

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Hellenistic philosophy concerns the thought of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics, the most influential philosophical groups in the era between the death of Alexander the Great (323 BCE) and the defeat of the last Greek stronghold in the ancient world (31 BCE).

The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy provides accessible yet rigorous introductions to the theories of knowledge, ethics, and physics belonging to each of the three schools, explores the fascinating ways in which interschool rivalries shaped the philosophies of the era, and offers unique insight into the relevance of Hellenistic views to issues today, such as environmental ethics, consumerism, and bioethics. Eleven countries are represented among the *Handbook's* 35 authors, whose chapters were written specifically for this volume and are organized thematically into six sections:

- The people, history, and methods of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism.
- Earlier philosophical influences on Hellenistic thought, such as Aristotle, Socrates, and Presocratics.
- The soul, perception, and knowledge.
- God, fate, and the primary principles of nature and the universe.
- Ethics, political theory, society, and community.
- Hellenistic philosophy's relevance to contemporary life.

Spanning from the ancient past to the present, this *Handbook* aims to show that Hellenistic philosophy has much to offer all thinking people of the twenty-first century.

Kelly Arenson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. She is the author of *Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus* (2019).

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THE STOIC THEORY OF THE SOUL

Tamer Nawar

The Stoics put forward a distinctive theory of the soul whose details are important for understanding not only Stoic psychology and physics, but also Stoic ethics and epistemology. Our evidence concerning Stoic theorizing about the soul presents several difficulties. It is highly fragmentary, consists largely of hostile reports, and Stoic philosophers seem to have differed among themselves on several important issues (which polemical sources may have exaggerated or downplayed in line with their own interests). While this makes it difficult to speak of *the* Stoic theory of the soul, in this piece I aim to clarify some of the central features of Stoic philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind.

Stoic Corporealism, *Pneuma*, and the Soul

The Stoics recognized that there are some things that are incorporeal, such as sayables [*lekta*], void, place, and time (*M* 10.218). However, they maintained that only corporeal things [*sōma*, *sōmatika*]*—i.e.* those things that are extended in three dimensions and have resistance [*antitupia*] (DL 7.135; Galen *Qual. Inc.* 19.483, 13–16 – LS 45F) *—*are causally efficacious and able to act or be acted upon.¹ Items like the soul [*psuchē*] are able to act or be acted upon and so such items must be corporeal (e.g. Sen. *Ep.* 106.4–5; 117.2). Moreover, it is widely agreed that the soul makes things alive through its presence and that death is the separation of body and soul (Stob. 1.38.14–139.4 – LS 55A; cf. Plato *Phaedo* 64c). However, only corporeal things can be separated from or present to each other. Therefore, the Stoics argue, the soul is corporeal.²

The Stoics take everything corporeal to be ultimately constituted by the four elements, two of which (fire and air) are active and two of which (earth and water) are passive (e.g. Nemesius *De Natura Hominis* 164.15–18 = LS 47D). Of these elements fire is seemingly the most fundamental and the most active (Stob. 1.129.2–130.13 = LS 47A). *Pneuma* is a fiery or airy corporeal stuff and is often described as a subtle body [*sōma leptomerēs*] which acts upon the ordinary macroscopic objects we perceive and is blended through and through with them (Galen *Def. Med.* 19.355K = *SVF* 2.780; Hierocles 4.38–53 = LS 53B). By means of a certain tension (*tonos*) or tensile motion [*tonikē kinēsis*], *pneuma* makes things stable [*monimos*] and substantial [*ousiōdēs*] and grants them their real qualities (Plut. *Comm. Not.* 1085c11–d5 = LS 47G).³ It seems that *pneuma* is made up of fire and air, or perhaps that just one of these elements may serve as *pneuma* or perform the functions attributed to *pneuma*.⁴

Pneuma thus has a central role in Stoic physics. It permeates and penetrates us. It binds the cosmos and everything in it together. The soul [*psuchē*] is sometimes characterized simply as *pneuma* (e.g. DL 7.157), but it would be more accurate to say that the soul is a particular kind of *pneuma*. *Pneuma* extends through everything, but it does so with different degrees of tension and different motions.

- “*Hexis*” (“tenor”) was the term applied to the *pneuma* that penetrates inanimate items, like stones or metals, and also items like bones or sinews. This *pneuma* is cohesive [*hektikon*] and is responsible for holding these items together, sustaining them and giving them their real qualities (e.g. hardness to stones, whiteness to bones, etc.).
- “*Phusis*” (“physique,” “nature”) was the term applied to the *pneuma* that penetrates animate items like plants and grants them the ability to grow, be nourished, and reproduce.
- “*Psuchē*” was the term applied to *pneuma* which penetrates animals and gives them impulse [*hormē*], perception [*aisthēsis*], and self-motion.⁵

Rational *psuchē* is unique to rational animals and grants them rational abilities, such as the ability to deliberate and make judgements (Philo *Quod Deus sit Immutabilis* 35–6 = LS 47Q; Origen *Princ.* 3.1.2–3 = LS 53A).

The relevant kind of *pneuma* is in each case a sustaining cause of the body’s unity, its life, or rationality (cf. Stob. 1.138.14–139.4 = LS 55A). Two points deserve attention on this score. On the one hand, insofar as plants have only *phusis* and not *psuchē*, the Stoics differ from several other ancients in that they do *not* think that *psuchē* is required for all kinds of vital functions and do *not* ascribe a soul to all living beings. Instead, *psuchē* is required only for certain higher functions, notably those such as impulse, sensation, and several others that we would nowadays more naturally regard as “psychological.”

On the other hand, the difference between the *pneuma* responsible for endowing a plant with its functions (i.e. *phusis*) and the *pneuma* responsible for endowing an animal with its functions (i.e. *psuchē*) seems to be one of degree (of complexity of motion and of tension of the relevant *pneuma*) and, in describing the development of embryos, the Stoics offer an account of how *psuchē* can arise from *phusis*:

If the seed falls into the womb at the right time and is gripped by the receptacle in good health, it no longer stays still as before but is energized and begins its own activities. It draws matter from the pregnant body and fashions the embryo in accordance with inescapable patterns, up to the point when it reaches its goal and makes its product ready to be born.

Yet throughout all this time—I mean the time from conception to birth—it remains *phusis*, i.e. *pneuma*, having changed from seed and moving methodically from beginning to end. In the early stages, the *phusis* is *pneuma* of a rather dense kind and considerably distant from *psuchē*. However, later, when it is close to birth, it becomes finer.... So when it passes outside, it is adequate for the environment, with the result that, having been hardened thereby, it is capable of changing into soul.

For just as the *pneuma* in stones is immediately kindled by a blow, on account of its readiness for this change, so the *phusis* of a ripe embryo, once it is born, does not hesitate to change into *psuchē* on meeting the environment. So whatever issues forth from the womb is at once an animal.

(Hierocles 1.5–28 = LS 53B)

According to Hierocles' report, the Stoics maintain that in the womb a foetus does not have a *psuchē* but merely a *phusis* (and is thereby akin to a plant). When it is born, the foetus becomes an animal and its *phusis* undergoes a change and the relevant *pneuma* becomes *psuchē*. *Psuchē* is possessed by human and non-human animals alike. However, humans are such that, in late childhood or adolescence, their *psuchē* becomes rational (DL 7.55; cf. Aetius *Plac.* 4.11.1–4 = LS 39E). Hierocles' report makes it seem like *psuchē* is “*phusis*+,” i.e. that *psuchē* performs the same functions as *phusis* (e.g. nutrition, growth) as well as some additional ones (e.g. impulse, perception) (cf. Philo *Leg. Alleg.* 2.22 3 = LS 47P). However, other evidence suggests that living beings possess both *psuchē* and *phusis* simultaneously (e.g. Galen *Adv. Iul.* 18.266 = SVF 2.718) and that an individual's *phusis* is responsible for functions like nutrition and growth while the individual's *psuchē* is responsible for “higher” functions, such as impulse and perception. In addition to *psuchē*, a living being might thus have *phusis* running through certain parts of themselves (notably, hair and nails), and *hexis* running through others (Philo *Leg. Alleg.* 2.22 3 = LS 47P). Regardless of precisely how the Stoic views on these matters should be understood, the Stoics' distinctive views merit an important place in the history of philosophical psychology.

Stoic Souls: Parts and Wholes, Mereology and Identity

The Stoic view of the soul [*psuchē*] as a particular kind of *pneuma* raises a number of puzzles concerning: i) the nature of *psuchē* (especially rational *psuchē*) and its parts; ii) the relation between *psuchē* and the body (i.e. the macroscopic object, which we typically speak of as “a human body”) and the relation between *psuchē* and the person or agent; iii) diachronic identity and neighboring issues; iv) issues concerning post-mortem existence; and v) the relation between one *psuchē* and another. These are best considered in turn.

Concerning i), our sources often attribute to the Stoics the view that the mature human *psuchē* has eight parts [*merē*]: the five senses (sight, smell, hearing, touch, taste); a reproductive part; a linguistic or phonetic part; and a part which is known as “the reasoning part” [*to logistikon*] or “the intellective part” [*to dianoētikon*], i.e. the intellect [*dianoia*] (e.g. DL 7.110, 157; cf. Calcidius *In Tim.* 2.220–1 = LS 53G). In rational creatures, the reasoning part is the ruling principle [*hēgemonikon*] and Chrysippus was inclined to locate it in the heart (rather than, e.g., in the brain).⁶

Several points deserve attention. First, although the precise nature of these parts (or perhaps powers or faculties) is not entirely clear, these “parts” are taken to be *pneumata* (portions of *pneuma*). Thus, for instance, sight is *pneuma* extending from the ruling principle to the eyes; hearing is *pneuma* extending from the ruling principle to the ears; and the reproductive part is *pneuma* extending from the ruling principle to the genital organs (Aetius *Plac.* 4.21.1–4 = LS 53H; Stob. 1.368.12–20 = LS 53K).

Secondly, the reasoning part is not simply one part among others; instead, it is the *ruling principle* or *commanding faculty* [*hēgemonikon*] of the living being. The ruling principle integrates the information received from the senses (which are described as quasi-messengers, Calcidius *In Tim.* 220 = LS 53G) and—in mature humans—is described as being responsible for appearances [*phantasiai*], perceptions [*aisthēseis*], impulses [*hormai*], assent [*sunkatathesis*] and reason [*logos*] (DL 7.159; Aetius *Plac.* 4.21.1–4).⁷ The ruling principle would thereby seem to perform several functions and have several faculties. However, these faculties cannot be distinguished from each other in the same manner as the senses can (e.g. by being allocated different locations, Stob. 1.368.12–20 = LS 53K).⁸

Thirdly, the Stoics take a rational *psuchē* to be rational through and through. Even those faculties in the rational *psuchē* that are possessed by both rational *psuchē* and nonrational

psuchē alike (such as impulse and appearance) are strongly shaped by reason. In contrast to several other ancients, the Stoics are not inclined to see irrationality as the result of the activity of some nonrational part or power of the *psuchē*, but instead simply as the result of the rational *psuchē* not doing its job well.

Concerning ii), Stoic views concerning the relation between the soul and the body are not entirely easy to discern. A living being is sometimes described as a composite [*suntheton*] of two corporeal items: a body and *psuchē* (Hierocles 4.38–40 = LS 53B; cf. *M* 7.234). However, it might be more accurate to say that a living being is a *total blend* [*krasis*] of two corporeal items: a body and *psuchē*. In *total blends*, the items blended “are mutually coextended through and through, with the original substances and their qualities being preserved in such a mixture” (Alex. *Aphr. Mixt.* 216.14–218.6 = LS 48C).

Whatever the precise nature of the body-*psuchē* composite, one may still ask: what precisely is a person? For instance, is Socrates a composite of body and *psuchē*? Or is Socrates perhaps just one of these? These questions have provoked substantial discussion (e.g. Long 1982; Gill 2006; Brennan 2009) but have not been easy to resolve. The evidence from later Stoic philosophers suggests that several later Stoics were inclined to identify a person not as a composite of body and *psuchē*, nor as a peculiarly qualified individual being informed by a soul (on *peculiar qualities* and *peculiarly qualified individuals*, see Nawar 2017), but simply as a rational *psuchē* or as the ruling principle of the rational *psuchē*.⁹ Furthermore, some of the evidence about earlier Stoics also points in this direction (e.g. Chrysippus’ remarks on the first person pronoun, Galen *Plac.* 2.2.9–11 = LS 34J). Such a reading *might* contribute to explaining certain Stoic ethical views (Sen. *Ep.* 92.27–35; cf. Long 1982; Brennan 2009), but several readers are reluctant to attribute such an account to the Stoics (e.g. Gill 2006). Any detailed consideration of these matters has to take into account Stoic developmental psychology and their views of “appropriation” [*oikeōsis, conciliatio*].¹⁰

Concerning iii), in response to puzzles raised by the Growing Argument (concerning how a thing might remain identical to itself across time even though it undergoes change), the Stoics sought to give some account of diachronic identity and persistence. They proposed that each living being has a unique so-called “peculiar quality” [*idia poiōtēs*] throughout its existence (cf. Sedley 1982; Nawar 2017). On the Stoic view, qualities—at least in the strict sense of “quality”—are portions of *pneuma* and thus act upon the matter in which they inhere and qualify and shape them in the manner already described. A peculiar quality would thereby seem to be a portion of *pneuma* that makes (e.g.) Socrates the very individual that he is throughout his life. However, insofar as the relevant *pneuma* is susceptible to changes similar to those undergone by the body it pervades, it seems that the worries raised by the Growing Argument recur and that the Stoic attempt to account for diachronic identity by appealing to peculiar qualities is vulnerable to a number of damaging criticisms (cf. Nawar 2017).

Concerning iv), as noted above, the *psuchē* forms a *total blend* [*krasis*] with the body. As such, *psuchē* remains in existence and retains its identity even while being a constituent of the blend. Upon death (i.e. the separation of body and *psuchē*, see above), the human’s *psuchē* exits the body and passes into the air and goes from having the same shape as the body with which it was blended to becoming spherical (at least according to Chrysippus, *Scholia in Hom. Iliad* 23.65 = SVF 2.815). In this “disembodied” state, *psuchē* is perishable [*phthartos*] but nonetheless persists after death for at least some time (DL 7.156). More concretely, with regard to what happens to the *psuchē* after death, it was maintained either that:

- each *psuchē* survives until the cosmic conflagration (according to Cleanthes); or that
- only the *psuchē* of sages survives until the cosmic conflagration (according to Chrysippus, who presumably thought that only the *psuchē* of sages was held together by sufficient tension); or that
- each *psuchē* eventually decomposes some time after it is separated from the body and passes into the air.¹¹

Whether the post-mortem existence of an individual's *psuchē* amounts to *personal* existence after death depends in large part upon how one construes Stoic views concerning ii).

Finally, concerning v), the Stoics regard the cosmos as a single living being and intelligent animal (e.g. DL 7.142–3; cf. Cic. *DND* 2.37–9).¹² The *pneuma* which runs through the cosmos sustains the many individual things which populate it, makes these many things into a single thing, and is the soul of the cosmos or world (DL 7.138–9, 143).¹³ The Stoics were inclined to identify the living cosmos, its immanent soul, or some part thereof (such as the ruling principle of the cosmic soul) as God (e.g. DL 7.137–9, 147; Origen *C. Cels.* 4.14 = LS 46H).¹⁴ Insofar as God is cosmic *pneuma*, God is thus immanent and always acting upon matter, and so the Stoics also identify God (or perhaps God's activity) as intelligent, designing fire and as fate, i.e. the causal chain that is causally responsible for everything (Aetius *Plac.* 1.7.33 = LS 46A; DL 7.135–6).¹⁵ The souls of individual creatures such as Alexander or Bucephalus are parts [*merē*] or fragments [*apospasmata*] of the world-soul and of God (DL 7.143, 156), and just as these parts are perceptive and sentient, so too the whole of which they are parts is perceptive and sentient (e.g. Cic. *DND* 2.22). This fact is important for understanding Stoic views about cosmic *sumpatheia* (M. 9.78–80) and cosmopolitanism, and also has other important ethical implications.¹⁶

Stoic Cognitive Psychology and Moral Psychology

We can now turn to clarifying the nature of certain important psychological processes or states, notably: i) appearances [*phantasiai*]; ii) assent [*sunkatathesis*]; iii) impulses [*hormai*]; and (iv) passions [*pathē*]. These play a central role in Stoic analyses of knowledge, action, and emotion and are best discussed in turn.

Concerning i), an appearance [*phantasia*] was characterized by Chrysippus as an imprinting [*tupōsis*]—or perhaps an alteration [*alloiōsis*] or affection [*pathos*]—in the *psuchē* (DL 7.50; cf. M 7.228–241). More concretely:

An appearance is an affection (*pathos*) occurring in the soul which reveals itself and its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white object which activates us [...] What brings about an appearance is that thing which is appearing. For instance, something white or cold or everything which is able to activate the soul.

(Aetius *Plac.* 4.12 = LS 39B)

Appearances are thus representational psychological states that stand in an appropriate causal relation with certain items. These items are also the objects represented by the appearance. In virtue of being accessible and occurrent, an appearance is a psychological state that reveals itself. In virtue of its representational features, it also reveals its object (i.e. what it is about) and its cause.

Some appearances are formed through perception and others are formed through thought (DL 7.51). However, it seems that in every appearance there is an appropriate causal

connection between the representational psychological state and that of which it is a representation. Thus, for instance, an appearance of a particular cat (e.g. Watson) will both be caused by Watson and will represent Watson. Even if I have an appearance of Watson when I am not currently perceiving him (as, for instance, when I am remembering what a curious cat he is), Watson must, in some sense, be the ultimate cause of the representational psychological state if that psychological state is to be considered an appearance (as opposed to some appearance-like representational state—such as a hallucination—which falls short of instantiating an appropriate causal connection with its object). Precisely how the Stoics aimed to explain representation is not entirely clear, but Chrysippus seems to have argued, against Cleanthes, that while appearances might be imprintings made in the *psuchē*, such imprintings should not be understood as being akin to those made in wax by signet-rings, as they do not represent their objects pictorially (*M* 7.228–32; cf. *PH* 2.70–6).

As reported by Diogenes Laertius:

some appearances are rational [*logikai*], and others non-rational. Those of rational animals are rational, while those of non-rational animals are non-rational. Rational appearances are thought processes [*noēseis*]; irrational ones are nameless. Also, some appearances are expert and others not: a work of art is viewed in one way by an expert and different by a non-expert.

(DL 7.51 – LS 39A)

In mature humans, appearances are thus thoughts [*noēseis*] and are rational. That is to say, they are a product of the reasoning part and they represent their objects in a certain determinate and articulable fashion and have propositional content.¹⁷ This propositional content is either true or false (Cic. *De Fat.* 20–1; Ps.-Plut. *Fat.* 574f2–3), and, in virtue of having content, it seems that appearances may themselves be regarded as being (derivatively) true or false. Precisely how the content of an appearance is determined is not entirely clear, but it seems to depend in significant part upon features of the agent's *psuchē*, most notably upon the relevant agent's concepts [*ennoiai*]. Thus, for instance, two people might hear the same music, but the content of the appearance formed by an expert who has mastery of the relevant concepts (e.g. Minor Key, Pentatonic Scale, Key Change) will differ from the content of an appearance formed by an inexperienced person who lacks mastery of the relevant concepts.¹⁸

Appearances differ not only in the content they have, but in the *kind of content* they have. Most saliently, some appearances are such that we would regard their content as being straightforwardly descriptive. Thus, for instance, one might have an appearance whose relevant articulable content is something along the lines of “this is Socrates” or “these apples are red” (cf. Nawar 2017: 129–30). However, a *hormetic appearance* [*phantasia hormētikē*] has evaluative or normative content (cf. Inwood 1985). Thus, for instance, one might have an appearance whose relevant articulable content is something like “it is appropriate (e.g. *kathēkon*) to take this apple,” “it is beneficial to pick up this cat,” etc. The Stoics think that these appearances are distinctively motivating and action-guiding (Stob. 2.88.2–6 = LS 33I).

Concerning ii), while appearances are something that the ruling principle *undergoes* (even though the reasoning part plays an important role in determining the content of appearances), assent [*sunkatathesis*] is something which the ruling principle *does* (e.g. *M* 7.237). Assent is seemingly unique to mature humans. It is intimately connected to our ability to reason and assent is often said to be in our power or up to us (e.g. Cic. *Acad.* 1.40; 2.37–9; *De Fat.* 43). As a result, we have epistemic and doxastic responsibility and

may be held responsible for what we opine or know and—more generally—how we respond to the appearances we receive (cf. Epictetus *Diss.* 1.1.7–12 = LS 62K).¹⁹

In responding to our appearances, we may give assent or withhold assent (or *perhaps* also dissent). By giving assent, we may arrive at items of knowledge and various other doxastic or semi-doxastic states, such as opinions, impulses, and emotions. For instance, by giving assent to a kataleptic appearance (i.e. an epistemically secure appearance)²⁰ that *p*, we attain a secure form of cognition that *p*: *katalēpsis* (knowledge or apprehension) (*M* 7.151; 8.397). By giving assent irresponsibly or to appearances that are not epistemically secure, we attain mere opinion (“*doxa*” in Greek, “*opinio*” in Latin).²¹

Concerning iii), an impulse [*hormē*] is “a movement [*phora*] of the *psuchē* towards something” (Stob. 2.86.17–87.6 = LS 53Q) and it seems that impulse is either identical to or the result of assenting to a hormetic appearance (as was noted above, hormetic appearances have the power to move us towards action, Stob. 2.88.2–6 = LS 33I).²² It is usually thought that assent to a hormetic appearance is necessary and sufficient for impulse and that impulses are necessary and (typically) sufficient for action (cf. Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1057a = LS 53S; Sen. *Ep.* 113.2; Inwood 1985). Thus, for instance, suppose that one experiences a hormetic appearance with the articulable content “it would be beneficial to pick up this cat” and one gives one’s assent. In giving one’s assent, one has formed an impulse and this impulse would typically result in action: the picking up of the cat. The Stoics thus think that pro-attitudes like desire (a form of impulse) may be viewed as cognitive attitudes in virtue of the truth-aptness of the content of the relevant appearances that are assented to.²³

Concerning iv), the Stoics characterize a passion [*pathos*] variously as: an excessive impulse [*hormē pleonazousa*]; an irrational movement [*kinēsis*] of the *psuchē* which goes against nature; a judgement or mere opinion [*krisis*, *hupolēpsis*, *doxa*]; a fluttering [*ptoia*]; and as a contraction, cowering, tearing, swelling, or expansion of the *psuchē* which supervenes upon or results from judgement.²⁴ While the degree to which these characterizations are consistent is controversial,²⁵ these characterizations do seem to capture both the physiological and the cognitive aspects of the relevant phenomena and aptly illustrate how the Stoics are inclined to give physiological-cum-cognitive analyses of psychological states and dispositions (e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.23–36; Galen *Plac.* 4.6.2–3 = LS 65T; cf. Sedley 1993). Thus, for instance, a passion might be partially characterized in physiological terms, e.g. as a contraction of *pneuma* (as in the case of distress or pain, cf. Andronicus *De Passionibus* 1 = LS 65B). Thus construed, we may suppose that passions disturb the tension of the *psuchē* in much the same way that a drug (or some other cause of arrhythmia) might disturb one’s heartbeat.

However, a passion should also be characterized cognitively and normatively as being constituted at least in part by a mere opinion that is unjustified or mistaken (Andronicus *De Passionibus* 1 = LS 65B; Stob. 2.88.22–89.3 = LS 65C; DL 7.110). Although passions are in a way rational (e.g. they are the product of the ruling principle, which is rational, and they involve assent to appearances),²⁶ they are nonetheless irrational and “excessive” in that they don’t conform to what is in reality the appropriate or rational thing to do (Galen *Plac.* 4.2.10–18 = LS 65J; cf. Inwood 1985: 155ff; Cooper 1998). That is to say, passions are blameworthy and unjustified emotions based on mistaken evaluative judgements or mere opinions and a perfectly rational agent will not have any passions. (This is not to say that a perfectly rational agent will not have any emotions or feelings whatsoever).²⁷ Thus, the Stoics claim that passions often result from representing something that is in reality *indifferent* as if it has value or disvalue. For instance, avarice (which is identified as a passion) is or requires a supposition that money (which is in fact indifferent) is good (DL 7.111).²⁸

Stoic moral psychology has several noteworthy features and implications. First, in contrast to several other ancient philosophers, the Stoics do not take passions to be the result of

the influence of some non-rational or “other” part of the soul. Second, insofar as assent is involved in passions, the passions are up to us and voluntary (e.g. Epictetus *Ench.* 5 – LS 65U; Sen. *De Ira* 2.3.1–2.4 = LS 65X). Third, it seems that the Stoics leave little room for resisting one’s desires because, in having a desire, one has already given one’s assent. As Epictetus puts it: “it is impossible to judge that one thing is beneficial and yet to desire something else, or to judge that one thing is appropriate [*kathēkon*] and yet have an impulse towards another” (Epictetus *Diss.* 1.18.2). Given how action follows impulse and some other Stoic views about the soul, it thus seems that the Stoics leave little room for the possibility of weakness of will in the strict sense (cf. Hare 1963). Instead, it seems that apparent cases of weakness of will are to be explained in terms of rapid changes between different impulses (Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 446f 447a – LS 65G).²⁹

Given their views of the passions, it is not surprising that the Stoics (or at least some Stoics) had reason to provide an account of so-called *propatheiai* (“pre-passions”), i.e. passion-like psychological states that involve movements of the *psuchē* and certain feelings, but no corresponding assent and no mere opinions or mistaken value judgements. Thus, for instance, one might jump at a loud sound, turn pale at something which seems frightening, or feel something when stabbed even if one does not give one’s assent to the relevant appearance or suppose that anything bad is occurring (cf. Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 19.1). Since they do not involve assent, *propatheiai* are involuntary and it seems that even a perfectly rational agent may suffer them. However, the precise details of Stoic views of emotions and passions remain a subject of continuing discussion.³⁰

Epilogue

Despite the decline of Stoicism in later antiquity, the influence of Stoic views about the soul seems to have been significant. Thus, for instance, the Stoic account of appropriation [*oikeōsis*] was influential among several philosophical schools,³¹ and Stoic accounts of appearances, assent, impulses, and the passions were enormously influential upon many Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic philosophical accounts of action and emotion.³² However, what is perhaps especially striking is the manner in which even some of the Stoics’ most vociferous critics were nonetheless significantly influenced by them. Thus, for instance, while Galen extensively criticized Chrysippus’ unitary account of the soul and preferred a Platonic account of the soul as tripartite, his corporealist account of the soul—and especially of the soul’s tension [*tonos*—seems to owe much to the Stoics (Trompeter 2016; cf. Gill 2007; 2010). Equally, while Augustine argued that the soul was incorporeal and extensively criticized Stoic-influenced corporealist accounts of the soul, his discussion of *intentio*, *spiritus*, and several other psychological notions adapts Stoic views about *pneuma* and its tension. In each case, Augustine is either inclined to find some role for the relevant corporeal items (e.g. *Gn. Litt.* 3.5.7; 7.13.20–19.25) or else to “incorporealize” them (cf. O’Daly 1987). More generally, Augustine’s views concerning belief, assent, and knowledge are significantly influenced by Stoic moral and cognitive psychology (cf. Nawar 2015b; 2019), and so too are his views about perception and emotion (cf. Brittain 2002; Byers 2013).

Stoic views of the soul were discussed in a scholarly fashion in the early modern period (notably by the Neostoic Justius Lipsius in his *Physiologia Stoicorum*), but Stoic corporealist views of the soul were difficult to reconcile with Christian teachings, and while some have found similarities between Stoic views and those of early modern philosophers like Spinoza or Cavendish,³³ the relevant similarities often seem superficial. However, with regard to Stoic moral psychology, things are rather different.

Stoics ethical theories have proven attractive to some moderns (cf. Becker 1998) and since at least the Renaissance, Stoic cognitive analyses of the passions (and their therapy) have proven to be of significant interest to a wide variety of readers. The use of Stoic views has even been advocated in recent work on cognitive psychotherapy (e.g. Robertson 2010) and it is perhaps here, in Stoic cognitive and moral psychology, that one may find the enduring legacy of Stoic theorizing about the soul and Stoic philosophical psychology.

Notes

- 1 E.g. Cic. *Acad.* 1.39; Aetius 1.11.5 = *SVF* 2.340; S.E. *M.* 8.263; 9.211.
- 2 Nemesius *De Natura Hominis* 78.7–79.2 = LS 45C; 81.6–10 = LS 45D; Sen. *Ep.* 106.8–10. Cf. Tert. *De Anima* 5; Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 63–7 = LS 14A; Lucr. *DRN* 1.298–304; Annas (1992).
- 3 Cf. Galen *Caus. Cont.* 1.1–2.4 = LS 55F; Alex. *Aphr. Mixt.* 223.25–36 = LS 47L; Nemesius *De Natura Hominis* 70.6–71.4 = LS 47J.
- 4 Zeno and Cleanthes may have been inclined to think that heat or fire alone was responsible for endowing things with life and sensation (e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.19; *DND* 2.23–30). However, perhaps inspired by certain criticisms (e.g. Cic. *DND* 3.35–7), from Chrysippus onwards the Stoics predominantly took a composite to perform these functions. For an overview of pre-Stoic views about *pneuma*, see Annas (1992: 17–33).
- 5 Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1053f–1054b = LS 47M; DL 7.138–9, 156; Galen *Intr.* 14.726.7–11 = LS 47N; Philo *Leg. Alleg.* 2.22–3 = LS 47P.
- 6 For discussion of Chrysippus' reasoning on this issue, see Tieleman (1996).
- 7 For more on these topics, see Hensley's chapter in this volume, "Stoic Epistemology."
- 8 While a division along the lines described above may have been the "orthodox" Stoic view, there is evidence of lively debates on these issues. Thus, for instance, Panaetius seems to have thought that the reproductive faculty was not a part of *psuchē* but of *physis* (Nemesius *De Natura Hominis* 212.6–9 = LS 53I) and Posidonius is reported to have maintained that the soul was tripartite and had irrational parts (in the manner put forward by Plato's Socrates in the *Republic*, cf. Galen *Plac.* 4.3.2–5 = LS 65K; 5.5.8–26 = LS 65M). For discussion, see Tieleman (1996; 2003).
- 9 E.g. M. Aur. *Med.* 2.2; 4.41; Epictetus *Diss.* 1.1.23, 20.17–19; 3.10.14–17. Cf. Cic. *De Fin.* 4.26–8.
- 10 The Stoics maintain that animals enjoy a continuous kind of inarticulate *aisthēsis* (sensation, perception, awareness) of themselves. Thus, for instance, in Cicero's *De Finibus*, the Stoics are said to hold that every animal seeks things beneficial to itself and avoids things harmful to itself. It does this independently of pleasure and pain and does so because it is attached to itself (*ipsum sibi conciliari*, Cic. *De Fin.* 3.5.16) and loves its own constitution [*statum suum*] (*Fin.* 3.5.16). This requires that it have some awareness of itself and its constitution. Equally, in *Ep.* 121, Seneca thinks that in order to intentionally pursue beneficial things, avoid harmful things, and appropriately do other things, a living creature cannot merely be motivated by pleasure and pain (*Ep.* 121.7–8). Instead, Seneca proposes that a living creature must have: (a) some awareness of its constitution [*constitution*] at that moment in time (i.e. its *hēgemonikon* in relation to the body, *Ep.* 121.5, 9–10, 14–16); (b) some awareness of what is natural or appropriate for itself (Sen. *Ep.* 121.7–8); (c) some awareness of which things are harmful and useful to *itself* (Sen. *Ep.* 121.18–19); and (d) some attachment to itself (*Ep.* 121.16–17, 21, 24). This awareness of oneself seems to go significantly beyond mere proprioception (i.e. an awareness of the position of one's bodily parts) and one might worry that animals would need to be more sophisticated than many Romans to grasp such things (cf. *Ep.* 121.10).
- 11 Cf. DL 7.156–7; Aetius *Plac.* 4.7.3 = *SVF* 2.810; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.78–80; M. Aur. *Med.* 4.21; Eusebius *PE* 15.20.6 = LS 53W; S.E. *M.* 9.71–4; Ju 2009.
- 12 While the Stoic cosmos is surrounded by infinite void (on this point the Stoics differ from Aristotle and others, cf. Stob. 1.161.8–26 = LS 49A; Nawar 2015a), there is no void within the Stoic cosmos and no part of the cosmos which does not contain some *pneuma* (Cic. *Acad.* 1.28–9; cf. Galen *Qual. Inc.* 19.464.10–14 = LS 49E).
- 13 Cf. S.E. *M.* 9.78–80; Alex. *Aphr. Mixt.* 225.1–2 = LS 45II.
- 14 Cf. Cic. *DND* 2.22–30; DL 7.137; Cic. *Acad.* 1.28–9; Plut. *De Fac.* 928a–d.

- 15 Insofar as God is the cosmos or permeates the cosmos, the cosmos is thereby divine and the Stoics may be regarded as pantheists. However, insofar as not all the *pneuma* that runs through the cosmos seems to perform higher functions, it does not seem that the Stoics should be regarded as panpsychists.
- 16 Cf. M. Aur. *Med.* 4.40; DL 7.85–9; Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1035c; Stob. 2.75.11–76.8 = LS 63B.
- 17 Cf. S.E. *M* 7.242–6; 8.70; DL 7.49, 63; Sen. *Ep.* 117.13 = LS 33E.
- 18 Cf. DL 7.51; Epictetus *Diss.* 3.6.8; Cic. *Acad.* 2.20, 86; Nawar 2014; 2015b; Shogry 2019.
- 19 Even though assent is in our power, we cannot spontaneously and deliberately decide to give our assent to seeming absurdities or to disbelieve what strikes us as being extremely evident (Epictetus *Diss.* 1.28.2–3). Certain appearances — notably, kataleptic appearances (see below) — *command assent* even if they do not always or inevitably result in assent (S.E. *M* 7.257; Nawar 2014).
- 20 Appearances differ in the kind of grasp they afford of their objects. The Stoics made the kataleptic appearance [*phantasia katalēptikē*] — an appearance that is accurate, appropriately formed, and meets certain other conditions (DL 7.46, 50; S.E. *M* 7.248) — central to their epistemology (cf. Frede 1983; Nawar 2014).
- 21 Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1056e–f = LS 41E; cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2.59; S.E. *M* 7.151.
- 22 Our more informative reports (e.g. Stob. 2.86.17–87.6 = LS 53Q; 2.88.2–6 = LS 33I; Sen. *Ep.* 113.18 = *SVF* 3.169; Cic. *De Fat.* 40–3; *Acad.* 2.24–5; Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1057a = LS 53S; cf. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1122a–f = LS 69A) seem to describe the relation between hormetic appearances, assent, and impulse differently. The three principal options are to suppose that: a) impulse is an assent; b) assent precedes impulse and is the cause of impulse; or c) impulse precedes assent and is the cause of assent. This last option is less popular. For discussion, see Inwood 1985; Stevens 2000.
- 23 Although one gives one assent to the propositional content of an appearance (and this is capable of being true or false), impulses are said to be directed towards predicates (Stob. 2.88.2–6 = LS 33I).
- 24 Cf. DL 7.110–111; Stob. 2.88.8–90.6 = LS 65A; Stob. 2.88.22–89.3 = LS 65C; Galen *Plac.* 4.3.2–5 = LS 65K.
- 25 For some contrasting views, see Brennan 1998, 2005; Cooper 1998; Sorabji 2000; Tieleman 2003; Graver 2007.
- 26 The Stoics seem to think that all impulses can be considered rational in some sense (cf. Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1037f = LS 53R) and psychological states like desire were seemingly characterized as a form of rational impulse (*logikē hormē*, Stob. 2.86.17–87.6 = LS 53Q).
- 27 The Stoics gave an account of “good emotions” [*eupatheiai*]. These emotions differ from the *passions* in being praiseworthy and being intimately connected to *knowledge* (as opposed to mere opinion, cf. DL 7.116 = LS 65F).
- 28 The Stoics think that the more general passions may be characterized as involving opinions with roughly the following kinds of content (cf. Andronicus *On Passions* 1 – LS 65B; Galen *Plac.* 4.2.1–6 = LS 65D; Cic. *Tusc.* 3.74–6; 4.14ff; Stob. 2.90.7–91.9 = *SVF* 3.394):
 Distress or pain [*lupē*]: α, which is present, is bad and one should be contracted.
 Pleasure [*hedonē*]: α, which is present, is good and one should be swollen.
 Fear [*phobos*]: α, which is in the future, is bad and should be avoided.
 Appetite or Desire [*epithumia*]: α, which is in the future, is good and should be pursued.
 This is schematic. For discussion, see Inwood 1985; Brennan 1998; Sorabji 2000; Graver 2007.
- 29 For discussion of Stoic views of *akrasia* qua character trait and vice, see Gourinat 2007.
- 30 Cf. Graver 1999, 2007; Sorabji 2000.
- 31 E.g. Antiochus of Ascalon (Cic. *De Fin.* 5.24ff, 41ff), the Middle Academy (e.g. Apuleius *De Dog. Plato.* 2.2), and the Peripatetics (e.g. Alex. Aphr. *Mant.* 17.151.3–153.27; Stob. *Ecl.* 2.7.13).
- 32 On emotion, see Sorabji 2000.
- 33 For Spinoza, see Miller 2015. O’Neill 2001 suggests that Cavendish’s views concerning rational and sensitive spirits are highly similar to and were probably influenced by Stoic views about *psuchē* and *pneuma*.

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