι* to introduce the figure of the *right* or *direct* path, l. 6, and the etymological play upon *rectitude*. Usually, as we have seen, by *ὀρθός* he means *erect, upright*. The simile of the direct path seems to be derived from the Pythagoreans, Persius iii. 56.

κατορθώσεις, a word used nowhere else in M., cf. 'recta effectio, *κατόρθωσιν* enim ita appello, quoniam rectum factum *κατόρθωμα*' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 45.

Ch. 15: 86. 7 **τηρητέον ἀνθρώπῳ,** this reading appears preferable to *ῥητέον ἀνθρώπου* P, in view of *παρατηρητέον τί ἐπιζητεῖ σου ἡ ὡς ζῴου φ.* p. **192.** 12.

86. 11–12 **τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους, τὸ ἀγαθόν:** cf. *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τέλος* l. 25; *μήθ' ὑγίειαν . . . ἡγουμένους αἱρετά . . . μηδὲ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς κατὰ φ. τελειότητος* Plu. *De comm. not.* 1060c.

86. 12–13 **τὸ ὑπερφρονεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ κατεξανίστασθαι:** so *ἐγκράτεια* is *κατεξαναστατικὴ ἡδονῆς* p. **160.** 6. A mark of a high-minded character is: 'ea, quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere' Cic. *Off.* i. 67. That the argument which M. employs was familiar, is shown by the use of it as an illustration by Longinus: *οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει μέγα οὗ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐστι μέγα, οἷον πλοῦτοι, τιμαί, δόξαι De Subl.* 7. 1.

86. 14–15 **ὁ ἐλαττωτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἔν τινι:** cf. *ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος . . . ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός* Arist. *E.N.* 1138^{a}1; *ὁ δίκαιος οἷον ἐλαττωτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ τῶν κατὰ σῶμα* Porphy. *De Abst.* iii. 26 fin.

86. 16 **τούτων ἢ τοιούτων ἑτέρων:** something is wrong in the tradition, not only because *ἤ* disturbs the balance of *ἀφαιρῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ καὶ ἀφαιρούμενος,* but also because *τοιούτων ἑτέρων* adds nothing to *τούτων* which already embraces the objects referred to at *ἀπροσδεῆ τούτων* l. 14, and at *ἔν τινι τούτων* l. 15. Unfortunately A has missed a line here (apparently through homoeoteleuton), and Xyl. omits just what A has omitted.

86. 17–18 **μᾶλλον ἀγαθός ἐστιν:** *μ.* to balance *πλείω.* He may also be tacitly criticizing Arist.'s *ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ . . . πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον . . . τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ E.N.* 1136^{b}21, which treats 'good' as if it were material of gain and loss. M.'s point of view is like

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Porphyry's: *αὔξεται γὰρ . . . τὸ ἐντὸς ἀγαθόν, τουτέστιν ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ὁμοίωσις De Abst.* iii. 26.

Ch. 16: 86. 19 τοιαύτη σοι ἔσται ἡ διάνοια: one of M.'s most familiar lessons (common to him and Epict.) is that the character of the moral consciousness is the resultant of its habitual imaginations: *ὁ οὖν λόγος . . . τί ἐστι; σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν* Epict. i. 20. 5; *εἶθ' ὅταν σε ἡ φαντασία δάκνῃ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί), ἀναμάχου τῷ λόγῳ, καταγωνίζου αὐτήν, μὴ ἐάσῃς ἐνισχύειν μηδὲ προάγειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀναπλάσσουσαν ὅσα θέλει καὶ ὡς θέλει,* i.e., you are to prevent one *φαντασία* exciting its consequent train, id. iii. 24. 108.

86. 20 βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχή: cf. *μὴ βαφῇς* p. **108.** 17. The mind, like the dyer's hand, is coloured by what it works in; a vigorous image, original to M., unless it was suggested by *τηνικαῦτ' αὐτὸς βέβαπται βάμμα Κυζικηνικόν* Aristoph. *Pax* 1176 or some similar proverbial saying.

The usual image is that of a die or seal: *ὁ δέ τις ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τύπωσιν τὴν ἐγγινομένην τῇ ψυχῇ, ὧν ἂν αἱρήσηται, χαρακτηρίζεται* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 632. Epict. suggests (l.c. in the last note) that the *φ.* bites into the surface like venom; for this image see p. **210.** 3, *Test.*

86. 22 ἐν αὐλῇ δὲ ζῆν ἐστιν, i.e. in the *praetorium*, cf. *ἐς τὴν βασίλειον ἐπανῆλθεν αὐλήν,* of Commodus at Sirmium, Hdn. i. 5. 8. Julian writes: *σύνεσμεν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις οὐ μετὰ τῆς αὐλικῆς ὑποκρίσεως* p. 381b. M. thus controverts the famous saying: 'exeat aula | qui volet esse pius' Lucan. viii. 493.

86. 23–5 οὗπερ ἕνεκεν ἕκαστον . . . ἐν τούτῳ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ. Accepting Gat.'s supplement, the argument is a characteristic sorites, whereas Sch.'s *πρὸς ὅ τε κατεσκεύασται, πρὸς τοῦτο φέρεται* destroys the logical form.

At first sight it looks as if the argument were circular, i.e. that *οὗπερ ἕνεκεν* were equivalent to *τὸ τέλος.* M., however, uses *οὗπερ ἕνεκεν* and *ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν* to mean 'for the sake of which', 'in the interest of one another'. Familiarity with Arist. easily leads the reader to misinterpret *οὗ ἕνεκεν,* yet Arist. has himself distinguished the two usages: *τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ . . . πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καὶ*

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καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζώων· οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψ. ὄντα, i.e. as being *in the interest of ἡ ψυχή*, *De An.* 415^{b}2 and 18.

Formally, the conclusion of the sorites is that the advantage and good of each creature is that in the interest of which it was created. This combined with the premiss that we were created in the interest of fellowship gives the conclusion that our (advantage and) good is fellowship.

86. 26 **τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν:** cf. *κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ συμφέρον* p. **42.** 15 n., where the identity of *utile* and *honestum* is assumed.

86. 27–8 **πάλαι δέδεικται,** this appears, at first sight, to be a reference to an earlier place, like Arist.'s references to *τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα, τὸν πάλαι λόγον*, but pp. **20.** 9, **40.** 5, **50.** 22, **54.** 1, though cognate, are not specific enough to be intended. M. means the proof from the *Scala Naturae*, which first appears at p. **92.** 17, cf. pp. **138.** 10, **168.** 19, **170.** 1, **224.** 6. He means then 'have been proved long ago', whether by Arist., from whom the Stoics derived the doctrine, or by the earlier Stoics. The fullest statement of the position is given at p. **174.** 23 sq.

Ch. 17: 88. 3 **μανικόν:** the sentiment is severely compressed, but is equivalent to *τὸ ἀξιοῦν μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς φαύλους μανικόν· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ἐφίεται* p. **228.** 6; cf. p. **54.** 15 where for *τοιαῦτά τινα* l. 4 we have *ταῦτα οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.* Sim. pp. **92.** 3, **188.** 15, **242.** 6, and *πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι;* Epict. ii. 20. 18.

Ch. 18: 88. 5 **ὃ οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνο πέφυκε φέρειν.** The precise text is doubtful; I take *ἐκεῖνο* to add point to the contrast with *ἄλλῳ*. The sense is like: *συμβαίνει ὡς πέφυκας αὐτὸ φέρειν* p. **192.** 17, *οὐ γὰρ ἀφόρητόν σοι ἔφερεν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις* p. **162.** 14.

88. 6 **ἀγνοῶν ὅτι συμβέβηκεν:** entire ignorance is hardly to the point, so that M. perhaps means that the man does not *realize* the evil, as Epict., in his ch. *περὶ ἀφοβίας* (iv. 7), says that a child does not feel alarm at the tyrant's body-guard; cf. *ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες* Arist. *E.N.* 1117^{a}22. In the same ch. of Epict. the man who approaches the tyrant and challenges death is like M.'s *ἐπιδεικνύμενος μεγαλοφροσύνην* l. 6, where there may be a suggestion of parade.

88. 7 **εὐσταθεῖ:** cf. *εὐσταθῶ καὶ θαρρῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι* p. **98.** 24. Epict.

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is fond of the word: *τοῦ εὐσταθεῖν, τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, τοῦ μὴ ταράττεσθαι* iii. 9. 17; *εὐσταθεῖ, εὐροεῖ*, iv. 1. 46; cf. *εὐροεῖν, εὐοδεῖν* pp. **96.** 1, **148.** 14.

88. 8 **ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀρέσκειαν:** we are unprepared for the second word, expecting a correlate to *μεγαλοφροσύνην*. Perhaps the word M. wrote was *αὐθάδειαν*, the attitude of Socr. when he insisted, as it seemed to his judges, on courting death, *αὐθαδιζόμενος*, Pl. *Ap.* 34d.

φρονήσεως, opp. to *ἄγνοιαν*, so that we expect *καὶ ἐλευθερίας* or some similar word to complete the antithesis, and to satisfy the rhythm of the sentence.

Ch. 19: 88. 9 **Τὰ πράγματα αὐτά:** cf. *τὰ πράγματα οὐχ ἅπτεται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἔξω ἕστηκεν* p. **52.** 19; about *τὰ ἀδιάφορα* M. says: *τὰ μὲν ἀτρεμεῖ, ἡμεῖς δέ ἐσμεν οἱ τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν κρίσεις γεννῶντες* p. **222.** 20.

τὰ πράγματα, at pp. **34.** 4, **82.** 15, stood for the ultimate *realities*, in contrast with objects of sensible experience. Here the word means the objects of experience opp. to the judgements which the mind makes upon them; the common-sense distinction between *things* and *thought* is before the writer, and at l. 12 he defines *τὰ π.* more closely as *τὰ προσυφεστῶτα*, the circumstances submitted to the judgement, cf. *τὰ ὑποκείμενα* p. **82.** 19. From a moral point of view they are *ἀδιάφορα*, l. 15, until a decision is taken upon them; cf. p. **222.** 17.

88. 11 **τρέπει δὲ καὶ κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν μόνη**, the correlate of what was said of things; they are the occasion, not the cause, of the movements of thought; thought is master in its own realm. Self-movement is a characteristic of *ψυχή*, according to Pl. *Lg.* 896a, cf. Arist. *De An.* 404^{a}22. See *μετατίθεσθαι ῥᾳδίως* p. **50.** 2, and pp. **88.** 18, **98.** 13, **200.** 12, **214.** 5.

88. 12 **τὰ προσυφεστῶτα**, a compound of *ὑφεστῶτα*, which is equivalent to *τὰ συμβαίνοντα* (*πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον* p. **98.** 14); cf. *οὐδὲν οἷόν τε κατὰ λόγον διοικεῖσθαι τῶν ὑφεστώτων* Polyb. vi. 14. 5. The scribe of A evidently took the word to be *προϋφεστῶτα*, the *antecedents* to action, cf. *πέφυκε δὲ τὸ δυνατόν, ὡς γένος προϋφεστάναι τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου* Plu. *De Fato* 570f.

Ch. 20: 88. 15 **ἔν τι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων:** the first use in M. of the

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technical term *indifferent*; it was implied at *πάντα ταῦτα ἐπίσης συμβαίνει* p. **26.** 20.

M. adopts the austere doctrine of Aristo Ch.: *πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδ' ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα* ('leaving no distinction open'), *ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα* D.L. vii. 160. It follows necessarily that *τῷ ἐμῷ προαιρετικῷ τὸ τοῦ πλησίον προαιρετικὸν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν* p. **166.** 21.

88. 16 **ἢ ἥλιος ἢ ἄνεμος:** referring to the fable of the Traveller, the Sun and Boreas, Babrius 18, cf. *πεποίηται δὲ καὶ Αἰσώπῳ τῷ μυθοποιῷ ἅμιλλά τις πειθοῦς καὶ βίας, καὶ ἀνύει τι μᾶλλον ἡ πειθὼ τῆς βίας* Themist. xvi, p. 208a.

88. 17–18 **διὰ τὴν ὑπεξαίρεσιν:** cf. p. **50.** 4 n.

88. 19 **εἰς τὸ προηγούμενον:** cf. *πρὸς τὰ ⟨προ⟩ηγούμενα* p. **50.** 4 n.; *ἐφ' οἷς προήχθημεν* p. **118.** 19; *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ παραπιπτούσης ὕλης τὰ προηγούμενα ἐκπονῶν* Epict. i. 4. 20, and the discussion of *τὸ προηγ. ἔργον*, the exercise of the will, opp. to material things, which are, as such, indifferent, id. ii. 5. 4.

Ch. 21: 88. 22 **τὸ κράτιστον,** the thought of the sovereign authority in the Universe as *most powerful* is met with in Heraclit.: *κρατέει γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκέει πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται* 114D. 91 B. Sim. *τοῦτο γὰρ θεὸν καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν εἶναι, κρατεῖν . . . καὶ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι* Arist. *M.X.G.* 977ª28; *κρατεῖ γὰρ ἡ φύσις* p. **176.** 19. The Stoics expressed it thus: *ἕνα λόγον καὶ μίαν πρόνοιαν περιγινομένην ἁπάντων καὶ κρατοῦσαν* Plu. *De Isid.* 369a.

Fundamentally the thought is anthropomorphic, but here and elsewhere M. writes as if he started from the macrocosm and reasoned to the microcosm.

88. 23 **πάντα διέπον:** cf. *οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ* [Arist.] *Mu.* 399ª18, the word is a poetical equivalent to *διοικεῖν* or *οἰκονομεῖν*, pp. **22.** 15, **94.** 8, **98.** 8, **114.** 13.

τῶν ἐν σοὶ τὸ κράτιστον, i.e. *τὸ ἡγ.*; so *τὸ κράτιστον τῶν σεαυτοῦ* is *ἡ ψυχή*, Epict. ii. 12. 22.

88. 24 **τὸ ἐκείνῳ ὁμογενές:** because it springs *ἐκεῖθεν*, from the *λόγος* of the Eternal City, p. **54.** 4; *ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν* Cleanthes, *Hymn.* 4; *τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν* Aratus *Phaen.* 5;

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Acts 17. 28; *συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσμεν κἀκεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν* Epict. i. 9. 13.

88. 24–5 τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρώμενον: cf. *ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκεν κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τούτων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς* Epict. ii. 23. 6.

Ch. 22: 88. 27 τὸν κανόνα, commonly, in Stoic writers, equivalent to *τὸ κριτήριον,* a test used in regard to *φαντασίαι* D.L. vii. 42. Here and at p. **192.** 15 M. uses it to mean a *rule* for guidance, almost a principle, *δόγμα.*

88. 28–90. 1 εἰ δὲ ἡ πόλις βλάπτεται: generally the view taken is that the *πόλις* cannot be injured: *γενικῶς μὲν ἡ κακία οὐδὲν βλάπτει τὸν κόσμον* p. **166.** 18; *καὶ μὴν αὐτόν γε οὐδὲ εἷς οἷός τέ ἐστιν ἀδικῆσαι. τῶν γὰρ παραβαινόντων τὸν νόμον ἕκαστος οὐκ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει* Dio Chrys. lxxv. 5, p. 407. M. then is writing popularly, and asks how we should treat a law-breaker.

90. 1 οὐκ ὀργιστέον . . .: because he who wrongs another acts in ignorance, cf. *ἄκοντες καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες* p. **224.** 15; 'iniuriam . . . potest facere nemo, nisi qui scit se iniuriam facere' Ulpian, *Dig.* xlvii. 10. 3. 2. As Socr. said, the right course for the party wronged is *ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν* Pl. *Ap.* 26a.

⟨ἀλλὰ δεικτέον⟩: Gat.'s supplement has been generally accepted, cf.: *τὸ παρορώμενον δεικνύναι* p. **192.** 24; *τὸ π. δεῖξαι* p. **220.** 25. Certainly the words *εἰ δὲ ἡ πόλις βλάπτεται* appear to continue the preceding sentence, and we expect an alternative rule of conduct.

Sch., followed by M. Trannoy, preserves the MSS. text, making *εἰ δὲ ἡ πόλις . . . τὴν πόλιν;* a question put by an interlocutor, to which the reply of M. is: 'What is being overlooked?' i.e. you forget that you should reason with him and instruct him.

Ch. 23: 90. 4 τῶν ὄντων τε καὶ γινομένων, used, without stress on the strict meaning of *τῶν ὄντων,* for what is called *ἡ οὐσία* in the next sentence, cf. *τὸ τὰ ὄντα μεταβάλλειν* p. **66.** 9.

ἥ τε γὰρ οὐσία οἷον ποταμός: cf. pp. **32.** 12, **68.** 6, **82.** 23.

90. 6 σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ἑστὼς καὶ τὸ πάρεγγυς: literally 'even what is close is hardly stationary'. He seems to be thinking of the appearance of stationariness of near objects, as we are carried past them, compared with what is farther off. St. Augustine

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says: 'aut quis ea conprehendit, vel cum praesto sunt?' *Conf.* iv. 10. 15.

90. 6–7 τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον . . . ἀχανές: see *τὸ χάος* p. **52.** 10 n.

90. 9 ὡς ἔν τινι χρονίῳ: Mr. Marchant's correction *χρονίῳ* removes the chief difficulty of the MSS. text, though possibly we should read *ἐνοχλήσοντι*. M. Trannoy adopts Fournier's *ἐνοχλῆσάν τι*: 'comme si quelque chose lui avait causé un trouble pendant une durée appréciable, et même considérable.'

Ch. 24: 90. 11 διάστημα ἀφώρισται: cf. p. **118.** 11, where the same verb is used of the quantity of matter and time *determined* for you. The word appears to combine the meanings of *marked off* from a whole and *assigned*.

90. 12 ἧς πόστον εἶ μέρος; M. is playing upon the etymology of *τῆς εἱμαρμένης*, cf. *ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας* Pl. *Prt.* 322a. Epict. says that Zeus: *μετὰ τῶν Μοιρῶν παρουσῶν καὶ ἐπικλωθουσῶν σου τὴν γένεσιν ὥρισεν*, adding *ἡλίκον μέρος πρὸς τὰ ὅλα;* i. 12. 26.

Ch. 25: 90. 13 τί εἰς ἐμέ; Gat. divined the correct punctuation which A confirms.

The reflection that, in some circumstances, my neighbour's act is no concern of mine is continued from p. **88.** 14. With the phrase cf. *τί πρὸς σέ; St. John* 21. 22.

ὄψεται, used as at pp. **160.** 15, **220.** 22, **236.** 1; cf. *ὄψονται Ἐφέσιοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν* [Heraclit.] *Epist.* 9; *ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκεῖνος ὄψεται*, of one's brother, Epict. iii. 10. 19; *τί πρὸς ἡμᾶς; σὺ ὄψει*, and *ὑμεῖς ὄψεσθε St. Matt.* 27. 4 and 24; 'ipsi videant' Cic. *R.* vi. 25.

The fut. tense, implying *must*, carries a suggestion of imputed blame, as in St. Paul's: *ἕκαστος γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον φορτίον βαστάσει Gal.* 6. 5.

ἰδίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν: in contrast with *ἡ κοινὴ φύσις* and parallel with *ἡ ἐμὴ φ.* the adj. means more than *τὴν ἑαυτοῦ*, cf. *ἴδιον ἡγ.* p. **76.** 3 n.

90. 14 θέλει νῦν ἔχειν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις: cf. *φιλοσοφία . . . θέλει* p. **82. 8.** M. does not distinguish *θέλειν*, appropriate to Nature's will or to man's decision: from *βούλεσθαι*, see, e.g., l. 25 below.

Ch. 26: 90. 16 κυριεῦον: cf. p. **50.** 1 n.

90. 17 τῆς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λείας ἢ τραχείας κινήσεως, the current of

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what M. calls *πνεῦμα*, vital spirit, p. **52.** 6, with which *αἱ πείσεις* were often loosely identified. The terminology is Cyrenaic in origin: *δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κ., τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον, τραχεῖαν κ.* D.L. ii. 86; cf. 'commotionem suavem iucunditatis in corpore' Cic. *Fin.* ii. 13. Thence Epicurus adopted it: *αἱ εἰς σάρκα λεῖαι καὶ προσηνεῖς γινόμεναι κ.* Plu. *An seni* 786c (cf. *Adv. Colot.* 1122e, cited at p. **82.** 9–10), and from him the use of *σάρξ* for *σῶμα* in this connexion passed to the Stoics, cf. p. **196.** 18, and *τραχέως κινεῖται τὸ σαρκίδιον, εἶτα πάλιν λείως* Epict. ii. 1. 19; see Dr. Bailey's note to D.L. x. 140; *Epicurus*, p. 350.

μὴ συγκιρνάσθω: for the emendation, cf. p. **176.** 7, where A's variant is one step towards *συγκρίνεσθαι*, a word always used by M. for the compounding of the bodily elements, e.g. p. **196.** 2.

90. 19 **ἀναδιδῶνται:** see *ἀναδίδοται* p. **68.** 1 n. The currents of the vital spirit are carried to the central intelligence analogously with the blood stream, which distributes nutriment throughout the organism.

κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν συμπάθειαν: the meaning is obscure so that *ἑτέραν* has been variously emended. M. has said that *τὸ ἡγ.* is not to allow itself to be blended with the vital current, not to 'descend', we might say, to the members. May he not here mean, by 'the other sympathy', the currents of sensitiveness moving in the reverse direction, 'ascending' to the central consciousness? This is a natural experience which it is of no use to resist; it must be recognized, but regarded by the judgement as morally 'indifferent'. In Epicurus' language: *ἡ διάνοια . . . ἀταρακτεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τηροῦσα* p. **188.** 6. The employment of *αἴσθησιν* l. 20, where M. would normally have said *φαντασίαν*, suggests that he had been reading the difficult passage on *αἴσθησις* in Pl. *Phlb.*, see especially: *τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι καταβεννύμενα* (sc. *παθήματα*) . . . *τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ* 33d.

90. 20 **ἐν σώματι ἡνωμένῳ:** the organic unity of the body involves sympathy between all the members, and this is analogous to what obtains in the universe, see p. **98.** 19 n.

Ch. 27: 90. 23 **"Συζῆν θεοῖς,"** apparently a quotation, inter-

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preted to mean 'Live, having a conscience void of offence', cf. *θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις . . . συμπολιτεύεσθαι* p. **192.** 8; *θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ* Pl. *Tht.* 176a. Gat. compares the O.T. 'walking with God', see p. **76.** 6 n.

90. 25 **ὁ δαίμων.** M. here combines three ways of regarding the *genius*, (*a*) the guardian of a man's days, sometimes represented as assigned to him, sometimes as chosen by him, see *Test.* l. 25; (*b*) the particle broken off from the fiery matter of the Universe, called sometimes the aether, see *Test.* p. **92.** 1; (*c*) the mind and reason of the individual, what Cic. calls 'perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio' *Tusc.* v. 39, cf. 'ergo animus, ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides (p. **246.** 9, *Test.*) dicere audet, deus' ib. i. 65. So Dio Chrys. has: *ὁ δὲ ἴδιος ἑκάστου νοῦς, οὗτός ἐστι δαίμων τοῦ ἔχοντος ἀνδρός* iv. 80, p. 165. On this later Stoic combination of mystical primitive belief with pantheistic rationalism, cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, ch. xiv, n. 44, Engl. Trans., and his references to Bonhöffer, *Epikt.* 79, Schmekel, *Phil. d. mittl. Stoa*, pp. 249, 256; and see my note on p. **28.** 14.

Ch. 28: 92. 3 **Τῷ γράσωνι.** M. very rarely writes in this vein; he puts more coarsely here the truth inculcated at pp. **54.** 15, **88.** 13, **188.** 15, **242.** 10. The correction, which he advocates, is of the analogous moral uncleanness.

92. 10 **Οὔτε τραγῳδὸς οὔτε πόρνη.** Gat. comparing *μήτε τύραννον μήτε δοῦλον* p. **64.** 3 and *φυλακτέον δὲ ἐπίσης τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ κολακεύειν αὐτούς* p. **226.** 24 supposed this enigmatic sentence to mean: 'you are neither a tragic actor nor a harlot to laud it over an offender or to pander to his fault.' Mr. Marchant suggests that M. runs on, in this way: 'he is neither play-actor, who must act his part, nor harlot, whom it is hopeless to advise.' I have thought it possible that the note was added after the Emperor's visit to Athens in A.D. 177, and that he is recalling the tombs of Pythionice and of the actor Theodorus, which were close together, Paus. i. 37. 3 and 5.

Ch. 29: 92. 11 **Ὡς ἐξελθὼν ζῆν διανοῇ**, i.e. when you are with the gods in that other world, 'when you are departed', cf. *ἐξιέναι* p. **26.** 5.

92. 11–12 **ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι**, sc. *οἱ θεοί*. To make the words

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mean: 'if men do not allow you', would be inconsistent with the spiritual liberty so emphatically asserted in chs. 25, 29, 33, and 34. Cf. *θεὸς ἐπέτρεψεν* p. **158.** 2; *ᾧ ἐπιτέτραπται* p. **166.** 20.

92. 13 **καπνὸς καὶ ἀπέρχομαι:** the smoky chimney, the fact that you are no longer able to behave with freedom, is God's signal. M. borrows the image from Epict. *Test.*

τί αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δοκεῖς; In the colloquial sense, *trouble, bother*: *μὴ οὖν ὡς πρᾶγμα* p. **72.** 20 n.

92. 15 **ποιεῖν ἃ θέλω:** he looks back to pp. **82.** 9, **90.** 15.

Ch. 30: 92. 17–18 **τὰ χείρω τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν:** the principle of the *Scala Naturae* was stated, by anticipation, at p. **86.** 28; cf. *κατεσκεύασται δὲ τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ τῶν λογικῶν ἕνεκεν . . . τὰ δὲ λ. ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν* p. **138.** 10; 'cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 67. Cic. gives an account of the *quattuor gradus* of life, *N.D.* ii. 33.

92. 19 **τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπένειμεν:** cf. *ὑπό τινος ἀπονέμοντος τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν* p. **54.** 26.

92. 20 **εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων:** Socr. taught: *ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι . . . καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν* X. *Mem.* iv. 4. 16, cf. Thuc. viii. 75. 2. Arist. says: *πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια. . . . τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν E.N.* 1167^{b}2.

M. does not employ the word elsewhere; he prefers *κοινωνία*, e.g. p. **86.** 27. The notion is extended to embrace all things: *πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα ἀλλήλοις ἐστί* p. **112.** 15, and the word *σύμπνοια* used for the bond between them.

Ch. 31: 92. 21 **ἀδελφῷ, γυναικί:** *ἀδελφοῖς* is an error for the sing., meaning Lucius, his adoptive brother, p. **16.** 22. Similarly the scribe of A first wrote *γυναιξί*, cf. vv. ll. at Pl. *R.* 329c; Arist. *E.N.* 1097^{b}10, 1115^{a}22.

92. 22 **οἰκέταις,** happily added, for sound and sense, after *οἰκείοις*, *familiaris*, *famulus*. M. exhibits the human kindness which is notable in Pliny: 'agellum quem nutrici meae donaveram' *Ep.* vi. 3. 1, cf. viii. 16, ix. 21. Sen. has the same pleasing trait:

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'vive cum servo clementer, comiter quoque, et in sermonem illum admitte et in consilium et in convictum' *Ep.* 47. 13.

92. 23 **ἐξαίσιον μήτε εἰπεῖν:** as M. is paraphrasing, it is better not to insert *τι*, and so to ascribe a false quantity (*-αι*) to him. He probably connected the Hom. extract with the Pyth. maxim, *Test.*, and would interpret *ἐξαίσιον* as *παρὰ φύσιν*, so that he would guard against acting like the *θεῖοι βασιλῆες* mentioned in the context.

94. 1 **δι' οἵων διελήλυθας:** cf. 'vixi et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi' Virg. *Aen.* iv. 653 quoted by Sen. *Ep.* 12. 9.

94. 3 **πόσα ὤπται καλά:** perhaps he recalls: *ὥραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε* Pl. *Phlb.* 26a–b; cf. *σεμνότερα τούτων ἕτερα δ' οὐκ ὄψει ποτέ* Menand. *Fr.* 481 K., at the close of lines which seem to be alluded to by Epict.: *ὅπου δ' ἂν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ ἥλιος, ἐκεῖ σελήνη, ἐκεῖ ἄστρα . . . ἡ πρὸς θεοὺς ὁμιλία* iii. 22. 22.

94. 4 **εἰς ὅσους δὲ ἀγνώμονας εὐγνώμων:** cf. *ἄγνωμον καὶ τυραννικόν* p. **228.** 8, and what M. says at p. **212.** 9. Galen says that M. was esteemed to be: *εὐγνώμονά τε καὶ μέτριον, ἥμερόν τε καὶ πρᾷον* xix. 18.

Ch. 32: 94. 5 **Διὰ τί συγχέουσιν . . .;** M. does not answer the rhetorical question. He means the same thing that is put by Socr. in Pl. *Tht.* 173c sq., esp. *ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι* ib. 174a. In worldly matters, in the markets and law-courts, the man of science is put to confusion by his ignorant opponents.

ψυχαί, interpreted by Gat. to mean *persons*, a sense esp. frequent in the LXX, where it translates the Hebrew word for principle of life, which was used as *ψυχή* was in this sense. Here, however, it is rather used as an equivalent for *φύσεις*, as at Pl. *R.* 491e.

It looks as if the text ran originally: *ψυχαὶ ψυχὴν ἔντεχνον . . .*

94. 7 **τὸν δι' ὅλης τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον.** He uses a Stoical phrase, cf. *ἡνῶσθαι μὲν ὑποτίθεται* (sc. *Χρύσιππος*) *τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν, πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ' οὗ συνέχεται . . . καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν* Alex. Aphr. *Mixt.* p. 216. He may have in mind, cf. l. 5, *ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι* Pl. *R.* 486a, a passage which continues in the extract made by M. at p. **132.** 5.

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94. 8 **οἰκονομοῦντα τὸ πᾶν:** elsewhere he uses *διοικεῖν* for this providential government, e.g. pp. **68.** 20, **80.** 21, **86.** 2. The avoidance of δι- appears to be for the sake of euphony.

Ch. 33: 94. 9 **σποδὸς ἢ σκελετός:** cf. *τάριχος ἢ τέφρα* p. **70.** 18.

94. 10 **ψόφος καὶ ἀπήχημα,** 'an inarticulate sound or an echo', cf. *τὸ κενὸν τῆς ἀπηχήσεως* p. **52.** 11. The immediately preceding effect resembles *καὶ μῦθος ἢ οὐδὲ μῦθος* p. **246.** 17.

94. 11–12 **παιδία φιλόνεικα:** this is, as usual, the MSS. spelling of the adj. The combination with *διαδακνόμενα* shows that M. means *contentious*, and the Greeks themselves, at least at this date, clearly felt both senses, *νεῖκος* and *νίκη*, to be in the word, so that *φιλόνεικος* represents both *φιλονεικής* and *φιλόνικος*. See vv. ll. at Arist. *Rh.* 1389ª12; Olymp. ad Pl. *Alc.* i. 122c (p. 617 Creuzer).

94. 12 **Πίστις δὲ καὶ Αἰδώς.** The passage which M. quotes (Hes. *Test.*) pictures Reverence and Right (for *Νέμεσις* is equivalent to *Δίκη*, l.c. 192, cf. *Δίκης Ν. ἄγγελος* Pl. *Lg.* 717d) leaving this earth at the close of the *ferrea aetas*. The words became famous, and are often alluded to, e.g. Eur. *Med.* 439, Virg. *Ecl.* iv. 6, *Georg.* ii. 474. The goddesses or *δαίμονες* are named *Εὐνομία, Δίκα, Εἰρήνα, παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος*, Pind. *Ol.* xiii. 11, cf. Hes. *Th.* 902, and with the addition of *Αἰδώς* Pl. *Lg.* 713e, where he is speaking of the *δαίμονες* of the age of gold. M. is following a later tradition of *four* sisters, cf.

> paulatim deinde ad superos Astraea recessit
> hac comite, atque duae pariter fugere sorores Juv. vi. 19.

The two sisters who companion Iustitia and Pudicitia are to be gathered from:

> cui Pudor et Iustitiae soror
> incorrupta Fides nudaque Veritas Hor. *Od.* i. 24. 6.

M. has the same four excellencies, with *νόμος* for *δίκη* at p. **200.** 20. The association of Truth with Right and Reverence may be seen at: *ψεῦδος δὲ αἰδοῖ καὶ δίκῃ νεμεσητὸν κατὰ φύσιν* Pl. *Lg.* 943e, and *Πίστις*, Fides (our *Honour*) is characteristically Roman, cf. 'fundamentum ... est Iustitiae Fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas' Cic. *Off.* i. 23; 'Fides enim nomen ipsum mihi videtur habere cum *fit* quod dicitur',

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a parody of Stoic etymologies, id. *Rep.* iv. 7; 'fugere Pudor Verumque Fidesque' Ovid, *Met.* i. 129. For similar associations in M., see pp. **42.** 19, **46.** 7, **170.** 1 and 7.

Here Right and Reverence, the Hesiodic pair, are conjoined with Faith and Truth as partners. The first two are primitive personifications of Zeus' rule. Thus Soph. says that *Αἰδώς* is *Ζηνὶ σύνθακος θρόνων O.C.* 1267, and *Δίκη* is *ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις* ib. 1382. They are the embodiments of the self-reverence which causes him both to uphold Law (for *Δίκη* is sometimes the daughter of *Αἰδώς* Pl. *Lg.* 943e, cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 662), and to regard the cause of the wrongdoer, while *Δίκη* primarily punishes the guilty. Thus *αἰδώς* prompts to pardon and pity, *δίκη* to *νέμεσις*. Zeus dispenses (*νέμει*) these attributes to men: *αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί* Pl. *Prt.* 322c. M. thus combines *εὐσταθὴς κρίσις* with *εὐμένεια* or *πραότης* p. **218.** 25, and joins *εὔνοια* with *νόμος, ἀλήθεια, αἰδώς* p. **58.** 16.

In his Panegyric of Rome, addressed to Pius and M., Ael. Arist. says: *δίκης δὲ καὶ αἰδοῦς πάντα πανταχοῦ μεστά* xxvi. 89, and refers to Hes.'s saying: *Δίκῃ δὴ καὶ Αἰδοῖ τότ' ἂν ἀποδοῦναι κάθοδον εἰς ἀνθρώπους* ib. 106. A late allusion to the legend of the four ages is: *ἀπὸ χρυσῆς τε βασιλείας* (the reign of M.) *ἐς σιδηρᾶν καὶ κατιωμένην . . . καταπεσούσης τῆς ἱστορίας*—the 'Decline and Fall' had begun—Epit. of Dio Cass. lxxi. 36. 4. See also my *Introduction*, p. xiv, note 3.

94. 16 ἀμυδρὰ καὶ εὐπαρατύπωτα: cf. *ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἀμυδρά* p. **32.** 13 and Pl. *Phdr.* 250b, cited there. The expression shows that M. recalls Pl.'s illustration of sensible experience from an impression on wax. If the wax is too soft: *ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά Tht.* 195a, and if the seal is applied crookedly, the impress is false (*παράτυπος* or *παράσημος* M. might say), cf. *κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής* (sc. *ἡ δόξα*) ib. 194b. M. does not, any more than Pl. or the Stoics, necessarily take the illustration literally, cf. *τὸ τυποῦσθαι κατὰ φαντασίαν* p. **102.** 21, D.L. vii. 45.

94. 17 τὸ ψυχάριον ἀναθυμίασις: *τὸ ψ.* here means the psycho-physical *πνεῦμα* upon which sense and volition depend

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organically, not the central unity, *τὸ ἡγ.* Early physicists spoke of *ἡ ψυχή* in this way, e.g. the Heracliteans: *'H. δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψ., εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν . . . καὶ ῥέον ἀεί* Arist. *De An.* 405^{a}25; *τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν . . . οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ πῦρ* Themist. *in De An.* p. 13. In this organic sense the Stoics defined *ψ.* as *πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικήν, ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν* [Plu.] *V. Hom.* 127, and Galen thought it possible that *ἀναθ. τίς ἐστιν αἵματος χρηστοῦ τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα* iii. 496.

94. 17–18 **τὸ δὲ εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοιούτοις:** 'apud eos, qui istiusmodi sunt, celebrem esse' Gat. This is, perhaps, the meaning in view of the frequent use of *παρά* with the dat. of persons judging.

94. 18 **περιμένειν ἴλεων,** the correction accords with *μεμνῆσθαι* l. 22; cf. *ἴλεων καταλῦσαι* p. 70. 19.

94. 18–19 **τὴν εἴτε σβέσιν εἴτε μετάστασιν,** the alternatives if *ἕνωσις* be presumed, pp. 130. 20, 216. 4. The atomic *σκεδασμός* is ignored here.

94. 20 **θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν καὶ εὐφημεῖν:** cf. *ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ εὐφημεῖν* Epict. i. 16. 15; *χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν* id. iii. 5. 10.

ἀνθρώπους δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν: Julian represents M. as professing, at the Judgement of the Caesars, that his endeavour was *μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς θεούς* and *εὖ ποιεῖν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα πλείστους* pp. 333c, 334a.

94. 21 **ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι:** he recalls Epict.'s *dictum*: *ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου* Aul. Gell. xvii. 19. 6; cf. *τὸν ἀνεκτικόν, τὸν ἀφεκτικὸν καὶ συνεργητικόν* Epict. ii. 22. 20, sim. iv. 8. 20.

94. 21–2 **τοῦ κρεᾳδίου καὶ τοῦ πνευματίου:** cf. *τὰ περικείμενα κρεάδια* p. 236. 12; *τὰ κρέα* was used for *τὰ νεκρὰ σώματα* Schol. ad Aristoph. *Ran.* 191, so that the effect is like that of our word *carcass.*

Ch. 34: 96. 1 **εὐροεῖν:** cf. p. 194. 3. Epict. couples *εὔροια* with *ἀταραξία* ii. 18. 28; cf. 'in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus' Cic. *Off.* i. 90.

96. 1–2 **ὁδῷ ὑπολαμβάνειν:** cf. *ὁδῷ* p. 8. 6 n. Here there is a play on *εὐοδεῖν* as at p. 104. 19, 'rectae viae insistere' Xyl.

96. 5 **ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀπολήγειν.** M. often emphasizes the psychological truth that desire ceases when its object is achieved:

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ὁρμὴ καὶ πρᾶξις καταλήγουσα ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ κοινωνικῶς πρᾶξαι p. **184.** 5. The moral consequence is that the reasonable self is satisfied by right conduct and a righteous disposition, and does not require anything further, like pleasure, for completion: *τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τὸ ἔσχατον τῆς φυσικῆς ὀρέξεως, ἐφ' ὃ ἐλθοῦσα ἡ φύσις τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔχει, οὗ τυχοῦσα πλέον οὐθὲν ἐπιποθεῖ* Mich. Eph. *in Arist. E.N.* x, p. 599.

Ch. 35: 96. 7 **τί ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ διαφέρομαι;** this verb, originally used with an acc. of respect, *τὴν ψυχήν*, M. employs absolutely (e.g. *μὴ διαφέρου* l. 24) and with a tacit reference to the technical word *ἀδιάφορα*, cf. *τῷ μὲν οὖν σωματίῳ πάντα ἀδιάφορα, οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται διαφέρεσθαι* p. **110.** 13.

96. 7–8 **τίς δὲ βλάβη τοῦ κοινοῦ;** The question implies a negative answer, inasmuch as *ἡ κακία οὐδὲν βλάπτει τὸν κόσμον* p. **166.** 18; *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τι τὸ ὅλον ὃ μὴ συμφέρει ἑαυτῷ* p. **194.** 5.

τὸ κοινόν is *ὁ κόσμος* regarded as a *πολίτευμα* in which the good is made to prevail by Providence: *τῷ κοινῷ, οὗ μάλιστα προνοοῦνται* p. **114.** 22.

Ch. 36: 96. 9 **ὁλοσχερῶς**, *temere*, cf. p. **172.** 20 n.

συναρπάζεσθαι: a reminiscence of Epict. *Test.*, and the obscurities are to be cleared up with the help of that ch. We may then mentally supply *ἀλλοτρίου πένθους* with *τῇ φαντασίᾳ*, 'do not allow the first and superficial suggestion of your neighbour's mourning to carry you away with it'. So Epict. says: *ὑπὸ τῆς ὀξύτητος μὴ συναρπασθῇς*, rather you must test the *φαντασία, εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεταί σ' ἔχουσα ὅπου ἂν θέλῃ* Epict. ii. 18. 24–5.

96. 9–10 **βοηθεῖν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν:** pity is to take the form of help, not of sentiment: *τὸν ἔλεον ψέγουσι πρὸς ἀτυχοῦντας ἀνθρώπους γιγνόμενον, ὡς καλοῦ τοῦ βοηθεῖν οὐ τοῦ συναλγεῖν καὶ συνενδιδόναι τοῖς πλησίον* Plu. *De Tranq.* 468d; 'cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? . . . non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine' Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 56; 'non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret, sed proderit' Sen. *De Clem.* ii. 6. 3; *τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον πειράσομαι κατὰ δύναμιν* (sc. *παύειν*) Epict. iii. 24. 23.

96. 10 **κατ' ἀξίαν:** cf. *τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐν τοῖς μέσοις συστοχάζομαι* p. **46.** 13 n.

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κἂν εἰς τὰ μέσα ἐλαττῶνται: i.e. even if they give way, *ἐλάττονες ὦσιν*, in respect to what is morally indifferent, *εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα*, your help is still to be forthcoming. Gat., however, takes the meaning to be: 'help them with a will, and do not, if they give way in respect to indifferent matters, imagine it to be a real hurt.'

96. 10–11 μὴ μέντοι βλάβην αὐτὸ φαντάζεσθαι: understand *συναρπαζόμενος* from l. 9: 'don't let your imagination be hurried, at the sight of mourning, into the thought that the blow that makes *them* give way is a real hurt.' The thought of the writer returns to ch. 34; to take an extreme case, even the loss of a little child is not a real hurt, for it is not a hurt to the whole order of things, and therefore not a hurt to the parents. M. is stating what Epict. expresses by an ironical question: *ὅπου τι σωματικὸν ἐλάττωμα ⟨ἢ⟩ εἰς κτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ ἡ βλάβη· ὅπου εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν, οὐδεμία βλάβη;* Epict. ii. 10. 27.

96. 11 κακὸν γὰρ ἔθος, the remark seems frigid, and Gat. preferred *κακὸν γὰρ οὐθέν*, an explanation of why it is that you are not to imagine it a real hurt.

The meaning is, however, satisfactory, even if laconically expressed. If you do this, a bad habit, indulgence of erroneous imaginations, will grow upon you, and this is an injury, a very real *βλάβη*, to yourself, cf. *ἀντίθες τῷ ἔθει τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος* Epict. i. 27. 6.

ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ γέρων: without a clue to the story or to the scene from a comedy, we are perplexed, and the state of the text adds to the perplexity. Gat. makes the parable end at *ὧδε* l. 13, treating the remainder to *μωρὸς γένῃ;* l. 15 as a separate aphorism, with no bearing on the story of the old man. In the English Commentary I have given Gat.'s suggested solution, because it has satisfied all the recent interpreters of the passage. I do not, however, think it adequate, and that for two reasons. First, if the analogy is to be a real one, it makes the comforter pretend what he does not himself believe, for the old man tells the boy a 'white lie'. Secondly, the parallel between the anecdote (or comic scene) and the situation in real life is too slight. The child is comforted at the old man's departure by a request for the gift of his favourite toy; the actual friend is overwhelmed by seeing a

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mourner sorrowing bitterly for what he valued and has lost. M.'s intention, his chief anxiety, is to illustrate the mistaken value which the mourner sets upon what has been taken from him, and consequently the error of the sympathetic friend in himself being plunged in grief.

I suggest, then, that the child's top had been taken from him, that a storm of tears followed, and that the old man begged it back for him. At the same time he was fully aware that the tears had been for a mere plaything, and he reminded the boy that, when he was grown up, he would know better. With this explanation the connexion between the story and what M. says next becomes clear. 'You have been swept away by the sight of your neighbour's laments, forgetting that his loss was of something indifferent if measured by real values.' The sufferer's friend should not have forgotten; he should, like the old man in the story, have remembered that, by a just estimate, the loss was like that of a mere plaything, and the sorrow, the extravagant mourning of a child.

Some confirmation of this interpretation is the fact that Epict., in the passage (*Test.*) that M. has in mind, uses the words *ἀπολωλεκότα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* (just as the boy had lost his top), and that Simpl., commenting on that part of Epict.'s ch. where he appears to advocate pretence, says: *οὐ προσποιητῶς· οὐ γὰρ προσήκει τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ἡ προσποίησις* p. 125c. That would also be M.'s view.

96. 12 ἀπελθὼν . . . ἀπῇτει: the exact sense here, whatever the interpretation of the story, is puzzling. I suppose that M. uses the narrative imperfect, as he recalls the scene upon the stage: 'the old man was begging the top back'.

ἀπελθών is perhaps a stage colloquialism, 'going off'; it cannot here mean 'when he had gone away'.

τοῦ θρεπτοῦ, this word normally means *οἰκογενής*, here it is taken to mean *foster-child* or *pupil*. L. and S. give only one reference for the latter sense, Vett. Val. *Astrol.* 157. 29. The implication would be that *ὁ γέρων* is either a *παιδαγωγός* or an old slave, familiar figures in Comedy.

μεμνημένος, remembering, i.e. calling to mind, parallel to *ἐπελάθου*, 'you allowed it to escape you', l. 14.

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96. 13 **καὶ ⟨σὺ⟩ ὧδε:** I have supplied *σύ*, cf. *τοῦτ' οὖν καὶ σύ* l. 15, after the words which A omitted through homoeoteleuton.

κλαίων ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβόλων: I have written *κλαίων*, which is so often corrupted to *καλῶν*. M. may have recalled *'Οδυσσεὺς . . . ἔκλαιεν ἐπὶ πέτρας καθεζόμενος*, an allusion to Hom. *Od.* v. 82 in Epict. iii. 24. 18, a chapter upon a subject similar to this.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβόλων, lit. on the *rostra*, may be used for declamation from the stage. Pl. speaks of rhapsodists *ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος κλάοντας Ion*, 535e, and Hesychius says: *βῆμα· πλείονα μὲν σημαίνει, κοινότερον δὲ οὕτως καὶ τὸ λογεῖον. λογεῖον· ὁ τῆς σκηνῆς τόπος, ἐφ' οὗ ὑποκριταὶ λέγουσιν.* The sense then would be 'theatrically'.

Ch. 37: 96. 16 **'Εγενόμην ποτέ:** M. appears to be giving another illustration of repining at misfortunes so-called, and to paraphrase, accordingly, a tragic lament. By interpreting the speaker's language, he answers him out of his own mouth. Observe that *ἐγενόμην* echoes *γένῃ* l. 15, and *εὔμοιρος* plays upon the sound of *μωρός*, cf. a similar artifice in Heraclit., cited at l. 17 n.

Here he may well recall: *ἦν Οἰδίπους τὸ πρῶτον εὐδαίμων ἀνήρ*, from the prol. of Eur. *Ant.* 157 N², quoted by Aristoph. *Ran.* 1182, and by Dio Chrys. lxiv. 6, p. 329, in an essay on *Τύχη*.

M. himself has " *ἀτυχὴς ἐγώ, ὅτι τοῦτό μοι συνέβη.*" *οὐμενοῦν ἀλλ' εὐτυχὴς ἐγώ* p. **72.** 1.

ὁπουδήποτε καταληφθείς: cf. *ὅπου ἂν καταληφθῇ* p. **214.** 10; *ἥκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ ὡς πρᾳότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη συμφορὰ καταλάβῃ* Pl. *R.* 387e.

96. 17 **τὸ δὲ εὔμοιρος:** the criticism resembles the point in:

> *ὁ μὴ φέρων δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ πράγματα*
> *Τύχην προσηγόρευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον*
>
> Menand. *Fr.* 594 K.

cf. *"Ονος τις οὐκ εὔμοιρος ἀλλὰ δυσδαίμων* Babrius, 141. 1.

ἀγαθὴν μοῖραν σεαυτῷ ἀπονείμας: cf. *μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι* Heraclit. 25 D., 101 B. *ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι* X. *Ap.* 32; *οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ'*

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ἑαυτοῦ Pl. *R.* 619c; 'quid votis opus est? fac te ipse felicem' Sen. *Ep.* 31. 5.

96. 18 **ἀγαθὴ δὲ μοῖρα:** the correction improves the sentence; the corruption has arisen from attraction.

ἀγαθαὶ τροπαὶ ψυχῆς: M. occasionally uses *τροπαί* as equivalent to *τρόποι, moods*; *τροπὰς τοῦ ἡγ.* p. **228.** 9, cf. *ἔν τινι ἀνοικείῳ . . . τροπῇ* p. **44.** 4 n. *τροπαί, τρέπεσθαι* are used of the shifting *colours* of the polypus, with which the toady's *moods* are compared Plu. *Quomodo*, 52f, *De Am. mult.* 96f, *De sollert.* 978e.

The doctrine that character is master of circumstance is not peculiar to any one school, it is proverbial: *οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* Pl. *Euthd.* 281b; *κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου* Arist. *E.N.* 1100^{b}9.

BOOK VI

Ch. 1: 96. 20 **Ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία,** the material and relatively passive *ἀρχή, τὸ ὑλικόν*, opp. to the formal and active, *τὸ αἰτιῶδες*, here termed *ὁ διοικῶν λόγος*, cf. p. **124.** 4. Zeno and his successors held *ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο* D.L. vii. 134, cited at p. **60.** 10, cf. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 132; S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 11; Sen. *Ep.* 65. 2.

εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής. M. implicitly accepts the doctrine of those of his school who held: *οὐ γὰρ ἥ γ' ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν· ἄποιος γάρ . . . ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν ἔσχε· κινεῖ δ' αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος* Plu. *Comm. Not.* 1076c. Contemporary Platonists and some Stoics, see e.g. Plu. *Rep. St.* 1051d, ascribed harm and evil to recalcitrant Matter.

εὐπειθής: cf. *ὕλη εὐπειθὴς εἰς ἅπαν* Galen, vi. 3; 'ratio materiam format et quocumque vult versat' Sen. *Ep.* 65. 2.

εὐτρεπής: cf. *τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 11; 'materiam enim rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexibilem et commutabilem' Cic. *N.D.* iii. 92.

The figure of the modeller and his wax persists: *ἡ τῶν ὅλων φ. ἐκ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας ὡς κηροῦ . . . ἔπλασε* p. **128.** 8, but strictly the active *λόγος* works within its material, p. **164.** 17; cf. Galen's contrast between Nature and a Phidias, ii. 82, quoted at p. **112.** 22–3 n.

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96. 21–2 κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει: because the nature of God excludes the notion of evil: *θεὸν δ' εἶναι . . . κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον* D.L. vii. 147, cf. S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 91.

96. 22 οὐδέ τι κακῶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ βλάπτεταί τι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. There are two corollaries: (*a*) Nature creates nothing amiss, either *παρ' ἀδυναμίαν* p. **26.** 16 or *παρ' ἀτεχνίαν*, for *τεχνικῶς ἅπαντα διαπλάττει γεννῶσα* Galen, ii. 28. Therefore *μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* Plu. *Rep. St.* 1051b. (*b*) No part of it and no individual member suffers injury at its hands; cf. p. **194.** 21; 'errat, si quis illos putat nocere nolle: non possunt; nec accipere iniuriam queunt nec facere' Sen. *Ep.* 95. 49. Thus M. makes rejoinder to the primitive belief that the gods harm their creatures, a view which Pl. refutes at the beginning of his account of creation: *ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος Ti.* 29e; cf. *ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὑτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται Lg.* 900d.

ὑπ' ἐκείνου, i.e. *ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου.* For the personification cf. *ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ πάντως σοι καλῶς χρήσεται ὁ τὰ ὅλα διοικῶν* p. **114.** 12, so *ἐκεῖνος* stands for *ὁ θεός*, Epict. iv. 1. 99.

96. 23 περαίνεται: cf. p. **98.** 16; *κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην φ. ἁπάντων παραγομένων* (v.l. *περαινομένων*) Chrysippus, ap. Plu. *Rep. St.* 1051c.

Ch. 2: 96. 24 Μὴ διαφέρου, i.e. *ἀδιάφορόν σοι ἔστω*, cf. *οὐ διαφέρομαι* Dem. ix. 8.

τὸ πρέπον, strictly 'quod decet', but in substance a synonym of *τὸ καθῆκον*, cf. 'nam et quod decet honestum est et quod honestum est decet' Cic. *Off.* i. 94; see p. **124.** 15.

96. 25 νυστάζων: cf. *συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ νυστάζειν καρωδῶς ἐν ταῖς ὀσημέραι πράξεσιν* Galen, xiv. 4, cf. p. **18.** 7–8 n. Fronto repeatedly urges M. to observe 'terminos diei et noctis' *Ep.* p. 227.

98. 2 μία γὰρ τῶν βιωτικῶν πράξεων, a serious paradox, as when he calls death *μίαν τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν* p. **172.** 21, cf. p. **44.** 2. So Sen. has. 'tu nescis unum esse ex vitae officiis et mori?' *Ep.* 77. 19.

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98. 3 **τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι,** a proverbial saying, originating in games of chance: *ὥσπερ ψῆφόν τινα τίθεσθαι τὸ συμβαῖνον* Socr. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 1133 (see Hemsterhuys' note to Lucian, *Nec.* 21). M. handles it here with some irony, since *τὸ παρόν* is the moment of death. He alludes also to his doctrine: *ἀεὶ γάρ μοι τὸ παρὸν ὕλη ἀρετῆς* p. **144.** 8. Cf. Soph. *Fr.* 861 N², 947 P., Epict. ii. 5. 28; and see above, p. xiv, n. 5.

Ch. 3: 98. 4 **Ἔσω βλέπε:** *διέλθε ἔσω καὶ ἴδε ποῖοί τινές εἰσιν* p. **180.** 21. Thus, as he says in a parallel passage, you will see *αὐτὸ ὁποῖόν ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν, γυμνόν* p. **44.** 23. For *ἡ ἰδία ποιότης* see p. **180.** 15.

98. 4–5 **ἡ ἀξία,** i.e. its *value* relatively to the Whole or to the individual, p. **46.** 2. The circumstance, *τὸ πρᾶγμα* or *τὸ φανταστόν*, may have absolute moral worth or it may possess value relatively to the good life. M. is probably speaking in terms of common sense, but he is doubtless aware of the Stoic doctrine, which was so much criticized, of preference among things which are strictly *ἀδιάφορα*, cf. *προηγμένα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχει* D.L. vii. 106; 'alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. . . . hinc est illud exortum quod Zeno *προηγμένον* . . . nominavit' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 50. See Sen. *Ep.* 74. 17, *V.B.* 22. 4, and above, p. **46.** 2 n.

Ch. 4: 98. 6 **τὰ ὑποκείμενα,** i.e. sensible objects, p. **82.** 19; cf. *πάντα ὅσα ὁρᾷς* pp. **128.** 18, **184.** 14.

μεταβαλεῖ: the context requires the correction. The spelling of this verb is very uncertain in the MSS., see e.g. pp. **52.** 22, **84.** 26, **128.** 18, **182.** 5–6, 15, **224.** 4.

ἐκθυμιαθήσεται, used met. for the *ἐκπύρωσις* p. **36.** 17, the periodical return of the Universe to fire, which M. here regards as going on continuously; see for a more detailed statement p. **196.** 2. The figure is from the vaporization of oil or pitch, *τὰ ἐκθυμιώμενα . . . ὡς ἔλαιον καὶ πίττα* Arist. *Mete.* 388ᵃ8, and is picturesque, rather than scientific; so Lucr. speaks of the stream of tiny atoms as vanishing 'ceu fumus' iii. 456, and the Psalmist, thinking perhaps of the sacrificial fat, says *ἐκλιπόντες ὡσεὶ καπνὸς ἐξέλιπον* 36 (37) 20. M. similarly uses the image from frankincense p. **56.** 14.

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98. 7 **εἴπερ ἥνωται,** i.e. if we accept the Stoic hypothesis of *ἕνωσις*, see ll. 19–20 n.

ἢ σκεδασθήσεται, i.e. *εἰ ἄτομοι* as at the corrected words of p. **130.** 20. *σκεδασμός*, l. 19, is used by M. for the dissipation of any combination into its *atomic* constituents, cf. *ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκίδνανται* Epicur. ap. S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 72; 'pereat dispersa (sc. anima)' Lucr. iii. 544. Socr. discusses an early form of this belief, based on the animism of passages like *Il.* xxiii. 100, at *ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα* Pl. *Phd.* 70a, but not with reference to Atomism.

Ch. 5: 98. 8 **οἵδε πῶς διακείμενος.** M. resumes what he began at p. **96.** 20, so that the *διάθεσις* implied is the absence of *κακία*. He intends, I think, to express his conviction that, whichever of the alternatives of ll. 6–7 be accepted as to the elements of the Universe, Reason still governs and governs for the best. See a similar position at p. **194.** 1 sq. and the doubtful passage at p. **136.** 10.

Ch. 6: 98. 10 **τὸ μὴ ἐξομοιοῦσθαι,** i.e. *τῷ βλάπτοντι*. 'Aurea gnome' Gat., who compares: *πῶς ἀμυνοῦμαι τὸν ἐχθρόν; αὐτὸς καλὸς κἀγαθὸς γενόμενος* Plu. *De cap. util.* 88b, and gives a wealth of illustration of the general maxim not to return evil by evil. None, however, of the citations, except the various forms of the maxim which Plu. reports, resembles M.'s paradox which turns upon the idea of *reprisal* upon an enemy by refusal to imitate him, a paradox analogous to heaping coals of fire upon his head, *Prov.* 25. 22.

The principle that to model oneself upon the wrongdoer is to punish oneself is laid down by Pl., especially in the words: *οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται Tht.* 177a; the punishment is *τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσι κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν Lg.* 728b. Good conduct is a becoming like to God, *Tht.* 176b, and that is implied perhaps by *σὺν μνήμῃ θεοῦ* l. 12. Arist. *E.N.* 1165^{b}16 says: *φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον*, where he seems to mean that the proverb 'Birds of a feather' was used with Pl.'s implication. This appears to be the point which underlies the corrupt passage, p. **128.** 13 sq. M. gives more positive directions at p. **226.** 13 sq.

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Epict. puts *his* teaching about not returning evil in the form of refined self-love. 'Why,' he asks, 'when you know that your enemy really injures himself by injuring you, should you injure him in return and so injure yourself?' ii. 10. 26.

Ch. 7: 98. 11 **Ἐνὶ τέρπου**: the joy of social service, in contrast to selfish retaliation, is described by a word which, in another context, would stand for bodily gratification, cf. p. **208.** 8, where he employs *ἀπόλαυσις* to describe this enjoyment. The Stoics classed *τέρψις*, *εὐφροσύνη*, and *εὐθυμία* under *χαρά*, which is a worthy emotion, *εὐπάθεια*, *constantia*, or a reasonable elation, *εὔλογος ἔπαρσις ψυχῆς*, D.L. vii. 116.

προσαναπαύου: see pp. **64.** 1 n., **100.** 6.

98. 12 **μεταβαίνειν**: this passing from one social service to another is compared with the unconscious beneficence of the vine, p. **78.** 5. He says too: *τί λοιπὸν ἢ ἀπολαύειν τοῦ ζῆν συνάπτοντα ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἀγαθόν;* employing again the notion of *joy*, p. **248.** 6.

σὺν μνήμῃ θεοῦ, *either* 'remember God', and so implore his aid: *τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθόν* Epict. ii. 18. 29; *ἐφ' ἅπασι δὲ θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ* p. **106.** 16; *or* 'remind yourself' of God's lovingkindness to all his creatures, and so walk by his example, pp. **46.** 25, **96.** 2, **144.** 16, **248.** 2. 'Kindness was a moral quality which Jehovah highly prized in man, and also took under His special patronage, and habitually manifested in His dealings with Israel'; thus it became a synonym for 'godliness', Driver, *The Parallel Psalter*, p. 443, ed. 2.

Ch. 8: 98. 13 **Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν**, in man the analogue of Nature's *ὁ διοικῶν λόγος*, l. 8, p. **96.** 20. This governing unity is *ψυχὴ λογική*, p. **102.** 4, and its properties are outlined at p. **214.** 4.

τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἐγεῖρον καὶ τρέπον: the first participle is equivalent to *κινοῦν*, although there may be a further reference to rousing oneself from sensual slumber, see p. **110.** 10. Pl. had said that self-movement is a mark of *ψυχή*, *Lg.* 896a, [id.] *Def.* 411c. So M. has *τρέπει δὲ καὶ κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν μόνη* p. **88.** 11.

τρέπον may refer to the Stoic connexion *τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον* D.L. vii. 114; so they called *χαρά καὶ ἔλεος, τροπαὶ ψ.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 466; cf. 'cum

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ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur' Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 13. The etymology, I suppose, was based on passages like *Il.* iii. 441.

98. 14 **οἷον ἂν καὶ θέλῃ**: the assertion is of moral freedom, cf. *ἑαυτὴν ὁποίαν ἂν βούληται ποιεῖ* p. **214.** 4. This is manifested also in liberty of intellectual judgement (cf. p. **88.** 11), whereby *τὸ ἡγ.* presents to itself *τὸ συμβαῖνον* (p. **80.** 18 n.) both as divinely disposed, and as making for the benefit of the Whole and of the individual. Thus: *ἐὰν μὴ ὑπολάβω ὅτι κακὸν τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὔπω βέβλαμμαι. ἔξεστι δέ μοι μὴ ὑπολαβεῖν* p. **124.** 19. This is put pointedly at the end of the Book, p. **120.** 8.

Ch. 9: 98. 16 **ἕκαστα περαίνεται**, points back to p. **96.** 23, where this accomplishment is directed by *ὁ λόγος*, which is to *ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις* what *τὸ ἡγ.* l. 13 is to the rational individual. The individual is related to his fellows and to the Whole, but the Whole is a self-embraced unity, related to nothing but itself, and to its parts and members. This is M.'s completest statement of the nature of what is called *τὸ τέλειον ζῷον*, p. **192.** 5, and of which he says *ἔξω οὐδὲν ἔχει*, p. **164.** 17.

The three dualistic hypotheses which he rejects may be conceived logically, as Pl. conceives his answer to a pluralistic view of the Universe at *Ti.* 31a (an argument akin to the '*τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*' reduction, Arist. *Metaph.* 990^{b}17). The use of *ἔξωθεν, ἔνδον, ἔξω* appears, however, to show that M. is thinking of the Universe as a material system, such as it would appear in an astronomical treatise.

The *φύσις ἔξωθεν περιέχουσα*, if he is writing astronomically, refers to the *primum movens* of the Peripatetics. Alex. Aphr. explicitly rejects the Stoic *ἕνωσις* in favour of *ἡ τοῦ . . . αἰθερίου σώματος φύσις, ἥτις περιέχουσα πᾶσαν τὴν ἔνυλον . . . οὐσίαν . . . συνέχει καὶ σῴζει τὸ πᾶν De Mixt.* p. 223. Now, even if this envelope, this *primum mobile*, be *within* the Whole, Arist.'s doctrine, as M. perceives, places the first *ἀρχή*, God or the *primum movens*, outside the system.

The other two possible hypotheses, *ἡ ἐμπεριεχομένη ἔνδον φ.* and *ἡ ἔξω ἀπηρτημένη φ.*, appear similarly to be astronomy in the guise of cosmology. The former may rest upon the Pythagorean picture of a central fire round which even the earth revolved,

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Aët. *Plac.* ii. 4. 15; Diels, *Dox.* p. 332 (Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, p. 95). The latter may refer to a theory such as that which put outside the Universe *γῆν ἐν ἑτέρῳ κόσμῳ περιεχομένην καὶ συνδεδεμένην* Plu. *Def. Orac.* 425c, i.e. a counter-balancing mass, seemingly a descendant of the Pythagorean counter-earth, which had a different purpose (Heath, *op. cit.* pp. 96 and 249).

Ch. 10: 98. 19 κυκεὼν καὶ ἀντεμπλοκὴ καὶ σκεδασμός: a summary of the Epicurean hypothesis. The *κ. συμπεφορημένος*, p. **62. 12**, results in an *entanglement* of some atoms, *ὅταν τύχωσι τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλιμέναι* D.L. x. 43; cf. *διὰ τῆς περιπλοκῆς ταύτης μηδαμοῦ φαινομένης*, of magnetic 'attraction', Galen, ii. 47. This is followed by *διάλυσις τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις ἀντεμπλοκῶν* and by the ensuing *σκορπισμός* p. **136. 10**.

98. 19–20 ἕνωσις καὶ τάξις καὶ πρόνοια: *ἕνωσις*, a technical term for the Stoic Monism, occurs only in Books vi–ix, though the doctrine was implied at p. **62. 12**. This *ἕνωσις* accounts for the mutual sympathy which binds all parts of the Whole together, p. **112. 13**, and thereby bodies even at stellar intervals react upon one another, p. **176. 14**.

The hypothesis originated in the nervous sympathy, *σύμπνοια* p. **112. 16**, which is apparent in organisms, and of which man is conscious: *οἷόν ἐστιν ἐν ἡνωμένοις τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος* p. **124. 9**. Thus Chrysippus held: *ἡνῶσθαι τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν, πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ' οὗ συνέχεταί τε καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν* Alex. Aphr. *De Mixt.* p. 216, cf. p. 223. Galen uses cognate physiological principles: *τὴν ὑποβεβλημένην οὐσίαν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ πᾶσαν ἡνωμένην θ' ἅμα καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυναμένην* ii. 27; *ἥνωται μὲν ἡ οὐσία . . . καὶ συμπνοῦν ὅλον ἐστὶ καὶ σύρρουν τὸ σῶμα* ii. 29; cf. *τὸ σύρρουν* p. **176. 18**.

τάξις καὶ πρόνοια stand for *alternative* Stoic hypotheses, equally opposed to *φυρμὸς εἰκαιότητος*, the Epicurean accidental and mechanical conglomeration, p. **240. 23**.

98. 20–1 τί καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ . . . ἐνδιατρίβειν; cf. *τί μοι ζῆν ἐν κόσμῳ . . . προνοίας κενῷ;* p. **26. 8**.

εἰκαίῳ συγκρίματι: thus M. uses *συγκριμάτιον* of the concatenation of the atomic constituents which will eventually be *scattered*, p. **154. 17**. The emphasis is on the adjective.

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98. 21 φυρμῷ τοιούτῳ, i.e. *εἰκαίῳ*, cf. *πεφυρμένως* p. **26.** 18 n., *ἀπροστάτητος*, *ἀνηγεμόνευτος* p. **240.** 24, 27.

98. 22 "αἶα γίνεσθαι". The unknown poet, as Xyl. and Gat. supposed, had in mind *Il.* vii. 99, a passage familiar to readers because the reference to the two lower elements was supposed to foreshadow the doctrine of the four elements: *σημαίνει γὰρ τὴν ἀνάλυσιν εἰς τὰ γεννητικὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός* [Plu.] *V. Hom.* 93. Homer's words were also used to illustrate man's dread of (*τὴν*) *εἰς κενὸν καὶ ἀτόμους διασποράν* Plu. *Non posse*, 1105a, and this is M.'s point in quoting it.

98. 22–3 τί δὲ καὶ ταράσσομαι; cf. l. 25, pp. **120.** 21, **186.** 11. An English version fails to call up the associations of the Greek verb. Pl. uses *ταραχή* and *ταράσσεσθαι* for the perturbation of man's *ψυχή* here detained in the flesh. Both Stoics and Epicureans constantly use the words with this implication, but they came to employ them specially for our anxious terror in the imagination of physical decomposition and, perhaps, of suffering in the future world. They endeavoured to substitute for this morbid apprehension a mental calm, what Bacon calls 'health from perturbations'. Thus Epicurus offers his disciples *ἀταραξία*. Men are agitated because they have not 'defined their dread of death': *ὅθεν, μὴ ὁρίζοντας τὸ δεινόν, τὴν ἴσην . . . ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα* D.L. x. 81. So the Stoics substitute *εὐσταθεῖν* p. **88.** 7; cf. *εὐσταθῶς καὶ ἀταράχως* Epict. ii. 5. 7; *γαλήνη*, of the calm haven, pp. **74.** 23, **244.** 2.

The reader will recall *ἡ ψυχή μου ἐταράχθη σφόδρα Ps.* 6. 3, and the reference to that text in: *νῦν ἡ ψυχή μου τετάρακται St. John*, 12. 27, where Bengel comments: 'concurrebant horror mortis et ardor oboedientiae.'

98. 24 θαρρῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι, sc. *λόγῳ* l. 8, recurring to p. **96.** 20. M. only once applies the term to God, p. **114.** 13.

Ch. 11: 98. 25 οἱονεὶ διαταραχθῆναι: cf. l. 22–3 n. Here the effect of outward circumstance is to upset the self-control by which a man maintains his balanced progress.

98. 26 μὴ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα: cf. *ὑπὲρ τὰ ἀρκοῦντα* p. **74.** 12. The phrase, like *ἀναγκασθῇς*, is not to be pressed as if it were a negation of freedom; it is a manner of speech, like *ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα*

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ἀνάγκη, and *ὅσον μὴ ἀν.* Pl. *Phd.* 67a, 83a; it recognizes that, while we are in the body, we cannot attain to entire self-control, any more than we can command circumstance.

98. 26–100. 1 ἐξίστασο τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ: cf. *τί ταράσσῃ; . . . τί σε ἐξίστησι;* p. 186. 4; *πολλάκις ἐξίστασαι ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ ταράσσῃ* Epict. ii. 22. 6. Virtue was sometimes defined by the Stoics as: *κοινότερον . . . διάθεσιν ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὑτῇ* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 60; δ. *ὁμολογουμένην* D.L. vii. 89, i.e. a condition in which the parts of the self are concordant.

100. 1 ἐγκρατέστερος τῆς ἁρμονίας, a metaphor from a musical instrument or mode, referring, like *ῥυθμός*, which is a met. from song and verse, to the measured unity of the self. Its use by Dio Chrys. shows that the Stoics had adopted it: *αὐτοὶ δὲ παντελῶς ἔξω τῆς ἁρμονίας τῆς κατὰ φύσιν γιγνόμενοι,* xxxii. 46, p. 676.

Its application to moral progress appears to come from Pl. *R.* 398c–401a, where education is said to correct the disorder and discord of the *ψυχή*, cf. *Ti.* 47d. By a transition of thought, Pl. goes on to compare temperance *συμφωνίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ R.* 430e, cf. *σώφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων,* of the concord of *λόγος* with the subordinate elements of the self, 442c.

Thus *ἁρμονία* is connected by Pl. with the description of the temperate man as *ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων*, and M. is not far removed from this when he says: *ἐπάνιθι εἰς ἑ.* **98. 26,** *ἀνάνηφε καὶ ἀνακαλοῦ σεαυτόν* p. **110. 10.**

M. prefers to speak of the good man's *life* as the rhythm, rather than like Pl. to call his *virtue* a melody. It is possible indeed that *ἁρμονία* means here the concerted relation of the self to the divine *λόγος*, cf. *τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν* D.L. vii. 88. M. speaks of the reverence which *σεαυτῷ τε ἀρεστόν σε ποιήσει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς εὐάρμοστον καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς σύμφωνον* p. **104. 15.**

Ch. 12: 100. 3 ἂν ἐθεράπευες: (*τὸν δαίμονα*) *γνησίως θεραπεύειν* p. **28. 14**; cf. *εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων* (sc. *τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς*) Arist. *E.N.* 1163^{b}18.

100. 4 ἡ ἐπάνοδός σοι . . . συνεχής: echoing, with another reference, *τῷ συνεχῶς . . . ἐπανέρχεσθαι* l. 1. There appears to be

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a reminiscence of the prisoners in the cave: *ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι* Pl. *R.* 521c.

100. 6 **προσαναπαύου ταύτῃ:** recurring in expression to: *τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπανιέναι . . . προσαναπαύσῃ αὐτῷ* (i.e. *τῷ λόγῳ*) p. **82.** 5–8.

τὰ ἐκεῖ, i.e. life on a lower plane, as it were in a world below; so *ἐκεῖ* is contrasted with *ἡ εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος* Pl. *R.* 532b.

Ch. 13: 100. 8 **Οἷον δή:** the exclamatory use of which M. is fond, cf. l. 13, and pp. **104.** 21, **110.** 3, **120.** 10. Thus *οὕτως δεῖ* l. 15 is resumptive, not correlative.

100. 9 **νεκρὸς οὗτος:** a disagreeable image, like *θάπτεται* p. **60.** 7.

100. 11 **ἡ περιπόρφυρος:** Demonax, seeing a man airing proudly his purple laticlave, said: *τοῦτο μέντοι πρὸ σοῦ πρόβατον ἐφόρει, καὶ ἦν πρόβατον* Lucian, *Dem.* 41.

αἱματίῳ κόγχης: not the blood, but a yellow juice expressed from the mantle of the *murex* or *πορφύρα*. The yellow stain turns to violet under the sun's rays, and that is why the colour afterwards hardly fades.

100. 12 **ἐντερίου,** not to be altered to *νευρίου*, after Tzetzes *Test.*; cf. *εἰς πόρνης γυναικὸς ἔντερον* Archil. *Fr.* 142 Bergk, Ael. *V.H.* iv. 14.

100. 13 **μυξαρίου,** i.e. *σπέρματος*, as at p. **70.** 18.

100. 13–14 **καθικνούμεναι:** cf. *καθικέσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς* [Pl.] *Ax.* 369e. Holste notes a scholion from L 4, *εἰς βάθος χωροῦσαι.*

100. 14 **διεξιοῦσαι δι' αὐτῶν:** cf. *διεξόδου* p. **108.** 13 n.

100. 16 **λίαν ἀξιόπιστα,** personifying *τὰ πράγματα* as *plausible*, cf. *πολλοὶ λύκοι ἀξιόπιστοι* St. Ign. *Philadelph.* 2; *ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ πιθανότητες αὐτῶν* (sc. *τῶν φαντασιῶν*) Epict. ii. 22. 6; *λογικῇ τινι πιθανότητι παραγόνται* p. **78.** 15, and the adv. at p. **210.** 9.

ἀπογυμνοῦν: cf. *αὐτὸ ὁποῖόν ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν, γυμνόν* p. **44.** 24; *γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν . . . χρωμάτων . . . αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται* Pl. *R.* 601b.

100. 17–18 **τὴν ἱστορίαν . . . περιαιρεῖν:** the meaning appears to be that you are to strip your experience of the *account* the presenta-

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tions give of themselves, 'narrationis pompa', Gat.; cf. *ἵνα μὴ σοφιστικὴν ἕξιν μηδὲ ἱστορικήν, ἀλλὰ ἐνδιάθετον καὶ φιλόσοφον λαμβάνωμεν*, where *ἱστορική* is opp. to *ἐνδιάθετος*, as though it were equivalent to *προφορικός*, 'put into words', Plu. *De audiendo* 48d, so that *ἱστορία* may have suggested 'verbal show of proof'. Compare *ἱστόριον* for 'confirmatory evidence': *ταῦτά μοι καὶ τοσαῦτα ἐστὶν ἱστόρια τῶν προτέρων λόγων* Hippocrates, i, p. 380.

M. passes to *τῦφος*, here employed for vainglory expressed in acts which only pretend to be virtuous: *ὁ πάντων ἐπιβουλότατος φύεται τῦφος, ὃν τινες . . . προσκυνοῦσι τὰς κενὰς δόξας σεμνοποιοῦντες* Philo, ii, p. 181, cf. *σεμνοτυφίαν* p. **182.** 21.

σεμνύνεται: cf. *καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων* Pl. *Tht.* 175a, like 'the boast of heraldry'.

100. 20 **Ξενοκράτους:** a harsh interpretation must have been put by the Cynic Crates upon the conduct or utterances of Xen., who was head of the Academy after Pl.'s nephew, Speusippus. Cf. the scoff of Antisthenes: *ἔσκωπτέ τε Πλάτωνα ὡς τετυφωμένον* D.L. vi. 7. M. says 'even of Xen.' for he was reckoned to be *ἀτυφότατος* D.L. iv. 11; *αὐστηρὸς τὸν τρόπον* Plu. *De vit. pud.* 533c.

Ch. 14: 100. 22 Τὰ πλεῖστα: see Eng. Commentary, p. **343.**

ἡ πληθύς, the Ionic form to distinguish the meaning 'multitude' from *πλῆθος*, number, p. **102.** 1; cf. *τὴν δὲ πληθὺν ὁρᾷς, ὦ Χάρων, τοὺς πλέοντας αὐτῶν* Lucian, *Cont.* 15.

εἰς γενικώτατα ἀνάγεται: cf. *εἰς μίαν ἀνάγειν τὰς πολλὰς* (sc. *τέχνας*) and *εἰς τὰς καθόλου ἀν.* Galen, v. 851, 856; *ἐτ' ἀνωτέρω καὶ γενικώτεραι* ib. 855.

Thus *γεν.* means *general heads*, under which real kinds are grouped, not categories, as the moods are grouped under the infin., *ῥῆμα γενικώτατον* Apoll. Dysc. *Synt.* 3, 13, p. 228 S. The Stoics held that: *τῶν ἡνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτά, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 81; cf. Plu. *De virt. mor.* 451b; Philo, ii. 496; Julian, p. 182d (where *φύσεως* should be read for *σώματος*); Galen, xiv. 726, where *ἕξις* is seen to be equivalent to *ἐκτικὸν πνεῦμα, τὸ συνέχον τοὺς λίθους.*

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100. 24 ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγῳ μετριωτέρων, i.e. 'a little better educated': *ἐὰν γὰρ εὖ παιδευόμενοι μέτριοι ἄνδρες γίγνωνται* Pl. *R.* 423e.

εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, i.e. *εἰς γεν. τὰ ὑπὸ ψ. συνεχόμενα.*

102. 1 ἢ κατὰ ψιλὸν τὸ πλῆθος . . . κεκτῆσθαι: in the MSS. order these words have no construction; if removed to here, M. adds to flocks and herds a 'family of slaves', regarded ironically as mere *ψυχαί*, as *ἄλογοι* whose value is in their bare economic use, cf. *ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλόγων σμήνη καὶ ἀγέλαι*, which are *ψυχαὶ ἤδη*, p. **176.** 8.

Cf. the cattle followed by 'body of slaves' *Job*, 1. 3. So Milton says, with reference to *Gen.* 26. 14, 'of herds and flocks and numerous servitude' *P.L.* xii. 132. Boethius, contrasting Fortune's gifts with goods of the spirit, asks: 'an vero te longus ordo famulorum facit esse felicem?' *Cons.* ii, Pr. 5.

The grouping of slaves even with material commodities is not uncommon: *ἀνδράποδα καὶ ἵπποι καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος* [Pl.] *Eryx.* 392d; *χρυσίον δὲ πολὺ . . . καὶ ἀργύριον καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων* Plu. *De Fort.* 99e; *διὰ πλήθους θεραπόντων καὶ ὀχημάτων* Philo, ii, p. 181; *οἰκία . . . καὶ τἀνδράποδα πάντα καὶ ἵπποι δὴ καὶ κύνες καὶ χωρία* Galen, i. 10.

102. 2 τῶν ἔτι χαριεστέρων: 'sub conficto virtuosorum nomine' d'Acier, *amateurs* of taste; cf. *χαριέστατον . . . περὶ τὰς τέχνας* Pl. *Amat.* 135d; *οἱ χαρίεντες* opp. to *οἱ πολλοί* Arist. *E.N.* $1095^{b}22$; sim. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 15, p. 1000 R.; Epict. *Fr.* xviii.

102. 3 καθὸ λογική: for the emendation cf. p. **140.** 22, where Cas. wrote *καθὸ λ.* for *καθὸ ὑλική* P Mo 2 (*καθολική* A). *ψ. καθολική* is not found elsewhere in the *Meditations.*

ἀλλὰ καθὸ τεχνική: M. introduces a distinction between the relatively high development of *ψ.*, as exhibited in man's technical skill, and the higher grade reached in his moral and social activities, a distinction between *artificium* and *scientia* for which we are prepared at p. **74.** 16 sq.; cf. 'communis prudentia, quam omnes, cuicumque artificio praesunt, debent habere' Cic. *Fin.* iv. 76, sim. iii. 18; 'artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis' Caes. *B.G.* vii. 29. 2.

ἐντρεχής: *ἐντρέχεια* is used of skill in teaching p. **6.** 18, and the

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adv. of Socr.'s dialectic p. **142.** 8. The reference, then, here is to intellectual ability as distinguished from artistic proficiency, and M. is thinking of grammar, literature, and science.

102. 4 **ψυχὴν λογικήν.** P's addition *καθολικήν* seems to have originated in a correction of *λογικήν* influenced by the erroneous *καθολικῆς* just above.

102. 4–5 **οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστρέφεται:** cf. *τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεψόμεθα* Epict. i. 9. 21.

The maxim of concentration resembles that laid down for the warriors in the ideal state: *τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν δημιουργιῶν ἀφειμένους δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως* Pl. *R.* 395b.

102. 6–7 **τῷ ὁμογενεῖ εἰς τοῦτο συνεργεῖ:** a co-operation, in the first instance, with our fellow-men, although M. may also intend 'with the gods', since reason makes man of one kind with them. St. Paul has said: *Θεοῦ γάρ ἐσμεν συνεργοί* 1 *Cor.* 3. 9. See the quotation from Heracl. p. **114.** 8.

εἰς τοῦτο, i.e. *εἰς τὸ τὴν ἑ. ψυχὴν διασῴζειν.* Should we not read *εἰς ταὐτό* in view of *συνεργὰ δὲ πρὸς ταὐτόν* p. **114.** 18, i.e. *εἰς ἓν ἀποτέλεσμα* ib. l. 6?

Ch. 15: 102. 9 **ἀπέσβη.** M. passes from the metaphor of the flame of life (Heraclit. 26 D., 77 B., cited at p. **58.** 4 *Test.*), to that of the stream of existence, p. **68.** 6 and *Test.* there, cf. p. **90.** 4.

ῥύσεις καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἀνανεοῦσι τὸν κόσμον: cf. *φιλεῖ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φ. . . . τὰ ὄντα μεταβάλλειν καὶ ποιεῖν νέα ὅμοια* p. **66.** 9.

ἀλλοιώσεις, a term inherited from Arist., suggests an analogy between the vicissitudes of the Universe and the physiological *alterations* of an organism, cf. *φθείρεσθαι· λεγέσθω δὲ τοῦτο σημαντικῶς τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι* p. **194.** 18; *τὴν ὑποβεβλημένην οὐσίαν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ πᾶσαν ἡνωμένην θ' ἅμα καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυναμένην* Galen, ii. 27.

102. 10 **τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα,** *boundless eternity* exhibits the like flux as the passage of phenomena. He spoke of *τὸ ἄπειρον ἀχανές* in regard to both future and past, p. **90.** 7. Pl. has *ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας Lg.* 676a, and Arist. defines *αἰών* as *τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος Cael.* 279ª26.

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102. 11–12 **ἐφ' οὗ στῆναι**: some translators make *τί . . . τούτων τῶν παραθεόντων* the antecedent, but *τῷ ποταμῷ* is that in which man cannot secure a foothold: *ποταμοῖσι δὶς τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης* Heraclit. 91 D., 41 B. A dislocation in the MSS. may then be presumed.

102. 12 **τῶν παραθεόντων**: cf. *καὶ ἄλλο παραφέρεται* p. **68.** 7.

102. 13 **ὥσπερ εἴ τίς τι**, the ellipse is like that in: *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀποδημῶν ἐκάλεσεν*, 'for it is as when a man' *St. Matt.* 25. 14.

Mr. Jackson's *εἰ ⟨παῖς⟩ τίς τι* is at first attractive, the proverb *τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν*, of a vain quest, being naturally applied to children, *διώκει παῖς ποτανὸν ὄρνιν* Aesch. *Ag.* 394, cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 291b. The simile is, however, even more effective when used of any man, for men are children in this, cf. *πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;* Pl. *Euthyph.* 4a, where it is a synonym for madness.

Guigue uses the image of the pursuit of temporal delights: 'capitur enim (sc. puer) viso passere, quem cum acceperit, subiacet tot casibus, quot ipse passer', op. cit. 188, cf. 454–5.

The parables of the bird which leaves no trace of its passage through the air, *Wisdom*, 5. 11, and of the sparrow in Bede, *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 13, have been compared with this passage, but the illustration in each case is different.

102. 14 **τοιοῦτον δή τι**: i.e. man's life is equally fleeting with the world-stream, and is transient like the continued replenishment of the *πνεῦμα* from the blood and of the breath by respiration.

102. 15–16 **ἀναθυμίασις . . . ἀνάπνευσις**, the two processes recognized by the Pneumatists: the change from blood to vital spirit by *exhalation*, p. **94.** 17, and the vitalization of blood by atmospheric air: *ἐξ οὗ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναπνέω* p. **76.** 7.

102. 18 **χθὲς καὶ πρῴην**: cf. *ἐχθὲς καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν*, of man's renewal but yesterday, p. **196.** 7.

102. 19 **ὅθεν τὸ πρῶτον ἔσπασας.** M. is perhaps combining two hypotheses: (*a*) that we inspire *πῦρ νοερόν* with each breath, cf. p. **54.** 10; (*b*) that with its first inhalation the babe passes from *τὸ καθάπερ φυτόν* to *τὸ ζῷον*: *γίγνεσθαι μὲν γάρ φησι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν τὸ βρέφος ἀποτεχθῇ* Plu. *St. rep.* 1053d, cf. Tertull. *De An.* 25.

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For the change from the first pers. pl. to the second pers. sing., cf. p. **118.** 17.

Ch. 16: 102. 20 **τὸ διαπνεῖσθαι:** cf. p. **34.** 7 where the order of enumeration of vital functions is correct. Here *τὸ τρέφεσθαι* is brought in out of its order to lead to the depreciatory comparison of nutrition with excretion.

102. 22 **τὸ συναγελάζεσθαι:** cf. p. **186.** 13, where it is joined with *βόσκεσθαι* depreciatingly. Polybius uses *εἰς τὸ ὁμόφυλον συναγ.* of man's natural aggregation into tribal groups which became the germ of city life, so that M.'s use of the word is unexpected.

§ 2: 104. 3 **αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι,** used for the industries of agriculture and stock-farming in contrast with *τέχνη* in its narrower sense of manufacture.

§ 4: 104. 8 **ὧδε οὖν τὸ τίμιον.** It would be in M.'s manner to write *ὧδε οὖν ἓν τίμιον* or *ὧδε ἓν τίμιον.* See *τί οὖν ἐστι περὶ ὃ δεῖ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεσθαι; ἓν τοῦτο* pp. **64.** 28–**66.** 1; *ἓν ὧδε πολλοῦ ἄξιον* p. **118.** 1.

The argument from industries and crafts, with the reference to the *ἔργον* of what is trained or constructed, is the same as that at Pl. *R.* 352e. Pl. wished to show that a reasonable satisfaction, wherein man may rest, lies in the fulfilment of normal human nature, in what M. here terms *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κ. κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἴσχεσθαι* l. 2, and *ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς κίνησις* l. 18; cf. *ὠφελεῖν δέ ἐστι κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατ' ἀρετήν* D.L. vii. 104; *εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ' ἀρ. καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κατ' ἀρ.* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 95.

104. 10–11 **φθονεῖν, ζηλοτυπεῖν:** cf. *στῆναι στάσιν πολεμίου* p. **114.** 5. These anti-social passions are pilloried by Lucr.: 'denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido' iii. 59. They are by him paradoxically ascribed to man's dread of death and of an existence beyond the grave.

104. 12 **ὅλως πεφύρθαι:** cf. *φύρονται* p. **40.** 9 n.; M. portrays the general result of appetite and ambition; so, *φύρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα* Max. Tyr. xi. 4; 'ipsi se in tenebris caenoque queruntur' Lucr. iii. 77.

§ 5: 104. 14 **ἡ δὲ τῆς ἰδίας διανοίας αἰδώς:** here *διάνοια* corresponds

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with *ψ. λογική* p. **102.** 4. In the earlier Books reverence is for the higher self, *ὁ δαίμων*, see *μὴ αἰδουμένῃ σεαυτήν* p. **24.** 5 n.

104. 15 **τοῖς κοινωνοῖς εὐάρμοστον**: cf. *τὸν δὲ σπουδαῖον . . . εὐάρμοστον εἶναι πρὸς πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 108; *εἰς τὸ κοινῇ χρήσιμον καὶ εὐάρμ.* p. **122.** 16; sim. p. **102.** 6.

104. 16 **ἐπαινοῦντα.** *Praise* is inappropriate according to Aristotle to this emotion; the gods are *τῶν τιμίων*, not *τῶν ἐπαινετῶν* *E.N.* 1101^{b}11. M. elsewhere has *ἀσπάζεσθαι* p. **38.** 22, *φιλεῖν* p. **48.** 15, *στέργειν* p. **114.** 25.

104. 17 **διατετάχασιν**: cf. *κόσμος διατεταγμένος*, where Providence is implied, p. **62.** 12; *ἡ πάντα διατάξασα τοῦ βίου ἡμῶν Πρόνοια* Ditt. *Syll.*^{3} 458.

Ch. 17: 104. 18 **Ἄνω, κάτω, κύκλῳ**: cf. *τὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐγκύκλια, ἄνω κάτω* p. **180.** 26, and pp. **68.** 17, **228.** 18. Usually M. regards the elemental movements as Heraclit. did: *ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὠυτή* 60 D., 69 B. So, *αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ μεταβάλλει* Muson. xlii H.; cf. 'sic naturis iis, ex quibus omnia constant, sursus deorsus, ultro citro, commeantibus mundi partium coniunctio continetur' Cic. *N.D.* ii. 84.

κύκλῳ, however, may here refer, as is perhaps intended at p. **54.** 10, to a fifth element with a peripheral motion: *τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ' εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ' αἰθέριον περιφερῶς κινεῖται* Aët. *Pl.* i. 12. 4; Diels, *Dox.* p. 311.

104. 18–19 **ἡ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς κίνησις**, the gen. of definition, *virtutis motus*, like our 'the motive of passion'. Self-determination is a movement other than the natural necessity of elemental motion, *κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν μόνη* (sc. *ἡ ψ.*) p. **88.** 11; *νοερᾶς κινήσεως ἴδιον περιορίζειν ἑαυτήν* p. **138.** 14. Fournier thought *φοραί* and *κίν.* to be opp., but the two words are used indifferently, e.g. for the movements of the heavens, Arist. *Cael.* 287^{a}23, *Metaph.* 1052^{a}27; cf. *νοῦς φέρεται* p. **168.** 20.

104. 20 **προιοῦσα εὐοδεῖ**: cf. *εὐοδία* p. **80.** 15 n., *διὰ τῆς εὐοδούσης καὶ . . . προιούσης ἐνεργείας* p. **138.** 1; *εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὕροιαν βίου* D.L. vii. 88; p. **96.** 1 n.

Ch. 18: 104. 25 **οἱ προγενέστεροι**: cf. 'quid autem interest ab iis, qui postea nascentur, sermonem fore de te, cum ab iis nullus

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fuerit, qui ante nati sunt?' Cic. *Rep.* vi. 23; cf. Lucr. iii. 972; Sen. *Ep.* 54. 4.

Ch. 19: 104. 26–7 Μὴ . . . ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνειν, a maxim common to moralists; M. repeats it in other words at p. **162.** 11; *ἔθιζε καὶ ὅσα ἀπογινώσκεις* p. **240.** 1. Epict. says: *δύο ταῦτα ἐξελεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἴησιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν· . . . ἀπιστία δὲ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑροεῖν τοσούτων περιεστηκότων* iii. 14. 8, cf. iii. 12. 8; so too Sen.: 'quicquid fieri potuit, potest; nos modo . . . sequamur naturam' *Ep.* 98. 14, 'non possumus ista, quia nos posse non credimus' 116. 8.

αὐτῷ σοί: for the order cf. *οὐδ' αὐτὸν σὲ βλαβήσεσθαι* Pl. *Hp. Mi.* 373a.

104. 27 δυνατὸν καὶ οἰκεῖον: cf. *ὃ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο οἰκειότερον* p. **150.** 16; *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν* Chrysippus ap. D.L. vii. 85.

104. 28 νομίζειν, Mr. Marchant's correction, conforms with *ὑπολαμβάνειν* l. 27, and with M.'s practice, see pp. **60.** 12, **82.** 1. Notice that *ἐν* follows at once at p. **106.** 1, and cf. *μέν⟨ειν⟩ ἐν* p. **110.** 3.

Ch. 20; 106. 2 ἐρραγείς: this seems to be taken usually with *τῇ κεφαλῇ* to mean *capite alliso*. I have translated it as if M. had written *ἐκραγείς* (Schultz), although the simple verb is not recorded in this sense.

ἐπισημαινόμεθα: cf. *οὐκ εἰκὸς παρατρέχειν αὐτούς . . . ἀλλ' ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον* Polyb. vi. 6. 4; here the use seems cognate to our 'marking' a man at football.

106. 6 παρενθυμώμεθα: cf. *μὴ παρενθυμουμένῳ* p. **76.** 24 n.

τῶν οἷον προσγυμναζομένων: we should perhaps read *προγυμν.*, as Upton suggested, in the sense that our antagonists serve as *trainers*: *τί δ' ὠφελεῖ τὸν ἀθλητὴν ὁ προγυμναζόμενος; . . . τὸ ἀνεκτικόν μου γυμνάζει, τὸ ἀόργητον, τὸ πρᾷον* Epict. iii. 20. 9. Writing on the text 'calamitas virtutis occasio', Sen. personifies Fortune: 'verberat nos et lacerat Fortuna; patiamur: non est saevitia, certamen est' *De Prov.* 4. 12.

Ch. 21: 106. 8 ἐλέγξαι, constructed with *ὅτι*, cf. *οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;* Pl. *Grg.* 470c, and id. *Sph.* 259a.

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παραστῆσαί μοι: cf. *δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι ὡς* Pl. *R.* 600c; *εἴ τις τοῦτο παριστὰς βλάπτει τοὺς ἀκούοντας* Epict. ii. 23. 47; *τὰς αἰτίας, ἃς διὰ παντὸς ἐπειράθην ὑμῖν παραστῆσαι τοῦ λόγου* Alex. Aphr. *De Fato*, p. 212; *οὐδὲ παραστῆσαι δύνανταί σοι περὶ ὧν νῦν κατηγοροῦσί μου Acts*, 24. 13.

106. 9 χαίρων μεταθήσομαι: for the maxim cf. *Test.* and the example of Pius, pp. **12.** 1, **110.** 6. It was a favourite with Socr. e.g.: *πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ χάριν ἕξω . . . σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς* Pl. *Grg.* 470c.

μετατίθεσθαι, ἀνατίθεσθαι properly refer to taking back or altering a move in a game, cf. p. **56.** 5, and *τὸ μ. καὶ ἕπεσθαι τῷ διορθοῦντι* p. **152.** 1; *ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι* Pl. *R.* 334e.

106. 11 ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπάτης καὶ ἀγνοίας: cf. *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται* Arist. *E.N.* 1113a33. Self-deception brings ignorance of the true end, and this leads men astray: *πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἀφαμαρτάνει τοῦ προκειμένου καὶ πεπλάνηται* p. **188.** 26.

Ch. 22: 106. 13 πεπλανημένα, continuing the last ch. and alluding to Heraclit. *Test.*; cf. 'ut . . . recta ire te via credas, nihil avocatus transversis multorum vestigiis passim discurrentium, quorundam circa ipsam errantium viam' Sen. *De Tranq.* 2. 2.

Although *πεπλ.* refers to persons, M. continues the generic neuter from *τὰ ἄλλα.*

Ch. 23: 106. 14 Τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις ζῴοις. The words take up *ἄλογα* l. 13, as *τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις* take up *πεπλανημένα* l. 13. Sim. *ἀγνοοῦντα* l. 13 takes up *ἀγνοίας* l. 11, and *πεπλ.* l. 13 resumes *ἀπάτης* l. 11. Thus the division into three chapters is artificial.

πράγμασι, coupled with *ὑποκειμένοις*; cf. p. **82.** ll. 15 and 19.

106. 17 θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ: see *σὺν μνήμῃ θεοῦ* p. **98.** 12 and Epict. cited there; cf. *καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς* Pl. *Ti.* 27b; *σὺν τῷ θεῷ πράττειν συμβουλεύω, ἵνα καὶ τὴν τύχην συνεπαινῇ θεῶν ἵλεων ὄντων* X. *Eq. Mag.* 5. 14, cf. ib. 9. 8. St. Paul has: *ἀδιαλείπτως προσεύχεσθε, ἐν παντὶ εὐχαριστεῖτε* 1 *Thess.* 5. 17, on which Theophyl., influenced by Stoic doctrine, comments: *ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς συμφερόντως συμβαίνουσι.* So the Christian sailor is to

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voyage: *τὸν οὐράνιον κυβερνήτην παρακαλῶν* Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* p. 80.

106. 18 καὶ τρεῖς ὧραι τοιαῦται. The sentiment resembles: *πότερον δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον διάστημα χρόνου . . . οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν αὐτῷ μέλει* p. **42. 24** n., the stress being upon the truth that the *shortness* of a life so dedicated matters no whit. Hutcheson says: 'Three hours of such a life is sufficient (as well as the three ages of Nestor)', believing that M. refers to *ὁ τριήμερος* p. **72. 22**. D'Acier and others suppose that *τοιαῦται* refers only to prayer.

Ch. 24: 106. 19 Ἀλέξανδρος. M. may have recalled what the Roman poet says of Scipio: 'ossa dedit terrae proinde ac famul infimus esset' Lucr. iii. 1035, for, at p. **64. 24**, he has contrasted Scipio with the common folk, who are 'as though they had never been'. No doubt the reflection occurs in the literature of many ages and many lands; see e.g.; *ὑμεῖς δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωποι ἀποθνήσκετε, καὶ ὡς εἷς τῶν ἀρχόντων πίπτετε Ps.* 81. (82.) 7;

> *ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ Ἶρος κρείων τ' Ἀγαμέμνων*
> *Θερσίτῃ δ' ἶσος Θέτιδος παῖς ἠϋκόμοιο*
>
> Lucian, *Cont.* 22.

and again: *ἅπαντες γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς ἀλλήλοις γίγνονται ὅμοιοι* id. *Nec.* 15; 'et quae diligis et quae despicis, unus exaequabit cinis' Sen. *Ad Marc.* 11. 2.

The lesson implied is: 'tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire?' Lucr. iii. 1045.

106. 20 εἰς ταὐτὸ κατέστησαν: cf. *ὅταν μὲν ἡ λίμνη καταστῇ*, 'finds its level', Aristoph. *Eq.* 865.

⟨ἀν⟩ελήφθησαν: cf. *ἀναληφθήσῃ* p. **56.** 13 n., *ἀναλαμβάνεται* p. **124.** 5, *ἀναληφθῆναι* p. **196.** 3.

106. 21 διεσκεδάσθησαν, i.e. if we should accept the atomic hypothesis, cf. *σκεδασθήσεται* p. **98.** 7 n.

Ch. 25: 106. 25–6 ἐν τῷ ἑνί τε καὶ σύμπαντι: cf. *ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον* p. **66.** 27, *τοῦ τελείου ζῴου* p. **192.** 5. For the phrase, not used elsewhere by M., cf. *διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου*, and *κόσμον ἐτύμως τὸ σύμπαν* [Arist.] *Mu.* 398^{b}8, 399^{a}13.

A's *γεννητῷ* is remarkable; it belongs to an order of thought about the universe which is familiar from Pl., e.g. *αἰσθητόν*,

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γεννητόν, πεφορημένον ἀεί, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον Ti. 52a. M. never employs the word, rather he says: *τοῦ τελείου ζῴου . . . γεννῶντος πάντα* p. **192.** 6, so that *τῷ ἑνί τε καὶ σύμπαντι καὶ γεννῶντι πάντα* might have been used by him. Sch.'s *τὰ γινόμενα καὶ γεννητά*, tentatively proposed, has no parallel in M. and is a combination alien to his way of writing, nor is the corruption of the text, thus suggested, probable.

Ch. 26: 106. 27 **πῶς γράφεται.** This illustration appears designed to introduce the doctrine of the numbers or proportions of Duty, p. **34.** 8 n.; see an attempted explanation, Engl. Comm. p. **345.**

108. 2 **πρῴως προϊών.** Either you are to go over the 24 letters of the alphabet with the angry man, so that one may preserve, the other recover, self-control, or else the 'letters' here are metaphorically used for the *numbers* which determine the problem of duty. Against the former interpretation is the fact that the metaphor is introduced by *καὶ ἐνθάδε* l. 3; as a question of orthography is no ground for anger, only for explanation, so *here*, in the case of a difference in the moral sphere, you are to remember that duty consists in a perfection composed of certain due proportions, so that there is no place for anger: you are mildly to show him a better way, p. **226.** 15.

108. 4 **συμπληροῦται.** *πᾶν καθῆκον* is looked upon as a numerical sum, or rather, according to the geometrical way in which the Greeks did their arithmetic, as a *προβλῆμα*, a completed figure. In the finished diagram *τὸ παραπλήρωμα* is a complement, Eucl. *Elem.* ii, Def. 2. Cf. *συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν* Arist. *G.C.* 336^{b}31.

τηροῦντα, *preserving* the elements of Duty, as man is to maintain, *τηρητέον*, both the *τελειότητες* in which his *τέλος* consists, and *τὸ ἀγαθόν* which is *τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους* p. **86.** 7 sq.

108. 6 **παραίνειν ὁδῷ τὸ προκείμενον,** i.e. *τὸ τέλος*, cf. *ὁδεύουσι εἰς τὸ προκείμενον τέλος* p. **86.** 5.

For *ὁδῷ*, see p. **8.** 6.

Ch. 27: 108. 7–8 **τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα.** M. is following Epict. closely: *ὅστις οὖν τούτου μέμνηται . . . ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μέτρον πάσης πράξεως τὸ φαινόμενον . . . εἰ καλῶς* (sc.

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φαίνεται) ἀνέγκλητός ἐστιν· εἰ κακῶς, αὐτὸς ἐζημίωται . . . οὐδενὶ ὀργισθήσεται i. 28. 10; *πᾶν ζῷον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ᾠκείωται ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι* id. ii. 22. 15; cf. ib. 33 and 36, ii. 26 passim, *Ench.* 42.

Ch. 28: 108. 12 Θάνατος ἀνάπαυλα: a reminiscence of Heraclit. *Test.*; cf. *μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται* id. 84a D., 83 B., and perhaps 84b D., 82 B. We know too little of H.'s belief about the individual *ψ.* to judge whether his conception of rhythmical change was prolonged beyond death in the case of mortals.

The longing for rest is here a natural emotion, like that often expressed by the Psalmists or by St. Paul in *τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων εἰς τὸ ἀναλῦσαι Phil.* 1. 23.

108. 12–13 ἀντιτυπίας . . . νευροσπαστίας, the *reaction* or *response* to sense-impressions, and the *stimulus* to action arising from *αἱ ὁρμαί*, cf. *τὸ μὲν τυποῦσθαι φανταστικῶς . . . τὸ δὲ νευροσπαστεῖσθαι ὁρμητικῶς* p. **48.** 9.

108. 13 διανοητικῆς διεξόδου, of the *penetration* of the presentations, or of the objects of imagination, by the judging mind; cf. *διεξιοῦσαι δι' αὐτῶν* p. **100.** 14.

M. has taken this use of *διέξοδος* from Pl.'s account of the analysis of experience into its elements, which he compares with the division of words first into syllables, then into letters: *τὴν διὰ στοιχείου δ. περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι Tht.* 207c. M. probably recalls here what he said, at l. 2 above, of the enumeration of *τὰ στοιχεῖα*, as, when he wrote *περαίνειν ὁδῷ* l. 6, he may have recollected Pl.'s *διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα Tht.* l.c.

108. 13–14 τῆς πρὸς τὴν σάρκα λειτουργίας: cf. *παύσῃ πόνων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἀνεχόμενος καὶ λατρεύων . . . τῷ ἀγγείῳ* p. **36.** 22. Pains and pleasures, and *αἱ πείσεις* generally, are connected with *τῆς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λείας ἢ τραχείας κινήσεως* p. **90.** 17, where see the note on *σάρξ* as a synonym for *σῶμα*.

Ch. 29: 108. 16 προαπαυδᾶν, this *failure* of the mind before that of the body has been differently contemplated at p. **34.** 6. Here he is thinking of physical vigour and moral ineptitude, cf. *τοῦ σώματος ἰσχύοντος ἡ ψυχὴ προαπολείπει* opp. to *τὸ σῶμα ἀπειρηκὸς ἡ ψ. συνεξέσωσεν* Antipho, v. 93. Mr. Haines compares M.'s expressed determination to persist in a prescribed regimen:

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'turpe alioqui fuerit diutius vitium corporis quam animi studium ad reciperandam sanitatem posse durare' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 71.

Ch. 30: 108. 17 **ἀποκαισαρωθῇς,** a word coined on the model of forms like *ἐγκεκοισυρωμένη* Aristoph. *Nu.* 48. For the prefix, cf. *ἀπογλαυκοῦσθαι*, 'to be dyed blue *in grain*', *P. Holm.* 26. 32.

μὴ βαφῇς, added to indicate his meaning: cf. *τὴν βαφὴν οὐκ ἀνιέντα τῆς τυραννίδος . . . δευσοποιόν*, Plu. *Max. cum princ.* 779c; *ἔξωθεν . . . λευκοπάρυφός ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἔνδον ὁλοπόρφυρος*, id. *Reg. Apophth.* 180e. The contrast here is with *δικαιοσύνῃ βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος*, p. **38.** 21.

108. 17–18 **τήρησον οὖν σεαυτόν,** the phrase has a devotional sense: *τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον* p. **32.** 18, *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δ. καθαρὸν ἑστῶτα τηρῆς* p. **46.** 16; *ἄσπιλον ἑ. τηρεῖν St. James*, 1. 27; cf. St. Paul, 1 *Tim.* 5. 22, 1 *St. John*, 5. 18.

108. 18 **ἁπλοῦν:** cf. *ἅπλωσον σεαυτόν* p. **62.** 7–8 n., where the verb is shown to combine the meanings of simplicity, openness to the day, and sincerity.

ἀκέραιον, not used by M. elsewhere. In meaning it is close to *καθαρός*, p. **46.** 17; thus Arist. says: *ἂν γὰρ μὴ καθαρὸν ᾖ τὸ ὕδωρ . . . καὶ ἀκέραιον, οὐκ ἐθέλει πιεῖν H.A.* 605ª14. There seems to be in its use as a moral term some sense of virgin innocence, cf. *ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπίπληκτος αὐτὸς τῷ βίῳ* Menand. *Epitrep.* 526 J., a line which almost repeats Eur. *Or.* 922.

σεμνόν, ἄκομψον, these are correlated: 'dignified in act and speech' and 'unaffected in word and deed'. For the second word see *κομψεία* p. **40.** 13 n.

108. 19 **θεοσεβῆ,** used only here and at p. **110.** 8 by M. of his predecessor. He nowhere employs *εὐσεβής* or *εὐσέβεια*, probably from a nice sense that by becoming a title it had lost its genuine implication. He never permitted the word to be ascribed to himself, though later writers often use it of him.

εὐμενῆ, φιλόστοργον: the second word adds a colour of natural, human affection to the word 'gracious' which applies to himself in his station as emperor. This word had begun to lose its force through its conventional use of monarchs.

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ἐρρωμένον, of the *enduring* temper of a ruler; cf. *ἐρρωμένως* of Pius, p. **16.** 1 and of M. himself, with *εὐμενῶς* p. **46.** 16.

108. 20 **ἀγώνισαι**, a natural metaphor from the games. It is used literally by Epict.: *οὐδ' ἂν ἀπαυδήσωμεν ἐνταῦθα* (at Olympia), *κωλύει τις πάλιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι* iii. 25. 4. Cf. *ἀθλητὴν ἄθλου τοῦ μεγίστου* p. **38.** 20, *ἀγών* p. **234.** 10, and St. Paul's *κοπιῶ ἀγωνιζόμενος Col.* 1. 29, *τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν καλὸν ἠγώνισμαι* 2 *Tim.* 4. 7.

108. 21 **αἰδοῦ θεούς, σῷζε ἀνθρώπους**: cf. *θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν . . . ἀνθρώπους δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν* p. **94.** 20.

108. 22 **διάθεσις ὁσία καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαί**: almost a repetition of 'reverence the gods, save men'; see pp. **230.** 4, **234.** 19, and cf. *πράξει δικαίᾳ καὶ διαθέσει εὐμενεῖ* p. **62.** 6.

§ 2: **108.** 23 **Ἀντωνίνου μαθητής**: the transition from the lessons of Philosophy to the teaching of Pius is happy. The sketch of his virtues, like the series of portraits in Book i, is at the same time a summary of what he proposed to learn from example.

108. 24 **εὔτονον**, of mental energy by transference from muscular vigour; cf. *καὶ κατὰ ψυχήν τινας λέγομεν ἰσχύειν . . . καὶ εὐτόνους εἶναι* Chrysippus ap. Galen, *Hipp. et Pl.* p. 414 Mü. Epict. compares firmness of judgement to *τὴν εὐτονίαν* of a well-founded edifice, ii. 15. 8. For this constancy cf. p. **10.** 25 (see p. **10.** 8, where by an oversight I have translated *ὁμότονον*).

τὸ ὁμαλές: the word has the sense 'level', of an unruffled surface, so that it stands for *mens aequa*; cf. *διὰ τί οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων οὐχ ὁμαλίζεις, καὶ ὅταν Καίσαρι προσίῃς;* Epict. iv. 4. 9. The opposed weakness is *διαταραχθῆναι* p. **98.** 25, see *ταράσσομαι* p. **98.** 22 n.

τὸ ὅσιον: cf. l. 22 n. This trait is omitted in the portrait at i. 16; evidence, perhaps, that this is not an earlier draft of that chapter. The virtue is akin to what is ascribed to Pius at p. **110.** 8, and is coupled, as by many other writers, with justice; see, e.g., p. **56.** 23.

108. 25 **τὸ εὔδιον τοῦ προσώπου**, 'frons tranquilla et serena', the aspect of Pheidias' Zeus at Olympia, Cic. *Tusc.* iii. 31. Roman poets use *serenus* of Augustus, Ovid, *Pont.* ii. 2. 65, and of Domitian, Mart. v. 6. 9. M. has *τὸ φαιδρόν* at p. **12.** 11, an epithet of Hermes, which agrees better than this august term with the portrait busts of Pius; 'vultu placidus' is the biographer's expression *H.A.* iii. 2. 1.

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τὸ μειλίχιον: Zeus was so entitled, at Athens and elsewhere; *Διάσια, Διὸς ἑορτὴ Μειλιχίου μεγίστη* Thuc. i. 126. 6; cf. Paus. i. 37. 4; *Μειλίχιος, εἰκότως, ἅτε καὶ πατήρ* Ael. Arist. xliii. 30.

τὸ ἀκενόδοξον: as at *εὔτονον* l. 24, an abstract term is substituted for the concrete phrase of p. **12.** 13.

108. 26 **τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν πραγμάτων**: the result of *τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκριβῶς* p. **12.** 8; the *ambition* to achieve this grasp of business is opposed to the pursuit of vain glory.

§ 3: 108. 27 **οὐκ ἄν τι ὅλως παρῆκε**, corresponding to *οὐ τό· προαπέστη τῆς ἐρεύνης* p. **12.** 9.

108. 28 **τοὺς ἀδίκως αὐτῷ μεμφομένους**: *αὐτῳ* is a correction required by M.'s usage, see pp. **104.** 13, **112.** 28, **140.** 14, **152.** 4–5, **170.** 15, **186.** 10, **190.** 9, **192.** 9. For the uncertainty of the MSS. cf. p. **110.** 23.

ἀδίκως, perhaps *temere, iniuria*, a colloquialism of which the lexicons give few examples.

This unfair criticism was of his public frugality, what they called niggardliness, see *τὸ φυλακτικὸν ἀεὶ . . . καταιτιάσεως* p. **12.** 14–16 n.

108. 29 **ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔσπευδεν**: see "*ἕως ἱδρῶτος*" p. **14.** 25.

108. 29–30 **διαβολὰς οὐκ ἐδέχετο**: cf. p. **4.** 13; this trait is omitted in the other sketch, unless it is implied at p. **14.** 14. The special meaning is that informers were discouraged, cf. 'quadruplatores exstincti sunt; publicatio bonorum rarior quam umquam fuit' *H.A.* iii. 7. 2.

108. 30 **ἀκριβὴς ἦν ἐξεταστὴς ἠθῶν καὶ πράξεων**: a general statement of which a particular illustration is given at p. **12.** 25. His shrewd judgement appears at many places in the biographer.

108. 30–**110.** 1 **οὐκ ὀνειδιστής**, repeating *οὐκ ἐξονειδιστικόν* p. **14.** 1.

110. 1 **οὐ ψοφοδεής, οὐχ ὑπόπτης**: the two adjectives appear to be complementary and to express the suspicious apprehensions of the despot. There is nothing corresponding in i. 16.

οὐ σοφιστής: see p. **12.** 22 n.

110. 1–2 **ὀλίγοις ἀρκούμενος**: see the more detailed account at p. **14.** 19, and *τὸ αὔταρκες ἐν παντί* p. **12.** 11 n.

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§ 4: 110. 3 **φιλόπονος καὶ μακρόθυμος**: a comparison with *τὸ φιλόπονον καὶ ἐνδελεχές* p. 12. 1 shows that the second adj. means 'long-suffering' in the sense of 'enduring', 'persevering'.

οἷος μέν⟨ειν⟩ ἐν τῷ ⟨αὐτῷ⟩: the supplements were made by Is. Cas. in a note to 'Senex etiam' *H.A.* iii. 13. 2.

The expression is a more succinct form of Theophrastus' usage in his sketches, e.g. *τοιοῦτός τις οἷος Char.* 3. 2.

110. 4 **διὰ τὴν λιτὴν δίαιταν**: cf. p. 14. 5 and 19 for other aspects of his temperance, and in general p. 16. 2. This curious illustration was perhaps suggested by Xen.'s account of Persian self-control: *ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐδύναντο ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ διαίτῃ μετρίᾳ ἐχρῶντο Cyr.* i. 2. 16.

110. 5–6 **τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ὅμοιον ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις**: cf. *τὸ διατηρητικὸν τῶν φίλων* p. 12. 10; *ἀεὶ δὲ ὅμοιον αὐτόν* ib. l. 7, with some detailed illustration.

110. 6–7 **τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι . . . καὶ χαίρειν**: cf. *τὸ παραχωρητικόν* p. 14. 6, where the details are interesting. M. is himself insistent upon this duty of intellectual modesty in a ruler, see *χαίρων μεταθήσομαι* p. 106. 9, and *προσπαραλαβών* p. 122. 13 n.

110. 8 **θεοσεβὴς χωρὶς δεισιδαιμονίας**: both Pius and M. were punctual in their observance of divine worship. The superstitious excesses and, on the other hand, the negligence of the first century A.D. may be studied in Plu.'s *De Superstitione*; he says that *εὐσέβεια* lies midway between *δεισιδαιμονία* and *ἀθεότης* 171f, and defines superstition as *δόξαν ἐμπαθῆ καὶ δέους ποιητικὴν ὑπόληψιν οὖσαν ἐκταπεινοῦντος καὶ συντρίβοντος τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἰόμενον μὲν εἶναι θεούς, εἶναι δὲ λυπηροὺς καὶ βλαβερούς* 165b.

110. 8–9 **ἵν' οὕτως . . . ἐπιστῇ**. The construction appears to be *πάντα ὡς Ἀντωνίνου μαθητής . . . ἵν' οὕτως*, all between forming a long parenthesis illustrating the disciple's lessons.

εὐσυνειδήτῳ: except in a doubtful fragment *συνείδησις* is used neither by Epict. nor by M. The latter has *ἡ συναίσθησις τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν* p. 128. 16, and *συννοεῖν* p. 92. 6. Epict. says: *τῷ Κυνικῷ ἀντὶ τῶν ὅπλων . . . τὸ συνειδὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην παραδίδωσιν* iii. 22. 94, where, however, he may mean the Cynic's *consciousness* of his high mission, cf. *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον . . . παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν* Chrysippus

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ap. D.L. vii. 85. This Cic. expresses thus: 'nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent' *Fin.* iii. 16.

In Epict. *τὸ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδῆμον* i. 5. 5, express what we mean by *conscience*, just as M. employs in this sense *αἰδώς* and its cognates, e.g. *μὴ αἰδουμένῃ σεαυτήν* p. **24**. 5. Thus it is difficult to be sure of the meaning of *εὐσυνειδήτῳ* here. Probably M. is expressing *bona conscientia*, a term often used by Sen., e.g. 'bona conscientia turbam advocat, mala etiam in solitudine anxia atque sollicita est' *Ep.* 43. 5. If this be so, M. would imply what St. Paul expresses by: *ἐγὼ πάσῃ συνειδήσει ἀγαθῇ πεπολίτευμαι τῷ Θεῷ*, 'I have lived in virtue and the conscience of my worth', *Acts*, 23. 1. In St. Paul's epistles *συνείδησις* has been said to 'correspond accurately to that of his Stoic contemporaries' (Sanday and Headlam ad *Rom.* 2. 15). The apostle, in his use of this word, approaches perhaps more nearly to our *conscience* than the Greek Stoics do. Seneca's *conscientia* is, however, close to our sense, and it has even been suggested that St. Paul was, during his Roman captivity, affected by the Latin use of this word (Ewald, *De vocis συνειδήσεως apud script. N.T. vi*, &c.).

110. 9 ἐπιστῇ ἡ τελευταία ὥρα: cf. *ὅπου ἂν τὸ τοῦ βίου πέρας ἐπιστῇ* p. **214**. 7; *πρίν μοι τύχη τοιάδ' ἐπέστη* Soph. *O.T.* 776. Possibly M. personifies *ὥρα*, since the verb is commonly used of a god's appearance or of a dream vision, e.g., *ἐὰν γοῦν τινα θεὸς ἐπιστάς* p. **238**. 9.

For 'your last hour', cf. *ἐννόησον τὴν ἐσχάτην ὥραν* p. **130**. 11 n. The death of Pius at Lorium is thus described: *τὴν δὲ τελευτὴν ἡδίστην αὐτῷ κατ' ἴσον ὕπνῳ τῷ μαλακωτάτῳ* Dio Cass. lxx. 3. 3; 'signum tum tribuno Aequanimitatis dedit atque ita, conversus quasi dormiret, spiritum reddidit' *H.A.* iii. 12. 6.

Ch. 31: 110. 10 Ἀνάνηφε καὶ ἀνακαλοῦ σεαυτόν: cf. *ἀναβιῶναί σοι ἔξεστιν· ἴδε πάλιν τὰ πράγματα, ὡς ἐώρας* p. **120**. 22. Drunkenness, caused by excess of moisture, and slumber, in which the senses prevail over the reason, are figures used by Heraclitus; see, e.g., the drunken man, *ὑγρὴν τὴν ψ. ἔχων* 117 D., 73 B. He appears also to have conceived of three grades of psychic existence, sleep, the present life, life after death, 21 D., 64 B.

The language here suggests recovery from drunken torpor, cf. *μόλις ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων . . . ἀνανήψαντες*, of men sobered by alarm,

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Plu. *Cam.* 23, even a summoning from the dead, *Δαρεῖον ἀγκαλεῖσθε* Aesch. *Pers.* 621. The awakening and recall are to the life of reason, *ἀνακαλεσάμεναι τὸν νόον ἐξ ἀγνοίας* Ti. Locr. 104c.

ἐξυπνισθεὶς πάλιν: a favourite met. with Christian writers: *γρηγορῶμεν καὶ νήφωμεν* St. Paul, 1 *Thess.* 5. 6, *μήποτε . . . εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας, καὶ ἀνανήψωσι* 2 *Tim.* 2. 25; *ἀνανήψατε καὶ διαβλέψαντες ὀλίγον ἐννοήθητε* Clem. Alex. *Protrep.* p. 80. For recall from the dead, cf. *ἔγειραι ὁ καθεύδων, καὶ ἀνάστα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν Eph.* 5. 14.

110. 11 ὄνειροί σοι ἠνώχλουν: cf. *φαῦλον ἀνέγρεσθαι σοφὸν καὶ προσειπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψ. μεθεικότα τὰς χθιζὰς . . . ἀπάτας· ψευδεῖς ὄνειροι, χαίρετ', οὐδὲν ἦτ' ἄρα* Plu. *Quomodo* 75e. Clement too cites the words from Eur. *I.T.* 569, saying that the dreams are *τὰς φαντασίας ταύτας τὰς κενὰς Protrep.* p. 80.

110. 12 ὡς ἐκεῖνα: cf. *ὡς ἑώρας* p. **120. 22**, cited at l. 10 above. You are to see that your imaginations were illusory, as, on awakening, you saw the falsity of your dreams. The image, but not its interpretation, recalls: *θάνατός ἐστι ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὕδοντες ὕπνος* Heraclit. 21 D., 64 B.

Ch. 32: 110. 13 Ἐκ σωματίου εἰμὶ καὶ ψυχῆς: contrast the tripartite division, p. **20.** 13 n.

Ch. 33: 110. 19 τῇ χειρί: an analogy similarly employed by Epict.: *καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι*, ii. 6. 10; see also: *εἰ προῄδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν* id. ii. 10. 5; cf. p. **80.** 18 n.

Ch. 34: 110. 24 Ἡλίκας ἡδονάς: he does not say *οἵας*, as usual, because the hedonist estimates the *quantum* of pleasure. For the evil of these enjoyments, cf. *ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος . . . μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίγνονται* Pl. *Phlb.* 45e.

Ch. 35: 110. 25 οἱ βάναυσοι τεχνῖται: cf. *τούτῳ γάρ τοι καὶ οἱ τεχνῖται τῶν ἰδιωτῶν διαφέρουσιν* Galen, i. 173. It is remarkable that M. should use the old depreciatory phrase 'base mechanics' when speaking of artisans whose intelligence he is preferring to that of amateurs and whose ardour he contrasts at p. **74.** 15

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with his own lax pursuit of the art of living. The effect is as if we said: 'even a poor working man knows better'.

110. 25 ἁρμόζονται: cf. *οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἁρμόσωμαι πρὸς αὐτόν*, i.e. to my patron, Lucian, *Merc. cond.* 30.

110. 27 τούτου ἀποστῆναι: cf. *ἓν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο σφάλμα τῶν ἀποστάντων τῆς ὁλκῆς*, i.e. physiologists who abandon the hypothesis of mechanical attraction, Galen, ii. 78. Cic., illustrating disdain of reputation, says: 'tibicines . . . suo, non multitudinis arbitrio, cantus numerosque moderantur' *Tusc.* v. 104; Polyb., urging that a general officer must not despise geometry, has: *ἄτοπον . . . τοὺς περὶ τὰς βαναύσους τέχνας ἀσκοῦντας ἐμμελεστέρους εἶναι . . . τῶν περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα . . . προαιρουμένων* ix. 20. 7.

110. 28 ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὁ ἰατρός: M. still regards these as *mechanics*; cf. *τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχῃ, οἷον τέκτων ἢ ἰατρός* Arist. *De An.* 403^{b}13. Contrast Galen by whom music and medicine are regarded as *λογικαί τε καὶ σεμναί* in opp. to *τινὲς δὲ εὐκαταφρόνητοι . . . ἃς δὴ βαναύσους τε καὶ χειρωνακτικὰς ὀνομάζουσιν* i. 38.

112. 1 τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, i.e. *τὸν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τέχνης λόγον*, what he called *ἡ λογικὴ τ.* p. **86.** 3, cf. *τὸ τεχνίον ὃ ἔμαθες* p. **64.** 1. So Arist. says that *ὁ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφῶν* is *τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων E.N.* 1152^{b}1.

112. 1–2 κοινός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς: cf. *ἡ ἐμὴ φύσις* opp. to *ἡ κοινὴ φ.* p. **90.** 14. There is a verbal antithesis between *τῆς ἰδίας τ.* and *λόγος κοινός*, and *κοινός* is employed in a double sense—it is universal, (*a*) in distinction from the principle of an individual or of a particular art; (*b*) because it is enjoyed *in common with* all reasonable beings.

Ch. 36. 112. 3: γωνίαι τοῦ κόσμου: cf. *ἐν γωνίᾳ τούτου τοῦ κλίματος* p. **152.** 23. They are obscure *corners* of the vast Whole, just as the terrestrial globe is a mere angular point to an astronomer who surveys the solar and stellar systems, p. **52.** 13.

112. 4 Ἄθως βωλάριον: cf. *οἷον ὅλης τε τῆς γῆς καὶ βώλου μιᾶς* Arist. *Ph.* 205^{a}11.

πᾶν τὸ ἐνεστὼς τοῦ χρόνου: these words should have been translated 'the whole of the present time'. M. is writing popularly and contrasts the whole of this present life with infinite time

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or with timeless Eternity. Cf. St. Paul's *τὰ παθήματα τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ Rom.* 8. 18.

112. 6 ἐκεῖθεν ἔρχεται: cf. pp. **22. 6, 32. 22, 54. 4.** The *source* is *τὴν πάντων πηγήν* l. 10, **154. 4.**

112. 6–7 ἀπ' ἐκείνου . . . ὁρμήσαντα ἢ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν. The difficulty in interpreting this elliptical and perhaps mutilated phrase is to determine the precise force of the opposition between *ὁρμήσαντα* and *κατ' ἐ.* M. asks for an explanation of the existence in a world governed by Providence of what is injurious. He accepts the ugly facts, *πᾶσα κακουργία*, and offers in justification the Stoic explanation that they arise *κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν.*

Chrysippus taught 'non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines mortis obnoxios . . . sed cum multa atque magna gigneret . . . alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda his ipsis quae faciebat cohaerentia; eaque ⟨non⟩ per naturam sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν*' A. Gell. *N.A.* vii (vi) 1. 7. Chrysippus further illustrated his argument by the compromise in the construction of the human skull as stated by Pl. *Ti.* 75c.

M.'s opposition then is, to use Stoic terms, between *προηγουμένως ὁρμήσαντα*, starting from 'principale naturae consilium', and *κατ' ἐπ. συμβαίνοντα*, what M. calls also *ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν* l. 9. That he is not entirely satisfied is clear, I think, from his appeal to faith, in case of doubt, in the 'fountain of all things'.

ὁρμήσαντα is used here in a sense which M. does not employ elsewhere; we expect *ὁρμηθέντα.* For this reason, and perhaps, because of the obscurity of the MSS. reading Cas. adopted *ὁρμήσαντος*, an emendation which Gat. independently submitted for consideration. This would agree with M.'s usage, e.g. at p. **182. 2**, but it makes the whole sentence very difficult without easing the main problem.

κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν here is to be compared with its use at p. **36. 4**, and see also *τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα* p. **34. 15** n. There M. gives a wider treatment of the problem. His use of the term at pp. **146. 1, 172. 1, 182. 2** shows a development in his grasp of

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the law of necessary determination, for in these three passages he does not oppose the secondary to the primary principles but regards them as their normal and natural consequents.

112. 8 **πᾶσα κακουργία**: 'every form of mischief', perhaps with an eye to derivation from *κακοεργία* and the suggestion that the artificer has blundered or been limited by *ὕλη*, see *τῆς ὕλης . . . τὴν μοχθηρίαν* Galen, iii. 355. For the abstract form cf. p. **12.** 13.

ὡς ἄκανθα: Gat. points to a debate upon *Gen.* 3. 18 as to whether thorns and thistles were created before or after man's fall. He refers to St. John Chrys. on that text, and to St. Augustine's change of opinion.

ὡς βόρβορος, perhaps, quite simply, a bog or morass, the despair of the small farmer. More probably M. uses the word, associated as it was with the 'slough of despond' in Tartarus, of mundane imperfection. Thus Galen has: *θεασάμενος ἐν τοσούτῳ βορβόρῳ σαρκῶν τε καὶ χυμῶν ὅμως ἐνοικοῦντα νοῦν* iv. 360. This is contrasted with *ἡ καθαρότης*, the clear radiance of interstellar space, to which M. tells us, in metaphor, to lift up our eyes.

112. 10 **τὴν πάντων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζου**. Although M. everywhere avoids interpreting *ἐκεῖθεν* by the local word *ἄνωθεν*, and although he says *reflect upon*, he may here be thinking of the sun as the fountain of light and heat, drawing up, as Heraclit. taught, the foggy moisture of this world. Elsewhere he speaks of *πηγὴ ἀέναος*, a spring able to wash away all impurity, p. **166.** 3.

Ch. 37: 112. 12 **ὁμογενῆ καὶ ὁμοειδῆ**: see, for parallels, p. **30.** 10 n., and *οὐδὲν νεώτερον* p. **214.** 14 n.

Ch. 38: 112. 13 **τὴν ἐπισύνδεσιν.** Whereas in the earlier Books M. uses picturesque and mythological images for this *concatenation* of the Universe, e.g. *ἡ σύννησις* p. **68.** 2 n., the web of *Κλωθώ* p. **66.** 5, here he employs a scientific term: *ἐπισύνδεσίν τινα καὶ συνέχειαν τῶν αἰτίων* Alex. Aphr. *De Fato*, p. 195; *τὸν εἱρμὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπισύνδεσιν* p. 196; *τῷ δίκην ἀλύσεως τοῖς πρώτοις συνηρτῆσθαι τὰ δεύτερα, ὃ ὥσπερ οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὑποτίθενται* p. 193. These are varied expressions to formulate the Stoic doctrine of the causal necessity underlying the Universe.

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112. 14 σχέσιν, normally employed by M. for a *personal* relation, pp. **154.** 23, **224.** 6; here used instead of *συνέχεια* p. **80.** 24, as *φίλα ἀλλήλοις* l. 15 is a stronger expression than *οἰκεῖα* (*οἰκείως* p. **68.** 12 n.). He suggests an almost conscious relation, as of *living* unities, a relation implied in the doctrine of *σύμπνοια καὶ ἕνωσις*.

ἐπιπέπλεκται: cf. *ἐπιπλοκή* pp. **22.** 5 n., **192.** 27. The perfect tense is normal in these expressions, see p. **122.** 24, Cor.'s emendation.

112. 15–16 ἄλλῳ ⟨ἄλλο⟩ ἐξῆς ἐστι ταῦτα: Sch.'s correction (combining P and A), of a doubtful passage; it is based upon Cor.'s proposal, but *ταῦτα* gets rid of the awkward *τοῦτο* ⟨*δέ*⟩, being equivalent in sense to *πάντα* ll. 14, 15.

The principle is that of *οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἄλλο ἄλλῳ* p. **122.** 25; cf. *παντί τε τῷ γενομένῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ⟨ἐξ⟩ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὑτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται*, the complete Stoic expression of causal connexion and dependence, Alex. Aphr. *De Fato*, p. 192.

112. 16 τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν: cf. *τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βρῖθον* p. **248.** 14–15 n.

This is M.'s sole *explicit* reference to *ἡ περὶ τῆς τονικῆς κινήσεως δόξα* (Alex. Aphr. *Mantissa*, p. 131), of the tension produced by *πνεῦμα*, an all-pervasive energy. The Stoic theory is a vague anticipation of modern attempts to explain natural phenomena by other than mechanical laws.

Galen mentions the hypothesis as an explanation of apparently spontaneous movements originating in muscular contraction: *τίνα οὖν ἄν τις λύσιν ἐφεύροι τῆς ἀπορίας; πότερον ἢν οἱ τὰς τονικὰς καλουμένας ὑποθέμενοι κινήσεις;* and goes on to discuss a bird's motionless self-suspension *τῇ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψ. τόνον ἄνω φορᾷ*, suggesting that the *τόνος πνεύματος* resists somehow the influence of gravity, iv. 400.

σύμπνοιαν, referring to the pervasive *πνεῦμα*, cf. *σύμπνους συμμείνας* p. **218.** 21; *ἡνῶσθαι* (sc. *τὸν κόσμον*)· *τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν* D.L. vii. 140; *τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα* Plu. *De Fato*, 574e; cf. pp. **62.** 15, **176.** 16.

112. 17 ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας: cf. p. **98.** 19 n. This hypothesis of

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sympathetic unity pervading the Universe originated no doubt from the observed nervous sympathy of the body and its parts. This was a principle of Hippocrates: *ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν σύμπνοιάν τε μίαν εἶναί φησι καὶ σύρροιαν καὶ πάντα συμπαθέα* Galen, ii. 39, cf. 189.

Ch. 39: 112. 18 συγκεκλήρωσαι. Like *συλλαγχάνειν* this verb occurs here only in M. In a maxim similar to the present one he recurs to the image of the *thread* of destiny, p. **138. 23.**

συνάρμοζε σεαυτόν. Not only is Man bound up with the Whole (ch. 38) but his duty is to bring his will both into accord with his dispensation, p. **48. 23**, and into harmony with his fellow men.

112. 19 φίλει, ἀλλ' ἀληθινῶς: cf. *ἀληθινῶς ἀγαπητικόν*, of love to children, p. **10. 2.** We may compare St. Peter's *φιλαδελφίαν ἀνυπόκριτον* 1 *Ep.* 1. 22.

Ch. 40: 112. 21 εὖ ἔχει. The Socratic argument from the adaptation and subordination of tools to their purposes and of the inferior to the superior has been stated at p. **86. 23.** There follows that men and women are good or bad as they serve their purpose well or ill. Cf. *πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλά ἐστι πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς* X. *Mem.* iii. 8. 7; *εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς* Pl. *R.* 353c; *ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ* Arist. *E.N.* 1097^{b}26.

112. 22–3 ἔνδον ἐστὶ . . . ἡ κατασκευάσασα δύναμις: cf. pp. **164. 17, 214. 1.** This further point, the differentiation of organisms which contain within them the power of adaptation from lifeless tools is derived especially from Arist.: *εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, καὶ ἐν φύσει Ph.* 199^{b}28, cf. *Metaph.* 1070^{a}7, *E.N.* 1140^{a}10. The Stoic view is stated, and the contrast between life and art brought out clearly by Alex. Aphr. *De Mixt.* p. 225.

Φύσις therefore is here contrasted with *τέχνη* as it is at p. **220. 7.** Similarly Galen contrasts Nature's working with the pencil of Praxiteles and the chisel of Phidias, to show the external character even of the greatest art: *ἡ διαπλάττουσα τὰ μόρια φύσις . . . πάντως δήπου δι' ὅλων αὐτῶν ἐκτέταται. . . . τὸ σπέρμα τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις οἴκοθεν ἐκέκτητο, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας . . . περὶ τὴν ὕλην*

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ἐπεδείξατο ii. 82. Cf. *ἡ μὲν φύσις ἐντὸς οὖσα καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων χωροῦσα οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεργεῖ, ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐχ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἐκτὸς οὖσα* Eustr. *in E.N.* vi, p. 301.

112. 23 αἰδεῖσθαι αὐτήν: cf. *ἐξ ὧν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν ἑκάστοτε πειρῶμαι, ἐκ τούτων . . . αἰδοῦμαι* p. **248.** 3. Thus the reverence for the power which is immanent in her works and controls them is reverence for Nature herself, to whom he passes at *κατὰ τὸ βούλημα ταύτης* l. 24.

112. 23–4 ἐὰν . . ἔχῃς καὶ διεξάγῃς: for the absolute use of the verbs and their association, see: *τίνος δ' ἕνεκα φιλολογεῖς; . . . οὐχ ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃς καὶ διεξάγῃς;* Epict. iii. 10. 10, cf. iv. 4. 43. A's insertion of *αὐτὸν* (i.e. *αὑτὸν*) arose from a misunderstanding of the idiom. Thus *σαυτόν* Cor., and *αὐτὸς ἔχῃς* Sch. are unnecessary.

112. 24 κατὰ τὸ βούλημα ταύτης, i.q. *κατὰ φύσιν.* M. interprets Nature's will from her *δύναμις*, cf. pp. **90.** 14, **170.** 3 n.

Arist. uses *βούλεται εἶναι* to express a 'tendency of Nature', e.g. *βούλεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμολόγως ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι P.An.* 665^{b}22. Even in him, however, the word sometimes conveys the meaning *purpose*, e.g.: *βούλεται μὲν γὰρ ἡ φ. ἐν πᾶσι μόνον ἓν ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐ δυναμένη δέ, ἐνεργείᾳ ποιεῖ μόνον ἓν δυνάμει δὲ πλείω P.An.* 682^{a}6.

112. 25 τῷ παντὶ κατὰ νοῦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ: the correspondence implies *τῷ παντὶ ⟨πάντα⟩ κατὰ νοῦν.* Cas. thinks that in the preceding words there is a play upon *ἔχειν κατὰ νοῦν*, i.e. 'you have all things to your mind and to the mind of Him that is all in all'.

Ch. 41: 112. 26 Ὅ τι ἂν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. As Epict. insists that only what is in a man's power is truly good and evil for him, *Ench.* 1, so M. says that by making *ἀπροαίρετα* into objects of our purpose we are led into *ἀσεβήματα καὶ ἀδικήματα*, we sin against holiness and wrong our neighbour, cf. pp. **26.** 18, **170.** 1.

112. 28 μέμψασθαί σε θεοῖς: *προσέτι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς μέμφεσθαι* is added p. **104.** 13 after *φθονεῖν, ζηλοτυπεῖν* and other unneighbourly acts or thoughts. So Epict. says: *κάθησθε τὰ*

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μὲν μὴ συμβῇ τρέμοντες, περὶ δὲ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὀδυρόμενοι . . . εἶτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐγκαλεῖτε i. 6. 38–9, cf. i. 27. 12.

Fronto, after the loss of his grandson, writes to M.: 'saepe etiam expostulo cum dis immortalibus et fata iurgio compello. . . . hoccine ullo modo aequum aut iustum fuit?' *Ep.* p. 232.

114. 2 διὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα διαφοράν, *concern* for *τὰ ἀδιάφορα, τὰ ἀπροαίρετα*; cf. *οὐ γὰρ τηρηθήσεται τὸ δίκαιον, ἐὰν ἤτοι διαφερώμεθα πρὸς τὰ μέσα . . .* p. **220.** 13, *ἡ πρὸς ὁτιοῦν διαφορά* p. **246.** 20.

Ch. 42: 114. 8 οἶμαι. The same literary affectation occurs in one of M.'s youthful letters: "*εἰς ὅμματ' εὔνου φωτὸς ἐμβλέψαι γλυκύ, Εὐριπίδης* (*Ion*, 732) ait opinor" Fronto, *Ep.* p. 71.

ἐργάτας εἶναι. Heraclit. presumably meant that, even when we appear to be at rest, the continuous motion and change, upon which life depends, proceeds. Menand. (*Test.*) evidently refers to the doctrine of flux, and gives the optimistic interpretation which M. puts upon Heraclitus.

114. 9 ἐκ περιουσίας, sc. *συνεργοῦσι*. The general sense is clear: the man who deplores his lot or who tries to resist, like the sleeper, contributes to the Whole and is carried along by the current, *οὗτός ἐστιν ἐκείνων τῶν ἀναισχύντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ εἶναι* p. **188.** 17.

The difficulty is to see why such a man is said to co-operate *ex abundanti*, an expression which usually means *gratuitously* or *superfluously*, for nothing can be outside the purpose of the Whole, even the *γελοῖος στίχος* l. 15 is contributory to the effect of the drama.

M. uses the analogous *ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος* to mean 'from the balance', i.e. from what is added as an *extra* to your years, p. **138.** 22. When a testator adds a specific bequest which is already covered by the general form of bequest, Papinian says the bequest is 'ex abundanti adiectum', for even were it not expressly named the legatee would have been entitled to claim it, *Dig.* xxxiii. vii. 12. 46, cf. ib. x. 9 *praef.* The sense, then, appears to be that even the rebel serves the Whole, not in the main intention of his acts, but unwillingly and 'as an extra'. His intention being overruled, the general purpose is not affected by his specific will.

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114. 11 ἔχρηζεν ὁ κόσμος, leading up to *καλῶς χρήσεται,* and thus implying the doctrine of Cleanthes:

> *ὡς ἕψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω*
> *κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι*
> ap. Epict. *Ench.* 53, translated at Sen. *Ep.* 107. 11.

114. 13 εἰς μέρος τι: the predicative *εἰς: ἤγειρεν τὸν Δαβὶδ αὐτοῖς εἰς βασιλέα Acts,* 13. 22.

114. 15 γελοῖος στίχος: see Chrysippus, *Test.* The doctrine is that vice is complementary to the Whole, like lines in a play which are, if detached from their context, ludicrous and vile.

Ch. 43: 114. 16 τὰ τοῦ Ὑετίου. As he is clearly speaking of gods, I have written *Ἥλιος* and the title of *Ζεὺς Ὑέτιος,* as in Ael. Arist. xliii. 30; cf. *ἀλλ' ὅταν θέλῃ εἶναι Ὑέτιος καὶ Ἐπικάρπιος* Epict. i. 19. 12; see also [Arist.] *Mu.* 401ª18 sq.

114. 17 τῆς Καρποφόρου: cf. *Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ναός, ἃς ἐπονομάζουσι Καρποφόρους* Paus. viii. 53. 7.

114. 18 συνεργὰ δὲ πρὸς ταὐτόν: pointing back to ll. 6 and 8; cf. *εἰς τοῦτο* (vel *εἰς ταὐτὸ*) *συνεργεῖ* p. **102.** 6.

Ch. 44: 114. 20 ἄβουλον. A being without purpose may do good or ill, indifferently, so that *ἄβουλος* suggests something evil; cf. *οὐ ταῦτ' ἀβούλου καὶ κακοῦ γνώμην πατρός;* Soph. *El.* 546.

114. 21 ἐπινοῆσαι: Nauck, I suppose, considered that the compound verb means rather to *visualize,* and this appears elsewhere to be its sense in M. There seems however no need to expel *ῥᾴδιον.*

114. 24 κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν, used, as at pp. **36.** 4, **112.** 7, of secondary or supervenient consequents, like *πᾶσα κακουργία* p. **112.** 8. Of these he says that it is the duty of the good man *φιλεῖν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τὰ συμβαίνοντα* p. **48.** 15.

§ 2: 114. 25–6 εἰ δ' ἄρα περὶ μηδενὸς βουλεύονται: the wider hypothesis, which supposes gods that take no thought for man and live at their ease. M. dismisses this as fatal to religion, and passes to the narrower conception *περὶ μηδενὸς τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς* p. **116.** 3. The alternatives are put in the reverse order by Cicero: 'quae enim potest esse sanctitas, si dii humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans?' *N.D.* i. 123.

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There, however, the indifference of the gods to human affairs is made a reason for regarding man's worship as misplaced. M. does not adopt the position that we serve them for our own advantage; we should sacrifice and pray, even though they do not intervene for our benefit, see p. **186.** 23.

114. 26–**116.** 1 **μηδὲ θύωμεν μηδὲ εὐχώμεθα**: cf. 'quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos?' Cic. *N.D.* i. 122. The Stoic argument to the divine existence from the worship prevailing in every city and nation is set out at length in Cic. *N.D.* ii, and this line of argument is suggested here as a *red. ad absurdum* of atheism and Epicureanism. Chrysippus' teaching was: *ὥσπερ εἴ τις θεὸν ὁρίσασθαι προελόμενος τὸ βωμοὺς εἶναι θεῶν καὶ θυσίας καὶ νεὼς καὶ ἀγάλματα οἴοιτο αὐτῷ συμβαλεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι* Themist. *in De An.* p. 8. A parallel argument was: *ὥστε εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια· ὑπάρχει δὲ εὐσέβεια· τοίνυν ῥητέον εἶναι θεούς* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 123; cf. Sen. *De Ben.* iv. 4. 2 sq.

116. 4–5 **σκέψις περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος**: a semi-ironical appeal to enlightened self-interest, cf. *κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ συμφέρον* p. **42.** 15 n. Self-interest is in practice self-consistency, and that is to do one's duty, pp. **74.** 13, **116.** 10. See Cic. *Off.* iii, passim.

116. 7 **ἡ Ῥώμη**: for M.'s Roman citizenship and its obligations, see pp. **22.** 18, **40.** 15.

116. 8 **ὁ κόσμος**: cf. p. **32.** 10, and *ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις* p. **54.** 2 n.

Ch. 45: 116. 10 **τῷ ὅλῳ συμφέρει**: a fundamental dogma, cf. *πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον δικαίως συμβαίνει* p. **54.** 24. Man must welcome *τὰ συμβαίνοντα* as flowing from superior causes and fulfilling a divine purpose, p. **114.** 25; cf. l. 5, above.

116. 11 **ὄψει παραφυλάξας**: cf. *ὃ ἐὰν ἀκριβῶς παραφυλάσσῃς, εὑρήσεις* p. **54.** 24.

116. 11–12 **ὅσα ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἑτέροις ἀνθρώποις**: supply *συμφέρει*. M. adds that the benefits in question are commonly (*κοινότερον* p. **24.** 20 n.) so termed, although strictly speaking they are *μέσα* or *ἀδιάφορα* (see p. **46.** 13 n.).

M. is not saying that what is just for the individual is just for his fellows, and conversely; that is the foundation of law. He means that, speaking generally, an individual's benefit

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advantages also his neighbours; my health and wealth, e.g., redound to the benefit of my family and friends, are not gained at their expense, and conversely.

Ch. 46: 116. 14 Ὥσπερ προσίσταταί σοι: the correspondence with *τοῦτο* is imperfect; Gat.'s *ὅπερ* rested on *ὅσπερ* Bas., which appears to be a misprint. For the verb cf. *οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται τὸ ζῆν* Epicur. ap. D.L. x. 126; *ἔφη τὸ γλυκὺ πανταχοῦ προσίστασθαι καὶ πλήσμιον εἶναι* Plu. *Conviv.* 655 f.

τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀμφιθεάτρῳ, referred to, with the Circus, at p. 4. 11, cf. p. 196. 24. The biographer says: 'cogeretur nonnumquam . . . vel in theatrum descendere vel spectaculis interesse' *H.A.* iv. 4. 8; 'in Circensium spectaculo legeret audiretque ac subscriberet' ib. 15. 1. M. writes from Naples: 'nam *διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν* fere dies tramisimus. Idem theatrum, idem odium' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 30, 'ego istic noctibus studeo, nam interdiu in theatro consumitur' ib. p. 34. Fronto, like a wise man of the world, reproves him: 'in theatro tu libros vel in convivio lectitabas' ib. p. 74.

Sen. and Plin. both deplore the tedium of these shows, e.g. 'nihil novum, nihil varium, nihil quod non semel spectasse sufficiat' Plin. *Ep.* ix. 6. 1.

116. 16 τοῦτο . . . πάσχεις. If we keep the MSS. reading *πάσχειν*, the sense would appear to be that you are to realize the sameness of all life; thus death will be no terror, but a rest and relief.

116. 16–17 ἄνω κάτω τὰ αὐτά: cf. the similar reflection at p. 112. 12. Gat. sees a reference to *ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὠυτή* Heraclit. 60 D., 69 B., but that is hardly in point here, and *ἄνω κάτω* is often used like 'ultra aut citra mota', e.g. *πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς . . . ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται* Pl. *Phd.* 90c, cf. p. 104. 18. The appropriate saying here is rather *κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν* Heraclit. 84 D., 82 B.

116. 17 μέχρι τίνος οὖν; As is often the case in translating M.'s laconic sentences, the literal English sounds frigid, and we are tempted to read below the surface. The 'quousque tandem' motive already appears in Greek literature in the pathetic scene between Thetis and her son: *τέο μέχρις ὀδυρόμενος; Il.* xxiv. 128.

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Here the context and the parallels in Sen. show that the stress is on the *sameness*: 'quosdam subit eadem faciendi videndique satietas et vitae non odium, sed fastidium, in quod prolabimur ipsa inpellente philosophia, dum dicimus: quousque eadem?' *Ep.* 24. 26, cf. id. *De Tranq.* 2. 15. The answer of the Stoic teacher is: *μέχρις ἂν ὁ χρήσας θέλῃ* Epict. iv. 1. 110. W. Pater has a felicitous paraphrase: 'When shall Time give place to Eternity?'

As M. is recalling the Amphitheatre, *we* cannot but revive the memory of 'that lingering expostulation of the saints under the altar, Quousque, Domine? (*Rev.* 6. 9)', Browne, *Rel. Med.* i. 46 and of: *ἕως πότε, Κύριε;* 'Usque quo, Domine?' *Ps.* 12 (13). 1.

Ch. 47: 116. 18 **Ἐννόει συνεχῶς.** We should probably write the infinitive as at p. 70. 8, cf. l. 28.

116. 20 **Φιλιστίωνος.** A contemporary mime writer of this name is recorded, but the other two persons are not. It seems therefore as if M. refers to three of his attendants and that the point is like that about Alexander the Great and his groom, p. 106. 19.

116. 21 **ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα φῦλα.** Gat. interprets M.'s meaning as being to pass from dramatic writers to orators, philosophers, and men of science.

116. 22 **σεμνοὶ φιλόσοφοι.** Pythagoras here, and Diogenes at p. 146. 25, is substituted for Democritus, p. 36. 18.

116. 23 **ἥρωες πρότερον,** i.e. *ἀριστεῖς* p. 70. 11, not heroes of the Greek cults. M. never mentions Heracles, the hero of the Cynics, and he treats Asclepius as a god, pp. 78. 24, 114. 16.

116. 24 **Εὔδοξος,** well chosen, with Hipparchus and Archimedes, for pre-eminence in natural science. Galen associates the two latter names with Pl. and Arist., iv. 359.

116. 25–6 **πανοῦργοι, αὐθάδεις.** These words may be employed here in their older senses, e.g. *π. τε καὶ σοφός* Pl. *R.* 409c, *κομψὸς καὶ π.* Plu. *Quomodo*, 28a, *αὔθαδες* p. 198. 14. I have however supposed that they are used in depreciation and thus lead to *χλευασταί.*

116. 27 **χλευασταί, οἷον Μένιππος.** *χλευασμός* and *χλευασία* are used by Lucian to express the *mockery* which was characteristic

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of Aristophanes and Eupolis, the masters of the school of comic invective to which he makes Menippus belong, *Pisc.* 25, *Bis Acc.* 33. M. makes an effective point in closing his enumeration with one who ridiculed, so he says, life itself and its precarious brevity. Menippus' most salient trait, however, appears to have been his ridicule of human failings, using what the scholiast (thought to be Arethas) calls *φύσει γενναίᾳ καὶ ἐλεγκτικῇ*, imputing the summary criticism to Marcus. His mordant humour exercised itself upon hypocrisy, especially the pretentious imposture of philosophers. We know less of his real work, which in form at any rate inspired Varro's *Saturae Menippeae* ('in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus' Cic. *Acad. Post.* i. 8), than of his personality as dramatized by Lucian, for the latter makes him his spokesman in *Necyomantia*, *Piscator*, and *Icaromenippus*. He is the one teacher whom Lucian represents as a deserter from the ranks of the advocates of philosophy when they take up cudgels against him (*Pisc.* 26). Indeed he seems as *σπουδογέλοιος* (Strabo, xvi, p. 759) to have been Lucian's exemplar.

118. 1 ἓν ὧδε πολλοῦ ἄξιον: cf. pp. **74. 21**, **104. 8**. Lucian makes Teiresias advise Menippus to pass through life *γελῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἐσπουδακώς Nec.* 21. On the contrary, says M., there is one thing of inestimable price; cf. *ἑνὸς δέ ἐστι χρεία St. Luke*, 10. 42.

118. 2 εὐμενῆ τοῖς ψεύσταις: cf. pp. **128. 25**, **188. 21**. For the combination of kindness with truth and justice cf. *ἔλεος καὶ ἀλήθεια συνήντησαν, δικαιοσύνη καὶ εἰρήνη κατεφίλησαν Ps.* 84 (85) 10, and the many parallels in the *Psalms*.

Ch. 48: 118. 3 εὐφρᾶναι σεαυτόν. The Stoics divided *χαρά* into three heads: *τέρψις*, p. **98. 11**, *εὐθυμία*, p. **60. 22**, and *εὐφροσύνη*, p. **154. 19**. M. interprets *εὐφρ.* at p. **160. 23**.

118. 4 τὸ δραστήριον: cf. *τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δρ. τεταγμένον* Th. ii. 63. 3; *Ἰούδας δὲ . . . καὶ τἆλλα δραστήριος ὢν ἀνήρ* Jos. *A.J.* ii. 6. 8.

118. 6 τὰ ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἀρετῶν : reminiscent of *δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης . . . ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν*, the *copies* upon earth of the ideal virtues, Pl. *Phdr.* 250b. M. had long been familiar

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with that dialogue, Fronto, *Ep.* p. 254. Sim. in Socrates' speech are *ἀγάλματ' ἀρετῆς Smp.* 222a, and M. in his first Book has tried to picture excellencies which he had met with.

118. 7 **ἀθρόα ὡς οἷόν τε συμπίπτοντα:** cf. *λόγους οἰκείους οἷον ἀθρόους ἐπιβλέψαντι μάλα ἡσθῆναι* Pl. *Lg.* 811d.

συμπίπτοντα lit. *converging*, as parallels are said *ἐπὶ μηδέτερα συμπίπτειν ἀλλήλαις*, Eucl. *Elem.* i, Def. 23; M.'s instances converge to form a group of impressions.

Ch. 49: 118. 11 **ἀφώρισταί σοι:** cf. *διαστῆμα ἀφ.* p. **90.** 11 n.

Ch. 50: 118. 13 **καὶ ⟨αὐ⟩τῶν ἀκόντων:** Xyl., see app. crit., evidently made the same correction as Ménage.

118. 16 **καὶ συγχρῶ εἰς ἄλλην ἀρετὴν τῇ κωλύσει:** *καί* is epexegetic, the virtue of resignation being substituted for the activity originally proposed, as is explained at p. **88.** 18.

118. 17 **μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως ὥρμας:** cf. pp. **50.** 4, **88.** 17, which make M.'s meaning here plain.

ὥρμας is a certain correction, cf. *εἰ μὲν ἀνυπεξαιρέτως ὥρμας* p. **160.** 16, where A has *ὁρμᾶς*, i.e. *ὁρμᾷς*, by the influence of *λαμβάνεις*.

καὶ ὅτι: Gat.'s correction is justified by the improbability that *ὅτι* should be used in two different senses; and by the meaning, cf. *πρὸς τὸ δυνατόν . . . μετατίθεσθαι* p. **50.** 2.

118. 18 **τῆς τοιᾶσδέ τινος ὁρμῆς:** cf. *ἐνέργεια μέν τις ἐμποδισθείη ἄν, ὁρμῆς δὲ καὶ διαθέσεως οὐ γίνεται ἐμπόδια* p. **88.** 16. *τοιᾶσδε* means *οὐκ ἀνυπεξαιρέτου*, i.e. you were desirous of an impulse to action, if that action were *δυνατόν*. It would have been clearer if he had said *διαθέσεως*, temper of mind.

118. 18–19 **ἐφ' οἷς προήχθημεν, ταῦτα γίνεται.** Difficulty has been felt about this phrase, no doubt because of the change of person, and the apparent tautology. Xyl.'s 'si id, cuius causa citatus es, consequatur' anticipated Cor.'s insertion of *εἰ* and change of person. Cas. took the words to mean 'for which we were born', as at p. **74.** 3, where however *εἰς τὸν κόσμον* is added, and, in his version, he supplied *si*. Gat. proposed *προήχθης*, in his margin, but, in his note, suggested *⟨εἰ καὶ⟩ ἐφ' οἷς προήχθημεν ταῦτ'*

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⟨οὐ⟩ γ., or κἂν ἐφ' οἷς προήχθης ταῦτα ⟨μὴ⟩ γ. (For the change of person, see p. **102.** 19.)

προήχθημεν is chosen under the influence of *τὸ προηγούμενον* p. **88.** 19, and there is a slight extension of the usual meaning: *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν προήχθην εἰπεῖν χάριν τῆς ἀλαζονείας* Polyb. v. 33. 8.

ἐφ' οἷς implies reason or purpose, as in *ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ κατελήμφθην* St. Paul, *Phil.* 3. 12. The tautology is avoided if we understand the aor. to be gnomic, and the first person to be used in a generalizing sense, as if he meant: 'what the good man proposes, God disposes'.

Ch. 51: 118. 20 ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν: i.e. his neighbour's praise or blame; cf. *ἐν ταῖς ἄλλων ψυχαῖς τιθεμένῃ τὴν σὴν εὐμοιρίαν* p. **24.** 5.

118. 21 ἰδίαν πεῖσιν, opp. to *ἰδίαν πρᾶξιν,* cf. p. **74.** 6 n.

Ch. 52: 118. 22 μὴ ὀχλεῖσθαι: cf. *μηδὲ θορυβεῖν ὄχλῳ φαντασιῶν* p. **48.** 17 n.

118. 23 αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ πράγματα: *τὰ πρ. αὐτὰ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ψυχῆς ἅπτεται* p. **88.** 9, cf. pp. **52.** 19, **178.** 11, **220.** 15.

Ch. 53: 118. 25–6 ἀπαρενθυμήτως: cf. *μὴ παρενθυμουμένῳ* p. **76.** 24 n. There is a similar maxim at pp. **122.** 5, **130.** 13.

Ch. 54: 118. 27 Τὸ τῷ σμήνει μὴ συμφέρον: the aphorism elegantly expresses the doctrine of v. 22. The Greeks regarded the ordered life of the hive, under a ruler, as exhibiting a consciousness of *τὸ συμφέρον* and, therefore, as approaching to human intelligence, see, e.g., Arist. *Pol.* 1253ª7, *Metaph.* 980ᵇ24.

A recollection of *βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν σμήνεσιν ἐμφύεται* Pl. *Plt.* 301e, and the similes of the master mariner and the physician there, 297e, perhaps led him to the thought of the next ch., which appears to express favourite maxims of Socrates that the many must listen to the advice of the expert, and that the master of the ship or the physician is effective only if his subjects are reasonable and obey him.

Ch. 55: 118. 28 κυβερνῶντα . . . ἢ ἰατρεύοντα: *καὶ γὰρ ἐν νόσῳ, ὃν ἂν ἡγῶνται ἰατρικώτατον εἶναι, τούτῳ μάλιστα πείθονται, καὶ ἐν πλῷ ὃν ἂν κυβερνητικώτατον* X. *Mem.* iii. 3. 9, cf. *Cyr.* i. 6. 21; *οὔτε νοσῶν . . . τοῖς πολλοῖς ἂν ἐπιτρέψειας αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ . . . τοῖς*

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ἰατρικωτάτοις οὔτ' ἂν πλέων ἅπασι τοῖς συμπλέουσιν ἀλλ' ἑνὶ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ Galen, i. 23.

118. 28–120. 1 κακῶς ἔλεγον. By citing in full the passage from Galen referred to in the last note, and Pl. *Cri.* 47b–48a, both of which refer to the reasons for preferring the *approval* of the expert to that of the multitude, Gat. appears to suggest that M. is thinking principally of good and ill report. It seems in view of the last ch. that he means quite simply that those who do not follow the best advice, what Pl. calls *ὁ εἷς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια Cri.* 48a, are not likely to follow consistently the advice of the less informed.

120. 1 ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἂν προσεῖχον; I follow Gat.'s punctuation and his interpretation of the passage. There has, however, been much divergence of opinion in recent translations.

(*a*) Some take these words with *ἢ πῶς κ.τ.λ.* in the sense: 'Would they have attended to anything else except to the question how he may save the crew and passengers or his patients?' This runs counter to the history of the use of the two illustrations and appears to give little, if any, point to the aphorism. The answer to the question would be that by refusing the advice of the man who knows they are above all neglecting the wellbeing of themselves and their fellow patients.

(*b*) Richards proposed *ἐνεργοίην*, and this was adopted by Leopold, saying that light was thus brought into darkness. M. is however giving a general truth, and it is improbable that he would have introduced himself in this way.

(*c*) Schenkl's *πῶς ἄν τις ἐνεργοίη* is clearly an attempt to explain the absence of *ἄν* by the corruption of *ἄν τις* to *αὐτός*. But *αὐτός* corresponds with *ὁ κυβερνῶν*, *ὁ ἰατρεύων*, and is opp. to *ἄλλῳ τινί*. The insertion of *ἄν* is justified by M.'s usage at pp. **26.** 13, **30.** 9.

Ch. 57: 120. 5 τὸ σφαιρίον: cf. *σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη . . . μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου* Arist. *E.N.* 1123ª14. The dim. form is not depreciatory; the 'small ball' game is recommended for exercise in Galen's *περὶ τοῦ διὰ μικρᾶς σφαίρας γυμνασίου* v. 899.

120. 6 τὸ διεψευσμένον, *falsified*, not *deceived*. The mistaken impression resembles the ball, which the boy takes to be a fine

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thing. M. is pondering a 'misrepresentation' the effect of which upon the fancy is like that of bile upon a jaundiced patient; it makes what is sweet to the healthy seem acrid to the vitiated palate.

Ch. 58: 120. 8 τῆς σῆς φύσεως, opp. to *τῆς κοινῆς φ.* as e.g. at p. **138.** 9.

Ch. 59: 120. 10 Οἷοί εἰσιν: the connexion of thought, as well as the form, resembles p. **132.** 1. For the form see pp. **40.** 8, **200.** 18, **202.** 11.

δι' οἷα περιγινόμενοι: A has: *δι οἱ*, then an erasure of two letters, followed by *οι τὰ περιγινόμεθ*. I have supposed that the superfluous *οι* represents a correction, i.e. *περιγινόμενα*, and that *α* should be above the first *οἱ*. Thus *δι' οἷα περιγινόμενοι* will be in agreement with *οἷοι*, 'prevailing by what vile means', cf. *ἐδούλευον πόσοις καὶ δι' οἷα* p. **202.** 13; cf. 'magis magisque perditi homines cum sui similibus servis' Cic. *Phil.* i. 5.

120. 11 καλύψει: cf. *ἤδη πάντας ἡμᾶς γῆ καλύψει* p. **182.** 5; *ἀθάνατος θάνατος περὶ πάντα καλύπτει* Linus, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 119;

ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται.

Soph. *Aj.* 646.

BOOK VII

Ch. 1: 120. 13 Τοῦτ' ἔστι κακία. This, which is A's reading, appears preferable, because *ἐπὶ παντὸς δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος πρόχειρον ἔχε* shows that M. is contemplating a particular experience which he recognizes immediately to be familiar; cf. *ταῦτα οὕτως . . . πέφυκε γίνεσθαι*, at the opening of a ch., p. **54.** 15. It is no answer to 'What is Evil?' to say that it is an everyday occurrence. Formally, also, *τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πολλάκις εἶδες* is unnatural as an answer to *τί ἐστι κακία;*

120. 14 πρόχειρον ἔχε, have your equipment ready, like a surgeon, p. **46.** 21. The wise man, like the physician and the master mariner, expects the emergency, p. **150.** 26.

120. 15 ἄνω κάτω τὰ αὐτά: cf. p. **116.** 16 n. A man of forty years has seen 'all the past and all that is to be' *κατὰ τὸ ὁμοειδές* p. **214.** 16.

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120. 15 **ὧν μεσταὶ αἱ ἱστορίαι:** cf. *μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, | πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί· μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα* Arat. *Phaen.* 2. The form of the verses is echoed at *μεσταὶ μὲν ἀγοραὶ ἀνθρώπων, μεσταὶ δὲ ἀγυιαί* Dio Chrys. lxxiv. 15, p. 400; *νῦν δὲ μεστὰ πάντα πολέμου καὶ ἀδικίας* Max. Tyr. xxiii. 6.

120. 16 **αἱ πόλεις καὶ οἰκίαι:** no supplement is necessary; the words form a single group, cf. *τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις* Dio Chrys. xxx. 12, p. 550.

Ch. 2: 120. 18 **Ζῇ τὰ δόγματα.** Stich happily divined that A's *ἢ τὰ δόγματα* is derived from a text which omitted the initial capital. The antithesis to *νεκρωθῆναι* and the presence of *γάρ* in A further support the correction.

We are reminded of *ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε | ζῇ ταῦτα* Soph. *Ant.* 456; *ζῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐνεργής Hebr.* 4. 12. The opposition of the living and the dead precept is familiar, esp. the Christian antithesis of spirit and letter, cf. *τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον . . . ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον* Pl. *Phdr.* 276a.

120. 19 **αἱ κατάλληλοι αὐτοῖς φαντασίαι.** The complementary images and ideas quicken or revive *τὰ δόγματα*. Similarly evil imaginations kindle latent appetites, *πάλιν ἐρεθισθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς καταλλήλου φ. . . . ἐξήφθη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν* Epict. ii. 18. 9.

120. 20 **περὶ τούτου,** i.e. *τοῦ συμβαίνοντος* l. 14. The kind of *δόγμα* which a man should revive, in the presence of a disturbing image, is stated, e.g., at p. **124.** 19.

120. 20–1 **εἰ δύναμαι.** In the app. crit. I have ascribed *εἰ ἄρα*, a correction of *εἰ γάρ* A, to Dr. Rendall, on the strength of the editions of Leop., Sch., and M. Trannoy, but I cannot verify it. Sch. and M. Trannoy read *εἰ δ' ἄρα*. It is better not to insert *δέ*, for M.'s usage is thus always to sum up a series of premisses, pp. **114.** 25, **116.** 3.

120. 21 **τὰ ἔξω:** the dogma applies to all solicitations from circumstance: *τὰ πράγματα . . . ἔξω ἕστηκεν ἀτρεμοῦντα*, disturbance arises *ἐκ μόνης τῆς ἔνδον ὑπολήψεως*, p. **52.** 19.

120. 22 **τοῦτο μάθε.** In a similar connexion Spinoza says: 'optimum . . . certa vitae dogmata concipere eaque memoriae mandare' *Eth.* v. 10, Schol.

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ὀρθὸς εἶ: a favourite image in M., pp. **40.** 20, **56.** 24, **124.** 8, **140.** 11, **160.** 8. Cf. 'non est magnus animus, quem incurvat iniuria' Sen. *De Ira*, iii. 5. 8.

120. 23 **ἴδε πάλιν:** cf. *ἐλεύθερος ἔσο καὶ ὅρα τὰ πράγματα* p. **52.** 16, *πάλιν ἐγρηγορὼς βλέπε ταῦτα, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἔβλεπες* p. **110.** 11. To recover one's principles is to awaken from slumber, to return to the life of reason from the death of sense. At these places M. appears to have in mind: *αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα*, where Pl. says that, in this life, we can attain this vision: *ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι Phd.* 66e, 67a.

Ch. 3: 120. 24 **Πομπῆς κενοσπουδία.** The words are echoed by *ταῦτα περὶ ἃ ἐσπούδακεν* p. **122.** 4. He appears to be thinking of a Roman triumph, cf. *εἴς τινα θριαμβικῆς θέαν πομπῆς* Plu. *Aem. Paul.* 30, *πομπῆς ἀξίωμα καὶ κόσμος Pomp.* 45. M. triumphed a tenth time in his last year.

ἐπὶ σκηνῆς δράματα, a now familiar comparison, cf. *ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος σκηνῆς*, of 'this wide and universal theatre', p. **216.** 15, and the image derived from toy theatres, p. **122.** 1.

ποίμνια, ἀγέλαι, he may recall the captured flocks and herds which were features of a triumphal procession, e.g. *βοῦς ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι* Plu. *Aem. Paul.* 33, or he may recur to the objects that some men admire, *ποίμνας, ἀγελας* p. **102.** 1.

120. 25 **διαδορατισμοί,** for the cognate verb see p. **52.** 2. The allusion intended escapes us; the idea of men skirmishing, however, serves to introduce the derogatory images which follow.

κυνιδίοις: Epict., reflecting upon strife between a father and his son, says: *κυνάρια οὐδέποτ' εἶδες σαίνοντα καὶ προσπαίζοντα ἀλλήλοις, ἵν' εἰπῇς· οὐδὲν φιλικώτερον; ἀλλ' ὅπως ἴδῃς τί ἐστι φιλία, βάλε κρέας εἰς μέσον καὶ γνώσῃ* ii. 22. 9.

ψωμίον, perhaps a *tit-bit*, for strange delicacies were thrown by wealthy Romans to their fish: 'duodena millia sestertia . . . *escis* quas dabat piscibus consumebat' Varro, *R.R.* iii. 17. 3.

120. 26 **μυρμήκων:** Sen., speaking of an army seen from a height, has: 'formicarum iste discursus est in angusto laborantium' *N.Q.* i, prol. 10, and M. may be writing as he regards the scene from his seat in the amphitheatre, cf. pp. **134.** 20, **182.** 22.

The ancients believed the society of ants to be without a

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ruler: *μύρμηκες δὲ καὶ μυρία ἄλλα ἄναρχα* Arist. *H.N.* 488ª12; 'inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qualis formicis per arbusta repentibus' Sen. *De Tranqu.* 12. 3.

120. 26–122. 1 μυιδίων ἐπτοημένων: cf. *τὴν πτοίαν*, of the town mouse, p. **230.** 16.

σιγιλλάρια, the Latin word for *θαύματα*, *puppets*, cf. 'ego sum Felicio, cui solebas sigillaria adferre' Sen. *Ep.* 12. 3. Pl. speaks of men as God's puppets: *θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα . . . θεῖον· . . . ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοι . . . σπῶσιν ἡμᾶς Lg.* 644d, *θαύματα ὄντες τὸ πολύ* ib. 804b.

Arist. thus illustrates the movements of the limbs, *ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ αὐτόματα κινεῖται μικρᾶς κινήσεως γινομένης Mo. An.* 701ᵇ1, *εἶναι οἷον τὰ αὐτόματα τῶν θαυμάτων Gen. An.* 734ᵇ10.

In the literature of M.'s time the figure is used to illustrate the communication of motion from God to the Universe: *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ νευροσπάσται μίαν μήρινθον ἐπισπασάμενοι ποιοῦσι καὶ αὐχένα κινεῖσθαι* [Arist.] *Mu.* 398ᵇ16. Galen refers to marionettes to illustrate the movement of the fingers by tendons, iii. 48, 262.

νευροσπαστούμενα. M. uses *νευροσπαστηθῆναι* of the response of the self to the *ὁρμαί*, p. **22.** 2; cf. *μὴ νευροσπαστούμενον ἀψύχων δίκην ὀργάνων* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 598.

122. 2 μὴ καταφρυαττόμενον: see *μετὰ δεινοῦ φρυάγματος* p. **70.** 12. Originally meaning to *whinny*, the use of the verb was extended to other animals and to man, e.g. *κύων ἐφρυάττετο τῇ τῶν ποδῶν ταχυτῆτι* Aesop. *Fab.* 230, *ἵνα τί ἐφρύαξαν ἔθνη; Ps.* 2. 1. Epicurus used the word slightingly of the airs his physicians gave themselves, p. **188.** 8.

122. 3 τοσούτου ἄξιος ἕκαστος: cf. *ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ* Arist. *E.N.* 1114ª32.

Ch. 4: 122. 5 κατὰ λέξιν, *in conversation*; not, as is more usual, *in diction*. For the precept, cf. pp. **118.** 25, **130.** 13.

122. 6–7 ἐπὶ τίνα σκοπόν: cf. p. **38.** 4. M. more than once emphasizes the importance, in forming a practical judgement, of paying regard to the *ἀναφορά* of actions, whether our own or those of our neighbour, see p. **212.** 21.

Ch. 5: 122. 12 ἐὰν ἄλλως τοῦτό μοι καθήκῃ: substituting, with Ménage, the dative of the personal pron. for *μή*, I understand

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the sense to be: 'provided that on other grounds the responsibility rests upon me,' that is, 'provided that it is my duty to see it through'. Then I get it done, either by finding an agent to complete it, in view of my insufficiency, or superintending some one who assists me.

This solution is certainly doubtful, but the usual interpretation of the MSS. text appears to result in an absurdity. M. is made to say that if he is unequal to the task, he makes way 'unless this is his duty on other grounds', i.e. unless he is under an obligation to attempt to do what *ex hyp.* he cannot do.

Reiske shifts the ἤ and emends to ἄλλῳ. This gives a weak and improbable sense.

122. 13 **προσπαραλαβών:** he is describing what is said to have been his habitual practice: *εἰ μέν τις χρηστόν τι ἔπραττεν, ἐπῄνει καὶ ἐχρῆτο ἐς ἐκεῖνο αὐτῷ . . . τοῖς δὲ δὴ οὖσι* (sc. ἔφη) *προσήκειν, ἐς ὅτι ἄν τις αὐτῶν τῷ κοινῷ χρήσιμος ᾖ, χρῆσθαι* Dio Cass. lxxi. 34. 4. In this he was following the example of Pius, pp. **14.** 6, **110.** 6.

122. 15 **σὺν ἄλλῳ.** It was a Stoic dictum: *καὶ ἡμεῖς δέ, ἃ καθ' αὐτοὺς ὄντες οὐκ ἔσμεν οἷοί τε ἐνεργεῖν, σὺν ἄλλοις ἐνεργοῦμεν* Alex. Aphr. *De Mixt.* p. 217. Xyl. refers to the familiar *σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω Il.* x. 224 (Pl. *Prt.* 348d), which the Schol. quotes at *εἷς δ' ἀνὴρ οὐ πάνθ' ὁρᾷ* Eur. *Ph.* 745.

The way, however, in which M. expresses what is a commonplace, esp. the words *τὸν δυνάμενον . . . ἡγεμονικοῦ*, has suggested to me that *σὺν ἄλλῳ* here and in l. 21, and *τὸν δ.* may refer to the divine *λόγος*, which assists me in my work for the Whole and is able to employ my *ἡγ.* to that end. On *ἄλλος με κωλύει*, Epict. i. 25. 13, Mr. P. E. Matheson writes: 'For this reverent use of "Another" for "a divine Helper" see Abbott, *The Son of Man*, 3618' (*Diatessarica*, part viii), *Epictetus, The Discourses, &c.* ii. p. 246. If this be M.'s meaning, cf. *τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ φυλάξαι ὑμᾶς ἀπταίστους καὶ στῆσαι* St. Jude, *Ep.* 24.

122. 16 **συντείνειν:** cf. p. **34.** 5 n.; *εἰς οὐδὲν συντείνουσαν ἕξει τὴν παράθεσιν τῶν τρόπων* Apoll. Dysc. *Synt.* 3. 3.

Ch. 6: 122. 17 **Ὅσοι μέν:** 'aliunde huic loco videntur haec a librario esse intercalata' Xyl. ad loc.

πολυύμνητοι: cf. p. **64.** 22 n.

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Ch. 7: 122. 19 Μὴ αἰσχύνου. Pl. says that self-love is an obstacle to what M. here prescribes: *οὐκ ἐπιτρέποντες δὲ ἄλλοις ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα πράττειν, ἀναγκαζόμεθα ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτοὶ πράττοντες· διὸ πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρὴ φεύγειν τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὑτόν, τὸν δ' ἑαυτοῦ βελτίω διώκειν ἀεί, μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ πρόσθεν ποιούμενον Lg.* 732a. Cf. *δεῖ πρὸς ὃ χείρων ἑτέρου πέφυκας αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς μᾶλλον δυναμένους*, where Diomed is the example, Plu. *Praecept.* 819b.

βοηθούμενος: see *ὀρθούμενος* p. **124.** 8 n. Perhaps cf. 'non sunt di fastidiosi, . . . adscendentibus manum porrigunt' Sen. *Ep.* 73. 15.

122. 19–20 **τὸ ἐπιβάλλον:** cf. *βάρη τινὰ φέρομεν μετ' ἄλλων, ὧν τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἡμῖν μέρος, μόνοι γενόμενοι, φέρειν οὐ δυνάμεθα*, a Stoic maxim ap. Alex. Aphr. *De Mixt.* p. 217.

Ch. 8: 122. 22 Τὰ μέλλοντα μὴ ταρασσέτω: the words recall: *μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσητε εἰς τὴν αὔριον St. Matt.* 6. 34; *μὴ ταρασσέσθω ὑμῶν ἡ καρδία St. John* 14. 1.

122. 23 φέρων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, 'bearing' the identical *λόγος* in a double sense, i.e. bringing it to bear upon novel circumstances, and carrying it with you, since *ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος* is equivalent to *ὁ δαίμων* p. **92.** 1. So Epict. says: *ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτόν* ii. 8. 13, and *οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν αὐτοῦ θεόν, οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν μετὰ τίνος ἀπέρχεται* ib. 16.

Ch. 9: 122. 24 ἐπιπέπλεκται: the perf. tense is proper, see p. **112.** 14, and A's erroneous reading there.

For the figure see *ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων* p. **22.** 5, sim. p. **192.** 27.

ἡ σύνδεσις ἱερά. Gat. pointed out the reference to the *σειρὴ χρυσείη* of Hom. *Test.* Pl. had related this allegorically to Heraclitus' doctrine of Fire, making the chain an image of the sun and its motion, *Tht.* 153c. M. follows a Stoic allegorization, cf. *ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὁμήρου σειρὰν ἅπαντα εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνήρτηται καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξῆπται, πολὺ καλλίων ἅλυσις ἢ κατὰ χρυσῆν* Ael. Arist. xliii. 15 (Keil); Heraclit. *Alleg.* 36.

ἱερά is used because the bond unites the human to the divine, cf. *τῆς ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συνδέσεως* p. **46.** 24, sim. p. **112.** 13. The poetical and religious word may be a reminiscence of *τὴν*

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τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην Pl. *Lg.* 645a, where the Homeric cord was probably in Pl.'s memory.

122. 25 **οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον:** cf. *πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα ἀλλήλοις*, in the parallel passage p. **112.** 15; and *συγγενικὴ δ' ἡ τῶν ζῴων μετοχή, ἅπερ διὰ τὴν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν αὐτῶν κοινωνίαν . . . ὡσανεὶ ἀδελφότητι πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνέζευκται* Iambl. *V. Pyth.* 108.

συγκοσμεῖ: cf. pp. **74.** 8, **134.** 24.

122. 26 **εἷς ἐξ ἁπάντων:** cf. Heraclit. *Test.*, where *ἁπάντων* has been interpreted as either 'of all that exists' or 'for all', i.e. gods and men (Zeller). There has been a similar difference of opinion in regard to *εἷς Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν* St. Paul, *Eph.* 4. 6.

122. 26–**124.** 1 **θεὸς εἷς δι' ἁπάντων καὶ οὐσία μία.** *θεός* and *οὐσία* are two aspects of *ὁ κόσμος*, the relatively formative and active, and the relatively material and passive. As the vital spirit in man animates his physical frame, so God is regarded as passing δι' ἁπάντων.

οὐσία μία. This unity of the *κόσμος* as matter follows from the hypothesis that under all changes the quantity of matter remains identical, and that the four elements are reciprocally related and continually tend to pass from one compound into another.

124. 1 **λόγος κοινός**, in apposition to *νόμος εἷς* with which in contexts like this it is almost synonymous. M. is passing from God as the law of the physical universe to His manifestation in the reason common to all rational creatures. This is seen in the unity of law, which is the principle of the Commonwealth of gods and men. See p. **52.** 25.

124. 2 **ἀλήθεια μία.** For M. *ἀλήθεια* is one because it is *τῶν ἀληθῶν ἁπάντων πρώτη αἰτία* p. **170.** 7, i.e. an objective primal ground or cause upon which the subordinate (active) causes of the universe depend. Thus Chrysippus regarded *ἀλήθεια* as an alternative name for *εἱμαρμένη* which is *ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος: μεταλαμβάνει δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ λ. τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην* Stob. *Ecl.* i. p. 79. M. says that the soul's orb *φωτὶ λάμπηται ᾧ τὴν*

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ἀλήθειαν ὁρᾷ τὴν πάντων καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ, combining the objective and subjective senses of the word, p. **220.** 20.

Here M. is occupied with a principle of Truth which is exhibited in the unity of intelligences—with what is, ultimately, a moral hypothesis of the unity of the *κόσμος*.

εἷγε καὶ τελειότης μία. *τελειότης* means the perfection of any *φύσις*, which it attains by realizing the law, the inherent *λόγος*, of its being: *μία γὰρ ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἡ τελειότης, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἑκάστου φ.* Chrysippus ap. Galen, *Hipp. et Pl.* p. 447 Mü. In consequence Universal Nature is *ἡ πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων τελεωτάτη καὶ περιληπτικωτάτη φ.* p. **220.** 8.

Truth then is one, inasmuch as it is the perfect system uniting all creation, and is specially exhibited in the ideal perfection of the reciprocal moral and intellectual activities of all reasonable creatures.

Ch. 10: 124. 4 **τὸ ἔνυλον,** used only here by M. for *τὸ ὑλικον*, opp. to *τὸ αἴτιον*. See pp. **60.** 10 n., **84.** 23.

ἐναφανίζεται: *ἐναφανίζεται, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα, τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι αἱ μνῆμαι αὐτῶν* p. **26.** 23, cf. l. 6 below.

124. 6 **ἐγκαταχώννυται:** for the simile from the sands of the desert, cf. pp. **64.** 26, **132.** 2.

Ch. 11: 124. 7 **κατὰ φύσιν:** synonymous with *κατὰ λόγον* in reasonable creatures, because *λόγος* is the conscious law by which they reach *τελειότης* l. 2, cf. pp. **90.** 14, **92.** 15.

Ch. 12: 124. 8 **ἢ ὀρθούμενος:** Cas.'s *μὴ ὀρθούμενος* was prompted by the wish to make the aphorism consistent with *ὀρθὸν οὖν εἶναι χρή, οὐχὶ ὀρθούμενον* p. **40.** 20. In view, however, of *βοηθούμενος* p. **122.** 19 no change is demanded.

We may compare Theseus' words to Athena: *σὺ γάρ μ' ἀνορθοῖς, ὥστε μὴ 'ξαμαρτάνειν* Eur. *Suppl.* 1228.

Ch. 13: 124. 9 **Οἷόν ἐστιν . . . τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον.** The analogy between *τὰ λογικά* and *τὰ μέλη*, i.e. that they are constituted for co-operation, is expressed by *οἷόν ἐστιν*, while the relation upon which the analogy rests is expressed by *τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον*, which is then defined by *πρὸς μίαν τινὰ συνεργίαν κατεσκευασμένα*. Thus *τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον* has not its usual meaning 'are similar to'. Cf. *τοῦτον οὖν ἔχει τὸν λόγον ὁ θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ,*

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συνέχων τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἁρμονίαν, i.e. God has this relation, that of a keystone in an arch, to the world, a relation then defined by a participial clause [Arist.] *Mu.* 400ª3.

124. 10 **ἐν διεστῶσι.** Bodies were distinguished thus: *τὰ μὲν ἐκ διεστώτων . . . τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων . . . τὰ δ' ἡνωμένα*, examples respectively being *στόλος, ναῦς, ζῷον*, Plu. *Praec. coniug.* p. 142e, cf. S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 78; 'quaedam continua', 'quaedam composita', 'quaedam ex distantibus' Sen. *Ep.* 102. 6. M. says there is what we should term an organic unity which combines what are separated locally, thus he says of widely sundered stars: *διεστηκότων τρόπον τινὰ ἕνωσις ὑπέστη* p. **176. 14.**

Socr., comparing the relation of brothers to that of the hands and feet of a living creature, said: *πολὺ διεστῶτε, πράττετον ἅμα καὶ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν* X. *Mem.* ii. 3. 19, cf. p. **20.** 9. Hierocles writes: *πράττουσι γὰρ τὰ κοινῇ διαφέροντα καὶ διεστηκότες τοῖς τόποις πάμπαν, μέγα θ' ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλήλων ὄφελος κἂν μυρίον ᾖ τὸ διάστημα* Stob. *Ecl.* iv. p. 663. St. John Chrysostom, commenting upon St. Paul's use of *τὴν ἑνότητα τοῦ Πνεύματος*, *Eph.* 4. 3, says: *ἵνα τοὺς γένει καὶ τρόποις διαφόροις διεστηκότας ἑνώσῃ.*

124. 11 **ἡ τούτου νόησις προσπεσεῖται:** this idea of fellowship is conceived as *striking* the attention more vividly if the word *member* be used to stimulate the association of ideas between an organism and a group or fellowship. This is an example of keeping alive *τὰ δόγματα* by exciting the relative *φαντασίαι* p. **120.** 18, cf. Pl.'s prescription, *Ti.* 90b.

προσπεσεῖται: used originally of a sense stimulus striking the sense organ, e.g. Pl. *R.* 523c, cf. p. **144.** 6. Then, more generally, of an idea arising in consciousness: *ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων* Pl. *Lg.* 854b, cf. pp. **36.** 11, **126.** 20, **180.** 14, **218.** 9.

124. 12 **μέλος εἰμί.** In spite of this exhortation M., according to our MSS., uses *μέρος*, not *μέλος* in the rest of the *Meditations* to describe this participation in society. Pl. often writes *μέλη καὶ μέρη*, e.g. *Phlb.* 14e, *Lg.* 795e. Arist., in his zoological writings, distinguishes the two words: *ὅσα τῶν μερῶν ὅλα ὄντα ἕτερα μέρη ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς* are *μέλη H. An.* 486ª9. He does not employ *μέλος* in the political works in the met. sense now before

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us. St. Paul writes: *ὑμεῖς δέ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους* 1 *Cor.* 12. 27. The analogy is found in Justin: 'per multa membra civitas in unum tantum corpus redigitur' *Epit. Pomp. Trog.* v. 10. 10.

124. 12–13 **συστήματος**: see p. **180.** 7, where *συμφωνία* (l. 12) is a synonym, so that the musical sense of *μέλος* may be in his mind when he speaks of the 'canine' letter rho.

124. 13 **διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ στοιχείου**: omitted by Xyl. in his version of 1568, and regarded by Gat. as a gloss. M., however, takes an innocent pleasure in words, and may well mean that the canine letter is cynical or antisocial: 'inritata canes quam homo quod planiu' dicit' Lucil. i. 19 Lachm. Pl. had spoken of its *σκληρότης* *Crat.* 426c, 434d. So Ben Jonson: 'and, right anenst him, a Dog snarling *Er' Alch.* ii. 6. 22. Conversely, Plotinus would call his disciple Amelius "*διὰ τοῦ ῥ 'Αμέριον*", Porphyr. *V. Plot.* 7.

124. 14 **καταληκτικῶς**: for the origin of this use of the adv., see *ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ καταλήγει* p. **58.** 10–11 n. Gat.'s emendation is justified by the context here and by the parallel: *διδοὺς μὴ καταληκτικῶς ἔδωκας* p. **190.** 11. There M. says the favour should be embraced in the act of giving, the gift be its own end; here he says that the joy of well doing is not complete unless the well-doing 'terminates in itself', i.e. is done for its own sake.

Bonhöffer prefers the MSS. *καταληπτικῶς*, interpreting M.'s meaning to be that 'ist auch seine Freude am Wohlthun eine kataleptische, weil sie auf der *κατάληψις*, d. h. auf klarer Erkenntnis der menschlichen Natur und Bestimmung beruht' *Epictet und die Stoa*, p. 297. Fournier also keeps *καταληπτικῶς*. See, for M.'s use of a cognate adv., p. **124.** 26.

124. 15 **ὡς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψιλὸν ποιεῖς**: cf. *τὸ πρέπον ποιεῖς* p. **96.** 24 n. The meaning is 'you do it barely as a duty', so that the sense corresponds with the narrow ideal, so often ascribed to the Stoics, of Duty for Duty's sake.

124. 16 **ὡς ἑαυτὸν εὖ ποιῶν**: cf. *μὴ οὖν κάμνε ὠφελούμενος, ἐν ᾧ ὠφελεῖς* p. **144.** 25, and see p. **190.** 13 seq.

Ch. 14: 124. 18 **μέμψεται τὰ παθόντα**: ironical, as at l. 27; cf. *τὰ δὲ κακούμενα μέρη . . . ἀποφηνάσθω* p. **130.** 24.

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124. 19 οὔπω βέβλαμμαι: for the reason given at p. **54. 19**, cf. pp. **160. 7**, **162. 16**, **226. 3**.

Ch. 15: 124. 21 ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. The maxim is repeated at p. **148. 7**. The explanation is that a man's benefit is *κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευὴν καὶ φύσιν* p. **116. 5**.

124. 22 ἡ πορφύρα. Although M. is in the first place thinking of the unfading and beautiful colour, yet he probably recalls Epict.'s use of the word in reference to the *laticlave*, a mark of rank and responsibility, with his suggestion of *noblesse oblige*: *ἐγὼ δὲ πορφύρα εἶναι βούλομαι, τὸ ὀλίγον ἐκεῖνο καὶ στιλπνόν* i. 2. 18, sim. iii. 1. 23. Sen. has 'illud pulcherrimum reipublicae praetextum, optimates' *Ep.* 71. 9.

124. 23 τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ χρῶμα: this expresses the ideal of self-consistency which is again suggested at *ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται* p. **230. 15**.

Ch. 16: 124. 24–5 Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν . . . εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν. This first sentence is clearly mutilated, and no satisfactory emendation has been proposed. M. is declaring that *τὸ ἡγ.* has power to remain unshaken in adversity: *ἐπ' ἐμοί ἐστιν ἵνα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ψυχῇ μηδεμία πονηρία ᾖ μηδὲ ἐπιθυμία μηδὲ ὅλως ταραχή τις* p. **156. 1**, cf. the closing words of this ch., p. **126. 3**. As he is principally occupied with that *ταραχή* which takes the form of the *πάθη* of *φόβος* and *λύπη*, and not with *ἡδονή* or *ἐπιθυμία*, the two remaining chief *πάθη*, the older critics tried to get rid of *ἐπιθυμία* in this sentence and to introduce a reference to fear and grief. Thus Saumaise substituted *ἀθυμία*, reading ⟨*οὐκ ἄγει*⟩ *εἰς ἀθυμίαν*, and Gat., though deferring to Saumaise, suggested alternatively that *οἷον λέγω* conceals *οὐ λυπεῖ ἑαυτό*. Gat. further made all this first sentence interrogative because, as he said, M. repeatedly affirms that these passions arise because *τὸ ἡγ.* allows itself to make false judgements: *εἰ μὲν διά τι τῶν ἐκτὸς λυπῇ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνό σοι ἐνοχλεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρῖμα* p. **162. 16**.

As to *ἐπιθυμίαν*, it will be seen by looking to the end of the ch. that M. there adds *ἀπροσδεές ἐστιν . . . τὸ ἡγ.*, thus introducing the notion of *appetite*, *ἐπιθυμία*. This *πάθος* may then well have occurred in the first sentence.

Secondly, notice that the burden of the whole ch. is that

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τὸ ἡγ. can be *ἀτάραχον καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον*, and that one object of the ch. is to assert this indemnity by contrast with the weakness of *τὸ σωμάτιον* and *τὸ ψυχάριον*. This abstraction of the higher self from two aspects of the lower is the justification of the emendation and repunctuation in ll. 28–9.

αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ. Gat.'s difficulty may be reduced by laying stress on *αὐτό*, and by realizing in the light of what follows that M. is expressing an ideal tranquillity of the governing self; cf. 'sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur' Spinoza, *Ethica*, v. 42, Schol.

οἷον λέγω serves to introduce specific instances of *τὸ ἐνοχλεῖν*, an equivalent of *ταραχή*. Cf. the use of *οὐ λέγω μόνον*, in qualification, p. **54.** 25, sim. pp. **58.** 6, **82.** 22.

124. 25 **εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν:** *ἀθυμίαν*, proposed by Saum., is an equivalent of *λύπη*, cf. *ἀθυμία δὲ λύπη ἀπελπίζοντος ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ τυχεῖν* Andron. *De Pass.* 2 (p. 570 Mullach), but it is only one of twenty-five *εἴδη λύπης*, and the word is nowhere used either by M. or by Epict.

There is certainly some corruption, but *ἐπιθυμία* may well have been introduced as one of the four *πάθη*. It is not unlike M. to propose an example which is relevant but is then left alone, cf. *μὴ φόβος; μὴ ὑποψία; μὴ ἐπιθυμία;* p. **242.** 21.

124. 26 **ποιείτω**, almost as if he were saying 'he may try but will try to no purpose', for *εἴ τις ἄλλος δύναται*, like *εἰ δύναται* just below, is ironical; the body cannot care for itself.

ὑπολητικῶς οὐ τρέψει: cf. *τὸ . . . ὅλως ὑπολαμβάνον* l. 29. Gat. says *opinando*, but the adv. seems to mean 'with the consent of its faculty of judgement'. The fortitude of the self depends on its *ὑπόληψις*, e.g. *ἆρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν* p. **54.** 19, and many other such exhortations. Cf. *οὔπω σε καταληπτικῶς* l. 14, if right, and *ἀβιάστως διαζῆσαι* p. **144.** 1.

124. 26–7 **εἰς τοιαύτας τροπάς**, i.e. *ἀλλοιώσεις*, cf. *αἱ τῷ αἵματος τροπαὶ καὶ ἀλλοιώσιες* Ti. Locr. 102c. The *πάθη* are *alterations* which, if the judgement should consent, become *τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὰς . . . λόγου κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας* Them. *in ll. De An.* p. 107.

124. 28 **τὸ [δὲ] ψυχάριον τὸ φοβούμενον.** By moving the position of *δέ*, and putting a semicolon after *δύναται*, the contrast of *τὸ*

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ἡγ. αὐτό with *τὸ σωμάτιον* and with *τὸ ψυχάριον*, the body and the psycho-physical mechanism, the seat of *φόβος* and *λύπη*, becomes clear, and the origin of the corruption evident. *τὸ ψ.* is equivalent to *τὸ πνευμάτιον*, p. **20.** 13 n., cf. *τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ψ.* opp. to *νοῦς*, p. **246.** 11. Possibly the original ran: *τὸ δὲ ἡγ., τὸ περὶ τούτων ὅλως ὑπολάμβανον κ.τ.λ.*

For the sense of the passage, cf. *οὐ χεῖρον τὸ ἡγ. γέγονε, τὰ δὲ κακούμενα μέρη . . . ἀποφηνάσθω* p. **130.** 23.

126. 1 **οὐ γὰρ ᾄξει αὐτό εἰς κρίσιν.** There have been many corrections suggested for *οὐ γὰρ ἔξεις*, a manifest corruption with which cf. *εξεις* A for *ἥξεις* p. **122.** 22, *ἔξειν* A for *ἄξειν* p. **16.** 17, *ἧξεν* codd. for *ἦξεν* Lucian, *Demon.* 4.

For the use of the verb, cf. *οὐδ' ἦξας εἰς ἔρευναν* Eur. *Ion*, 328; *τῶν τῆς ψ. παθημάτων, τὸ μὲν ἐξᾴττον αὐτῆς καὶ φερόμενον κατεπᾴδουσα* Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 5.

126. 1–2 **ἀπροσδεές ἐστιν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ:** the laudable man is *ὁ ἀπροσδεῆ τούτων ἑαυτὸν παρεχόμενος* p. **86.** 14. To admit *wants* is to admit *ἐπιθυμία*, desire for what is absent.

126. 3 **ἀνεμπόδιστον:** added to complete the notion of *αὐτάρκεια* which M. has before him, cf. p. **148.** 22.

Ch. 17: 126. 5 **Εὐδαιμονία.** The first sentence is complete in itself; its connexion with what follows is obscure. Is it that M. regards the unseasonable *φαντασία* as a temptation personified, as a *δαίμων κακός*? There is no parallel to such a line of reflection in the *Meditations*.

ἢ ⟨δαιμόνιον⟩ ἀγαθόν. Gat.'s *ἡγεμονικόν* has been generally accepted; Mr. Marchant, however, remarks that M. is etymologizing, and it strikes him that 'in relation to *εὐδαιμονία* *δαιμόνιον* is more exact than *δαίμων*'.

We may compare, in addition to *Test.*, *ἡ δεισιδαιμονία . . . δειλία πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον* Theophr. *Char.* 16; *εὐδαιμονία . . . δαιμονία τις καὶ θεία φύσις, καὶ εὐδαίμων . . . ὁ εὖ τὸν δαίμονα διακείμενον ἔχων* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 47, and for a verbal parallel: *ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὰς καθαρτικὰς* (sc. *ἐνεργῶν*) *δαιμόνιος ἦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ καὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός* Porphyr. *Sent.* 32 (34), ap. Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 94.

126. 6 **ὦ φαντασία:** the imagination of an evil act or the image of death, see l. 9, and *τὰ ἐμφανταζόμενα αὐτῷ* (sc. *θανάτῳ*) p. **28.** 5.

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Similar apostrophes are *θᾶττον ἔλθοις, ὦ θάνατε* p. **174.** 9; *ἔκδεξαί με μικρόν, φαντασία· ἄφες ἴδω τίς εἶ* Epict. ii. 18. 24; *τί ποτ' ἔσθ' ὃ βούλει, θυμέ; τοῦτό μοι φράσον* Cleanthes, ap. Galen, v. 476; *ὦ πονηρὸν ἐνθύμημα, πόθεν ἐνεκυλίσθης; Ecclus.* 37. 3; 'nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, numquam te esse confitebor malum' Posidon. ap. Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 61.

τοὺς θεούς σοι, sc. *ἐπόμνυμι*; cf. *τοὺς θεούς σοι* Epict. ii. 19. 15, sim. iii. 7. 19, 23. 35.

Ch. 18: 126. 10 **τί δὲ φίλτερον**; of the change of death, continuing the last ch.; cf. *οὐδὲν οὕτως φιλεῖ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φ. ὡς τὸ τὰ ὄντα μεταβάλλειν* p. **66.** 9. See also p. **184.** 20.

Ch. 19: 126. 16 **διὰ χειμάρρου.** Time is figured as a whirlpool, *καταπέπωκεν* l. 19, an image to which M. passes from that of the stream of phenomena, cf. pp. **68.** 6, **90.** 4, **102.** 8, and for *χειμάρρους* p. **182.** 9.

126. 18 **πόσους ἤδη ὁ αἰὼν Χρυσίππους.** The natural meaning is like our own 'how many a Newton!' Zeller, however, thinks that M. is referring to a doctrine of *παλιγγενεσία* held by certain Stoics: *μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀριθμόν, ὡς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι* Chrysippus ap. Alex. Aphr. *in Anal. pr.* p. 180 (Zeller, *Die Phil. der Gr.*[3] iii, p. 155, Eng. tr. p. 167). Sen. writes: 'veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies; quem multi recusarent nisi oblitos reduceret' (cf. 'scilicet inmemores', in regard to the Pythagorean doctrine, Virg. *Aen.* vi. 750) *Ep.* 36. 10.

M., if he momentarily entertained either hypothesis, recognized that such a reincarnation is not *individual* survival: *ἀλλοῖον ζῷον ἔσῃ* p. **168.** 17.

Ch. 21: 128. 1 **περὶ πάντων λήθη**: cf. p. **52.** 10.

Ch. 22: 128. 3 **τοὺς πταίοντας**: cf. p. **140.** 14–15 n.

Ch. 23: 128. 8 **ἐκ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας**: see *τῇ ὕλῃ* l. 9, and p. **96.** 20 n.

ὡς κηροῦ: see *Test.* and *ἀποξέων ἂν τὸν κηρὸν ἢ βόας ἢ ἵππους ἢ καὶ νὴ Δί' ἀνθρώπους ἀνέπλαττον* Lucian, *Somn.* 2. M. is thinking first of *κήρινα μιμήματα πεπλασμένα* Pl. *Lg.* 933b, and uses *ἱππάριον* for the completed work of art, p. **58.** 19 n.

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128. 10 **εἶτα εἰς ἄλλο τι:** cf. 'quicquid conposuit, resolvit: quicquid resolvit, conponit iterum' Sen. *Ep.* 30. 11.

128. 11 **δεινὸν δὲ οὐδέν:** cf. *ἐκεῖ οὐδὲν δεινόν* p. 136. 21; *καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται* Pl. *R.* 486b. To supply *ἀγαθόν*, with Kron., introduces a point which is irrelevant, nor is the adj. the proper antonym to *δεινόν* in its present meaning.

M.'s main thought is like St. Paul's: *Τί με ἐποίησας οὕτως;* *Rom.* 9. 20; it is not for the vessel to repine at the decision of the master workman.

Ch. 24: 128. 13 **Τὸ ἐπίκοτον τοῦ προσώπου.** This ch. is corrupt, and no adequate restoration has been proposed. In the English commentary, p. 355, I have said that M. appears to have compared a set evil expression of face with a hardening of the conscience. Both changes result from repetition, and both are eventually incurable. If this view is correct, there must be a lacuna in the middle of the ch.

128. 13–14 **ὅταν ⟨δὲ⟩ πολλάκις ᾖ.** In this and what follows Gat. follows closely Boot's emendation of P's *ὅταν πολλάκις ἐναποθνήσκειν ᾖ* (*ᾗ* A) *πρόσχημα ἢ τὸ τελευταῖον ἀπεσβέσθη*. The resultant text is clearly only a provisional expedient.

128. 14 **⟨τὸ⟩ πρόσχημα,** the *expression* or *expressiveness*, rather than the *grace* of the countenance, cf. *σχηματίζεσθαι*, used of *τὸ πρόσωπον*, p. 132. 10, where the countenance is said to be controlled by the mind, whereas the mind fails to control itself.

128. 16 **ὅτι παρὰ τὸν λόγον.** It is not clear why this habitually fixed expression shows that a scowl or the wrath of which it is the index is contrary to *reason*, except that what is *παρὰ φύσιν* is irrational. If, however, M. compared the hardening of the moral sense to the loss of the ability to remove a scowl, he might well say that what causes this hardening is as contrary to reason as the expression of anger is contrary to nature.

Mr. Jackson takes *ὅτι* to be the pronoun: 'be vigilant in the detection of aught that is contrary to reason.'

128. 16–17 **εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν οἰχήσεται.** As the text stands, even with the amendments, it is impossible to see the force of this sentence and of the *γάρ* which introduces it. How can a fixed evil expression show that a man has lost the

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consciousness of wrong doing? Moreover *οἰχήσεται* corresponds to *ἐναποθνῄσκει*, thus implying a comparison of the inward man to the outward, as *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* appears to be parallel with and not a corollary of *παρὰ φύσιν*. The connexion of thought may then have been: 'endeavour to understand that repeated evil is contrary to reason, since it destroys the moral sense of the wrongdoer; attend to this in order that your conscience may not be hardened; for, if it is, life ceases to be worth while.'

Compare the mortification of conscience described at p. **120.** 18, and the use there of *νεκρωθῆναι* and *σβεσθῶσιν*. See also Epict. i. 5. 4, ii. 18. 31.

Ch. 25: 128. 20 **ἀεὶ νεαρός.** The world renews itself by change, cf. *νεαρὸς ἀεὶ καὶ ἀκμαῖος* p. **244.** 12; sim. pp. **66.** 9, **164.** 20.

Ch. 26: 128. 21 **εὐθὺς ἐνθυμοῦ:** cf. *εὐθὺς μεταβὰς ἐπιλογίζου* p. **206.** 6.

128. 22 **ἐλεήσεις αὐτόν:** cf. *τρόπον τινὰ ἐλεεινά* p. **28.** 18 n. Gat. reminds the reader that pity is inconsistent with strict Stoicism. But so also is *συγγνώμη* l. 24. The point is a nice one, but where does M. profess to be a strict Stoic? Rather, as the work progresses, he becomes increasingly human and lenient towards evil-doers, more conscious that he too is liable to err, p. **206.** 7. Here his main point is that he must not be surprised at evil, p. **120.** 13, nor give way to anger, p. **206.** 9.

His own practice to his foreign foes is illustrated by: *ἠλέησε γοῦν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁ Μάρκος* Dio Cass. lxxi. 10. 4.

128. 24 **ἢ ἄλλο ὁμοειδές:** i.e. one of the 'indifferent' objects, cf. money, pleasure, glory *καὶ κατ' εἶδος* p. **206.** 7.

128. 25 **εὐμενὴς ἔσῃ τῷ παρορῶντι,** as the gods are to men, p. **178.** 1. You will be gracious to him because of his ignorance, an ignorance figured as distorted vision, cf. *τῷ ἰκτεριῶντι* p. **120.** 6.

Ch. 27: 130. 1 **ὡς ἤδη ὄντα.** M., instead of saying *ὡς παρόντα*, uses this rather stronger and more exact expression. He requires the image of what is absent to be treated as if it did not exist. Arist., speaking of a sign of weather, says: *ὑπὸ πνεύματος γέγονεν ἤδη μὲν ὄντος, οὔπω δὲ παρόντος*, 'it arises from a wind which exists now but has not yet reached us', *Mete.* 372^{b}27.

M. requires more self-control than he had commended in Pius, p. **12.** 21.

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130. 5 ταραχθήσεσθαι: 'quem res plus nimio delectavere secundae | mutatae quatient' Hor. *Ep.* i. 10. 30; the contrast is with *γαλήνην ἔχειν* l. 7, pp. **74.** 23, **154.** 27, **244.** 2.

Ch. 28. 130. 6 Εἰς ἑαυτὸν συνειλοῦ: cf. *εἰς ἑ. ἀναχωρεῖν* p. **50.** 13, where the retreat was to be momentary, for refreshment from mundane cares. The exact meaning of *συνειλοῦ* is doubtful. Gat. compares 'resigno quae dedit et mea | virtute me involvo' Hor. *Od.* iii. 29. 54, and quaintly supposed that both Hor. and M. were thinking of the hedgehog, *ἑαυτὸν συνειλήσας* Ael. *N. An.* vi. 64, cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 687. But Hor. may mean that when Fortune has stripped me, I wrap myself in my own goodness, and M., similarly, may suggest that you are to clothe yourself with just acts. Most probably, however, the sense corresponds with *sese colligere*, cf. 'quomodo potest ille diu in pace manere, . . . qui parum vel raro se intrinsecus colligit?' à Kempis, *Imit. Chr.* i. 11. 1.

130. 6–7 ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖσθαι: cf. p. **148.** 14 n.

Ch. 29: 130. 8 Ἐξάλειψον τὴν φαντασίαν: the imaginative presentation is to be treated as though it were, as such, bad; cf. pp. **126.** 6, **156.** 1, and contrast p. **74.** 22. The same is said even of *ὑπόληψις*, p. **246.** 3. He goes on here to say *στῆσον τὴν νευροσπαστίαν*, i.e. *τὴν ὁρμητικήν*, p. **108.** 12, as though our impulses were, as such, bad, cf. p. **174.** 17.

130. 8–9 περίγραψον τὸ ἐνεστώς: cf. *ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντα ὅτι . . . ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος* Arist. *Rh.* 1396^{b}7.

130. 9 γνώρισον τὸ συμβαῖνον: cf. p. **164.** 10. The wise man is never surprised, he is prepared for every event.

130. 10 μέρισον τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἰς τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ ὑλικόν: cf. for this maxim of intellectual method p. **60.** 10 n.

130. 11 ἐννόησον τὴν ἐσχάτην ὥραν: cf. *ἡ τελευταία ὥρα* p. **110.** 9. Gat. considered that M. intended by this phrase the maxim, common to the Stoics with other schools, to live each day and to do each act as if it were your last, p. **22.** 22. M., however, may have used the words in their more natural sense to mean 'prepare for your final account'. He would then be entertaining popular religious views of a trial of the dead in the world below.

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The effect of either maxim in practice is the same: 'qui omnem diem tamquam ultimum ordinat, nec optat crastinum nec timet' Sen. *De Brev.* 7. 9.

τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἁμαρτηθέν, repeated, with a small change, from p. **90.** 13, cf. pp. **178.** 23, **186.** 8. If the injunction about the 'last hour' referred to an account, it would be natural that M. should here mention that individual responsibility which follows from the dogma of moral freedom. He says elsewhere: *καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν γεγόναμεν, ὅμως τὰ ἡγ. ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τὴν ἰδίαν κυρίαν ἔχει* p. **166.** 22. See pp. **62.** 5, **174.** 11, **226.** 13.

Ch. 30: 130. 13 **Συμπαρεκτείνειν**, a met. derived from *applying* a line to the boundary of a surface, Procl. *in Eucl. Elem.* I, p. **100.** 18, cf. *πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν αὐτὴν συμπαρεκτεινομένην καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιβάλλουσαν τὰς ἑαυτῆς διανοήσεις* ib. p. 62. 1. For the maxim see pp. **118.** 25, **122.** 5.

εἰσδύεσθαι: cf. *φῶς εἰσδυόμενον* p. **168.** 7; *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς εἰσδύεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, of the Truth, Polyb. xiii. 5. 5.

130. 14 **τὰ γινόμενα καὶ ⟨τὸν⟩ ποιοῦντα.** The addition of *τόν* seems to be expedient, cf. *παρακολουθεῖν . . . τοῖς γινομένοις, καὶ . . . ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ τίνα σκόπον ἡ ἀναφορά*, where *τοῦ ποιοῦντος* is to be understood, p. **122.** 5. See also p. **168.** 23.

Ch. 31: 130. 15 **Φαίδρυνον σεαυτόν**: cf. *τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον φαιδρυνάμενον κατὰ νόμον κοσμεῖν δεῖ* Pl. *Lg.* 718b; *τὸ φαιδρόν* is used for this outward gladness, pp. **40.** 18, **200.** 12.

ἁπλότητι: associated with self-respect, see *ἅπλωσον σεαυτόν* p. **62.** 7–8 n.

130. 15–16 **τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιαφορίᾳ**: cf. *τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῆν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρ. καὶ κακίας* Aristo Ch. ap. D.L. vii. 160. For M.'s statement see pp. **96.** 10, **220.** 13, **222.** 17.

130. 16 **φίλησον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.** After a statement of Duty to oneself, there follow, as in iii. 9, Duty to man, and finally to God: *τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἰκείωσιν καὶ τὴν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀκολουθίαν* p. **44.** 15.

At vi. 39, M. enjoined genuine love to our immediate neighbours, p. **112.** 19; in this Book he has said *οὔπω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* p. **124.** 14, and *ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου φιλεῖν*

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καὶ τοὺς πταίοντας p. **128.** 3. Again, he said that it belongs to man's nature κήδεσθαι πάντων ἀνθρώπων p. **40.** 5, cf. pp. **42.** 6, **150.** 2, **174.** 4. Nowhere else, however, is this second commandment put so warmly and so universally.

130. 17 **ἀκολούθησον θεῷ.** To balance φίλησον he has varied the better known ἕπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ, which he uses at pp. **48.** 18, **200.** 5, **246.** 22, **248.** 20.

The maxim is Pythagorean: ὁ βίος ἅπας συντέτακται πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ Iambl. *V. Pyth.* 18. 86; 'Pythagoricum illud, ἕπου θεῷ' Boeth. *Cons.* i, Prosa 4. It is indeed older, part of the proverbial tradition: 'vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent . . . sequi deum' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 73; 'vetus praeceptum, deum sequere' Sen. *V.B.* 15. 5.

The Stoics, as usual, adopt it in two senses: (*a*) to obey God and to make oneself like him, a religious maxim; (*b*) to follow Nature's law, a philosophic tenet, e.g. τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, Chrysippus ap. D.L. vii. 88; ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει . . . τῇ κοινῇ p. **76.** 4. The two aspects are combined in: τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ p. **248.** 20; 'secundum rerum naturam vivere et deorum exemplum sequi' Sen. *Ben.* iv. 25. 1.

"**πάντα νομιστί**". Usener's brilliant ἑτερῇ δὲ μόνα τὰ στοιχεῖα, following Cas.'s δὲ μόνα for δαίμονα, has made the reference to Democritus, *Test.*, clear. Even so the connexion with what precedes is abrupt and obscure. Is it that to love men and to obey God are parts of the rule of Law that obtains in the realm of Physics? A further difficulty is caused by the condensed shape in which, as the MSS. stand, M. cites Democr. Thus πάντα νομιστί must stand for πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ νομιστί, for by τὰ στοιχεῖα (cf. τῶν ἀπαθῶν στ. p. **136.** 11) he means the *atoms*, the elements of D.'s system, with the *void*.

νομιστί seems to be a later technical term for νόμῳ, to avoid the sense 'by law', which M. treats it as meaning. Diog. Oen. has: Δημόκριτος τὰς ἀτόμους μόνας κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰπὼν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ νομιστεὶ ἅπαντα *Fr.* vi W. Galen explains: τὸ γὰρ δὴ νόμῳ ταὐτὸ βούλεται τῷ οἷον νομιστὶ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς i. 417; cf. νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν S. Emp.

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Math. vii. 135. Thus the meaning is not that *all* things are *νομιστί*, but that the sensible world is *νομιστί*, relative, that is, to our senses.

130. 18–19 **τὰ πάντα νομιστὶ ἔχει.** As the text stands M. appears to take advantage of the equivocal meaning of *νομιστί* = *νόμῳ*, and to say that we may be satisfied that *law* rules all. This resembles his controversial use of *κόσμος* p. **62.** 13. The reply to the atomist, and the verbal statement would be much clearer if we might rewrite: *ἐκεῖνος μέν φησιν ὅτι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ νομιστί . . . ἀρκεῖ δὲ μεμνῆσθαι ὅτι τὰ πάντα νόμῳ ἔχει.* He would sweep away the relativity of the seen world by an appeal not to the unseen atoms but to the moral presupposition of the rule of Law.

An alternative solution is that M. understood D.'s opposition of *νόμῳ, νομιστί* to *ἐτεῇ, ὄντως* to be an opposition of the law of the changing arrangement of the atoms, what D. called *ἀνάγκη*, *Fr.* 181, to the theoretically conceived atoms. He would understand that D. taught that the attributes of the real are ever changing, and that their diversification rests upon the *foedera naturae* which rule the elements. See what he appears to contend for at p. **62.** 13. His answer, then, here would be no mere verbal retort but a just philosophical criticism: the contrast of human institutions to Nature's law, the opposition of *νόμῳ* to *φύσει*, the idea of appearance *versus* reality, is unsound.

130. 19 **ἔχει· ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα:** *ἔχει* has been suspected. Usener's *εἰ τὰ πάντα νομιστί, ἐτεῇ δὴ λίαν ὀλίγα* is not consistent with M.'s belief. Dr. Rendall writes: *ἔχεις ἤδη λίαν ὀλίγα*, and interprets by 'all lies in a nutshell'. Mr. Marchant suggests that either M. himself in a mood of despondency or some owner of the MSS. in darker days added the comment: 'Yes, but now too little is ruled according to law!'

Ch. 32: 130. 20 **Περὶ θανάτου.** At pp. **36.** 21, **94.** 18, M. stated alternatives between survival and extinction, in the former passage using the Epicurean term *ἀναισθησία*, cf. p. **168.** 15, to include what here is termed *σβέσις*, and called by Socr. an unawakening sleep, Pl. *Ap.* 40c. He is now writing with reference to the opposed doctrines of Atomism and *ἕνωσις* and uses *μετάστασις* for what he terms *συμμεῖναι* at p. **216.** 4. The con-

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templation of three possibilities is ascribed to Socr. in Plu. *Cons. ad Apoll.* 107d–110e, where the writer gives the alternatives of the *Apology*, adding a third possibility, a scattering of the ψ., referring presumably to Pl. *Phd.* 77d.

Ch. 33: 130. 22 Περὶ πόνου. He here gives one form of an alternative in regard to pain derived from Epicurus, *Test.* Another is ascribed to the latter by name at p. **140. 24**, *οὔτε ἀφόρητον οὔτε αἰώνιον.* Here he follows his quotation by his own remedy for suffering, a remedy identical with the practice of Epicurus given at p. **188. 6**.

That extreme pain is shortlived was interpreted in two ways: (*a*) that acute suffering is intermittent; this seems to have been Epicurus' original meaning: *οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι* D.L. x. 140; 'nullum enim dolorem longum esse, qui magnus est' Sen. *Ep.* 30. 14. It followed that: *τὸ τῶν κακῶν ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς* D.L. x. 133; 'si gravis, brevis: si longus, levis' Cic. *Fin.* ii. 22; 'aut tolerabilem aut brevem' Sen. *Ep.* 78. 7; 'modicum quidem contemptibilem . . . magnum vero non diuturnum' Tertull. *Apol.* 45;

(*b*) that extreme suffering brings deliverance by death; this is the view M. adopts here: *ἔξαγει* (sc. *τοῦ ζῆν*); cf. *οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν* Plu. *De poet. aud.* 36b; *ὁ γὰρ πόνος ὁ ὑπερβάλλων συνάψει θανάτῳ Contra Epic.* 1103e. Diog. Oen. gives both views: *τῶν ἀλγηδόνων αἱ ἄκραι χρονίζειν οὐ δύνανται, ἢ γὰρ ταχὺ τὸ ζῆν ἀναιροῦσαι συναναιροῦνται καὶ αὐταὶ ἢ ὑφαίρεσιν λαμβάνουσι τῆς ἀκρότητος Fr.* lviii W. Plu. adds: *ὁ μέγας καὶ σύντονος οὐ παραμένει πόνος* l.c. 36b. The point which M. is making was, so Plu. thinks, suggested to philosophers by the poets, as well as by human experience, cf. *πόνου γὰρ ἄκρον οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον* Aesch. *Fr.* 352 N.², and *ἥδε μοι | ὀξεῖα φοιτᾷ καὶ ταχεῖ' ἀπέρχεται* Soph. *Ph.* 807. The agony of Philoctetes was also used by the critics of Epicurus as a negative instance, Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 44.

Aristotle notices this psychical law when he is discussing anger: *τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται E.N.* 1126ᵃ12.

τὸ δὲ χρονίζον φορητόν. Epicurus used this member of the

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disjunction to show that, where pain of a mild kind is present, there may be a surplus of pleasure: *αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν* D.L. x. 140.

130. 23 ἡ διάνοια τὴν ἑαυτῆς γαλήνην κατὰ ἀπόληψιν διατηρεῖ: cf. Epicurus' words: *ἡ διάνοια . . . ἀταρακτεῖ* p. **188.** 6. M. seems to choose Epicurean terms, cf. *γαλήνῃ* p. **74.** 23 n.

κατὰ ἀπόληψιν: cf. *ἀπολάβῃ* p. **52.** 7.

130. 25 ἀποφηνάσθω, ironically, cf. p. **124.** 27, and *ὄψεται γὰρ τὸ πάσχον* p. **236.** 1.

Ch. 34: 132. 1 οἷαι καὶ οἷα μὲν φεύγουσι: the correction is supported by *οἷα μὲν φεύγουσιν* at p. **66.** 16. Mr. Marchant's suggestion: *οἷαι οὖσαι οἷα μὲν φεύγουσι* not only improves the sentence but also suggests the origin of the corruption.

132. 2 καὶ ὅτι, ὡς αἱ θῖνες: there is a similar transition of thought at pp. **54.** 17, **120.** 11.

The simile is like that at *λήθη κατέχωσεν* p. **64.** 26. It is said of a sandstorm which overwhelmed the host of Cambyses: *νότος . . . λέγεται . . . ἀναστήσας θῖνα μεγάλην καὶ κυματώσας τὸ πεδίον μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων πέντε καταχῶσαι* Plu. *Alex.* 26.

Ch. 35: 132. 5 "Ὡι οὖν" κ.τ.λ. Here A has preserved *ᾗ*, though omitting the *ι* as usual, but does not appear to have had *διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια*, the reading of the older Pl. MSS. P's reading, which I have printed, is recorded as a variant by Schneider.

Ch. 36: 132. 9 This celebrated dictum, see *Test.*, is put into Alexander's mouth: *β. εἶναι τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν εὖ ποιοῦντα* Plu. *Alex.* 41.

Ch. 37: 132. 10 Αἰσχρόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ. Apparently an original aphorism; the form, at least, resembles that used at p. **108.** 15. He treats of the control of the outer man again at p. **140.** 5. At 11–12 the translation should be 'and that the mind should not be'.

Ch. 38: 132. 13–14. As will be seen from *Test.* the points of Eur.'s speaker were (*a*) we are not to be angry with lifeless obstacles, a maxim enunciated by Plu. *De Tranq.* 467a, who cites this passage, and by Dio Chrys. lxxiv. 22, p. 403; (*b*) we are to make

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the best use we can of present circumstances, cf. *τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι* p. **98.** 3 n. Pl., like Eur., combines the two maxims, *R.* 604c.

Ch. 39: 132. 15: the line was thought by Gat. to be a father's exhortation to his son to be good. He cited 'a wise son maketh a glad father' *Prov.* 10. 1.

Ch. 40: 132. 16–17. These lines come from a famous passage in the *Hypsipyle* of Eur. partly cited in *Test.* Amphiaraus is consoling Eurydice upon the early death of Archemorus. Cic. says that Chrysippus praised the poet's words, and himself gives a fine translation of six lines, ending:

> reddenda terrae est terra; tum vita omnibus
> metenda, ut fruges: sic iubet necessitas *Tusc.* iii. 59.

Clem. Alex. uses the verses to illustrate the Greek view of necessity, adding: *ὦ Κύριε, δὸς περίστασιν καὶ λάβε ἐπίδειξιν, ἵτω τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτο, κινδύνων ὑπερφρονῶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς σὲ ἀγάπην, Strom.* p. 588, which resembles the spirit of M.'s *δὸς ὃ θέλεις· ἀπόλαβε ὃ θέλεις* p. **200.** 23.

Ch. 41: 132. 18–19. Antiope is speaking of her sons, Zethus and Amphion. They were in fact not destined to die on that occasion. The point again consists in resignation to necessity. Dr. Rendall makes the emperor cite the lines in reference to his two surviving sons, Commodus and Verus, the latter of whom died when M. was away on the Danube front, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, To Himself*, 1898, Introd. p. cxix.

Ch. 42: 132. 20. This familiar saying, see *Test.*, is thus interpreted by Clem. Alex., no doubt under Stoic influence: *αὕτη δὲ ἡ εὐσυνειδησία τὸ ὅσιον τὸ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίκαιον διασῴζει . . . κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀγνοίας εἶναι νομίζουσα* (sc. *ἡ ψυχή*) *καὶ τῆς μὴ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ἐνεργείας, ἀεὶ δὲ εὐχαριστοῦσα ἐπὶ πᾶσι τῷ Θεῷ Strom.* p. 797.

Ch. 43: 134. 1. In sympathy we are to be neither extravagant nor callous, cf. pp. **96.** 9, **144.** 13.

Chs. 44–6: 134. 3–17. The two *Apol.* extracts are cited by M.'s contemporary, Ael. Aristid., and by several authors of later date. The *Gorgias* passage is not quoted, I think, by anyone except M.

Chs. 47–9: 134. 18–**136.** 5. These chs. were presumably composed

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by M., at least they are in his manner and spirit. The note *καλὸν τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος*, printed in P after *βίου*, p. **134.** 19, may have been a marginal adscript referring to *βιώῃ*, l. 16, and wrongly ascribed to *βίου*.

134. 17 **Περισκοπεῖν . . ..** A variation upon the Pythagorean maxim, p. **232.** 5. To the counsel to follow the starry courses with the eyes, M. adds the injunction to run their race with them. This recalls Pl. *Lg.* 716a, p. **200.** 4, *Test.*, and *ὡς τῶν συνακολουθησόντων ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ Lg.* 716b. The practical Roman mind took such maxims as advice to make daily life as regular and continuous as the apparent motion of the celestial sphere: 'credo deos immortalis sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui . . . caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantia' Cic. *Sen.* 77.

ἄστρων δρόμους: M. may recall [Pl.] *Axiochus*, *Test.* We are reminded of: *ἀγαλλιάσεται ὡς γίγας δραμεῖν ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ Ps.* 18 (19). 5.

134. 17–18 **τὰς τῶν στοιχείων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολάς:** referring to Heraclit.'s doctrine, p. **68.** 17; see also l. 24 with *Test.* This contemplation promotes *μεγαλοφροσύνη*, p. **198.** 25.

134. 18 **ἀποκαθαίρουσι:** cf. *τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν . . . τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι* Pl. *Crat.* 396c. Julian writes with enthusiasm of the effect upon him in boyhood of such contemplation, iv, p. 130d. Boethius contrasts the terrene squalor (*βόρβορος* p. **112.** 8 n.) with the purity on high: 'veluti si vicibus sordidam humum caelumque respicias . . . ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse videaris' *Cons.* iv, pros. 4.

Ch. 48: 134. 20 **ἐπισκοπεῖν [δεῖ].** *δεῖ* is clearly intrusive in view of *περισκοπεῖν*, *ἐννοεῖν*, ll. 17, 18 and of *ἀναθεωρεῖν* p. **136.** 1. See p. **24.** 15 n.

134. 21 **ἄνωθεν κάτω:** cf. pp. **182.** 22, **244.** 24. M. seems to recall Pl.'s words in *Sph.* 216c, *Test.* The order of thought at *μετέωρος ἄνωθεν Tht.* 175d is different.

Cic. has employed the fancy in his *Somnium Scipionis*, *R.* vi. 11; Sen. has: 'terrarum orbem superne despiciens angustum' *N.Q.* i, prol. 7; see also Lucian, cited in *Test.*

134. 24 **τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συγκοσμούμενον:** a reminiscence of

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Heraclit. *Test.*, one of the best known of his paradoxes, cf. 'concordia discors' Hor. *Ep.* i. 12. 19; 'concordia ex discordibus' Sen. *N.Q.* vii. 27. 4. By *τὸ παμμιγές* M. may mean to recall *κυκεών*, p. **62.** 12, and *σάρμα εἰκῇ κεχυμένον* Heraclit. 46 Test. B., 124 D.

Ch. 49: 136. 3 **ἐκβῆναι τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ:** cf. *ἐκβῆναι τοῦ ῥ. τοῦ πρέποντος*, of a flute player, Dio Chrys. lxxviii. 18, p. 420. The 'rhythm of the present' seems to have been suggested by the close of the last ch.; he coupled *ῥυθμός* and *ἁρμονία* at p. **100.** 1.

136. 4 **τεσσαράκοντα ἔτεσιν:** cf. *ὁ τεσσαρακοντούτης . . . πάντα . . . ἑώρακε κατὰ τὸ ὁμοειδές* p. **214.** 16.

Ch. 50: 136. 7 **τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας . . .:** part of a fragment of Eur., *Test.*, which is referred to by at least eleven Greek authors. It must have been familiar to Roman readers from Lucr.'s translation, ii. 991. See also Vitruv. viii. praef. 1; Lact. *Inst.* vii. 12.

136. 9 **εἰς αἰθέριον πάλιν ἦλθε:** cf. *ἐνταῦθ' ἀπελθεῖν, πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα* Eur. *Suppl.* 533.

136. 10 **Ἢ τοῦτο·** This punctuation, suggested by Dr. Gilbert Murray, is intended to indicate that M. is quoting Eur. to illustrate one of the two Stoic hypotheses as to the destiny at dissolution of the elements composing man's unity, see pp. **58.** 23, **130.** 20. He then sets in opposition to it the hypothesis of atomic dissipation.

Gat., reading *ἢ τοιοῦτός τις σκορπισμός*, took the whole prose sentence to be interpretation of Eur.: 'aut hoc est atomorum invicem implexorum dissolutio aut elementorum sensus expertium dispersio'. This makes the second member of the disjunction a reference to the *Stoic* doctrine of a separation of the elements. It will be shown below, however, that *τῶν ἀπαθῶν στοιχείων* is another way of describing the *atoms*.

The modern translators all follow Gat. (although some do not adopt his emendation *ἢ τοιοῦτός τις*), except Fournier, who translates: 'Sinon, ce sont des combinaisons d'atomes qui se désagrègent; de même ensuite se dispersent ces éléments insensibles.'

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A third interpretation is possible, i.e. that M. is writing controversially in regard to the use of these verses by Lucr. He may be asking whether what Eur. said can be taken to mean, as the Roman poet implies, a mere shattering of atomic interlacements, such as his doctrine involves.

The line 'denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi', ii. 991, is *prima facie* repugnant to the atomic hypothesis. That this point had been taken by ancient critics is established by: 'denique idem Lucr. oblitus quid adsereret et quod dogma defenderet hos versus posuit: "cedit item . . . templa receptant". Quod eius non erat dicere, qui perire animas cum corporibus disserebat: sed victus est veritate, et imprudenti ratio vera subrepsit' Lact. *Inst.* vii. 12, cf. id. vi. 10, cited at p. **20.** 6 n.

M. would in this view, after citing Eur., have added: 'Can this be an undoing of the interlacements of the atoms and some such shattering of mere senseless molecules?', and written ἢ τοῦτο διάλυσις κ.τ.λ.;

136. 10 **διάλυσις**, a word used by M. for the *undoing* of a compound or complex, whether one adopts the Stoic hypothesis: μεταβολὴ καὶ δ. pp. **32.** 26, **58.** 22, or the question is left open, p. **194.** 28.

ἀντεμπλοκῶν: cf. ἀντεμπλοκὴ καὶ σκεδασμός p. **98.** 19 n.

136. 11 **σκορπισμός**, a word happily suggesting a scattering of a set of atoms which then re-form, like sheep, in clustered groups: ὁ λύκος . . . σκορπίζει (sc. τὰ πρόβατα) *St. John*, 10. 12. If we could adopt Gat.'s interpretation we should need to interchange διάλυσις and σκορπισμός, and this τοιοῦτός τις forbids.

τῶν ἀπαθῶν στοιχείων, not the elements of the Stoic doctrine but τῶν ἀτόμων, pp. **130.** 17 n., **196.** 2. Galen says: ἀπαθῆ δ' ὑποτίθενται τὰ σώματα εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα . . . μήτ' ἄλλην τινὰ ὅλως ἐπιδέχεσθαι ποιότητα κατὰ μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν, i.e. they are quantitatively, not qualitatively, distinct, i. 418.

Ch. 51: 136. 13 **σίτοισι κ.τ.λ.**: in Eur. *Suppl.* 1110, *Test.*, Iphis desires death, deploring the shifts adopted by the aged to escape Necessity. M. thinks of the natural sense in the original and not of the use in Plu. to illustrate the flux of generation and death.

136. 15 **θεόθεν κ.τ.λ.**: the source of the lines is unknown; their preservation is due to M. He may be taking an extract from

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some collection like that of Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 957 sq. or have recalled the original. Cf. *φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τὰ δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως* Thuc. ii. 64; *τὰς γὰρ ἐκ θεῶν ἀνάγκας θνητὸν ὄντα δεῖ φέρειν* Eur. *Ph.* 1763.

Ch. 52: 136. 17. See app. crit. and *Introd.*, p. lxx for an adscript which has got into P at this point.

" Καββαλικώτερος." The word refers to a Spartan story about a youth who was beaten in the games (*Test.*). Galen's reference occurs in his attack on athletic professionalism; he says that we should nowadays substitute *καταβλητική* for the time-honoured term *γυμναστική*. M. asserts the superiority of moral courage to angry passion at p. **226. 27.**

Ch. 53: 136. 20–1 κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν . . . λόγον: cf. *ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς . . . λόγος*, which prescribes *ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων*, p. **56. 4.** The word *ὠφέλεια* with its cognates belongs to the vocab. of the later Books; it expresses what benefits both giver and taker, pp. **144. 26, 216. 8.**

138. 1 εὐοδούσης καὶ . . . προιούσης: cf. *προιοῦσα εὐοδεῖ* p. **104. 20.**

Ch. 54: 138. 3 ἐπὶ σοί ἐστι, of man's moral freedom, *ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο* p. **26. 11**, *πᾶν δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ σοί* p. **208. 2.**

138. 4 θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν, the verb with its related subst. belongs, like *ὠφελεῖν*, to the vocab. of the later Books. It is a convenient word, for which we have no exact equivalent, to express contentment with reverent acceptance of Nature's dispensation: *εὐαρέστησις, ὡς πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν γιγνόμενα* Plu. *De Fato* 574 f.; *πῶς ἂν εὐαρεστοίην τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει* Epict. i. 12. 8; sim. ii. 23. 42. See pp. **156. 19, 174. 15.** For the *idea* in earlier books see pp. **32. 21, 38. 22.**

138. 5 ἐμφιλοτεχνεῖν. Epict. employs *φιλοτεχνεῖν* and its subst. as equivalents of *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* and *ἐπιμέλεια*, e.g. in ii. 5. 21. M. means that he is to attend diligently to (*ἐξετάζειν*) the sense impression, so that he may not admit what he has failed to grasp (*ἀκατάληπτον*). He may well be conscious of the components of the word (cf. *τὸ τεχνίον ὃ ἔμαθες φίλει* p. **64. 1**) and Mr. Jackson renders: 'expend a labour of love on thy present thoughts.'

Ch. 55: 138. 7 Μὴ περιβλέπου: the transition of thought is like

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that from 'welcoming all that comes to pass' to 'seldom imagining what another is saying' p. **38.** 22. M. now has a fuller treatment of what he mentioned at p. **76.** 3, where he used similar images, the direct path and the undeflected vision, cf. p. **56.** 23.

ἐκεῖ βλέπε: in the light of: *βλέψον δὲ κἀκεῖ, πάτερ,* Menand. *Epitrep.* 103; *οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεῖ βλέπειν θαρρῶν* Epict. iii. 26. 5, it is not necessary to substitute *ἐκεῖσε.*

138. 8 **ἐπὶ τί σε ἡ φύσις ὁδηγεῖ:** the Universal Nature is regarded as guiding the individual by her dispensation, so that her will is coincident with his will as he pursues the path of duty, cf. *εὐθεῖαν πέραινε ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φ. τῇ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ, μία δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἡ ὁδός* p. **76.** 4.

διὰ τῶν συμβαινόντων σοι: see *τὰ ἑαυτῷ ἐκ τῶν ὅλων συγκλωθόμενα . . . ἀγαθὰ εἶναι πέπεισται,* and what immediately precedes those words, p. **40.** 1. He omits to say, what he said in ch. 54, that the individual must *τῇ παρούσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν,* l. 3.

138. 9 **πρακτέον δὲ ἑκάστῳ.** He briefly stated in chs. 53 and 54 that man's conduct follows from his (rational) constitution, and gave two aspects of that conduct, social obligation and intellectual probity. In what follows he adds a third aspect, resistance to bodily passions.

138. 12 **τὸ μὲν οὖν προηγούμενον:** cf. p. **88.** 19 n. Epict. uses the phrase *τὸ προηγούμενον ἔργον* ii. 5. 4.

138. 14 **τὰς σωματικὰς πείσεις:** cf. p. **90.** 17–18 n. Of Socr. he says: *μήτε τοῖς τοῦ σαρκιδίου πάθεσιν ἐμπαρέχων συμπαθῇ τὸν νοῦν* p. **142.** 17.

λογικῆς γὰρ καὶ νοερᾶς κινήσεως. The motion of *νοῦς καὶ λόγος* is assumed, in contrast with the movements of the physical elements and of lifeless bodies like the roller, at p. **208.** 15. This is in accordance with the materialist background of Stoicism. The present passage is unique in M. in its identification of *νοῦς* with its movement, and in regarding that movement as limiting itself to its own sphere and resisting the animal motions.

138. 15 **περιορίζειν ἑαυτήν,** almost 'to cut itself off from', cf. *περιγραφέτω αὑτὸ καὶ περιοριζέτω τὰς πείσεις* p. **90.** 18.

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138. 16 **ζῳώδεις,** belonging to *ἡ ζωτικὴ φ.* p. **160.** 11. For this explanation of the origin of *αἱ πείσεις* cf. *τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον . . . τῷ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι* Posidonius, ap. Galen, v. 469.

138. 19 **τὸ ἀπρόπτωτον καὶ ἀνεξαπάτητον:** cf. *ἵνα μή τι ἀκατάληπτον παρεισρυῇ,* l. 5. See *ἀπροπτωσία* p. **44.** 14 n., and *εὐεξαπάτητοι καὶ προπτωτικοί* p. **220.** 14.

138. 20 **εὐθεῖαν περαινέτω:** the expression seems both here and at pp. **76.** 4, **200.** 4 to be modelled on *ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός . . . εὐθείᾳ περαίνει* Pl. *Lg.* 716a. As our MSS. have *εὐθεῖαν,* without variant, three times, it appears best to read it also here. The erroneous variant *εὐθέα* occurs in many places where the Pl. passage is cited; see Mr. Lorimer's note to [Arist.] *Mu.* 401^{b}26, Budé edn.

ἔχει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ: cf. pp. **90.** 14, **96.** 4.

Ch. 56: 138. 21 **Ὡς ἀποτεθνηκότα ἤδη:** the sentiment resembles *ἤδη τεθνήξῃ καὶ οὔπω οὔτε ἁπλοῦς* p. **66.** 13, so that it is reasonable to write *ἤδη* for *δεῖ.* See, e.g., A's *δεῖ* for *δή* p. **134.** 20.

⟨μὴ⟩ βεβιωκότα: the negative seems required to avoid tautology. He regrets the past years as at p. **146.** 6, and at *τὸ γὰρ ἔτι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷος μέχρι νῦν γέγονας* p. **196.** 21. Mr. Jackson compares Sen. *Ep.* 12. 9; see also 'quis extremo die dicere audet: "vixi et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi" (Virg. *Aen.* iv. 653)?' *Ben.* v. 17. 5.

In view, however, of the use of *βεβίωται* in such a sentence as 'verum si quaeris, homini non recta sed voluptaria quaerenti nonne *βεβίωται*?' Cic. *Att.* xii. 2. 2, it may be that M. is using the active part. in the sense of 'up till now your life has been as good as wasted', which gives the required sense; cf. *οἱ κεκμηκότες τῷ βίῳ* p. **24.** 9–10 n.

138. 21–2 **τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος:** cf. p. **38.** 3. M. appears to mean 'the balance of days remaining which is granted to you as a luxury'. The capital has been squandered, yet Nature gives you, out of her store, a remainder; music, in man's life, is said to be a further and free gift, *ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη γενέσθαι* Democrit. 144 D.; so Pl. lavished upon his portrait of Socrates more than his original possessed: *ὁ δὲ τῆς φύσεως, οἶμαι, κέχρηται*

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τῇ περιουσίᾳ Ael. Arist. ii, p. 295 Dind. See also *ἐκ περιουσίας* p. **114.** 9.

Ch. 57: 138. 23–4 **τί γὰρ ἁρμοδιώτερον;** M. wishes to convey the two senses of *suitable* and *pleasant*, as we might say 'more agreeable'.

Ch. 58: 138. 26 **ἐξενίζοντο:** cf. p. **150.** 25, and *ὡς ξένον τι* p. **142.** 16. The word is used of a novel experience: *οἷῳ 'κπλαγέντες ἐνθάδ' ἐξενίσμεθα | ψόφῳ* Soph. *Ichn.* 137; of what happens *παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν*, Polyb. iii. 68. 9.

138. 28 **τοῖς τρέπουσι καὶ τρεπομένοις.** M., like many Greek writers, plays upon a verb's two voices, see pp. **40.** 4, **244.** 15–16. For the middle or pass. here, cf. *τούτῳ συντρέπεσθαι* p. **204.** 6.

138. 29 **τὸ πῶς χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς,** i.e. *τοῖς συμβάμασι*. Epict. says: *τῷ πεσόντι . . . τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον* ii. 5. 3, and treats the topic at large in iii. 20. See p. **144.** 5.

138. 30 **ὕλη σοι ἔσται:** in the handling of his subject-matter the artist is manifested: *τὸ δὲ ἀντεισαγόμενον ὕλην ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖ* p. **50.** 4, cf. p. **208.** 9.

πρόσεχε, καὶ θέλε σεαυτῷ καλὸς εἶναι. Gat. proposed moving *σεαυτῷ* to follow *πρόσεχε*. M., however, uses *πρόσεχε* abs. at p. **198.** 24, and *θέλε σεαυτῷ καλὸς εἶναι* resembles *μὴ οὖν κάμνε ὠφελούμενος*, 'benefiting yourself', p. **144.** 25. If the reflexive pron. is removed the vigour of the unusual phrase disappears. The translation 'fair to yourself' is an attempt to express what *σεαυτῷ καλός* implies, cf. *ἐὰν μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῇς* p. **234.** 17. Pl. says: *ὃ ἂν πρέπῃ ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καλὸν ποιεῖ ἕκαστον Hipp. Ma.* 290d; similarly by acting appropriately M. will make himself *καλός* in his own judgement—*fine* for himself, to borrow George Herbert's word.

140. 1 **μέμνησο ἀμφοτέρων:** the pronoun points to a sentence with two members. The sense required is indicated, as Gat. said, by *αἱ ὗλαι ἀδιάφοροι, ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος*, and *ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορον . . . ἡ ὕλη οὐ διαφέρουσα* Epict. ii. 5. 1 and 7. His correction was intended to indicate: 'Remember, whether in ignoring evil men or in the proper use of every contingency, that the material of your action is indifferent.' Mr. Marchant's supplement gives the right sense, and makes the omission

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easily explicable. Schultz marked a lacuna before *καὶ διάφορον*, but then the last words give a wrong sense.

Ch. 60: 140. 5 μὴ διερρῖφθαι: cf. *διερριμμένον* p. **56.** 24 n.

140. 7 συνετόν: *συνεστώς* Cor. is an attractive correction. Sch., however, defended the MSS.; *συνετόν* is a term of physiognomic art; for instances see Foerster, *Script. Physiogn.* ii, *Syll. Fr.* 103 and 105.

140. 8 σὺν τῷ ἀνεπιτηδεύτῳ: cf. *ἐπιτηδεύων φαίνεσθαι* p. **14.** 10.

Ch. 61: 140. 10–12 ὁμοιοτέρα . . . κατὰ τὸ . . . ἑστάναι: cf. *οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται* Pl. *R.* 341d.

140. 11 οὐ προεγνωσμένα, i.e. the surprises of a wrestler or other opponent. Galen, writing of the game of ball, says: *σφετερίσασθαι τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ βιασάμενον ἢ ἐξ ἀδοκήτου ἐπιθέμενον* v. 905. Helvidius Priscus was trained by his Stoic mentors: 'altioribus studiis quo firmior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret' Tac. *Hist.* iv. 5.

ἕτοιμος καὶ ἁπτώς: the attributives are transferred from the agent to the act; cf. *ἡ δὲ* (sc. *ἀρετὴ*) *πανταχοῦ πάρεστι διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος* X. *Cyn.* 12. 21.

Ch. 62: 140. 13 ἐφιστάναι, τίνες εἰσὶν οὗτοι: cf. *τί εἰσιν οὗτοι* (sc. *ἐφιστάναι*) p. **28.** 2, where he is speaking of ignoring the opinion of unworthy critics.

140. 14–15 τοῖς ἀκουσίως πταίουσιν, the verb is peculiar to this Book, cf. p. **128.** 3, where too he lays stress upon the ignorance and therefore involuntariness of error.

140. 15 ἐπιμαρτυρήσεως: cf. p. **40.** 17. Galen, who is making a similar point, says: *ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τὸν λόγον ἄγῃς μάρτυρας καὶ τὸν παρὰ τούτων ἔπαινον προχειρίζῃ* i. 23.

Ch. 63: 140. 17 "Πᾶσα ψυχή . . .": ascribed by Epict. to Pl., see *Test.*, although the epigram in this form is not extant in his works. The similar truth in *R.* 413a is excerpted by Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 499, and paraphrased by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 341. The quotation is suggested by *ἀκουσίως* l. 14.

140. 18 εὐμενείας: cf. *φιλεῖν καὶ τοὺς πταίοντας* p. **128.** 3. This virtue and the duties which flow from it become prominent in the last six Books. M. associates *εὐμένεια* with *πραότης*, l. 20,

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pp. **218. 26, 220. 3**, which has a wider sense than Arist. gave to it. Both words mark a development in moral outlook, if we compare Arist.'s ethical treatises, where the former is absent and the latter is merely associated with the study of anger. *εὐμενής* and *πρᾷος* were originally used of the gods, so that in M. we find the words joined with *ἵλεως*, pp. **162. 23, 212. 12**. One may observe a similar progress in Hebrew literature, see the note on *kindness* in Driver's *Parallel Psalter*, p. 447.

140. 20 **πρᾳότερος**: cf. *τοῦ δ' ἀνομοίου ἀνεκτικός, πρᾷος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἥμερος, συγγνωμονικὸς ὡς πρὸς ἀγνοοῦντα* Epict. ii. 22. 36.

Ch. 64: 140. 22 **τὴν κυβερνῶσαν**: cf. *ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ . . . νῷ* Pl. *Phdr.* 247c.

καθὸ λογική. Cas.'s emendation of *καθὸ ὑλική* P, Mo 2; for *καθολική* A see p. **102.** 3 n.

140. 24–142. 1 οὔτε ἀφόρητον οὔτε αἰώνιον. This is a different reflection upon pain from that at p. **130. 22**, and is interpreted to mean 'not intolerable, unless you give rein to your imagination: not continuing, if you remember that it has limits'. That the whole is an extract from Epicurus is probable in view of the terminology; thus *προσδοξάζεσθαι* is to add illegitimately a subjective interpretation to the presentations of sense, D.L. x. 50 and 62, and *ὅροι τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν* is a phrase of Epicurus, x. 142, cf. 139 (pp. 72–3 Us.).

The better-known *dictum* is answered by St. Thomas More in his *Dilemma Epicuri*: ' "si longa est, levis est: si gravis est, brevis est." Contra: "longa, nec ulla levis: nec gravis ulla brevis" ' *Lucubrationes*, Bas. 1563, p. 203.

142. 2 **πολλὰ πόνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα λανθάνει**: the sense is that the sufferer from minor disagreeables allows himself to give in to them because he overlooks that they are of the same order as pain, yet he would be ashamed to give in to pain.

There may be some self-revelation here, since M. suffered as a young man from fatigue caused by overwork and lack of sleep, Fronto, *Ep.* pp. 57, 75, 78 Naber, and at the end of his life his digestion was exhausted.

Ch. 65: 142. 5–6 **οἷον οἱ ⟨ἀπ⟩άνθρωποι**: the correction seems inevitable. M. means perhaps *misanthropes*, like the *Ἄγριοι* of

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Pherecrates, Pl. *Prt.* 327d. He seems to be leading up to the next ch. which is based upon a contrast, it appears, between the genial humanity of Socr. and the sordid asceticism of Telauges.

Ch. 66: 142. 7 Τηλαύγης. This ch. is straightforward and simple, yet the reason for its presence here and its occasion are puzzles. Why does M. hang what he has to say about Socr. upon an obscure reference to the hero or butt of one of the seven Socratic dialogues of Aeschines of Sphettus? Owing partly to an error in P, the reference to the dialogue was not detected until Ménage explained it in a note to D.L. ii. 24, and in the second half of the XIXth century, when a number of works upon Aeschines were written, curiously divergent views as to the purpose and content of the *Telauges* were entertained. Early critics, C. F. Hermann, *De Aesch. Socratico reliqu.*, 1850, and Hirzel, *Der Dialog* i. 129 sq., 1895, believed that M. is here expressing a favourable judgement upon Telauges, at the expense of Socr. and perhaps of Aesch. himself. Krauss said much the same: 'quem, ut verba eius docent, Marcus, ut erat Stoicus et quodam modo etiam Cynicus, ut exemplum paupertatis et continentiae pluris aestimabat quam ipsum Socratem' *Aesch. Socr.*, 1911. Krauss's volume contains all the materials for a judgement on the ancient opinion and the extant remains of Aeschines, but in regard to our present problem builds a doubtful theory on very slender evidence.

A different view was expressed by Dittmar, *Aischines von Sph.*, 1912. He supposed that, after reading the dialogue, M. was led to ask himself whether the criticism of Telauges was just. In order to clear up his own views he accordingly applied to Socr. the canons which the latter had employed in what was no doubt an ironical examination of Telauges. This would explain an ancient criticism of the dialogue: *πᾶσα γὰρ σχεδὸν ἡ περὶ τὸν Τηλαύγη διήγησις ἀπορίαν παράσχοι ἄν, εἴτε θαυμασμός εἴτε χλευασμός ἐστι* Demetr. *Eloc.* p. 59, Raderm.

The problem, however, remains a problem because, like so many other places in our author, this one gives almost no evidence of its occasion. Aesch. had ridiculed Crito's son Critobulus for want of culture and moral rectitude, and Telauges

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for his scanty and squalid dress, Athen. v, p. 220a. Wherein, M. inquires, did Socr.'s greatness actually consist? Not in any external traits, and here M. is thinking of the *Clouds* and the *Symposium* rather than of Aesch.'s slighter ridicule; not in soldierly endurance and political courage, excellent though these were; not even in his destructive intellectual power, but in his moral integrity.

142. 8 **οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ.** His outward traits are not enough to prove his superiority to Telauges. Notice that M. is neither giving a summary of points made by a speaker in the *Telauges* nor citing that dialogue; if he is criticizing any one it is Pl. himself.

142. 10 **διενυκτέρευε:** a composite recollection of two incidents narrated in Pl. *Smp.* 220a–d.

τὸν Σαλαμίνιον: either *Λέοντα* has dropped out or M. thinks the story, Pl. *Ap.* 32c, so well-known that he omits the proper name. Leo was only one of many Salaminians to suffer, see Lysias, *Agor.* 44, *Erat.* 52.

142. 11 **" ἐβρενθύετο ":** see *Test.*; *ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς* shows that he recalls the passage in the *Clouds*.

142. 12 **ἐπιστήσειεν:** cf. p. **8.** 17 n.; *ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις εἰκότως πότερον . . .* Julian, p. 265b.

142. 13 **τὴν ψυχήν:** cf. *ἐξεταστέον δὴ τὸν φιλόσοφον . . . γνώμῃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ παρασκευῇ ψυχῆς* Max. Tyr. i. 10.

142. 13–14 **δίκαιος . . . ὅσιος:** see *Test.* and cf. pp. **230.** 4, **234.** 19.

142. 14 **εἰκῇ.** M. appears to refer, perhaps unconsciously, to: *οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν*, and *οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ* [Pl.] *Alc.* 2. 143c, d. That dialogue was familiar to Roman Stoics, see Persius' second *Satire*.

142. 15 **ἀγανακτῶν:** because he was not indignant at what he considered to arise from ignorance, cf. p. **108.** 9.

δουλεύων τινὸς ἀγνοίᾳ: a reference to those who were ignorant in their own conceit, Pl. *Ap.* 21b sq.

142. 16 **ὡς ξένον τι:** cf. *οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο* Pl. *Ap.* 36a.

ὡς ἀφόρητον: cf. *κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι* ib. 40b.

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142. 17 **τοῖς τοῦ σαρκιδίου πάθεσιν . . . συμπαθῇ:** Stoic terminology to express the great Athenian's superiority to the solicitations of the flesh, cf. pp. **16.** 2, **42.** 5.

Ch. 67: 142. 18 **συνεκέρασέ ⟨σε⟩:** cf. *ἡ φύσις συνῆψέ ⟨σε⟩ καὶ συνέκρινεν* p. **212.** 16. Gat.'s supplement from a MS. point of view is preferable to *⟨τὸν νοῦν⟩*. The meaning too is not different, if we remember that your self and your intelligence are identified, cf. *ἐὰν χωρίσῃς ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τῆς σῆς διανοίας* p. **236.** 17. There is always a difficulty of expression if we divide up what is the unity of man; see a similar ambiguity of phrase at p. **196.** 9.

142. 19 **περιορίζειν ἑαυτόν:** cf. p. **138.** 15.

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, equivalent to 'what pertains to the self'; the translation attempts to express the transition from 'yourself' to what we conveniently term '*the* self'.

142. 21 **διαλεκτικὸς καὶ φυσικός:** his thought runs back to Socr., whose true virtue lay elsewhere than either in power of argument or in acquaintance with Nature, of which he said: *ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστιν* Pl. *Ap.* 19c. At any rate, M. says, you can resemble him in those moral qualities, *τῷ δίκαιος εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* l. 13.

142. 22 **ἀπογνῷς:** cf. *ἔθιζε καὶ ὅσα ἀπογινώσκεις* p. **240.** 1, *οὐδεμία ἀφυΐας . . . πρόφασις* p. **76.** 17.

ἐλεύθερος, sc. *ἔσεσθαι*; the three attributes which follow are the consequents of moral freedom, i.e. self-respect, p. **24.** 3, social regard, p. **20.** 9, obedience to Nature, p. **24.** 17.

142. 23 **λίαν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται . . ..** These words have clearly been displaced in transmission. Kron.'s bold transference to the opening of ch. 66, after *ἦν;* l. 8 is attractive but difficult to explain. Removed to the close of this ch. the words come in as a corollary.

θεῖον ἄνδρα: cf. *δεῖται γὰρ ἀσκήσεως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν σχεδὸν δι' ὅλου τοῦ βίου πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τέλειος ἀνήρ* Galen, v. 14. M. has preferred an old-fashioned term which is a favourite expression of Pl. for an excellent man. Similarly M. spoke of *εὐδαιμόνως βιῶσαι* l. 21, cf. *ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις,* of pre-eminent citizens, Pl. *R.* 540c. The word is, in this period, employed of the ideally wise man: *οὕτω γὰρ ποιῶν Διογένης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος*

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. . . *ἀξιώς θεῖοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἐλέγοντο* Epict. *Ench.* 15, cf. Simpl. *in Ench.* p. 124a.

142. 24 γνωρισθῆναι: the reference appears to be to a saying of Democritus (*Test.*), which is cited also by Cic. in his discussion on the happiness of the wise man, *Tusc.* v. 104; cf. *σοφὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὀλίγοις γινωσκόμενος, εἰ δὲ βούλει καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ἀγνοούμενος, γινώσκεται ὑπὸ θεοῦ* Porphyr. *Epist. ad Marc.* 13.

Ch. 68: 144. 1 Ἀβιάστως διαζῆσαι: cf. *ἀβιάστως . . . συνηρμοσμένον* p. **48.** 23 n., and for the maxim p. **164.** 27.

θυμηδίᾳ, in the context a paradox, for the word suggests indulgence; Suid. gives as synonyms *τέρψις, τρυφή*, cf. *οἷόν ἐστι τοῖς ἡδυπαθοῦσιν ἡ τρυφή* p. **208.** 8. M. may have in mind an association of the word with *γαλήνη*, l. 4: *τὸ πέλαγος . . . πᾶν θυμηδίας ἀνάμεστον* Alciphr. i. 12. 5.

144. 2–3 τοῦ περιτεθραμμένου τούτου φυράματος, the same participle is used with *σαρκιδίου* p. **236.** 1; lit. 'curdled about the *ψ.*' M. may refer to the clay of the sculptor, as the body is *πηλὸς κομψῶς πεφυραμένος* Epict. i. 1. 11, and Theodor. Gadareus said that Tiberius was *πηλὸς αἵματι πεφ.* Suet. *Tib.* 57. On the other hand, he may be thinking of *ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι* Pl. *Phdr.* 250c. Cf. Philo, ii. 52, and Arist.'s description of the shell of Testacea: *κύκλῳ μὲν τοῦ γεώδους . . . πηγνυμένου G.An.* 762ª29. At p. **190.** 22 the body is regarded in Pl.'s figure as a *χιτών*.

144. 6 τῷ προσπίπτοντι, i.e. *φαντάσματι*. For a similar practical counsel see p. **164.** 5.

144. 7 κατὰ δόξαν: the Platonic opp. of *δόξα* to *οὐσία*.

144. 8 τῷ ὑποπίπτοντι: cf. *τοῦ ὑποπ. φανταστοῦ* p. **44.** 23; the present is material for right action, *τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς . . . ὑποπ. ὕλης ποιεῖν τὰ οἰκεῖα* p. **208.** 9, cf. pp. **98.** 3, **138.** 29.

144. 10 ἐξοικειοῦται, 'is suited to', i.e. able to be *appropriated* by, as the active voice is used for assimilating food or fuel, pp. **50.** 7, **206.** 22; cf. *εὐτρεπής* p. **96.** 20 n.

οὔτε καινόν: cf. *γνώριμον* pp. **66.** 3, **68.** 9; the opposed word is *ξένον*, pp. **70.** 1, **142.** 16.

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Ch. 69: 144. 13 σφύζειν . . . ναρκᾶν: see *συσφύζειν* p. **134.** 1 n., and *πτοία* opp. to *νάρκα* p. **198.** 10.

Ch. 70: 144. 14 ἀθάνατοι ὄντες, opp. to *οὐδέπω λήγειν μέλλων* l. 17, and to men who are accounted *φαῦλοι*, a Stoic word for *ἀπαίδευτοι, ἄφρονες, κακοί.* Unlike the gods of Epicurus, the immortal gods do care for man in every kind of way, see l. 16 n.

144. 15 φαύλων, orig. 'simple folk', see Pearson's note to Soph. *Fr.* 771; in Stoic terminology they are *insipientes*: *τοὺς δὲ φ. διαφωνοῦντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι καὶ κακοποιητικοὺς ἀλλήλων καὶ πολεμίους* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 94, cf. Zeno, ap. D.L. vii. 32.

144. 16 καὶ κήδονται αὐτῶν: cf. *εὐμενεῖς τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰσίν* p. **178.** 1, *παντοίως αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦσι* p. **180.** 23; *χαῖρον εὐεργεσίαις, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐγγυτάτω τῆς τῶν θεῶν φύσεως* Dio Chrys. ii. 26, p. 81; 'di vero tot munera quae sine intermissione . . . fundunt' Sen. *Ben.* iv. 3. 2.

144. 16–17 σὺ δέ . . . ἀπαυδᾷς; cf. *σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς* Pl. *Lg.* 903d.

ὅσον οὐδέπω: cf. p. **198.** 26; *τὸ λήγειν αὖθις* p. **248.** 18.

Ch. 71: 144. 18 τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν κακίαν: he is continuing the self-criticism of l. 17.

Ch. 73: 144. 22–3 τί ἔτι ζητεῖς τρίτον; cf. *τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις εὖ ποιήσας, ἄνθρωπε;* p. **190.** 13; 'quae (sc. mens) cum suum inplevit . . . consummatum est summum bonum, nec quicquam amplius desiderat' Sen. *V.B.* 9. 3.

Ch. 74: 144. 25–6 μὴ οὖν κάμνε: cf. *μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε* Pl. *Grg.* 470c; *τὸ δὲ καλὸν ποιοῦντες μὴ ἐγκακῶμεν* St. Paul, *Gal.* 6. 9.

144. 26 ὠφελούμενος, ἐν ᾧ ὠφελεῖς: cf. pp. **124.** 15–16, **216.** 8; X. *Mem.* iii. 3. 15; *τὸν ὠφελοῦντά τινα τῶν πλησίον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὠφελεῖν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 93, sim. p. 95; Sen. *V.B.* 9. 1.

Ch. 75: 146. 2 κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν, a term usually employed of a subordinate consequence, e.g. p. **36.** 4; here it means 'in consequence of the necessary dependence of effect upon cause', p. **114.** 24 n.

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146. 2–3 **τὰ κυριώτατα,** the original or first causes upon which the universe depends, called *τὰ κοινά* p. **114.** 24, see also p. **112.** 6–7 n.

146. 3 **ἰδίαν ὁρμήν:** cf. *ὁρμῇ τινι ἀρχαίᾳ τῆς προνοίας* p. **172.** 2 n.

BOOK VIII

Ch. 1: 146. 5 **Καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀκενόδοξον φέρει.** The ch. opens abruptly but the context shows that the vain-glory for which he is seeking a further antidote is the claim to be a philosopher. His remedy is the memory of what his life has been, and, in passing, the recognition that his calling conflicts with devotion to philosophy. In any case he must ignore what men say of him, and live well the life that remains to him.

146. 5–6 **οὐκέτι δύνασαι . . . βεβιωκέναι:** 'a life spent in philosophy is no longer within your reach.' Cf. 'inde fit ut raro qui se vixisse beatum | dicat . . . reperire queamus.' Hor. Sat. i. 1. 117.

146. 8 **πέφυρσαι,** meaning presumably that he is tainted by his desertion of the true path, l. 13. The tarnish would expose a claim to the title. See *φύρονται* p. **40.** 9 n. Some, however, take the word here to mean 'you are confused'.

146. 9 **ἡ ὑπόθεσις,** your calling, cf. *κατὰ τὰς ὑ., ὧν προῄρηνται βίων ἕκαστοι* Paul. Aeg. iii. 17. He takes the view at p. **206.** 20 that his station is a school of exercise for his reason.

146. 10 **ἀληθῶς ἑώρακας:** cf. *ἴδε πάλιν τὰ πράγματα, ὡς ἑώρας* p. **120.** 23.

τὸ πρᾶγμα, i.e. *φιλοσοφία,* cf. *ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα* Pl. *Tht.* 168a; *ποίαν παιδείαν, ἄνθρωπε; . . . μέχρι νῦν οὐδ' ἤψω τοῦ πράγματος* Epict. ii. 17. 27.

146. 10–11 **τί δόξεις ἄφες:** cf. *τί ἔτι ζητεῖς τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα . . . τὸ καὶ δόξαι εὖ πεποιηκέναι* p. **144.** 22.

146. 11–12 **⟨ᾗ⟩ ἡ [σὴ] φύσις σοῦ:** cf. *φιλοσοφία μόνα, ἃ θέλει ἡ φύσις σου, θέλει* p. **82.** 8. *ὅσον δήποτε* was thought to belong to the words which followed, so that *ᾗ* or *ὡς* (Gat.) dropped out. For the combination proposed, cf. *ᾗ ἡ ὁδὸς ἄγει* p. **68.** 19, and, for the omission of *ᾗ* before *ἡ*, see Pl. *Grg.* 512d, cited at p. **134.** 12.

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146. 13 πλανηθείς: cf. *πεπλανημένα καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἀγνοοῦντα* p. **106.** 13. So Apollodorus says of his life before he met Socr.: *περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι* Pl. *Smp.* 173a; cf. *πεπλάνηνται καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ζητοῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . . . ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν* Epict. iii. 22. 23; 'quamdiu quidem passim vagamur . . . conteretur vita inter errores brevis' Sen. *V.B.* 1. 2. Sen. has expressed the disillusionment of the voluptuary very forcibly, *Ep.* 77. 16.

146. 15 ἐπιζητεῖ, *requires*, as l. 23, p. **192.** 10. Usually M. employs it for 'to require something further', twice for *inquire*, pp. **212.** 21, **246.** 25.

146. 19 ἐλεύθερον, substituted for *φρόνιμον* in the enumeration of virtues, cf. p. **40.** 22 where *ἀλήθεια* represents *φρόνησις* and *τὸ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ τὴν διάνοιάν σου liberty*.

Ch. 2: 146. 24 ἰσονόμου θεῷ, subject equally with the gods to the law of the Eternal city, p. **32.** 10–11, cf. 'sapiens . . . cum dis ex pari vivit" Sen. *Ep.* 59. 14. The claim is less audaciously expressed than it is, e.g., by Epict.: *οὐ μόνον συμπότης τῶν θεῶν ἔσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνάρχων Ench.* 15.

Ch. 3: 146. 25 πρὸς Διογένη. The Cynical philosopher is put first to match Alexander with whom so many legends associated him. The contrast of potentates with philosophers, cf. p. **36.** 14, is the contrast of splendid servitude with moral freedom, see the ch. entitled *περὶ ἐλευθερίας*, Epict. iv. 1, e.g. *ὅταν οὖν μήτε οἱ βασιλεῖς λεγόμενοι ζῶσιν ὡς θέλουσι . . . τίνες ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐλεύθεροι;* ib. 51. Julian puts 'the son of Sophroniscus' above Alexander, *τίς οὖν ἐσώθη διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξ. νίκην; . . . ὅσοι δὲω σῴζονται νῦν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, διὰ τὸν Σωκρ. σῴζονται* p. 264d.

146. 26 εἶδον τὰ πράγματα, regarded experience, i.e. with the eye of reason, and so distinguished its causal from its material aspects, cf. pp. **60.** 10, **130.** 10, **148.** 6.

148. 1 αὐτά⟨ρκη⟩, Sch.'s correction, cf. *ἐλεύθερον* p. **146.** 19 n., and p. **40.** 22 cited there.

148. 2 ἐκεί⟨νων⟩ δέ, to balance *οἱ μέν* p. **146.** 26 and *αὐτῶν* l. 1. For the contrast, cf. *ἐκεῖνοι* (monarchs and rich men) *μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν βουλεύσονται, σὺ δ' ὁ μὴ πλούσιος . . .* Galen, v. 13.

δσων πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων: cf. *πόσοι καὶ οἷοι* p. **52.** 14 n. M. does not use *πρόνοια* elsewhere quite in this sense, so that

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many emendations have been suggested. By *δουλεία* is meant, as usually in M., subjection of the higher self to material and ambitious ends, cf. *πόσα δ' οὐχὶ καὶ διακονήματα δεινὰ ἐργάζεσθαι* Plu. *De Tranq.* vol. v, p. 835 Wytt.

Ch. 4: 148. 3 **Ὅτι**, the introductory *ὅτι*, p. **30.** 16 n., so that M. appears to be quoting. The content of the aphorism is proverbial. Mr. Marchant suggests that *μέμνησο* may have dropped out, see, in this Book, pp. **150.** 25, **152.** 1, **162.** 25.

κἂν σὺ διαρραγῇς: cf. *ἢν καὶ σὺ κεκραγὼς δ.* Lucian, *Contemp.* 21; 'non si te ruperis,' Hor. *Sat.* ii. 3. 319.

Ch. 5: 148. 4 **μὴ ταράσσου.** For the connexion of thought see the English Commentary.

148. 6 **ἀτενίσας εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα:** cf. *ἀτενίζοντες ἦσαν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* *Acts* i. 10.

148. 8 **ἀμεταστρεπτί**, cf. *ἀ. ταύτῃ χωρεῖν* p. **200.** 7, where it may mean 'without turning back', the interpretation which Tim. *Lex.* gives of Pl. *R.* 620e, *Lg.* 854c.

148. 9 **ἀνυποκρίτως:** *ἁπλῶς* is combined with *εὐμενῶς* and *αἰδημόνως* at p. **166.** 4.

Ch. 6: 148. 11 **πάντα τροπαί:** cf. *πάντα μεταβολαί* p. **234.** 3. By exchanging the clauses which, in the MSS. order, follow *πάντα τροπαί* and *πάντα συνήθη* respectively, I make the writer say that every change is accordant with equitable distribution, a point to which he returns at *εἴγε ἴσους καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν* l. 22.

Gat. wished to read *πάντα τροπαί· πάντα συνήθη· ὥστε οὐχὶ φοβ. μή τι καινόν*, but that destroys the balance, and leaves *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ἀπονεμήσεις* in the air. M. Trannoy in a note follows Gat.'s suggestion and regards *ἀλλὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.* as a gloss on *εἴγε ἴσους* in the next ch.

148. 12 **ἀλλὰ ἴσαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονεμήσεις:** although A omits *αἱ*, this appears preferable to P's *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ἀπ.*

οὐχ ὥστε φοβηθῆναι: cf. *οὐδὲ ὥστ' ἄν τινα εἰπεῖν* p. **14.** 24. The MSS. order seems to be more vigorous than Gat.'s emendation.

Ch. 7: 148. 14 **Ἀρκεῖται πᾶσα φύσις ἑαυτῇ εὐοδούσῃ:** *ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖσθαι δικαιοπραγοῦντι* p. **130.** 6, cf. pp. **40.** 22, **162.** 26.

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The first word is taken up from *ἀρκέσθητι* p. **146.** 11, and he states in what the philosophic life consists, as he did there.

πᾶσα φύσις is every living organism, with the further implication living organisms *in general*, cf. *ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος* Pl. *Phdr.* 245c, the word *φύσις* being extended to include both animal life, which is strictly *ψυχή* p. **100.** 24, and the life of rational beings, *λογικὴ ψυχή* p. **102.** 2.

An organism is enabled by natural law to pursue its true path, *εὐοδεῖν*, and so doing satisfies itself: *τῶν ἀλόγων . . . ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀρκούμενον οὔτε τροφῆς ἀπορεῖ τῆς οἰκείας κ.τ.λ.* Epict. i. 9. 9. By analogy *φ. λογικὴ ἀρκεῖται καὶ εὐοδεῖ* by following the true doctrine; cf. *ἀρκοῦ οὖν ἐν παντὶ τῷ εἶναι φιλόσοφος Ench.* 23, *πῶς ἔτι ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχω, μὴ ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι ὅς εἰμι, ἀλλ' ἐπτοημένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν;* id. iv. 6. 24.

148. 16 **ἀπευθύνουσα,** used here in an unusual sense; normally it means rectifying in regard to a model, pp. **230.** 14, **234.** 19.

148. 17 **περιποιουμένη.** The false reading has arisen from the abbreviation $\overset{\eta}{\pi}$ for *περί* being mistaken. See AD's error at p. **174.** 8, where Dr. Rendall also restores the pres. part.

148. 17–18 **τὸ . . . ἀπονεμόμενον.** He recurs to *αἱ ἀπονεμήσεις* which are *ἴσαι*, cf. *ἴσους καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν* l. 22.

148. 23 **τοὺς μερισμοὺς χρόνων,** the varying length of duration which is *allotted* to every *φύσις*, living thing; cf. *πόσον δὲ χρόνον ὑφίσταται;* p. **150.** 12, and p. **244.** 4.

οὐσίας: *matter* opp. to *αἰτίου*, cf. pp. **60.** 10 n., **150.** 11.

148. 23–4 **ἐνεργείας, συμβάσεως:** abstract terms for what is put concretely at pp. **138.** 8, **184.** 3, **198.** 28, **244.** 19.

148. 24 **τὸ ⟨ἓν⟩ πρὸς τὸ ἕν.** Cas. by this supplement, by writing *τοῦδε* and repunctuating, restored the sense. M. appears to mean that Nature's equal assignment does not involve a 'one to one' correspondence in the endowment of each *φύσις*, but that looked at in large the share of one is equivalent to that of another.

Gat. however supposes M. to be saying that Nature assigns to the least as to the greatest parts of creation proportionably all that it requires to fulfil its function, to be satisfied, l. 14. He

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compares this place to passages which anticipate the later doctrine referred to in my note to *ἀληθῆ χάσματα* p. **36.** 6.

Ch. 8: 148. 27 **Ἀναγινώσκειν.** Many corrections have been proposed, yet the sense appears to be cognate to what is said, with resignation, at pp. **20.** 18, **22.** 10, **46.** 27, **146.** 9.

In effect M. says what Philosophy says to Boethius, when he is shut up in prison, away from his 'bibliothecae . . . comptos ebore ac vitro parietes' *Cons.* i. Pros. 5.

If, however, *ἀναγινώσκειν* means *to lecture*, as in *πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκοντας καὶ διαλεγομένους ἐπιδεικτικῶς* Epict. iii. 23 *Tit.*, the stress upon the superiority of practical endeavour to any intellectual dexterity is like that at pp. **76.** 12, **142.** 21, and at so many places in Epict.

150. 1 **ἀναισθήτοις καὶ ἀχαρίστοις.** The first adj. might refer to *μωροί*, cf. p. **68.** 11, for *ἀναισθησία* is *βραδυτὴς ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν* Theoph. *Ch.* 14. That, however, would contradict what M. is here saying, and his general teaching in the passages referred to in the last note. The word means rather *insensitive* in respect of *κοινονοημοσύνη* p. **12.** 5 n. We may compare with the two words, as Mr. Haines does: *αὐτὸς χρηστός ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀχαρίστους καὶ πονηρούς St. Luke* 6. 35.

Ch. 9: 150. 4 **μηδὲ σὺ σεαυτοῦ.** Xyl. printed *τόν* for *σύ* in his second edition, translating 'ac ne tuam quidem ipsius'. He thus saved the grammar, and got a contrast between the emperor's true life and his public calling, p. **146.** 9. The injunction to himself not to complain openly nor in secret appears, however, to be more forcible.

Ch. 10: 150. 5 **Ἡ μετάνοια,** recurring to *μετανοήσω* p. **146.** 22, which should have been translated 'Shall I regret it?' *μετάνοια* is *ἐπίληψις ἑαυτοῦ*, self-censure for an opportunity missed: *μεταμέλεια* is *λύπη ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις ὡς παρ' αὐτοῦ ἡμαρτημένοις* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 102.

150. 6 **τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν χρήσιμόν τι.** The implied hypothetical argument is: If a thing be useful we regret its loss: we do not regret the loss of a pleasure: pleasure therefore is not a useful thing. There follows a syllogism: All good is useful: No pleasure is useful: No pleasure therefore is a good.

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Reiske's correction *τὸ δὲ χ. ἀγαθόν τι*, which many have adopted, involves an illicit process of the major term.

Ch. 11: 150. 10 Τοῦτο τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό. M. often returns to the importance of clear and distinct apprehension, see pp. **44. 22, 60. 10, 148. 23**.

Ch. 12: 150. 13 δυσχερῶς: cf. *δυσόκνως* p. **74. 1**.

150. 15 ἀποδιδόναι: cf. *τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδόναι* p. **60. 12**.

150. 16 οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον: the words seem to be a reminiscence of Pl. *Phlb.*, *Test.*, and 64c.

προσφυέστερον is used of what is drawn into and assimilated with the self, cf. *ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ἕλκει μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἑαυτῷ χυμόν, ἕλξαν δὲ προσφύει τε παντὶ μέρει τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τελέως ἐξομοιοῖ* Galen, ii. 30.

150. 17 προσηνέστερον: cf. p. **82. 12**. What agrees with man's *κατασκευή* is not only appropriate but also pleasant to him. This organic principle follows Arist.'s teaching: *προσφιλὲς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων τὸ κατὰ φύσιν H. An.* 590ª10.

Ch. 13: 150. 18 φυσιολογεῖν: this and the two words joined with it appear to be M.'s effort to express the relation of his practical teaching to the Stoical division of philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic. He expressed himself in technical terms at pp. **148. 23**, and l. 11 above.

φυσιολογεῖν was used of Heraclit.'s Natural phil. at p. **36. 18**. M. here seems especially to refer to that analysis of *φαντασίαι* of which he gives instances at pp. **46. 4, 100. 8**.

150. 19 παθολογεῖν means perhaps that branch of Ethics which studies *τὰ πάθη* with which *φαντασίαι* are associated, and the *ὁρμαί* which they excite. Galen says: *γέγραπται Χρυσίππῳ . . . θεραπευτικὰ συγγράμματα τῶν τῆς ψ. παθῶν* v. 3, and himself makes such a study in his *περὶ ψ. παθῶν καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων*, where he treats of *ἡ παραφυλακή, ἡ διάγνωσις, ἡ ἐπανόρθωσις τῶν παθῶν* v. 2.

διαλεκτικεύεσθαι refers perhaps to the employment of the critical faculty in moral judgements, esp. to the testing of *φαντασίαι* in regard to moral ends, see p. **228. 11**.

Ch. 14: 150. 24 μεμνήσομαι. With A's *μέμνησο*, corresponding with

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πρόλεγε l. 20, cf. the structure of ch. 29, where *μέμνησο* p. **156.** 4 corresponds with *ἐξάλειφε* l. 1.

Ch. 15: 150. 25, **αἰσχρόν** *absurd, foolish*, cf. *πῶς γελοῖος καὶ ξένος ὁ θαυμάζων καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ γινομένων* p. **240.** 21.

150. 25–6 **ἡ συκῆ σῦκα φέρει.** As the analogy is with fever and a squall at sea, we should perhaps read *ὀπὸν φέρει*, cf. pp. **54.** 16, **242.** 11. The folly is to be surprised not at the fig bearing figs but that it should produce sweet fruit and acrid juice.

Ch. 16: 152. 1 **μετατίθεσθαι:** cf. *μεταθέσθαι ἐὰν ἄρα τις παρῇ διορθῶν* p. **56.** 5, sim. p. **106.** 9.

152. 3 **περαινομένη:** cf. p. **96.** 23; *περαίνεται δὴ ὁ λόγος ἤδη μοι κατ' εὐθεῖαν* Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 217.

Ch. 17: 152. 4–5 **ταῖς ἀτόμοις ἢ τοῖς θεοῖς;** The atoms are equivalent to chance; *τῇ ἐπιτυχίᾳ* opp. to *τῇ προνοίᾳ* p. **244.** 21, and *πρόνοια* to *ἄτομοι* p. **52.** 4.

152. 6 **διόρθωσον.** The personal object is omitted, as it is after *θεραπεύσεις* p. **92.** 8 and *μεταδίδασκε* p. **176.** 28.

Ch. 18: 152. 9 **Ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου.** This is not a statement that *τὸ ἀποθανόν* survives but only that none of the elements of which it is constituted passes out of the one and self-contained Universe, cf. *ἡ δὲ τῶν ὅλων φ. ἔξω οὐδὲν ἔχει* p. **164.** 17. M. does not here distinguish, in regard to what dies, between *τὸ αἰτιῶδες* and *τὸ ὑλικόν* as he did at p. **84.** 23.

εἰ ὧδε μένει. To complete the thought we must understand *συνίσταται καὶ* before *μένει* to correspond with *ἀρχή, διεξαγωγή, ἀπόληξις* ll. 15–16.

152. 10 **εἰς τὰ ⟨ἀ⟩ίδια:** cf. for the error in the MSS. *τὸν ⟨ἀ⟩ίδιον αἰῶνα* p. **184.** 10.

Gat. interprets *τὰ ἴδια* as *sua*, comparing 'in sua corpora rursum' Lucr. i. 215; but there is no parallel to justify calling *τὰ στοιχεῖα "τὰ ἴδια"*.

I understand M. to mean 'into the indestructible parts of *τὸ σύγκριμα*'. The word *ἀίδια* can mean either the four fundamental elements: *κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κράσεως γινομένου τοῦ σώματος καὶ, διαλυομένου τούτου εἰς τὰ τέσσαρα, παραμενόντων τούτων ἀφθάρτων* Justin. M. *De*

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Resurr. 6, or the matter which is their substrate: *τῶν κατὰ ποιότητα ὑφισταμένων πρώτην ὕλην· ταύτην δὲ ἀίδιον* Chrysippus ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 133.

152. 11 καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ μεταβάλλει: *σῴζουσι δὲ κόσμον, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν στοιχείων, οὕτως καὶ αἱ τῶν συγκριμάτων μεταβολαί* p. **22.** 8; *τὴν δὲ κρᾶσιν γίγνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολῇ* Zeno ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 153; 'cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est' Cic. *N.D.* ii. 84.

According to one hypothesis all the elements were fire or forms of fire: *τὸ δὲ* (sc. *πῦρ*) *κατ' ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολήν* Stob. i. 129.

Ch. 19: 152. 13 ὁ Ἥλιος . . . καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ θεοί: *ἔστι δὲ καὶ Ἥλιος θεός, ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα* Plot. *Enn.* v. 1, p. 483; *ὡς ὁ Ἥλιος . . . τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ πρώτῳ θεῷ γίνεται συνεργός* Plu. *Qu. Plat.* 1007d. M. speaks of the gods as *ὄψει ὁρατοί* p. **246.** 26.

152. 14 εἰ ἀνέχεται ἡ ἔννοια. Gat. translates 'an sensus communis id ferat', and certainly elsewhere M. uses *ἀνέχεσθαι* as middle. On the other hand *ἔννοια* is used by him to mean a conception of the mind at pp. **4.** 5, **8.** 1, **16.** 17, and for the passive use we may compare *ἀνεκτὰ φαίνεται* p. **100.** 6.

Ch. 20: 152. 15 **ἐστόχασται,** met. but chosen with reference to the simile of the ball. That image is intended to illustrate our entire dependence upon Nature, not her indifference to our fortunes.

152. 18 **τῇ πομφόλυγι:** cf. the exquisite passage: *ἤδη ποτὲ πομφόλυγας ἐν ὕδατι ἐθεάσω sqq.* Lucian, *Contemp.* 19. Transience is the theme there, and it must have been in M.'s mind here, although the main point of the aphorism is Nature's disposal of men's lives.

152. 19 **ἐπὶ λύχνου:** 'non stultissimum dicas, si quis existimet lucernae peius esse cum extincta est quam antequam accenditur?' Sen. *Ep.* 54. 5; cf. the image of the box, p. **128.** 11.

M.'s thought again moves to his favourite topic of transience. He may even have recalled: *ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἅπτεται, ἀποσβέννυται* Heraclit. 26 D., 77 B. The lamp shines only so long

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as the oil, the 'radical humour', lasts; cf. the dialogue of Hadrian with Epictetus: ' "Quid est homo?"—"sicut lucerna in vento posita" ', ap. Fabricius, *Bibl. Gr.* xiii, p. 557.

Ch. 21: 152. 20 **οἷόν ἐστι,** i.e. *λύθρος καὶ ὀστάρια καὶ κροκύφαντος* p. **20.** 14.

152. 21 **πορνεῦσαν:** of the many emendations suggested the best is Gat.'s *νοσῆσάν τε καὶ ἀποπνεῦσαν.* The place, however, appears to be too deeply corrupted to admit of remedy. It will be noticed that *προσέτι δὲ καί* just below seems to be the result of curtailment.

152. 23 **ἐν γωνίᾳ:** cf. *τῆς γωνίας εἰς ἣν ἐρρίφη γεννηθέν σου τὸ σωμάτιον,* where the contrast is with *κἀκεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν* Epict. i. 9. 2, 13. By using *τοῦ κλίματος,* a geographical term, he leads up to *ἡ γῆ στιγμή,* for to the astronomer the whole round world is a point, see p. **52.** 13.

Ch. 22: 152. 26 **τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ,** either the *subject* in question or the material *object* you are observing, as at p. **202.** 8.

τῷ δόγματι, either the *doctrine* before you or the *opinion* of the person whose acts you criticize. The reflections are continued in ch. 23 after the intrusive sentence *Δικαίως κ.τ.λ.* p. **154.** 1.

152. 26–7 **τῷ σημαινομένῳ:** cf. p. **122.** 5.

154. 1 **μᾶλλον δή.** I have taken this reading instead of ⟨*ὅτι*⟩ *μᾶλλον δή* Gat.

For the self-criticism cf. *ἀλλ' εἶ* ⟨*σοι*⟩ *αὔριον καλῶς ἔχει, πόσῳ κρεῖττον σήμερον;* Epict. iv. 12. 21.

Ch. 23: 154. 3 **ἀναφέρων.** M. gives two instances of what he means by his stress upon *ἀναφορά,* cf. *ὁπόταν μὴ τὴν ἀ. ἐπί τι κοινωφελὲς ποιῇ* p. **38.** 4. There is also *relation* to an end, pp. **122.** 7, **242.** 23, which corrects random conduct.

154. 4–5 **τὴν πάντων πηγήν:** *ἀπὸ μιᾶς πηγῆς νοερᾶς πάντα* p. **186.** 9. Passages like these presage the later doctrine, in writers like Julian, where the Sun god is mystically represented as a source of illumination intermediate between the One intelligible world and the mundane realm.

154. 5 **συμμηρύεται:** cf. p. **46.** 9 n.

Ch. 24: 154. 6 **ῥύπος:** *ὁ ἐπὶ τοῖς βαλανείοις συναιρόμενος* ⟨*ῥύπος*⟩

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Diosc. *M. Med.* i. 30; cf. 'eadem vitae condicio est quae balnei, turbae, itineris . . . non est delicata res vivere' Sen. *Ep.* 107. 2.

The word *dirt* mediates the transition to ch. 25, cf. *πάντα . . . ῥυπαρὰ τῇ ὕλῃ* leading to *πάντα νῦν οἷα ἐπ' ἐκείνων οὓς κατεθάψαμεν* p. 178. 10.

Ch. 25: 154. 9 Σέκουνδα Μάξιμον. Secunda is presumed to be the wife of M.'s teacher and friend Maximus, who is mentioned and characterized at pp. 10. 13, 16. 7, 18. 2.

154. 10 **Διότιμον,** mentioned again, as surviving Hadrian, p. 158. 22. There his name is associated with one Chabrias, so that this man, Epitynchanus and Chabrias may have been freedmen of Hadrian.

Φαυστῖναν. M.'s aunt Annia Faustina who died early in the reign of Antoninus. If her daughter was, as he wrote, already dead, he may well have realized that the words were applicable also to his own experience.

154. 11 **Κέλερ Ἀδριανόν.** At p. 158. 22 two favourites are recorded as mourning at Hadrian's bier, and we have no evidence of a personal link between Celer and the emperor. Caninius Celer caught oratory to M. and his future colleague, Lucius, *H.A.* iv. 2. 4, v. 2. 5.

154. 12 **προγνωστικοί,** i.e. *μαθηματικοί, ἄλλων θανάτους . . . προειπόντες* p. 70. 9, cf. *Χαλδαῖοι* p. 36. 13.

τετυφωμένοι, presumably men intoxicated by success, like the despots who fancied themselves to be immortal, p. 70. 12. The word is used of men overcome by vinous fumes, Arist. *Prob.* 872ª23.

154. 13 **δριμεῖς μέν:** the corresponding clause seems to have fallen out. That would be an easy lapse in such an enumeration as this, thus A has dropped *εἶτα Ἀντωνῖνος* in l. 11.

Χάραξ. Suid. s.v. says: *ἱερεὺς καὶ φιλόσοφος. . . . ἔστι δὲ τῶν κατ' Αὔγουστον πολλῷ νεώτερος. . . . ἔγραψεν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱστοριῶν βιβλία μ'.*

Δημήτριος. M. intends probably, as Arethas supposed (*Test.*), the Cynic philosopher whom Vespasian banished, Dio Cass. lxvi. 13. 1, cf. Tac. *Hist.* iv. 40; *Ann.* xvi. 34. This Demetrius was a friend of Sen., *De Ben.* vii. 8. 2; *Ep.* 20. 9, 62. 3. *ὁ Πλατωνικός* will then be an adscript such as we are at liberty to excise.

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154. 14 Εὐδαίμων, perhaps Hadrian's procurator bibliothecarum Gr. et Lat. He then became his Greek secretary, and fell later into disfavour: 'Eudaemonem prius conscium imperii ad egestatem perduxit' (sc. Hadr.) *H.A.* i. 15. 3.

154. 16 ἐκ μύθων ἐξίτηλοι, cf. *ἐξίτηλα γὰρ πάντα καὶ μυθώδη* p. **64.** 25.

154. 17 σκεδασθῆναι: of the 'disiectus materiai' of atomism, Lucr. iii. 928, contrasted with the Stoic alternatives, as at pp. **130.** 20, **216.** 4. In the latter passage he opposes *ἡ ψ.* to the body, as here *τὸ πν.* to the compound. The word *καταταχθῆναι* is used as a reminder that, in the Stoic view, the post of the soul is determined by Nature, *καταταχθήσεται πᾶν μέρος κατὰ μεταβολήν* p. **84.** 25.

Ch. 26: 154. 19 Εὐφροσύνη, the joy which is not mere physical emotion, pp. **118.** 3, **124.** 15, **160.** 23, cf. *οἷς εὐφ. τε καὶ χαρὰν βεβαίαν ἕπεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον* Muson. p. 90 H.; 'cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur' Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 13; 'sapiens ille plenus est gaudio, hilaris et placidus, inconcussus' Sen. *Ep.* 59. 14.

τὰ ἴδια ἀνθρώπου: see p. **214.** 4, and cf. 'proprium hominis . . . animus et ratio in animo perfecta' Sen. *Ep.* 41. 8, sim. 76. 9.

154. 21 τῶν πιθανῶν φαντασιῶν, cf. *ἀξιόπιστα φαντάζεται* p. **100.** 16.

Ch. 27: 154. 23 [τὸ αἴτιον] τὸ περικείμενον. Gat. compared *τὸ περικείμενον ἀγγειῶδες* p. **212.** 25, *τοῦ περικειμένου σοι σωματίου* p. **236.** 20, and his note seems to have prompted Valck.'s *τὸ ἀγγεῖον* and Cor.'s *τὸ σωμάτιον*, the former of which has been widely accepted (cf. *τὸ αἴτιον* A, *τὸ ἀγγεῖον* F at Pl. *Criti.* **111a**, and Gat.'s correction (p. 250b) of *αἴτιον* to *ἀγγεῖον* [Arist.] *Probl.* 928^{b}27).

Gat. translated 'causam ambientem' and paraphrased by '*corpus* ambiens te', but he gives no example of man's relation to his body being counted by M. to be one of three, the other two being to the divine cause and to neighbours. Surely the third relation is, as M. repeatedly implies, to the environing circumstances, what are called *τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν γινομένων* l. 22, and from which arise *αἱ αἰσθητικαὶ κινήσεις* and *αἱ φαντασίαι* of which he has just spoken, cf. *διάθεσις εὐαρεστικὴ πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὴν*

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ἐκτὸς αἰτίαν συμβαῖνον p. **174.** 15; *ἀταραξία περὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας συμβαίνοντα* p. **184.** 3. For the attitude generally see pp. **24.** 7, **46.** 8, **50.** 2, **52.** 19, **88.** 9, **98.** 25, **162.** 16.

If this exegesis is correct, *τὸ περικείμενον* is equivalent to *τὸ περιέχον* p. **66.** 19, and *ἡ ἐκτὸς αἰτία* might be held to justify *τὸ αἴτιον τὸ περικείμενον*. Against such a view are the facts that *τὸ περικείμενον* is sufficient by itself, being equivalent to *τὸ ἐκτὸς αἴτιον*, that M. would hardly write *τὸ αἴτιον* immediately above *τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν*, and that the proximity of *αἰτίαν* helps to explain the intrusion.

Ch. 28: 154. 26 **ἀποφαινέσθω:** cf. p. **124.** 27; *ἀποφηνάσθω* p. **130.** 25 n.

154. 27 **αἰθρίαν καὶ γαλήνην,** of the *ψυχή* delivered from *ταραχή*, as the next ch. explains. The same contrast is exhibited at p. **130.** 23–5. Cf. *ἀπαιθριάσαι* p. **22.** 17, and *ἐν πάσῃ γαλήνῃ* p. **74.** 23 n. The parallel use in Epicurean literature is well shown by Lucr., who says, of human troubled life, that his master 'in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit' v. 12.

154. 29 **οὐδὲν κακὸν ὧδε ἀναβαίνει:** as at *ἀναδιδῶνται . . . εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν* p. **90.** 19, the physical movements are regarded as carried up to the central sensorium; there correct judgement robs them of potential evil, ib. l. 21. Lucr. uses the same figure: 'nec temere huc dolor usque potest penetrare neque acre | permanare malum', iii. 252.

Ch. 29: 156. 1 **Ἐξάλειφε:** cf. pp. **74.** 22, **130.** 8 n., **162.** 17.

156. 1–2 **ἐπ' ἐμοί ἐστιν ἵνα:** cf. for the construction, p. **158.** 4, for the sentiment, p. **120.** 20.

156. 3 **ταραχή τις,** moral disturbance, want of equilibrium, cf. *θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχήν* Pl. *Phd.* 66d; *μηδὲ θορυβεῖν ὄχλῳ φαντασιῶν* p. **48.** 17.

156. 4 **μέμνησο:** see p. **150.** 24 n.

τῆς ἐξουσίας: cf. *τὴν ἰδίαν ἐξ.* p. **52.** 8, *ἐξ. ἔχει ἄνθρωπος* p. **240.** 16; i.e. man's reasonable liberty; so *πάντες φύσει πεφύκαμεν οὕτως ὥστε ζῆν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ καλῶς* Muson. p. 6 H.; 'nulli praeclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit' Sen. *Ben.* iii. 18. 2.

κατὰ φύσιν: cf. *κατὰ φ. διελθεῖν* p. **70.** 19, i.e. in obedience to Nature.

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Ch. 30: 156. 5–6 **κοσμίως, μὴ περιτράνως.** The first adv., which is supplemented by *ὑγιεῖ λόγῳ*, means with a decorous economy of words (cf. *λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας κ.* Pl. *Prt.* 347d, *ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κ.* id. *Phd.* 68c), in contrast with *περιτράνως*, which, starting from its original sense of *plainly*, had acquired the meaning *affectedly*, from the idea of studied precision: *ὅτι χρὴ τὸν παραμυθούμενον μὴ μετὰ σοφιστικῆς τρανότητος, ἀλλὰ μετὰ συμπεπονθυίας λέγειν ἁπλότητος* Longin. *Fr.* 22 (I. ii, p. 216 Speng.–Ham.).

156. 6 **ὑγιεῖ**, used by Epict. to mean *wholesome*; but here M. appears to mean *ἀληθής*, in the sense of 'ringing true', cf. *εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται* Pl. *Tht.* 179d. Truth is opp. to perspective illusion: *μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ . . . καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ Phd.* 69b.

Ch. 31: 156. 7 **Αὐλὴ Αὐγούστου.** Augustus had, like Hadrian, great difficulty in securing a successor, and his last years were clouded by disappointment: 'Divus Augustus, cui di plura quam ulli praestiterunt, non desiit quietem sibi precari et vacationem a republica petere. . . . filia et tot nobiles iuvenes . . . iam infractam aetatem territabant' Sen. *De Brev.* 4. 2, 6.

γυνή, Livia Augusta: 'Liviam Drusillam matrimonio Tib. Neronis abduxit, dilexitque et probavit unice. . . . ex Livia nihil liberorum tulit, cum maxime cuperet. . . . in osculis Liviae et in hac voce defecit: "Livia, nostri coniugi memor vive, ac vale" ' Suet. *Aug.* 62, 63, 99. She died, aged over 80 years, and Tacitus remarks: 'sanguini Augusti per coniunctionem Agrippinae et Germanici adnexa communis pronepotes habuit' *Ann.* v. 1.

θυγάτηρ, the infamous Julia: 'ex Scribonia Iuliam tulit. . . . Iuliam primum Marcello, Octaviae sororis suae filio . . . deinde M. Agrippae dedit' Suet. *Aug.* 63; then married to Tiberius: 'Iuliam Aug. filiam confestim coactus est ducere . . . cum et Agrippinae consuetudine teneretur et Iuliae mores improbaret' id. *Tib.* 7; 'Iulias, filiam et neptem, omnibus probris contaminatas relegavit' id. *Aug.* 65.

ἔγγονοι, i.e. Marcellus, whose premature death, 23 B.C., is celebrated in Virg. *Aen.* vi. 882, and Julia's two sons by Agrippa, Gaius and Lucius, whom Aug. adopted 17 B.C. and entitled *Caesares*: *οὓς νεανίας ἀνήρπασεν ἡ τύχη Mon. Anc.* 14. 1, *Gr.* vii.

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11; 'Gaium et Lucium in duodeviginti mensium spatio amisit ambos' (A.D. 4 and 2), Suet. *Aug.* 65. Julia's third son was the banished Agrippa Postumus, ib. 65.

πρόγονοι, his stepsons, by his union with Livia, i.e. his successor Tiberius and the elder Drusus. The latter married Antonia, daughter of Octavia by Mark Antony: *τὴν δὲ Ἀντωνίαν Δροῦσος, ὁ Λιβίας υἱός, πρόγονος δὲ Καίσαρος* Plu. *Anton.* 87; *ἡσσηθέντα ὑπὸ Τιβερίου Νέρωνος, ὃς τότε μου ἦν πρόγονος καὶ πρεσβευτής Mon. Anc.* 30. 1, *Gr.* xvi. 9.

ἀδελφή, Octavia, wife of Mark Antony: 'sororem Octaviam (sc. amisit) quinquagensimum et quartum agens aetatis annum' Suet. *Aug.* 61. Plu. relates her generosity to Cleopatra's children, *Anton.* 87.

156. 8 Ἀγρίππας, M. Vipsanius Agrippa, 63–12 B.C., principal minister and general of Aug., and his colleague as consul, 28 B.C.: 'M. Agrippam, ignobilem loco, bonum militia et victoriae socium, geminatis consulatibus extulit; mox, defuncto Marcello, generum sumpsit' Tac. *Ann.* i. 3.

συγγενεῖς: leading up to *ὅλου γένους θάνατον*, l. 13.

Ἄρειος, the philosophic guide of Aug.: 'eruditione etiam varia repletus per Arei philosophi . . . contubernium' Suet. *Aug.* 89; he rode with Aug. on his entry into Alexandria, after Antony's death: *τιμώμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διαπρεπῶς* Plu. *Anton.* 80. There is an 'imaginary conversation' of Areius with Livia, Sen. *Ad Marc.* 4. By birth an Alexandrian, he was a Stoic by profession, and his summary of Pl. and Stoic doctrine was one of Stobaeus' sources for his *Eclogues*.

Μαικήνας, of Arezzo, the famous patron of poets, and Aug.'s minister of Home affairs, died 8 B.C.: 'Aug. bellis civilibus Cilnium Maecenatem, equestris ordinis, cunctis apud Romam atque Italiam praeposuit' Tac. *Ann.* vi. 11, cf. Dio Cass. xlix. 16, li. 3, and see Virg. *G.* ii. 40; Hor. *Odes*, i. 1. 2; Prop. ii. 1. 74. Tac. says 'speciem magis in amicitia principis quam vim tenuit. . . . fato potentiae raro sempiternae' *Ann.* iii. 30.

ἰατροί, of these, the best known is Musa: 'medico Antonio Musae, cuius opera ex ancipiti morbo convaluerat, statuam aere conlato juxta signum Aesculapi statuerunt' Suet. *Aug.* 59;

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'divus certe Aug. lactuca conservatus in aegritudine fertur prudentia Musae medici' Plin. *H.N.* xix. 8. 128.

156. 9 **θύται,** *haruspices*, *οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ θύτου δι' αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι δι' ἐκείνου κατανοήσειν οἰόμεθα τὰ μέλλοντα* Epict. i. 17. 18; *μάγους τε καὶ ἀστρονόμους καὶ θύτας μετεπέμπετο* Hdn. iv. 12. 3. Aug. was superstitious about omens and signs, Suet. *Aug.* 92 sq. M. may be thinking also of *popae*, sacrificial ministers, such as are represented in one of the bas-reliefs from his triumphal arch.

ἔπιθι τὰς ἄλλας . . ., *αὐλάς* naturally suggests itself, but there is a serious lacuna.

156. 10 **Πομπηΐων.** The name is found as late as the time of Caracalla (*Prosop. Imp. Rom.* letter P, no. 459), M., however, refers to the immediate descendants of Cn. Pomp. Magnus, who were killed in the civil wars.

156. 10–11: **τὸ ἐπιγραφόμενον:** e.g. 'ultima suorum Cupieinnia' *C.I.L.*[2] i. 1297.

156. 11 **ἐπιλογίζεσθαι.** With a full stop after *γένους* l. 11, the words form an apostrophe, and *ἐπιλ.* then governs *πόσα ἐσπάσθησαν.*

156. 12 **ἵνα διάδοχόν τινα καταλίπωσιν.** M. perhaps recalls: *γενόμενοι ζώειν ἐθέλουσι μόρους τ' ἔχειν . . . καὶ παῖδας καταλείπουσι μόρους γενέσθαι* Heraclit. 20 D., 86 B.; cf. *γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι*, the survival of the race is secured by children's children, Pl. *Lg.* 721c. The old and deeply rooted conviction of the dependence upon an heir of the rites due to dead ancestors appears to be as little in M.'s mind as it would be in our own. If he dwells occasionally on this primitive form of worship, it is to condemn it as irrational, see p. **158.** 21.

156. 13 **ὅλου γένους θάνατον:** the government appears to be continued from *ἔπιθι* l. 9; one would expect *θάνατος* to balance *ὅλης αὐλῆς θάνατος* l. 9.

The direst curse a man could invoke on himself was *ἐξώλειαν αὐτῷ καὶ γένει καὶ οἰκίᾳ* Antipho, v. 11; the theme is familiar in literature, e.g.: *πρόρριζον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔφθαρται γένος* Soph. *El.* 765.

Ch. 32: 156. 14 **Συντιθέναι.** The interpretation of this difficult ch. is assisted by ch. 35, p. **158.** 7, which is connected with it in meaning. The main contention, which *συντιθέναι*, in the opening, and *σύνθεσιν*, in the close, emphasize, is that the good life

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is to be a connected series, a sequence of effects flowing as inevitably from a man's moral purpose as results follow causes in Nature's dispensation, cf. p. **80.** 5. This interesting formula for the moral harmony does not occur again in M. Pl. had spoken of the *synthesis* of a sentence, *Sph.* 262e, and Arist. of the *synthesis* of the judgement, which underlies a proposition, *De An.* 430^{a}27.

156. 15 **ἀπέχει . . . ἀπέχῃ.** This emendation, where some change is necessary, appears to be nearest to the MSS. evidence. For the verb, with this meaning, see *ἡ φύσις . . . ἀπέχει τὰ ἴδια* p. **72.** 12.

156. 15–16 **οὐδὲ εἷς σε κωλῦσαι δύναται:** as *συντιθέναι δεῖ*, l. 14, implies '*you* must', the change from act to agent is permissible, indeed the Greek writers do not appear to have been so conscious of such changes as we are.

156. 16 **ἀλλ' ⟨ἐν⟩στήσεται.** Xyl.'s *obstabit* implies Morus' correction; cf. *ἀλλ' ἰσχυρότερόν τι ἐνίσταται* p. **162.** 20, where the connexion of thought shows that M. means that, in the event of impediment, the rightness of *intention* is a substitute for action in the narrow sense of *πρᾶξις*.

156. 16–17 **οὐδὲν εἷς γε τὸ δικαίως.** The dialogue form permits a colloquial brevity, cf. *ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς*, with no verb expressed, Epict. iii. 2. 2. There is a similar ellipse of the infin. at p. **166.** 4. Here we may mentally supply either *πράττειν*, which Morus proposes to insert (in which case *πράττειν* is used in its wider sense) or *ἔχειν* in view of what is said in the last note. For this ellipse, of which Arist. has several examples, cf. *τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει De An.* 404^{b}2.

For *εἷς γε τό* with the substantive verb cf. *ἐνίστανται τινες εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα* p. **88.** 14.

156. 17–18 **ἄλλο δέ τι ἴσως ἐνεργητικόν,** virtually equivalent (as *πρᾶξις*, its synonym in l. 20 shows) to *ἐνέργημά τι*. The objector means that, in spite of what is said about *inward* activity, your *effectiveness* is barred by the obstacle.

156. 18 **αὐτὸ τὸ κώλυμα:** cf. *συγχρῶ εἰς ἄλλην ἀρετὴν τῇ κωλύσει* p. **118.** 16, and see p. **158.** 11. M.'s meaning is clear, but his opponent would feel that *πρᾶξις* is used equivocally.

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156. 19 εὐαρεστήσει: cf. pp. **138. 4** n., **174. 15**, and Pl. *Grg.* 512d, cited by M. at p. **134. 12**.

156. 20–1 περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος: cf. *περὶ οὗ ὁ λ.* Pl. *Phdr.* 235e.

Ch. 33: 156. 22 Ἀτύφως: cf. what is said of Pius: *χρηστικὸν ἀτύφως* p. **12. 20**.

εὐλύτως: cf. *ἀποδιδόναι εὐλύτως* Epict. ii. 16. 28.

Ch. 34: 156. 25 ὁ μὴ θέλων τὸ συμβαῖνον: cf. pp. **62. 24**, **204. 7**.

158. 3 συνελθεῖν should be followed in the text by a full stop.

τὴν χρηστότητα, a word, like its adj., used especially of divine kindness, cf. *ἴδε οὖν χρηστότητα . . . Θεοῦ* St. Paul, *Rom.* **11. 22**; see *χρηστοί* p. **178. 3** n.

158. 4 ἵνα . . . μή. For the construction cf. p. **156. 1–2**.

Ch. 35: 158. 7 Ὥσπερ . . . εἰλήφαμεν. The text is corrupt and, even when a verb is supplied to govern *ἑκάστῳ*, the sense is not satisfactory. We do not need to be told that man derives this, like his other faculties, from Nature; rather we expect M. to say that as other abilities are given man for other demands of his moral life, so we have this one from her bounty. The context further suggests that he made the point that the various faculties of man correspond generally with Nature's own powers.

σχεδὸν ὅσον. Cas. thought that these words have excluded the missing verb, and suggested *εἰς ἕκαστον . . . ἐσκέδασεν* or *ἑκάστῳ . . . διένειμεν*. Some qualification is required, however, and Rich. proposed *σχεδὸν δίδωσιν*. Gat. boldly hazarded *ἕκαστος . . . σχεδὸν ὅσον παρὰ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως*, and certainly the repeated *τῶν λογικῶν* is an error, as Schultz and Cor. observed. M. uses *ἐπέτρεψεν*, in a similar context, *supr.* l. 2.

158. 8 καὶ ταύτην. At first sight the pronoun appears to refer to man's power of recovery as described in ch. 34, but the concluding sentence shows that M. is thinking of the ability of man to restore or maintain a synthesis, p. **156. 14–21**; with this he compares a similar power in Nature herself. If the order were ch. 32, ch. 35, ch. 34, the development would be much clearer.

158. 9–10 ἐπιπεριτρέπει, a unique compound, it looks as if *περι-* had been written as a correction of *ἐπι-* above *ἐπιτρέπει*, cf. *περιτρέπει καὶ μεθίστησι πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κώλυμα* p. **88. 18**.

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158. 10 **κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην**; paradoxically Nature is supposed to restore an order which is in fact determined from eternity, p. **172.** 2; thus a parallel with man's action, as described in chs. 32 and 34, is secured.

μέρος ἑαυτῆς: in the present order of chapters, this expression and *κατατάσσει* have been apparently influenced by *τὴν τοῦ μέρους τάξιν* l. 6; if ch. 35 preceded ch. 34, the language here would suggest the further development of the point made in ch. 34. There is also in *μέρος* an allusion to the derivation of *ἡ εἱμαρμένη*, cf. *τῆς εἱμ., ἧς πόστον εἶ μέρος;* p. **90.** 12.

158. 11 **ὕλην ἑαυτοῦ**. M.'s language here is an echo of *τὸ ἀντεισαγόμενον ὕλην ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖ*, p. **50.** 4, where he uses the analogy of fire which consumes its material.

158. 12 **ὥρμησεν**. The individual's original purposive impulse is made analogous to Nature's *ὁρμή*, but we must remember M.'s usual qualification of man's proposals by *ὑπεξαίρεσις* pp. **50.** 4, **88.** 18, **118.** 17; *ἐφ' οἷον κ.τ.λ.* is equivalent to *εἰς τὸ προηγούμενον* p. **88.** 19.

Ch. 36: 158. 14 **πιθανὸν ἐπιγεγενῆσθαι**. The word 'probably' is omitted after 'which' in my version as printed. Gat. proposed to change the perfect into the fut., but Mr. Marchant's reading maintains a correspondence with the perf. and fut. participles in l. 17; cf. the language and the argument at p. **30.** 8, and again at p. **234.** 17.

Ch. 37: 158. 21 **Οὐήρου**. A has preserved a corruption originating in an editor who supposed that the reference was to the famous story of *Πάνθεια*, the wife of Abradatas and captive of Cyrus, whose tomb was in fact erected by the latter, X. *Cyr.* vii. 3. 17. Lucian says of Lucius Verus' favourite: *ὁμώνυμος γάρ ἐστι τῇ τοῦ Ἀβραδάτα ἐκείνῃ τῇ καλῇ Imag.* 10. That the text once read *Οὐήρου* appears from the note by Arethas in his copy of Lucian (*Test.*), a variant of which (in form historically more correct) is given in Hemsterhuys' *Lucian.* ad *Imag.* 10: *ἧς καὶ ὁ Ἀντωνῖνος μέμνηται ὁ Μάρκος ἐν τοῖς ἐς ἑαυτὸν ἠθικοῖς* (Schol. Ms. Reg. 3011).

158. 22 **Διότιμος**, his death is implied at p. **154.** 10; nothing is known of him, nor of Pergamos and Chabrias.

158. 24 **ἤδεσθαι**, the fut. form depends on P only. Mr. Marchant

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has corrected it to agree with *αἰσθάνεσθαι*. The scribe may have been unconsciously influenced by *ἠσθάνοντο* which immediately precedes.

For the sentiment, cf. *μὴ κλᾶε τοὺς θανόντας· οὐ γὰρ ὠφελεῖ | τὰ δάκρυ' ἀναισθήτῳ γεγονότι καὶ νεκρῷ* Menand. *Fr.* 705 K.; 'id cinerem aut manis credis curare sepultos?' Virg. *Aen.* iv. 34.

160. 2 λύθρον ἐν θυλάκῳ: cf. *λύθρος* p. **20.** 14 n., *γῇ καὶ λύθρος* p. **38.** 2. The meaning of *θύλακος* may be the bag or skin in which the blood-vessels are contained; Gat. compares *πτίσσε τὸν 'Αναξάρχου θ., 'Ανάξαρχον γὰρ οὐ πτίσσεις* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 589, D.L. ix. 59; sim. (with *ἀσκόν*), Philo ii. 462. It is better, however, in the context, to take the reference to be to a shroud.

Ch. 38: 160. 3 Εἰ δύνασαι ὀξὺ βλέπειν, written with a spice of irony, as *εἰ οὖν γοργὸς εἶ* p. **242.** 13; *εἰ οὕτως αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὀξυδερκὴς ἡ ψ.* Galen, v. 90. M. refers, as at p. **48.** 6, to the inward vision: *οὐ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ νοῦς* ⟨*ὁρᾷ*⟩ Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 621.

κρίνων ⟨**κρίμασι**⟩**, φησί.** Gat. supposed that the corruption conceals a sentiment like *ἐὰν δὲ μὴ συνορᾷς, ἐπέχειν καὶ συμβούλοις τοῖς ἀρίστοις χρῆσθαι* p. **200.** 7. Dr. Rendall's correction means: 'discern the inly wise', for *φησί* replacing *φύσει*, cf. pp. **92.** 6, **188.** 8, **194.** 17 and 19. The form of the sentence, however, suggests a quotation, cf. pp. **60.** 19, **140.** 17.

Ch. 39: 160. 5 κατεξαναστατικήν: cf. *παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατεξ. αὐτὴν* (sc. *τὴν διάνοιαν*) *τῶν ὀχληρῶν παρέχειν* Sext. Emp. *Math.* xi. 106.

Ch. 40: 160. 7 τὴν σὴν ὑπόληψιν, meaning a *mistaken* judgement, as he often elsewhere implies, e.g. *ἄρον τὴν ὑ.* p. **54.** 19, where he ironically suggests, as he does here, that the lower self can judge; cf. pp. **124.** 18, **160.** 15.

160. 8 τίς αὐτός; Cf. *τρίτον οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἡγ.* p. **20.** 17. M. nowhere else identifies the self with *ὁ λόγος*, and here he speaks popularly.

Ch. 41: 160. 11 ζωτικῆς φύσεως. Three grades of the self are distinguished: that which we share with plant life, *φυτικὴ κατασκευή*; animate life, *ζωτικὴ φύσις*; life as intelligence, *νοερὰ φύσις*. Cf. *ἕξις, φύσις, ψυχή, λογικὴ ψ.* p. **100.** 23; *ὑπὸ φύσεως μόνον διοικούμενος, ἡ ὡς ζῴου φ., ἡ ὡς ζῴου λογικοῦ φ.* p. **192.** 10.

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Thus ζ. φ. here is equivalent to ἡ ὡς ζῴου φ., the grade of life which depends for its maintenance upon ψυχή, vital spirit.

160. 15 **ὄψεται ἡ αἴσθησις**: for the idiom, see p. **90.** 13 n. The hurt affects the man's ζωτικὴ φύσις, not the mind, cf. l. 9, and ὄψεται γὰρ τὸ πάσχον p. **236.** 1.

160. 15–16 **ὁρμήσαντι ἔνστημα.** The first case contemplated is that where the impulse has been directed to an object without reservation (cf. p. **118.** 17); the obstacle, which is as such merely a κακὸν ζωτικῆς φ. l. 12, in this case becomes a κακὸν νοερᾶς φ., a κακὸν ὡς λογικοῦ. The second case is where the impulse has been governed by a reservation; in such a case M. usually says that the intelligence is not hindered, since the man can accept it resignedly or alter his course to provide for it, see p. **156.** 18.

Here, however, he says: εἰ τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνεις, and his meaning has been variously interpreted. Most critics follow more or less exactly Gat.'s: 'si id quod communiter fieri solet tibi proposueris' and make the sense to be virtually identical with εἰ μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως ὥρμας; thus Dr. Rendall says: 'accept the universal limitation', and Michaut: 'si tu acceptes l'événement commun'. B.-St. Hilaire takes the sense to be: 'si ton sort est le sort commun de tout le monde', a translation which appears to me natural and to be supported by εἰ οὖν ἑκάστῳ συμβαίνει ὃ καὶ εἴωθε καὶ πέφυκε, τί ἂν δυσχεραίνοις; οὐ γὰρ ἀφόρητόν σοι ἔφερεν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις, p. **162.** 13. In such a case you are neither hurt nor hindered, because your mind can rise superior to the weapons of the tyrant, much more therefore to ordinary accidents. He repeats this claim, in another form, at p. **162.** 25 sq., where he has just said οὐ γὰρ παρὰ σὲ ἡ αἰτία, i.e. circumstances are too strong for you.

160. 18 **τὰ μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ ἴδια.** For a statement of the properties of mind, esp. its freedom, see p. **214.** 4 sq.

160. 19 **οὐ πῦρ, οὐ σίδηρος,** the weapons of the despot: τὸ σωμάτιον . . . δοῦλόν ἐστι . . . τυράννου, πυρός, σιδήρου, παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου Epict. iii. 22. 40. The touch of rhetoric is rare in M. but reappears at p. **164.** 27, in what appears to be almost an extravagant form.

160. 20 **σφαῖρος.** He makes the reference to Emped. explicitly at p. **238.** 3, and again employs the image at p. **220.** 19.

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μονίῃ, either 'in abiding rest' or, as Diels prefers, 'in loneliness', i.e. self-contained. For the reading, see vv. ll. at p. **238**. 3 *Test.*

Ch. 42: 160. 21 **Οὐκ εἰμὶ ἄξιος.** Expression and sentiment are both illustrated by: *πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ* Pl. *Ap.* 37b.

Ch. 43: 160. 23 **Εὐφραίνει**, cf. *εὐφροσύνη* p. **154**. 19 n. M. does not pause upon the familiar theme 'velle suum cuique est', he goes straight to the moral. He touches the subject at p. **198**. 20.

160. 26 **κατ' ἀξίαν**, i.e. its worth to the moral life, cf. *τίνα μὲν ἔχει ἀξίαν* p. **46**. 2.

Ch. 44: 160. 27 **Τοῦτον ἰδοὺ τὸν χρόνον.** After glancing at men's various passions, he emphasizes the present, as the satirists do in a similar context, cf. *κερδαντέον τὸ παρόν* p. **62**. 10.

ἰδού, like *ἴδε*, is often employed colloquially by Epict. e.g. *ἴδε, ἐπίσκεψαι* i. 17. 16.

162. 1 **ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι:** cf. *ἄλλος τοιοῦτος εἶ* p. **224**. 20.

162. 2 **κἀκεῖνοι δὲ θνητοί.** The same sentiment as at: *φυλλάρια δὲ καὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἐπιβοῶντα* p. **210**. 8.

Ch. 45: 162. 5 **Ἄρόν με καὶ βάλε**, addressed apparently to Nature, who casts the ball where she pleases, p. **152**. 16. So à Kempis says: 'Pone me ubi vis et libere age mecum in omnibus' *Imit. Chr.* iii (iv). 15.

τὸν ἐμὸν δαίμονα, identified with *ἡ ψ.* l. 8, whereas in the earlier passages they are distinguished, and *ἡ ψ.* fulfils the behests of, and preserves untarnished, the Genius, e.g. p. **90**. 25.

162. 9 **συνδουμένη.** I have followed Sch. in adopting Gat.'s suggestion in the sense the latter gives: 'curis anxietateque constricta ac vincta.' Sch. compares: *τῆς ψ. τῷ σώματι συνδουμένης* Pl. *Ti.* 73b, but the word is there used literally. L. and S. translate the MS. reading, 'sinking together'.

Cas. proposed, and Gat. himself inclined to accept, *συγχεομένη*, cf. *ταραχθῇ ἐκείνη καὶ συγχυθῇ* Epict. *Ench.* 28.

πτυρομένη, used in a sense analogous to *ἐπτοημένος*, 'in a flutter', p. **58**. 1; cf. *ὄχλος μήτε ὄψει μήτε φωνῇ πτυρόμενος* Plu. *Praec. ger. reip.* 800c; *μὴ πτυρόμενοι ἐν μηδενὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων* St. Paul, *Phil.* 1. 28.

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The four participles express aspects of weakness in circumstances of trial, in contrast with the self-control of the preceding paragraph, so that the ch. appears to be a unity, and not two distinct aphorisms as it is in A's arrangement of the clauses.

Ch. 46: 162. 11–12 **ἀνθρωπικὸν σύμπτωμα,** the subst., which normally indicates a mishap or disorder, appears to be employed here in the sense of what is *appropriate*, for otherwise there is tautology. The principle is that of: *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τυχοῦσα φύσις φέρει τι, ὃ μὴ τῷ διοικουμένῳ ὑπ' αὐτῆς κατάλληλόν ἐστιν* p. **80.** 16, cf. p. **144.** 10, and the interpretation here is confirmed by *ὃ καὶ εἴωθε καὶ πέφυκε* l. 14. For M.'s doctrine, cf. *μὴ δυσχέραινε ταῖς περιστάσεσιν, ἐνθυμούμενος πόσα ἤδη σοι τῶν ἐν βίῳ οὐχ ὡς σὺ ἐβούλου συνέπεσεν, ἀλλ' ὡς συνέφερεν* Muson. Fr. xxvii H. where the use of *συνέπεσεν* and *συνέφερεν* is noteworthy. M.'s view at p. **192.** 17 is more qualified, as it is indeed at ll. 21–4.

162. 12 **οὐδὲ βοῖ:** the amplitude of illustration arises from a desire to make his point by reference to each grade of Nature's Scale, cf. p. **100.** 23, sq.

162. 14 **οὐ γὰρ ἀφόρητόν σοι ἔφερεν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις:** cf. p. **160.** 17 n. Epict. says: *τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ μόνον ἀφόρητόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον* i. 2. 1. M.'s maxim must be supplemented by the consideration that what Nature brings is also for the benefit of the Whole, p. **80.** 15.

Ch. 47: 162. 16–17 **τὸ σὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρῖμα.** The connexion with the last ch. is illustrated by: *πέφυκας φέρειν πᾶν, περὶ οὗ ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει ἐστὶ τῇ σῇ φορητὸν . . . αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι* p. **192.** 21.

162. 17 **ἐξαλεῖψαι:** cf. pp. **74.** 22, **130.** 8, **156.** 1, **160.** 7.

162. 22–3 **ἄπιθι οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν:** cf. *τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι, οὕτως μέντοι ὡς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχων* p. **92.** 12; it is the customary Stoic attitude to suicide like *ἅρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν, ὅτε ἔξεστι* Muson. *Fr.* xxviii. H.

162. 23 **ᾗ καὶ ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀποθνήσκει.** Gat. paraphrases: 'quo modo excederes si id agere daretur', so that *ὁ ἐνεργῶν* means that, unlike you who are hindered, l. 21, he does achieve his proposed task. I had expected words like *ὁ ἀποθνήσκων ἐνεργεῖ* to mean that death boldly faced is an *ἐνέργεια* though not the particular act, *τόδε τι* l. 19, originally contemplated. This is M.'s teaching at pp. **44.** 2, **172.** 18, and would introduce the statement at

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l. 25, for in such a death the reasonable self acts according to its will.

162. 23–4 ἵλεως τοῖς ἐνισταμένοις: in view of the human reference of *εὐμένεια* and *πραότης*, and of M.'s counsel to be kind to *οἱ ἐνιστάμενοι* p. **218. 24**, I now think that he means 'propitious to those who oppose you', those whose instruments are *ἰσχυρότερόν τι* l. 20.

Ch. 48: 162. 25 Μέμνησο. The connexion of thought between the idea of death as a haven and that of a mind free from passions as a city of refuge is well illustrated by Epict. iv. 10. 27–8.

162. 25–6 εἰς ἑαυτὸ συστραφέν: cf. *εἰς ἑ. συνειλοῦ* p. **130.** 6 n. The met. here is from soldiers closing their ranks, or from a warrior or beast gathering himself together, cf. p. **240.** 13.

162. 26 μὴ ποιοῦν τι. Although both P and A appear to have written *ποιοῦντι, ποιοῦν τι* (which the older editors and Leop. printed) runs more easily.

162. 27 ἀλόγως παρατάξηται, opp. to *μετὰ λόγου κρίνῃ*, as *κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν* is to *ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως* p. **216.** 5. Epict. uses the same military met.: *ἐν ᾗ καταταχθεὶς ἐπιδείξεις τίνα δύναται λογικὸν ἡγ. πρὸς τὰς ἀπροαιρέτους δυνάμεις ἀντιταξάμενον* ii. 1. 39.

164. 1 ἀκρόπολις: cf. *πῶς οὖν ἀκρόπολις καταλύεται; οὐ σιδήρῳ οὐδὲ πυρί, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν* Epict. iv. 1. 86. The image is familiar from Bunyan's *Holy War*; the Stoics may have derived it from Pl.'s brilliant account of the capture of the young man's soul: *κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν . . . λόγων ἀληθῶν R.* 560b, cf. *παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον* 561b; *τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βασίλειον* Plu. *Dion*, 10. Boethius says: 'nam qui vallo eius ac munimine continetur, nullus metus est ne exul esse mereatur' *Cons.* i Pros. 5.

164. 2 ὀχυρώτερον: cf. *ταύτην γε μὴν ἐν ὀχυρωτάτῳ ἵδρυσεν ὁ θεός* (sc. *τὴν διάνοιαν*) Muson. p. 87 H.

164. 4 ἀμαθὴς . . . ἀτυχής. He whose inward eye is darkened lacks understanding; if, having learned, he fails to apply the lesson, his life miscarries. The form of the sentence resembles *ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος, ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους* Pl. *Lg.* 730c, where *ἀκούσιον, ἄνους* is parallel to *μὴ ἑωρακὼς τοῦτο*

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ἀμαθής here, and *ἄνους* is actually replaced by *ἀμαθής* in the next sentence but one.

Ch. 49: 164. 5 **Μηδὲν πλέον.** The maxim is akin to *μὴ . . . τῇ φαντασίᾳ συναρπάζεσθαι* p. **96.** 9. M. may here be again recalling the teaching of Epict., e.g. *οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄλλῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα ἢ οὗ φαντασία καταληπτικὴ γίνεται* iii. 8. 4; *ὅταν σοί τι προσαγγελθῇ ταρακτικόν, ἐκεῖνο ἔχε πρόχειρον, ὅτι ἀγγελία περὶ οὐδενὸς προαιρετικοῦ γίνεται* iii. 18. 1.

αἱ προηγούμεναι φαντασίαι: cf. *τῶν πρώτων φ.* ll. 8–9, the immediate presentations which are the material *precedent* to your judgement.

164. 9–10 **οὐδέν σοι γίνεται:** cf. *ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανε· τί ἐγένετο; ὁ υἱὸς ἀπέθανεν· ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδέν* Epict. iii. 8. 5, where the fact of the child's death is the *φαντασία καταληπτική*, which is not to be interpreted as evil inasmuch as *ἔχει λόγον καὶ τοῦτο* p. **132.** 19.

164. 10 **ἐπίλεγε ὡς γνωρίζων.** The wise man is never taken by surprise: *γνώρισον τὸ συμβαῖνον ἢ σοὶ ἢ ἄλλῳ* p. **130.** 9. M. may be recalling the famous saying of Anaxagoras: 'I knew they were mortal whom I brought into life' Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 974; Ael. *V.H.* iii. 2, or he may be passing to more general reflections on the Universe, as *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* suggests.

Ch. 50: 164. 12–13 **μὴ προσεπείπῃς,** carrying on, from a wider standpoint, the words *μηδὲν πλέον ἑαυτῷ λέγε* l. 5, as *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* echoes what is said at l. 10. He says that you are not, in the presence of what is inconvenient to yourself, to add the gloss that it is injurious or wasteful, cf. *πᾶσα κακουργία, ὡς ἄκανθα* p. **112.** 8.

164. 14 **ὑπὸ τέκτονος.** Arist., like Pl. before him, is fond of the analogy between Nature and the human craftsman: *ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φ. οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαί τι χρηστόν Gen. An.* 744^{b}16, *τὸ μὲν ἡ τέχνη τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀφαιρεῖ, τὸ δ' ἡ φ.* 762^{a}17.

164. 17 **ἔξω οὐδὲν ἔχει:** cf. *ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἀποθανὸν οὐ πίπτει* p. **152.** 9 n., the correlate of what he is saying here.

164. 20 **εἰς ἑαυτὴν μεταβάλλει:** cf. *πάλιν ἄλλα ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων οὐσίας, ἵνα ἀεὶ νεαρὸς ᾖ ὁ κόσμος* p. **128.** 19, and Pl.'s account of the self-contained Universe: *αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν*

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παρέχον κ.τ.λ. Ti. 33c, where is is explained that the Universe requires no organs to take in nutriment or to extrude excrement.

164. 21–2 ἐκβάλῃ τὰ σαπρότερα: cf. *τὴν δὲ πρότερον ἐξικμασμένην* (sc. *οὐκ*) *ἀποπέμψοι πάλιν* Pl. *Ti.* l.c. So Arist. explains that generation is not by decay, but by concoction and absorption: *γίνεται δ' οὐθὲν σηπόμενον, ἀλλὰ πεττόμενον Gen. An.* 762ª13, cf. 715ᵇ27.

Ch. 51: 164. 24 ἐπισύρειν . . . φύρειν: the exact sense of these words is difficult to determine and harder to express aptly. Both suggest some kind of contamination of the self, and this is confirmed by *καθαράν* l. 28, as the image of the sweet spring resisting befoulment. Thus Epict. says that acts of worship are to be performed *καθαρῶς καὶ μὴ ἐπισεσυρμένως Ench.* 31. 5, where Simplicius remarks: *τῷ δὲ καθαρῷ . . . εἴ τι νόθον παραμιχθείη, μολύνει αὐτό*, and *τὸ ἐπισεσυρμένον μεταλαμβάνει τινὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐδάφους ἀκαθαρσίας in Ench.* p. 221a. M. generally expresses some foulness by *φύρειν*, see p. **40.** 9 n., so that he may here be expressing the tendency of company to contaminate: *φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί* St. Paul, 1 Cor. 15. 33; 'inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquid nobis vitium . . . nescientibus illinit' Sen. *Ep.* 7. 2, cf. à Kempis, *Imit. Chr.* i. 10. 1.

164. 25 καθάπαξ, used as at pp. **224.** 18, **242.** 20 to indicate a word or phrase summarizing conclusively what has gone before, so that *μήτε ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀσχολεῖσθαι* should probably follow *ἀλᾶσθαι* immediately.

164. 25–6 συνέλκεσθαι ἢ ἐκθόρνυσθαι. He appears to mean 'to be contracted or expanded', extending what is a physical correlate of emotion to the emotional self, as we might say: 'be not depressed or elated'. The Stoics called *λύπη* and *ἡδονή*, the one *συστολὴ ψ.*, the other *ἔπαρσις ψ.*, in either case *ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ*, Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 90; here M. applies similar notions to the self generally, cf. p. **162.** 9, compare, too, perhaps his analogy of the sphere p. **220.** 19.

164. 27 Κτείνουσι: supply *ἡμᾶς* or *ὑμᾶς*. M. appears to be quoting words from some treatise of consolation upon exile or death, or again of monition to prepare constantly for death; this will account for a rhetorical note such as we have met at p. **144.** 2. The point is the wise man's ability to rise above circumstance,

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cf. *τὸ σωμάτιον δ' αὐτοῦ δέδωκεν αὐτὸς χρῆσθαι τῷ θέλοντι ὡς βούλεται* Epict. iii. 22. 100, as some held that he could be happy on the rack, *τροχιζόμενον*, Arist. *E.N.* 1153^{b}19.

For the form of sentence, cf. *λοιδοροῦσι καὶ τύπτουσι καὶ παντοίως ὑβρίζουσιν ἡμᾶς* Simplic. *in Ench.* p. 134b. L. and S. give no parallel to this use of *κρεανομεῖν* for 'to butcher'.

Mr. Haines thinks the words are the indignant cry of the Christians, see his text and translation, *The Communings, &c.* p. 383, but such a reference here is improbable.

164. 29 πηγῇ διαυγεῖ καὶ γλυκείᾳ: cf. Epict. *Test.*, Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 98, and *καθαράν* l. 28, *πότιμον* p. **166.** 1. We are reminded of: *πηγὴ ὕδατος ἁλλομένου εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον St. John*, 4. 14.

166. 2 ἐκκλύσει: cf. *ἀποκλύσαι* p. **50.** 20. Pl. says that *πότιμος λόγος* is of service: *ἁλμυρὰν ἀκόην ἀποκλύσασθαι Phdr.* 243d.

166. 3 πηγὴν ἀέναον, the adj. is felicitously used, especially if we preserve P's *φρέαρ*. It may have been suggested by the Epict. fragment, but M. perhaps recalled the familiar *παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως* of the Pyth. oath by the *quaternio, Carm. Aur.* 48, S. Emp. *Math.* vii. 94–100.

The antithesis is familiar from Hebrew and Alexandrian literature; thus running waters are contrasted with cisterns in the Hebr. text of *Prov.* 5. 15; cf. *ἀντὶ μὲν πηγῆς ἀενάου, ποταμοῦ αἵματι λυθρώδει ταραχθέντος Wisdom* 11. 6. Philo refers to Jeremiah's opp. of *πηγὴν ζωῆς* to *λάκκους* (i.e. *δεξαμενάς*) *συντετριμμένους*, and calls God *πηγὴ τοῦ ζῆν ἀέναος* i. 575 M.

[καὶ] μὴ φρέαρ: I have bracketed *καί*, cf. *ὀρθὸν . . . οὐχὶ ὀρθούμενον* p. **40.** 20, where *καί* has crept into Suid.'s text. Dr. Rendall condemns the words as a Christian scribe's adscript prompted by the opp. of *φρέαρ* to *πηγή* in *St. John*, 4. 12–14. *φρέαρ*, however, is there not a cistern but a well, see *Gen.* 21. 30, 26. 18. For M.'s opposition, cf. *εἴ τις εἰς φρέαρ βαθὺ βορβόρῳ πλῆρες ἐγχέοι καθαρὸν καὶ διειδὲς ὕδωρ* Iambl. *V.P.* 77.

ἂν φυλάσσῃς σεαυτόν, in favour of this, which is AD's text, is the form of sentence which resembles *πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσει; ἐὰν δόγματα ἔχῃ* p. **146.** 16, cf. p. **226.** 6. M. writes *φύλασσε σεαυτόν* at p. **218.** 26. The early editors had to deal with P's *φύου σεαυτόν*, which Xyl. rendered 'compone te ipsum'; Cas. proposed *φύε*,

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'id age ut natura duce te ad veram libertatem excolas'. Gat., suspecting the integrity of the text, suggested: 'congenitam . . . fac tibi usu atque industria iugi libertatem'; Dr. Rendall justifies his *εἰσδύου* by pp. **130.** 13, **168.** 7.

166. 4 **εἰς ἐλευθερίαν.** Morus, with only *φύου* before him, suggested 'vindica te in libertatem', presumably intending to read *ῥύου*. The construction with *φυλάσσειν* may perhaps be supported by *παιδεύειν εἰς ἀρετήν* Pl. *Grg.* 519e; the usage is late and not uncommon in the N.T., e.g. *εἵλετο ὑμᾶς . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν*, 'chose you unto salvation', St. Paul, 2 *Thess.* 2. 13.

μετὰ τοῦ εὐμενῶς, for the ellipse of *ἔχειν*, cf. p. **156.** 17 n. There M. combines three adverbs as he does here and again at pp. **148.** 9, **198.** 3.

Ch. 52: 166. 6 **Ὁ μὲν μὴ εἰδώς.** A strangely elaborate proof to make his point. To M. it would not appear so pedantic, since the argument he uses was familiar in the Stoic writings. The text is uncertain. I have restored the MSS. reading *ὅτι ἔστι κόσμος*, which was first corrected by Stich, because the argument is that a man ignorant that a Universe *exists* does not know where he is, he is a *ξένος* in the City, p. **62.** 19. Moreover, to read *ὅ τι ἐστί κόσμος* involves using the next sentence as a minor premise leading to the suppressed conclusion: 'he who does not know the purpose of the universe does not know where he is'; whereas the two clauses are merely successive.

I have inserted *κόσμος*, because the argument requires that word to be the subject of *πέφυκεν*, as indeed most translators assume. The balance of the sentence is also improved by the addition.

The close of the chapter leaves the reader to take the implied steps: *a fortiori*, they do not know what the Universe is nor what their own purpose is in being there: their opinion is therefore worthless, and he is a fool who seeks or shuns their praise or blame.

166. 7 **πρὸς ὅ τι πέφυκεν** ⟨**κόσμος**⟩. We expect the argument to continue: 'he who does not know what the Universe is, does not know what it is made for.'

166. 8 **ἔν τι τούτων ἀπολιπών**, i.e.: 'where he is', 'who he is', 'what the Universe is'.

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ἀπολιπών, *omitting*, presumably from his mental outlook.

166. 8–9 **πρὸς ὅ τι αὐτὸς πέφυκεν:** *αὐτός* shows that *κόσμος* is the subj. of *πέφυκεν* above. The argument follows the order, clearly traditional, of: *τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν τῇ φύσει τέλος ἐποιήσαντο, οὗπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε τυχεῖν τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τίς καὶ ὁποῖος πέφυκεν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγνοῶν ὅστις ἐστίν, οὐκ εἴσεται δήπουθεν ὅ τι πράττειν ἑαυτῷ προσήκει* Julian, p. 186a.

166. 9–10 **ἔπαινον φεύγων ἢ διώκων.** Gat.'s correction *ἢ ψόγον φ. ἢ ἔπαινον* δ. makes the compendious expression more correct formally, but, by bringing *ψόγον* next to *κροτούντων*, a slight contradiction is made more emphatic, since *κροτούντων* naturally suggests accordant applause. The word *κροτεῖν* is, however, sometimes used, like *θορυβεῖν*, to cover both dissent and assent: *ἐπιδοῦναι κελεύοντας αὐτὸν ἐν ἑορτῇ καὶ κροτοῦντας* Plu. *De vit. pudore*, 533a.

Ch. 53: 166. 11, **Ἐπαινεῖσθαι,** continuing the subject of ch. 52; the word shows that *applause* is foremost in his thought, cf. *ἔπαινον* p. **40.** 11.

166. 13 **ὁ μετανοῶν,** 'changing his mind', 'regretting' perhaps, as *repent* now carries a slightly different sense, see p. **150.** 5 and cf. 'Idem eadem possunt horam durare probantes?' Hor. *Ep.* i. 1. 82.

Ch. 54: 166. 14. This ch. is closely related to ch. 57, which in the X excerpts immediately follows it, preceding ch. 56.

τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, the term usually means the air which envelops the terrestrial globe, extending to the interstellar spaces: *δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς ἀέρος οὐκ ὀλίγος τις ἐκτετάσθαι δοκεῖ νοῦς* Galen, iv. 360. M. here means the *atmosphere* we breathe, cf. pp. **102.** 16, **174. 21**; he is merely using an analogical simile, not referring to the older view that our mind is sustained by the air we respire.

166. 15 **ἡ νοερὰ δύναμις.** Galen, as cited above, speaks of *νοῦς* penetrating, like the rays of sunlight, to man. M. too thinks of the mind energy as filling the universe of thought, pp. **66.** 27, **248.** 10. n. The interval between the sober language of M. and Galen and the extravagant words of Julian in his address to the Sun God, on this subject, is remarkable. Galen says: *οὐ γὰρ*

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δὴ τῆς μὲν αὐγῆς τῆς ἡλιακῆς μεταλαμβάνειν πέφυκεν (sc. *νοῦς*), *οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῆς* iv. 360, cf. p. **168.** 10.

166. 16 **κέχυται:** read perhaps *διακέχυται*, cf. p. **62.** 14–15 n.

βουλομένῳ, even if this is only a conjecture in two of the X group, it is most attractive in form and meaning. We breathe almost unconsciously, our dependence upon Universal mind is largely voluntary.

Ch. 55: 166. 18 **Γενικῶς,** opp. to *κατὰ μέρος*, the individual instances, i.e. *κακία ἐμή* p. **96.** 6, *ἡ τοῦ πλησίον* l. 24.

166. 19 **τὸν ἕτερον,** i.e. *τὸν πλησίον* l. 21; see St. Paul's words cited there.

166. 20 **αὐτὸς θελήσῃ.** Reiske's emend. gives the required emphasis on personal liberty and responsibility, cf. *μένω ἐλεύθερος καὶ οὐδείς με κωλύσει ποιεῖν ἃ θέλω* p. **92.** 14.

Ch. 56: 166. 21 **τὸ τοῦ πλησίον.** The principle that my neighbour, if he is an obstacle to my proper work, *ἕν τι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων μοι γίνεται*, has been stated clearly at p. **88.** 15. St. Paul expresses the truth: *τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἑαυτοῦ δοκιμαζέτω ἕκαστος, καὶ τότε εἰς ἑαυτὸν μόνον τὸ καύχημα ἕξει καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον· ἕκαστος γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον φορτίον βαστάσει Gal.* 6. 4.

τὸ προαιρετικόν, an Aristotelian expression for *τὸ ἡγ.* in its aspect as willing and selecting: *εἰς αὐτὸν (ἀνάγειν) τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον* Arist. *E.N.* 1113ª6.

The Stoics normally employ *βούλησις, voluntas*, for this faculty, but cf.: *τὸν σπουδαῖον . . . μέγαν μὲν ὅτι δύναται ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ὄντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων* Zeno ap. Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 99.

166. 24 **ἐπεί τοι:** cf. *ἐπεί τοι τῶν θαυματοποιῶν οὐδὲν διοίσομεν* Epict. iii. 12. 1.

168. 2 **τὸ ἐμὲ ἀτυχεῖν:** cf. *ἀτυχής*, of one whose life miscarries, p. **164.** 4.

Ch. 57: 168. 3 **κατακεχύσθαι.** The sun pours down his light, which is conceived to be a refined fluid, an hypothesis which lasted in various forms until Newton introduced a different explanation.

168. 3–4 **οὐ μὴν ἐκκέχυται,** 'nec effunditur tamen', Gat., who

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supposed M.'s meaning to be identical with the Neoplatonic doctrine that, in pouring down its light, the sun does not squander its energy. He illustrates the passage from: *οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀφαιρεῖται φωτὸς . . . τὸν μέγαν καὶ θαυμαστὸν τουτονὶ κόσμον ἐμπλήσας αὐγῆς* Julian, p. 80d. So this passage of M. is cited, with others, to show that the Neoplatonic tenet that 'the law of emanation is qualified . . . by a further law, viz. that in giving rise to the effect the cause remains undiminished' was a product of the Middle Stoa (Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*, p. 214). A doctrine of this kind is rejected by Lucr. (v. 302), who holds correctly that the energy given out by the sun must be replaced, and it is difficult to believe that M. would differ from him on this point in view of what he so repeatedly says upon the law of renewal in the world of generation. An alternative is to suppose that *ἔκχυσις* l. 11 is contrasted with *τάσις* (*κατ' εὐθύ*), so that there is force in Fournier's contention: 'il ne s'agit pas d'épuisement, mais d'écoulement sans direction.'

168. 4–5 ἀκτῖνες . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτείνεσθαι. The observation is correct although the etymology mistaken. The ray or beam is extended in a right line; cf. *ἐπ' ἄκρον ἐστὶ τεταμένη γραμμή*, 'is produced rectilineally', Proclus, *in Eucl. Elem.* i, p. 110 Fr. (M. does not mean *stretched*, there being no implication of tension); *λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτὶς ἡλίου, κανὼν σαφὴς* Eur. *Suppl.* 650; 'With thy long levell'd rule of streaming light' Milton, *Comus*, 340.

168. 7 τείνεται, Cor. made the same corr. of *γίνεται* at p. **248.** 15.

168. 8 διερείδεται, the correction is supported by P's *διαιρεῖται δή*, and by the sense, see *ἐπέρεισιν* l. 12; cf. *ὅταν μὲν οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθεια . . . εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται* Pl. *R.* 508d. If *διαιρεῖται* is preferred, it may be interpreted, as it was by Gat., of the stream of light *breaking* upon an obstacle, cf. 'ubi . . . | aut in materiam ligni pervenit, ibi iam | scinditur' Lucr. iv. 147.

168. 8–9 διεῖργον τὸν ἐπέκεινα ἀέρα: the ray is regarded as a fluid, and *τὸν ἐπ. ἀέρα* is the light-stream which flowed beyond, before the obstacle broke its current, cf. *κἂν διείργηται τοίχοις*, of the sun's ray being interrupted by a wall, p. **248.** 9. Lucr. explains a shadow as 'lumine cassus aer', where *lumen* is what M. here calls *ἀήρ*, iv. 368.

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168. 9 οὐ κατώλισθεν, the fluid ray does not, as water would, *slide off* the object. He refers to the flickering effect which is especially noticeable in a *camera obscura* such as he is describing.

168. 10–11 μηδαμῶς ἔκχυσιν. The natural interpretation is that the mind is not to be *diffused* in attention, but to direct itself upon its object. If, however, M. means by *ἔκκεχυται*, l. 4, 'is not exhausted', then *ἔκχυσιν* suggests the moral analogy for which Gat. quotes: *οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, ἀρετῆς μεταδιδοὺς ἄλλῳ, τῷ μεταδοθέντι μεῖον ἔχων ἐφάνη ποτέ* Julian, l.c. supra, comparing the famous lines which end: 'nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit' Enn. *Sc.* 400 V., ap. Cic. *Off.* i. 51.

168. 11 τὰ ἀπαντῶντα κωλύματα. The obstacles *prima facie* oppose reasonable interpretation or conduct. The ray of thought shows them up, as being, what in fact they are, hindrances.

168. 14 τὸ μὴ παραπέμπον αὐτήν: the simile changes as M.'s thought shifts from the mind of the observer to the mind which opposes it. The evil man, who refuses to admit reason, repels the ray and deprives himself of the illumination. M. mistakenly supposes that a black object does not admit the light, whereas it actually absorbs more light than a white object.

παραπέμπον: cf. p. 6. 21 n. Cor., followed by Fournier, excised *μή*, the latter remarking that *reflecting* introduces the simile of a mirror, not of a screen. He forgot that an object can reflect light without reflecting, as a mirror, an image.

Ch. 58: 168. 16 αἴσθησιν ⟨ἕξεις⟩: one of Reiske's suggestions. Possibly, however, M. mentally supplied a word out of *κτήση* to govern *αἴσθησιν*.

168. 17 ἀλλοῖον ζῷον: vaguely conceived as at: *ἐς ἄλλο σχῆμ' ἀποστάντες βίου* Eur. *Med.* 1039, *ἐς ἄλλας βιότου . . . μορφάς Ion*, 1068.

Is it possible that M. entertains hypothetically the Pythagorean doctrine, expressed, e.g., by: *τὸν γὰρ ἐς ἄλλο σχῆμα μεθαρμοσθέντα καὶ ἄλλοις | ἐν κόσμοισι βίου σῶμα λαβόνθ' ἕτερον* Philiscus, ap. Plu. *V. Orat.* 836c?

If that be so, he yet regards the next phase of existence as a distinct life, not crediting such stories of a memory of a previous life or of the mind being able to leave the body, in

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slumber or ecstasy, such as we meet, e.g., in Plutarch, in Philostratus, *V. Apoll.* and in Max. Tyr. x.

Ch. 60: 168. 21 εὐλαβῆται, and therefore appears to *pause*: *εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς* (sc. *εἴρηται*), *τοῦτ' εὐλαβηθῶμεν* Arist. *De An.* 403^{b}24.

στρέφηται: cf. *κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον* Pl. *Ti.* 34a, *στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα . . . ἀληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής Tht.* 194b.

For the simile, cf. *versari*, of the mind.

φέρεται κατ' εὐθύ: cf. *τείνεται κατ' εὐθύ* l. 7. The mind's *directness* consists in not vacillating from its object or end. Its movement is not like that of bodies, p. **104.** 19, not in straight or circular lines, nor like a bolt along a parabola.

Ch. 61: 168. 23. The second member of the aphorism recalls Galen, *Test.* Epict. gives this rule: *ἀνθρώπῳ δ' ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ συμβάλλει ὁ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνων καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει τὰ ἴδια δεικνύων* iii. 9. 12. Cic. says: 'talis vir non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam audebit quod non audeat predicare' *Off.* iii. 77. Sen. repeatedly insists that we should be so upright in heart as to require no concealment: 'tunc autem felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico, cum te parietes tui tegent, non abscondent' *Ep.* 43. 3, cf. 5, ib. 10. 5, *V.B.* 20. 4.

BOOK IX

Ch. 1: 170. 1 Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀσεβεῖ. By *ἀδικία* is meant the breach of *human* relations and the spirit which underlies such a breach. Socrates is represented as defining godliness as a species of justice, in an early Pl. dialogue: *τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον Euthphr.* 12e, and the Stoics similarly give the definition: *τὴν γὰρ ὁσιότητα ὑπογράφεσθαι δικαιοσύνην πρὸς θεούς* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 68. In *The Laws*, Bk. x, Pl. makes an established belief in gods the foundation of a system of Right: *θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς ἠργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον* 885b, and so Clem. Alex. says that the gentile philosophers taught that *πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν οἱ ἀνόητοι ἀνοσιουργεῖν καὶ ἀσεβεῖν νομίζουσιν Protrept.* p. 94.

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M. treats holiness (piety) not as an aspect of legal institutions but as a temper of will, and he makes it the first commandment, and precedent to justice: *ὁσιότητα γὰρ καὶ θεοσέβειαν . . . πρεσβύτερα τῶν δικαιοπραγημάτων* p. **230.** 4, cf. the order of words at p. **234.** 19. Holiness is an attitude of obedience to God's will and an adaptation of conduct to the original system of the Universe.

Gat. says: nihil hoc axiomate est paginae sacrae pietatique Christianae magis consentaneum, comparing *St. John*, 13. 34; 1 *St. John*, 4. 21. Even more apposite is *St. Mark*, 12. 29–31.

170. 1–2 κατεσκευακυίας . . . ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων: cf. *οὗπερ ἕνεκεν ἕκαστον κατεσκεύασται . . . πρὸς τοῦτο φέρεται . . . τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κοινωνία* p. **86.** 23, and often elsewhere.

170. 2 κατ' ἀξίαν, i.e. moral worth, see p. **46.** 13 n.

170. 3 τὸ βούλημα ταύτης: cf. p. **112.** 24; *πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα . . . τὸ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν βούλησίν τι πράττεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ ἀσεβείας εἶναι τεκμήριον* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 105. M. also says: *ὅσα βούλεται ὁ δαίμων* p. **90.** 25. The difficulty of combining the pantheistic view with this use of the *will* or *purpose* of what must be thought of as a personal deity is obvious. The religious attitude involved in the ideas of *ὁσιότης* and *θεοσέβεια* requires the implicit recognition of what he here calls *τὴν πρεσβυτάτην τῶν θεῶν*, and personifies as *ἡ πρώτη αἰτία* and *Ἀλήθεια*, l. 7. It would be an exaggeration to say that he means that our wills are ours to make them God's, but he approaches here and elsewhere that attitude. The religious temper which he recommends is a *reasonable* recognition that his dispensation is good and the result of good will. Impiety is resistance to that good purpose, and failure to recognize and acquiesce in it. His point of view is close to that of Epict. in his ch. *περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως* i. 12, his duty is especially *μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται* l.c. 15, cf. id. *Ench.* 31. A more strictly religious and emotional tone is displayed at such places as pp. **64.** 2, **192.** 3, **202.** 18.

170. 5 ὄντων ἐστὶ φύσις: it is clear, I think, that *ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων φύσις* should follow *τῶν θεῶν* immediately. Universal Nature is the most venerable of the gods because it is a nature of what is, that is, of the ultimate reals, the primal causes. This ultimate Reality is intimately connected with the present existents, *τὰ*

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ὑπάρχοντα, and what disturbs the latter affects the whole system of the Universe, and is therefore an offence against ultimate Reality.

πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, the terms are derived from Arist., *τὰ ὑπ.* being used, like *τὰ πάθη* in that philosopher, for the attributes of the real essences, what M. calls *τὰ γινόμενα* opp. to *τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα* p. **62.** 20. Cf. *τὰ καθόλου ὑπ.* opp. to *οὐσίαι* (which there = *individuals*) Arist. *P. An.* 644ª25; *ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγένητα ἔλθωμεν, ἅπερ οὐκέτι τῶν γινομένων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ὄντα ταῦτα κυριώτερον λέγεται* Simpl. *in Ench.* 225b; and, in Stoic logic, *ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα* Stob. *Ecl.* i, p. 106. See also *τῇ τῶν ὅλων φ.* opp. to *τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φ.* ll. 9–10.

§ **2: 170.** 6 **καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος**, this and the words to *θεόν* were replaced in the text by Cas. from Mo 2, at the point where, as he pointed out, they were in P cod. as Xyl.'s version showed. By shifting them to this point we get the correct parallelism *ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀσεβεῖ* l. 1, *ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ ψ.* l. 6, *καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τὰς ἡδονὰς . . . ἀσεβεῖ* ll. 13–14, *ἔτι δὲ ὁ φοβούμενος* l. 19. M. begins with the untruth of social intercourse and then passes, like Pl. (see the references below), to untruth in its essence, the failure to understand reality, *διαφωνεῖ τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει* l. 9. There is a similar profound analysis of the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, l. 13 sq., and this is generalized in regard to all 'indifferent' aims at ll. 25–6.

170. 7 **Ἀλήθεια αὕτη ὀνομάζεται**, almost 'is personified', cf. *Δίκη καὶ Ἀλήθεια* p. **94.** 12; *τὸ Ἀληθείας πεδίον* Pl. *Phdr.* 248b; Epimenides dreamed *ἐντυχεῖν αὐτὸς Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ Δίκῃ* Max. Tyr. x. 1. M. more than once connects *ἀλήθεια* and *δικαιοσύνη*, e.g. p. **118.** 2. True speech and lawful conduct are parts of *δικ.* at p. **234.** 21. The union of the two qualities is brought out at the close of *De Mundo*, where the writer has combined the passage from Pl. *Lg.* 716a (p. **200.** 4, *Test.*) with an extract from the clause beginning: *ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται* ib. 730c. Cf.

> Yea Truth, and Justice then
> Will down return to men
> Milton, *On the Morning, The Hymn*, xv.

and 'truth and justice, religion and piety' in the English Liturgy.

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Truth is, as so often in philosophy and common speech, the counterpart of Reality, see p. **122.** 26 sq., esp. *καὶ οὐσία μία καὶ νόμος εἷς, λόγος κοινὸς . . . καὶ ἀλήθεια μία.*

170. 8 **ἑκὼν ψευδόμενος,** opp. to *ἄκων,* as in the passage which M. may well have here had in mind: *ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους* Pl. *Lg.* 730c. The involuntary lie is called paradoxically *τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ψ.* id. *R.* 382a, and Pl. declares that *ψεύδεσθαι περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα* (M.'s *τὴν τῶν ὅλων φ.*) *οὐδεὶς ἔκων ἐθέλει* ib., cf. p. **140.** 17, and *Test.* There M. adds, as complements of truth, justice and kindness, much as Pl. puts (next to truth) justice, temperance, and wisdom, where he is summarizing *τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα θεῖα Lg.* 732e.

170. 9 **διαφωνεῖ,** cf. *διαφωνοῦσι δ' οἱ φαῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 106. M.'s use of the word is clear from: *τοῖς θεοῖς σύμφωνον, τουτέστιν ἐπαινοῦντα ὅσα ἐκεῖνοι διανέμουσι* p. **104.** 15, cf. *μέμφεσθαι* l. 15.

170. 10 **ἀκοσμεῖ,** used with stress upon the etym. sense, 'mundi ordinem pulchre compositum infringit' Gat., cf. *ἦν* (sc. *τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν*) *ὁ ταράττων . . . καὶ ἀγνοῶν ἄνομος καὶ ἄκοσμος* Dio Chrys. i. 43, p. 58; cf. *ἀπόστημα κόσμου* p. **62.** 23.

170. 11 **φερόμενος παρ' ἑαυτόν,** for the verb, see p. **26.** 3. M., like Arist., makes the man responsible for what has now become involuntary, *ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος E.N.* 1114^{b}2.

ἀφορμάς, cf. *ἀφορμὰς ἐκ τοῦ λόγου εἶχες* p. **190.** 6. The meaning is equivalent to *ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν* Arist. l.c. ^{a}20. By *ἀφορμαί* are meant congenital aptitudes: *ἡ φ. ἀφ. δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους* Zeno ap. D.L. vii. 89; *πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀφ. ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 65, cf. ib. pp. 60–1.

170. 12–13 **διακρίνειν,** for this moral loss of perception M. has several images, see pp. **28.** 18, **62.** 21, **210.** 16.

§ 3: 170. 13–14 **ὁ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὡς ἀγαθὰ διώκων,** from pleasure-pain M. generalizes, as usual, to the erroneous pursuit and avoidance of *τὰ ἀδιάφορα,* objects proved to be of neutral value because they befall good and bad men without reference to *ἀξία,* see pp. **26.** 18, **54.** 21, **80.** 15, **150.** 21. The pursuit of such ends

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causes selfishness and wrong, and repining against Nature's dispositions, p. **104.** 13.

170. 17 **τοὺς μὲν φαύλους ἐν ἡδοναῖς εἶναι.** *φαῦλοι* is the Stoic name for *sinners*, cf. *μωροί* pp. **68.** 11, **144.** 23. The pl. of *ἡδονή* gives a concrete sense, as well as that of variety; *εἶναι* is equivalent to *διακεῖσθαι*, cf. *ἦσαν ἐν θαλίῃσι* Hdt. iii. 27; *ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας* Pl. *R.* 603c. That the gods bestow upon evil men what they esteem to be goods is shown at pp. **144.** 14, **178.** 1, **180.** 23.

§ 4: 170. 24 **ὁμογνώμονας**, i.e. accepting as good what is *τῷ ὅλῳ καίριον καὶ συμφέρον*, for he who so accepts what befalls him is *ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ γνώμῃ (θεῷ) φερόμενος* p. **244.** 17.

§ 5: 172. 1 **κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς**, the text is uncertain, and this arrangement seems best in view of the transition from the right attitude in face of pleasure and pain to a recognition of present experience as a necessary consequence in the chain of events. At p. **54.** 25 M. opposed *κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς* (sc. *συμβαίνειν*) to *κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον*. Here he has realized that present consequences are the natural and necessary result of what went before. He explains that what he has called Nature's impartiality or indifference to apparent good and ill in the present is an aspect of her impartiality as exhibited in what we should call her uniformity, her preservation of the balance of the whole (see *κατ' ἰσότητα* p. **10.** 5 n.).

κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς is to be compared with *κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν*, pp. **114.** 24, **146.** 2, **182.** 2. See, especially, *πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ἔρχεται, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἦγ. ὁρμήσαντα ἢ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν* p. **112.** 6, where what seem at first to be evil and injurious phenomena are said to be *ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν* l. 9.

172. 2 **ὁρμῇ τινι ἀρχαίᾳ**, he takes the second alternative of the two proposed at p. **182.** 2, i.e. *ἅπαξ ὥρμησε, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν*. Nature is conceived as restarting the generation of the world from the stage of formless Fire, cf. *ἐπὶ τὴν κοσμοποιίαν ὥρμησε* p. **146.** 1, and the anthropomorphic terms are justified by such passages as: *ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς* Zeno ap. D.L. vii. 148.

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172. 3–4 **συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους,** i.e. λ. *σπερματικοί,* imaged as conceived in Nature's womb, see pp. **56.** 13 n., **106.** 21, and cf. *ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λ. ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου* D.L. vii. 136.

172. 4 **δυνάμεις γονίμους:** the Universe is regarded as *τοῦ τελείου ζῴου, τοῦ . . . γεννῶντος πάντα* p. **192.** 5, cf. *τῷ γεννήσαντι* p. **56.** 12. As such it has *powers* of generation analogous to those which appear e.g. in Galen's physiology: *αὕτη* (sc. *ἡ φύσις*) *τὰ σώματα τῶν τε φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων συνίστησι δυνάμεις τινὰς ἔχουσα* ii. 28 (see the extract at p. **176.** 8–9 n.). These *powers* enable organisms and their parts to maintain themselves, to select, distribute, and assimilate their *τροφή*. For this sense of *δύναμις,* see L. and S.[9], s.v. ii. 2; and add Arist. *G.C.* 336[a]1. The term *δυνάμεις γόνιμοι* is used in the Neoplatonists for the hypothetical 'intermediaries between the Forms and the material world', see Prof. E. R. Dodds on Procl. *Inst.* 27, p. 215.

172. 5 **διαδοχῶν τοιούτων,** i.e. *γονίμων,* for the changes regenerate the *ὑποστάσεις,* and the succession is living, cf. what is said of *τὰ ἐξῆς,* that *τὰ γινόμενα οὐ διαδοχὴν ψιλήν, ἀλλὰ θαυμαστήν τινα οἰκειότητα ἐμφαίνει* p. **68.** 15.

Ch. 2: 172. 6 **Χαριεστέρου μὲν ἦν,** of a man more accomplished than the vulgar, p. **102.** 2. For the potential indicative cf. *καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἤ . . .* Arist. *E.N.* 1181[a]4.

ἄγευστον ψευδολογίας, M.'s first image is from life's banquet, see *κορεσθέντα* and *προσκαθῆσθαι,* cf. *ὥσπερ ἐκ συμποσίου ἀπαλλάττομαι οὐθὲν δυσχεραίνων, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βίου ὅταν ὥρα ᾖ* Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 46: 'vita | cedat uti conviva satur' Hor. *Sat.* i. 1. 118. The topic is abundantly illustrated by Munro at Lucr. iii. 938, cf. Usen. *Epicur. Fr.* 499 n.

ψευδολογίας resumes *ψευδόμενος* p. **170.** 6, as *τρυφῆς καὶ τύφου* to *ἡδονὴν* and *δόξαν* ib. 25.

172. 8 **κορεσθέντα,** cf. 'satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum' Lucr. iii. 960, sim. Sen. *Ep.* 61. 4, 98. 15; Stat. *Silv.* ii. 2. 129. Cf. *πλήρης* p. **190.** 23–4 n.

δεύτερος πλοῦς, cf. *κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα λεπτέον τῶν κακῶν* Arist. *E.N.* 1109[a]34.

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172. 9 προσκαθῆσθαι τῇ κακίᾳ, either continuing the met. of sitting at meat with (cf. *προσκαθήμενος δὲ εἰπεῖν* Theophr. *Ch.* 29.5 (codd.)) or passing to the image of contagion, as *adsidere* is used of attending the sick. We may compare, in either sense, *τὰς δὲ τῶν κακῶν συνουσίας φεῦγε . . . εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου* Pl. *Lg.* 854c, cf. *ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας ἀπαλλαγή κ.τ.λ.* Themist. viii, p. 101b.

ἡ πεῖρα πείθει: for the meaning and alliteration, cf. *πεπείρασαι γὰρ περὶ πόσα πλανηθεὶς οὐδαμοῦ εὗρες τὸ εὖ ζῆν* p. **146.** 13 n.

172. 10 λοιμὸς γὰρ διαφθορὰ διανοίας. M. is primarily occupied with an image derived from the contagion or infection of the plague which the legions of Verus brought back from Mesopotamia. He compares it with the corrupting influence of evil company, p. **174.** 3, as Seneca had done: 'quod in pestilentia curandum est ne correptis iam corporibus et morbo flagrantibus adsideamus, quia pericula trahemus adflatuque ipso laborabimus . . . initium morbi est aegris sana miscere' *De Tranq.* 7. 4, cf. of the actual plague, *ἕτερος ἀφ' ἑτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιμπλάμενοι* Thuc. ii. 51. 4.

The image had been used of the contagion from evil associates, e.g. by the Just Word of wrong appearing right and right wrong, so that *καταπυγοσύνης ⟨σ'⟩ ἀναπλήσει* Aristoph. *Nu.* 1023, of the corruption of the *ψ.* by the body: *μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως* Pl. *Phd.* 67a, sim. 83d, and the analogy is expressed generally: *τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῖς λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι καὶ πολιτείαις . . . ἀδικίαν* id. *Lg.* 906c.

172. 11–12 πνεύματος τοιάδε τις δυσκρασία καὶ τροπή, cf. 'morbidus aer' Lucr. vi. 1097; *ὁκόταν δὲ νουσήματος ἐνὸς ἐπιδημίη καθεστήκῃ, δηλονότι οὐ τὰ διαιτήματα αἴτιά ἐστι, ἀλλ' ὃ ἀναπνέομεν* Hippocr. i. 362; 'spiritus pestilens' *H.A.* v. 8. 1.

The plague continued all through M.'s reign. One of his last reported sayings is: 'Quid de me fletis et non magis de pestilentia et communi morte cogitatis?' *H.A.* iv. 28. 4; cf. 'bellum Marcomannicum . . . cum virtute tum etiam felicitate transegit, et eo quidem tempore, quo pestilentia gravis multa milia et popularium et militum interemerat' ib. 17. 2; 'ut in eas provincias per quas redit Romam usque luem secum deferre

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videretur, . . . id. v. 8. 1, cf. Dio. Cass. lxxi. 2. 4. Galen says: *ἐπιβάντος οὖν μου τῆς 'Ακυληίας κατέσκηψεν ὁ λοιμὸς ὡς οὔπω πρότερον* xix. 18. It broke out again in Commodus' reign: *συνέβη λοιμώδη νόσον κατασχεῖν τὴν 'Ιταλίαν . . . πολλή τέ τις φθορὰ ἐγένετο* (A.D. 188) Hdn. i. 12. 1. For *τροπή*, cf. *τὰς νόσους . . . ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος εἶναι τροπῆς* Julian, 178c.

Ch. 3: 172. 14 Μὴ καταφρόνει: contrast pp. **72.** 15, **250.** 3. Here, as Gat. says, M. is regarding death not as a supposed hindrance but as a dispensation.

εὐαρέστει αὐτῷ: cf. *τῇ παρούσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεστεῖν* p. **138.** 3, sim. pp. **174.** 15, **194.** 4.

172. 18 τὰ ἄλλα φυσικὰ ἐνεργήματα: cf. *μίαν τῶν φ. ἐνεργειῶν* l. 21. Death is regarded as *ἐνεργείας ἀπόληξις* l. **178.** 24, and M. there, for his purpose, treats each change in life as a kind of death. Here he makes the point that death is an activity like any other natural function, cf. *οὕτως εὔλυτος ἅπεισιν, ὡς ἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν . . . ἐνεργεῖσθαι δυναμένων ἐνεργήσειεν* p. **44.** 2; *μία γὰρ τῶν βιωτικῶν πράξεων καὶ αὕτη ἐστί* p. **98.** 2. The point would be more emphatic if he looked to a further life as Clem. Alex. does: *καθάπερ ἡλικίας μεταβολήν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ βίου ἐναλλαγὴν ὑπομένοντες Strom.* p. 599, but M. is not thinking like that.

αἱ τοῦ βίου ὧραι φέρουσι, D's reading is to be preferred. The expression is proverbial, see p. **60.** 16 n., and words like *κυοφορῆσαι* exclude a reference to himself.

172. 20 **λελογισμένον,** transf. from the *deliberate* act to the agent. Gat. compares *consideratus* and *ὁ μὲν ἀλόγιστος λέγεται καὶ φερόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλογίας, ὁ δὲ λελογισμένος καὶ ἐγκρατὴς παντὸς ἀλογίστου* Porphyr. *De Abst.* i. 44.

μὴ ὁλοσχερῶς μηδὲ ὠστικῶς μηδὲ ὑπερηφάνως: cf. *λελογισμένως καὶ σεμνῶς καὶ . . . ἀτραγῴδως* p. **216.** 6.

ὁλοσχερῶς is used at p. **6.** 9 for superficial, hasty thought; at p. **96.** 9 it means, as here, *rashly* opp. to deliberately, on due reflection.

ὠστικῶς is used with *θυμικῶς* of the behaviour of wild creatures, Epict. ii. 9. 5. The two adverbs may be illustrated from: 'sed non temere nec cum procursu capiendus est impetus; vir fortis ac sapiens non fugere debet e vita, sed exire' Sen. *Ep.* 24. 24;

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'impetu quodam et instinctu procurrere ad mortem' Plin. *Ep.* i. 22. 10, in a letter to M.'s great-grandfather.

ὑπερηφάνως refers to *μὴ καταφρόνει* l. 14, cf. 'quid est stultius quam fastidiose mori?' Sen. *Ep.* 70. 20.

172. 24 τοῦ ἑλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται: cf. *τὸ ψ. ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐξειλεῖται* p. **212.** 15. Lucian ridicules the epitaph of a certain Admetus: *γαῖα λάβ' Ἀδμήτου ἕλυτρον· βῆ δ' εἰς θεὸν αὐτός Demon.* 44. Bishop Butler (*Anal.* i. 1. 27) quotes: *νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον* Strabo, p. 713. He suggests that M. had the same meaning here. Sen. uses a like analogy: 'quemadmodum decem mensibus tenet nos maternus uterus . . . sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum' *Ep.* 102. 23.

§ 2: 174. 1 παράπηγμα, equivalent according to Suid. *Test.* to *κανόνα*, cf. *ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα* p. **88.** 27. The word *π.* is used for a canon of grammar in S. Emp. *Math.* i. 223, 236, 269.

ἰδιωτικόν is similarly used in *ἰδ. μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀνυστικὸν βοήθημα πρὸς θανάτου καταφρόνησιν* p. **72.** 15.

εὔκολον, much the same as *ἡσύχιον* p. **48.** 22, 'quietly content', cf. *εὐκολώτερον ἐξελεύσῃ* p. **212.** 7.

174. 2 ἡ ἐπίστασις, the verbal noun of *ἐπιστῆσαι* p. **8.** 17 n.; cf. *ἐφιστάναι τίνες εἰσὶν οὗτοι*, p. **140.** 13.

174. 3 μεθ' οἵων ἠθῶν, i.e. with *persons* of what character or temper, cf. *τὰ βέβαια ταῦτα ἤθη . . . οἷς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο* Pl. *R.* 503c; *τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν*, animals and human races of leonine temper, Arist. *Pol.* 1338^{b}19. See Bywater on Arist. *Po.* 1454^{a}23.

ἡ ⟨ψυχή σου⟩ συμπεφυρμένη. The reading is doubtful; Xyl.'s *animus* shows that he supplied *ψυχή*, and Cas. and Gat. had the same opinion. If this correction be adopted, M. has applied Pl.'s language about the corruption of the *ψ.* by the body, *Phd.* 66b *Test.*, to the contamination caused by *ὁμιλίαι κακαί* (St. Paul, *1 Cor.* 15. 33), cf. my note on *διαφθορὰ διανοίας* p. **172.** 10. As M. has *οἷοι μεθ' οἵων φύρονται* p. **40.** 9, cf. *ἡ δὲ* (sc. *ψ.*) *σώματι πεφυρμένη* Plu. *Rom.* 28, the text may have been corrupted from *οὐκέτι ἔσῃ πεφυρμένος*. In view of the context

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Kron. suggested ἡ ⟨ἐνταῦθα διατριβὴ⟩ following Leop.'s proposal ἡ ⟨διατριβὴ⟩.

174. 4 προσκόπτεσθαι . . . κήδεσθαι: cf. *ἀχαρίστοις μὴ θυμοῦσθαι, προσέτι κήδεσθαι αὐτῶν* p. **150. 1.**

174. 6 ἡ ἀπαλλαγή, a departure and a deliverance, as *κατεῖχεν* l. 7 expresses detention.

174. 8 περιπεποιημένοις. Dr. Rendall proposes to substitute the pres. part., cf. his correction at p. **148. 17.** Here, however, the perf. part. is better, cf. *οἷας ἀνάγκας δογμάτων κειμένας ἔχουσι* p. **224. 12.** For the usage he compares: *ἀγρύπνησον ἕνεκα τοῦ δόγμα περιποιήσασθαι ἐλευθεροποιόν* Epict. iv. 1. 176.

Ch. 4: 174. 11 'Ο ἁμαρτάνων ἑαυτῷ ἁμαρτάνει, sim. p. **62.** 8. The problem of the divided self was perhaps suggested by the use of the common expression 'forget myself' l. 10. M. does not discuss the psychological difficulty which the Stoics, maintaining as they did the unity of the self, attempted to solve. Arist. handles it in *E.N.* v. 11, and some fragments of Chrysippus' treatment are preserved in Plu. *St. con.* 1041c–d, but unfortunately Plu. is endeavouring to convict Chry. of self-contradiction. He cites: *τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν βλαμμάτων ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἁμαρτάνων παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνει· πᾶς ἄρα ὁ ἁμ. βλάπτει ἑαυτὸν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν* l.c., d. M.'s words may then conceal the argument: every sinner sins against himself, every sinner then makes himself evil: to make oneself evil is to wrong oneself, every wrongdoer therefore wrongs himself.

ὁ ἀδικῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ. There is evidently serious corruption in the MSS. I have followed Leop.'s text, which is Reiske's except for the change of order in the last words. I suspect, however, that the connexion between the first and second members of the ch. was originally indicated. M.'s attitude is like: *πᾶς ὅστις ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ἀδικεῖ εὐθύς, εἰ καὶ μηδένα τῶν πέλας, ἀλλ' αὑτόν γε πάντως χείρονα ἀποφαίνων καὶ ἀτιμότερον* Muson. p. 65 H.; sim. Clem. Alex. *Paed.* p. 230.

Ch. 6: 174. 14 ὑπόληψις καταληπτική. M.'s apprehensive judgement is more precise than the familiar Stoic term *φαντασία κ.*, since man's faculty of understanding weighs the presentations

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of sense and bestows or withholds assent, *συγκατάθεσις*, cf. *ἐπὶ πάσης φ. σῴζειν τὸ καταληπτικόν* p. **60.** 13 n.

174. 15–16 **τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς αἰτίαν συμβαῖνον:** for the emendation Cas. referred to *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας συμβαίνοντα* p. **184.** 3, where *παρὰ τὴν ἐκ σοῦ αἰτίαν* supports the acc. here.

Gat. suggested *τὸ παρὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας*, i.e. *ἐκ τῆς θείας αἰτίας*, to accord with *διάθεσις εὐαρεστική*, cf. *ἡ δὲ* (sc. *σχέσις*) *πρὸς τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν* p. **154.** 23. See n. on *τὸ περικείμενον* there.

Ch. 7: 174. 17 **Ἐξαλεῖψαι φαντασίαν:** cf. *ἐξάλειψον τὴν φ. στῆσον τὴν νευροσπαστίαν* p. **130.** 8 n., where the last word includes *ὁρμήν, ὄρεξιν.*

Ch. 8: 174. 19 **μία ψυχή . . . μία νοερὰ ψυχή.** This and ch. 9 exhibit the unity which should combine men as creatures sharing a common mind, p. **176.** 5, by an appeal to the analogy of one light, one breath, one vital spirit which pervade the Universe. Cf. xii. 30, p. **248.** 9.

174. 21 **ἑνὶ φωτὶ . . . καὶ ἕνα ἀέρα.** M. is employing a popular illustration, although he is no doubt conscious of the many scientific doctrines connected, at least since the fifth century B.C., with light and atmosphere. Plato's use of light, as analogous in the world of sense to the illumination of the ideal world, e.g. *R.* 507b–509a, may be in his mind, and again he may recall the common view that intelligence is drawn in by men from the air and aether, S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 87, or that, as some Stoics held, mind enters the infant with its first inhalation.

The common air is a favourite topic in Comedy, e.g. *εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις | ἐφ' οἷσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἕσπασας τὸν ἀέρα | τὸν κοινόν* Menand. *Fr.* 531 K.

Ch. 9: 174. 23 ⟨**Πάντα**⟩. I think Cas. was right to open this ch. with *πάντα.* I have, however, supposed that the last ch. ended with the same word.

ὅσα κοινοῦ τινος μετέχει: for this participation in a common principle, which causes each of the four elementary bodies to move towards its fellow, has its highest expression in *τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα*, cf. pp. **52.** 25, **124.** 3.

174. 24 **ῥέπει ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.** A's *τὴν γῆν* seems preferable, since the tendency is due to gravitation to the earth, as centre. Similarly

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τὸ πῦρ ἀνωφερὲς μὲν διὰ τὸ στοιχειῶδες πῦρ, p. **176.** 1. This law of 'like to like', which covers both gravitation and levitation, is called *τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βρῖθον* p. **248.** 14.

τὸ ὑγρὸν πᾶν σύρρουν: the *watery* and *τὸ ἀερῶδες* are here considered as *fluids*, that is, as tending to *stream together*, water to water, air to air. M. ignores the common tendency of air and fire to move upwards.

176. 1 **τῶν διειργόντων καὶ βίᾳ.** The MSS. reading *βίας* probably arose from the notion that the word is governed by *χρήζειν*. The elements are regarded as *βίᾳ συμμένοντα* in their assigned places at p. **228.** 22, if my emendation is accepted.

M.'s hypothesis is analogous to the view of Empedocles, who considered that *δίνη*, the rotation of the universe, kept in their places what naturally tended to part: *τὸ συνέχον λέγεται ἃ συνέχει ἔχειν ὡς διαχωρισθέντα ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον* Arist. *Metaph.* 1023^{a}22. See also a passage from Philo ii. 489, Arist. *Fr.* 20.

This principle, which thus unites what is naturally sundered, is called *ἕνωσις* l. 14, *τὸ ἑνοῦν* p. **248.** 14 n., the force at work being termed *ὁ τόνος τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ συνέχον, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ συνδέον*. Cf. *γῆν μὲν γάρ φασι καὶ ὕδωρ οὔθ' ἑαυτὰ συνέχειν οὔθ' ἕτερα, πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῆ καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὐτῶν τ' εἶναι δι' εὐτονίαν ἐκτατικά, καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες* Plu. *Comm. Not.* 1085c. Their Peripatetic critics showed the difficulties of this anticipation of some modern theories of matter, see, e.g. Alex. Aphr. *De Mixt.* p. **224.**

176. 2 **παντὶ δὲ πυρὶ ἐνταῦθα,** i.e. on this earth; the terrestrial fire is hindered from blazing up because it is 'damped down' by moisture; otherwise it would fulfil its tendency to return to *τὸ στοιχειῶδες πῦρ* in the outer and upper regions. M. is thinking of the effect of mist and clouds in preventing the radiation which takes place on a clear night.

176. 2–3 **πρὸς τὸ συνεξάπτεσθαι ἕτοιμον.** M. is describing the phenomenon of lightning. Fire, which naturally tends upward, is actually ready to descend and to 'blaze up' in any fuel which has lost the moisture which hinders kindling. Alternatively this

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may be a vague explanation of what we call 'spontaneous combustion'.

176. 5 **τὸ κοινῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως μέτοχον.** Cas., in view of what is said of *τὰ ἄλογα*, ll. 8–9, proposed *κοινῆς ἀλόγου ἢ νοερᾶς φ.* or *κοινῆς ψυχῆς ἢ νοερᾶς φύσεως*. This is, however, unnecessary if M. is here making his main point, that what shares in a common mind is attracted to its own kind as are the elements. Man is bound to man and god by *νοῦ κοινωνία* p. **246.** 9, and *κοινὴ νοερά* is thus an adjectival term corresponding to *νοῦς κοινωνίαν ἔχουσα*.

176. 6 **ὁμοίως σπεύδει,** the verb he used for 'tendency' p. **174.** 23, cf. *διάνοια δὲ ἰδίως ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμόφυλον τείνεται καὶ συνίσταται* p. **248.** 15.

§ 2: 176. 8 **εὐθὺς γοῦν.** Most critics, beginning from Gat., have taken *εὑρέθη* to be a gnomic aorist (*existunt*, Gat.; 'findet man', Schultz; 'l'on remarque', Fournier), and so have misunderstood M.'s meaning. Mr. Marchant pointed out to me the contrast between the harmonious state of nature, l. 8 sq., and *ὅρα οὖν τὸ νῦν γιγνόμενον* l. 16. M. therefore looks back to a golden age from which man degenerated, although the principle of unity has remained at work in the development of human society, and man can still correct the discord which his passions have introduced; at any rate Nature herself continually overcomes disunion.

176. 8–9 **ἐπὶ μέν τῶν ἀλόγων,** balancing *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν* l. 12, *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔτι κρειττόνων* l. 13. M. arranges animals in an ascending order of social habits: hiving bees, herding beasts, birds. He follows the lead of Arist. and the Peripatetics in regard to animal anticipations of human society: *μεχρὶ γὰρ τούτου ἡ φ. αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθεν ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις* Arist. *Pol.* 1253^{a}12, cf. id. *Metaph.* 980^{a}27 and *ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ φρονιμωτέροις διήρθρωται μᾶλλον· φαίνονται γὰρ μᾶλλον βοηθείαι γινόμεναι καὶ εὔνοιαι καὶ συνεργίαι ἀλλήλοις* [Arist.] *Oec.* 1343^{b}15. Cic. gives the general theory from Panaetius: 'commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum quae procreata sunt. . . . eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem *Off.* i. 11.

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Galen ascribes similar economy to Nature: *αὕτη τὰ σώματα τῶν τε φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων συνίστησι . . . καὶ προνοεῖται τῶν γεννωμένων ἑτέραις αὖθίς τισι δυνάμεσι, στερκτικῇ μέν τινι καὶ προνοητικῇ τῶν ἐγγόνων, κοινωνικῇ δὲ καὶ φιλικῇ τῶν ὁμογενῶν* ii. 28.

The Epicureans in this matter rejected the hypothesis of Nature's providence, and plainly recognized the struggle for existence and survival as fundamental in animate forms and in human history.

176. 9 **εὑρέθη**, cf. *εὑρίσκετο* l. 11, *ἐξευρέθη* p. **184.** 24. Gat. regards the word as equivalent to the copula, comparing the usage of *εὕρεσθαι* in the LXX and the N.T., and the corresponding Hebrew word (הנמצאת), e.g. *Gen.* 19. 15. See Lightfoot on St. Paul, *Gal.* 2. 17 and *Phil.* 3. 9, and Winer, *Grammar of N.T. Greek*[8], p. 769. We may compare the Latin: 'his adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo' Cic. *De Am.* 42 and our own English usage of 'to find'. M. may however mean 'were *discovered* in the progress of animal development'. As was said, l. 8 n., he does not mean that on a study of the evidence we *find* hives, &c.

νεοσσοτροφίαι, rearing of nestlings, including *nidification*, which was part of the evidence for *πρόνοια* in Nature: *χελιδὼν ποιεῖ νεοττίαν διὰ τὴν διαδοχήν* Schol. ad Arist. *Metaph.* 519[a]37 Bk. So Gilbert White speaks of 'that rotundity and compactness so remarkable in the edifices of that little architect', i.e. the wren, *Selborne*, Letter 56.

176. 9–10 **οἷον ἔρωτες**, qualifying a word which is unusual in reference to animals. He is thinking of the almost human solicitude of ewes at lambing and of the turtle dove.

176. 10 **ψυχαί**: vital spirit differentiates animate beings from plants and minerals which are bound together by *φύσις* and *ἕξις* p. **100.** 23.

176. 11 **ἐπιτεινόμενον**: the pitch is raised as we go higher in the scale, cf. *ἐπιτείνεται*, 'there is an acceleration', Arist. *Cael.* 289[a]3. The reference is to the doctrine of stress, *τόνος*, see *τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν* p. 112. 16 n., and Plu. cited at p. **176.** 1 n.

ἐπὶ φυτῶν: the reverse order of the scale to *λίθων ἢ ξύλων*.

176. 13 **σύλλογοι**: cf. *ἐν μὲν τοῖς σ. καὶ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις* opp. to *κατ' αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν πόλεμον* Polyb. xviii. 3. 2; 'natura sumus apti ad

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coetus, concilia, civitates' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 63, id. iv. 4. In the next words he appears to indicate man's solidarity even in war, by pointing to armistices. He may recall Heraclit.'s paradox that war and peace are one (36 B., 67 D.).

176. 14 τῶν ἔτι κρειττόνων καὶ διεστηκότων. In the vast interstellar spaces, there is a unifying sympathy between the widely sundered luminaries, as they too influence this terrestrial globe, e.g. in the relation between the moon and the tides, S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 79. He says *τρόπον τινὰ ἕνωσις* because *ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 80. Of this sympathy Manilius says:

> 'quae quamquam longo cogit summota recessu
> sentiri tamen' ii. 84.

οἱ κρείττονες are the planets and constellations regarded perhaps as gods, cf. *παρὰ θεῶν καὶ ὅσοι κρ. ἡμῶν* Pl. *Lg.* 718a, id. *Sph.* 216b, *Smp.* 188d. In the Neoplatonists the word is freely used for the gods.

176. 15 ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπανάβασις, the gradual ascent by the *Scala Naturae*, the only use of the word in this sense known to me. Pl. has *ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον*, of the ascent towards Ideal beauty, *Smp.* 211c, and *ἐπάνοδος* for the ascent from the cave achieved by philosophy, *R.* 521c.

§ 3: 176. 16 ὅρα οὖν τὸ νῦν : cf. *οὐ δεινὸν οὖν μόνον τὸ νοερόν σου μέρος ἀπειθὲς εἶναι;* p. **228.** 24.

176. 17–18 σπουδῆς καὶ συννεύσεως : the *haste* or *zeal* refers to *πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενὲς σπεύδει* p. **174.** 23. *σύννευσις*, referring to *ῥέπει* p. **174.** 24; the word means originally linear convergence: *οὐ ποιοῦν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο σύννευσιν οὔτε σύγκρασιν ἑνωτικήν* Plu. *De Def.* 428a, and so met. tendency to agreement, *σύννευσις τῶν πόλεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας* Polyb. ii. 40. 5.

176. 18 τὸ σύρρουν, a met. use referring to *τὸ ὑγρὸν πᾶν σύρρουν* p. **174.** 24. It is tempting to conjecture that M. wrote *τὸ σύρρουν καὶ τὸ σύμπνουν*, referring thus to *τὸ ἀερῶδες* l.c. Galen says: *ἥνωται μὲν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ σύμπνουν ὅλον ἐστὶ καὶ σύρρουν τὸ σῶμα* ii. 29; cf. *μία τις σύρροια καὶ σύμπνοια*

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Hippocr. ap. Galen, ii. 189. The reference is to the systematic inspiration, exspiration, and perspiration, and to the flow and circulation of blood and spirit in the organism.

176. 19 **κρατεῖ γὰρ ἡ φύσις,** an allusion to Heraclit., whose doctrine the Stoics here followed, see *Test.*

176. 21 **γεώδους προσαπτόμενον,** an awkward way of expressing the fact of gravitation; cf. *κἀκεῖνα . . . συνέχει καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βρῖθον* p. **248.** 14, where this tendency of brute matter is contrasted with *διάνοια δὲ ἰδίως ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμόφυλον τείνεται.*

Ch. 10: 176. 23 **καὶ θεὸς καὶ ὁ κόσμος,** cf. *καὶ ὁ Ἥλιος ἐρεῖ· πρός τι ἔργον γέγονα, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ θεοί* p. **152.** 13, where the gods, like the horse and the vine, have their purpose in one universe.

M. is continuing from ch. 9 the recognition of the 'stair of creatures', which leads through the *κρείττονες* to the divine universe; cf. *τοίνυν κράτιστον ἂν εἴη ζῷον καὶ ἄριστον (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). . . . τὸ δὲ τέλειον καὶ ἄριστον κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν ὑπάρχοι ἀνθρώπου . . . τοῦτο δὲ οὐ διοίσει θεοῦ* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 89–91; 'quartus autem *gradus* est et altissimus eorum . . . quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constansque, quae supra hominem putanda est deoque tribuenda, id est mundo, in quo necesse est perfectam illam atque absolutam inesse rationem', where Cic., like M. here, passes from *θεός* to *κόσμος* and so to *ὁ λόγος*, *N.D.* ii. 34.

176. 24 **ἡ συνήθεια κυρίως τέτριφεν.** Xyl., as his version shows, emended to *τέτροφεν*, and actually printed this in the Bas. edition. Gat., though he had not a copy of the ed. princ., restored *τέτριφεν* from ed. Lugd. and compared 'nomina quae nunc consuetudo diuturna trivit' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 15.

For *κυρίως*, cf. *λέγεται δὲ τοὔνομα κ. μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐψομένων* Arist. *Mete.* 380^{b}14.

176. 25–6 **ὁ λόγος . . . καρπὸν ἔχει,** cf. *τὸν καρπὸν ὃν φέρει, αὐτὴ* (sc. *ἡ λογικὴ ψ.*) *καρποῦται* p. **214.** 5, where M. feels, as he does here, some difficulty in the use of what is so familiar an analogy in Greek literature.

176. 26 **τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα,** i.e. *τὰ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαίνοντα* p. **36.** 4 n.; *τοῖς γινομένοις καὶ ἐπιγινομένοις* p. **172.** 1; *τοῦ τελείου*

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ζῴου . . . περιλαμβάνοντος διαλυόμενα εἰς γένεσιν ἑτέρων ὁμοίων p. **192.** 5.

Ch. 11: 178. 1 **ἡ εὐμένειά σοι δέδοται:** cf. *εὐμενέστερος ἔσῃ . . . ἔδωκε γὰρ . . . τὴν πρᾳότητα* p. **188.** 21.

καὶ οἱ θεοὶ δὲ εὐμενεῖς: cf. *κήδονται αὐτῶν παντοίως* p. **144.** 16; *οἱ θεοὶ δέ . . . αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦσι* p. **180.** 23.

178. 2 **εἰς ὑγίειαν, εἰς πλοῦτον, εἰς δόξαν.** M. follows the old Socr. division of goods into bodily, external, and mental. These are *ἀδιάφορα*, the gods can also assist the good man to inward calm and joy, p. **186.** 18.

178. 3 **χρηστοί,** cf. *τὴν χρηστότητα* p. **158.** 3. The subst. and adj. are appropriate to the gods as givers of good things: *χρηστός ἐστι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀχαρίστους καὶ πονηρούς St. Luke*, 6. 35, cf. *St. Matt.* 5. 45; *χρηστότητα . . . Θεοῦ* St. Paul, *Rom.* 11. 22, ib. 2. 4; *Eph.* 2. 7; *Tit.* 3. 4 Menand. says: *⟨συλλαμβάνειν γε τοῖς⟩ πονηροῖς τοὺς θεούς Kol.* 26.

ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ σοί. Julian makes M.'s motto *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς θεούς*, which he interprets: *δεῖσθαι μὲν ὡς ἐλαχίστων, εὖ ποιεῖν δὲ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα πλείστους* pp. 333c, 334a. Here, then, he may mean not only to be kind to offenders but also to bestow upon them the external goods which were in his hand as emperor, cf. p. **16.** 28.

Ch. 12: 178. 4 **Πόνει, μὴ ὡς ἆθλιος,** Gat. points out the verbal play *ἆθλιος—ἆθλον*, comparing *τὸν δὲ Ἡρακλέα πονοῦντα . . . ἔφασαν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀθλιώτατον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἆθλους ἐκάλουν τοὺς πόνους αὐτοῦ . . . καὶ τούτῳ πάντες εὔχονται, ὅπως αὐτοὶ μὴ ἔσονται ἄθλιοι, τῷ πλεῖστα ἀθλήσαντι* Dio Chrys. viii. 28, p. 285.

178. 5 **κινεῖσθαι:** cf. *τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψ. λογικῶς καὶ κοινωνικῶς ἔχουσαν καὶ κινουμένην* p. **102.** 5.

ὁ πολιτικὸς λόγος, the reasonable rule of the Eternal city, *ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς λόγος* p. **56.** 4; cf. *φυγὰς ὁ φεύγων τὸν πολιτικὸν λ.* p. **62.** 20. The concrete expression of it is *νόμος* p. **204.** 7.

Ch. 13: 178. 7 **περιστάσεως:** cf. *ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις π.* p. **10.** 14; *αἱ π. εἰσὶν αἱ τοὺς ἄνδρας δεικνύουσαι* Epict. i. 24. 1; *ὡς καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ λέγειν εἰώθασι· δὸς περίστασιν καὶ λάβε τὸν ἄνδρα* Procl.

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in Pl. Ti. p. 18c, Schn. Like *συμφορά*, the word often means, as it does here, *trouble*, *untoward* circumstance, cf. *ποίας περιστάσεις, ἄνθρωπε; εἰ π. λέγεις τὰ περιεστηκότα, πάντα π. εἰσίν· εἰ δ' ὡς δύσκολα καλεῖς, ποίαν δυσκολίαν ἔχει τὸ γενόμενον φθαρῆναι;* Epict. ii. 6. 17.

ἐξέβαλον, a paradox. I cast out my surroundings by expelling the judgement *within* me. For the counterpart see *ἔξω θυρῶν* l. 11; cf. *βάλε ἔξω τὴν ὑπόληψιν* p. **246.** 3, sim. pp. **74.** 22, **160.** 7, **244.** 1.

Ch. 14: 178. 9 **Πάντα ταὐτά**, the emendation (cf. p. **180.** 26) is supported by: *ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα* (*ταῦτα* codd.) and *πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα* P, p. **64.** 5 and 12; *τὰ αὐτὰ εὑρήσεις*, where *συνήθη καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνια* follow, p. **120.** 15. For the sentiment, cf. also pp. **66.** 7, **68.** 9.

Ch. 15: 178. 11 **Τὰ πράγματα ἔξω θυρῶν**, the complement of ch. 13, which it presumably once followed directly. A favourite tenet that *things* only find admission by our consent, cf. *τὰ πράγματα . . . ἔξω ἕστηκεν ἀτρεμοῦντα* p. **52.** 19; *τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ . . . οὐδὲ ἔχει εἴσοδον* p. **88.** 9; sim. pp. **118.** 23, **124.** 17.

Ch. 16: 178. 14 **Οὐκ ἐν πείσει ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ.** Good and ill consist in what we *do*, not in what we *feel*, cf. Arist.'s definition of *εὐδαιμονία*: *πρακτική τις* (sc. *ζωή*) *τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. . . . διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον E.N.* 1098^{a}3, and pp. **74.** 6, **118.** 21, **170.** 13, **208.** 8.

Ch. 17: 178. 17 **Τῷ ἀναρριφέντι λίθῳ:** cf. the images of the ball and the bubble, p. **152.** 16, which show that the reference here is to the beginning and the close of life.

Ch. 18: 178. 19 **Δίελθε ἔσω.** The expression is very close to that at p. **180.** 21; cf. pp. **66.** 16, **132.** 1, **224.** 11.

τίνας κριτὰς φόβῃ, cf. pp. **40.** 10, **52.** 14, **166.** 11, **200.** 14.

Ch. 19: 178. 21 **Πάντα ἐν μεταβολῇ**, cf. *πάντα ταῦτα, ὅσα ὁρᾷς, ὅσον οὐδέπω μεταβαλεῖ* p. **52.** 21. The recognition of the law of mutation in the Universe is here coupled with the statement of its analogy in the individual. This is developed in ch. 21, which must originally have followed ch. 19 immediately.

ἀλλοιώσει, for the conjunction with *φθορᾷ*, cf. *τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου . . . ἀνάγκη φθείρεσθαι· λεγέσθω δὲ τοῦτο σημαντικῶς τοῦ*

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ἀλλοιοῦσθαι p. **194.** 17. *ἀλλοίωσις* is qualitative change, *μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*, a term inherited from Arist. e.g. *G.C.* 317ª26, and distinguished from translation, *φορά*, i.e. *μεταβολὴ κατὰ τόπον* by which the atomist physicians and philosophers explained organic changes. Galen explains in detail in his *περὶ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων* why a mechanical, atomic explanation of bodily alterations is impossible, in his view. M., unlike Arist. e.g. *G.C.* 317ª20, regards *γένεσις καὶ φθορά* as aspects of *ἀλλοίωσις*. Thus, with most of his School, he goes back to some of the earlier physicists in this matter: *τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίων οἱ μὲν τὴν καλουμένην ἁπλῆν γένεσιν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναί φασιν* l.c. 314ª6. This is the interpretation the Stoics seem to have given to *ταὐτ' εἶναι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός, . . . καὶ νεόν καὶ γηραιόν* Heraclit. 88 D., 78 B. The individual, like the Universe, is continually changing its sensible attributes, *ἀλλοιώσει καὶ κατά τι φθορᾷ*. Coming to be and passing away are alterations, just as every alteration is a kind of birth and at the same time death.

Ch. 20: 178. 23 ἐκεῖ δεῖ καταλιπεῖν, 'where it is', i.e. *ὅπου ἡ ἁμαρτία ὑπέστη* p. **130.** 12, cf. *ἐκεῖ τὸ κακόν* p. **186.** 8.

Ch. 21: 178. 24 Ἐνεργείας ἀπόληξις. M. is here stating summarily a corollary from Heraclit.'s doctrine of unity underlying continuous change, i.e. that each of us dies daily and that the ages of man's life are a series of births and deaths. This truth was seized upon early by popular thought and became a staple of treatises of consolation. Already Epicharmus used it to suggest the discontinuity of the individual: *ἐν μεταλλαγᾷ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον Fr.* 170 K., 2 D., and this, and not something more mystical, is perhaps the meaning of:

> *τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν*
> *τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;* Eur. *Fr.* 638.

cf. 833, N². Pl. alludes once to the idea: *οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νεὸς ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς Smp.* 207d. Later we often meet the idea, illustrated by scraps of Heraclit., e.g. [Plu.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 106e; *τῷ μηδέποτε λήγειν . . . τὴν γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σπέρματος ἀεὶ μεταβάλλουσαν ἔμβρυον ποιεῖν, εἶτα βρέφος, εἶτα παῖδα μειράκιον ἐφεξῆς νεανίσκον, εἶτα ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην γέροντα* Plu. *De EI*, 392 c, and *ἐφθάρη δ' ὁ νέος εἰς τὸν ἀκμάζοντα καὶ παῖς εἰς τὸν νέον* ib. The theme

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appears in Ovid, *Met.* xv. 214 as familiar. In Sen. we continually meet it, e.g. 'Infantiam amisimus, deinde pueritiam, deinde adulescentiam' *Ep.* 24. 20; 'omne momentum mors prioris' ib. 58. 23, cf. *Ep.* 1. 2, 4. 9, 120. 17; *Ad Marc.* 21. 6; *Ad Polyb.* 11. 2. Pl. and Arist. prefer to illustrate from Heraclitus the truth that, in human life, birth and death ensure the immortality of the kind, since the individual is mortal; see, e.g. Pl. *Smp.* 207e–208d, *Lg.* 721c, 773e; Arist. *De An.* 415ª26, *Gen. An.* 735ª17, *Pol.* 1252ª26.

παῦλα, οἷον θάνατος. I have printed the text with Gat.'s transference of *καί*, but whereas he takes *οἷον θάνατος* to be the predicate, I understand *παῦλα, οἷον θ.* to be that. The whole point of the ch. is that death is a moment in the continuous series of life, and this language can only express by the use of analogy. M. begins by the psychological truth that one activity gives place to another, that, as he says elsewhere, *ὁρμή terminates* upon its object, p. **96.** 5. Thus, in the game of ball, *ἀπόληξις, διεξαγωγή, ἀρχή* are relative moments in what is resumed, although language says inexactly *ending, continuance, beginning*, p. **152.** 15. M. means, therefore, here by *παῦλα, παῦλα ζωῆς*, each pause is a kind of death, *καθότι ἕκαστον πέφυκεν ὥσπερ θνῄσκειν* p. **202.** 10. The word *παῦλα* is sim. used by Pl.: *ἡδονὴν . . . παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι R.* 584b, where *π.* is interpreted by *ἀπαλλαγή*, death, ib. 584c. Even more to the point is the passage about the deathlessness of *ψυχή*, where *τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς Phdr.* 245c.

The implication, which M. characteristically reserves, is that the *ψ.* continues; death may be a double bar, but the music does not cease, it only pauses to begin again.

Ch. 22: 180. 3 **τὸ σεαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικόν.** This Duty, that to the Whole, and that to one's Neighbour are treated in Book ii, and often in the whole work. See, for Duty to Self, pp. **30.** 19, **124.** 21, **164.** 28, **236.** 23, **244.** 18; for Duty to the Whole, pp. **22.** 7, **80.** 12, **116.** 8, **148.** 4, **194.** 1, **246.** 4; for Duty to Neighbours, pp. **20.** 5, **46.** 10, **108.** 11, **128.** 21, **194.** 10, **224.** 6.

180. 6 **ἄγνοια ἢ γνώμη,** Gat. corrected to datives, but M. intends to say: 'whether his *ἡγ.* is *ἄγνοια* or the reverse', cf. *ὅτι συγγενές.*

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He writes: *τί μου νῦν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια; μὴ φόβος; μὴ ὑποψία;* p. **242.** 21.

Ch. 23. 180. 9 **ἥτις ἐάν,** perhaps we should, with Sch. and M. Trannoy, adopt Nauck's correction. For the MSS. reading, cf. *πᾶν ῥῆμα ἀργὸν ὃ ἐὰν λαλήσωσιν St. Matt.* 12. 36.

τὴν ἀναφοράν, the issue of *νοῦς δικαϊκός* l. 4; cf. *τὰ μικρότατα κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀναφοράν γίνεσθαι,* i.e. to obey the rule of the commonwealth, p. **32.** 9; sim. pp. **38.** 4, **154.** 3.

180. 10 **διασπᾷ τὸν βίον.** Like Pl. in the *Republic* M. regards the unity or division of the self as a counterpart of the unity or division of the City, cf. *ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς* (sc. *πόλεις*) *ἀντὶ μίας* Pl. *R.* 462b; *στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή . . . καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο, τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα* Arist. *E.N.* 1166^{b} 19.

180. 11 **στασιώδης,** factious conduct makes a man *ἀπόσχισμα πόλεως* p. **62.** 25, *ξένος* and *φυγάς* ib. 20. M. is thinking of the popular struggles of earlier Greek and Roman democratic life. Indeed Gat. translates *τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν μέρος* by 'factionis suae homines', thus lending point to *ἐν δήμῳ*. The middle voice, *διιστάμενος*, however, shows that he means *pro sua parte*, cf. *τὴν πολιτείαν ὡς προδιδοὺς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος* Pl. *Lg.* 762c. The converse, the loyal citizen's conduct, is described at p. **194.** 14.

180. 12 **τῆς τοιαύτης συμφωνίας,** i.e. *τῆς κοινωνικῆς*, with which *παιδίων ὀργαί* are contrasted in the next ch. The mind of the Universe is *κοινωνικός* and brings reasonable men *εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων* p. **92.** 20.

Ch. 24: 180. 13 **Παιδίων ὀργαὶ καὶ παίγνια,** cf. *παιδία φιλόνεικα, γελῶντα εἶτα εὐθὺς κλαίοντα* p. **94.** 11. In both places he is comparing men's passions and pursuits to children's, cf. p. **96.** 14. Plu. contrasts a child who regarded her dolls as living with women who treated their children *καθάπερ παίγνια Cons. ad uxorem* 609e, cf. id. *Per.* 1.

πνευμάτια νεκροὺς βαστάζοντα, this appears to be a variation by M. on Epict.'s saying which he cites at p. **68.** 3. The connexion with what follows is most baffling. Why should the thought of mortals as spirits shouldering corpses make the legends of Odysseus' or Theseus' visit to Hades more vivid? Gat. suggests

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that by *νέκυια* he may be referring to *νεκυομαντεῖα, psychomantia*, the practice of which is referred to by Cic. *Tusc.* i. 37, *Divin.* i. 132, cf. *αἱ περὶ τὰς νεκυίας τερατουργίαι* Plu. *De Aud.* 17b, Hdn. iv. 12. 4. The bodies would be, presumably, called up and supposed to be 'suspended' by breath:

> unde animae excitantur obscura umbra, aperto ex ostio
> altae Acheruntis, salso sanguine, mortuorum imagines
> Cic. *Tusc.* i. 37.

The analogy then would be between the unreality of life and the false appearances conjured up by necromancy.

Ch. 25: 180. 15 τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ αἰτίου, individuality is given to *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*, or *οὐσία*, by its *ποιότης*, the formal as opposed to the material, cf. *ἡ ἰδία π.* p. **98. 4**, and, generally, *ἰδίως ποιὰ σώματα* opp. to *οὐσία κοινή* p. **248. 10**.

180. 17 τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν, the object in its individuality, cf. p. **196. 9**. M. lays stress upon the element of time-continuance in the experience, pp. **130. 8**, **242. 17**, but he does not explain anywhere the object of this determination of its period. Possibly he is thinking of the Epicurean maxim, pp. **130. 22**, **140. 24**.

Note that folio 377v ends here, not at *ἄλις* as marked in the text.

Ch. 26: 180. 19 ἀλλὰ ἄλις. The text of A is exactly as printed in the app. crit.; there is no sign of *ἄλλοις* having been corrected as Sch. reports. There is therefore no MSS. support for Cor.'s emendation. The close is abrupt, and even if we wrote *ἀλλὰ ἄλις τούτων* the remark would have little point. Is it possible that p. **186. 3** once followed directly? There too M. is occupied with the distinction between the formal and the material, as he was in ch. 25.

Ch. 27: 180. 21 ἐπὶ τὰ ψυχάρια αὐτῶν, cf. pp. **178. 19**, **184. 18**. That the dim. is not depreciatory is shown by its equivalence to *τὰ ἡγ.* in those two passages, by the use of *αὐτὸ τὸ ψ.* as almost a synonym of *ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς* at p. **246. 11**, and by the opposition of *τὸ ψ. σου* to *τὸ ἔλυτρον* p. **172. 23**.

180. 22 οὐ δεῖ σε σπᾶσθαι, cf. pp. **38. 3**, **166. 11**.

εὐνοεῖν, cf. *εὐμενῆ τοῖς ψεύσταις καὶ ἀδίκοις διαβιοῦν* p. **118. 2**.

180. 23 φύσει γὰρ φίλοι, cf. *πρὸς τὸν φύσει συγγενῆ καὶ φίλον* p. **220.**

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6; sim. pp. **20.** 5, **128.** 4; *πάντα δὲ φίλων μεστά, πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν, εἶτα καὶ ἀνθρώπων φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾠκειωμένων* Epict. iii. 24. 11.

180. 24 **βοηθοῦσι,** cf. *συνεργοῦσιν* p. **178.** 2, sim. p. **144.** 16.

δι' ὀνείρων, διὰ μαντειῶν, cf. *δι' ὀνειράτων βοηθήματα,* of his own experience, p. **18.** 18; *προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων,* of Apollo, Pl. *Ap.* 33c, cf. for dreams Id. *Cri.* 44a, *Phd.* 60e. Xen. says that Socr. taught men, in regard to what was hidden from their understanding, *διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ σημαίνειν Mem.* i. 1. 9, cf. Id. *Cyr.* viii. 7. 3, *Anab.* iii. 1. 11. Galen paid heed to the guidance of the gods in dreams, and says of the materialist school of the physician Asclepiades: *καταφρονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀνειράτων καὶ τῶν οἰωνῶν* ii. 29. The lengths to which some Stoics went may be seen in Cic. *Div.*

πρὸς ταῦτα μέντοι: a sim. reservation is made at p. **178.** 2. The reason is that M. himself believes that prayer should be for *spiritual,* not temporal, blessings, p. **186.** 15 sq., and he remembers no doubt the philosophical and popular recognition of the truth that men do not know what it is good to ask for, and that the answers to their requests often prove their destruction.

180. 24–5 **πρὸς ἃ ἐκεῖνοι διαφέρονται,** Gat. paraphrases by 'cum animi solicitudine anxia et distractione feruntur', comparing *amore differri, cupidine differri,* in Plautus. M. thus uses the verb at pp. **74.** 20, **186.** 21, **220.** 13, and *διαφορά* at pp. **114.** 3, **246.** 20. The transition of sense already appears in *οὐ διαφέρομαι,* 'it does not matter to me', 'I am not concerned' Dem. ix. 8, cf. *μὴ διαφέρου πότερον* p. **96.** 24, the Stoic expression *ἀδιάφορον,* and the use of *ἀδιαφορεῖν* p. **222.** 18; sim. *περὶ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς διαφέρεται, τῶν ὀστρακίων δ' οὐ πεφρόντικεν* Epict. iv. 7. 5.

Ch. 28: 180. 26 **Ταὐτά ἐστι τὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐγκύκλια:** for *ταὐτά* Gat. cf. p. **178.** 9 n. By *ἐγκύκλια* he clearly intends the regular sequence of events in the Universe, cf. *πάντα ἐξ ἀιδίου ὁμοειδῆ καὶ ἀνακυκλούμενα* p. **30.** 10. The met. appears to be derived from the uniformity of the rotation of the stellar hemisphere, the 'certus siderum cursus' Plin. *Ep.* iii. 1. 2. The word was commonly used for the 'daily round' of duty assigned to the slaves in a great household, *πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους* Arist. *Pol.*

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1263ª20. Gat. compares this usage, and infers that M. desires to cheapen experience, to depreciate life's sameness. This is surely an error, for he goes on to speak of *ἡ τοῦ ὅλου διάνοια*, p. **182.** 1, as manifested in this uniformity. So Epict., using a slightly different met., says: *ἡ οὐσία ἐξ ἧς δεδημιούργηται* (sc. *ὁ κόσμος*) *μία, καὶ ἀνάγκη περίοδόν τινα εἶναι . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν διαλύεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐπιγίνεσθαι* iii. 24. 10.

ἄνω κάτω, cf. *ἄνω, κάτω, κύκλῳ* p. **104.** 18 n.

ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνα. We are so much used to this phrase to translate certain Hebr. expressions that we are liable to assume the same meaning in M. He may imply the periodic return of the Universe to fiery formlessness, p. **86.** 1; in that case he means 'from one age to its successor'. More probably he is thinking of the eternity of the Universe on either side of the present moment, as when he says: *ὀπίσω τὸ ἀχανὲς τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ τὸ πρόσω ἄλλο ἄπειρον* p. **72.** 21.

182. 1 **ἤτοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον ὁρμᾷ:** a comparison of this passage with pp. **114.** 19, **240.** 23 suggests that M. is pondering (i) the general problem, which divided his school from the Epicureans, which he expresses by the disjunction *εἴτε θεός, εἴτε τὸ εἱκῇ*, cf. *ἤτοι πρόνοια ἢ ἄτομοι* p. **52.** 4; (ii) the alternative exposition of the relation of Providence to the individual, which the Stoics offered, *ἀπαράβατος τάξις ἢ πρόνοια ἱλάσιμος* p. **240.** 23. This alternative is here expressed by the *ἤτοι . . . ἤ* clauses with which he begins, l. 1.

As the MSS. tradition stands, this alternative is followed by *καὶ τί ἐν τίνι τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄτομοι ἢ ἀμερῆ*. This, even if corrected to *τί ἐντείνῃ . . .*, cf. p. **206.** 18, makes no sense. We should expect a third clause, say *ἢ εἱκῇ γίνεται πάντα*, to express the view:

> nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
> ordine se suo quaeque sagaci mente locarunt Lucr. i. 1021.

Then *καὶ τί ἐντείνῃ;* would be parallel with *τί οὖν ταράσσῃ;* p. **186.** 11.

Mr. Marchant suggested that the clue lies in *τὸ δὲ ὅλον*, which has been traditionally interpreted adverbially (*omnino* Xyl., *ad summam* Cas., *denique* Gat.), but may here well stand for the Whole, cf. *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου*, in a parallel passage, p. **186.** 10. I have

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therefore supposed that the text is disordered, and that, after putting the Stoic alternative hypothesis, M. returns to the general problem of the nature of the Whole, saying: 'Why are you anxious? Whether the Whole be divine, all is well (because *πάντα σοι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πάρεστι* p. **192.** 3), or, if all be casually determined, you are not and must not be a random agent.'

182. 4 **ἄτομοι ἢ ἀμερῆ,** with the MSS. order, Dr. Rendall emends to *ἄτομοι ἢ ἡ εἱμαρμένη*, making 'atoms or fatal destiny' equivalent to *ἢ θεὸς ἢ τὸ εἰκῇ*. But *ἡ εἱμ.* is only one of the Stoic alternatives p. **240.** 23, i.e. the hypothesis of an inevitable series caused by *ὁρμῇ τινι ἀρχαίᾳ* p. **172.** 2, and is therefore inappropriate here. Although M. nowhere else uses *ἀμερῆ* as an equivalent to or an alternative for *ἄτομοι*, there is no objection to this as a way of referring to the Epicurean hypothesis. Philo uses the expression: *τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἐπειδὰν μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ λεγομένων ἀμερῶν διεξέλθῃ* i. 491, seemingly identifying *ἄτομος* and *ἀμερές*. Epicurus held that the 'atom', though physically indivisible, consisted of parts which themselves had extension only but no parts: *ἔτι τε τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ πέρατα δεῖ νομίζειν* D.L. x. 59. M. may then refer quite correctly to what, in Epicurus, may be made intelligible to ourselves by the distinction between molecules and atoms.

μὴ καὶ σὺ εἰκῇ. The practical reply to the atomic doctrine of chance is by recourse to the consciousness of moral freedom: *ἐμοὶ μὲν ἔξεστι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ βουλεύεσθαι* p. **116.** 4. The Stoics pointed out that the practice of the Epicureans was inconsistent with their theory. M. often teaches that to act without purpose is to neglect the rule of reason, p. **32.** 8.

182. 5 **Ἤδη πάντας ἡμᾶς γῆ καλύψει.** Here A begins a new aphorism to which some critics append the first sentence of ch. 29; that, however, although related in thought to what precedes, appears to be a beginning in form, not a close. For *καλύψει* cf. p. **120.** 11.

182. 7 **ἐπικυματώσεις,** a picturesque image, cf. that of the *sands* p. **132.** 2.

Ch. 29: 182. 9 **ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία.** At p. **126.** 16, *ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία* is compared to or identified with *χειμάρρους*, so that Leop.,

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following Reiske, substitutes *οὐσία* here for *αἰτία*. There is, I think, no parallel to the expression here, which treats the principle of reality as itself a torrent. There appears also to be some omission or dislocation after *φέρει*, the transition to what follows is in the MSS. certainly hard to follow.

182. 10 **δ νῦν ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ**, i.e. *τὸ ἐν χερσὶ πράσσειν* p. **22.** 18. Possibly the transition to the pressing immediacy of duty is suggested by *ἤδη πάντας* l. 5.

182. 10–11 **μὴ περιβλέπου**, cf. *ἔργῳ δείκνυε κἂν μηδεὶς αἰσθάνηται* Epict. iii. 24. 118; 'qui virtutem suam publicari vult non virtuti laborat sed gloriae' Sen. *Ep.* 113. 32; *εἰκός ἐστι τὸν φιλόσοφον, συνόντα διὰ τῶν πράξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ χρώμενον, αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σιωπῇ μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ἀκροατῶν μηδὲν δεόμενον* Plu. *Quomodo*, 80e.

182. 11 **τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν.** M. may be thinking of the ideal ruler in Pl. *R.* 502a, but probably the saying was already proverbial.

182. 12 **ἀρκοῦ**: *ἀρκεσθήσῃ γε καὶ μικρῷ τινι . . . ἐπιδοῦναι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον* Galen, v. 20; *ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν* Pl. *Prt.* 328a.

182. 13 **ὡς οὐ μικρόν.** In view of the parallel in Galen, and the fact that little words are more often dropped than inserted by the copyists, I have preferred P's reading. The reading of A may, however, be thought to be more in character, with its ironical *litotes*.

ὡς εὐτελῆ. I have ventured to remove this sentence from its place in the MSS., where it is certainly more abrupt, to this point, where it leads naturally to *δόγμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τίς μεταβαλεῖ;*

182. 14 **μυξῶν μεστά**, emphasizing the childlike weakness of these political theorists, as if he recalled Thrasymachus' taunt: *ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον* Pl. *R.* 343a. The Cynic, says Epict., must be sharp-witted, *εἰ δὲ μή, μύξα γίνεται, ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν* iii. 22. 90, cf. *εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἡμῖν συνέρχῃ . . . ὅλος ὢν πτύσμα καὶ μύξα* iv. 11. 32.

182. 15 **δογμάτων μεταβολῆς**: the change symbolized by Pl. as a conversion of the soul's vision to the light, to be achieved by the

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higher education, cf. *ἀλλὰ δή, ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον*; *R.* 502b.

182. 16 **δουλεία στενόντων**, the subjects lament, and their obedience is a pretence, because the conquerors impose their will by force, not by reason. The word *enslavement* leads him to a favourite reflection, that famous conquerors were themselves slaves, *δουλεία πόσων* p. **148.** 2.

182. 16–17 **ὕπαγε νῦν**: cf. *ὕπαγε, ἄλλον πεῖθε* Epict. iii. 23. 12; *καὶ ὕπαγε, πρῶτον διαλλάγηθι St. Matt.* 5. 24. This, like other such colloquialisms, becomes old-fashioned very soon in literature, as similar expressions have in our own tongue.

182. 17 **καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον**: coupled again with Philip, p. **204.** 24. The judgement of antiquity upon the latter is illustrated by: *ἐγκρατείας δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας καὶ πραότητος . . . οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει Φ. οὔτε μιμήσει μετέσχεν* Plu. *Pelop.* 26; *στρατηγὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἄν τις φρονῶν ὀρθὰ καλέσειεν αὐτόν, ὅς γε . . . πίστιν τε ἠτίμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων* Paus. viii. 7. 5.

τὸν Φαληρέα: suspiciously like an intrinsic gloss, cf. p. **154.** 13. Certainly we do not expect the name of the last and most learned of the Attic orators. Much more to the point would be Demetrius Poliorcetes; *ὁ μὲν γὰρ* (sc. *Ζεὺς*) *Πολιεὺς καὶ Πολιοῦχος, ὁ δὲ Πολιορκητὴς ἐπίκλησιν ἔσχεν* Plu. *Demetr.* 42.

182. 18 **ἔψομαι**, cf. *ἕπεσθαι τῷ διορθοῦντι* p. **152.** 1; the correction makes a good parallel to *μιμεῖσθαι* l. 20. The MSS. reading *ὄψονται* would according to M.'s usage mean 'let *them* look to it'.

182. 19 **ἐτραγῴδησαν**, the word connotes *pretence*, because the play is unreal, and the actor's part assumed, and *pretentiousness*, because tragedy uses high-flown diction. Thus *τραγῳδεῖν* is the contrary of *ἀληθεύειν*, e.g. those are said *τραγῳδεῖν ὀνόματα* who are *τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα πλάττοντες* Pl. *Crat.* 414d, and Galen hesitates to describe the wonderful structure of a joint lest he should seem *τραγῳδεῖν* not *ἀληθεύειν*, iv. 286. Apul. narrating an actor's sudden death opposes *veram fabulam*, his true story, to *fictum argumentum*, the part he meant to play, *Flor.* iii. 66. M. then intends the duplicity and vainglory of the despot to be despised when

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matched against *τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ αἰδῆμον* of Nature's schooling, cf. 'omnium istorum personata felicitas est: contemnes illos si despoliaveris' Sen. *Ep.* 80. 8. Similarly Julian says of Julius Caesar's liberality: *πολλὴν μὲν ὑποκρινάμενος ὥσπερ ἐν δράματι καὶ σκηνῇ φιλανθρωπίαν* p. 332a.

182. 20 **μιμεῖσθαι,** to mimic them would be to act a part untrue to myself; my part is to be *Ἀντωνίνου μαθητής* p. **108.** 23, cf. ib. 20, and *φιλοσοφία μόνα, ἃ θέλει ἡ φύσις σου, θέλει,* with the virtues enumerated here, p. **82.** 8; *φαίδρυνον σεαυτὸν ἁπλότητι καὶ αἰδοῖ* p. **130.** 15.

Ch. 30: 182. 22 **" Ἄνωθεν ἐπιθεωρεῖν",** this appears to be a citation, cf. pp. **134.** 21, **244.** 24.

184. 1 **τάχιστα ψέξουσι,** cf. p. **212.** 1.

Ch. 31: 184. 3 **Ἀταραξία μὲν περὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας,** cf. *εὐαρεστικὴ πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς αἰτίαν συμβαῖνον* p. **174.** 15–16 n. The quotation from Epicurus illustrates the fact that this calm of mind was his ideal too, p. **188.** 6. M. says that *τὸ ἡγ.* is *ἀτάραχον καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον, ἐὰν μὴ ἑαυτὸ ταράσσῃ καὶ ἐμποδίζῃ* p. **126.** 3.

184. 5 **ὁρμὴ καὶ πρᾶξις καταλήγουσα,** cf. *ἐν τῇ δικαϊκῇ διαθέσει καὶ πράξει ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀπολήγειν* p. **96.** 5 n. It is odd to say 'act terminating in neighbourly conduct', so that perhaps M. actually wrote *ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις, impulse* is followed by *desire* and that terminates in action. Cf. pp. **148.** 16, **154.** 28, **174.** 17.

Ch. 32: 184. 7 **Πολλὰ περισσὰ περιελεῖν,** he is recurring to Democritus' maxim, p. **60.** 19, and his own corollary: *δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον πράξεις τὰς μὴ ἀναγκαίας περιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαντασίας* p. **62.** 1, for *φαντασίαι* as he so often has said are subject to and tested by *ἡ ὑπόληψις.*

184. 8 **εὐρυχωρίαν,** cf. *ὁρᾷς ὅτι σὺ σαυτῷ στενοχωρίαν παρέχεις . . . τουτέστι τὰ δόγματα ἡμᾶς θλίβει καὶ στενοχωρεῖ* Epict. i. 25. 26. As he goes on to speak of the kingdom of thought which is the *κόσμος,* he probably runs back in mind to Alexander, p. **182.** 17, of whom the satirist says: 'aestuat infelix angusto limite mundi' Juv. x. 169.

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184. 9 **τὸν ὅλον κόσμον . . . τὸν ⟨ἀ⟩ίδιον αἰῶνα,** cf. *περιέρχεται τὸν ὅλον κ. . . . καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐκτείνεται* (sc. *ἡ λογικὴ ψ.*) p. **214.** 11.

184. 12 **ἀχανές,** cf. *τὸ χάος τοῦ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ἀπείρου αἰῶνος* p. **52.** 10, sim. p. **72.** 21.

Ch. 33: 184. 15–16 **ὁ ἐσχατόγηρως . . . τῷ προώρῳ,** cf. *τί διαφέρει ὁ τριήμερος τοῦ τριγερηνίου;* p. **72.** 22.

Ch. 34: 184. 17 **Τίνα τὰ ἡγεμονικά,** a repetition of p. **180.** 21, but without the charitable close. M. makes *τὰ ἡγ.* equivalent to *τὰ ψυχάρια,* but without any derogatory implication, see p. **180.** 21 n. The contempt is contained in the suggestion of what their minds are if seen *γυμνά,* i.e. *τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων,* as God sees them, p. **236.** 8.

184. 19 **ὅση οἴησις,** the word combines the senses of superficial judgement and of the conceit of ignorance. A saying: *τήν τε οἴησιν ἱερὰν νόσον* is ascribed to Heraclit. 46 D., 132 B., and to Epicurus, *Fr.* 224 Us.

Ch. 35: 184. 20 **Ἡ ἀποβολή,** the text of this ch. is uncertain, and different views have been taken of the exact argument maintained. I understand the sequence to be: (*a*) Nature rejoices in change, whereby good ensues; (*b*) change and consequent loss have continued from eternity and will continue the same; (*c*) why, then, do you, when you suffer loss, find evil instead of good everywhere?

Critics who excise *καλῶς* in l. 21, or alter that word to *καθῶς* (Sch.) appear to destroy the force of *πάντα κακῶς ἔσται* l. 23, and to make the reasoning nugatory.

184. 21 **καλῶς γίνεται,** cf. *πάντα καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως διατάξαντες οἱ θεοί* p. **238.** 14, to be contrasted with the pessimism of *οὐδεμία ἄρα δύναμις ἐν τοσούτοις θεοῖς* l. 24.

Arist., reasoning with critics who, like Momus, think that Nature has failed in the creation of man, says: *ἀλλ' οἱ λέγοντες ὡς συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς ὁ ἄ., ἀλλὰ χείριστα τῶν ζῴων . . . οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν P. An.* 687ª23.

184. 23 **πάντα ⟨ἀεὶ κακῶς⟩ [δ] καὶ πάντα ἀεὶ κακῶς:** this is Reiske's correction with the addition of the first *ἀεί,* which helps

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to explain A's omission of *καὶ πάντα*, and echoes *ἐξ αἰῶνος . . . ἐγίνετο*.

Gat. proposed, for *ὃ καί, καὶ ὅτι πάντα*, construing *κακῶς* with both verbs.

184. 24 **ἐν τοσούτοις θεοῖς**, at first sounds like a criticism of the Roman Pantheon. The irony is, however, at the expense of himself or of an imaginary disputant. M. was a convinced polytheist, see pp. **78**. 24, **152**. 13, **246**. 25, and phrases like *dis faventibus, dis iuvantibus* would often be on his lips.

ἐξευρέθη ποτέ: cf. *εὑρέθη* p. **176**. 9 n. The word includes the sense *procuring, finding a* helper: *ἧς σε προστάτην | σωτῆρά τ', ὦναξ, μοῦνον ἐξευρίσκομεν* Soph. *O.T.* 303.

184. 25 **κατακέκριται**, the figure of speech is common to many languages, and referred perhaps originally to malevolent powers. It is used colloquially in *ἐπεί πως κατεκρίθην πώγωνα ἔχειν πολιὸν καὶ τρίβωνα* Epict. iii. 1. 24. M. used the active voice at p. **182**. 19, which is some evidence of continuity of composition.

Ch. 36: **184**. 27–8 **ὕδωρ . . . γράσος**: cf. *γράσος πᾶν τοῦτο* p. **160**. 2. This dwelling upon the proximate constituents of the underlying matter is an exercise in that method of disillusionment which he recommends at p. **44**. 25, and elsewhere.

184. 28 **ἢ πάλιν**: passing to admired and coveted possessions which are themselves the outcome of decay and death.

πῶροι γῆς, deposits of lime in the veins of the earth; *πῶρος* is a name for *calculus* in the joints, Arist. *H. An.* 521^{a}21, and for stalactites, id. *Mete.* 388^{b}26.

184. 29 **τριχία ἡ ἐσθὴς καὶ αἷμα ἡ πορφύρα**, these are combined in *τριχία προβατίου αἱματίῳ κόγχης* δεδευμένα p. **100**. 11.

186. 1 **τὸ πνευματικόν**, not to be corrected to *τὸ πνευμάτιον*. In the first sentence he regarded *τὸ γεῶδες* and *τὸ ὑγρὸν* as aspects of *ὕλη*, cf. p. **54**. 6, and he passes to what might be thought less material, the vital spirit, p. **54**. 7; this also is another form of transitory matter, it is *μεταβάλλον*, as was said at p. **20**. 17, and, more generally, at p. **58**. 24. For Gat.'s interpretation, 'quod formae rationem obtinet', see *πνεύματα* p. **248**. 13 n.

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Ch. 37: 186. 3 **γογγυσμοῦ καὶ πιθηκισμοῦ**, cf. *ἵνα μὴ γογγύζων ἀποθάνῃς* p. **22.** 11, and *ὁ οἰμώζων ἐπὶ τοῦ κλινιδίου*, compared with the sacrificial pig, p. **206.** 1. The meaning of *πιθηκισμοῦ* is perhaps *dissembling*, cf. *ὑποκρίνῃ* l. 12. M. may, however, mean that he is living like an ape, the mockery of a man, *πίθηκος* p. **56.** 17.

186. 4 **τί σε ἐξίστησι;** sc. *σεαυτοῦ* or *τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ*, as at *μὴ ἐξίστασο τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ* p. **98.** 26.

Ch. 38: 186. 8 **ἐκεῖ**, opp. to *ἐνταῦθα*, i.e. of your own doing, as at p. **190.** 2.

Ch. 39: 186. 9 **ἀπὸ μιᾶς πηγῆς νοερᾶς**, cf. *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοιαύτης καὶ πηγῆς ῥέον*, i.e. from a source in reason, p. **66.** 4.

186. 12 **τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ λέγειν.** I have substituted for *λέγεις* the inf. imp. which M. uses in a similar context: *ἐπανερωτᾶν ἑαυτόν . . . τί μοί ἐστι νῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ;* p. **84.** 6.

186. 13 **συναγελάζῃ, βόσκῃ;** cf. *οὔτε τὸ συναγελάζεσθαι οὔτε τὸ τρέφεσθαι* p. **102.** 22, only substituting for the second verb what is suggested there by *τὰ βοσκήματα* l. 21. Galen says that the materialist school of medicine taught that men are led by their passions like mere brutes: *ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄγεσθαι παθῶν ἡμᾶς καθάπερ βοσκήματα* ii. 29, cf. Neil's note on *οὓς ἐγὼ βόσκω* Aristoph. *Eq.* 256.

Ch. 40: 186. 15 **τί εὔχῃ;** cf. *τίς ἂν οὖν ἔτι προσκυνήσειε θεόν, μηδὲν . . . συλλαμβανόμενον* (v.l. *συμβαλλόμενον*); Nemes. *Nat. Hom.* ch. 42, p. 337; *εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, οὐκ ἔστιν εὐσέβεια* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 123. See p. **114.** 26 n.

186. 16 **τὸ μήτε φοβεῖσθαι**, three of the four principal *πάθη* are enumerated as at p. **124.** 25, and examples of two of them are given below at ll. 24–6.

186. 17 **τὸ μὴ παρεῖναί τι**, Dio Chrys. lecturing *περὶ λύπης* speaks of *προσευχόμενον τοῖς θεοῖς ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο μηδὲ τοῦτο συμβῇ* xvi. 7, p. 461.

186. 19–20 **ἐπ' ἐμοὶ αὐτὰ οἱ θεοὶ ἐποίησαν**, the Stoic disciple objects that prayer is superfluous on M.'s own showing: *ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο* p. **26.** 11. Plu. turns the same dogma against the Stoics, urging that the gods are believed by them to bestow 'indifferent' blessings, but that they hold that *τὸ καλὸν αὐθαίρετόν ἐστι De St. rep.* 1048d.

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186. 23 συλλαμβάνουσιν, the usual verb for the assistance of the gods, *αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι* Thuc. ii. 54. 4. It is employed here with an emphasis on the preposition. He moralizes the familiar proverb: *τῷ γὰρ πονοῦντι καὶ θεὸς ξυλλαμβάνει* Eur. *Fr.* 432 N.[2]

Epict. says that a man cannot cast out *λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν . . . εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα* ii. 16. 46.

186. 23–4 οὗτος εὔχεται. M. does not urge that prayer should be for blessings in general, the kind of boon being left to the gods to decide. This was Socr.'s advice and practice, and the injunction is repeated by Hor., Pers., and Seneca. M. makes prayer resemble ordinary religious usage by suggesting request for help in specific temptations.

186. 25 πῶς στερηθῶ ἐκείνου, a prayer for the death of one who stands between him and the succession to property. The instance is suggested by the use of the illustration to condemn selfish prayers made to the god out of the hearing of other worshippers:

> illa sibi introrsum et sub lingua murmurat: 'O si
> ebulliat patruus, praeclarum funus!' Per. s. ii. 9,

cf. 'alius donum promittit si propinquum divitem extulerit' Petron. *Sat.* 88.

188. 1 πῶς μὴ φοβηθῶ ἀποβαλεῖν. Pl. anticipates this Stoical resignation: *ἥκιστα ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι υἱός . . . ἥκιστα ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν ὡς πρᾳότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτῃ συμφορὰ καταλάβῃ R.* 387e.

Ch. 41: 188. 3 ἐν τῇ νόσῳ: cf. Epicurus' letter, on the eve of death: *στραγγουρικά τε παρηκολούθει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη . . . ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ* D.L. x. 22; see Us. *Epicur.* pp. 139–40, 143–4; Cic. *Fin.* ii. 98.

188. 5 τὰ προηγούμενα φυσιολογῶν, *τὰ π.* are *τὰ κυριώτατα*: cf. D.L. x. 35.

φ. and *φυσιολογία* occur frequently in Epicurus, they stand for 'the science of *φύσεις*, of the underlying structure and character of things', Dr. Bailey, *Epicurus*, cf. D.L. x. 78.

188. 6 πρὸς αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὤν: cf. *πρὸς μόνῳ τούτῳ ἐστί, πῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ χώραν ἐκπληρώσῃ* Epict. iii. 24. 95, which supports Ménage's emendation.

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188. 7 **ἀταρακτεῖ:** see *ἀταραξία* p. **184.** 3. For Epicurus' usage, cf. *ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων* D.L. x. 82; *τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος* id. 128.

188. 8 **καταφρυάττεσθαι:** cf. *καταφρυαττόμενον* p. **122.** 2 n.; cf. *τῆς ὀφρύος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ δουλικοῦ φρυάγματος ἀνασχόμενον* Epict. iv. 1. 150, *τί οὖν κολακεύεις τὸν ἰατρόν; . . . τί παρέχεις αὐτῷ ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἐπᾶραι ὀφρύν;* id. iii. 10. 15.

188. 12 **⟨ἀ⟩φυσιολόγῳ:** the correction seems to be expedient. The word, coupled with *ἰδιώτῃ*, is opp. to *φυσιολογῶν* l. 5; cf. *ἀφυσιολογήτως*, Gat.'s conjecture at p. **198.** 11.

188. 13 **πρὸς μόνῳ . . . εἶναι,** an injunction summing up the lesson set by Epicurus. He repeats the form of words used in l. 6; cf. *χρῶμαι αὐτῇ* (sc. *τῇ διανοίᾳ*) *πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ὡς ὀργάνῳ παρὰ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φ. δοθέντι* p. **122.** 10.

Ch. 42: 188. 15 **ἀναισχυντίᾳ,** a word used, like *impudicitia*, of breach of decency and social propriety, e.g. of gross ill manners, where Pl. contrasts *αἰδὼς καὶ αἰσχύνη*, *Lg.* 671c; of unnatural love, id. *Smp.* 192a; of adultery, Epict. ii. 20. 35. Treachery and ingratitude, p. **190.** 8, similarly break the social bond.

188. 18 **οὕς ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ εἶναι:** cf. p. **88.** 3, and 'fert humana natura insidiosos animos, fert ingratos, fert cupidos, fert impios' Sen. *De Ira*, ii. 31. 5. M. says, p. **114.** 10, that such evil is necessary that good may come, and implies the same at ll. 22–4.

188. 21 **εὐμενέστερος ἔσῃ:** cf. *εὐμενῆ τοῖς ψεύσταις καὶ ἀδίκοις* p. **118.** 2, and p. **178.** 1, where *ἡ εὐμένεια* is said to be a divine attribute. M. also justifies this *εὐμένεια* and *πραότης* to individuals because they act from ignorance, pp. **140.** 17, **224.** 15.

§ 2: 188. 23 **ἔδωκε γὰρ ὡς ἀντιφάρμακον:** cf. *ἡ εὐμένειά σοι δέδοται* p. **178.** 1.

188. 25 **μεταδιδάσκειν τὸν πεπλανημένον,** by showing him the true end and the road he has missed p. **106.** 13. This correction is to be done *πρᾴως* and *εὐσχολῶν* p. **226.** 14, and with the recognition that you are not injured: *οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡγ. σου χεῖρον ἐποίησεν* p. **128.** 6, sim. p. **226.** 16.

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190. 2 ἐνταῦθα, i.e. your understanding, as *ἐκεῖ* means in *his* p. **186.** 8.

§ 3: 190. 3 τί δαὶ κακὸν ἢ ξένον: *κακόν* resumes what he said at l. 2, so that Kron.'s *καινόν* is unnecessary although M. said *οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἢ ξένον* in the same connexion at p. **150.** 23.

§ 4: 190. 9 εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφου. Epict. uses the act. voice: *μέμνησο ἐπιστρέφων ἐπὶ σ. ζητεῖν Ench.* 10. For the Neoplatonic 'introversion' see Prof. E. R. Dodds on Procl. *Inst.* 15–17.

190. 10 ἐπίστευσας ὅτι τὴν πίστιν, 'you had faith that a man of that disposition would keep faith', thus Dr. Rendall preserves the play on words. For the origin of misanthropy in disillusionment, against which M. warns us here, see *ἡγήσασθαι . . . πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον* Pl. *Phd.* 89d.

190. 11 καταληκτικῶς: see *καταλήγει* p. **58.** 11, and the adv. p. **124.** 14. In the latter passage M. shows that the *καρπός* is *εὐφροσύνη*, and that is defined as *ποιεῖν τὰ ἴδια* p. **154.** 19, cf. below, l. 17.

190. 13 ἄνθρωπε: Leop. proposed this correction and Sch. approved it, but neither printed it. M. employs *εὖ ποιεῖν* abs. at pp. **78.** 7, **144.** 22. The use of the vocative is common in Epict.; cf. p. **96.** 14.

190. 14–15 μισθὸν ζητεῖς; cf. 'nec est dubium quin is, qui liberalis benignusve dicitur, officium non fructum sequatur' Cic. *Lg.* i. 48.

190. 17 ἀπέχει τὸ ἴδιον: cf. *ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπέχει τὰ ἴδια* p. **72.** 11, sim. pp. **156.** 15, **214.** 11. The verb means *satis habere, weghaben*, see *ἀπέχοντα τῇ φύσει τὸ μέτριον καὶ πεπληρωμένον* Plu. *Praecepta san. tuend.* 124e, where Wytt. cites many parallels, e.g. *τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει καὶ πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ εἰκέναι* Epict. iii. 24. 17; *ἀπέχω δὲ πάντα καὶ περισσεύω· πεπλήρωμαι* St. Paul, *Phil.* 4. 18.

BOOK X

Ch. 1: 190. 21 Ἔσῃ ποτὲ ἄρα, ὦ ψυχή: cf. pp. **66.** 13, **198.** 15, where the address to himself is manifest, and clearly not intended as anything but self-colloquy. The form is familiar in poetry, but rare in prose. It becomes the model to later writers.

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Examples of the form are *τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη* Od. xx. 18; *μή, φίλα ψ.* Pind. *P.* 3. 61, *φίλον ἦτορ* id. *O.* 1. 4; *θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε* Archil. *Fr.* 66, Bergk, cited by Mr. Page at Eur. *Med.* 1056. The Psalmists freely employ it: *ἐπίστρεψον ψ. μου εἰς τὴν ἀνάπαυσίν σου Ps.* 114 (116). 7, cf. 42 (43). 5. Cf. *καὶ ἐρῶ τῇ ψυχῇ μου· ψυχή, ἔχεις κ.τ.λ., St. Luke,* 12. 19. In Latin we have Hadrian's verses, beginning: 'Animula vagula, blandula, | hospes comesque corporis' *Fr. P.R.* vi. p. 373, *Oxford Book of Latin Verse,* No. 287.

ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἁπλῆ καὶ μία καὶ γυμνή: cf. *τήρησον οὖν σεαυτὸν ἁπλοῦν, ἀγαθόν, ἀκέραιον* p. **108.** 17. M. returns to the ideal of self-consistency at p. **230.** 7.

γυμνή, i.e. stripped of all hindrances to contact and communion with the divine, of all *τὰ προσηρτημένα ἐκ προσπαθείας* p. **236.** 25. God beholds *τὰ ἡγ. γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν . . . καθαρμάτων* ib. 8. The image is derived from Pl.: *ἡ ψ. γυμνὴ τοῦ σώματος Crat.* 403b, and perhaps also from his simile of the last cloak of the soul, see *ἐξεδύσατο* p. **198.** 25 n.

190. 22 φανερωτέρα τοῦ περικειμένου σοι σώματος, more *visible* but also *purer*, like an incandescent luminary, cf. *ἡ καθαρότης καὶ ἡ γυμνότης*, of the stars p. **232.** 7, and *σφαῖρα ψυχῆς . . . φωτὶ λάμπηται* p. **220.** 20. Eur. associates *φανερώτατον ἀστέρ'* with *καθαρὰν φρένα Hipp.* 1122. So Epict. has: *τὸ ἡγ. αὐτοῦ δεῖ καθαρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἡλίου* iii. 22. 93. Julian makes M.'s transfigured body: *διαυγέστατον καὶ διαφανέστατον ὥσπερ αὐτό, οἶμαι, τὸ καθαρώτατον . . . φῶς Caes.* 317d.

The body is a covering, a shell or cloak, pp. **144.** 3, **236.** 1 and 20, like *τὸ ὕφασμα* of Pl.'s notable image, which is said by Burnet to be derived from Orphism, *Phd.* 87b, Emped. *Fr.* 126; cf. 'ossa . . . et cetera quibus involuti sumus' Sen. *Ad Marc.* 24. 5, sim. *Ep.* 92. 13.

190. 23–4 πλήρης καὶ ἀνενδεής: the former adj. is used of life's object *fully* attained, p. **214.** 10, where M.'s meaning here is explained. The word originally expressed *satisfaction* of the body or the senses, cf. *πλήρη δ' ἔχοντι θυμὸν ὧν χρήζοις* Soph. *O.C.* 778; vita, et plena et conferta voluptatibus Cic. *Sest.* 23, and the Hebrew word translated *χορτασθήσομαι* in *Ps.* 16 (17). 15. Cf. M.'s image from life's banquet, *κορεσθέντα*, p. **172.** 8 n.

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This *αὐτάρκεια*, pp. **46.** 7, **104.** 10, is expressed by *ἀνενδεῆ* p. **32.** 20, *ἀπροσδεές* p. **40.** 18, p. **214.** 10.

190. 24 οὐδὲν ἐπιποθοῦσα: cf. *τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι* Epict. iii. 24. 17. We may compare St. Paul's *ἐν οἷς εἰμι, αὐτάρκης εἶναι Phil.* 4. 11.

190. 26 ἐπὶ μακρότερον ἀπολαύσεις: the repetition of *ἀπολ.* is awkward, esp. if it is the verb, as Gat. assumes, cf. p. **198.** 15, and not, as in l. 25, the subst. M. does not elsewhere employ *ἀπολ.* absolutely, so that the subst. may be repeated for emphasis, and *ἔσονται* understood. To judge from his *Index*, Sch. so interpreted it.

192. 1 εὐκαιρίας. As this word is appropriately used with all three substantives, it is preferable to Cor.'s *εὐκρασίας*, which would govern *ἀέρων* only. For the meaning cf. *ἀλλὰ μέγιστον ὁ περιέχων ἀὴρ πρὸς εὐκ. ὑδάτων* Theophr. *Caus. Pl.* iii. 23. 4.

192. 1–2 ἀρκεσθήσῃ . . . ἡσθήσῃ. In spite of *ἀπολαύσεις* above, *ἡσθήσῃ* is an unnatural verb to be used by M., except ironically. A's *ἀρεστήσῃ* may represent an original *ἀρέσῃ* or even the unrecorded form *ἀρεσθήσῃ*. For the collocation of the two verbs compare: *ἀρεσκομένου μὲν τοῖς . . . ἀπονεμομένοις, ἀρκουμένου δὲ . . . διαθέσει εὐμενεῖ* p. **62.** 5.

192. 3 πάντα σοι . . . πάρεστι. Clearly there is some dislocation. A is again defective, but seems to have had before him a reading close to that of P. Cor. suggested: *πάντα σοι πάρεστι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, πάντα σοι εὖ ἔχει καὶ εὖ ἕξει*, but, though following his lead, I have kept P's order, and inserted *καὶ* before the second *πάντα*. The app. crit. reproduces two lines of P's text, as printed. They look *prima facie* like an error in setting up, and I have adopted the suggestion of a compositor in my choice of correction.

192. 4 ὅσα φίλον αὐτοῖς, sc. *διδόναι*.

192. 5 τοῦ τελείου ζῴου: cf. *ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον, μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψ. μίαν ἐπέχον* p. **66.** 27. Although Chrysippus said: *τέλεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν* Plu. *De St. rep.* 1054f, M. seems to have been writing with a passage of Pl. in mind: *ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ, διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς*

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γεγονὼς ἔστιν καὶ ἔτ' ἔσται Ti. 31b. This 'perfect living creature' is for Pl. the idea of which the Universe is the copy. M. intends by it the Universe itself, what Pl. terms: *ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν* 30b.

192. 6 συνέχοντος. The supreme god is *ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι* Xen. *M.* iv. 3. 13, cf. *ἐγκέκλεισται μὲν ἡ ψ. τῷ σώματι, συνέχει δὲ αὐτὴ τὸ σῶμα Ep. ad Diogn.* 6.

περιέχοντος: *πάντα μὲν τὰ σώματα ἐμπεριέχει, οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχοντος* Cleom. *Circ. doctr.* i. 1. 1.

192. 6–7 περιλαμβάνοντος: embracing in its comprehension, cf. *τὸν ὅλον κόσμον περιειληφέναι τῇ γνώμῃ* p. **184.** 9.

192. 7 διαλυόμενα: i.e. *ἐν μεταβολῇ* p. **202.** 9; passing into the original elements p. **152.** 9.

ἑτέρων ὁμοίων: cf. *γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα* Emped. 17. 35 D.

192. 9 μέμφεσθαι: *ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ καὶ μηκέτι μήτε θεὸν μήτ' ἄνθρωπον μέμφεσθαι* Epict. ii. 19. 26; cf. p. **240.** 19.

Ch. 2: 192. 10 τί σου ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητεῖ: *φ.* denotes here the life-principle which sustains and directs your life, as it does a plant's life-process or an animal's vegetative existence, cf. pp. **100.** 23, **160.** 11.

192. 10–11 μόνον διοικουμένου: *ὑπὸ μὲν ψ. θ' ἅμα καὶ φύσεως τὰ ζῷα διοικεῖσθαί φαμεν, ὑπὸ δὲ φύσεως μόνης τὰ φυτά* Galen, ii. 2; *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τυχοῦσα φ. φέρει τι, ὃ μὴ τῷ διοικουμένῳ ὑπ' αὐτῆς κατάλληλόν ἐστιν* p. **80.** 16, *ὅσα ὑπὸ φ. ἢ ψ. ἀλόγου διοικεῖται* p. **208.** 14. Arist. taught that man was, in his nutrition and growth, a vegetative being. Chrysippus considered the human embryo to be living a plant life in the womb: *τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι νομίζει, καθάπερ φυτόν· ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ . . . γίνεσθαι ζῷον de* Plu. *de St. rep.* 1052f.

192. 11 προσιέσο: as he is dealing with the bodily nature, he uses an appropriate word, cf. *παρὰ τὸ προσίεσθαι μὲν καὶ φυλάττειν τὸ οἰκεῖον, ἀποκρίνειν δὲ τὸ ἀλλότριον*, of the *vis medicatrix Naturae*, Galen, ii. 46.

192. 15 εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν: the adv. indicates the necessary

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dependence of man's social nature upon his reason. This use is frequent in Arist., see Bonitz, *Ind. Arist.* 296ª13, who translates by *suapte natura*. M. explains and illustrates this dependence at pp. **32.** 10, **54.** 1, **62.** 25.

192. 15–16 **μηδὲν περιεργάζου:** cf. pp. **22.** 25, **60.** 19.

Ch. 3: 192. 18 **ὡς οὐ πέφυκας αὐτὸ φέρειν:** strictly, contrary to the doctrine of pp. **88.** 5, **162.** 14. He is, however, referring at present merely to the inability of the body; at *μέμνησο*, l. **21**, he passes to the point of view of moral freedom.

192. 19 **μὴ δυσχέραινε:** *εἰ οὖν ἑκάστῳ συμβαίνει ὃ καὶ εἴωθε καὶ πέφυκε, τί ἂν δυσχεραίνοις; οὐ γὰρ ἀφόρητόν σοι ἔφερεν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις* p. **162.** 13; *μὴ δυσχέραινε ταῖς περιστάσεσιν, ἐνθυμούμενος πόσα ἤδη σοι τῶν ἐν βίῳ οὐχ ὡς σὺ ἐβούλου συνέπεσεν ἀλλ' ὡς συνέφερεν* Muson. xxvii H.

192. 20 **φθήσεται γάρ σε ἀπαναλῶσαν:** cf. *τὸ μὲν ἀφόρητον ἐξάγει* p. **130.** 22 n. P's *φθαρήσεται* lays stress upon the pain coming to an end; this, although a fact, is not to the point since it is the sufferer's death which terminates the pain.

192. 23 **συμφέρειν ἢ καθήκειν.** M. here makes advantage an alternative to duty, not, however, as a competing motive for the will. Advantage will be entertained only in respect of what is indifferent. On the other hand, the Stoics held that duty is always to the good man's benefit. See the ironical discussion at p. **42.** 15 and cf. pp. **80.** 11, **86.** 26, **110.** 22, **116.** 5, **222.** 2.

Ch. 4: 192. 24–5 **τὸ παρορώμενον δεικνύναι.** This disagreeable duty is repeatedly enforced, as M. holds with Socr. that oversights are involuntary, and that therefore we must convict the offender of ignorance, see pp. **90.** 1 n., **152.** 6, **176.** 28, **220.** 25.

192. 25 **σεαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι:** cf. *σὺ δεῖξον αὐτῷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὄψει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ· μέχρι δ' ἂν οὐ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ ἐκείνου καταγέλα ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνου τῆς ἀδυναμίας τῆς σαυτοῦ* Epict. ii. 12. 4; *ἂν δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μᾶλλον ἐγκάλει* ii. 26. 7.

ἢ μηδὲ σεαυτόν: cf. *πεπαιδευμένου τὸ μήτε ἄλλῳ μήτε ἑαυτῷ ἐγκαλεῖν* Epict. *Ench.* 5. For M. there are two reasons for this: *εἰκῇ γὰρ οὐδὲν ποιητέον* p. **152.** 7, and further, evil men must needs exist, p. **188.** 16.

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Ch. 5: 192. 27 ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν αἰτίων συνέκλωθε: cf. *οὐκ ἄνευ . . . συγκλώσεως καὶ ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων* p. **22.** 4; *ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς* Chrysippus ap. A. Gell. *N.A.* vii (vi). 2. 3.

Ch. 6: 194. 1 Εἴτε ἄτομοι εἴτε φύσις. As M. at once assumes a providential system, it appears that some words have been lost. I have thought that M. may have written *εἴτε φύσις· εἰ μὲν φύσις πρῶτον*, to which *εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀφέμενος τῆς φύσεως*, ch. 7, § 2, l. 25 would correspond. It may naturally be argued that *εἰ δέ τις* is very widely separated from *εἴτε ἄτομοι εἴτε φύσις* l. 1, and that *ἀφέμενος τῆς φύσεως* refers to *φύσει* ll. 17 and 19, and perhaps to *ἡ φύσις αὐτή* l. 22. On the other hand, chs. 6 and 7 are continuous, and it is clear that at ch. 7, § 2 M. turns to consider the effect of the atomic hypothesis upon man's attitude to death, and to this atomic hypothesis he appears to return in the last words of ch. 7 (see my notes on § 3).

194. 1–2 τοῦ ὅλου ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένου: cf. *εἰ μὴ ἄτομοι, φύσις ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα· εἰ τοῦτο, τὰ χείρονα τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν, ταῦτα δὲ ἀλλήλων* p. **224.** 9.

194. 2–3 ἔχω πως οἰκείως πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ μέρη, repeated emphatically at l. 10. Although M. uses this point as the ground for a moral admonition, its importance to his main argument, as will be seen from the passage cited in my last note, is that this subordination and co-ordination of the parts in the whole is testified to by the *natural* love of parents for children, and of kinsfolk for one another. Thus Galen, when arguing for a providential system against the mechanistic atomism of Asclepiades of Bithynia, refers to: *δυνάμεσι, στερκτικῇ μέν τινι καὶ προνοητικῇ τῶν ἐγγόνων, κοινωνικῇ δὲ καὶ φιλικῇ τῶν ὁμογενῶν*, ii. 28.

194. 6 πασῶν μὲν φύσεων. All *organic* creations, as we might say, have the common attributes of recognizing what is naturally their good and advantage, and of pursuing that, while avoiding what is injurious and evil.

194. 7 μηδὲ ὑπό τινος ἔξωθεν αἰτίας: cf. p. **66.** 27 sq.

§ 2: 194. 11 στοχάσομαι, 'guess the wishes and study the wants of my neighbour', cf. p. **8.** 2 n.

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194. 13 **εὑροεῖν:** cf. pp. **24.** 1, **96.** 1.

Ch. 7: 194. 17 **φύσει:** for the confusion with *φημί*, here and in l. 19, cf. the reverse errors: *φύσει* AD for *φησί* p. **92.** 6, *φύσιν* A for *φησί* p. **188.** 8.

194. 18 **ἀλλοιοῦσθαι,** *change* or, to use the technical term, *alteration*. The Stoics followed Arist. in defining *ἀλλοίωσις* as *μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*, i.e. a change in the properties of a substance which persists. Arist. distinguished *φθορά* from *ἀλλοίωσις*, whereas M. here identifies the processes, or rather uses identical terms for that change which is dissolution. He therefore appears to imply here that the individual, who has persisted in his life changes, ceases to be after dissolution. For Arist.'s distinctions see *Gen. et Corr.* $319^{b}6$–$320^{a}2$.

194. 20–1 **τῶν μερῶν . . . διαφόρως κατεσκευασμένων:** Gat. translates *διαφόρως* by *multifariam*. Does not M. mean that change is the *λόγος τῆς κατασκευῆς* p. **54.** 14, and that this is what differentiates the living *μέρη* from *τεχνικὰ κατασκευάσματα*?

194. 23 **ἔλαθεν αὐτήν:** cf. *ὁ διοικῶν λόγος οἶδε πῶς διακείμενος καὶ τί ποιεῖ* p. **98.** 8, as he has just said that Nature is not the cause of evil, cf. p. **96.** 20. The principles that God cannot create evil and cannot be ignorant are assumed at Pl. *R.* 379 and 382.

§ 2: 194. 25 **καὶ ἀφέμενος τῆς φύσεως,** *giving up*, for argument's sake, the principle of a governing and providential Nature, and so recurring to *ἄτομοι* l. 1, which are opposed to the Stoic *ἕνωσις* p. **130.** 20, and generally to *πρόνοια* pp. **52.** 4, **98.** 19.

κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι, the infinitive of *πέφυκε*, impersonal. Arist. censures Emped. for using '*ὅτι πέφυκεν οὕτως*' covertly as an *ἀρχή*, a principle of explanation, which is regarded as identical with *ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης* or with *ὅτι ἀεὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ἢ γίγνεται Ph.* $252^{a}6$ sq. Arist. then criticizes Democritus the Atomist on similar grounds. This use of *nature* in an impersonal sense runs through Lucr., e.g. 'corporibus caecis igitur natura gerit res' i. 328, 'naturae species ratioque' i. 148. Again, *rerum natura* seems even to be personified, iii. 931, cf. 964. Cic. refers to this identification of *natura* with natural law: 'ordo siderum et . . . constantia neque naturam significat, est enim plena rationis, neque fortunam' *N.D.* ii. 43.

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194. 26 **καὶ ὡς γελοῖον,** 'quam ridiculum sit' Gat. Most modern editors accept Schultz's *ὡς γελοῖον*, in the sense 'on this view'.

M. may be thinking of the frequent use of expressions like '*ματάζουσι*' D.L. x. 67, 'desiperest' Lucr. iii. 802, in the philosophers whom he is criticizing.

194. 27 **ὡς ἐπί τινι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμβαίνοντι:** the sense is as if he had written *ἐπί τινι ὡς παρὰ φύσιν συμβαίνοντι*. 'You must agree', he says, 'that every change is *κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι*, and yet you persist in resenting change as though it were *contra naturam*.'

Lucr. uses a parallel argument with one who, professing Epicureanism, yet shows by his apprehension in face of death that he has deserted his master's doctrine, iii. 1076.

194. 28–**196.** 1 **εἰς ταῦτα . . . ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον συνίσταται:** a physical principle common to all schools: *πάντα γὰρ φθείρεται εἰς ταὐτ' ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν* Arist. *Metaph.* 1000^{b}25.

For the Epicureans: 'huc accedit uti quidque in sua corpora rursum | dissoluat natura, neque ad nilum interimat res' Lucr. i. 215; for the Stoics: *εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἐγένου . . . εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα* Epict. iii. 13. 14; cf. p. **54.** 12.

196. 1–2 **σκεδασμὸς στοιχείων,** of the *atoms* as at p. **130.** 18, cf. *σκορπισμὸς τῶν ἀπαθῶν στοιχείων* p. **136.** 11.

196. 2 **συνεκρίθη:** cf. *διακρίνει καὶ συγκρίνει εἰς ἄλληλα* Democr. ap. Galen, i. 418; *τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ σ. πεποίηνται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι* Epicur. ap. D.L. x. 40.

τροπή, a Heraclitean word for the mutations of fire, 31 D., 21 B.

196. 2–3 **τὸ γεῶδες . . . τὸ ἀερῶδες:** *earth* and *spirit* are selected as typical, and because the spirit flies upward in common belief: *γᾶ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἕν* Epich. *Fr.* 245 K., 9 D.

196. 3–4 **καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι.** Unless the text is corrupt, M. conceives all the elements as received again into *ὁ τοῦ ὅλου λόγος*, perhaps in view of the ultimate *ἐκπύρωσις*, p. **86.** 1 n. Usually he writes of *αἱ εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαί* as thus 'taken up', p. **60.** 1.

196. 5 **ἀϊδίοις ἀμοιβαῖς,** the words have a Heraclitean ring: *ἀνταμείβεται πάντα* 22 B., for which Diels reads *πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβὴ*

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τὰ πάντα Fr. 90. In M.'s language: *ἀλλοιώσεις ἀνανεοῦσι τὸν κόσμον διηνεκῶς* p. **102.** 9.

§ 3: **196.** 5 **καὶ τὸ στερέμνιον.** For my explanation of this section see *Eng. Comm.*, p. 396. As Chs. 6 to 7 are written controversially (p. **194.** 1 and 25) I take this section to state M.'s view, the scientific view, of the individual compound human being who has undergone a succession of changes from his first conception by his mother to the day of his death. If this view is common for the purpose of the present problem to both Stoic and Epicurean, I interpret the last words to refer to the Epicurean hypothesis that the individual self depends on the compounded *material* self and therefore vanishes upon its final disintegration in death.

Gat.'s version is: 'quanquam ponatur, illud ipsum te valde addicere huic peculiariter sic affecto, nihil tamen obstabit quo minus verum sit quod iam dictum est'. His commentary runs: 'suppone vero, illud quod a matre traxisti, isti ipsi quod nunc geris, et peculiares suas affectiones habet, te valde addicere, eidemque quasi implicitum tenere, cum nihil hoc faciat ad id quod nunc dicitur, nec propterea obstet, quo minus verum id sit. Sed *ἐπέχω*.' He takes *ὑπόθου* (l. 9) to introduce a provisional hypothesis which is irrelevant to M.'s present purpose and not injurious (should it be accepted) to the truth he is expressing. Further *ἐκεῖνο* he refers to *ὃ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτεκεν* (and by implication to the compound body and spirit), making that bind the living person to his present individuality.

Cas. rewrites the concluding words: *προσπλέκει· τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ οὐδὲν φύντι* (vel *ὄντι* . . . revera) *πρὸς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.* He translates: 'pone vero solidum illud, qua solidum, tibi firmius adhaesisse: qua taliter tamen affectum, et propriis qualitatibus ab aliis secretum est, nihil opinor illi quod natum est, commune cum eo, quod nunc aboletur' (adding, 'aut *τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον*, de quo nunc agitur'). The next writer who examines this passage is D. Wyttenbach (*Adnotatio* to Bake's *Posidonius*, 1810, pp. 269–70). He translates: 'sic autem statue, illud incrementum te nimium ad te ipsum, ad tuam singularitatem et unitatem, omnino ad tuum individuum, astringere: quod individuum non pertinet ad praesentem disputationem.'

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His explanation is: '*τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως* et *ὃ ἡ μήτηρ ἔτεκεν* est ipsa *anima*, quae secundum Stoicos in utero matris oritur: quod adnotavimus, etc. Iam vero *οὐσία* continuo motu et mutatione agitatur, non anima quamvis externo adfluente alimento nutrita; haec enim eadem manet et hominem *τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ λίαν προσπλέκει*, suae singularitati et unitati et, ut ita dicam, *individualitati*, adstringit facitque ut semper idem maneat. Neque hoc *ἰδίως ποιόν* pertinebat ad praesentem disputationem; quippe cuius propositum erat *γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τῆς οὐσίας*. Porro *ὑπόθου* reddimus *sic statue*, vi verbi medii, quasi subiice tibi, admone te.' Thus he takes *ὑπόθου* to be an *admonition*, not a proposed hypothesis; in his translation *ἐκεῖνο* is 'illud incrementum', but in his commentary *ἐκεῖνο* refers to *ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν*, i.e. to the soul which is nourished during life, unites the man to his individuality, and preserves his identity amid the continued changes of his substance, his material self.

Long, reading *ἐκείνῳ* not *ἐκεῖνο*, translates: 'This then which has received [the accretion] changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. But suppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.'

Dr. Rendall discussed the passage in *J. of Phil.* xxiii, p. 152, 1895: 'Behind these elements, which it continually accretes, etc., lies the individual Ego . . . which constitutes the personal and individual life. This was received or became immanent at the moment of birth, the embryo being until then in the category of *φυτά*. Hence the careful introduction of the words *τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως*, and *οὐχ ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν*.'

After showing the difficulty of making *ἐκείνῳ* agree with *τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ* and the resultant confusion of the permanent Ego with the ever-changing phenomenal elements, he suggests emending to *ὅτι ἐκείνῳ σὺ λίαν προσπλέκῃ τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ*: 'thus that which it receives changes, not the original offspring which the mother bore. But even admitting that you are intimately bound up with that (sc. the changeable assimilated *περικείμενον*) in (or by) your individuality, that does not affect the present question.'

A. C. Pearson criticized Dr. Rendall, and gave his own version,

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in *J. of Phil.* xxx, 1907, p. 212: 'The objection to this rendering is that in making the *ἰδίως ποιόν*, which is the principle of fixity and permanence, the source or instrument of our mutability, it is not in accordance with Stoic teaching. But, if we retain *ἐκεῖνο*, it is easy to translate: 'and be assured that this (sc. *ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν*) really unites you to your individuality, which I think has no connexion with the present subject of discussion (sc. *τὸ πεφυκέναι μεταβάλλειν*). This interpretation was given long ago by Wyttenbach. . . . The Stoic doctrine, to which M. here alludes, was framed to meet the old logical puzzle known as *ὁ αὐξανόμενος*, or how far is growth destructive of personality?' He goes on: 'The Stoic solution, if it deserves the name, was to treat man—and every existing thing—as a complex duality consisting of *οὐσία* and *ποιότης*, of which *οὐσία* is incapable of increase or diminution but continually shifting, while *ποιότης*, the principle of identity, is permanent but subject to increase or diminution.' (This difficult question of *οὐσία* is examined by Zeller, *Die Phil. der Gr.*[3] iii. 1, p. 98.)

There is only one point where Pearson's account of the Stoic doctrine appears erroneous, i.e. in his statement about *οὐσία*. The Stoic account of *οὐσία* applies not to this or that individual but to the Universe, the substance of which is unalterable in quantity—this is the Stoic equivalent of the modern theory of the indestructibility of matter. The tradition we have is difficult in detail, but the point in question is clear. In the case of the *individual*, the life-history shows that the 'substance' of every individual is continually increasing and diminishing, from birth to maturity and so to age, and this is the very point of what M. says in the first part of this section. What does *not* alter is the *subject* of those changes, *τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν*.

Notice that three things are involved in the discussion, i.e. the changing or phenomenal living creature, what I shall call the 'compound'; secondly, what M. calls 'you'; thirdly, 'the principle of individuality'. In the first part M. says that the 'compound' from the point of view of its *οὐσία* or *ὕλη* (for the Stoics use either term) is at the moment of death made up of elements which are not those which composed it at its first generation, *τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως* (this may even mean

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at the moment of union between the seed and the matter which it kindles in the womb) nor is it now ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν, i.e. the babe, when it first began to draw nutriment from the atmosphere. Materially it is composed of elements of yesterday's absorption.

Now suppose, and this I take to be a controversial supposition in reference to Epicurus, that ἐκεῖνο, the compound I speak of, is bound up with the principle of individuality, or rather, as he correctly puts it, 'binds *you* up with that principle', what are we to say of death? The result of the hypothesis I take to be the Epicurean conclusion that if you are just such a combination then death is mere dispersal. This for M. is an open question. Taking this interpretation I suppose that the closing words were: οὐδὲν τῷ ὄντι, οἶμαι, πρὸς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. What is not to the point, and many of the above translations seem unconsciously to support me, is the *hypothesis*. The ἰδίως ποιόν is very much to the point.

In conclusion, notice that, whether this agrees with Stoic tradition or not, the view M. adopts of the problem is not far removed from the Aristotelian doctrine. He substitutes for the εἶδος of Aristotle the Stoic term τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν, the difference being, as I understand it, that the *form* is for M. a δύναμις, an energy which comes upon the οὐσία and controls it in all its stages, just as in the life of a plant the φύσις, which controls *its* development, is a δύναμις.

196. 6 **τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως**: πᾶν τοῦτο is the present entire σύγκριμα, the οὐσία or constituent material of which is entirely different from what it was at its first generation, p. **204.** 13, and from what its mother bore, ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν. It has experienced ἄλλας δὲ πολλὰς διαφθορὰς καὶ μεταβολάς p. **178.** 28. There is no question here of the theory that, with its first breath, the babe drew in a soul; that is not M.'s view; he makes only one reference to it at p. **244.** 22.

196. 8 **τοῦτο οὖν ὃ ἔλαβε**, sc. ἡ ἐπιρροή l. 8, the nutritive foodstuffs and air; *this* compound which took in nourishment, changes at death, not what your mother brought forth.

196. 8–9. Dr. Rendall takes this to be the ψυχή 'for to the γένεσις of the ψ. the words ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν undoubtedly point'. It is surely unnatural to make the ψ. (which, in the theory upon which

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both Pearson and Dr. Rendall rely, comes into *τὸ βρέφος* from without, with its first breath) to be equivalent to *ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν*, which, according to the theory in question, was a *φυτόν*.

196. 9 **ὑπόθου δ'**, of an hypothesis admitted provisionally, not necessarily acceptable to the writer: *ὑπόθου δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀθάνατοι μὲν οἱ μεμνησόμενοι . . .. τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς σέ;* p. **58. 4**.

ἐκεῖνό σε λίαν προσπλέκει: *ἐκεῖνο* refers to the remoter words: *τοῦτο ὃ ἔλαβε* and not to *ὃ ἡ μ. ἔτεκεν*. Then the hypothesis is that this quantitative compound closely involves you (the whole man) with the specific quality which persistently underlies the quantitative changes. This is an awkward way of saying that the two aspects of the whole man are intimately connected, the implied consequence being that at death with the destruction of that which has been continually changing, the *form* of the changing man is also destroyed:

> sic animi atque animae naturam corpore toto
> extrahere haud facile est quin omnia dissoluantur Lucr. iii. 329.

The word *συμπλέκειν* well represents the repeated metaphor of 'complication' in Lucr.:

> quare etiam atque etiam resoluto corporis omni
> tegmine et eiectis extra vitalibus auris
> dissolui sensus animi fateare necessest
> atque animam, quoniam coniuncta'st causa duobus
> iii. 576 (591);
> sic animus per se non quit sine corpore et ipso
> esse homine . . .
> quandoquidem conexu corpus adhaeret iii. 554;

and, in a passage where Lucr. refers to the (Stoic) theory of the entry of the *ψ.* into the body:

> nec, tam contextae cum sint, exire videntur
> incolumes posse et salvas exsolvere sese
> omnibus e nervis atque ossibus articulisque iii. 695.

196. 9–10 **τῷ ἰδίως ποιῷ**, this is the Stoic term for the *individual* quality or form, which continues the same in all the changes of the material with which it is associated: *ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ⟨ποιόν⟩· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται . . . τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται* Plu. *Comm. not.* 1083d; *εἴ γε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνθέτων τὸ ἀτομωθὲν ὑπάρχει εἶδος,*

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καθ' ὃ ἰδίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Στ. λέγεται ποιόν, ὃ καὶ . . . τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοῦ συνθέτου βίῳ διαμένει, καίτοι τῶν μορίων ἄλλων ἄλλοτε γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων Simplicius *in De An.* p. 217. This Stoic view is derived from the Peripatetic: *τοῦ μὲν πόσου ὡς ὕλης ὑποκειμένου, τοῦ δὲ εἴδους τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ χώραν ἔχοντος, τὸ μὲν πόσον οὐ μένει ταὐτόν, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ ὡς εἶδος τοῦ αὐξομένου, μένει* Alex. Aphr. *Qu.* p. 13.

196. 10 **οὐδὲν ⟨τῷ⟩ ὄντι, οἶμαι, πρὸς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.** As the words stand in the MSS., they mean that *τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν* has nothing to do with what M. is contending. But what he must have said, in any interpretation, is that the whole hypothesis does not affect his contention. Might not *οὐδὲν τῷ ὄντι πρός* be what he wrote, or perhaps, *οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρός*, cf. *εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν . . . οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον* Alex. Aphr. *in An. Pr.* p. 181; and M.'s *ὑπόθου δ' ὅτι . . ., τί οὖν τοῦτο πρὸς σέ;* p. 58. 4?

Mr. Marchant disagrees. He points out that *ὑπόθου δ'* is parallel with *μὴ φαντάζου* above, so that the natural translation is: 'you are to assume'. His interpretation, reached after considering Wyttenbach, is: 'you are to assume that what your mother bore, *ἐκεῖνο*, binds you closely to your individual quality, i.e. that, in spite of the continuous *change*, *τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν* is closely determined at birth, and *that* (*τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν*) has nothing to do with what I am saying now'.

His reply to my difficulty, as to the introduction of: 'it doesn't affect the question', is that 'after convincing the person addressed that *πᾶν τοῦτο* is ever changing and is not *τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως*, he bids him assume that despite this continuous change every human being, though a *μέρος τοῦ ὅλου*, has an unchanging *ἰδίως ποιόν*, which is largely determined at birth; to which M. adds: "but I am not concerned here with the *ἰδίως π.*, which is constant".'

Ch. 8: 196. 11 **Ὀνόματα.** Epict. says that Socr. began *ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον*, and that Antisthenes wrote: *ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις* i. 17. 12. This, he says, is the foundation of Logic. Corresponding with this theoretical inquiry is the practical study of names: *ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα*, 'is a model for the appropriate conduct'

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ii. 10. 11, cf. *Ench.* 30. Similarly Socr. required men: *τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν R.* 463c. M., in this ch., illustrates this kind of moral inquiry, which agreed also with his interest in the derivation of words. He may also be thinking of the virtues ascribed to himself and his predecessors on inscriptions and coins. Thus Augustus says: *ὅπλον τε χρυσοῦν . . . διὰ τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπείκειαν (sic) καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ εὐσέβειαν ἐμοὶ μαρτυρεῖ Mon. Anc.* 34. 2, Gr. xviii. 3; of Nero's titles Vindex said: *μηδαμῶς μηδεὶς ὑβριζέτω τὰ ἱερὰ ἐκεῖνα ὀνόματα* Dio Cass. lxiii. 22. 5.

196. 12 ἔμφρων, σύμφρων, ὑπέρφρων. Whereas in a similar enumeration at p. **72.** 9. M. gives *σώφρονα, ἔμφρονα*, he here substitutes *σύμφρων, ὑπέρφρων*, for the former. He is anxious to elucidate the precise meaning of three adjectives related, like *σώφρων*, to *φρήν*.

μετονομάζῃ: cf. *μὴ ἀποβάλῃς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, τὸ ἀνὴρ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς κεκλῆσθαι* X. *Oec.* 12. 2.

196. 13 ἐπάνιθι ἐπ' αὐτά: the verb is used of a return to one's (better) self, to one's mistress philosophy, pp. **98.** 26, **100.** 5.

196. 14 τὸ μὲν ἔμφρων: with M.'s exposition, cf. *ἔμφρον δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ διὰ ταὐτὰ πρᾶττον ἀεί* Pl. *Epin.* 982e.

ἐβούλετό σοι σημαίνειν: cf. *τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν* Arist. *Top.* 142^{b}27, sim. *E.N.* 1110^{b}30.

196. 16 σύμφρων, used of being of one mind with, in policy, Pl. *Ep.* vii. 324b; cf. *συμφρονεῖν* p. **166.** 14.

196. 17 ὑπέρφρων, he connects with *ὑπερφρονεῖν*, in the good sense *disdainful* of indifferent ends and of the solicitation of appetite. For *σαρκὸς* see p. **90.** 17 n.

§ 2: 196. 23 μολύνεσθαι, used by St. Paul of a conscience polluted by meat offered to idols, 1 *Cor.* 8. 7, and by Pl. of wallowing in ignorance, *R.* 535e. M. too uses the word metaphorically but anticipates, by combining it with *σπαράσσεσθαι*, the powerful simile from the arena which follows.

196. 24 θηριομάχοις. M. used the amphitheatre, in illustration, at p. **116.** 14. It has been remarked that, neither here nor there, is any pity shown for the victims or any condemnation of the

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sport. The reader will observe that such sentiments here would have destroyed the force of the self-criticism.

§ 3: **196.** 27 **ἐμβίβασον οὖν ἑαυτόν:** cf. *ἐμβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην* X. *Oec.* 14. 4; *ἐμβιβάσαι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀπέχθειαν* Polyb. xvi. 38, where the sense appears to be 'lead their steps towards'. Here M. may mean 'embark upon', cf. *Δίωνα εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβιβάσας* Pl. *Ep.* 329c, in a met. sense, as Pl. talks of adventuring upon an argument as a raft. Possibly he intends 'fit yourself to', cf. *ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος*, of fitting an image into the mental impression Pl. *Tht.* 193c.

196. 28 **εἰς μακάρων τινὰς νήσους.** Although he continues the image of a voyage by *μετῳκισμένος*, he is using what had long become a proverbial expression (see e.g. Pl. *Menex.* 235c; Arist. *Pol.* 1334ª31); he means you will be in a paradise, not in Paradise.

198. 2 **εἰς γωνίαν τινά,** another prov. expression, with a note of contempt: *καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ*, the vulgar view of a scholar's life Pl. *Grg.* 485d; *εἰς τὴν γ. ἀπελθὼν κάθησο καὶ πλέκε συλλογισμούς* Epict. ii. 13. 26; the beaten cock retires *ἐς οἴκου γωνίην* Babrius, 5. 4.

198. 2–3 **ἔξιθι τοῦ βίου:** cf. *τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι* p. **92.** 12 n. There, however, there is justification for suicide in the situation contemplated. With *μὴ ὀργιζόμενος*, cf. 'venit aliquis ad mortem iratus' Sen. *Ep.* 30. 12.

§ 4: **198.** 5 **τὸ μεμνῆσθαι:** the repetition of these words in the next line is awkward. May not *μεμνῆσθαι* in the first instance have displaced *μένειν ἐπί*, cf. *ἐπ' αὐτῶν μένειν* p. **196.** 27–8?

198. 7 **ἐξομοιοῦσθαι.** Julian makes M. profess, as one of man's ends, *τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς θεούς* p. 333c, and the last words of this ch. show that M. here thinks of this imitation as a man's proper work, cf. p. **114.** 16. Pl., after speaking of *τῶν συνακολουθησόντων τῷ θεῷ*, says: *ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ Lg.* 716b, d. The later Platonists, beginning with Clem. Alex., dwell repeatedly upon *ὁμοίωσιε θεῷ*, with especial reference to the beautiful words in *Tht.* 176b.

198. 7–8 **τὴν μὲν συκῆν,** referring to the gradual Scale: plants,

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animals, social creatures, man. Each has, like the gods its appropriate task, *τὸ καθ' αὑτὰς συγκοσμούσας κόσμον* p. **74.** 8.

For the emphatic repetition, unusual in M., cf. 'ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res . . . ad intellegendum et agendum esse natum, quasi mortalem deum' Cic. *Fin.* ii. 40.

Ch. 9: 198. 10 **Μῖμος, πόλεμος.** The construction of the first paragraph is uncertain as the connexion of thought is obscure. Some interpreters make the first five words govern *ἀπαλείψεται*, which is taken as a middle, but the sense appears unnatural, and in view of *ἀπαλεῖψαι πᾶσαν φαντασίαν* p. **74.** 22 the pass. meaning is preferable. The first five words will then stand alone as an apostrophe, although their meaning will colour the following sentence. There is a longer sentence, hanging in the air, followed by a comment at p. **120.** 24.

μῖμος, 'hic humanae vitae mimus' Sen. *Ep.* 80. 7, and *πόλεμος*, as in *ὁ δὲ βίος π.* p. **32.** 16, are metaphorically used: 'the masque of life and our warfare here.'

πτοία, νάρκα, *excitement*, *ἐπτοῆσθαι* p. **4.** 18, opp. to mental and bodily *paralysis*, see *ἀναισθήτου* p. **196.** 23. The form *νάρκα* is found in Hippocr. and in Menander, *Fr.* 498 K.

δουλεία, moral *servitude* opp. to *ἐλευθερία*, spiritual *freedom*. δ. is associated with *ταπεινότης* p. **186.** 21, cf. *οὐ κολακεύεσθαι* l. 6 supra. See also pp. **148.** 2, **182.** 16, **202.** 13, **232.** 15.

198. 11 **ἀφυσιολογήτως φαντάζῃ:** cf. *⟨ἀ⟩φυσιολόγῳ* p. **188.** 12 for the MSS. error.

The doctrines correspond with imaginations: *πῶς ἄλλως δύναται νεκρωθῆναι* (sc. *τὰ δόγματα*), *ἐὰν μὴ αἱ κατάλληλοι αὐτοῖς φαντασίαι σβεσθῶσιν* p. **120.** 18; the latter have to be scientifically tested before admission, to do this is *φυσιολογεῖν* p. **150.** 18.

The word *φυσιολογεῖν* and its cognates come from Epicurus; see, e.g., *ἀφυσιολόγητον μηδὲν ἡγοῦ βοώσης τῆς σαρκὸς βοᾶν τὴν ψ.* *Fr.* 200 Us.

198. 12 **παραπέμπεις,** i.e. into the inner or central consciousness; the word is used to express a vibration passing along a shaft, Max. Tyr. x. 8.

198. 13 **περιστατικόν.** The Stoics divided duties thus: *τὰ μὲν εἶναι*

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καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά, i.e. imposed by circumstances, D.L. vii. 109.

198. 14 **τὸ . . . αὔθαδες**, used in a good sense, as at p. **116.** 26; cf. *ταῖς δὲ αὐθαδείαις καὶ ταῖς σεμνότησιν οὐκ ἀληθιναῖς ἀλλὰ καταπεπλασμέναις χρῆσθαι* Isoc. vi. 98.

198. 15 **λανθάνον, οὐχὶ κρυπτόμενον.** Mr. Marchant suggests that M. has added these words, being sensible that *τὸ αὔθαδες* might appear to be a quality offensive to others. We may compare Socr.'s remarks about *αὐθάδεια*, Pl. *Ap.* 34c.

λανθάνον may allude to the Epicurean motto *λάθε βιώσας Fr.* 551 Us., familiar to M. doubtless from 'an secretum iter et fallentis semita vitae?' Hor. *Ep.* i. 18. 103.

οὐχὶ κρυπτόμενον suggests a path of life which does not hide its head from duty. The good man comes into the open, *οὐδὲ ἐμφωλεῦον* p. **44.** 11, cf. p. **142.** 24. Ruskin describes a quiet rural landscape as 'fain-hidden—yet full-confessed', *Crown of Wild Olive*, Introd.

πότε γὰρ ἁπλότητος ἀπολαύσεις; Cf. *ἔσῃ ποτὲ ἆρα . . . ἁπλῆ* p. **190.** 21, followed by *ἀπολαύσεις* ib. 26.

198. 16–17 **τί τε ἐστὶ κατ' οὐσίαν:** opp. to *ἐκ τίνων συγκέκριται*, like *τί ἐστί* p. **46.** 4. *κατ' οὐσίαν* is reminiscent of Platonic and Aristotelian terminology.

198. 17 **τίνα χώραν.** In these enumerations M. mentions nowhere else either *place* or *position*; of *duration* he often speaks.

198. 19 **τίνες δύνανται:** i.e. the gods or one's fellow men, see p. **46.** 8 sq.

Ch. 10: 198. 20 **θηρᾶσαν.** Thus Pl. brackets *θηρευτική* in irony with *στρατηγική R.* 373b, and divides *θηρευτική* into *στρατηγική* and *φθειριστική Sph.* 227b. Arist. says of men's lives: *οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι . . . οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας Pol.* 1256ª35, cf. 'latrocinia nullam habent infamiam quae extra finis cuiusque civitatis fiunt' Caes. *B.G.* vi. 23. 6.

198. 22 **Σαρμάτας.** M. was styled Germanicus, Sarmaticus, p. **254** supra. He assumed the latter title, with Imp. viii, in A.D. 175, Dion Cass. lxxi. 17; *H.A.* iv. 24–5; *C.I.L.* viii. 2276.

οὐ λῃσταί; Cf. *ἀνάγκη καὶ σὲ . . . λῃστὴν . . . γίνεσθαι* p. **226.** 7;

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Ael. Arist. says of Alex. and his successors: *τὴν τοιαύτην κατάστασιν πότερον λῃστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ βασιλείᾳ προσεοικέναι φήσομεν;* xxiv. 27; cf. 'illic Pellaei proles vesana Philippi, | felix praedo iacet' Lucan x. 20.

Gat. suspected that M. was thinking of the story about Alex. and the Scythian or pirate: 'cum quaereretur ex eo, quo scelere impulsus mare haberet infestum uno myoparone, "eodem", inquit, "quo tu orbem terrae" ' Cic. *Rep.* iii. 24. For the transmission of the legend through Q. Curtius, the *Gesta Rom.*, and Joh. Salisb. to Chaucer, see Skeat's note to *The Manciple's Tale*, H. 223 sq.

τὰ δόγματα: cf. *χώρις δὲ δογμάτων μεταβολῆς τί ἄλλο ἢ δουλεία στενόντων*; p. **182.** 15, and the passage concerning the real greatness of Socr. p. **142.** 12 sq.

Ch. 11: 198. 23 **Πῶς εἰς ἄλληλα:** cf. Heraclit. at p. **68.** 17, and *τὰς τῶν στοιχείων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὰς συνεχῶς ἐννοεῖν* p. **134.** 18.

198. 24 **συγγυμνάσθητι:** cf. *λογισμοῦ συγγεγυμνασμένου* p. **34.** 11.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος: cf. *μεγάλην εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῖς παρέξεσθαι χρείαν* Polyb. i. 16. 8.

198. 25 **οὐδὲν . . . ποιητικόν.** The whole phrase is repeated from p. **44.** 26, a most unusual thing in M.

ἐξεδύσατο: cf. and contrast: *ὁ γάρ τοι ἀνὴρ ὁ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ.* p. **38.** 16. The subj. here may be *ὁ συγγεγυμνασμένος* from *συγγ.* l. 24, the body being regarded as raiment, cf. *γυμνή* p. **190.** 21, and *οἷον ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια, γυμνούς . . . θεῖν* Pl. *R.* 474a. Pl. has also the image of the soul stripping off the encumbrances to moral progress: *ἔσχατον τὸν τῆς δόξης χιτῶνα ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτῷ ἀποδυόμεθα* ap. Athen. xi. 116, p. 507; *τὰ ἄλλα πάθη . . . ἀποδυσαμένη ἡ ψ., ἐσχάτην ἀποδύεται ταύτην, εἰς αὐτὸ . . . τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπογυμνουμένη* Simpl. *in Epict. Ench.* p. 106a.

198. 28 **τοῖς ἄλλως συμβαίνουσι,** opp. to *τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργούμενα*, cf. *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας* opp. to *τὰ παρὰ τὴν ἐκ σοῦ αἰτίαν* p. **184.** 3; *ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμβαινόντων* opp. to *ἐπὶ μὲν ὧν ποιεῖς* p. **244.** 19.

Thus *ἄλλως* opp. to *ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ* means circumstances *beyond your control*, cf. for the antithesis *οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ* Pl. *Tht.* 172e. These are called *τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον* p. **200.** 2 in regard to which he is to exhibit

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ὁσιότης, the virtue associated with *δικαιοσύνη* pp. **230.** 4, **234.** 19; cf. *ποιοῦσαν τὰ δίκαια καὶ θέλουσαν τὰ συμβαίνοντα* p. **236.** 23.

200. 1 **εἰς νοῦν βάλλεται**, like *ἐνὶ θυμῷ βάλλευ Od.* xii. 217; *θαυμαστὸν ἔργον εἰς νοῦν βαλόμενος* Plu. *Thes.* 24; *ἐπὶ νοῦν ἐβάλετο μεταποιῆσαι τὴν βασιλείαν* Julian, p. 58a.

200. 4 **εὐθεῖαν περαίνοντι**, with *ἕπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ*, an allusion to Pl. *Test.*, cf. pp. **76.** 4, **138.** 20, Clem. Alex. cited at *ἀμεταστρεπτί* l. 7 below.

Ch. 12: 200. 6 **τίς ὑπονοίας χρεία;** You need no *hint* (not *misgivings*, *suspicious fears*, as in e.g. Rendall's and Long's trr.) when Duty stares you in the face. *ὑπόνοια* means looking below the surface for an explanation, and so is transferred to express *hint*, *innuendo*: *ὑπόνοιαν ἡμῖν οἷα πείσεται πόλις* Eur. *Ph.* 1133; *ὁ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή* Pl. *R.* 378d.

200. 7 **ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ταύτῃ χωρεῖν:** cf. p. **148.** 8 n. M. takes up the thought of *εὐθεῖαν περαίνοντι* l. 4, as he echoes *ἕπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ* l. 5 by *ὁ τῷ λόγῳ ἑπόμενος* l. 13.

The sense here is 'without turning aside from the path': *μαθόντες δὲ ἄρα τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδόν, εὐθεῖαν βαδίζωμεν ἀμεταστρεπτί* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 648.

200. 10 **τοῦ φαινομένου δικαίου:** cf. *ὡς δικαιότατον φαίνεταί σοι*, of true speech conjoined with undeviating action, p. **148.** 8. Notice the stress upon *τὸ δίκαιον* at lines 2, 4, 10, and 15, and the suggestion that even if an obstacle hinders you, you still attain what is right, *ἄριστον γὰρ κατατυγχάνειν τούτου*, cf. *τούτου δὲ τυγχάνεις* p. **118.** 18.

200. 11 **ἐπεί τοι ἥ γε ἀπόπτωσις ἀπὸ τούτου ἐστίν.** Great difficulty has been felt about this sentence, as we expect *ἀπὸ τούτου οὐκ ἐστίν*, 'your failure is *not* failure from right'. Dr. Rendall proposed *ἥ γε ἀ. ἀπότευγμ' οὐκ ἔστιν*, comparing p. **72.** 7. If, however, we remember what is in M.'s mind, we may keep the MSS. reading, with Cas. and Boot, in the sense 'for *true* failure is to fall away from this', i.e. from what you see to be just.

Gat. would have liked to substitute *ἀπότευξις* for *ἀπόπτωσις* (not to read *ἀ. τούτου ἀπότευξίς ἐστιν* as Sch. reports), but the use of the word is justified by *πολλάκις δὲ οὐκ ἔθους ἀλλὰ καθήκοντος ἀπόπτωσιν ἐμφαίνει* Simpl. *in Cat.* p. 395; cf. *τῆς περιπτώσεως* p. **114.** 2.

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200. 12 σχολαῖόν τι, the neuter attributives lend a generic character to the aphorism. For the meaning cf. *ἀσχολίας . . . ἀφῆκε* l. 3, *εὐσχολώτερος καὶ ἀταρακτότερος* p. **60. 24.**

εὐκίνητον, lit. *expeditus*; ease of movement is a characteristic of *ψυχή*, p. **88. 11** n.

φαιδρὸν ἅμα καὶ συνεστηκός: cf. *φαίδρυνον σεαυτόν* p. **130. 15.** The conjunction of cheerfulness and composure is a trait derived from Pius, and is expressed in: *τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον φαιδρυνάμενον κατὰ νόμον κοσμεῖν δεῖ* Pl. *Lg.* 718b. See also *πεπηγέναι* p. **140. 5.**

200. 13 τῷ λόγῳ . . . ἑπόμενος, equivalent to *ἑπ. τῷ θεῷ* l. 5, cf. p. **248. 20.**

Ch.13: 200. 15 ψέγηται, the correction is properly ascribed to Lofft (Sch. adn. supp. p. 189 is erroneous). For the corruption cf. *λέγοντα* AX, for *ψέγοντα* P p. **210. 10.** For the pass. sense, see p. **58. 17.**

200. 17 φρυαττόμενοι: cf. *καταφρυαττόμενον* p. **122. 2** n.

200. 20 ᾧ γίνεται. If *ὃ γίνεται* be read, with Leop., we get the difficulty that *τὸ ἡγ.* is said to become *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων*. At p **242. 21**, certainly, *ἡ διάνοια* is conceived of as becoming *φόβος, ὑποψία, ἐπιθυμία*, but it can hardly become what is regarded as its presiding deity.

ὅταν θέλῃ: cf. *ὁπόταν πρῶτον θελήσῃ* p. **166. 19.**

200. 21 ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, not 'good character', as Bonhöffer interprets (*Epict. und die Stoa*, p. 86), seeing a reference to *ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ* δ. Heraclit. 119 D., 121 B., for that is a man's natural endowment: *ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπων δ. κατὰ τὸν Ἡ., τουτέστι φύσις* Alex. Aphr. *De Fato*, p. 170, *De An.* p. 185.

M. means 'a spirit of goodness', a *θεία* or *ἀγαθὴ μοῖρα* p. **96. 18.** The fruit of that indwelling spirit is *ἀγαθαὶ τροπαὶ ψυχῆς* (ib.), i.e. *πίστις κ.τ.λ.*, which are regarded as taking up their abode in *τὸ ἡγ.* There is thus a recognition of contemporary religious belief, although the proximity of *νόμος* permits the 'spirit of goodness' to be also rationally interpreted as *ὁ λόγος ᾧ νῦν πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χρᾷ* p. **122. 23**, cf. p. **92. 1.**

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Ch. 14: 200. 24 **εὐνοῶν**, *loyal*, not obedient merely, cf. *πολίτας ἀρίστους καὶ εὐνουστάτους παρέχεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ* Xen. *Oec.* 6. 10.

Ch. 15: 200. 26 **τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον**, sc. *τοῦ βίου*, cf. *τὸ ὑπόλοιπον τοῦ βίου* p. **64.** 1; sim. pp. **38.** 3, **138.** 21, **238.** 4–5.

ζῆσον ὡς ἐν ὄρει. There was a tradition concerning Zoroaster, from love of wisdom and justice, *ἀποχωρήσαντα τῶν ἄλλων καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν ὄρει τινὶ ζῆν* Dio Chrys. xxxvi. 40, p. 93.

200. 27 **ἐκεῖ ἢ ὧδε:** cf. *πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐνθάδε* p. **202.** 24, and pp. **50.** 15, **52.** 15.

Ch. 16: 202. 3–4 **διαλέγεσθαι**, the lesson which Rusticus endeavoured to teach him, p. **6.** 1.

Ch. 17: 202. 5 **φαντασία** ⟨**ἔστω**⟩: the supplement seems requisite. The second reflection is introduced by *καὶ ὅτι*, cf. p. **66.** 9 and 27.

Ch. 18: 202. 8 **Εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐφιστάντα:** cf. *ἡ ἐπίστασις ἡ ἐπὶ τὰ ὑποκ.* p. **174.** 2, and *πάντα τὰ ὑποκ. τάχιστα μεταβαλεῖ* p. **98.** 6.

202. 8–9 **ἤδη διαλυόμενον**, breaking up even as you dwell in mind upon it, for every part exemplifies the rule: *διαλυόμενα εἰς γένεσιν ἑτέρων ὁμοίων* p. **192.** 7. This is one aspect of the Heraclitean flux: *γῆς θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι* p. **68.** 17; the reciprocal process is implied at l. 10.

202. 9 **οἷον σήψει ἢ σκεδάσει:** the change is a kind of *decay*, a *διαφθορά* p. **178.** 29, because in the natural parallel ('the flower fadeth') *τὸ τέλος τῆς κατὰ φύσιν φθορᾶς σῆψις* Arist. *Meteor.* 379ᵃ8. M. thinks of the changes as caused by evaporation of vital heat, *ἐκθυμίασις* (cf. the parallel passage p. **98.** 6), followed by decay or crumbling. So Pl. of the death of the body says: *καὶ ἂν σαπῇ Phd.* 80d, and Arist., speaking of the decay of organic bodies, has: *ξηρότερα γίγνεται τὰ σηπόμενα πάντα* (for the warm moisture is gone out of them), *καὶ τέλος γῆ καὶ κόπρος Meteor.* l.c. 23. M. indicates the double process by *καπνὸς καὶ σποδός* p. **246.** 16.

σκεδάσει of the alternative Epicur. hypothesis, see p. **98.** 7 n., and cf. 'nam certe non inter se stipata cohaeret | materies' Lucr. ii. 67.

202. 10 **πέφυκεν ὥσπερ θνήσκειν**, 'it is born to die',—more exactly

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'it is the nature of each thing (that comes into being) in one sense to die', cf. *εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον* Arist. *Metaph.* 1068^{b}28. The reciprocal process (*ἔμπαλιν* p. **68.** 19 and *Test.* there) is that *γένεσις* implies *θάνατος*, Clem. Alex. *Test.* Pl. generalizes the doctrine of Heraclit. in the *Phaedo*, giving as one instance: *ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; τὸ τεθνηκός*, *ἔφη* 71d. M., however, is not like Pl. and Clem. using the doctrine in the interests of the survival of the *ψυχή*. Notice that here the Epicureans agree:

> nam quodcunque suis mutatum finibus exit,
> continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante. Lucr. i. 670.

The emendations of Morus and Sch. are based on misapprehension of M.'s correct presentation of Heraclit.'s *teaching*.

Ch. 19: 202. 11 **ὀχεύοντες**: cf. *εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες* Pl. *R.* 586a, to emphasize their merely animal intercourse.

202. 12 **ἀνδρονομούμενοι**, a word found nowhere else; the men stigmatized appear to be creatures who have risen to power from a servile condition, and who exercise their power brutally.

202. 13–14 **ἐδούλευον πόσοις καὶ δι' οἷα**: cf. *οἷς θέλουσιν ἀρέσκειν καὶ δι' οἷα* p. **120.** 10, and for the form: *ὅσων πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων* p. **148.** 2. Speaking of the great families of slaves in rich houses, Simpl. says that they are obliged *πόσους κολακεύειν καὶ πόσοις δουλεύειν in Epict. Ench.* p. 272a.

202. 14 **ἐν τοιούτοις ἔσονται.** Gat.'s emendation preserves the syntax, but the corruption is not easily explained. M. may have written *καὶ ὅτι μετ' ὀλίγον*, see the constructions at p. **200.** 16 sq. Cas. and Gat. ('quo in statu futuri sint') interpret the words of the levelling of death, and that agrees with M.'s trains of thought elsewhere, e.g. pp. **128.** 5, **210.** 14, **226.** 2. I have rather supposed that M. means that to-morrow they will be in a like condition, i.e. will sink again to the material servitude from which they have climbed to their present lofty station. Thus Mr. Haines has: 'and anon will be at their old trade'.

For *ἐν τοιούτοις εἶναι*, cf. *ἐν ἡδοναῖς εἶναι* p. **170.** 17.

Ch. 20: 202. 15 **Συμφέρει ἑκάστῳ**: an often-repeated theme, see pp. **22.** 6, **40.** 4, **60.** 14, **62.** 25, with M.'s favourite play upon

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words. ἑκάστῳ means πάντι φύσεως μέρει, so that my translation unduly limits the meaning. The transition of thought to l. 17 is like that at p. **60.** 14–17.

Ch. 21: 202. 17 **ἐρᾷ δὲ ὁ κόσμος.** M. cites two phrases from a celebrated passage in Eurip. [*Test.*], where Aphrodite is said to bring about the mythical union, by fertilizing showers, of the Sky and Earth, cf. Aesch. *Danaid. Fr.* 44 N². The words which M. selects had also been used to give a scientific ground for human friendship (Arist. *E.N.* 1155ᵇ2). M. extends the idea to explain the impulse of the Universe to creative activity,

> Which wields the world with never wearied love
> Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above
>
> Shelley, *Adon.* xlii.

M. has also in his mind the words of Eurip. cited at p. **136.** 7, where the Aether is the power which kindles the body with πνεῦμα, *anima.*

The substitution of αἰθήρ for οὐρανός may be due to an unconscious reminiscence of similar passages in Roman poetry, e.g.

> Postremo pereunt imbres, ubi eos pater aether
> in gremium matris terrai praecipitavit Lucr. i. 250, and
> Tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus aether . . .
>
> Virg. *Georg.* ii. 325.

202. 19 **φιλεῖ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι,** φιλεῖ used like *amat*, cf. ἐθέλει, *vult.* Nature's uniformity, in M.'s view, expresses her desire, the object of her love, cf. οὐδὲν οὕτως φιλεῖ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φ. ὡς . . . p. **66.** 9. The usage of speech he supposes to embody this truth. Here he notices that Eur.'s ἐρᾷ . . . πεσεῖν may mean 'is wont to fall', uniformly descends in showers, cf. ἐρᾷ γὰρ τὸ βάρβαρον . . . ῥᾴστα κινεῖσθαι Hdn. i. 3. 5. He then enlarges this to the wider proposition ἐρᾷ δὲ ὁ κόσμος ποιῆσαι . . . γίνεσθαι (notice the successive use of γίνεσθαι), and observes that a common phrase for happenings, uniformities in Nature, is φιλεῖ τοῦτο γίν., cf. οἷα τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγν. (of autumn thunderstorms) Thuc. vii. 79. 3. Thus vulgar speech lends support to a philosophic doctrine, it expresses what is wont to occur in terms which indicate Nature's *desire* in production. As Long remarks, ad loc.: 'Most great truths are expressed in the common

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language of life.' J. Cook Wilson was accustomed, *loved*, to assert this principle of the interpretation of living speech, see *Statement and Inference*, Index, s.v. *Usage*.

Ch. 22: 202. 20 **ἤδη εἴθικας.** Gat. believed the reference to be to the Pythagorean: *ἑλοῦ βίον ἄριστον, ἡδὺν δ' αὐτὸν ἡ συνήθεια ποιήσει* Gal. v. 33; Stob. *Ecl.* iii, pp. 14, 659. M. may, however, be reminding himself, as he so often does, of the monotony of life, *πάντα καὶ συνήθη καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνια* p. **120.** 17; this seems to agree with the context better than the former view.

ἔξω ὑπάγεις: the contrast with *ἐνταῦθα ζῇς* and *ἀποθνήσκεις*, of natural death, shows that to withdraw is used of suicide, cf. *τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι* p. **92.** 12. Gat., however, translates 'e privato in publicum prodis', believing M. to refer to the proverb: *ἀνδρὶ Λυδῷ πράγματ' οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐξελθὼν ἐπρίατο Paroemiographi Graeci*, Zenob. i. 87.

The verb is used for *voluntary* withdrawal from life: *πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὑπάγω St. John*, 16. 10.

202. 21 **ἀπελειτούργησας:** cf. *τελεία ἡ λειτουργία* p. **94.** 2. M. may mean his earthly service, as St. Paul said: *τελειῶσαι . . . τὴν διακονίαν Acts*, 20. 24, or refer to deliverance from the flesh, *τῆς πρὸς τὴν σάρκα λ.* p. **108.** 13.

Ch. 23: 202. 23 **τοιοῦτο ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀγρός:** the text is doubtful, but the sense appears to be like that of *οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐκεῖ ἢ ὧδε* p. **200.** 26, and *ὁ ἀγρός* to be used as an image for *retreat*, cf. p. **52.** 5, and the quotation from Pl. *Tht.* p. **204.** 2. The words *τὸ ὅτι* show that he is quoting, and the words may be from Aristo the Stoic who: *τοὺς πολλοὺς εἴκαζε τῷ Λαέρτῃ, ὅστις τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀγρὸν ἐπιμελούμενος ὀλιγώρως εἶχεν ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ γὰρ τούτους τῶν κτημάτων πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιουμένους περιορᾶν τὴν ψ. ἑαυτῶν πλήρη παθῶν ἀγρίων οὖσαν*, Stob. iii. 246, where the allusion is to *αὐτόν σ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κομιδὴ ἔχει Od.* xxiv. 249. M. seems to mean that life in a palace is no better and no worse than life in retirement, and that a retreat is often a place where a man neglects his true self.

204. 1 **τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος.** Pl. *Test.* says that a king is like a herdsman, in a mountain fastness, but on a greater scale. M. quotes from memory, and the catchword is *ἐν ὄρει*. A ruler in his position

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may, he implies, be merely what Pl. ironically describes; cf. the contrast of the real king and the despot, id. *Plt.* 276e, and M.'s comparison of himself to a bandit p. **198. 22.**

204. 2 βδάλλων βληχήματα, No Pl. editor has suggested that the extract or paraphrase in *Tht.*, which at present ends abruptly, originally had *περιβεβλημένον καὶ βδάλλοντα βληχήματα.*

Ch. 24: 204. 3 Τί ἐστί μοι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν μου; Cf. p. **84.** 5, where, as here, he asks *πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα νῦν χρῶμαι τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ψυχῇ;* and *πῶς ἑαυτῷ χρῆται τὸ ἡγ.*; p. **250.** 1.

204. 5 **ἀπόλυτον καὶ ἀπεσπασμένον κοινωνίας,** *ἀπόλυτος* not, as normally, 'freed from the body' but *severed* from social unity; the word is used by Epict. in opp. to *μέρος ὅλου τινός* ii. 5. 25. For the met. use of the participle cf. *οὐκ ἠθέλησα ζῆν ἀποσπασθεῖσά σου* Eur. *Alc.* 287.

204. 5–6 **προστετηκὸς καὶ ἀνακεκραμένον,** a powerful expression for the bondage to the body described in Pl. *Phd.* 83d; cf. *ἔχεις τι καὶ κρεῖσσον τῶν σαρκιδίων· τί οὖν ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνο τούτοις προστέτηκας;* Epict. i. 3. 6; *προσήλωται αὐτοῖς καὶ προστέτηκεν,* combining Pl.'s image of *nailing* with M.'s of *welding,* Simpl. *in Epict. Ench.* 86c.

ἀνακεκραμένος is given as equivalent to *εὔνως ἔχειν πρός τινα* Poll. v. 113, but M. clearly is thinking of the literal sense, cf. *ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μοῖρα . . . πολλῷ τῷ θνητῷ . . . ἀνακεραννυμένη,* of the blending of the divine and human, Pl. *Criti.* 121b. See Lightfoot's note on *τοὺς ἀνακεκραμένους οὕτως . . . ἵνα πάντα ἐν ἑνότητι σύμφωνα ᾖ* St. Ignat. *Eph.* 5.

204. 6 **συντρέπεσθαι,** to *change with,* and so to conform itself to the body, as Pl. says *ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι Phd.* l.c. M. thinks of the *ἡγ.* as identified almost with the flesh, and uses a verb which describes the sway of the moon over the ocean and of the sun over plants: *συντρέπεται τῷ ἡλίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα φυτά* (where the instance is the mallow which closes in the heat of the day) Iamb. *Protr.* 21. 38; cf. *τοῦ ἡλίου . . . δύνοντος δὲ περιτρεπόμενον,* of the sunflower, Fronto, *Ep.* p. 259. Elsewhere M. speaks of servitude to the flesh, p. **36.** 22, and again of the mind turning into appetites, etc., p. **242.** 21.

Ch. 25: 204. 7 δραπέτης: cf. *φυγάς* p. **62.** 20, *λιποτάκται* p. **220.** 5.

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M. may well be thinking of Socr.'s justification of the laws of Athens: *εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν κ.τ.λ.* Pl. *Cr.* 50a.

204. 9 **οὐ βούλεταί τι.** Nauck's correction at least makes good sense. For the relation of *τὸ ἡγ.* to the *πάθη* of fear, grief, and wrath cf. p. **124.** 24 sq.

204. 11 **ὅσα ἑκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει:** cf. *ἃ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . οὐκ ἐπιβάλλει* p. **86.** 7, of what does not befall a man as his duty, *qua* man; sim. of a private soldier's task p. **122.** 19. Gat. prefers 'quae cuique conveniunt', i.e. Xyl.'s 'quod suum est'; but the central idea is 'his allotted portion', that according to M.'s doctrine is also suited to him.

Ch. 26. 204. 13 **Σπέρμα εἰς μήτραν ἀφείς:** M.'s purpose is to illustrate, from the generation and development of a human being, the evidence of *δύναμις* which works secretly behind the visible *ἔργα* of the Universe. He takes as an analogy (l. 18) the hypothetical force which explains the fall of bodies and the expansion of gases. Compare Galen's reasoning: *καταβληθέντος δὴ τοῦ σπέρματος εἰς τὴν μήτραν . . . χρόνοις τισὶν ὡρισμένοις πάμπολλα συνίσταται μόρια τῆς γεννωμένης οὐσίας* ii. 11. Though it may be at the back of his mind, M. does not here argue to the gods as the source of the *δύναμις* as he does at p. **248.** 1 nor to *πρόνοια* as Epict. does at i. 6. 1 and elsewhere. He may well have been reading Galen's *περὶ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων*, ii. 1–214.

ἄλλη αἰτία: *αἰτία* is the wider term which covers *δύναμις*, cf. *ἐνέργειαν δὲ τὴν δραστικὴν ὀνομάζω κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης αἰτίαν δύναμιν* Galen, ii. 7, *πρώτως μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἐνεργείας αἰτία* (sc. *ἡ δ.*), *ἤδη δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἔργου κατὰ συμβεβηκός* id. ii. 9.

By *ἄλλη αἰτία* is meant a *φύσις*, which ensues upon contact between *τὸ σπέρμα* and that which the female contributes: *ὃ γὰρ ἦν πρότερον σπέρμα, τοῦθ' ὅταν ἄρξηται φύειν τε καὶ διαπλάττειν τὸ ζῷον* (*βρέφος* l. 14) *φύσις τις γίγνεται* Galen, ii. 83, id. iv. 188; *τοῦτο, ὅταν ἀφεθῇ εἰς τὴν μήτραν, συλληφθὲν ὑπ' ἄλλου πνεύματος, μέρος ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ θήλεος, καὶ συμφυὲς γενόμενον κρυφθέν τε φύει* Zeno ap. Euseb. *Praep. evang.* xv. 20. 1.

204. 14 **παραλαβοῦσα** 'taking under its charge', cf. *παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψ. ἡ φιλοσοφία* Pl. *Phd.* 82c.

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ἐργάζεται: *ἔργα τοίνυν τῆς φύσεως ἔτι μὲν κνουμένου τε καὶ διαπλαττομένου τοῦ ζῴου τὰ σύμπαντ' ἐστὶ τοῦ σώματος μόρια* Galen, ii. 10.

ἐξ οἵου οἷον; M. is not writing depreciatingly as he does at *ἐξ οἵων . . . εἰς οἷα* p. **244.** 23, in a reflection upon generation and dissolution. Gat. thinks that he may recall *τὸ τοῦ Ἱφικράτους ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα*, of small beginnings and great achievement, Arist. *Rh.* 1367^{b}18.

For similar reflections see: *εἰς ἄρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἀόρατα . . . ζῷα κατασπείραντες . . . μεγάλα ἔντος ἐκθρέψωνται . . .* Pl. *Ti.* 91d; *ἄρχεσθαι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου τὴν φύσιν, λήγειν δὲ εἰς τὸ πάντων ἄριστον* Ph. i. 15; *ἐκ μικρᾶς τινος ῥανίδος τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος δύνατον ὀστέα τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ σάρκας . . . οἷα ὁρῶμεν γενέσθαι;* Justin M. *Apol.* 19. 1. Contrast p. **70.** 18.

204. 15 **ἄλλη αἰτία,** i.e. what Galen calls *ἡ αὐξητικὴ δύναμις, ἡ θρεπτικὴ* δ., ii. 16.

204. 17 **ἐγκαλύψει:** see p. **82.** 15 n., and cf. *τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αἰνιττομενον ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐγκάλυψιν καὶ ἀπόκρυψιν* Plu. *Qu. Rom.* 266e; *κρυφθέν τε φύει* Zeno, cit. l. 13 above; *ὃ ἐποίησας ἐν κρυφῇ Ps.* 138 (139). 15.

204. 18 **τὴν βρίθουσαν:** i.e. *δύναμιν, gravity,* as *τὴν ἀνωφερῆ* δ. is *levity.* The evidence is from *ὡς πῦρ ἄνω, ὡς λίθος κάτω* p. **208.** 18; *τό τε πῦρ ἀβαρὲς ὂν ἀνωφερὲς εἶναι* Chrysippus ap. Plu. *De Rep. St.* 1053e; cf. p. **176.** 1. The mod. concept of gravitation has superseded these two hypotheses.

204. 19 **οὐχὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς:** cf. pp. **48.** 6, **220.** 21, **246.** 27.

Ch. 27: 204. 21–2 **δράματα καὶ σκηνὰς ὁμοειδεῖς:** M. uses the figure of a play for the various periods of history, not, however, in the sense often intended that the great men were merely acting a part. By *σκηνὰς ὁμ.* he may mean that the *setting* on the greater stage of life, p. **216.** 15, remains the same from age to age. Probably he has given the word *scene* the extension of meaning which it has in French and English, using it for *episode.* No doubt the *setting* is the same, but *ὁμοειδεῖς* suggests that the successive events, the scenes of the drama, in that sense of *scene,* repeat themselves. Cf. *τὸ ὁμοειδὲς προσκορῆ τὴν θέαν ποιεῖ* p. **116.** 15. History enables the reader *πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι* the characters of bygone reigns, and the identical scenes they

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enacted, cf. p. **156.** 7; so Polybius, writing of the historian's purpose, speaks of *τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν* i. 1. 2, their tragic catastrophes are the *episodes* of their careers.

204. 25 **ἐκεῖνα τοιαῦτα ἦν:** i.e. *ὁποῖα νῦν γίνεται* l. 20. The reading of A at both places presumably embodies a correction *τα*, written above the line, and standing for *τὰ αὐτά*. For *τοιαῦτα* cf. *ἐξ αἰῶνος ὁμοειδῶς ἐγίνετο καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἔσται* p. **184.** 21.

Ch. 28: 204. 27 **τῷ θυομένῳ χοιριδίῳ.** A bull and a pig, prepared for sacrifice to the Capitoline Jupiter, are figured on a panel from M.'s triumphal arch; cf. *suovetaurilia*, and the *porcae piacularis* recorded in *Acta Fratrum Arv.* p. 20, Henzen.

206. 1 **ὁ οἰμώζων:** cf. 'proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum' Lucr. iii. 870; 'nos homunculi indignamur si quis nostrum interiit?' Sulpicius Rufus to Cic. *Fam.* iv. 5. 4.

ἐπὶ τοῦ κλινιδίου: cf. 'cum matercula mea supra torum sedente multum garrivi' Fronto, *Ep.* p. 70; *ἐπὶ τῆς κλίνης αὐτοῦ Prov.* 26. 14, sim. *Ps.* 35 (36). 4.

206. 1–2 **τὴν ἔνδεσιν ἡμων.** I have followed Gat.'s punctuation, who thought that *ἐπινόησον δέ* may have dropped out, cf. *ἐπινοεῖν πῶς* p. **204.** 20. In view of what follows, he thought that *ἔνδεσις* meant the chain of necessity, what M. elsewhere terms *σύνδεσις*, pp. **46.** 24, **112.** 13, **122.** 24, and compared *ἑπόμεθα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐνδεδεμένοι* Hdt. ix. 16. See also *αἱ ψυχαὶ . . . ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ* Epict. i. 14. 6.

Cas. followed the MSS. punctuation, supposing the man to be lamenting the bondage of the self to the senses, cf. *πάντας δὴ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τοὺς βίους ἡμῶν ὡς ἐν τούτοις ἐνδεδεμένοι πεφύκασιν*, of bondage to pleasure, pain, and desire, Pl. *Lg.* 733d, sim. *ἐγκαταδεῖν* id. *Phd.* 84a, cf. 81e, 92a. This, however, leaves *καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* in the air.

206. 3 **τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλόν,** 'merely to follow' is an allusion to Cleanthes' saying (*Test.*), cf. p. **114.** 6. He continues the notion of a chain of necessity.

Ch. 29: 206. 5 **εἰ ὁ θάνατος δεινόν:** this is put differently at p. **248.** 21.

Ch. 30: 206. 7 **τί παρόμοιον ἁμαρτάνεις:** this maxim is ascribed to

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Pl. (in a form which is nearer to M.'s: *καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνεις καὶ ἄλλος τοιοῦτος εἶ* p. **224.** 20); in Plu.: *τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος· ἦ που ἄρ' ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος; De cohib. ira*, 463e, cf. id. 40d, 88e (*μή που*), 129d; sim. Stob. *Ecl.* iii, p. 599. Epict. employs it: *μή που καὶ αὐτὸς εἶς εἰμι ἐκείνων;* ii. 21. 9, *ἐπ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφω, εἰ ταὐτὰ κἀγὼ ἁμαρτάνω* iv. 4. 7. We may also compare Pyth.'s saying, cited at p. **92.** 23 *Test.*

The form here is closest to:

> hoc quidam non belle; numquid ego illi
> imprudens olim faciam simile? Hor. *Sat.* i. 4. 136.

206. 8 **τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλων.** M. uses this verb only here in a sense familiar from Epicurus, see Dr. C. Bailey, *Epicurus*, p. 261.

206. 9 **βιάζεται:** cf. *ἀναγκάζεται οὕτως ποιεῖν* p. **150.** 24; he is compelled because he is ignorant, that is, his judgement is perverse; it is that which is to be removed.

Ch. 31: 206. 11 **Σατυρίωνα ἰδών:** the tradition is corrupt, and M. Trannoy proposes to reduce the proper names to three. My paraphrase assumes some reordering which would imply that the first three names are those of contemporary members of the Academy, that Eutychion and Silvanus are Stoics whom M. compares with Euphrates, the teacher and friend of the younger Pliny. Tropaeophorus was perhaps a writer of literary letters like Alciphron, and Severus M.'s friend, p. **10.** 3, whom he likens to Socrates' friend Crito and his pupil Xenophon.

206. 14 **εἰς ἑαυτόν . . . φαντάζου:** Stich, by an oversight, reported that these words were omitted by A. The mistake was repeated by Leop. and Sch., and corrected by M. Trannoy sub silentio.

206. 17 **καπνὸν καὶ τὸ μηδέν:** cf. *νεκρὰ καὶ καπνός* p. **250.** 2; *τοιγὰρ σὺ δέξαι μ' . . . τὴν μηδὲν εἰς τὸ μηδέν* Soph. *El.* 1165; *κατθανὼν δὲ πᾶς ἀνὴρ | γῆ καὶ σκιά· τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει* Eur. *Fr.* 532 N².

206. 17–18 **τὸ ἅπαξ μεταβαλὸν οὐκέτι ἔσται.** M. is using the language of every day as he did at p. **52.** 21, he is not expressing an opinion on the question of the cyclical repetition of the world process, p. **86.** 1 n. In this and similar passages he is occupied with the rapid passage of mortals and mortal things, and does not entertain such thoughts as he expresses, e.g., at pp. **56.** 12, **152.** 9,

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still less does he appear to realize the inconsistency of this kind of reflection with the larger view of such passages as pp. **194.** 17 sq., or **198.** 23 sq.

206. 18 **ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ**, an expression equivalent to *δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτ' εἶναι* Epicur. *K.Δ.* 14.

τί οὖν ἐντείνῃ; Cor. made the same correction at p. **182.** 3. M. employs *διατεινάμενοι* at p. **70.** 11.

206. 20 **ὕλην καὶ ὑπόθεσιν:** the two words are sometimes synonymous; M., however, rarely repeats himself, and may well use the second word for his *vocation*, cf. p. **218.** 9.

206. 21 **γυμνάσματα λόγου**, words which recall *πῶς πρὸς τὰς περιστάσεις ἀγωνιστέον*, the title of Epict. i. 24; cf. *τὸ ἀνεκτικόν μου γυμνάζει, τὸ ἀόργητον, τὸ πρᾷον* id. iii. 20. 9.

φυσιολόγως: see *φυσιολογεῖν* p. **150.** 18 n. M. gives examples of such scientific reflection at p. **198.** 16 sq.

206. 22 **ἐξοικειώσῃς σεαυτῷ καὶ ταῦτα:** the same figure of assimilation by *τὸ λαμπρὸν πῦρ* is used at p. **50.** 6; here mental absorption is also compared to physiological *ἐξομοίωσις*, and similarly Galen uses *τὸ οἰκεῖον* of food which the digestive tracts can assimilate, ii. 22.

Ch. 32: 208. 3 **κρῖνον μηκέτι ζῆν:** words which resemble those employed about suicide at pp. **92.** 12, **198.** 2.

208. 3–4 **οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱρεῖ λόγος μὴ τοιοῦτον ὄντα.** If we may supply *ζῆν*, the construction will be like that of *μέχρις ἂν οὗ λ. αἱρῇ συνεῖναί με τῷ σωματίῳ* Epict. i. 29. 28. The meaning of *αἱρῇ* there appears to be *approves*, an extension of the sense of *αἱρεῖ ὁ λόγος* examined at p. **22.** 23 n. This interpretation conflicts with M.'s doctrine at p. **114.** 9, and generally with the doctrine of Epict. l.c., for he is saying that we are to remain here while Reason requires us to do so. I think therefore that *αἱρεῖ* is used here in the sense of *αἱρεῖται*, and means that Reason does not choose such a man for its own, does not *approve* him.

Ch. 33: 208. 11 **ἀπόλαυσιν.** M. endeavours in a variety of ways to express the joy which ensues from right action, and so to remove the reproach of want of human feeling commonly levelled against the right doer and against the Stoic doctrine.

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He uses *ἀπόλαυε* p. **42.** 2, *ἀπολαύειν* p. **248.** 6; cf. pp. **98.** 11, **154.** 19, **160.** 23, **192.** 2.

208. 12 **πανταχοῦ**: cf. *οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐκεῖ ἢ ὧδε* p. **200.** 26.

§ **2 τῷ μὲν οὖν κυλίνδρῳ**: the roller once started goes *κατὰ πρανοῦς*, l. 19, as fire ascends and a stone descends, if not constrained. M. is referring to an illustration of Free-will and Necessity used by Chrysippus: 'revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat' Cic. *De Fato*, 42; cf. Gell. *N.A.* vii (vi). 2. 11; [Arist.] *Probl.* 913^{b}37, *Mu.* 398^{b}28.

208. 13 **οὐδὲ τῷ ὕδατι**, i.e. water (and fire) in composite bodies on this earth, as he says *παντὶ δὲ πυρὶ ἐνταῦθα* p. **176.** 2.

208. 14 **ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ ψυχῆς ἀλόγου**, i.e. vegetable and mere animal life, cf. pp. **100.** 23, **160.** 11, **192.** 10.

208. 15 **νοῦς δὲ καὶ λόγος**, coupled as the goal of Nature, *τῆς φύσεως τέλος*, by Arist. *Pol.* 1334^{b}14.

§ **3**: **208.** 20 **τοῦ σωματίου . . . τοῦ νεκροῦ**: the body is not elsewhere so termed by M. as it is often by Epict.

208. 21 **τῆς αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου ἐνδόσεως**, usually translated by 'the surrender of Reason itself'. The meaning, however, seems to be *consent* or *permission*, the figure of speech being connected with *τὸ ἐνδόσιμον*, the signal to begin a movement, p. **228.** 23. The author of *De Mundo*, speaking of the complicated movements which are set up by one original 'release' (say of a handle in a machine working puppets) says: *τῆς πρώτης οἷον ἐνδόσεως εἰς κίνησιν μιᾶς γενομένης* 398^{b}26, where *ἔνδοσις* does not mean that the showman 'gives in' to the machinery, but that he 'releases' a spring or lever. It is worth observing that *τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον* is there used later, 399^{a}19, of the signal of consent to begin which is given by the coryphaeus, and compared to the originative command of God, like M.'s *ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν τὸ ἐνδόσιμον τῆς διαλύσεως* p. **228.** 23.

Here, then, the obstacles are either external or, if inward, only such by the consent of man's reason.

οὐ θραύει: the figure used at *οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ παρόντος θρανόμενος* p. **72.** 2.

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§ 4: **208.** 27 **τὸν φύσει πολίτην,** i.e. the member of the eternal City, cf. p. **88.** 26.

208. 28 **τῶν καλουμένων ἀκληρημάτων.** He says 'are called' because the word, like *ἀτύχημα*, rests on a vulgar criticism of life, cf. *ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῦτο ἀτύχημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φέρειν αὐτὸ γενναίως εὐτύχημα* p. **72.** 13. Polyb. makes a refined distinction, based probably upon his studies of Stoicism, between the two words: *ἀκληρεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντας ἡγητέον καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν τοὺς παραλόγοις συμφοραῖς περιπίπτοντας, ἀτυχεῖν δὲ μόνους τούτους οἷς διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος αἱ πράξεις ἐπιφέρουσιν* xxxviii. 3. 7.

Ch. 34: 210. 3 **τῷ δεδηγμένῳ:** the word appears to be a reminiscence of Pl. *Test.* Moreover, the assonance with *δογμάτων* is some support of the MSS. text.

210. 6 **φύλλα τὰ μέν κ.τ.λ.:** Xyl. in his Bas. edition printed *φύλλα . . . ἀπολήγει*, see Test. M., however, paraphrases partly, like Arist., partly quotes, cf. *ἀπόλλυται, ἄλλη δὲ πάλιν ἐπιγίγνεται, διὸ . . . πᾶσαν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὴν ἄλλην γίγνεται ὥραν H. An.* 569^{b}1. Simonides said of l. 146: *ἓν δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον Χῖος ἔειπεν ἀνήρ Fr.* 85 (60) Bergk.

210. 8 **ταῦτα τὰ ἐπιβοῶντα,** the neut. is influenced by *τὰ φυλλάρια,* but appears also to be used to give a generic character to the saying.

210. 9 **ἀξιοπίστως.** Sch. prints in inverted commas as if M. were referring to himself as a lecturer. These, however, seem to be persons whose praises are of his conduct and are genuine, cf. *ἐπαινείτωσαν* l. 23.

210. 10 **ἡσυχῇ,** *sotto voce*, cf. *ἡσυχῇ πρὸς ἐμὲ εἶπεν* Plu. *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 151 f; of a stage 'aside', Aristoph. *Schol. Ven.* ad *Ran.* 606.

210. 15 **ἄλλος θρηνήσει:** expressed with much more fullness at p. **154.** 9.

Ch. 35: 210. 17 **ὀφθαλμιῶντος:** cf. *ὡς οἱ ὀφθαλμιῶντες* p. **82.** 5.

210. 19 **τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα στόμαχον,** like *ὁ ἐρρωμένος στόμαχος* p. **206.** 22.

Ch. 36: 212. 2 **ἀσπαζόμενοι τὸ συμβαῖνον κακόν:** cf. *ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν μὲν συμφορὰν ἀσπάζομαι* Eur. *Ion*, 587. Some difficulty has been felt

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because M. here refers to death as an *evil*. But clearly he is stating dramatically what the critics think and say.

212. 3 **καθ' αὑτόν**: *ἡσυχῇ, καθ' ἑαυτόν, ἠρέμα, λεληθότως* are all stage directions for *aside*, cf. Rutherford, *Schol. Aristoph.* iii, p. 111.

212. 6–7 **ὁ ἀπαλλακτιῶν ἡμῶν**: cf. *ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε*, 'getting free of their master', X. *Mem.* i. 2. 24; *ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν* Pl. *Grg.* 514c.

212. 12–13 **εὐμενὴς αὐτοῖς ἄπιθι . . . ἵλεως**: cf. *ἄπιθι οὖν ἵλεως* p. **250.** 17. Pl. has: *ἀγαπᾷ εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας . . . τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς ἀπαλλάξεται R.* 496e.

212. 13 **τὸ ἴδιον ἔθος διασῴζων**: cf. *θάρσει, τό τοι σύνηθες ὀρθώσει μ' ἔθος* Soph. *Ph.* 894.

212. 14 **μὴ . . . ἀποσπώμενος**: the word appears to be passive, cf. *ἀπεσπασμένον κοινωνίας* p. **204.** 5; 'non repente avulsum vitae' Sen. *Ep.* 30. 12; *ἀβιάστως* l. 18.

212. 14–15 **τοῦ εὐθανατοῦντος εὐκόλως**. M. thinks perhaps of his adoptive father's death, see p. **110.** 9 n. Of Augustus it is said: 'sortitus exitum facilem et qualem semper optaverat. Nam fere quotiens audisset cito ac nullo cruciatu defunctum quempiam, sibi et suis *εὐθανασίαν* similem . . . precabatur' Suet. *Aug.* 99.

212. 15 **τὸ ψυχάριον . . . ἐξειλεῖται**, as the *imago* slips from the *chrysalis*, for the *ψ.* was commonly pictured as winged, see Frazer, *Golden Bough*, i.² 253. At p. **172.** 23, M. seems to mean that it drops like a seed from the pod, though *ἔλυτρον* might mean the casing of the *pupa*, cf. 'Why ev'n the worm at last disdains her shatter'd cell' Byron, *C. Harold*, ii. 5. M.'s words suggest merely release from the body's shell, not the prospect of survival, indeed he must have been familiar with Lucretius' use of the image of the snake and its skin in contrast with man's complaints at death, iii. 612.

212. 17 **συνῆψέ ⟨σε⟩ καὶ συνέκρινεν**: for the meaning and for the form of the emendation, cf. p. **142.** 18 n.

Ch. 37: 212. 20 **Ἔθισον**. For the use of the verb cf. *εἴθισα δὶς τῆς ἡμέρας ἀναγιγνώσκειν* Galen, v. 30.

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The moving and checking control is hidden from our senses, p. **246.** 27; [Arist.] *Mu.* 399[b]14, cf. Lucr. iii. 138.

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Ch. 1: 214. 4 Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, the *properties*, i.e. the distinctive marks of the soul or spirit at the level of reason, cf. p. **102. 4**. M. terms these *τὰ ἴδια ἀνθρώπου* p. **154. 19** (for *ἡ λογικὴ δύναμις* is *ἰδία τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψ.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 487), so Epict. says that *τὰ ἴδια* are *τὰ ἀνθρωπικά, τοὺς χαρακτῆρας οὓς ἔχων ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλήλυθεν* iv. 5. 16. They are called *τὰ ἐμά*, l. 11.

M. enumerates four moral and intellectual characteristics of the reasonable spirit at p. **154. 19**, and these he sets out in other words here (ll. 11–20), but first he exhibits the self-consciousness which results in the self-development and self-realization from which these activities are derived. This is a deeper view than he reaches elsewhere, and more profound than is met with in the rest of Stoic literature.

ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, sees with the eye of *reflection*, a word which preserves the simile. This ability distinguishes the inward eye from the organ of outward vision, and so man's reason excels his other faculties: *ἡ καὶ αὐτὴν θεωροῦσα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα . . . ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη καὶ αὐτὴν κατανοήσουσα παρείληπται* Epict. i. 1. 4.

ἑαυτὴν διαρθροῖ: it gives articulate shape to itself, as the mother *ἀποτελεῖ βρέφος* p. **204. 14**; cf. *ἐξ οὗ ὅλου ὅλον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, διαρθρουμένου . . . τοῦ κυήματος* Arist. *H.A.* 489^{b}9.

214. 5 ὁποίαν ἂν βούληται: expressing the liberty of the reasonable will: *τὸ ἡγ. . . . τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἐγεῖρον καὶ τρέπον καὶ ποιοῦν ἑαυτὸ οἷον ἂν καὶ θέλῃ* p. **98. 13**, sim. pp. **166. 20**, **200. 20**.

τὸν καρπόν: a favourite N.T. metaphor; cf. pp. **176. 23** n., **190. 12**.

214. 8 ἐπιστῇ: cf. *μήποτε . . . αἰφνίδιος ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἐπιστῇ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη St. Luke*, 21. 34; *τῆς νουμηνίας ἐπιστάσης* Lucian, *De Merc. cond.* 23.

214. 9 ἀτελὴς γίνεται . . . ἐάν τι ἐγκόψῃ. M. is thinking perhaps of an interruption to ritual enactment, in respect of which the Romans were especially sensitive: 'si ludius constitit aut tibicen repente conticuit . . . ludi sunt non rite facti' Cic. *De Harusp.* 23.

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ἐπὶ παντὸς μέρους. M. seems to allude to a *scene* in men's lives; cf. *τὰ πέντε μέρη* p. **250.** 13; 'nihil ad rem pertinet quo loco (i.e. seu fabulae seu vitae) desinas' Sen. *Ep.* 77. 20.

214. 10 **καταληφθῇ:** cf. *οὐδὲ ἀσυντελῆ τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ ἡ πεπρωμένη καταλαμβάνει* p. **44.** 7, where he contrasts, as he is doing here, the good man with the actor or artistic performer.

πλῆρες καὶ ἀπροσδεές. Moral conduct is entire at every instant, determined by its quality, not by its duration; see the paradoxes at pp. **30.** 13, **72.** 22. In this point the Stoics differed from Arist.'s doctrine. Philo makes the same point as M.: *κρίνεται γὰρ οὐ ποσότητι ἀλλὰ ποιότητι ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ καλόν· ὅθεν ἰσότιμον καλῷ βίῳ σοφοῦ καὶ μίαν ἡμέραν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι κατορθουμένην* ii. 426, and he contrasts herein the dancer and the Stoic wise man: *πάσαις μὲν ταῖς κινήσεσι, πάσαις δὲ ταῖς σχέσεσιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐπαινετός.* Similarly Cic. has: 'ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet . . . et tamen est etiam aliqua cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnis partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus . . . omnis numeros virtutis continent; sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est' *Fin.* iii. 24. See also *πλήρης καὶ ἀνενδεής* p. **190.** 23.

214. 11 **ἀπέχω τὰ ἐμά:** cf. *ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπέχει τὰ ἴδια* p. **72.** 11, where justice, etc., are man's true characteristics, l. 4 above. This is the fruit he garners, l. 5, cf. *τὸν καρπὸν ἀπέχειν τῶν . . . πονηθέντων*, of the honour and glory of Themistocles, Plut. *Them.* 17. Epict. has *τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι* iii. 24. 17, and St. Paul says: *ἀπέχω δὲ πάντα καὶ περισσεύω, πεπλήρωμαι Phil.* 4. 18, where Lightfoot remarks that 'the idea of *ἀπό* in this compound is correspondence of the contents to the capacity . . . so that it denotes the *full* complement'. Even if it is intelligible to speak of having 'all things to the full' and of a complement which, e.g., fills up a parallelogram, as a full complement, M.'s use of the word is rather in the sense *to secure*, to be in complete possession of; indeed he uses *ἔχει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ* in an identical meaning, p. **190.** 20.

§ **2 περιέρχεται:** contrast the narrow point of view at p. **28.** 11,

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and cf. Pl. *Tht.* 173e, cited there in *Test.* M. now approves an *ἐπιθεώρησις τῆς τῶν ὅλων φ.* p. **154.** 21. For the metaphor cf. 'atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque' Lucr. i. 74; 'infinitatem omnem peregrinabatur ut nulla in extremitate consisteret' Cic. *Tusc.* v. 114.

214. 12 **τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν κενόν.** The Stoics held, in opposition to Epicurus, that there is no void within the universe, but that without and around it is a void which will be occupied when the expanding mass returns to its gaseous condition: *ὁ τοίνυν ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκχεομένης καταλαμβανόμενος τόπος νῦν κενός ἐστιν* Cleom. *Circul. doctr.* p. 1; cf. *τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν ἐκτὸς ἄπειρόν ἐστι* Plu. *Rep. St.* 1054b; *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Σ. ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κενὸν εἶναι βουλόμενοι* Simpl. *in De Cael.* p. 284.

τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ: the earth is spherical and stationary, enclosed by the rotating spheres of aether, atmosphere, and water: *τὸν δὲ αἰθέρα καὶ οὐρανόν . . . ἔξωθεν εἶναι, σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα ἔχοντα . . . ἐν δὲ τῷ μεσαιτάτῳ τὴν γῆν εἶναι* Achill. *Isag.* 4, cf. Cleom. op. cit. p. 11.

214. 12–13 **τὴν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ αἰῶνος:** cf. *τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα* p. **102.** 10 n., and 'nullum seculum magnis ingeniis clusum est, nullum non cogitationi pervium tempus' Sen. *Ep.* 102. 22.

214. 13 **ἐκτείνεται:** cf. 'quam naturale sit in inmensum mentem suam extendere' Sen. l.c. 21. Cic. says: 'in quam se iniciens animus et intendens ita late longeque peregrinatur' *N.D.* i. 54.

Pl. has *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα ἀνάγει ἄνω R.* 533d, and later Platonists: *δύνανται εὐθὺ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀνατεινόμενοι τῇ ψ. τῷ θείῳ ἐντυγχάνειν* Max. Tyr. ii. 2; *ἀνατεινόμενοι ἄνω τῇ ἐννοίᾳ* Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* p. 107.

M. appears to avoid the use of *ἄνω, ἀνά* in passages like this, for he does not think of the *οὐρανός*, or of the other world as 'above', cf. *ἄνωθεν* p. **224.** 8 n.; he may indeed conceive the mind as piercing time and space like a ray of light, see p. **168.** 4.

τὴν περιοδικὴν παλιγγενεσίαν: cf. pp. **86.** 1 n., **94.** 8, **196.** 4.

214. 14 **οὐδὲν νεώτερον:** this sentiment depends upon a recognition of the principle of uniformity, *κατὰ τὸ ὁμοειδές* l. 17. M. sometimes employs this in preparation for death, by way of disillusionment, pp. **30.** 10, **116.** 15. More often he emphasizes the

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monotony of history, the repetition of mixed good and evil, e.g. pp. **112.** 12, **184.** 21, and the many passages, like p. **64.** 5, where he seems to be steeling himself to endure wickedness but does not invoke the principle of necessity. These two moments of reflection are to be compared with the spirit of *Ecclesiastes*, e.g. *ἴδε τοῦτο καινόν ἐστιν; ἤδη γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσιν τοῖς γενομένοις*, i. 10, and with Lucretius': 'eadem tamen omnia restant' iii. 947. A third aspect of his recognition of the rule of law is found in passages like the present where he founds himself on the righteousness of Nature's purpose, cf. pp. **112.** 12, **184.** 21.

214. 16 **ὁ τεσσαρακοντούτης**, a man in forty years can embrace all life's lessons, cf. p. **136.** 4. M. seems to be blending with the third point of view, just mentioned, somewhat of the less profound consideration of the vanity of life, except of what lies in virtuous activity, to which he passes in the next chapter.

§ 3: 214. 18 **καὶ ἀλήθεια:** the substantives are combined with the verbal term *τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς πλησίον*, as he has *ἁπλότης καὶ αἰδώς* followed by *φίλησον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος* p. **130.** 15. He might have written *νόμος, ἀλήθεια, εὔνοια, αἰδώς* as at **58.** 15.

It is strange that Sch. should read *ὃ καὶ ἀλήθεια* with A, for 'love of neighbours' is not a synonym with *truth*, etc. P has a similar misreading, whatever the explanation, in *ὃ καὶ πάντα* p. **184.** 23.

214. 19 **ὅπερ ἴδιον καὶ νόμου:** M. elsewhere has silently associated *νόμος* with certain social virtues, here he gives the ground for his doctrine. Law, the objective expression of *λόγος ὀρθός*, prefers to every other claim its own principle, and is therefore the outcome of the righteous man's self-reverence, cf. pp. **76.** 2, **88.** 23. For *μηδὲν ἑ. προτιμᾶν*, cf. *ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν αὐτοῦ* (sc. *Καίσαρος*) *μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον, ἐνταῦθα δ' αὐτοὺς ἁπάντων* Epict. i. 14. 17.

οὕτως ἄρ': the inference is incompletely expressed, as is M.'s custom. The middle term is *τὸ μηδὲν ἑαυτῆς προτιμᾶν* (cf. *τὸ ἀρκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῇ τὴν διάνοιάν σου* p. **40.** 22) and *λόγος ὀρθός* the major, from which *λόγος δικαιοσύνης* depends. The two are often loosely treated as equivalents: *φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λ.* D.L. vii. 128. Cic. states the connexion: 'quibus enim ratio natura data est,

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isdem etiam recta ratio data est, ergo etiam lex, quae est recta ratio in iubendo et vetando; si lex, ius quoque' *Lg.* i. 33, and ultimately: 'principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis dei' ib. ii. 8. For the law of God as governing the state cf. [Arist.] *Mu.* 400^{b}13.

Ch. 2: 214. 23 **διατραπήσῃ**, 'erubesces enim id fateri', Gat., taking the meaning to be equivalent to *αἰσχυνθήσῃ γὰρ ὁμολογῆσαι* p. **158.** 16. The verb in the passive appears to convey the sense 'to be put out of countenance', a synonym being *ἀθυμῆσαι* Plb. iii. 54. 7.

214. 24–5 **κίνησιν ἢ σχέσιν:** cf. *ἡ γὰρ ὄρχησις ἔκ τε κινήσεων καὶ σχέσεων συνέστηκεν* Plu. *Conv. Disp.* 747c; see Arist. *Po.* 1447^{a}27.

216. 1–2 **ἐπὶ τὸν βίον ὅλον μεταφέρειν:** cf. *οὕτως δεῖ παρ' ὅλον τὸν β. ποιεῖν* p. **100.** 15, of the same method of disillusionment; sim. pp. **184.** 27, **202.** 8. Holste's correction makes a better conclusion of the sentence; for the scribal error cf. Mr. Marchant's *νομίζειν* for *νόμιζε* at the close of vi. 19.

Ch. 3: 216. 3 **ἐὰν ἤδη ἀπολυθῆναι δέῃ.** Gat. suggested a change of order, i.e. *ἐὰν ἤδη δέῃ* or *ἐὰν δέῃ* so that *ἕτοιμος* might govern *ἀπολυθῆναι* or *ἤδη ἀ.* By excising *καί*, the intrusion of which is explicable, we get a simple and clear period; the structure *ἀπολυθῆναι καὶ ἤτοι . . . ἢ . . . ἤ* is not in accordance with M.'s usage.

ἀπολυθῆναι combines the senses of discharge (p. **250.** 17) and delivery. There is a natural reminiscence of Pl.'s teaching that the philosopher is *ἀπολύων . . . τὴν ψ. ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας Phd.* 65a, and that death gives that release: *ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς* ib. 67a. For the three possible consequences of death see p. **130.** 20 n.

216. 5 **τοῦτο ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως ἔρχηται:** this use of *ἵνα* with the subj. for an imperatival clause occurs again in l. 8, but nowhere else in our author. For the idiom cf. *ἵνα μὴ μωρὸς ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἵνα μάθῃ* Epict. iv. 1. 41; *ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἵνα φοβῆται τὸν ἄνδρα* St. Paul, *Eph.* 5. 33.

ἰδικῆς, which M. does not use elsewhere, was chosen, perhaps, because *ἀπὸ ἰδίας κ.* would have been interpreted as 'by your own

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decision'. He means a judgement reached after weighing the specific circumstances, cf. 'me vero peculiaris quaedam inpedit ratio' Plin. *Ep.* i. 8. 16. Of Corellius Rufus' suicide, after long deliberation, Pliny writes: 'dixerat sane medico . . . *κέκρικα*' id. i. 12. 10.

ἔρχηται expresses causal dependence, the *outcome* of reflection, as the verb is used for the coming in due course of the seasons, of the years, of death, e.g. *εἰς ὅ κε γῆρας | ἐλθῇ καὶ θάνατος Od.* xiii. 59, cf. M.'s employment of it at p. **54. 9.**

μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν: cf. *κἂν ἀλόγως παρατάξηται* (sc. *τὸ ἡγ.*) opp. to *ὅταν καὶ μετὰ λόγου . . . κρίνῃ* p. **162. 27.** Here Xyl. in his second edition translated the words by 'simplici obstinatione', which Gat. approved, referring to Pliny's 'pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem' *Ep.* x. 96 (97). 3. As M. is thinking of deliberate suicide, we may fairly suppose that he contrasts the voluntary martyrdom of certain Christians of whom Clem. Alex. even says: *ψέγομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τοὺς ἐπιπηδήσαντας τῷ θανάτῳ Strom.* p. 571. At least it is natural that in his position he should use language of which *mera obstinatio* is a reasonable paraphrase. The cognate verb is used, in the Christian letter from Vienne, of the deacon Sanctus, who suffered with Blandina: *ἀντιπαρετάξατο αὐτοῖς ὥστε μήτε τὸ ἴδιον κατειπεῖν ὄνομα* . . . Euseb. *H.E.* v. 1. 20. These passages, with many from Tertullian, are cited by Gat. in his judicious note. The development of meaning is clear in Josephus' use of *ἀντιπαράταξις τῆς γνώμης* for the Jews' sullen temper of resistance, *Ant. Iud.* xviii. 8. 4.

216. 6 **ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί,** words bracketed as a gloss by Eichstädt, *Exercit. Anton.* iii (1821), and recently by Mr. Haines. The latter thinks that M. would not have used the vulgar word for Christians, and remarks that the syntax is incorrect. It is true that Epict. says *οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι*, but M. must have known the word St. Luke uses, if only from Pliny. As to the syntax, both Greek and Latin authors construct comparative clauses loosely, and this is true of Hebrew writers also, e.g. "my feet like hinds' feet" is literally "like hinds", *Ps.* 18. 33. To Dobree's instances I add the following, which resemble M.'s usage here: *τῶν τετραπόδων . . . τὰ μέν ἐστι πολυσχιδῆ, ὥσπερ αἱ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου χεῖρες* Arist. *H.A.* 499^{b}7; *παραλογίζεται ἡ διάνοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν,*

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ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος id. *Pol.* 1307^{b}36, sim. *E.N.* 1147^{b}35; *ἤρκει λοιπόν, ὥσπερ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα, τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἀρκεῖσθαι πλεονεκτήμασιν*, where *ἡμῖν* is supplied from the context, Julian, 194c (Dobree, *Advers.* ii, p. 223; Riddell, *Digest*, § 176; Bywater's note on *οἷον*, Arist. *Po.* 1456^{a}2; Munro ad Lucr. iii. 456).

λελογισμένως: cf. *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν κατὰ ἄνθρωπόν ἐστι λελογισμένον, μὴ ὁλοσχερῶς . . . πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἔχειν* p. **172.** 19; 'deliberare vero et causas eius expendere utque suaserit ratio vitae mortisque consilium vel suscipere vel ponere ingentis est animi' Pl. *Ep.* i. 22. 10; 'Corellium quidem summa ratio, quae sapientibus pro necessitate est, ad hoc consilium compulit' id. i. 12. 3.

216. 7 **ἀτραγῴδως:** cf. *τραγῳδίαν οὐ ποιεῖ* p. **42.** 22; *τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος* Pl. *Ap.* 35b. The simile may well have suggested the reflections of ch. 6.

Ch. 4: 216. 8 **οὐκοῦν ὠφέλημαι.** That a social service benefits the doer follows from the reasoning at p. **86.** 23 which concludes *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου· τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κοινωνία.* The rational self gathers its own fruit, p. **214.** 5, it must act *ὡς ἑαυτὸν εὖ ποιῶν*, p. **124.** 15. Epict. points out that this natural self-regard is not selfishness inasmuch as the rational creature is so constituted *ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν ἂν μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται. οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινώνητον γίνεται τὸ πάντα αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν* i. 19. 13

τοῦτο ἵνα ἀεὶ . . . ἀπαντῇ: the late usage commented upon at l. 5. Here it is coupled with an imperative, *παύου*, as St. Paul has *ἀγαπάτω* in co-ordination at *Eph.* l.c.

216. 9 **μηδαμοῦ παύου:** the participle is left to be supplied and might be in at least three ways. A close parallel is *μὴ οὖν κάμνε ὠφελούμενος, ἐν ᾧ ὠφελεῖς* p. **144.** 25.

Ch. 5: 216. 10 **Τίς σου ἡ τέχνη;** His art is the art of living, which is based on *θεωρήματα*, cf. p. **50.** 9. The word is appropriate here in contrast with the fine arts of ch. 2; but he may, as he says at p. **74.** 15, emulate the devoted labours of *ὁ τορευτὴς* and *ὁ ὀρχηστής*.

πῶς ἄλλως γίνεται ἢ: Upton's correction of the MSS. reading

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καλῶς may be supported by the sense, by the fact that *ἤ* is rarely used *simpliciter*, and by the fact that P has *καλῶς* and A Mo. 2 *ἄλλως* at p. **222.** 24.

Ch. 6: 216. 13 **Πρῶτον αἱ τραγῳδίαι παρήχθησαν:** the order, Tragedy then Comedy, l. 25, is that given by Horace, although Quint. puts the Old Comedy first, *Inst.* x. 1. 65. M. ignores Roman drama.

παρήχθησαν appears to be a stage metaphor, as in *μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν*, of the tragic poet, Aristoph. *R.* 1054, but M. may mean *introduced* as elements of education, cf.: *πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν*, of music, Arist. *Pol.* 1338ª22.

216. 13–14 **ὑπομνηστικαὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων:** the tragic poet reminds his audience of human *vicissitudes*, which his fables exhibit. So Polybius says that historians claimed to educate their readers to bear fortune's blows nobly through *τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν*, i. 1. 2. M. makes this view of drama more vivid by making the poet address *ὑπομνήματα* to the spectators. This was done in *Oedipus Rex* by the chorus at the close: *ὦ πάτρας Θήβης ἔνοικοι, λεύσσετ', Οἰδίπους ὅδε* Soph. *O.T.* 1524; cf. Eur. *Ph.* 1758. Dr. Rendall's difficulty about 'the recurrent and isolated use of the 2nd. pers. plur.' may thus be resolved.

216. 14 **ταῦτα οὕτως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι**, words echoed in *δεῖ ταῦτα περαίνεσθαι*, where M. may be thinking of: *νῦν χρησμός, ὦ παῖ, Λοξίου περαίνεται* Eur. *Ph.* 1703. So St. Luke says: *οὐχὶ ταῦτα ἔδει παθεῖν τὸν Χριστόν;* of the divine drama, 24. 26. Arist. explains that a good plot is constructed *ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα Po.* 1452ª19, and M.'s most general expression for the law of human life is: *ἕκαστον πέφυκεν ὥσπερ θνήσκειν* p. **202.** 10.

216. 14–15 **οἷς ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ψυχαγωγεῖσθε.** M.'s way of putting the paradox of our pleasure in the mimicked sorrows. He used the same verb for the similar paradoxes at p. **36.** 2. The comic poet Timocles gives a like theory of this experience when he says that the poor and suffering spectator:

> *πρὸς ἀλλοτρίῳ τε ψυχαγωγηθεὶς πάθει*
> *μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀπῆλθε παιδευθεὶς ἅμα,*

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for, seeing another's suffering greater than his own: *τὰς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ συμφορὰς ἧττον στένει, Dionys. Fr.* 6 K.

216. 15–16 **ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος σκηνῆς,** the *stage* of history, as he said: *ὅλα δράματα καὶ σκηνὰς ὁμοειδεῖς* p. **204.** 21. Bernays thought, following Gat., that M. refers to the saying of the tragic actor Neoptolemus, *Test.* The parallel, so familiar to us, between life and the drama appears already in Pl.: *μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ Phlb.* 50b; cf. *τὰ πέντε μέρη* p. **250.** 13–14 n.

216. 16–17 **φέρουσιν αὐτά,** an instance of a thought familiar in Greek tragedy and consonant with Stoicism. Soph. has: *οὐδεὶς οἷός τε πλὴν ἐμοῦ φέρειν βροτῶν O.T.* 1415; *χρεὼν | τὰ θεῖα θνητοὺς ὄντας εὐπετῶς φέρειν* id. *Tereus Fr.* 526 N.², 585 P., where Pearson gives many parallels.

216. 17 **ἰὼ Κιθαιρών,** words also cited by Epict. but to point a different moral, i. 24. 16.

216. 18 **χρησίμως:** he cites three 'sententias . . . quas Graeci *chrias* vocant' Sen. *Ep.* 33. 7; cf. p. **218.** 1–2 and 6. Although M. regards tragedy from a moral rather than an aesthetic point of view, the thought of its moral *maxims* leads him to inquire, in the next section, into the value of comedy, especially the Old Comedy, as a criticism of politics and human life.

216. 22 **⟨χρεών⟩,** this word, clearly lost in transmission, cf. pp. **132.** 13 and **134.** 1, reminds us of a similar loss of one word, at several places in our MSS., e.g. pp. **54.** 12, **88.** 7–8, **126.** 5, **156.** 9, **160.** 3, **166.** 9–10, **168.** 16, **174.** 3, **228.** 16. Each of these small lacunae is not to be explained by homoeoteleuton, but merely by plain oversight.

§ 2: 216. 25 **ἡ ἀρχαία κωμῳδία:** cf. 'successit vetus his comoedia' Hor. *A.P.* 281. M. appears to follow a tradition, which cannot be traced earlier than to the time of Hadrian. He recognizes an intermediate stage between the Old and the New Comedy of Aristotle's arrangement, *E.N.* 1128ª22.

218. 1 **παιδαγωγικὴν παρρησίαν,** this disciplinary frankness is claimed for himself by Aristophanes, e.g. *ὡς κωμῳδήσει τὰ δίκαια, τὰ βέλτιστα διδάσκων Ach.* 655, 658; *τολμᾷ τε λέγειν τὰ δίκαια Eq.* 510. He makes the tragic poets similarly claim to be

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instructors, e.g., Aeschylus, *Ran.* 1055; Euripides, ib. 1009. That M. is thinking of larger issues than the censure of vicious individuals, which Horace ascribes to 'comoedia prisca', *Sat.* i. 4. 3, and than the mere ridicule of moral failings, which continued in the Middle and New Comedy (*παρρησία . . . ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τοῖς κωμῳδοδιδασκάλοις* Isocr. viii. 14) seems clear from his depreciation of the later writers, which follows.

218. 2 εὐθυρρημοσύνης. Arist., contrasting the Old and New comic writers, says: *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια* (suggestion) *E.N.* 1128ª23. M. regards this unvarnished language as exposing to its victim his vanity, and *τῦφος* is especially characteristic of men in high station, cf. 'Domine, qui solus sine tyfo dominaris' St. Aug. *Conf.* x. 59.

218. 3 καὶ Διογένης ταυτὶ παρελάμβανεν. The reference appears to be to the *plain-speaking* of the Cynics, which resembled such candour as Menander put into the mouths of honest slaves, see the instance which M. cites at p. **84.** 13 and 22. So Philo, commending *ἡ ἐν τῷ δέοντι παρρησία πρὸς τοὺς ἀμείνους*, cites Men. *Fr.* 370 K., of freedom permitted to slaves, i. 473.

Diogenes when asked *τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις;* replied *παρρησία* D.L. vi. 69.

Leop. thought the reference to be to Diogenes' tragedies which Favorinus said were forged by Philiscus, D.L. vi. 73 and 80; see also *Test.*

ταυτί is a form not used elsewhere by M. Perhaps it represents *ταῦτα* with an interlinear *οι*, and should be *τοιαῦτα*; cf. A's *ταῦτα εἰ* for *τοιαῦτα* p. **180.** 20.

218. 3–5 μετὰ ταῦτα τίς . . . ἐπίστησον. The sentence is awkward but is hardly mended by correcting, with Stich, what was A's attempted remedy. Gat. considered that the government of *ἐπίστησον* extends to *πρὸς τίνα ποτὲ σκοπόν* l. 7.

218. 5 τὴν ἐκ μιμήσεως φιλοτεχνίαν. Menander was celebrated as holding a mirror to life: *ὦ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;* Aristoph. Byz., cited by Scaliger in his note on 'Menander | qui vitae ostendit vitam', Manil. v. 476; cf. 'ita omnem vitae imaginem expressit' Quint. *Inst.* x. 1. 69.

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What M. exactly means to criticize in the later Comedy is not clearly expressed. Neil says: 'M. Aurelius gives what was no doubt the accepted view, that the Old Comedy was for public edification, while the New tended to art for art's sake', *Knights of Aristophanes*, p. xiv, n. 3.

218. 6–7 **ἡ ὅλη ἐπιβολή**: cf. *τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς ἱστορίας* Polyb. i. 4. 2. Like the arts mentioned in ch. 2 its aim was to amuse, not to edify.

Ch. 7: 218. 9 **ἐναργὲς προσπίπτει**: cf. *ἐναργέστερον προσπεσεῖν* p. **180.** 14.

βίου ὑπόθεσιν: his attitude to this *calling* has shifted since he wrote: *ἀνταγωνίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις* p. **146.** 9 as indeed it had already done at p. **150.** 3. He may also, when he uses this word, remember its employment for the plan of a drama.

Ch. 8: 218. 11 **Κλάδος . . . ἀποκοπείς.** M. thinks of a branch cut off from a cultivated tree, as St. Paul of a broken branch of a domesticated olive, *Rom.* 11. 17. Neither mentions grafting a fruit-bearing stock on to a wild tree, which is one of the four kinds of *ἐγκεντρισμός* described by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 799.

218. 14–15 **μισήσας καὶ ἀποστραφείς**: cf. *ἀπέχθεσθαι αὐτῷ* and *ἀποστρέφεσθαι* p. **20.** 8 and 12.

218. 16–17 **δῶρον τοῦ . . . Διός**: cf. *τοῦτο ἄλλῳ μέρει οὐδενὶ θεὸς ἐπέτρεψεν, χωρισθέντι καὶ διακοπέντι πάλιν συνελθεῖν* p. **158.** 2. The only other passage where Zeus is introduced in this way is p. **90.** 25.

218. 17 **συμφῦναι τῷ προσεχεῖ**: cf. *εὐπρόσφυτον δ' ἀεὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον* Theophr. *De Caus. Pl.* i. 6. 2.

218. 21 **σύμπνους**: the branch partakes through the bough of the sustaining *διαπνοή* of the parent stock, see *διαπνεῖσθαι* p. **102.** 20, and *σύμπνοιαν* p. **112.** 16.

218. 22 **ἐγκεντρισθέντι**: cf. *δυνατὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς πάλιν ἐγκεντρίσαι αὐτούς* St. Paul, *Rom.* 11. 23.

ὅ τι ποτὲ λέγουσιν οἱ φυτουργοί: i.e. that they can bring about a perfect reunion. Mr. Marchant pointed out that the passage has usually been mistranslated ('as gardeners say' etc.), and that in fact M., in his desire to make the illustration exemplify his doctrine, does not give gardeners credit for a skill which (at least in modern times) they not only profess but actually possess.

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218. 23 Ὁμοθαμνεῖν μέν, μὴ ὁμοδογματεῖν δέ. Xyl. separated this sentence from the preceding aphorism, and omitted to translate *ὅ τι . . . φυτουργοί*. He may also have intended to correct δέ to δεῖ, for his version is: 'oportet igitur in eadem arbore esse, etsi non idem cum omnibus sentias.' Gat. translated: 'quem plantarum cultores dicere solent, confruticari quidem, sed non configurari', substituting *ὁμοσχηματεῖν* for *ὁμοδογματεῖν*. M. appears to sum up by a quotation of which the implication is that men are to live in unity although they agree to differ in opinion. This is how the passage was taken by Rigault, who quoted, emended, and censured it, in his *Onosandri Strategicus*, A.D. 1600, saying: '*κοινωνήσουσι γνώμης αὐτοῦ*. Communio et *κοινωνία* esse debet, ut vitae sic opinionum; et vanum illud M. Antonini Imp. Lib. xi *τῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν, ὁμοθαμνεῖν μέν, μὴ ὁμοδογματίζειν δεῖ*' (notes, p. 14).

Ch. 9: 218. 26 ἐκκρουέτωσαν: see *ἐκκρουσθέντα* p. **82.** 3 n. Although the word soon lost its vigour in becoming fig., it retains some of its old force here in view of *οἱ ἐνιστάμενοι* and *ἀποτρέψαι*.

220. 1 εὐσταθοῦς: cf. p. **88.** 7 n. A balanced judgement leads to equilibrium in conduct. To achieve *εὐστάθεια* of the flesh, as well as of the spirit, was an endeavour of the Epicurean school.

220. 3–4 ἀσθενές, τὸ χαλεπαίνειν: cf. *οὐχὶ τὸ θυμοῦσθαι ἀνδρικόν* p. **226.** 27. An admirable correction both of the vulgar view and of the Peripatetic teaching on *Anger*.

220. 5 λιποτάκται: see pp. **62.** 20, **204.** 12. This spelling is that of Choeroboscus, s.v. *λιποταξίου*, Cramer, *Anecd. Ox.* ii. 239.

Ch. 10: 220. 7 Οὐκ ἔστι χείρων οὐδεμία φύσις τέχνης: the phrase means in effect that natural principle *per se*, and every *nature* which contains this principle unalloyed, is superior to art regarded as human technique. A *nature* exhibits in its life-history an adaptation of means to the ends of its existence and persistence. Art is a second Nature since all arts reproduce Nature's methods. *φύσις* in Galen's popular physiological works stands, according to the context, for a given natural organism, or for its guiding principle (*ἡ τυχοῦσα φύσις* p. **80.** 16), or for Nature itself. Thus on the present question Galen is in agreement

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with M., e.g.: *οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις τῶν ἀτεχνίαν τῆς φ. εἴης κατεγνωκότων ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς, αἰδεσθήσεσθαί τε καὶ μεταγνώσεσθαι . . . Ἱπποκράτει πεισθέντα, διὰ παντὸς ὑμνοῦντι τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν εἰς τὰ ζῷα πρόνοιαν* iii. 235, *οὐ μόνον δικαίαν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τεχνικὴν καὶ σοφὴν ἀποφανούμεθα* iv. 264. Notice his emphasis upon Nature's *τεχνικὴ εὐμηχανία*, to borrow M.'s term, l. 9, and upon *δικαιοσύνη* to which M. makes a transition at the close of this ch.

220. 7–8 **αἱ τέχναι τὰς φύσεις μιμοῦνται:** the pl. shows that *οὐδεμία φύσις* is used mainly in a distributive sense.

Both the Epicureans and the Stoics held that the history of arts and crafts proved that man in them was reproducing Nature's methods, modelling his devices on hers. The Stoics followed Arist. in this hypothesis: *μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φ., ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τὴν φ.* Arist. ap. Iambl. *Protrept.* p. 49. The Epicureans reproduced the teaching of Democritus, Pl. *Lg.* 889a.

220. 10 **τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν τὰ χείρω.** This subordination in the world of arts and crafts is appealed to by Arist. in the opening ch. of *E.N.* Nature follows the same principle in her subordination of inanimate to animate parts, and of the merely animate to reasoning creatures p. **86.** 28, cf. p. **138.** 10.

220. 11–12 **γένεσις δικαιοσύνης.** He appears to contemplate a natural history of justice, which would have grown up by a study of the subordination and co-ordination observable in nature's products. Thus justice is a human art resting upon natural law. Galen says that we will praise Nature as just in all her works: *εἰ δὲ καὶ διττῆς οὔσης δικαιοσύνης, ἑτέρας μὲν ἰδιώταις γνωρίμης, ἑτέρας δὲ καὶ τεχνίταις προσηκούσης, ἡ φ. φαίνοιτο τὴν τεχνικωτέραν αἱρουμένη, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπαινέσομεν* iv. 265. He goes on to compare this artistic justice with what Pl. says is the truest *ἰσότης*: *τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ Lg.* 757c.

Elsewhere M. says: *οὐδὲν διήνεγκε λόγος ὀρθὸς καὶ λόγος δικαιοσύνης*, i.e. the rule of justice rests on the rule of reason, p. **214.** 20.

220. 12 **αἱ λοιπαὶ ἀρεταί.** The position taken up in the early books of Pl. *R.*, and recurring in Arist.'s moral and political works.

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So Cic. has: 'si natura confirmatura ius non erit, virtutes omnes tollentur' *Lg.* i. 43.

Later in this Book M. puts holiness and the service of God above justice, p. **230.** 6.

220. 12–13 **οὐ γὰρ τηρηθήσεται τὸ δίκαιον.** M. does not give an exhaustive or rigorous proof; he gives instead instances where particular failures overthrow the principal civic virtue.

220. 13 **ἐὰν ἤτοι διαφερώμεθα πρὸς τὰ μέσα:** if we are partial where Nature is impartial, as she is in regard to *τὰ μέσα*, p. **26.** 18, we commit a breach of *ἰσότης*. Again *ἀδικοῦμεν δὴ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα διαφοράν* p. **114.** 2.

220. 14 **εὐεξαπάτητοι καὶ προπτωτικοί:** cf., in a parallel context, *τὸ ἀπρόπτωτον καὶ ἀνεξαπάτητον* p. **138.** 19. These two attributes and *μεταπτωτικοί* seem to have little to do with justice. Is his meaning that these faults are injurious to truth and, if we fall into them, we do an injustice to ourselves, by self-deception, by hasty or vacillating judgements? We may compare p. **170.** 6.

Ch. 11: 220. 15 **Οὐκ ἔρχεται ἐπὶ σὲ τὰ πράγματα:** cf. pp. **52.** 19, **88.** 9, **178.** 11, **222.** 20. This is the only place where M. represents the mind as going out to its objects, as sight was supposed to do in early theory.

Ch. 12: 220. 19 **Σφαῖρα ψυχῆς αὐτοειδής.** The mind is compared to a sphere at pp. **160.** 20, **238.** 3. Under this figure the Ionian physicists represented God or the Universe, Xenoph. ap. Arist. *M.X.G.* 977^{b}16–20; Parm. 8. 43; Emped. 27 and 28.

αὐτοειδής appears to be a concise equivalent to *ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἑαυτῷ*, as the *ψυχή* is *τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον* Pl. *Phd.* 80b.

ἐκτείνηται ἐπί τι: opp. to *ἕσω συντρέχῃ*, i.e. the spherical body, to which the *ψ.* is compared, is not deformed by expansion at any point of its surface or by collapse.

220. 20 **μήτε σπείρηται μήτε συνιζάνῃ.** The fig. seems to be derived from a globe, like the sun, which is luminous and glowing. *σπείρηται* is a poetical word for the *showering* or *scattering* of the light waves: *σπείρων θεοκτίσταν φλόγα* ap. Arist. *Po.* 1457^{b}29: 'dissipat omnis | ardorem in partis et lumine conserit arva' Lucr. ii. 211.

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συνιζάνῃ describes embers falling in and dying down: *οὐκ ἔπαθεν ἃ προσήκει πάσχειν πηλὸν ἐν πυρί, πυκνοῦσθαι καὶ συνιζάνειν* Plu. *Publ.* 13.

Epicurus spoke of the atoms of the anima being drawn inwards or dispersed outwards: *ὕπνον τε γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψ. μερῶν . . . ἐγκατεχομένων ἢ διαφορουμένων* schol. ap. D.L. x. 66; 'fit uti pars inde animai | eiciatur et introrsum pars abdita cedat' Lucr. iv. 944.

φωτὶ λάμπηται. The light of the mind illuminates its objects and itself, whereas the light of the eye can only see its objects, not itself. A curious observation which Pl. dwells upon, e.g. *Smp.* 212a, *R.* 518c, 532a.

Gat. compares *ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν, ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον, ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, the true light, the illuminating truth, *St. John*, 1. 9, adding 'illuminabat illud et M., etiamsi sui nescium'.

Ch. 13: 220. 22 **ὄψεται:** see p. **90.** 13 n. Cf. *ψέγει σε· αὐτὸς ὄψεται πῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον* Epict. iii. 18. 9. Here M. varies his expression by adding *ἐγὼ δὲ ὄψομαι*, 'I must look to it that, etc.'

220. 25 **οὐκ ὀνειδιστικῶς:** cf. *μήτε εἰρωνικῶς . . . μήτε ὀνειδιστικῶς, ἀλλὰ φιλοστόργως* p. **226.** 19.

220. 26 **γνησίως καὶ χρηστῶς:** the second adv. alludes to Phocion's nickname or rather title of honour, *ὁ χρηστός*. Suid. says: *χρηστὸς ἐκλήθη κοινῇ ψήφῳ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*. Plu.'s life of him is full of sayings which illustrate his dry irony. Naturally we think of the most celebrated, his dying message to his son, *Test.*, more fully given as *μηδὲν Ἀθηναίοις μνησικακῆσαι ὑπὲρ τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν φιλοτησίας, ἣν νῦν πίνω* Ael. *V.H.* xii. 49. Thus the reference would be to a gesture of *ἀνεξικακία*, which was not a veiled reproach, if it was said *γνησίως* (*μὴ εἰρωνικῶς* p. **226.** 19), i.e. *εἴ γε μὴ προσεποιεῖτο.*

The story in Musonius, *Test.*, fits *τὸ παρορώμενον δεῖξαι* better, but 'perhaps you owe an apology to some other lady's husband' is plainly ironical.

220. 27 **τὰ ἔσω,** the parts which man cannot see, whereas *ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνὰ . . . ὁρᾷ* p. **236.** 8, cf. *βλέπεσθαι* p. **222.** 1; *θέλησον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ* Epict. ii. 18. 19. Gat. also refers

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to: 'Behold, thou delightest in truth in the places plastered over' *Ps.* 50 (51). 6 (see Driver, *The Parallel Psalter*, ad loc.).

222. 2 δεινοπαθοῦντα: cf. *ἐπὶ τῷ Κλείτου φόνῳ δεινοπαθοῦντα παραμυθούμενος Ἀλέξανδρον* Plu. *Ad princip.* 781a.

222. 4 τεταμένος πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι: cf. *ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν, πάντι δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται* Pl. *R.* 581b; *πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι* Epict. iv. 12. 19; *σπεύδοντά τε καὶ συντεταμένον ἐκμαθεῖν* Galen, ii. 179.

Ch. 14: 222. 5 ἀλλήλοις ἀρεσκεύονται: cf. pp. **120.** 10 n., **202.** 13; 'eodem tempore servos despicis et colis, imperiosus intra limen atque inpotens, humilis foris' Sen. *Ben.* iii. 28. 6.

222. 6 ὑποκατακλίνονται: used of disputants who are over-complaisant, *R.* 336c. There may be an allusion to taking a lower place at table: *κελεύω φιλολόγῳ μὲν ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι φιλομαθῆ, δυσκόλῳ δὲ πρᾶον* Plu. *Smp.* 618e.

Ch. 15: 222. 9 ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου: cf. 'speciem ita formavit (sc. natura) oris, ut in ea penitus reconditos mores effingeret; nam et oculi mimi arguti . . . loquuntur, et is qui appellatur voltus . . . indicat mores' Cic. *Lg.* i. 27; *ἡ δ' ἀναιδείης | ὀφρὺν ἔχουσα καὶ μέτωπον εἰστήκει*, of the Fox, Babr. 95. 57. Contrast Eur. *Med.* 516.

222. 9–10 ἡ φωνὴ . . . ἠχεῖν: cf. *κἂν διαπειρώμενος κρούσῃς, σαθρὸν . . . ὑπηχεῖ* Plu. *De discern.* 64d, where Wytt. proposed *εἴ πῃ τι σαθρὸν ἠχεῖ* (for *ἔχει*) at Pl. *Phlb.* 55c. Cic. writes: 'ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago' *Tusc.* iii. 3.

222. 10 ὄμμασιν ἐξέχειν. Writing to his tutor, M. quotes: *εἰς ὄμματ' εὔνου φωτὸς ἐμβλέψαι γλυκύ* (Eur. *Ion* 732) Fronto, *Ep.* p. 71; cf. *ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα* Pl. *Phdr.* 253e. For *ἐξέχειν*, see *λέξεις ἄρα | ὥσπερ τὰ παιδί'· ἔξεχ' ὦ φίλ' ἥλιε* Aristoph. *Fr.* 389.

222. 14 σκάλμη. The image recalls 'with lies thou cuttest like a sharp rasor' *Ps.* 51 (52). 3 (Coverdale). M. may have in mind: *μὴ κρυπτὸν ἔχων ἔγχος κραδίῃ | φαιδρῷ ⟨σε⟩ προσεννέπῃ προσώπῳ* Solon 42 (27). Pollux has: *ξίφους δὲ ὄνομα ἔοικεν εἶναι βαρβαρικὸν ἡ σκαλμή* (so accented) x. 165.

Gat. adopted *σκαμβή*, *perverted*, at Saumaise's suggestion. He

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cited from Suid. *σκαμβή, διεστραμμένη*, thinking that might be a gloss on the present passage.

λυκοφιλίας: cf. *ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ γενόμενα τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ σὴν λυκοφιλίαν καὶ ἀκοινωνίαν διὰ σὲ ἀπηργάσατο* [Pl.] *Ep.* 318e; *λυκοφίλιοι μέν εἰσιν αἱ διαλλαγαί* Menand. *Fr.* 833 K. The fable of *The Wolves, the Dogs, and the Flock*, Babrius 93, Aesop. 269, is alluded to in Pl. *Lg.* 906d, and that of *The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing*, Babrius 132 in the words: *ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί* Pl. *Phdr.* 241d.

Ch. 16: 222. 17 Κάλλιστα διαζῆν. Gat.'s emend. is supported by *ἀβιάστως διαζῆσαι* p. **144.** 1.

222. 18–19 **διῃρημένως καὶ ὁλικῶς:** cf. *ὅλον δι' ὅλων διῃρημένως βλέπειν* p. **44.** 24 n. *ὁλικῶς* has been questioned, see v.l.; the meaning, however, seems to be 'when broken into parts and as wholes'.

222. 19 **περὶ αὐτοῦ.** As M. uses the shorter form of the reflexive pron. after *περί* (pp. **160.** 10, **178.** 12, 20, **238.** 8) and as the breathings are so uncertain in the MSS., *περὶ αὑτοῦ* seems probable, cf. *μηδὲν μήτε εἰδότα περὶ αὑτῶν μήτε ἀποφαινόμενα* p. **178.** 11.

222. 20 **οὐδὲ ἔρχεται ἐφ' ἡμᾶς,** but rather we go out to them, p. **220.** 16, cf. p. **154.** 29.

222. 21 **οἷον γράφοντες,** the participle is qualified thus to show that the surface of the mind is not literally waxen, cf. *φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις . . . οὐδὲ γὰρ δεκτέον τὴν τύπωσιν οἱονεὶ τύπον σφραγιστῆρος* D.L. vii. 50.

222. 24 **τί μέντοι δύσκολον ἔχει ταῦτα;** The MSS. variants appear to have arisen from a supralinear correction *κόλως*, which got into the text before *ἔχει* and caused that word to be changed to *ἔχειν*. Then some copyist wrote *ἄλλως* to make sense. For the latter variation, see p. **216.** 10.

224. 1 **ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεῦδε:** cf. *οὐ τρέχεις ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν σὴν φ.* p. **74.** 9.

224. 2 **συγγνώμη.** M. is fond of this little touch of irony which depends on the double sense of *τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν ζητοῦντι*, cf. p. **42.** 15.

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Ch. 17: 224. 3 ἕκαστον, perhaps meaning 'each thing that comes to be', in which case it will refer especially to the birth, life, and death of each human being. If he means 'each experience', the ch. is a maxim like those which recommend analysis into cause or form and matter, and so forth.

Ch. 18: 224. 6 [Καί], either a connective introduced erroneously or the *καί* which A omits before *ὡς οὐδέν*, l. 4, or a repetition of the last three letters of *πείσεται*. Dr. Rendall suggests that *Καί* is a compendium for *Κεφάλαια ι'*, cf. *ἐννέα κεφαλαίων* p. **226.** 23. He compares the title of Philo's *De Decalogo*, *περὶ τῶν δέκα λόγων, ἃ κεφάλαια νόμων εἰσί*, ii. 180, and adds: 'it can hardly be an accidental coincidence that leads M. to formulate his *δόγματα* in *ten* heads.' But the ch. is very far removed from a Stoic decalogue, being concerned only with a part of my Duty to my Neighbour, and M. gives his reason for the ten heads in the note about Apollo and the Muses at p. **228.** 5. In the margin of my copy of Gat.'s second edition is written in an old hand: 'Ad iram compescendam', an excellent title to the ch.

224. 7 καθ' ἕτερον λόγον. The first argument is based upon the co-ordination of rational creatures; the second rests upon their subordination, which is anticipated in the subjection in the animal world of the lower animals to the higher, especially to man, cf. pp. **86.** 28, **92.** 17, **138.** 10, **220.** 10.

προστησόμενος. The Genius is termed *προστάτης*, pp. **40.** 15, **90.** 25.

224. 8 ταῦρος ἀγέλης: reminding the reader of: *ἠΰτε βοῦς ἀγέληφι μέγ' ἔξοχος ἔπλετο πάντων | ταῦρος* Hom. *Il.* ii. 480. The simile is frequent: *ὁ δὲ ταῦρος σαφῶς . . . πρὸς βασιλέως εἰκόνα πεποίηται* Dio Chrys. ii. 68, p. 97; *πόθεν δ' ὁ ταῦρος, ἔφη, λέοντος ἐπελθόντος μόνος αἰσθάνεται τῆς αὐτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ προβέβληκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγέλης πάσης;* Epict. i. 2. 30; 'ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones . . . contendant, sic ii qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt . . . ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur' Cic. *Fin.* iii. 66.

ἄνωθεν δὲ ἔπιθι. By *ἄνωθεν* is meant a return to first principles, as in p. **80.** 20. A further ground for his social principles is to be found by a reference to Nature's government, to that *γένεσις δικαιοσύνης* which rests upon subordination in Nature, p. **220.** 11.

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224. 12 ἀνάγκας δογμάτων: cf. *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* p. **54.** 15; *ἀναγκάζεται οὕτως ποιεῖν* p. **150.** 24. Their inferior aims—pleasure, wealth, glory *determine* their opinions and, in turn, these govern their actions.

224. 13 μεθ' οἵου τύφου: cf. *ὅση οἴησις* p. **184.** 19, of men who commend or condemn, so that *τῦφος* here means the conceit of themselves which causes them to judge others.

§2: 224. 16 τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. In the parallel passage at p. **140.** 17, the Truth of which the soul is unwilling to be deprived is defined as *δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ εὐμένεια.*

224. 17 ἄχθονται γοῦν ἀκούοντες: the homage that vice pays to virtue. Pl. has said: *θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖσιν κακοῖς, ὥστε πάμπολλοι καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας Lg.* 950b.

224. 20 ἄλλος τοιοῦτος: cf. p. **162.** 1.

224. 22 διὰ δειλίαν ἢ δοξοκοπίαν: *cowardice* appears to mean 'sensitiveness to public opinion', and *δοξοκοπία* 'courting popular favour' like *δημοκοπία.* Pericles' dignity was called *δοξοκοπία τε καὶ τῦφος,* Plu. *Per.* 5. Again endurance in affliction is termed *ὠμότης ἢ δοξοκοπία ἄκρατος* Epicur. *Fr.* 120 Us. *δοξοκοπία* thus suggests coveting a reputation of superiority to human frailty.

§ 3: 224. 24 κατείληφας, your judgement is *convinced,* cf. *καταληπτικῶς* l. 26, *τὸ καταληπτικόν* p. **60.** 13. So M. says: *τάχα δ' οὐχ ἥμαρτεν* p. **186.** 8.

224. 24–5 κατ' οἰκονομίαν: Xyl. took the meaning to be that much that you find fault with as evil is part of a divine dispensation, and, therefore, overruled to good, cf. pp. **54.** 23, **112.** 25.

Here, however, M. is concerned with leniency in judging your neighbour. The apparent wrongdoer, he says, may have acted with a further end in view, an end of which you are ignorant. Similarly Arist. had said that one ground for modifying our condemnation of an action may be that it was done *ἕνεκά τινος*; such considerations lead to *ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη E.N.* 1111^{a}5.

226. 1 ἀκαριαῖος. The quotation in Suid. *Test.* seems to show that

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the text of M. that he or his authority used was written in uncials. For the word, see p. **30.** 7 n.

226. 8 **λῃστήν**, used of sportsmen and victorious generals, who are bandits, but on a grand scale, p. **198.** 22.

παντοῖον, opp. to the *uniform* character described, e.g. at p. **230.** 15.

§ 4: 226. 12 **σεσηρός**: cf. *προσσεσηρός* p. **10.** 20. The word suggests the fawning grin of a dog: *ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ προσφιλοῦς μειδιάματος ταπεινὸν ἐσεσήρει καὶ ὕπουλον* Dio Chrys. i. 79, p. 70; used of one who, when corrected, conceals his dislike, *σεσηρότα καὶ κατειρωνευόμενον* Plu. *De Aud.*, 46d; of flatterers, *σεσηρότων καὶ σαινόντων καὶ ἐπ' ἄκρᾳ τῇ γλώττῃ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐχόντων* Max. Tyr. xxxv. 7.

226. 15 **εὐσχολῶν**, of one free from disturbance, *εὐσχολώτερος καὶ ἀταρακτότερος* p. **60.** 24; *εὐσχολῶ γάρ· οὐ περισπᾶταί μου ἡ διάνοια* Epict. iii. 9. 19.

226. 16 **μή, τέκνον**, 'my child' in English is perhaps not quite an equivalent for what in the original expresses an older man's considerate rebuke. Nestor says to Patroclus "*τέκνον ἐμόν*" Hom. *Il.* xi. 786, where a scholiast remarks: *ἔστιν οὖν ἀνεπαχθὴς ὡς οὐκ ἰδίας ὑποθήκας εἰσάγων, ἀλλ' ὑπομιμνήσκων τοῦ πατρός.* So we have in a similar reproof: *ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ* Pl. *Lg.* 888a. Jocasta addresses the grown man Eteocles: *κεῖνο κάλλιον, τέκνον* Eur. *Ph.* 535. One of Epict.'s hearers calls him *ἀφιλόστοργος γέρων*, because when he was leaving him he did not say: "*τέκνον, ἂν σωθῇς, ἄψω λύχνους*", ii. 17. 37.

226. 17–18 **εὐαφῶς καὶ ὁλικῶς.** The first adv. suggests the touch of a mother's hand or a physician's. *εὐαφής* is used of a doctor's sponge, Paul. Aeg. iv. 21; of a musician's fingers, Lucian *Imag.* 14.

ὁλικῶς refers to the *general* instances from nature. Such correction or admonition bears less hardly upon the individual.

226. 19–20 **μήτε εἰρωνικῶς . . . μήτε ὀνειδιστικῶς**: cf. *γνησίως καὶ χρηστῶς* p. **220.** 26. Cic. says: 'clementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen adiuncta, ut et severitas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur' *Off.* i. 137, sim. 88.

226. 20 **φιλοστόργως**, referring to the protective devotion of cows and ewes, cf. p. **8.** 9 n.

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ἀδήκτως τῇ ψυχῇ, 'not stung to the quick'; *δάκνειν* is also used of the lash of correction: *νουθεσίας . . . ὥσπερ φαρμάκῳ δάκνοντι, λόγῳ χρωμένης* Plu. *De Aud.* 46d.

226. 21 **ὡς ἐν σχολῇ**: because nothing is more galling than to be held up to contempt before one's class-fellows. Gat. thought that M. may have meant *ὡς κατεπιδεικνύμενος* p. **220.** 25; that, however, is expressed by the next words.

226. 21–2 **ἀλλ' ἤ τοι πρὸς μόνον**: the correction solves a vexed difficulty. Mr. Marchant thinks that Xyl. by 'sed ut cum solo' intended the same emendation. The implied construction is *μὴ ὡς ἐν σχολῇ, ἀλλ' ἤ τοι πρὸς μόνον ἂν λέγοις.*

The prescription is the same as: *ἔλεγξον αὐτὸν μεταξὺ σοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ μόνου St. Matt.* 18. 15.

§ 5: 226. 26 **πρόχειρον δέ.** We expect *δὲ εἶναι* (Mr. Marchant), or *δὲ ἔχειν.* There is, however, an even more striking ellipse, say of *πρόχειρον ἔστω*, at p. **242.** 6.

226. 27 **οὐχὶ τὸ θυμοῦσθαι ἀνδρικόν**: cf. p. **228.** 3. The Peripatetic school held that *θυμός*, e.g. righteous anger, was appropriate in some circumstances, the Stoics held that it should be resisted, as a *πάθος*. Plu., here probably following Chrysippus, *περὶ παθῶν*, writes: *ὡς οὐκ εὐγενὴς οὐδὲ ἀνδρώδης . . . ἐστίν* (sc. *ἡ ὀργή*) *De cohib. ira*, 456f. Contrast: *τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν* Arist. *E.N.* 1126^{b}1.

228. 1 **νεύρων**, in the older meaning of *sinews*, fig. for *strength*; cf. *ἕως . . . ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς* Pl. *R.* 411b; *ἔστι μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ἡ ἰσχὺς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις* Arist. *Gen. An.* 787^{b}11.

§ 6: 228. 5 **τοῦ Μουσηγέτου δῶρον**: cf. *δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης* Pl. *Tht.* 191d, *καὶ Μούσας Ἀπόλλωνά τε μουσηγέτην Lg.* 653d; *ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε τούτου παρασταίη βοηθὸς ὅ τε λόγιος Ἑρμῆς ξὺν ταῖς Μούσαις ὅ τε Μουσηγέτης Ἀπόλλων* Julian 132a.

228. 6 **ἀδυνάτου**: *τὸ τὰ ἀδύνατα διώκειν μανικόν* p. **88.** 3, cf. p. **188.** 16.

Ch. 19: 228. 9 **τροπάς**, *moods*, see p. **124.** 27.

228. 10 **ἐπιλέγοντα**, of using a formula as a spell to resist a temptation: *τοὺς ἀνθρώπους . . . ἐπιλέγειν τῷ λοιμῷ· φεῦγ' εἰς κόρακας* Arist. *Fr.* 496. For the fig. use, cf. *ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν*

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φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν (Helen as *pleasure*) *ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἥττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα* id. *E.N.* 1109^{b}10, cf. p. **126.** 6.

228. 11 **οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.** We are to remove not only superfluous actions but also unnecessary imaginations, *φαντασίας*, p. **62.** 2.

228. 13 **ἐν τοῖς ἀτοπωτάτοις.** Insincere speech is certainly, if looked at rationally, incongruous, and absurdity to a Greek is next door to evil. *ἄτοπον*, like *αἰσχρόν* (p. **150.** 25), gained a worse meaning in later Greek, and the former, e.g. in the LXX and N.T., often means *wicked, abandoned, οὗτος δὲ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἔπραξεν St. Luke*, 23. 41.

It appears highly probable that M. wrote *ἐν τοῖς ἀτοπώτατον.*

228. 16 **ταῖς τούτου παχείαις ἡδοναῖς.** The text has been much questioned, although P's reading appears to give a tolerable sense. Nauck proposed *βραχείαις ἡδοναῖς*, but M. nowhere dwells on the fleeting character of pleasures. Sch. adopts A's *παχείαις ἰδέαις* presumably with the sense 'gross images', an expression to which it is hard to find a parallel.

Leop. printed *τραχείαις ἢ λείαις ⟨κινήσεσιν⟩*, which had occurred to Fournier and Mr. Jackson independently. It was suggested doubtless by *τῆς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λείας ἢ τραχείας κινήσεως* p. **90.** 17.

Ch. 20: 228. 17 **Τὸ μὲν πνευματικόν.** The correction is necessary as M. is speaking of an elementary body, the air, cf. pp. **54.** 7, **196.** 3. *τὸ πνευμάτιον* would be the 'animal spirit', see p. **20.** 13 n.

228. 19–20 **τὸ γεῶδες δὲ τὸ ἐν σοί**, e.g. the skull is held erect, *ἐγήγερται*. Sim. *τὸ ὑγρόν*, e.g. the blood-stream rises, overcoming gravity.

228. 22–3 **βίᾳ συμμένοντα.** The MSS. reading *σὺν βίᾳ μένοντα* would mean 'persist in remaining', but M. insists that they *παρακρατεῖται* l. 19. Leop. punctuates after *σὺν βίᾳ*, but the prep. remains a difficulty. If we regard the *σύν* as having been shifted, *συμμένοντα* gives an additional stress. They hold together until the signal *τῆς διαλύσεως* is given, cf. *ἐπὶ ποσὸν συμμείνασαι* p. **58.** 24.

228. 23 **τὸ ἐνδόσιμον:** cf. *τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν ἐκ τοῦ βίου* p. **40.** 16. The

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unusual word may have been suggested by *κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον* [Arist.] *Mu.* 399ª19.

M., as usual, prefers *ἐκεῖθεν*, cf. p. **22.** 6 and *Test.* there.

§ 2: 228. 24 **μόνον τὸ νοερόν:** cf. *μόνα γὰρ τὰ νοερά* p. **176.** 17, a similar criticism of men gifted with reason.

230. 2 **ἀφισταμένου τῆς φύσεως:** cf. p. **62.** 23, where *ὁ ἀφιστάμενος τοῦ λόγου* is called *ἀπόστημα κόσμου.*

230. 4 **πρὸς ὁσιότητα.** This correction is supported by *ὁσιότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην* p. **234.** 19. An editor or scribe, expecting a word distinct from *θεοσέβειαν*, wrote *ἰσότητα.*

Is it, however, not possible that M. actually wrote *ἢ πρὸς ⟨ἰσότητα⟩ καὶ δικαιοσύνην* to balance *ὁσιότητα καὶ θεοσέβειαν*, and that this is the explanation of the word *ἰσότητα* in the tradition?

For this combination of words, cf. *τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα τοῖς δούλοις παρέχεσθε* St. Paul *Col.* 4. 1, where Lightfoot cites: *μετὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἰσότητος τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιστρέφοντας* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 764. The two words occur together in Neo-Pythagorean writings: *τὴν δὲ καθαρειότητα τῆς περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἰσότητος καὶ δικαιοσύνης μαρτυρίαν* (outward symbol) *ἀποδιδούς* (where Rohde proposed *ὁσιότητος*) Iambl. *V. Pyth.* 153.

There is another possible view, that the MSS. are right. M. may have written *ἰσότητα καὶ θεοσέβειαν*, meaning that *aequitas* and *pietas* are superior to *ius*, exactly as *aequitas* and *humanitas* prevailed in the decisions of his own law officers over the strict letter of the *ius civile.* In this connexion a passage of Philo is to be remarked: *ἔστι γὰρ ἰσότης, ὡς οἱ τὰ φύσεως ἀκριβοῦντες ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν, μήτηρ δικαιοσύνης. . . . πάντα ἰσότης τά τε κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς εὖ διετάξατο νόμοις καὶ θεσμοῖς ἀκινήτοις* ii. 373. Philo is evidently thinking of the physicists' account of *ἰσότης* (see *κατ' ἰσότητα* p. **10.** 5 n.), and he goes on to compare the ordered *κόσμος* with wise human governments, with the well-tempered body in health and with *καλοκἀγαθία ἐν ψυχαῖς.* Note also that Polyb. couples *ἰσότης καὶ φιλανθρωπία* ii. 38. 8, and cf. 'iustitia quamvis omnis simul virtutes amplectatur, tamen duae sunt omnium principales . . . pietas et aequitas' Lact. *Inst.* v. 15.

230. 5–6 **ἐν εἴδει ἐστὶ τῆς εὐκοινωνησίας:** cf. *ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει*

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πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι Pl. *R.* 459d, *ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων Ti.* 30c; *ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν* Arist. *Pol.* 1253^{b}30. M. here treats *εὐκοιν.*, a species of justice, as its synomym, cf. *ὑποτάττεσθαι . . . τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ εὐσέβειαν, χρηστότητα, εὐκοινωνησίαν, εὐσυναλλαξίαν* Stob. *Ecl.* ii, p. 60.

230. 6 πρεσβύτερα, *more august*, cf. pp. **32. 11, 80. 20.** Socr. represents holiness and justice as his principles of guidance: *οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον* Pl. *Cri.* 54b, cf. *δίκαιος . . . καὶ ὅσιος* p. **142. 13**, and *Test.* there. So Pl. says: *ὁμοίωσις* (sc. *θεῷ*) *δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*, a text to which later Platonists repeatedly refer, *Tht.* 176b.

Sim.: *ἡ δικ., ἀνθρωπίνη οὖσα, κοινόν· ὑποβέβηκε ⟨δὲ⟩ τὴν ὁσιότητα, θείαν δικ. ὑπάρχουσαν* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 803. There must be some corruption, then, in *θετέον δὲ ἐν ἀρετῆς μοίρᾳ τὴν εὐσέβειαν τὴν κρατίστην· ἔστι γὰρ ὁσιότης τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔκγονος* Julian, p. 70d. Should we not read *ὁσιότητος δικαιοσύνη ἔκγονος*?

Ch. 21: 230. 7 εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός. The ideal of self-consistency is thus expressed by Cic.: 'aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum . . . in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus' *Off.* i. 111; a statement to which M.'s criticism applies. Of the Emperor himself we read: *ὅμοιος διὰ πάντων ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν οὐδενὶ ἠλλοιώθη* Dio Cass. lxxi. 34. 5. Socr. made a like profession: *ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε . . . τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος* Pl. *Ap.* 33a.

230. 8–9 οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον. This requirement of the further definition of an incomplete statement has a slightly scholastic form unusual in M. Technically it was known as *τὸ περὶ παραλείψεως*, cf. *τὸν ἰατρὸν τῷ μαθητῇ προστάττειν λέγουσι* (sc. *οἱ Στωικοί*) *τεμεῖν καὶ καῦσαι, κατὰ παράλειψιν τοῦ εὐκαίρως καὶ μετρίως* Plu. *De Stoic. repugn.* 1037e.

230. 9 προσθῇς, Arist.'s term for adding a mark to make the meaning of a definition more explicit, e.g. *ἢ προσθετέον; E.N.* 1101^{a}17, cf. 1147^{b}33.

230. 10–11 τῶν ὁπωσοῦν . . . δοκούντων, conveying the sense *εἰκῇ δοκούντων*, 'what *in one way or another* the many suppose to be good'; *τά γε τοῖς πολλοῖς φαινόμενα ἀγαθά* p. **84. 14.**

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230. 11 **ἀγαθῶν ὑπόληψις,** this variability in the vulgar judgement of happiness and 'goods' M. has illustrated in connexion with Menand.'s epigram, p. **84.** 16. Arist. discusses it in *E.N.* i. 4–5. See, especially, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τε καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον E.N.* 1095ª22.

230. 13 **ὑποστήσασθαι,** '*propose* to ourselves': *τὸν κράτιστον ὑποστησαμένους πειρᾶσθαι γίγνεσθαι τοιούτους* Isoc. v. 113.

230. 14 **ἀπευθύνων,** the continuity of this ch. with xii. 1 is indicated by the use of this verb at p. **234.** 19, as well as by the subject-matter.

Cf. *μὴ ἔχοντες σκοπόν, ἐφ' ὃν πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν καὶ καθάπαξ φαντασίαν ἀπευθύνουσιν* p. **24.** 10, see also p. **148.** 16 n.

ὁμοίας, the adj. which Arist. employs for a dramatic character *true* to the original of legend and to the poet's conception, *Po.* 1454ᵇ10; *παντοῖον* means a shifty, inconsistent character p. **226.** 8.

ἀποδώσει: cf. *διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις* Arist. *E.N.* 1103ᵇ22.

Ch. 22: 230. 16. From here to the end of the Book we have a series of extracts from a commonplace book which break the continuity of ch. 21 with xii. 1. See *Introd.* pp. lxx–lxxi.

τὸν ὀρεινόν. The country mouse is not called a *highlander* by any fabulist. Is M. thinking of:

> tandem urbanus ad hunc: 'quid te iuvat', inquit, 'amice,
> praerupti nemoris patientem vivere dorso?' Hor. *Sat.* ii. 6. 90.

In Babrius, as here, it is the town mouse who is alarmed; its ease and plenty are *μεστὰ κινδύνων.* In Horace's version both mice scuttle.

Ch. 23: 230. 18 **τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα:** especially the vulgar dread of death: see *Test.*; *ταῦτα δ' ὁ Σ. καλῶς ποιῶν μορμολυκεῖα ἐκάλει,* referring to their opinion about death, Epict. ii. 1. 15.

230. 18–19 **Λαμίας ἐκάλει, παιδίων δείματα:** cf. *τοῖς τε γὰρ παισὶ προσφέρομεν . . . εἰς ἀποτροπὴν τοὺς φοβεροὺς* (sc. *μύθους*), *ἥ τε γὰρ Λάμια μῦθός ἐστι* Strabo, i, p. 19; *παίδων ψυχὰς κηλεῖν δυνάμενα ἔτι τὴν Μορμὼ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων* Lucian, *Philops.*

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2. Olymp. remarks on *μορμολύττει αὖ* Pl. *Grg.* 473d: *ἀντὶ τοῦ· ὡς παιδίον φοβεῖς*, cf. Pl. *Cri.* 46c. Theocr. writes: *οὐκ ἀξῶ τυ, τέκνον· Μορμώ*, xv. 40. Cf. 'quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura' Lucr. vi. 38.

Ch. 25: 230. 22 Τῷ Περδίκκᾳ. Sch. reads *Τῷ Περδίκκα*, the Doric gen.; this is, however, not certainly the MSS. reading, as the iota subscript is almost always omitted by A and often by P. It would be better, if M. must be saved from a slip, to write *Περδίκκου*, cf. *'Αρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου* Pl. *Grg.* 470d. The story, see *Test.*, is just alluded to in D.L. ii. 25. There is nothing to assist in the interpretation of this ch. in Sternbach, *Wien. Stud.* xi. 221, to which Sch. refers.

232. 1 τῷ κακίστῳ: Sch. suggests *οἰκτίστῳ*, detecting an allusion to Hom. *Od.* xxiii. 79.

Ch. 26: 232. 3 τῶν 'Επικουρείων, a correction which relies upon Sen. *Test.* Galen advises a young man to find some elder friend to act in this way, v. 9.

Ch. 27: 232. 5 ἔωθεν, used of a morning devotional exercise, pp. **20.** 1, 74. 1.

ἀφορᾶν: cf. p. **134.** 17 and *Test.* there. *θεοῖς ὀπαδῆσαι* is connected with *ἐς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέπειν* by Euryphamus Pyth. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* iv, p. 914.

232. 6 **ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά:** cf. *τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀληθές . . . περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμεικτότατα ἔχοντα* Pl. *Phlb.* 59c, cf. *R.* 530b.

232. 7 **τῆς τάξεως:** cf. 'credo deos immortales sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui . . . caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantia' Cic. *Sen.* 77.

τῆς καθαρότητος: cf. *ἀποκαθαίρουσι γὰρ αἱ τούτων φαντασίαι τὸν ῥύπον τοῦ χάμαι βίου* p. **134.** 19; *ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι οὐρανία, ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι* Pl. *Cra.* 396b.

232. 6–8 **τῶν ἀεὶ . . . ἄστρου:** cf. *τῶν ἀστέρων τὸ φέγγος οὐκ ἀποθνῄσκει* Babr. 114; the earthly contrast is: *ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ* Arist. *De An.* 429ª7.

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Ch. 28: 232. 9 **τὸ κώδιον,** a loin-cloth worn under the *ἱμάτιον* instead of the *χιτών*; cf. 'Cato praetor iudicium sine tunica exercuit, campestri sub toga cinctus' Asconius, p. 29; see *ἡμίγυμνος* p. **62.** 28 n. There are many allusions to Socr. as being short of a tunic in Aristoph. *Nubes* and elsewhere. His wife is said to have deprived him of it, D.L. ii. 37; Aelian, however, tells a story of her refusing Socr.'s offer to lend her his tunic to go out and watch a procession; she thought it not fine enough, *V.H.* vii. 10.

232. 10 **ἃ εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης.** This suggests a variant of the story about Heraclitus surprised by visitors in the kitchen. He invited them in: *εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς* Arist. *P. An.* 645^{a}17.

Ch. 29: 232. 13. A proverb told in many ways: *ἄρχε πρῶτον μαθὼν ἄρχεσθαι* Solon, ap. D.L. i. 60. *οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα* Arist. *Pol.* 1277^{b}12. Cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 542; Pl. *Lg.* 762e; Cic. *Lg.* iii. 5.

Ch. 30: 232. 15 **οὐ μέτεστί σοι λόγου:** criticized by Arist. *Test.* The meaning was originally that a slave must be seen and not heard. M. intends by it that servility means abandonment of *λόγος*, since *δουλεία* to him is equivalent to obeying the passions. In Eurip. a similar saying is:

> *οὐ χρή ποτ' ἄνδρα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλευθέρας*
> *γνώμας διώκειν οὐδ' ἐς ἀργίαν βλέπειν* Eur. *Fr.* 216 N^{2}.

Ch. 31: 232. 16 **ἐγέλασσε,** Odysseus laughed when he had tricked the giant by giving the name 'No-man'. Gat. refers to x. 33, meaning presumably: *κρείττων γίνεται . . . ὀρθῶς χρώμενος τοῖς προσπίπτουσιν* p. **208.** 25. If that is what M. intends, cf. p. **98.** 3.

Ch. 32: 232. 17 **δ' ἀρετήν:** see Hes. *Test.* Gat. proposed to restore *δ' ἄρα τούς*, but the change may have been made by a Stoic for his own purposes.

Chs. 33–6. See *Test.* If M. made the excerpts, they illustrate his preference for brevity; they may, however, be examples of the way in which ancient texts were reduced in transmission by way of Anthologies.

Ch. 37: 234. 6–7 **ἐν τῷ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τόπῳ.** As M. Trannoy indicates, the meaning is: 'in the branch of Moral Phil. called *περὶ ὁρμῆς*', cf. *τὸ δ' ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς*

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τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον . . . εἰς τὸν περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας D.L. vii. 84.

234. 8 ⟨**ὧσιν**⟩. This supplement neatly rids the text of an awkward brachylogy.

κατ' ἀξίαν: see D.L. cited at ll. 6–7.

Ch. 38: 234. 10 **ἔφη.** Upton thought that Epict. is meant, see *Test.* The resemblance is, however, merely in the form of sentence. It may equally well be supposed that the reference, whether by Epict. or someone else, is to Socr., see the passages from [Pl.] *Alc.* 2 in *Test.*

Ch. 39: 234. 12 **ὁ Σωκράτης,** here a saying is definitely ascribed to Socr., but there is no adequate ground for making the ch. a fragment of Epict. It seems rather to be an extract from a *Florilegium.*

BOOK XII

Ch. 1: 234. 16 **διὰ περιόδου,** interpreted by some as 'after an interval of time', in opp. to **ἤδη.** The sense is rather local than temporal, being opposed to *σύντομος δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν* (sc. *ὁδός*) p. **72.** 23, as Julian says of his progress *οὐ τὴν σύντομον . . . ἀλλὰ τὴν κύκλῳ πορευθέντες* p. 235d. M. says *περὶ πόσα πλανηθείς* p. **146.** 13.

234. 17 **ἐὰν μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῇς:** cf. *εἴ τί σοι μέλει σεαυτοῦ* p. **48.** 4. M. likes the paradox that the path of duty is the path of profit, even of gratification as he sometimes asserts; see pp. **86.** 26, **150.** 17, **208.** 11, **224.** 1, **248.** 6.

234. 18 **τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προνοίᾳ.** Providence is opposed in the first instance to Chance, pp. **98.** 20, **172.** 2. The proximity of *ὁ θεός* here, p. **236.** 8, the suggestion that *πρόνοια* may be *ἱλάσιμος*, p. **240.** 24, as well as the language employed at pp. **244.** 16, **250.** 15, combine to give this Book a theistic colour, which distinguishes it from the central Books with their more pantheistic expression. That Gat. too felt this is shown by his note here: 'idem suos monet Dom. Christus, St. Matt. 6. 34.'

234. 19 **ὁσιότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην.** The words connect this ch. with xi. 20, p. **230.** 4, as *ἀπευθύνῃς πρὸς ὅσ.* connects it with

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xi. 21, *εἰς τοῦτον . . . ἀπευθύνων* p. **230.** 13. Julian makes *ἡ Ὁσιότης ξὺν τῇ Δίκῃ* offspring of Zeus, 229a. S. Emp. calls *ὁσιότης, δικαιοσύνη τις πρὸς θεούς Math.* ix. 124.

The two virtues are frequently associated in the O.T., and in the N.T. they express the two great Commandments, e.g. *λατρεύειν αὐτῷ ἐν ὁσιότητι καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ St. Luke*, 1. 74; cf. St. Paul, *Eph.* 4. 24, 1 *Thess.* 2. 10.

234. 20 **τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον:** cf. *φιλεῖ τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον* p. **200.** 2.

σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερεν καὶ σὲ τούτῳ: cf. the vernacular *τοῦτο ἔφερεν αὐτῷ*, and M.'s interpretation p. **80.** 8–9 n. Sim. pp. **162.** 14, **202.** 15.

234. 23 **μήτε ὑπόληψις μήτε φωνή,** i.e. *ἀλλοτρία*, cf. *τί δ' ἐρεῖ τις ἢ ὑπολήψεται* p. **198.** 29, where the expression of the ch. is to be compared with that of this.

236. 1 **τοῦ περιτεθραμμένου σοι σαρκιδίου:** cf. for the participle, p. **144.** 2 n., and for the subst. p. **90.** 17 n. The words lead up to *τὰ περικείμενα κρεάδια* l. 12.

ὄψεται γάρ, ironical, as so frequently, see pp. **90.** 13, **124.** 27, **160.** 10, 15.

§ 2: 236. 2 **ἐξόδῳ:** cf. *ἐξῆλθον τοῦ βίου* p. **36.** 17; *τὴν ἔξοδον αὐτοῦ St. Luke*, 9. 31. There may also be an implied reference to the actor's exit, p. **250.** 12.

236. 3 **τὸ ἐν σοὶ θεῖον:** cf. *τῷ σαυτοῦ δαίμονι* p. **238.** 6.

236. 4 **τό γε μηδέποτε ἄρξασθαι:** a maxim common, naturally enough, to all moralists: 'victuros agimus semper nec vivimus umquam' Manil. iv. 5. Sen. cites from Epicurus: 'inter cetera mala hoc quoque habet stultitia: semper incipit vivere' *Ep.* 13. 16, cf. Epicurus, *Frr.* 493 and 494 Us.

236. 5 **ἄξιος,** like *dignus*, means both *fit for* and *worthy of*: *τῷ ἄξιον τῆς χώρας ταύτης κεκρικάτι* Epict. ii. 1. 39; Sen. cites 'te quoque dignum | finge deo', Virg. *Aen.* viii. 364, in *Ep.* 18. 12.

τοῦ γεννήσαντος κόσμου: cf. *ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι* p. **56.** 12 n.

236. 6 **ξένος ὤν:** cf. *ξένος κόσμου* p. **62.** 19 n.

ὡς ἀπροσδόκητα: cf. *ξένος καὶ ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ γινόμενα* p. **62.** 20;

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the same understanding must be prepared for every circumstance, p. **210. 21.**

236. 7 **κρεμάμενος:** of attractions or distractions: *ἐξ ὧν κρεμαμένη πᾶσα ψυχὴ . . . οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ἴσχειν* Pl. *Lg.* 831c.

Ch. 2: 236. 8 **Ὁ θεός.** The thought of the writer is influenced by Pl., and the verbal expression recalls the dialogues. Indeed there is an approach, rare in M., to Neoplatonic speculation. We may also see a resemblance to St. Paul's teaching in *Eph.* chs. 4 and 5. The apostle, after speaking of the new man, *τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας*, 4. 24, illustrates the meaning of the old garments and then, summarizing the alteration, writes: *γίνεσθε οὖν μιμηταὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, 5. 1.

γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων: i.e. according to Pl.'s imagery, of sensations and impulses first: *τοῖς ἀγγείοις τῆς ψυχῆς, σώματι καὶ αἰσθήσει*, as Philo says, i. 467, cf. l. 1 above, and secondly *a fortiori* of its earthly vesture, l. 13.

236. 9 **φλοιῶν:** cf. *γυμνὰ τῶν φλοιῶν θεάσασθαι τὰ αἰτιώδη* p. **240. 7.** The force of the figure will strike any reader who has seen a cork tree, especially an old one.

καθαρμάτων: cf. *οὐδὲν γάρ μοι τοῦ καλλωπισμοῦ τῶν καθαρμάτων ἤρμοζεν*, of the finery of his court dress, Julian, 274d.

ὀρᾷ: cf. *ἅπτεται* l. 10, metaphorical terms to express intellectual intercourse, cf. *πῶς ἅπτεται θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος* p. **28.** 8 n. See *Ep. Hebr.* 4. 13.

236. 10 **ἐρρυηκότων καὶ ἀπωχετευμένων:** cf. *πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ* p. **22.** 5, sim. pp. **66. 4, 246.** 10. Pl., illustrating the diversion of desires to their objects, has *ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον . . . ἐρρυήκασιν R.* 485d; cf. *εἴτε, ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται, καθάπερ δι' ὀχετῶν τοιούτων εἰσφερούσης τῆς ψυχῆς* Julian, 189c.

236. 11 **σὺ τοῦτο ἐθίσῃς ποιεῖν:** i.e. *αὐτὸ ὁποῖόν ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν, γυμνόν, . . . βλέπειν* p. **44.** 23; Philo has: *τὸν μὲν ὑμέτερον νοῦν, ἀποδυσάμενον σῶμα, αἴσθησιν, λόγον, δίχα τούτων γυμνὰ δύνασθαι τὰ ὄντα ὁρᾶν* i. 466.

περισπασμόν, the opposite of *σχολή*, cf. *εὐσχολῶ γάρ· οὐ περισπᾶταί μου ἡ διάνοια* Epict. iii. 9. 19; see pp. **24. 7, 106.** 12.

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236. 12–14 **ἢ πού γε . . . θεώμενος ἀσχολήσεται.** Removing the comma after the participle, we have an ironical exclamation or, as Cas. preferred, a rhetorical interrogation. The purport agrees with: *ὁ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμελούμενος οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντως ἡμῶν ἐπιμελεῖται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὀργάνου· ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σπουδάζων οὐτ' ἀνθρώπου ἐπιμελεῖται οὐτ' ἀνθρώπου ὀργάνου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῦ ὀργάνου* Simpl. *in Epict. Ench.* 6c.

This division of goods into *τὰ περὶ τὴν ψ.*, *τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα*, *τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα*, Pl. *Lg.* 697b, is used by Socr. e.g. *Ap.* 30a, *Men.* 87e.

236. 13 **ἐσθῆτα:** cf. *ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα, πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι;* Pl. *Phd.* 64d.

περιβολήν: cf. *εἰς δὲ τὸ σὸν σχῆμα ὃ σὺ περιβέβλησαι καὶ τὴν σὴν δόξαν* X. *Oec.* 2. 4; *νεανίσκου . . . ἡρμοσμένου τὴν κόμην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην περιβολὴν κατακοσμοῦντος* Epict. iii. 1. 1.

236. 14 **σκηνήν:** the idea of 'make-up' is best seen on the stage, so that the transition from *περιβολή* to *σκηνή* in a slightly extended sense is natural, cf.: *ταυτὶ παρὰ τῆς τύχης σχήματα ἔοικεν τοῖς ἐν Διονύσου περιβλήμασι* Max. Tyr. i. 10. The despot in private is *γυμνὸς τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς* Pl. *R.* 577b (see Cor.'s *σκευήν* here).

Ch. 3: 236. 15 **Τρία ἐστίν:** the tripartite division of man used at p. **20.** 13, *νοῦς* being substituted for *τὸ ἡγ.*, to which it is equivalent, see l. 25.

236. 16–17 **τὸ δὲ τρίτον μόνον κυρίως σόν:** cf. p. **94.** 21.

236. 20 **τοῦ συμφύτου πνευματίου:** see *πνευμάτιον* p. **20.** 13 n.

236. 21 **ἡ ἔξωθεν περιρρέουσα δίνη.** A reference to, and apparent acceptance of, the Empedoclean hypothesis of a *whirl* in consequence of which the earth has taken up a place at the centre of the Universe, and is kept there by reason of the relatively swifter movement of the heavens. Nothing like it is found elsewhere in the *Meditations*. It would seem that, as M. is going to compare the self-poised mind to the sphere of Empedocles, he has for the moment adopted his astronomical theory. For the word *δίνη*, cf. the reference in the *Phaedo* to this theory: *δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν*, 99b, and see Arist.'s criticism in *Cael.* 295ª16 sq.

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236. 21–2 τῶν συνειμαρμένων ἐξῃρημένην: an expression which is without a parallel in M., and is anticipatory of Neoplatonic language. Thus Simpl. speaks of *αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ* (sc. *ψυχαί*) *ἐξῃρημέναι κατὰ φύσιν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ χωρισταὶ παντελῶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὖσαι in Epict. Ench.* p. 84b, and M. here uses *τῶν συνειμαρμένων* for the body and spirit, as well as for the rest of the circumstances which are outlined at ll. 18–21, 25 sq.

236. 22–3 καθαράν ⟨τε⟩ . . . ⟨καὶ⟩ ἀπόλυτον: some connectives are required, but Sch. prints the MSS. reading.

καθαράν may mean *κ. πάθους* cf. l. 25 and p. **28.** 15 or may refer, more generally, to emancipation from false imaginations, Bacon's *expurgatio intellectus*, cf. Pl. *Sph.* 230e.

ἀπόλυτον: cf. *τῶν τελέως κατὰ φύσιν ἀπολελυμένων* Simpl. loc. cit. 85a. The sense is 'freed from bondage', cf. *ἐξῃρημένην*, *emancipated*, and *χωρίσῃς* l. 24. Christ was *ὁ μὲν ἀπόλυτος εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀνθρωπίνων παθῶν* Clem. Alex. *Paed.* p. 99.

236. 25 τὰ προσηρτημένα, *attachments* conveys both the physical and the fig. sense: *δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα, τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ* Epict. i. 9. 11.

ἐκ προσπαθείας: cf. *μετὰ τῶν ἔργων ἀποστατέον καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὰ προσπαθείας* Porph. *De Abst.* i. 31. The verb *προσπάσχειν* was used of an artist's *attraction* to his work, p. **74.** 19. Gat. reviews the later examples of the use of the word, and concludes that it is 'affectio ea, qua rei alicui addicti sumus eamque quodammodo deperimus'.

238. 1 τὰ ἐπέκεινα ἢ τὰ παρῳχηκότα: cf. 'circumcidenda ergo duo sunt, et futuri timor et veteris incommodi memoria' Sen. *Ep.* 78. 14; cf. p. **234.** 17. The past and the future are alike *ἀδιάφορα* p. **110.** 17.

238. 3 σφαῖρος: cf. pp. **160.** 20, **220.** 19. See *Test.* for the two contexts in which the line is preserved, and the variants which M. or an editor of our text followed.

The fig. was applied to the *sapiens*, 'in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus' Hor. *Sat.* ii. 7. 86.

238. 5 ἀταράκτως: described as *οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιμος ἐν μελέεσσιν* Emped. 27. 5.

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238. 6 **ἵλεως τῷ σαυτοῦ δαίμονι.** The inward tranquillity rests upon a propitious relationship with the Divinity within, cf. *ἀβιάστως τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μοίρᾳ συνηρμοσμένον* p. **48.** 23. M. is fond of a combination of three adverbs, e.g. pp. **46.** 15, **148.** 9, **166.** 4.

Ch. 4: 238. 7–8 **ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἕκαστος . . . φιλεῖ:** *τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὑτῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον* Pl. *Lg.* 731e. Pl. interprets the proverb as an expression of the fact that, like lovers, we are blind to the faults of the beloved. The Stoics regarded self-love, like the natural bond of parent to child, as Nature's protective provision for the safety of the child. Later in life, mature reason is a substitute for this self-love. M. ignores the point that it is reasonable to prefer another's opinion or rather judgement upon one's conduct to one's own, because self-love prejudices one's own verdict.

238. 8 **τὴν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπόληψιν.** The verdict of *conscientia* is regarded as an intellectual judgement made by the self, which is contrasted with the judgement of our neighbour. This contrast is often referred to in Latin writers, e.g. 'sed vereor ne cui de te plus quam tibi credas' Hor. *Ep.* i. 16. 19; 'intus te ipse considera: nunc qualis sis aliis credis' Sen. *Ep.* 80. 10; 'multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur' Plin. *Ep.* iii. 20. 8. Cicero, conscious of rectitude, makes a profession which is opposed to what M. says: 'mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo' *Att.* xii. 28. 2. M. says that we ourselves are so far from possessing a *mens conscia recti*, so sensible of evil thoughts and evil desires, that we prefer our neighbour's opinion, which does not know the facts, to our own guilty self-knowledge. Thus it is a blind self-love which prefers what is not the whole truth to the bare truth. If we truly loved ourselves we should put real reform before vain reputation.

238. 9 **θεὸς ἐπιστὰς ἢ διδάσκαλος ἔμφρων:** the verb is appropriate to a vision in the night-watches: *ἐπιστᾶσα τῆς νυκτὸς Ὁμήρῳ* Isoc. x. 65, and to the appearance of a counsellor at one's elbow: *νῦν δ' ἐμέο πρότερος μάλ' ἐπέγρετο καί μοι ἐπέστη* Hom. *Il.* x. 124. Galen, like M. here, uses it of an older friend: *ὥστε τις ἐπιστὰς ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ προσηκόντως ἂν εἴποι πρὸς αὐτόν* i. 10.

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238. 10 **καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι:** *ὁ καθ' αὑτὸν λέγων* p. **212.** 3 n.

As M. is sparing of words, the second verb may mean meditate with action in view, cf. *ὡς ζῆν διανοῇ* p. **92.** 11. The English word 'contemplate' may be compared.

238. 11 **γεγωνίσκων:** cf. the parallel passage at p. **38.** 11. M.'s ideal of candour is to be gathered, especially, from p. **168.** 23.

Ch. 5: 238. 14 **Πῶς ποτε κ.τ.λ.;** Is the government continued from *ἐθαύμασα* l. 7?

φιλανθρώπως: see *χρηστοί* p. **178.** 3 n. Cf. *ἐνδεικνύμενον φιλάνθρωπον ἦθος . . . καὶ μάλιστα δὴ χαίροντα εὐεργεσίαις, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐγγυτάτω τῆς τῶν θεῶν φύσεως* Dion Chrys. ii. 26, p. 81; *ἡ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλανθρωπία τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν* St. Paul, *Tit.* 3. 4.

238. 16 **ὥσπερ συμβόλαια θεμένους:** the old conception of *contracting* or *covenanting* with *τὸ θεῖον*, *numen*. He qualifies the expression by a 'so to speak'.

238. 17 **δι' ἔργων ὁσίων καὶ ἱερουργιῶν:** *τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θύειν καὶ προσομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀναθήμασιν καὶ συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν κάλλιστον* Pl. *Lg.* 716d.

238. 18 **ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ ἀποθάνωσι:** *ἅπαξ θανόντος οὔτις ἔστ' ἀνάστασις* Aesch. *Eum.* 648.

238. 21 **ἤνεγκεν ἂν αὐτό:** cf. pp. **80.** 8 n., **234.** 20.

238. 21–2 **ἐκ δὴ τοῦ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν:** not, as the verbal expression suggests, the contrary of *οὕτως ἔχει* l. 19, but of *ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχειν* l. 20: 'from its not being otherwise,' i.e. as Nature does not bring it to pass.

238. 22 **πιστούσθω σοι,** 'you may rest assured', as Theseus says: *ἔκηλος αὐτοῦ μίμνε, πιστωθεὶς ὅτι | . . . οὐχὶ παύσομαι* Soph. *O.C.* 1039.

238. 23 **παραζητῶν,** means apparently 'questioning mistakenly', an extremely rare word.

238. 24 **δικαιολογῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.** Gat. compares St. Paul's: *σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ Rom.* 9. 20. M.'s point is, however, different; he says that by raising the question of justice the debater assumes that he is arguing with the author

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of good and right. His implied assumption is that of: *ὁ κρίνων πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν, οὐ ποιήσεις κρίσιν; Gen.* 18. 25.

Ch. 6: 240. 1 **Ἔθιζε καὶ ὅσα ἀπογινώσκεις:** cf. *δεῖ μηδὲν ἀπογινώσκειν μηδ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἀλλὰ . . . πεῖραν ἅμα λαμβάνειν ἑαυτοῦ* Plu. *De Tranqu.* 476c.

ἡ χεὶρ ἡ ἀριστερά. Pl. goes further and uses this illustration in support of his contention that man is naturally ambidextrous. The difference has arisen *διὰ τὰ ἔθη Lg.* 794e, and the erroneous reasoning is exposed *ἐν ἡνιοχείαις τε καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις* ib. 795a. Arist. holds the view *ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων* at *E.N.* 1134^{b}34, and frequently in his Natural History, see esp. *An. Inc.*

240.2 ἀργὸς οὖσα: cf. *τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐν ἀργίᾳ διάγον καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεων ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀσθενέστατον ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι* Pl. *Ti.* 89e.

Ch. 7: 240. 5 **τὴν ἀχάνειαν,** the immense gulf of Time contrasted with life's brevity, as at p. **90.** 7; cf. pp. **52.** 10–11 n., **72.** 21.

240. 6 **τὴν ἀσθένειαν,** an unusual word to apply to *ὕλη*, and chosen presumably for the assonance. The sense may be 'paltry nature' rather than 'weakness', for his scorn arises from our setting the affections on what is perishable, p. **26.** 25.

Ch. 8: 240. 7 **Γυμνὰ τῶν φλοιῶν,** *stripped* of their coverings as God sees men's *ἡγεμονικά*, p. **236.** 8, which are or should be the living, causal essences, p. **150.** 11.

τὰς ἀναφοράς: cf. *ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ τίνα σκοπὸν ἡ ἀναφορά* p. **122.** 6 n.; *περὶ ἔρωτος, οἷόν τ' ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν . . . εἰς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει* Pl. *Phdr.* 237c, as M. has said: *ὁποίαν τινὰ τοῦτο χρείαν παρεχόμενον* p. **46.** 1, where his meaning is set out more at large.

240. 8 **τίς οὐχ ἑαυτῷ.** Richards' correction leads excellently to *πῶς οὐδείς*. For the MSS. error, cf. *ὃ βούλεται* for *οὐ βούλεται* p. **204.** 9.

240. 9 **ἀσχολίας αἴτιος:** cf. *ἕκαστος αὑτῷ γίγνεται τῆς ἀτυχίας αἴτιος* Dion Chrys. lxxx. 6, p. 438. *ἀσχολία* stands for absorption in material aims and circumstance, p. **236.** 14.

ἐμποδίζεται. No man and no material obstacle can obstruct the freedom of the good life, which is *καὶ ἀτάραχον καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον, ἐὰν μὴ ἑαυτὸ ταράσσῃ καὶ ἐμποδίζῃ* p. **126.** 3, cf. pp. **96.** 2, **168.** 1, **234.** 5.

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240. 9–10 ὅτι πάντα ὑπόληψις. Although the doctrine thus stated is fundamental to M.'s teaching, and recurs repeatedly, e.g. *αἱ δὲ ὀχλήσεις ἐκ μόνης τῆς ἔνδον ὑπολήψεως* p. **52.** 20, yet in this form, derived from Monimus, it occurs only at p. **30.** 16, outside this Book. He repeats it at pp. **244.** 1, **246.** 12, the third occasion being in what is a summary of Book ii.

Ch. 9: 240. 11 Ὅμοιον εἶναι [δεῖ]. The construction continues the imp. infin. of l. 7. The MSS. variations arise from the intrusion of δεῖ, influenced perhaps in part by the opening of ch. 7. A actually has δεῖναι δεῖ.

240. 13 ἀναιρεῖται, *resumes*, as the antithesis to *ἀεὶ ἔχει* shows. For the latter, cf. *διὰ παντὸς χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἀναπόβλητος γάρ ἐστι· καὶ πάντοτε τῇ ψυχῇ χρῆται οὔσῃ τελείᾳ ὁ σπουδαῖος* Cleanthes, ap. D.L. vii. 128, cf. 127.

240. 14 δεῖ. Perhaps the archetype ran δεῖται αὐτά and the *scriptura continua* was misread δεῖ τοιαῦτα. There is no paragraph in A, the words run: *αὐτὴν δεῖ· τοιαῦτα. . . .*

Ch. 10: 240. 15 Αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα. This correction gives the required sense. See the parallel passage: *τοῦτο τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό . . . τί μὲν τὸ οὐσιῶδες; κ.τ.λ.* p. **150.** 10.

ἀναφοράν, grouped as in l. 7 with the material and formal, cf. **122.** 7 n. Our reference is to be especially to social good, p. **180.** 9.

Ch. 11: 240. 16 Ἡλίκην ἐξουσίαν: exclamatory like *ἡλίκας ἡδονὰς ἥσθησαν* p. **110.** 24. The moral liberty is especially in regard to pleasures and pains, p. **52.** 8, but also in reference to any evil appetite or disturbance, p. **156.** 4. Alex. Aphr. uses *τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἐξουσίᾳ* for liberty of conscience, *De Fato*, 1.

240. 17–18 ⟨ὡς⟩ τὸ ἐξῆς τῇ φύσει. I have supplied *ὡς*, supposing that the words amplify *πᾶν ὃ ἂν νέμῃ* and are equivalent to *τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει*, cf. p. **24.** 17. The words follow *ὁ θεός* immediately in A, whereas in P they open ch. 12.

Ch. 12: 240. 20 οὐχὶ ἄκοντες: wherefore they must be excused: *τῶν ἀκόντων, οἷς πολλὴ δοκεῖ συγγνώμη εἶναι* Pl. *H. Mi.* 372a; cf. p. **224.** 15.

οὐδενὶ μεμπτέον: cf. *οὐ δεῖ μέμφεσθαι οὐδενί* Epict. iii. 26. 18, *μὴ*

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θεὸν μέμψασθαι, μὴ ἄνθρωπον iii. 10. 13; *μηδὲ σεαυτὸν* (sc. *αἰτιᾶσθαι*) p. **192.** 25.

Ch. 13: 240. 21 ξένος, i.e. *κόσμου*, p. **62.** 19 or *τῆς πατρίδος* p. **236.** 6.

ὁ θαυμάζων καὶ ὁτιοῦν: cf. *αἰσχρόν ἐστι ξενίζεσθαι, εἰ ἡ συκῆ σῦκα φέρει* p. **150.** 25; *ὡς γελοῖον . . . θαυμάζειν* p. **194.** 26 sq.

Ch. 14: 240. 23 εἱμαρμένης: the unusual expression seems designed to balance (*φυρμὸς*) *εἰκαιότητος* l. 24. With P's *εἱμαρμένη* the correspondence will be with *ἀπαράβατος*, cf. *τὴν εἱμαρμένην περιφοράν*, 'fatalem coeli conversionem', Simpl. *in Epict. Ench.* p. 18c.

ἀπαράβατος τάξις: cf. *ἡ εἱμαρμένη εἱρμός τις οὖσα αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος* Nemes. *Nat. Hom.* ch. 37. This fatal order is also called *ἀπαραίτητος εἱμαρμένη* Max. Tyr. v. 5. The notion is expressed by: *ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα* Heraclit. 94 D., 29 B.

240. 23–4 πρόνοια ἱλάσιμος: Providence admitting personal intercession, the Stoic alternative to their doctrine of Fate, cf. pp. **114.** 19, **186.** 22.

240. 26 ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν ποίησον: deserving help by rectitude and prayer properly directed, as Socr. taught: *ἀρέσκοι δὲ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ὡς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς*; X. *Mem.* iv. 3. 17, cf. *δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν* Pl. *Phdr.* 279b.

240. 27 φυρμὸς ἀνηγεμόνευτος, i.q. *ἀπροστάτητος* l. 24, since *ἡγεμών* and *προστάτης* are, in this connexion, synonyms, p. **90.** 25. Plato's providential view, in contrast to mechanistic atomism, *κυκεών* p. **62.** 12 n., is thus expressed: *τὸ θειότατον . . . παράδειγμα τῶν ὄντων . . . ᾧ τὸ πᾶν ἡγουμένῳ πειθόμενον ἐξ ἀκοσμίας κόσμος ἐστίν* Plu. *Dion*, 10.

ἀσμένιζε: *ἄσμενος* is constantly used to express joy and relief in deliverance from perils.

Ch. 15: 242. 3 τὸ τοῦ λύχνου φῶς: *ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ λαμπτὴρ τῷ περιέχοντι τὴν ψ. σώματι, φῶς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐντὸς ψ.* Plu. *Qu. Rom.* 281b. We recall: *ὡς ὅταν ὁ λύχνος τῇ ἀστραπῇ φωτίζῃ σε St. Luke*, 11. 36.

Ch. 16: 242. 7 ὅτι ⟨οὐ⟩ κατέκρινεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν: Gat. took M.'s reference to be to *compunction*, and translated: 'unde novi . . . an peccati ipse se reum peregerit?' The Oxford editor of 1704 accordingly supplied *μή*, and Cor. *οὐ*. Some critics, however, treat

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κατέκρινεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν as a clause introduced by *ὅτι*, in inverted commas that is, and so parallel to *τί δαὶ οἶδα εἰ τοῦτο ἁμάρτημα;* Thus they take the sense to be: 'Say to yourself, "How do I know?" and, "He condemned himself".' This is difficult, if not impossible, and it would appear better to supply *μέμνησο* mentally to govern *ὅτι* as appears to be necessary just below at *ὅτι ὁ μὴ θέλων*, cf. *τί ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ ὅτι . . .* p. **28.** 4.

As to the general sense, *κατέκρινεν* may refer not to *compunction* but to a pronouncing judgement upon himself by his very act. This would agree with a paradox of Socr., as where he says that his judges have condemned themselves to *ἀδικία*, a worse penalty than death, Pl. *Ap.* 39b, cf. *Grg.* 479e; see also *ὁ ἀδικῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ* p. **174.** 11. In endeavouring to harm you, he has done himself wrong, and disfigured himself.

242. 10 **τὸν φαῦλον ἁμαρτάνειν.** Evil men are a necessary element in the world-order: *καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρῃζεν ὁ κόσμος* p. **114.** 11. For the fig-tree illustration, see p. **54.** 16.

242. 12 **τί γὰρ πάθῃ;** So *ὡμολόγηκα, τί γὰρ πάθω;* Pl. *Euthd.* 302d.

242. 13 **εἰ οὖν γοργὸς εἶ**, an ironical expression: *ἄσκησον, εἰ γ. εἶ, λοιδορούμενος ἀνέχεσθαι* Epict. iii. 12. 10, sim. ii. 16. 20.

θεράπευσον: *εἰ γὰρ ἐπαΐει, θεραπεύσεις* p. **92.** 8.

Ch. 17: 242. 14 **Εἰ μὴ καθήκει κ.τ.λ.** This maxim is put positively at p. **76.** 2, cf. pp. **48.** 18, **208.** 6.

242. 15 **εἰς τὸ πάν⟨τως⟩ ἀεὶ ὁρᾶν.** The arrangement of the clauses and the interpretation are difficult, and many different solutions, none of which is convincing, have been proposed. I suppose M. to continue the maxim about right act and word by insisting upon steady attention to the present circumstance. The words *πάντως ἀεί* are used at p. **144.** 15 for 'continually'.

Ch. 18: 242. 16 **τὸ τὴν φαντασίαν σοι ποιοῦν:** see p. **46.** 5–6 n.

διαιροῦντα: for this analysis, see p. **60.** 10 n. For the 'time' reference, pp. **46.** 5, **180.** 16.

Ch. 19: 242. 20 **τῶν νευροσπαστούντων σε:** see pp. **22.** 2 n., **122.** 1.

242. 21 **τί μου νῦν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια;** *ἡ διάνοια* usually means in M. the *understanding*. Here it is equivalent to *ἡ ψυχή*, being the abstract term for *τί νῦν διανοῇ;* p. **38.** 11. M.'s psychology and

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language are illustrated by: *οἷα ἂν πολλάκις φαντασθῇς, τοιαύτη σοι ἔσται ἡ διάνοια· βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψ.* p. **86.** 19; *τίνος ἄρα νῦν ἔχω ψ.; μήτι παιδίου*; p. **84.** 7, sim. p. **204.** 3.

Ch. 22: 244. 1 **Ὅτι πάντα ὑπόληψις:** for this saying of Monimus, see p. **30.** 16 n.

αὕτη ἐπὶ σοί: cf. *ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα* Epict. *Ench.* 1; p. **154.** 28.

ἄρον οὖν: cf. *ἆρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι* p. **54.** 19.

244. 2 **γαλήνη:** a figurative expression for *tranquillitas*, cf. pp. **74.** 23, **154.** 27.

244. 3 **κόλπος ἀκύμων:** Zeno described the slumber of the proficient in virtue by this fig.: *οἷον ἐν βυθῷ γαλήνης ἀκλύστου καταφανεῖ διαλάμπει τῆς ψ. τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένον* ap. Plu. *Quomodo quis*, 82 f.

Ch. 23: 244. 4 **κατὰ καιρὸν παυσαμένη.** The last ch. illustrated the power man has to escape from the perturbation of passion to calm. Here the general law of the passage of every activity to quiescence is stated, and similarly of every agent from activity to rest. This is an example of the Heraclitean law: *μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται* 84a D., 83 B.

244. 9 **τὸν εἱρμὸν τοῦτον:** the continuous train of activities, *τὸ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πράξεων σύστημα* ll. 6–7. *εἱρμός* is used for the sequence of impressions upon consciousness p. **38.** 9.

κακῶς διετέθη: cf. *εἰ μὴ χεῖρον μέλλει διατίθεσθαί σου ἡ ὡς ζῴου φύσις* p. **192.** 11; *τί γάρ σοι κακόν, εἰ αὐτὸς νῦν . . . δέχῃ τὸ νῦν τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει εὔκαιρον* p. **222.** 2.

244. 12–13 **καλὸν δὲ . . . καὶ ὡραῖον τὸ συμφέρον τῷ ὅλῳ:** so he said that Death *οὐ μόνον φύσεως ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον αὐτῇ* p. **28.** 7; cf. *πῶς κακὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ μέρους φθοράν, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ τῷ ὅλῳ;* Simpl. *in Epict. Ench.* p. 83b.

244. 14 **οὐδὲ αἰσχρόν:** *ὁ θάνατος . . . οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ ἄν τις αἰσχυνθείη* p. **54.** 12.

244. 15 **οὐκ ἀκοινώνητον,** appears to mean 'for the good of the Whole'; it is equivalent to *τῷ ὅλῳ καίριον*, but the form of the sentence has caused the double negative.

244. 15–16 **καὶ συμφέρον καὶ συμφερόμενον:** the assonance is like

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συνεμφέρεταί τε καὶ συνεμφέρει p. **40.** 4. Greek writers continually play on the various senses of *φέρειν* and *φέρεσθαι*, *συμφέρειν* and *συμφέρεσθαι*, see, e.g., Soph. *El.* 946, *Phil.* 627; Eur. *Heraclid.* 919; Pl. *Lg.* 775c, *Ti.* 43a, *Smp.* 187a, *Sph.* 242e.

244. 16 **θεοφόρητος**, *borne*, not inspired, by God. M. is pondering Cleisthenes' saying, which is paraphrased by Palladas:

> *ἢ τὸ φέρον σε φέρει, φέρε καὶ φέρου· εἰ δ' ἀγανακτεῖς*
> *καὶ σαυτὸν λυπεῖς,—καὶ τὸ φέρον σε φέρει.* *Anth. Pal.* x. 73.

Clem. Alex. terms the Christian gnostic, *θεοφορῶν καὶ θεοφορούμενος* *Strom.* p. 882, cf. p. 792. See further, *σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ προσφέρων καὶ προσφερόμενος*, 'both offerer and oblation', Hammond, *Antient Liturgies* p. 101.

244. 16–17 **κατὰ ταὐτὰ θεῷ**, closely akin to *εὐθεῖαν περαίνοντι ἕπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ* p. **200.** 4. The phrase appears stronger than *τὸ σὺν θεῷ πράττειν* X. *Eq. Mag.* 9. 8, cf. *Oec.* 6. 1; *ἀλλὰ σὺν θεῷ βαίνεις* Babr. 92. 6.

244. 17 **τῇ γνώμῃ**, frequently used by Ael. Arist. in opp. to *ἀνάγκῃ*, the implication here; *ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός εἰμι* Epict. ii. 16. 42.

Ch. 24: 244. 18 **δεῖ πρόχειρα ἔχειν**: cf. *πρόχειρον ἔστω* p. **74.** 1, *πρόχειρα αὐτὰ ἑκτέον* p. **118.** 8. We should probably read *ἀεί* for δεῖ, cf. pp. **56.** 3, **68.** 17.

ἐπὶ μὲν ὧν ποιεῖς, [εἰ]. This ch. is extremely condensed in expression, so that to cut out *εἰ*, with Morus, is a doubtful remedy. Mr. Marchant suggests that the author mentally supplied *ποιεῖν* before *εἰ*, as he appears to have supplied *ἐπινοεῖν* before *ὅτι ἤτοι*.

244. 20–1 **οὔτε δὲ τῇ ἐπιτυχίᾳ μεμπτέον**: *τίνι μέμφῃ; ταῖς ἀτόμοις ἢ τοῖς θεοῖς; ἀμφότερα μανιώδη* p. **152.** 4.

244. 22 **ἀπὸ σπέρματος μέχρι ψυχώσεως.** Gat.'s emendation of *στερήματος* has been generally accepted, *σπέρμα* being used for *σπερμάτωσις* or *σπερμοβολία*. Sch. suggested *στηρίγματος*, referring to *ὅταν εἰς τὴν μήτραν καταβληθὲν ἐνστηρίσῃ* Philo i. 15. This is M.'s only reference to the hypothesis of some Stoics that the embryo was a *φυτόν* until at birth, shocked by the cold atmosphere, it inhaled *ψυχή* (*ψῦχος*) with its first inspiration, Plu. *De St. repug.* 1052f.

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244. 23 ἀποδοῦναι: cf. *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονα . . . ἀποδοῦναι* p. **46. 17**, sc. *τῇ φύσει*, to whom he says: *δὸς ὃ θέλεις, ἀπόλαβε ὃ θέλεις* p. **200. 23**. Cf. *Eccl.* 12. 7.

ἐξ οἵων: cf. *ἐξ οἵου οἷον*, of the *βρέφος* from the semen p. **204. 14**. Here he refers to the composition of the body from the elements, and its dissolution into them, or rather their release, l. 24; cf. p. **32. 23**.

244. 24 ἄφνω μετέωρος ἐξαρθείς: cf. the similar fancy at pp. **134. 21**, **182. 22**. Philo speaks of the human mind as *πτηνὸς ἀρθεὶς καὶ τὸν ἀέρα . . . κατασκεψάμενος ἀνωτέρω φέρεται πρὸς αἰθέρα* i. 16, but as contemplating there the world of ideas, not the materialistic *daemons* which M. here, and nowhere else, envisages.

244. 25 [ὅση] κατανοήσαις. The textual evidence is perplexing. P has *τὴν πολυτροπίαν ὅση κατανοήσαις συνιδὼν ἅμα*, where Gat. interprets *ὅση* as if it were *ὅση ἐστί*. A has *τὴν π. ὅτι καταφρονήσεις συνόδων ἅμα*.

244. 26 τὸ περιοικοῦν ἐναερίων. M. clearly refers to the good, perhaps even to the evil spirits of prevalent pagan belief. Plu. often mentions *daemons* of a nature intermediate between human and divine, basing himself upon what Pl. says in the *Smp.* (202d) and elsewhere, and going back, like Sextus Emp. and Max. Tyr., to Hes. *Op.* 252 sq. See, e.g., *De defectu* 417b and 431b, *De Isid.* 360d.

The following passages illustrate M.'s doctrine and language: *εἶναί τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἔμπλεων, καὶ τούτους δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας νομίζεσθαι* the School of Pythagoras ap. D.L. viii. 32; *ἐν τῷ ἀέρι . . . ἔμψυχά τινα καὶ νοερὰ συνίστασθαι ζῷα. . . . καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι ζῴων εἶναι φύσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ἄνθρωποι νοερᾶς μετέχουσι δυνάμεως* S. Emp. *Math.* ix. 86; *πολλὴ δὲ ἡ δαιμόνων ἀγέλη . . . οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ νοσημάτων . . . οἱ δὲ ὁδοῦ συνέμποροι* Max. Tyr. viii. 8, cf. xi. 12; sim. Alcinous, *Introd.* 15.

Ch. 25: 246. 3 Βάλε ἔξω τὴν ὑπόληψιν: cf. p. **244. 1**. He may refer to *ὁ τῦφος* l. 2.

Ch. 26: 246. 4. This ch. is almost a complete summary of the topics of Book ii.

246. 4–5 πάντα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν: cf. p. **22. 7**.

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246. 5 τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον ἀλλότριον: cf. p. **20.** 7; sim. pp. **130.** 11, **178.** 23, **186.** 8.

246. 6 οὕτως ἀεὶ ἐγίνετο; cf. p. **30.** 10.

246. 7 ὅση ἡ συγγένεια: cf. p. **20.** 5; sim. p. **40.** 5.

246. 9 ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς θεός: cf. pp. **28.** 14, **32.** 18; sim. p. **84.** 3.

246. 10 ἐκεῖθεν ἐρρύηκεν: cf. p. **22.** 6.

οὐδὲν ἴδιον οὐδενός. This is supplementary to what he has said in Book ii; cf. *σύμπαντα εἰληφὼς παρὰ ἄλλου* (sc. *τοῦ θεοῦ*) *καὶ αὐτὸν σεαυτόν* Epict. iv. 1. 103; 'cum sciam nil esse in vita proprium mortali datum' Lucilius, 27, 664 Lachm.; 'vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu' Lucr. iii. 971; 'rerum natura illum tibi . . . non mancipio dedit, sed commodavit' Sen. *Ad Polyb.* 10. 4.

246. 10–11 τὸ τεκνίον. A point not made in Book ii, and irrelevant here, though true enough, unless he means that a child is dearer than life itself.

246. 12 πάνθ' ὑπόληψις: cf. p. **30.** 16; sim. pp. **240.** 9, **244.** 1.

Ch. 27: 246. 14 ἀναπολεῖν: cf. p. **64.** 15, where a very similar reflection about contemporaries is opened by *μάλιστα δὲ ἀναπολητέον.*

246. 16 καπνός: *τὰ ἀνθρώπινα κάπνον καὶ τὸ μηδέν* p. **206.** 16, *νεκρὰ καὶ καπνός* p. **250.** 2; the theme is echoed in the verses appended to A, p. **250,** after app. crit.

246. 17 μῦθος: 'cinis et manes et fabula fies' Pers. v. 152; see pp. **64.** 25, **94.** 9, **154.** 15.

246. 18 Φάβιος Κατουλλῖνος, reasonably to be identified with the aged *Φάβιος* of p. **72.** 18.

246. 18–19 ἐπ' ἀγροῦ . . . ἐν τοῖς κήποις: a country seat contrasted with a palace in Rome with wide gardens, like the *horti* of Maecenas, which Fronto occupied, or the seat of Domitia, M.'s mother, on the Caelian, Fronto, *Ep.* p. 31. Cic. says: 'vixeruntque nonnulli in agris delectati re sua familiari' *Off.* i. 69, and Tac. describes how Vitellius: 'umbraculis hortorum abditus . . . praeterita, instantia, futura pari oblivione dimiserat' *Hist.* iii. 36.

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246. 19 **Στερτίνιος**, like Lusius Lupus, known only from this passage, unless he is the officer who served under Germanicus in Pannonia, Tac. *Ann.* ii. 11. He is mentioned next to Tiberius.

ἐν Καπρέαις: *Τιβέριος δε Καῖσαρ ἐν Καπρέαις ἑπτὰ ἔτη διῃτήθη μεχρὶ τῆς τελευτῆς* Plu. *De Exilio*, 602e. The story is told in Tac. *Ann.* iv. 67; Suet. *Tib.* 40. Cf. 'principis angusta Caprearum in rupe sedentis | cum grege Chaldaeo' Juv. x. 93.

246. 20 **Οὐήλιος Ῥοῦφος.** Cardinal Barberini's correction is interesting, but the name of the town was *Ἐλέα* or *Ὑέλη*, and we now have Fronto's letters, one of which opens 'Velio Rufo seni salutem' *Ep.* p. 181. Fronto terms him 'hominem vehementem et cum doctrina tum multo magis natura validum', so that M. seems to have mentioned him because of his age and some known idiosyncrasy or ruling passion.

διαφορά: see pp. **114.** 3, **180.** 25.

246. 22 **ἐπὶ τῆς δοθείσης ὕλης:** *τὸ ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὕλης δυνάμενον . . . πραχθῆναι* p. **208.** 5; cf. *ἄλλος σοι δίδωσι τροφὰς καὶ κτῆσιν· . . . σὺ λοιπὸν παραλαβὼν τὴν ὕλην ἐργάζου* Epict. ii. 5. 22. So, if the emendation is correct, M. speaks of his *τροφὰς τὰς ἐκ τῶν μαθημάτων*, p. **62.** 29, cf. *ἐγὼ δὲ ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν τροφὴν λόγων ὑγιεινῶν* Max. Tyr. xxii. 6.

246. 22–3 **θεοῖς ἑπόμενον ἀφελῶς:** cf. *κοσμίως ἑπόμενον θεῷ* p. **48.** 18. I have therefore taken the adv. with the participle. In any case the unusual word is used in contrast with *τῦφος*.

246. 23 **ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἀτυφίᾳ τῦφος τυφόμενος:** for Gat.'s *ἐπί*, cf. *ἐφ' ᾗ σεμνύνεται* p. **100.** 17, where PA have *ὑφ'*.

τυφόμενος appears to mean *smouldering*, i.e. concealed, cf. *τυφόμενος πόλεμος* Plu. *Sull.* 6.

Ch. 28: 246. 26 **ὄψει ὁρατοί**, i.e. the heavenly luminaries: *τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεῶν ὁρῶντες σαφῶς τιμῶμεν* Pl. *Lg.* 931a. Arist. speaks of visible divinities: *τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων Metaph.* 1026^{a}18, cf. 1074^{b}3, *Cael.* 270^{b}10, *Meteor.* 339^{b}25, sim. [Pl.] *Epin.* 981e. From contemporary writers we have: *ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ξύμπαντα* (sc. *τὰ οὐράνια*) *ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων σέβει, θεοὺς ἡγούμενος μακαρίους μακρόθεν ὁρῶν* Dion Chrys. xii. 60, p. 405; *ὅπου δ' ἂν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ ἥλιος, ἐκεῖ σελήνη, ἐκεῖ ἄστρα . . . ἡ πρὸς θεοὺς ὁμιλία* Epict. iii. 22. 22.

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246. 27 **ἔπειτα μέντοι**, the progressive *μέντοι*, not the adversative.

τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ: cf. a saying of Pericles: *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνους αὐτοὺς ὁρῶμεν ἀλλὰ . . . τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἃ παρέχουσιν ἀθανάτους εἶναι τεκμαιρόμεθα* ap. Plu. *Per.* 8. Socr. reasoned: *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, . . . ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή* X. *Mem.* iv. 3. 14. Cf. 'sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non vides, tamen ut deum adgnoscis ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum . . . vim divinam mentis adgnoscito' Cic. *Tusc.* i. 70. The argument from seen effect to unseen cause, and the use of the analogy between man and the Universe often appear in the works of authors nearly contemporary with M., e.g. *οὕτω χρὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος φρονεῖν . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψ., δι' ἣν ζῶμεν . . . ἀόρατος οὖσα τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται . . . ταῦτα χρὴ καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι . . . ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται* [Arist.] *Mu.* 399^{b}10. Theophilus of Antioch, whose death is put in the same year as that of M., has: *καθάπερ γὰρ ψ. ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ βλέπεται ἀόρατος οὖσα ἀνθρώποις . . . οὕτως ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τὸν θεὸν μὴ δύνασθαι ὁραθῆναι . . . διὰ δὲ τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ βλέπεταί τε καὶ νοεῖται Ad Autol.* i. 5; cf. Tatian, *Ad Graecos* ch. 4. In Latin authors we meet similar thoughts: 'deum forma invisitata, vis cognita: quorum potestatis licet sentire, non datur cernere' Apul. *Fl.* ch. 10; 'Deum oculis carnalibus vis videre, cum ipsam animam tuam, qua vivificaris et loqueris, nec aspicere possis nec tenere' Minuc. Felix, *Oct.* 32. 6.

248. 1 **ἐξ ὧν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν**: *τὴν δύναμιν οὕτως ὁρᾶν . . . οὐχὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς* p. **204.** 18. Cf. *ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον* X. *Mem.* iv. 3. 14; *τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης* St. Paul, *Rom.* 1. 20.

Ch. 29: 248. 4 **Σωτηρία βίου**: *τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου*; Pl. *Prt.* 356d. His answer is *ἐπιστήμη*.

248. 5 **ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς**: *ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψ. τραπόμενος τοῦ ἀρίστου . . . ἀπόλαυε* p. **42.** 1, where he uses, as here, the word *ἀπολαύειν*, i.e. secure the gratification of your true nature, p. **208.** 11.

248. 6 **συνάπτοντα**: cf. *ἐνὶ τέρπου . . . τῷ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν κοινωνικήν* p. **98.** 11.

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Ch. 30: 248. 9 Ἐν φῶς ἡλίου. A variety of instances of *ἕνωσις*, see *εἴπερ ἥνωται ἡ οὐσία* p. **98.** 7 n.

κἂν διείργηται τοίχοις: cf. *διεῖργον τὸν ἐπέκεινα ἀέρα* p. **168.** 8; see also p. **208.** 15.

248. 10 **μία οὐσία κοινή,** i.e. *ὕλη*, the matter which is common to the mineral and vegetable kingdoms, in distinction from *ψυχή* which unites the animal realm, and *νοῦς* which connects social and rational beings with one another and with the gods, cf. p. **100.** 22 sq.

248. 11 **ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς:** cf. *τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον ἓν εἶναι λέγεται τῷ φαίνεσθαι κατά τινα περιγραφὴν ἰδίαν μηδαμῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνημμένον* Galen, iii. 1.

248. 12 **διακεκρίσθαι:** a word used by the Ionian physicists for the breaking down of composite bodies: *τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι* Anaxag. *Fr.* 17; *διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου | μορφὴν ἑτέραν ἐπέδειξεν* Eur. *Fr.* 839 N².

248. 13 **πνεύματα καὶ ὑποκείμενα ἀναίσθητα:** the 'spirits' in animals and the inorganic bodies which are without sense perception, esp. the plants. The elements in these are retained in their allotted stations by forces which control them, resisting their natural tendency to their own kindred elements, p. **208.** 13.

248. 13–14 **ἀνοικείωτα:** they are without the *οἰκειότης* which guides the higher beings *πρὸς τὸ συγγενές* and *πρὸς τὸ συγκιρνᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ*, p. **176.** 6–7.

248. 14 **τὸ ἐνοῦν συνέχει:** Cas. supported this correction of the MSS. *τὸν νοῦν συνέχει* by reference to *τρόπον τινὰ ἕνωσις ὑπέστη* p. **176.** 14. Of recent critics he is followed by Leopold, Dr. Rendall, and M. Trannoy. Couat and Schenkl adopted Gat.'s *τὸ νοοῦν*, the objection to which is that it would suggest that these are 'held together' by *ἡ νοερὰ ψυχή*, whereas we expect some term analogous to the purely physical 'gravitation', *τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βρῖθον*, which is a hypothetical *tendency* drawing each element to its kindred element and its own sphere, pp. **174.** 23, **204.** 18. Is it possible that M. wrote *τὸ τονικόν* for *ὁ τόνος τοῦ πνεύματος*, which rules the created compounds? See *διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας* p. **112.** 16 n., and notice *τείνεται* of the special *tendency* of understanding.

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248. 16 **οὐ διείργεται τὸ κοινωνικὸν πάθος:** a difficult phrase to interpret. The verb seems to have been chosen to give figurative expression to what is assumed physically at ll. 9–11. The word *πάθος* has the wider sense which was noticed at p. **36.** 3. See also p. **176.** 14 n.

Ch. 31: 248. 17 **τὸ διαγίνεσθαι:** at first sight Leop.'s *διαπνεῖσθαι* is attractive, in view of pp. **34.** 6, **102.** 20, where there are sim. enumerations of a variety of vital functions. But, if we insert *διαπνεῖσθαι*, we expect *τὸ ἀναπνεῖν* also, and M.'s point is well made by *τὸ διαγίνεσθαι*, which suggests 'getting through life', as in *τόπον ἀπράγμονα, | ὅποι καθιδρυθέντε διαγενοίμεθ' ἄν* Aristoph. *Aves*, 44.

248. 17–18 **τὸ αὔξεσθαι; τὸ λήγειν αὖθις;** The words suggest life passing like a physical phenomenon, a note of music which swells and dies away, *ἀλλότριός ἐστι καὶ λήγων καὶ ἀρχόμενος* Arist. *Probl.* 921^{b}30, the phases of the moon, Arist. *A. Po.* 78^{b}6; Ael. *N. An.* xii. 13. We are reminded of: *οἱ δὲ συγγενεῖς | μῆνές με μικρὸν καὶ μέγαν διώρισαν* Soph. *O.T.* 1082.

248. 18 **τὸ διανοεῖσθαι,** the inward, as *τὸ φωνῇ χρῆσθαι* is the outward, process of *λόγος*, cf. Pl. *Tht.* 189e.

248. 20 **πρόιθι ἐπὶ τελευταῖον,** a phrase cognate with *σπεῦδε οὖν εἰς τέλος* p. **48.** 3; *τελευταῖον* is the study which comes last, cf. *περὶ τὸν τελ. κατεγίνου τόπον, τὸν τῆς ἀμεταπτωσίας* Epict. iii. 26. 14.

πρόσιθι, the MSS. reading, might mean 'address yourself to', cf. *ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα πρόσεισι πρόθυμος*, 'appetite will vigorously attack those dishes' Plu. *Conv. Disp.* 669a.

τὸ ἔπεσθαι: see p. **246.** 22.

248. 21 **μάχεται,** like *ἀνταγωνίζεται* p. **146.** 9; *τί οὖν θεομαχῶ; τί θέλω τὰ μὴ θελητά, τὰ μὴ δοθέντα μοι . . . ἔχειν;* Epict. iv. 1. 101.

Ch. 32: 248. 23 **τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ ἀχανοῦς αἰῶνος:** cf. *τὸ χάος τοῦ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ἀπείρου αἰῶνος* p. **52.** 10 n., p. **240.** 5.

248. 27 **ἡ σὴ φύσις,** for the antithesis with *ἡ κοινὴ φ.* see p. **120.** 8–9 n.

Ch. 33: 250. 1 **Πῶς ἑαυτῷ χρῆται τὸ ἡγ.;** Cf. *τὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι* p. **34.** 8 n., *τί μου νῦν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια;* p. **242.** 21. M. uses the expression of himself at *πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα νῦν χρῶμαι τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ψ.;* p. **84.** 5.

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250. 2 νεκρὰ καὶ καπνός: cf. *εὔφθαρτα καὶ νεκρά* p. **28.** 2, *τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καπνὸν καὶ τὸ μηδέν* p. **206.** 16, *καπνὸς καὶ σποδός* p. **246.** 16. So Julian says: *ὀλιγωρεῖν δὲ πάντη τοῦ σώματος καὶ νομίζειν αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον* (96 D., 85 B.) *κοπρίων ἐκβλητότερον* p. 226c.

Ch. 34: 250. 4 τούτου κατεφρόνησαν: the Hedonists, esp. Epicurus, e.g. *τὸ μηθὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν* D.L. x. 125; *ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς K.Δ.* 2, D.L. x. 139; cf. the similar argument in [Pl.] *Ax.* 369b, and

> nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum . . .
> scire licet nobis nil esse in morte timendum
>
> Lucr. iii. 830, 866.

Ch. 35: 250. 5 τὸ εὔκαιρον. He repeats: *οὐδέν μοι πρόωρον οὐδὲ ὄψιμον ὃ σοὶ εὔκαιρον* p. **60.** 14.

ᾧ τὸ πλείους: cf. *πότερον δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον διάστημα χρόνου* p. **42.** 24 n.

250. 6 τῷ ὀλιγωτέρας. The Clarendon Press reader suggests that M. wrote ᾗ, and that *τῷ* was inserted by the scribe by attraction from *ᾧ*. This would get rid of an awkwardness of expression.

250. 7 οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος φοβερόν: the adj. recalls: *οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν* Pl. *Phd.* 67e.

Ch. 36: 250. 9 Ἄνθρωπε. The vocative has a depreciatory emphasis at pp. **96.** 14, **182.** 9, **222.** 8. Here M. means 'frail mortal', a sense esp. noticeable in the comic writers:

> *ἄνθρωπος εἶ,*
> *οὗ μεταβολὴν θᾶττον πρὸς ὕψος καὶ πάλιν*
> *ταπεινότητα ζῷον οὐθὲν λαμβάνει.*
>
> Menand. *Fr.* 531 K., and
>
> *ἄνθρωπός εἰμι, ἥμαρτον* Herond. v. 27.

ἐπολιτεύσω. M. means a citizen in the Commonwealth of gods and men, pp. **32.** 10, **46.** 3, **198.** 8, *ὡς ἐν πόλει τῷ κόσμῳ* p. **200.** 27; *λέγουσι γὰρ οἱ Στ. τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πόλιν* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 642.

St. Paul employs the image: *ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει Phil.* 3. 20; cf. *ἐπὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται Ep. ad Diogn.* 5.

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250. 10 **ἔτεσιν ⟨ἢ πεντήκοντα⟩.** The supplement is made on the hypothesis that the missing letters are *ἢ N′*. As Dr. Rendall has 'five years or fifty', the correction should have been ascribed to him. At p. **82.** 16, P has *ἔδοξε ἢ* for *ἔδοξεν*, and *εἶτα ἔχων ⟨πεντήκοντα⟩ μναῖς* is read by Reiske and Cobet at Julian, p. 19b.

Fifty years is a ripe age, Galen, v. 14, cf. *χ' ὥτι πεντήκοντα ἔτεα | ζωὰν βαθύπλουτον τελεῖς* Bacchyl. 3. 81.

250. 10–11 **τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἴσον ἑκάστῳ:** *εἴγε ἴσους καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν τοὺς μερίσμους χρόνων . . . ἑκάστοις ποιεῖται.* He has in mind the *naturalis aequitas* to which his legal decisions appeal.

250. 11 **τί οὖν δεινόν;** Cf. *ὅπερ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἀπονέμῃ, τοῦτο ἀσπαζομένου* p. **194.** 15.

250. 11–12 **οὐ τύραννος οὐδὲ δικαστὴς ἄδικος,** the autocrat, who overrides natural justice, or the popular law court, which ignores it. Socr. said of the dicasts who condemned him: *οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν* Pl. *Ap.* 39b.

250. 12 **ἡ φύσις ἡ εἰσαγαγοῦσα:** leading up to the sim. from the theatre; cf. *οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνός σε εἰσήγαγεν;* Epict. iv. 1. 104; *εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ θέατρον* Julian, p. 217b.

κωμῳδόν: cf. *τὸν τραγῳδόν* p. **44.** 9, where there is the same implication as here. For the simile, cf. *εἶναι ὅμοιον τὸν σοφὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ* Aristo Ch. ap. D.L. vii. 160; *μέμνησο ὅτι ὑποκριτὴς εἶ δράματος, οἷου ἂν θέλῃ ὁ διδάσκαλος . . . σὸν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔστι, τὸ δοθὲν ὑποκρίνασθαι πρόσωπον καλῶς· ἐκλέξασθαι δ' αὐτὸ ἄλλου* Epict. *Ench.* 17, cf. id. i. 29. 41, iv. 7. 13.

250. 13 **ἀπολύοι:** cf. *ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς* Pl. *Phd.* 67a; *νῦν ἀπολύεις τὸν δοῦλόν σου, δέσποτα, . . . ἐν εἰρήνῃ St. Luke*, 2. 29.

στρατηγός, the Roman praetor, who presided at the shows in his year of office.

250. 13–14 **τὰ πέντε μέρη,** the five acts of the Senecan tragedies, for instance, which had become normal: 'neve minor neu sit quinto productior actu | fabula' Hor. *A.P.* 189. In Arist. *Po.* *μέρος* is not a quantitative division but a part in the sense that the prologue is one member of the whole, 1452^{b}14. Plu., however,

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says: *καθάπερ ἐν δράματι τῷ βίῳ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος προβληματῶδες γέγονε καὶ ἄπορον Cato Min.* 25. The point of the climax is *περὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον μέρος* Epict. i. 24. 16.

250. 15 ἐκεῖνος ὁρίζει: cf. *τὸν ὅρον δίδωσιν ἡ φύσις* p. **244. 10**; *ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τὸ ὡρισμένον πορεύεται St. Luke*, 22. 22.

250. 17 ἄπιθι οὖν: cf. *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι* Pl. *Ap.* 42a, cf. *R.* 496e; *ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ καὶ ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταυτῆς τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, τότε ἀπελεύσεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν* Epict. i. 9. 16.

The scribe of A has written *Ὁ ἀπολύων.*

ἵλεως. M. recurs at the close to the ceremonial ideas of Roman religion, mingled with the fatalism of his philosophic creed. The word *reconciled* seems best to render the word which, like *propitius*, expresses the satisfaction of the God and of his servant. Gat. compares 'in Christo suo reconciliatus' and himself closes his great commentary thus: 'Et tu, Domine Jesu, *ὁ Ἀμήν*, voto servuli tui, inutilis licet, Amen tuum subicere ne dedigneris.'

The verses subscribed to A have been supposed to be some evidence that the MS. from which A is derived was the recension of Arethas. See P. Maas, *Hermes*, xlviii, p. 295. The date of Theophyl. Sim. is circ. A.D. 610.

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Λούσιος Λοῦπος **246.18.**
Λώριον (home of Antoninus Pius) **14.21.**

Μαικήνας (minister of Augustus) **156.8.**
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[Octavia] *Αὐγούστου . . . ἀδελφή* (wife of M. Antonius) **156.7.**
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