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THE SYMPOSIUM  
OF  
PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION, CRITICAL NOTES  
AND COMMENTARY

BY

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## PREFACE

PLATO'S *Symposium* is undeniably one of the masterpieces of classical literature. The subtlest and most brilliant of Greek artists in prose has left us no finer, no more fascinating specimen of his skill than this dialogue in which, with the throbbing pulse of life for his theme, he matches that theme by the dramatic verve and vigour of his style. The interest of the book is not merely literary or philosophical: it appeals also to the wider circle of the students of culture and of life and of the "criticism of life" by its richness of suggestion and by its vividness of portraiture. To mention one point alone,—nowhere else, not even in the *Phædo*, does the personality of Socrates shine before us so full and clear, "in form and moving so express and admirable," as in the pages of the *Symposium*. To miss reading it is to miss the enjoyment of a veritable *ἔστιμα λόγων*, blended and seasoned with curious art.

In the preparation of this edition I have been indebted mainly to the labours of continental scholars, for the sufficient, if surprising, reason that no English commentary has existed heretofore. It was, indeed, this singular fact, together with the recent publication of an interesting Papyrus fragment of the text, which chiefly moved me to attempt a commentary myself. On many of the interesting questions connected with the literary form and philosophical substance of the dialogue much more might have been said, but I have thought it best to keep both the Introduction and the Notes within a moderate compass. In the framing of the

text, although I have ventured on several innovations of my own, I have been more conservative than the majority of the foreign critics, a considerable selection of whose "restorations" will be found in the Critical Notes in addition to the evidence of the leading mss. and of the Papyrus: in all doubtful cases I have cited also the opinion of Schanz and of the Oxford editor, Prof. Burnet, whose admirable recension has been before me constantly and has aided me much. For expository material I must acknowledge in special my indebtedness to the useful and scholarly edition of A. Hug.

To gild with comment the refined gold of Plato's work is at the best a temerarious task; but if my book helps a single reader more justly to appraise the gold it will not have been wrought wholly in vain.

R. G. B.

October 4, 1909.

In this second edition I have made a number of minor corrections throughout the book. Further, to bring the work up to date, I have added a few new pages (lxxii ff.) at the end of the *Introduction* in which account is taken of some of the more important work done on this Dialogue since 1909.

R. G. B.

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## INTRODUCTION

### § i. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

#### I. *The Preface*: 172 A—174 A.

Apollodorus, in reply to the enquiry of some friends, explains the occasion on which the supper-party at Agathon's was held, when Socrates and others delivered Discourses on Eros. The matter is fresh in his memory and, as a φιλόλογος himself, he is quite ready to repeat the whole story as he had it from Aristodemus,—an eye-witness and an intimate disciple of Socrates,—just as he had repeated it a few days before to his friend Glaucon.

#### II. *Aristodemus's Prologue*: 174 A—178 A.

Aristodemus meeting Socrates smartly attired expresses his surprise at so unusual a circumstance. Socrates explains that being invited to dine with Agathon he feels bound to go "in finery to the fine"; and he presses Aristodemus, although uninvited, to accompany him. On the road Socrates, immersed in thought, lags behind, and Aristodemus arrives at Agathon's alone. Not till they are half-way through the meal does Socrates appear; and Agathon rallies him on his devotion to σοφία. The proposal of Pausanias to restrict the potations, in view of yesterday's banquet, and that of Eryximachus to dismiss the flute-girl and amuse themselves by λόγοι, are unanimously agreed to. Then Eryximachus propounds an idea of Phaedrus, that Eros is the best possible theme for encomia, and suggests that each of the party in turn, commencing with Phaedrus, should now deliver an encomium on Eros. This suggestion is applauded by Socrates. Of the encomia the most noteworthy were the following:—

III. *The Discourse of Phaedrus*: 178 A—180 B.

*Prologue*: Eros is a great and wondrous god.

(a) He is wondrous in origin, being *eldest* of gods and unbegotten—witness what Homer and others say of him.

(b) He is the supreme *benefactor* of mankind, (1) as inspiring a high sense of honour in private, civic and military life; (2) as inspiring self-sacrifice, which wins divine favour (*e.g.* Alcestis and Achilles, contrasted with the cowardly Orpheus).

*Epilogue*: Thus Eros is most ancient, venerable, and beneficent.

IV. *The Discourse of Pausanias*: 180 c—185 c.

*Prologue*: Eros being not single but dual, we must begin by defining which Eros is to be our theme.

(a) The dual nature of Eros follows from the dual nature of Aphrodite: as there is an Aphrodite Urania and an Aphrodite Pandemos, so there is Eros Uranios and Eros Pandemos.

(b) From the principle that no action is in the abstract good or bad but derives its moral quality solely from the manner of its execution it follows that Eros is bad or good according to the kind of love-making to which it prompts.

(c) The *general characteristics* (1) of Eros Pandemos are that it is directed to women as well as boys, to the body rather than the soul, to unscrupulous satisfaction of lust; (2) whereas Eros Uranios shuns females and seeks only such males as are noble and nearly mature both in mind and body. It is the followers of Eros Pandemos who have brought paederastia into disrepute.

(d) *The varying νόμοι concerning Eros* may be classified thus:—

(1) In all Greek states except Athens the νόμος is *simple*, either (a) approving paederastia, as in Elis and Boeotia; or (β) condemning it, as in Ionia and states subject to barbarian rule, where it is held to foster a dangerous spirit of independence (*e.g.* Harmodius and Aristogiton).

(2) At Athens the νόμος is *complex*. (a) Eros is approved, and its excesses condoned, when directed towards superior youths approaching manhood. (β) It appears to be condemned, in so far as parents forbid their boys to hold converse with “erastæ.” The explanation of this ambiguous attitude must be sought in the principle laid down above,

that the moral quality of an act depends upon the conditions of its performance. The Athenian νόμος provides a test for distinguishing between good and bad forms of Eros: the test of time shows whether or not the right motive (desire for ἀρετή) actuates both the lover and his object. This motive alone justifies all erotic pursuits and surrenders, even mutual deception: hence we conclude that καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.

*Epilogue*: This Eros Uranios, which inspires zeal for ἀρετή, possesses the highest value alike for the individual and for the State.

#### V. *The first Interlude*: 185 C—E.

It was the turn of Aristophanes next; but being seized with a hiccough he called upon Eryximachus either to cure him or to speak in his stead. So Eryximachus, having first prescribed a number of remedies, spoke next.

#### VI. *The Discourse of Eryximachus*: 185 E—188 E.

*Prologue*: Pausanias was right in asserting the dual nature of Eros; but he failed to observe that the god's sway extends over the entire universe.

(a) The body, with its healthy and diseased appetites, exhibits the duality of Eros; and *medicine* is "the science of bodily erotics in regard to replenishment and depletion." It is the object of "the Art" of Asclepius to produce the Eros which is harmony between the opposite elements—the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, etc. Eros is, likewise, the patron-god of *gymnastics* and *husbandry*.

(b) Similarly with *music*. The "discordant concord" of Heraclitus hints at the power of music to harmonize sounds previously in discord, and divergent times. Thus music is "the science of Erotics in regard to harmony and rhythm." It is less in the pure theory than in applied music (metrical compositions and their educational use) that the dual nature of Eros comes to light; when it does, the Eros Pandemos must be carefully guarded against.

(c) Again, in the spheres of *meteorology* and *astronomy* we see the effects of the orderly Eros in a wholesome temperate climate, of the disorderly Eros in blights and pestilences; for astronomy is "the science of Erotics in regard to stellar motions and the seasons of the year."

(d) Lastly, in *religion*, it is the disorderly Eros which produces the



impiety which it is the function of divination to cure; and religion may be defined as "the science of human Erotics in regard to piety."

*Epilogue*: To Eros, as a whole, belongs great power; to the virtuous Eros great influence in effecting human concord and happiness.—If my eulogy is incomplete, it is for you, Aristophanes, to supplement it, if you choose.

VII. *The second Interlude*: 189 A—C.

Aristophanes explains that he is now cured of his hiccough, as a result of sneezing according to Eryximachus' prescription. He makes a jocular allusion to Eryximachus' discourse, to which the latter retorts, and after some further banter Aristophanes proceeds to deliver his encomium.

VIII. *The Discourse of Aristophanes*: 189 c—193 d.

*Prologue*: Men have failed to pay due honour to Eros, the most "philanthropic" of gods, who blesses us by his *healing* power, as I shall show.

(a) *Man's original nature* was different from what it now is. It had three sexes—male, female, androgynous; all globular in shape and with double limbs and organs; derived respectively from sun, earth and moon.

(b) *Man's woes* were due to the pride of these primal men which stirred them to attempt to carry Heaven by assault. In punishment Zeus sliced them each in two, and then handed them to Apollo to stitch up their wounds. But, because they then kept dying of hunger, owing to the yearning of each for his other-half, Zeus devised for them the present mode of reproduction, altering the position of the sex-organs accordingly. Thus Eros aims at restoring the primal unity and healing the cleft in man's nature.

(c) Each of us is a split-half of an original male, female, or androgynon; and the other-halves we seek in love are determined accordingly. Courage is the mark of boy-loving men and of man-loving boys, as both derived from the primal male. In the intense passion of Eros it is not merely sexual intercourse that is sought but a permanent fusing into one (as by the brazing of an Hephaestus); for Love is "*the pursuit of wholeness.*"

(d) As it was impiety that caused our "dioikismos" and bisection, so in piety towards the god Eros lies the hope of meeting with our proper halves and regaining our pristine wholeness.

*Epilogue*: Let us, then, laud Eros as the giver both of present blessings and of bright hopes of *healing* and restoration in the future.

IX. *The third Interlude*: 193 D—194 E.

Some conversation ensues between Aristophanes, Eryximachus, Socrates, and Agathon. Upon Socrates attempting to entangle Agathon in an argument, Phaedrus intervenes and bids Agathon proceed without further delay to offer his meed of praise to the god.

X. *The Discourse of Agathon*: 194 E—197 E.

*Prologue*: The method of previous speakers needs amendment. The correct method, which I shall adopt, is to laud first the character of Eros, and secondly his gifts to men.

(A) The *attributes* of Eros are (1) supreme felicity, (due to) (2) supreme beauty and (3) goodness.

(2) Eros is most *beautiful*, since he is (a) the youngest of gods (all tales to the contrary being false), witness his aversion to old-age; (b) most tender, witness his choosing soft souls for his abode; (c) supple, witness his power to steal unnoticed in and out of souls; (d) symmetrical, because comely as all allow; (e) fair-of-skin, for he feeds on flowers amid sweet scents.

(3) Eros is supremely *good*, since he is (a) most just, having no lot in violence or injustice; (b) most temperate, for he is the master of pleasure since no pleasure is greater than love; (c) most courageous, as holding sway over Ares, the most courageous of the gods; (d) most wise, being expert (a) in both musical and creative poesy, and (β) in the practical arts, as instructor of Zeus, Apollo and Athene in their respective crafts (he, too, inspired the gods with love of beauty and dethroned Necessity).

(B) The *blessings* conferred by Eros are, like his attributes, beauty and goodness. He produces peace and pleasantness in all spheres of life: he is the object of universal admiration, the author of all delights, best guide and captain for gods and men alike, whose praises it behoves all to chant in unison.

*Epilogue*: Such is my tribute of eulogy, not wholly serious nor wholly playful.

XI. *The fourth Interlude*: 198 A—199 C.

Agathon "brought down the house" with his peroration; and Socrates remarked to Eryximachus that its eloquence left him in despair—petrified by the Gorgon of Agathon's brilliant Gorgianisms. "Now,"

he said, "I must retract my rash tongue-pledge to join in a eulogy of Eros, since I perceive that I was quite astray in my ideas about the encomiastic art: for I supposed that truth came first, ornamental compliment second, whereas the contrary is evidently the fact. Such an encomium is quite beyond my poor powers; but if you care for an unvarnished speech about Eros, that I am ready to make." Phaedrus and the rest bidding him proceed in his own fashion, Socrates began by the following conversation with Agathon.

XII. *Socrates' preliminary Discussion with Agathon:*

199 c—201 d.

(1) "Your exordium on Method was admirable, Agathon. But tell me further, is Eros a relative notion, like 'father' or 'brother'?" "Certainly it is."

(2) "Next, you agree that if Eros desires its object it must lack it; and if a man wishes for some good he already possesses, what he really desires is what he lacks, *viz.* the future possession of that good." "True."

(3) "Again, if Eros is (as you said) love for beauty, Eros must lack beauty, and therefore goodness too, and be neither beautiful nor good." "I cannot gainsay you."

XIII. *The Discourse of Socrates (Diotima):* 201 d—212 c.

*Prologue:* I will now repeat the discourse on Eros which I once heard from my instructress in Erotics, Diotima the prophetess—assuming the conclusions formulated just now, and treating first of the character and secondly of the effects of Eros, according to Agathon's own method.

A. [*The nature of Eros*, 201 e—204 c.]

(1) Diotima showed me that Eros, although (as we have seen) neither beautiful nor good, is not therefore ugly and bad but rather a *mean* between these contraries.

(2) She argued also that Eros is not a god, since godhead involves the possession of just those goods which Eros desires and lacks. But neither is he a mortal, but stands midway between the two, being a *great dasmon*; and the function of the daemonian is to mediate between gods and men.

(3) As to origin, Eros is son of Poros and Penia, and partakes of the nature of both parents—the fertile vigour of the one, the wastrel neediness of the other. As he is a mean between the mortal and the immortal, so he is a mean between the wise and the unwise, *i.e.* a wisdom-lover (*philosopher*). The notion that Eros is a beautiful god is due to a confusion between subjective Eros and the object loved.

B. [*The effects, or utility, of Eros, 204 D—212 A.*]

(1) [The object or end of Eros.]

What does Eros as “love of the beautiful” precisely imply? In the case of the good, its acquisition is a means to happiness as end. But Eros is not used in this generic sense of “desire for happiness,” so much as in a narrower specific sense. And if we say that Eros is “the desire for the good,” we must expand this definition into “*the desire for the everlasting possession of the good.*”

(2) [The method or mode of action of Eros.]

Eros works by means of generation, both physical and psychical, in the beautiful.

(a) Generation, being an immortal thing, requires harmony with the divine, *i.e.* beauty; without which the process is hindered. And generation is sought because it is, for mortals, the nearest approach to immortality. It is in the desire for immortality that we must find the explanation of all the sexual passion and love of offspring which we see in the animal world, since it is only by the way of leaving a successor to take its place that the mortal creature, in this world of flux, can secure a kind of perpetuity.

(b) But the soul has its offspring as well as the body. Laws, inventions and noble deeds, which spring from love of fame, have for their motive the same passion for immortality. The lover seeks a beautiful soul in order to generate therein offspring which shall live for ever; and the bonds of such soul-marriages are stronger than any carnal ties.

(c) After this elementary prelude, we reach the highest stage of the Mysteries of Love. The right method in Erotic procedure is to pass in upward course from love of bodily beauty to love of soul beauty, thence to the beauty of the sciences, until finally one science is reached which corresponds to the Absolute, Ideal Beauty, in which all finite things of beauty partake. To gain the vision of this is the goal of Love's endeavour, and to live in its presence were life indeed. There, if anywhere, with truth for the issue of his soul, might the lover hope to attain to immortality.

*Epilogue*: Believing that for the gaining of this boon Eros is man's best helper, I myself praise Eros and practise Erotics above all things and I urge others to do likewise. Such is my "encomium," Phædrus, if you choose to call it so.

XIV. *The fifth Interlude*: 212 c—215 a.

Applause followed. Then suddenly, when Aristophanes was on the point of making an observation, a loud knocking was heard at the door. Presently Alcibiades, leaning on a flute-girl, appeared. "I am come to crown Agathon," he cried, "if you will admit a drunken reveller." Being heartily welcomed, he took the seat next Agathon, where Socrates had made room for him. And as soon as he perceived Socrates, he began playfully to abuse him. Then, taking some of the ribbands with which he had bedecked Agathon, he crowned "the marvellous head of Socrates, the invincible in words."

Next Alcibiades insisted on all the company drinking along with him. And, when Eryximachus protested against bare drinking without song or speech and explained to him what the previous order of procedure had been, Alcibiades replied, "In the presence of Socrates I dare not eulogize anyone else, so that if I am to deliver an encomium like the rest, Socrates must be my theme."

XV. *Alcibiades' eulogy of Socrates*: 215 a—222 c.

*Prologue*: My eulogy will take the form of parables—aiming not at mockery but at truth. Socrates resembles (a) Silenus-statuettes which serve as caskets for sacred images; (b) the Satyr Marsyas.

I. In *form* he resembles both (a) the Sileni, and (b) the Satyr.

II. (*In character*) he resembles (b) *the Satyr*, being (1) a mocker, (2) a flute-player. As to (2) he excels Marsyas, since his words alone, without an instrument, fascinate all, old and young. Me he charms far more than even Pericles could, filling me with shame and self-contempt, and driving me to my wit's end.

III. He resembles (a) *the Sileni* in the contrast between his exterior and interior. (a) *Externally* he adopts an erotic attitude towards beautiful youths: (β) but *internally* he despises beauty and wealth, as I know from experience. For I tried to bribe him with my beauty, but all my many attempts came to nothing. Private conversations, gymnastics together, a supper-party *à deux*, even a night on the same couch—all was of no use. Against my battery of charms he was

armed (by his *temperance*) in "complete steel"; and I charge him now before you with the crime of ἕβρις. His *hardihood* was shown in the Potidaea campaign, where none could stand the cold like him. His *valour* was displayed in the battle where he saved my life, and in the retreat from Delium. Especially amazing is his unique *originality*, which makes it impossible to find anyone else like him—except Satyrs and Sileni.

IV. His *speeches* too, I forgot to say, are like the Silenus-statuettes, in outward seeming ridiculous, but in inner content supremely rational and full of images of virtue and wisdom.

*Epilogue*: Such is my eulogy, half praise, half blame. Let my experience, and that of many another, be a warning to you, Agathon: court Socrates less as an "erastes" than as an "anterastes"!

#### XVI. *Concluding Scene*: 222 c—end.

The company laughed at the erotic candour of Alcibiades. Then ensued some banter between Socrates and Alcibiades as rival "erastæ" of Agathon, which was interrupted by the entrance of a band of revellers who filled the room with uproar. Some of the guests left, and Aristodemus himself fell asleep. On awaking, about dawn, he found only three of the party still present and awake—Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates: Socrates was trying to convince the others that the scientific tragedy-writer must be capable also of writing comedy. Presently Aristophanes, and then Agathon, dozed off; whereupon Socrates, still "shadowed" by Aristodemus, departed.

### § ii. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DIALOGUE.

#### (A) *The Method of Narration and the Preface.*

The Platonic dialogues, viewed from the point of view of literary form, may be divided into two chief classes. To the first class belong those in which the story of the discussion is told *directly* by one of the protagonists; to the second class belong those in which the story is told *indirectly* or at second-hand,—a mode of narration which involves the further characteristic that dialogues of this class are necessarily prefaced (and concluded) by some explanatory paragraphs. This second class, moreover, falls into two subdivisions, according as the narrator is or is not represented as being himself present at the

discussion. It is to the latter of these subdivisions, in which the narrator is *not* an eye-witness but reports the matter only at second-hand, that the *Symposium* (together with the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*) belongs.

It is noteworthy also that, with the exception of the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*, ours is the only dialogue in which the narrating witness is not Socrates himself. The reason for this is obvious: eulogy of Socrates being one of the main purposes of the dialogue, it would be unfitting to put the story into his mouth, and make him the trumpeter of his own praises. Instead of doing so, Plato selects as the sources of the narrative persons of such a character as to produce the effect of verisimilitude. The way in which Aristodemus, the primary source, and Apollodorus, the secondary source, are described is evidently intended to produce the impression that in them we have reliable witnesses. Apollodorus<sup>1</sup>, "the fanatic," is put before us not only as a worshipper of Socrates, imbued with a passionate interest in philosophical discourses such as are here to be related, but also as an intimate disciple who had "compared with" Socrates for the space of nearly three years past and during that time had made it his peculiar task to study the every act and word of the Master (172 ε). Moreover, the story of the special occasion in question he had diligently conned (οὐκ ἀμελέητος, 172 Δ, 173 σ).

Aristodemus<sup>2</sup>, the primary source and actual narrator, is spoken of by Apollodorus as "an old disciple" and one of the most intimate with the Master in earlier years, and in his own narrative he represents himself as following Socrates with dog-like fidelity, and showing the closest familiarity with his ways and habits—a man so single-hearted, so engrossed in matters of fact, as to be constitutionally incapable of tampering with the truth. As the "minute biographer," Aristodemus is the prototype of all later Boswells.

Further, the impression of veracity made by the character of the

<sup>1</sup> Apollodorus appears also in *Phaedo* 59 Δ, Β as one of those present with Socrates "on the day when he drank the poison in the prison"; as characteristically exhibiting most marked symptoms of grief [this statement would support the epithet *μαλακός* as well as *μανικός* in *Symp.* 173 σ]; and as a native of Athens (τῶν ἐπιχωρίων). In *Apol.* 34 Δ he is one of those present at the trial of Socrates; and (in 38 Β) one of those who offered to go bail to the extent of 30 minae. Pfeiderer takes Apollodorus to represent Plato himself, by a piece of ironical "Selbstobjektivierung," a notion which had already occurred to me.

<sup>2</sup> For Aristodemus, see also Xen. *Mem.* i. 4. 2 where Socrates converses *περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον, καταμαθὼν αὐτὸν οὕτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς οὕτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα.*

narrators is enhanced by the express statement that in regard to some points at least (*ἐν* 173 B) the account of Aristodemus was confirmed by Socrates. The points in question are probably (as Hug observes) those which specially concern the picture drawn of Socrates himself. At any rate, it is in regard to these that we have the detailed testimony of Alcibiades, emphasized by repeated asseverations (214 E, 215 A, etc.), and endorsed by the silence of Socrates.

In addition to the evidence it contains for the dates of the narration and of the banquet<sup>1</sup>, and the vivid picture in miniature which it presents of a certain group of Socratics in whom an ardent admiration for the Master was blended with a limited capacity for understanding the deeper side of his practice and doctrine—as if to go barefoot and to rail at filthy lucre were the sum and substance of Socraticism,—there are two further points in the Preface which deserve attention.

Apollodorus, although asked only for the *λόγοι* spoken at the banquet (172 B, 173 E), proceeds to give a full account of the accompanying incidents as well (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς...διηγήσασθαι* 174 A). This may be taken to indicate that for estimating the effect of the dialogue as a whole we are meant to pay regard not only to the series of encomia but also to the framework of incident and conversation in which they are set.

Glaucon, in asking Apollodorus for the desired information concerning the "erotic discourses," states (172 B) that he has already heard an account of them from "another man" (*ἄλλος τις*), which account was unsatisfactory (*οὐδὲν σαφές*), and that the authority quoted by this unnamed informant was "Phoenix, son of Philippos." To this Apollodorus adds the fact (173 B) that this Phoenix was indebted to the same source as himself, namely Aristodemus. What precisely these statements signify it is not easy to determine, since the identity of Phoenix, as well as that of the anonymous informant (*ἄλλος τις*), is unknown to us. But it seems reasonable to infer that there was already in existence, when Plato wrote, at least one other account of a banquet at which Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon figured, and that it is Plato's intention to discredit it. That such is the intention is shown not only by the phrase *οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφές λέγειν*, but also by the statement that the evidence of *ἄλλος τις* was one degree further off from the primary source (Aristodemus) than is that of Apollodorus. Further, the assumption of some such controversial

<sup>1</sup> With regard to this evidence, see *Introd.* § viii.



intention throws light on the emphasis laid on the veracity of the narrative—to which attention has been drawn above—and gives it a more definite motive. It is as if the author means us to read into his preface something to this effect: "Socrates has been misrepresented: it is my task to clear his reputation by putting the facts in their true light."

If this, then, be a right reading of the hints thus given, what is the distorted account which Plato thus discredits, and who its author? Unfortunately this must remain a matter of conjecture. The most obvious suggestion to make is that the author in question is Xenophon, and the account alluded to his *Symposium*. But Xenophon's *Symposium* is most probably a later work than Plato's; and it is a further objection that the persons represented by Xenophon as present at the banquet are not—with the exception of Socrates—the persons mentioned by Glaucon.

We are obliged, therefore, to look further afield for the author whose identity is thus shrouded. The best suggestion I can offer is that Polycrates the rhetor is the writer intended. In favour of this we may adduce the fact that Polycrates is ὁ κατήγορος whose calumnies Xenophon aims at refuting in his *Memorabilia*<sup>1</sup>. It is by no means improbable *a priori* that Polycrates in his attacks on Socrates described, amongst other incidents, a banqueting-scene in which Socrates and Alcibiades were pictured in an odious light. And if we take the *Banquet* of Xenophon to be a genuine work, the very fact that Xenophon thought it necessary to supplement his *Memorabilia* by such a work might be construed as showing that the author of the slanders he is at such pains to refute had already libelled Socrates in connexion with a similar scene. But unless, by some happy chance, further light

<sup>1</sup> See Cobet, *Nov. Lect.* pp. 662 ff.; Gomperz, *G. T.* II. pp. 68, 118. Gomperz (II. 343) supposes the *Gorgias* to be a counterblast to Polycrates' indictment of Socrates, and Alcibiades' eulogy in *Sympos.* to have the same motive: "Plato had a definite motive for placing such praise in the mouth of Alcibiades—we refer to the pamphlet of Polycrates.... This writer had spoken of Socrates as the teacher of Alcibiades—in what tone and with what intention can easily be guessed.... Plato himself had touched on the subject (of the *liaison* between the two men), harmlessly enough, in his youthful works, as, for example, in the introduction to the 'Protagoras'.... But after the appearance of Polycrates' libel, he may well have thought it advisable to speak a word of enlightenment on the subject, which is exactly what he does, with a plainness that could not be surpassed, in the present encomium" (*op. cit.* 394–5). Gomperz, however, does not bring this hypothesis into connexion with the passage in the Preface of *Symp.* discussed above. There may be an allusion to the same matter in *Protag.* 847 c (*cp. Xen. Symp.* VII. 1).

should be shed upon the history of Polycrates' literary activity, it is hardly possible to get beyond the region of conjectural speculation, or to hope for a definitive solution of this obscure literary problem.

(B) *The Prologue of Aristodemus.*

In the Prologue, with which Aristodemus's narrative opens, special attention may be drawn to the following points:—

(a) It is significant that the first person to appear on the scene is Socrates. We are led at once to admire his good humour and ready wit as shown in the playful tone of his conversation (1) with Aristodemus (174 A, B), in which he makes jesting quotations from Homer and indulges in a pun on the name of Agathon (cp. the pun he makes on Gorgias, 198 c); and (2) with Agathon (175 c—E). These amiable traits in the character of Socrates are further illustrated in other parts of the dialogue.

(b) Socrates on the way becomes lost in thought and fails to put in an appearance till the banquet is already far advanced (174 D, 175 c). Aristodemus explains to Agathon (175 B) that this is no exceptional occurrence (*ἴθως τι τοῦτ' ἔχει*). That this incident is intended to be specially emphasized as typical of Socrates' habits becomes clear when we notice how Alcibiades in his speech (220 c) describes a similar incident as taking place in one of the campaigns in which he served. The corroboration thus effected is one of many examples of the literary care and ingenuity with which Plato in this dialogue interweaves incident with speech. Another example occurs a little further on (176 c) where Eryximachus, discussing the question "to drink or not to drink," describes Socrates as *ικανὸς ἀμφοτέρω*: this statement, too, we find amplified and confirmed by Alcibiades (220 A). Both these matters illustrate that entire subordination of flesh to spirit in which Socrates was unique.

(c) Agathon (175 c ff.) expresses a desire to share in the "witty invention" which Socrates had discovered on his way: Socrates with his usual mock-modesty disclaims for himself the possession of *σοφία*, except of a poor kind, but congratulates Agathon on the fine and abundant *σοφία* he has just been displaying so conspicuously: and the conversational banter concludes with Agathon's remark—"Presently, with the Wine-god as umpire, you and I will fight out our wisdom-match." Here, at this early stage, we have struck for us one of the key-notes of the dialogue. For one main motive of the dialogue as a whole is to exhibit the *σοφία* of Socrates, his intellectual as well as

moral supremacy. And we find, in the sequel, that this is done largely by pitting him against Agathon, over the wine-bowl. In this we have the reason for the juxtaposition of the two speeches, matched, as it were, one against the other. His speech is, in itself, one sufficient proof of the superiority of Socrates over his rival. But there are also other proofs: there is the masterly criticism and confutation to which Socrates subjects the belauded poet; there is the express statement, confirmed by expressive action, of Alcibiades, in which is asserted the superiority of Socrates not merely to Agathon but to all others who make claim to σοφία (213 E, 215 c ff.); and finally the Wine-god himself bestows on Socrates the palm when, in the concluding scene, we see him alone pursuing discussion with unflagging zeal and with a clearness of head undimmed by long and deep potations while his rival drowns and succumbs to sleep. Thus the διαδικασία περὶ τῆς σοφίας runs through the book, and always, from beginning to end, νικᾷ ὁ Σωκράτης.

To this we may add one minor point. Agathon, in this preliminary play of wit, applies to Socrates the epithet ὑβριστής, "a mocker." And this, too, is a trait upon which Alcibiades, in the sequel, lays much stress. ὕβρις is one of the most striking characteristics of the Satyr-Socrates (216 E, 219 c).

(d) Another example of the literary interweaving—or the method of "responions," as we might term it,—which is so marked a feature of the dialogue, is to be found in the statement of Socrates concerning the character of his own knowledge. His speciality in the way of science is, he announces, "erotics," and this is his only speciality (177 D). Accordingly, when we find Socrates in the sequel delivering a discourse on this subject we are evidently intended by Plato to feel that his views are to be taken seriously as those of one who professed to be an expert in this subject if in nothing else. And this intention is emphasized when we come to the later passage (the "responion") in 198 D where Socrates again refers to his conviction that concerning "erotics" he knew the truth (εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν). It is hardly necessary to add that "erotics," construed in the Socratic sense, constitutes by no means an insignificant department of knowledge (φαύλη τις σοφία 175 E), as Socrates modestly implies, inasmuch as it is practically coextensive with a theory of education and involves an insight into the origin, nature and destiny of the human soul.

(e) In 177 B we have an interesting parallel between Plato's language and that of Isocrates. In *Hel.* 210 B (τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦς

βομβυλίου καὶ τοὺς ἄλας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βουλευθέντων ἐπαινεῖν κ.τ.λ.) Isocrates scoffs at the eulogists of "bees and salt and such-like trumpery," and his language is echoed in the allusion (put in the mouth of Eryximachus quoting Phaedrus) to a βιβλίον ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐνήσαν ἄλας ἐπαινοῦσαν θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν (177 B). This eulogist of salt is commonly supposed to be Polycrates, since encomia on similar paltry subjects—mice, χύτραι, ψῆφοι—are ascribed to him<sup>1</sup>. Dümmler, however<sup>2</sup>, takes the reference to be to Antisthenes (*Protreptikos*), on the strength of the statement in Pollux vi. 16. 98: βομβύλιος δὲ τὸ στενὸν ἔκπωμα καὶ βομβοῦν ἐν τῇ πόσει, ὡς Ἀντισθένης ἐν προτρεπτικῷ. And for ἄλας as eulogized in the same work he quotes also *Rep.* 372 B ff. (ὄψον ἔξουσιν ἄλας). It may be added that a further allusion to the βομβύλιος, as στενὸν ἔκπωμα, may be discovered in the mention of ἔκπωμα μέγα in *Sympos.* 213 E. Since Antisthenes seems to have devoted a good deal of attention to the subject of μέθη<sup>3</sup>, one is inclined to suppose that his views are alluded to in *Sympos.* (176, 213-14); and another allusion to him may be found in the mention of the χρηστοὶ σοφισταί who eulogized Heracles (177 B), since Heracles was, notoriously, the patron-saint of the Cynics<sup>4</sup>. However much they might differ on other points, Plato and Isocrates were agreed in so far as both found the Cynic leader an objectionable person.

(f) A significant indication is given us at the conclusion of the Prologue that the account of the speeches which follows is not an exhaustive account, but only a *selection*. And it is a selection that has been sifted twice. For Apollodorus states (178 A) that neither did Aristodemus remember *all* the views put forward by *every* speaker, nor did he (Apollodorus) remember all that Aristodemus had related. This statement is further confirmed by the later statement (180 C) that Aristodemus passed over the discourses of several speakers who followed next after Phaedrus. We are to infer, therefore, that there was a good deal of speechifying at the banquet which was not ἀξιολογούμενον. But why Plato is at pains to emphasize this point is

<sup>1</sup> So Hug (*Sympos. ad loc.*) following Sauppe and Blass: also Jebb, *Att. Or.* II. 99. I may note here an inconsistency as to the date of Polycrates' "Accusation" in Jebb, *Att. Or.* I. 150-51 compared with *ib.* XLV: in the latter place it is set in 393 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> In this Dümmler (*Akad.* p. 66) follows Winckelmann (*Antisth. fr.* p. 21). Polycrates, however, may be alluded to as well as Antisthenes, as the terms of the reference are wide (ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνά); moreover, a close relation may have existed between these two writers.

<sup>3</sup> See Dümmler, *Antisthenica*, pp. 17 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See Gomperz, *G. T.* II. p. 151; Dümmler, *Akad.* p. 66.

not wholly clear. It may, of course, be merely a literary device meant to enhance the verisimilitude of the account, since the speeches actually related might be thought insufficient to occupy the length of time supposed to elapse between the end of the δέπνον and the hour of Alcibiades' arrival—which would probably not be early. It is possible, however, that we should look for a deeper reason. If so, may not the intention be to brush aside and discredit other speeches stated by another author<sup>1</sup> (ἄλλος τις, 172 B) to have been delivered on this occasion?

(C) *The Interludes.*

The *first Interlude*, worthy of the name, occurs between the second and third encomia (185 c—ε), and it is noticeable, first, for the reference to the "isology" of the rhetorical sophists; secondly, for the device by which the natural order of speakers is changed (Eryximachus taking the place of Aristophanes); and thirdly, for the alleged cause which renders such a change necessary, namely the hiccough (λύγξ) of Aristophanes. As regards the significance of this last matter considerable diversity of opinion exists among the commentators. Of the ancients, Olympiodorus (*vit. Plat.* 3) supposed that Plato here ἐκωμῶδησε Ἀριστοφάνη when he εἰσάγει αὐτὸν μεταξύ λυγγὶ περιπεσόντα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον πληρῶσαι τὸν ὕμνον: and similarly Athenaeus (187 σ) writes τὸν μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς λυγγὸς ὀχλούμενον...κωμωδεῖν ἤθελε καὶ διασύρειν: and Aristides (*or.* 46, II. p. 287), ἀλλ' οἶμαι λύζειν αὐτὸν ἴδει, ἵνα εἰς ἀπληστίαν σκωφθῇ. Of the moderns, some have followed the ancients in supposing that the incident is meant to satirize Aristophanes and his intemperate habits (so Stallbaum, Rückert, Steinhart); while some (Stephens, Sydenham, Wolf, Schwegler) take the object of the ridicule to be not so much the habits of the poet as his speech with its "indelicat ingredients." On the other hand, Schleiermacher held the view that Eryximachus with his "physiological and medical notion of love" is here being satirized; while Ast—whose view is shared in the main by Hommel, van Prinsterer and Rettig—argued that the real object of the ridicule is Pausanias, by whose speech Aristophanes implies that he has been "fed up" to the point of loathing. This view Rettig thinks is supported by the phrase Πανσανίου πανσαμίνου, which he takes to indicate Apollodorus' ridicule,—by the allusion made by Aristophanes to Pausanias' speech in 189 c,—and by his mention of Pausanias again in 193 B; and he construes the hint of another

<sup>1</sup> See above, § II. A, *ad fin.*

possible cause (ἢ ὑπό τινος ἄλλου, 185 c) as "affording the key to the hidden meaning of the word *πλησμονή*." This view, however, is open to the objections (urged by Rückert against Ast) that, first, it makes Aristophanes guilty of excessive rudeness in feigning a hiccough to show his disgust ("aliud est in convivio iocari, aliud in scena," e.g. *Nub.* 906 ff., *Ach.* 585 ff., the places cited by Rettig); and that, further, there is no plain sign that the hiccough was feigned, but on the contrary the whole incident is stated by Aristodemus as matter-of-fact. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude that the most obvious view—that of the ancients—is nearest to the truth. The incident shows up Aristophanes in a ludicrous light, and at the same time it gives further occasion to Eryximachus to air his medical lore; so that we can read in it the intention of satirizing gently both these personages. But to construe it as aimed at Pausanias is far-fetched and improbable: he is already disposed of in the satirical reference to sophistical "isology"; and to discover a fresh allusion to him in the "other cause" of the hiccough is to discover a mare's nest, for—as the Scholiast *ad loc.* informs us—other physical causes of this symptom were as a matter of fact recognized by the medical profession, and it is only polite on the part of Aristodemus to leave the matter open.

The *second Interlude* (189 A—C) and the *third* (193 D—194 E) call for no special remark.

The *fourth Interlude* (198 A—199 C), which follows on the speech of Agathon, is linked to the third both by a remark which Socrates addresses to Eryximachus, and also, at the close, by his appeal to Phaedrus (cp. 199 B with 194 D). Here, in even a greater degree than in the previous Interludes, Socrates is the central figure of interest, and this position he continues to hold throughout the rest of the dialogue. This Interlude, indeed, may be regarded as one of the cardinal points of the structure, in which the First Act, as we may term it, passes on into the Second; and in the Second Act we reach at length the theoretical climax, in the doctrine of Socrates-Diotima. To this climax the present Interlude, wherein is laid before us Socrates' confession of rhetorical faith, serves as prologue.

The *fifth Interlude* (212 C—215 A) is by far the longest and, as regards the action of the piece, the most important. For it introduces a new actor, and he a protagonist, in the person of Alcibiades. The contrast is striking between the prophetess in her soaring flights to the heavenly places of the spirit and the tipsy reveller with his lewd train who takes her place in claiming the attention of the audience. The

comic relief which, in the earlier scenes, had been supplied by Aristophanes, as *γελωτοποιός*, is now supplied by Alcibiades. We should notice also how a link with the Second Act is furnished here, at the commencement of the Third Act, by the mention of an attempt by Aristophanes to reply to an observation made by Socrates in the course of his speech. But apart from this, the rest of the speakers and banqueters are left out of account except only Agathon, Socrates and Eryximachus. The action of the last of these here is parallel to his action at the commencement of the First Act where he had taken the lead in fixing the rules for the conduct of the symposium. As regards Agathon and Socrates, the most important incident in this Interlude is the decision concerning their contest in *σοφία* which is pronounced by Alcibiades, when, acting the not inappropriate part of Dionysus, he awards the crown to Socrates,—an incident to the significance of which we have already (§ ii, B, c) drawn attention.

Of the *Epilogue* or concluding scene (222 c—end) it is unnecessary to say much. The persons that figure most largely in it are the three central characters, Alcibiades, Agathon and Socrates; while towards the close the rest of the characters receive, as it were, a farewell notice. When the curtain finally falls, it falls significantly on the solitary figure of Socrates, the incarnation of the Eros-dæmon, behind whom in his shadow stands the form of his erastes, the “shadow”-biographer Aristodemus.

### § iii. THE FIRST FIVE SPEECHES.

1. *Phaedrus*, son of Pythocles, belonged to the Attic deme Myrrhinus. Lysias describes him as “impoverished” in circumstances, but respectable. In the *Protagoras* he is represented as a disciple of Hippias; while in the *Phaedrus*—named after him—his chief characteristic is his ardent interest in erotic oratory (*λόγοι ἔρωτικοί*), a specimen of which, by *Lysias*, he has learnt almost completely by heart. It is, then, in accordance with this character that we find *Phaedrus*, in the *Symposium*, made responsible for the theme of the series of speeches (*viz.* *ἔπαινος Ἐρωτος*, 177 D), and entitled *πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου*. We may gather also from certain indications contained both in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Symposium* that *Phaedrus* was neither physically strong nor mentally vigorous<sup>1</sup>. The ostensibly prominent

<sup>1</sup> See *Phaedr.* 227 A, *Symp.* 176 c, 223 B, and, generally, his cultivation of medical friends. Also the probable word-play in the deme-name *Μυρρινόβσιος*, *Symp.* 176 D, *Phaedr.* 244 A.

position assigned to such a man in the *Symposium* is more natural if we assume that it is due to the desire to make him a link between this dialogue and the *Phaedrus*<sup>1</sup>.

Phaedrus's *speech*, although not without merit in point of simplicity of style and arrangement, is poor in substance. The moral standpoint is in no respect raised above the level of the average citizen; the speaker pays little regard to consistency, and the method of argument, with its want of logical coherence, savours much of the sophists. As examples of this self-contradiction we may point to the statement that Achilles, as younger than Patroclus, must be *παιδικά* not *ἑραστής*, whereas Alcestis, though younger than Admetus, is treated as the *ἑρώσα*, not the *ἑρωμένη*; we may point also to the other inconsequence, that the self-sacrifice of Achilles, the *παιδικά*, is cited in support of the contention that *οἱ ἑρώντες μόνοι* are capable of such self-sacrifice. The arbitrary handling of the Orpheus myth is another striking illustration of the sophistic manner.

What is, however, most characteristic of the speech of Phaedrus is its richness of mythological allusion. Lacking, it would seem, in native force of intellect, Phaedrus relies upon authority and tradition. He quotes Hesiod and Homer, Acusilaos and Parmenides: he builds his argument, such as it is, on the sayings of "them of old time," and on the legendary histories of the son of Oeagrus and the daughter of Pelias; and when he can confute Aeschylus on a point of mythology his joy is great. As a lover of religious tradition, we may credit Phaedrus with a capacity for genuine religious feeling; certainly, in his rôle as high-priest of Eros, on the present occasion, he shows a strict regard for ritual propriety when he rebukes Socrates for interrupting the service of speech-offerings to the god (194 D)<sup>2</sup>.

In point of *literary style* we may notice the following features:—

(a) *Rhetorical ornamentation*: chiasmus (178 D), paronomasia (179 c), special compound verbs (*ἀγασθέντες* 179 c, *ὑπεραγασθέντες* 180 A; *ἀποθανεῖν* 179 E, *ὑπεραποθανεῖν*, *ἐπαποθανεῖν* 180 A);

<sup>1</sup> Cf. P. Crain, p. 7: Vera causa, cur Plato sermonis in Symposio Phaedrum parentem praedicaaverit, haec mihi videtur esse: rediens ad eas cogitationes quas in Phaedro dialogo instituerat, eundem quoque auctorem colloquii reduxit.

<sup>2</sup> Hug sums up the position of Phaedrus thus (p. xlvi): "Phädrus stellt den gewöhnlichen athenischen Bürger dar, den eine rastlose Neugierde zu den rhetorischen und philosophischen Kreisen hindrängt, der da und dort etwas aufschnappt und sich aneignet, jedoch ohne tieferes Verständnis, aber mit desto grösserem Selbstbewusstsein." Cp. Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 528): "The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself...is half-sophist, half-enthusiast."



(b) *Monotony of expression* (οὔτε...οὔτε 178 C (4), 178 D (2); οὔτως...ὡς 178 D (2), οὔτω...ὥστε 179 A, C, τοσοῦτον...ὥστε 179 C; καὶ μὴν...γε 179 A, B; οὔτω καὶ 179 D, τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα 179 D, ὄθεν δὴ καὶ 180 A);

(c) *Anacolutha*: 177 A (οὐ δεινὸν κτλ.), 179 A (καὶ μὴν...οὔτω κακός).

2. Of *Pausanias*, of the deme Κεραμῆς, little is known beyond what we are told in this dialogue<sup>1</sup> and in Xenophon's *Symposium*, where also he appears as notorious for his love for the tragedian Agathon. Xenophon represents Pausanias as a vigorous champion of παιδεραστία<sup>2</sup>, and Plato here assigns to him a similar rôle, although he paints the fashion of the man in less crude colours.

The *speech* of Pausanias is a composition of considerable ability. Although, like Phaedrus, he starts by grounding his conception of the dual Eros on mythological tradition, yet when this conception is once stated the distinction is maintained and its consequences followed out with no little power of exposition. The manner in which the laws regarding παιδεραστία in the various states are distinguished, and in special the treatment of the complex Athenian νόμος, display the cleverness of a first-rate pleader. The general impression, in fact, given us by the speech is that it forms an exceedingly smart piece of special pleading in favour of the proposition καλὸν ἐρασταῖς χαρίζεσθαι. The nakedness of this proposition is cloked by the device of distinguishing between a noble and a base Eros, and by the addition of the saving clause ἀπερῆς ἐνεκα<sup>3</sup>. None the less, it would seem that the speaker's main interest is in the χαρίζεσθαι, rather than in the accruing ἀπερῆ, and that he is fundamentally a sensualist, however refined and specious may be the form in which he gives expression to his sensualism.

Pausanias is a lawyer-like person in his style of argumentation; and, appropriately enough, much of his speech is concerned with νόμοι.

<sup>1</sup> He is also mentioned in *Protag.* 315 D.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 32 ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀκρασίᾳ συγκυλιουμένων.

<sup>3</sup> We must, of course, bear in mind that, as Jowett puts it (*Plato*, vol. I. p. 529), "the value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy, (though) at variance with modern and Christian notions, is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment." Nor does the Platonic Socrates, in the sequel, fail to take account of them. For some judicious observations on the general question of the Gk. attitude to paederastia, see Jowett, *op. cit.* pp. 534 ff.; Gomperz, *Gk. Thinkers* (E. Tr.) II. pp. 380 ff.; for Eros in Gk. religion, see Miss J. E. Harrison, *Prolegom.* pp. 680 ff.; for Plato's and Xenophon's theories of Love, see I. Bruns, *Vorträge* etc., pp. 118 ff.; P. Crain, pp. 28 ff.

The term is noteworthy, since it inevitably suggests that antithesis νόμος) (φύσις which was so widely debated among the sophists and thinkers of the close of the fifth century. Is the moral standard fixed by nature (φύσει) or merely by convention (νόμφ)? This was one form of the question; and closely connected with this was the other form: Is knowledge absolute or relative? Pausanias poses as a conventionalist, and a relativist, a champion of law as against nature (πᾶσα πράξις αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά); and this is of itself sufficient to show that, in Plato's eyes, he is a specimen of the results of sophistic teaching.

Nor is it only in his adoption of this principle of moral indifference, as we might call it, and in his capacity τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, that Pausanias stands before us as a downright sophist; his argumentation also is chargeable with the sophistic vices of inconsistency and self-contradiction<sup>1</sup>. For example, with what right, we may ask, does Pausanias condemn the νόμοι of other states than Athens regarding παιδεραστία, while laying down τὸ νόμμον as the standard of morality? For such a distinction necessarily involves reference to another, superior, standard; whereas, by his own hypothesis, no such standard exists. Again, the section on the καλὴ ἀπάτη (181 E f.) stands out in curious contradiction with the section immediately preceding, in which fidelity and sincerity (τὸ βίβαιον) are put forward as the necessary conditions of a love that is fair (καλός) and irreproachable (οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος).

In *literary style* the speech of Pausanias displays, in a much higher degree than that of Phaedrus, the tricks and ornaments proper to the sophistical schools of rhetoric. Thus we find:—

*Paronomasia*: ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ 182 E; δουλείας δουλεύειν 183 A; πράττειν τὴν πράξιν 181 A, cp. 183 B.

*Alliteration*: ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οἷας οὐδ' ἂν δοῦλος οὐδεὶς (λ, δ, ο, ου).

*Rhythmic correspondence* of clauses and periods (εὐρυθμία, ἰσοκῶλα): The invention of this important feature of Greek rhetoric is commonly ascribed to Thrasy machus; and it is especially characteristic of the style of Isocrates<sup>2</sup>. The following examples (as formulated by Hug)

<sup>1</sup> So Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 529) writes: "(The speech of Pausanias) is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic."

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Ar. Rhet.* III. 9, 1409<sup>a</sup> 25 λέξις κατεστραμμένη και ὁμοία ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις.

<sup>3</sup> A good example occurs in *Helena* 17:

τοῦ μὲν ἐπίκουρον και φιλοκινδυνον τὸν βίον κατέστησε  
τῆς δὲ περίβλεπτον και σπερμάχτηον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησε.

will serve to indicate the extent to which Pausanias makes use of these artifices:—

- |      |   |   |
|------|---|---|
| I.   | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>πάσα γὰρ πράξις ὧδ' ἔχει.</i></li> <li>2. <i>αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς,</i></li> <li>3. <i>οὔτε καλὴ οὔτ' αἰσχρά.</i></li> </ol>   |
| II.  | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. <i>οἶον δ' νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν,</i></li> <li>5. <i>ἢ πίνειν ἢ ᾄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι,</i></li> <li>6. <i>οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν,</i></li> </ol>   |
| III. | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. <i>ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει,</i></li> <li>8. <i>ὡς ἂν πραχθῆ,</i></li> <li>9. <i>τοιούτον ἀπέβη.</i></li> </ol>  |
| IV.  | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. <i>καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται,</i></li> <li>11. <i>μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν,</i></li> <li>12. <i>οὔτω καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρωσ οὐ πᾶς ἐστὶ καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι,</i></li> <li>13. <i>ἀλλὰ ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν. [180 E ad fin.—181 A.]</i></li> </ol> |

Here we have four *περίοδοι* of which the first three are *τρίκωλοι*, the fourth *τετράκωλος*: in the three *τρίκωλοι*, the *κῶλα* of each are approximately equal; while in the *τετράκωλος*, long and short *κῶλα* alternate.

Other instances of strophic correspondence are 184 D—E, 185 A ff. (see Hug *ad loc.*).

3. *Eryximachus*, son of Akumenus, is like his father a physician and a member of the Asclepiad guild (186 E); he is also a special friend of Phaedrus (177 A). Alcibiades alludes to Akumenus as “the most temperate sire” of Eryximachus, and he is mentioned also by Xenophon as an authority on diet. The same “temperance” (*σωφροσύνη*) is a marked characteristic of Eryximachus in our dialogue: he is the champion of moderation in drinking (176 B ff., 214 B), and when, near the close, the revellers enter and the fun waxes fast and furious, Eryximachus, together with his comrade Phaedrus, is the first to make his escape (223 B). Another characteristic of the man is his *pedantic* manner. He is incapable of laying aside his professional solemnity even for a moment, and he seizes every possible occasion to air his medicinal lore, now with a lecture on *μέθη* (176 D), presently with another on *λύξ* (185 D, E).

Scientific pedantry is, similarly, the characteristic of Eryximachus's *speech*. He starts with a conception of Eros as a cosmic principle, from

the standpoint of natural philosophy<sup>1</sup>. This conception he applies and develops with equal rigour in the spheres of medicine, music, astronomy and religion, so that definitions of a precisely parallel kind for each of these departments are evolved. The dogmatic manner appears also in his treatment of the dictum of Heraclitus (187 A), which corresponds to the treatment of Aeschylus by his friend Phaedrus. He resembles Phaedrus also in his fondness for displaying erudition: he knows his Empedocles and his Hippocrates<sup>2</sup>, as well as the experts in musical theory.

The theory of the duality of Eros Eryximachus takes over from Pausanias, but he naturally finds a difficulty in applying this concept to other spheres, such as that of music, and in attempting to elude the difficulty he falls into the sophistical vices of ambiguity and inconsistency. *E.g.* in 187 D the reference of δὲ χαρίζεσθαι is obscure; and, in the same context, the substitutions of ἡ Οὐρανία Μοῦσα for Ἀφροδίτη Οὐρανία and of Πολυμνία for Ἀφροδίτη Πάνδημος are arbitrary<sup>3</sup>.

As regards *literary style* there is little to notice in the speech, beyond its plainness and lack of ornament. The monotony of expression (seen, *e.g.*, in the recurrence of such formulae as ἔστι δὴ 187 B, ἔστι γὰρ 187 C, ἔστι δὲ 187 D) marks it as the product of a pedantic, would-be scientific mind, in which literary taste is but slightly developed and the ruling interest is the schematization of physical doctrines.

4. *Aristophanes*. The greatest of Greek comic poets, the author of the *Clouds*, was a pronounced anti-Socratic. None the less, Plato

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Eurip. fr. 839 τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὄρας ὄση θεός; | ἦν οὐδ' ἄν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μετρήσεις ἄν | ὄση πέφυκε κἀφ' ὄσον διέρχεται. | ...ἔρᾳ μὲν ὄμβρου γὰρ', ...ἔρᾳ δ' ὄ σελμὸς οὐρανὸς κτλ.

<sup>2</sup> Pfeleiderer (*Sokr. u. Plato*, pp. 551 ff.) broaches the theory that Eryx's speech is intended as a parody of (Pseudo-) Hippocr. *περὶ διαίτης*, and that the real author of that work was Eryx. himself. There are, certainly, a number of similarities, but hardly sufficient to prove the case. Obviously, it is a parody of the style of some one or more medical writers, but more than that cannot safely be said: some Hippocratean parallels in matters of detail will be found in the notes. See also my remarks on the next speech (Aristophanes'). Teuffel drew attention to the etymological significance of the name (*ἐρυξι-μαχος*); this, however, cannot be an invention of Plato's, although it may partly account for the introduction of the *λύγι* incident.

<sup>3</sup> The doctrine of Love as a harmony of opposites, which plays so large a part in Eryx's discourse, may be illustrated from Spenser ("Hymn to Love"):

"Ayre hated earth and water hated fyre,  
Till Love relented their rebellious yre.  
He then them tooke, and, tempering goodly well  
Their contrary dislikes with loved meanes,  
Did place them all in order," etc.

paints him here in no dark colours, but does justice to his mastery of language, his fertility of imagination, his surprising wit, his hearty joviality. In contrast to the puritanism of the pragmatist doctor, Aristophanes appears as a man of strength to mingle strong drink, who jokes about his "baptism" by liquor (176 B), and turns the scientific axioms of the "man of art" to ridicule (189 A). His rôle is, in fact, throughout that of a γελωποιοῦς (189 A), and he supplies the comic business of the piece with admirable gusto<sup>1</sup>. Yet the part he plays is by no means that of a vulgar buffoon: he is poet as well as jester,—a poet of the first magnitude, as is clearly indicated by the speech which Plato here puts in his mouth.

That *speech* is a masterpiece of grotesque fantasy worthy of Rabelais himself. The picture drawn of the globular four-legged men is intensely comic, and the serious manner in which the king of gods and men ponders the problem of their punishment shows a very pretty wit. Their sexual troubles, too, are expounded with characteristic frankness. And it is with the development of the sex-problem that we arrive at the heart of this comedy in miniature,—the definition of Eros as "the craving for wholeness" (τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιθυμία 192 B).

This thought, which is the final outcome of the speech, is not without depth and beauty<sup>2</sup>. It suggests that in Love there is something deeper and more ultimate than merely a passion for sensual gratification; it implies that sexual intercourse is something less than an end in itself. But Aristophanes, while suggesting these more profound reflexions, can provide no solid ground for their support; he bases them on the most portentous of comic absurdities. Here, as so often elsewhere in the genuine creations of the poet, we find it difficult to determine where παιδιά ends and σπουδή begins<sup>3</sup>. How far, we ask ourselves, are the suggestions of an idealistic attitude towards the problems of life seriously meant? Does the cloke of cynicism and buffoonery hide a sincere moralist? Or is it not rather the case that the mockery is the man, and the rest but a momentary

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Plut. *Q. Conv.* vii. 7. 710 C Πλάτων δὲ τὸν τ' Ἀριστοφάνους λόγον περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὡς κωμῶντων ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Zeller. (n. on 192 C ff. ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, κτλ.) "Diese Stelle, in welcher der ernsthafteste Grundgedanke unserer Stelle am Deutlichsten zu Tage kommt, gehört wohl zu dem Tiefsten, was von alten Schriftstellern über die Liebe gesagt ist."

<sup>3</sup> See Jevons, *Hist. of Gk. Lit.* pp. 258 ff. for some judicious criticisms of the view that "behind the grinning mask of comedy is the serious face of a great political teacher."

disguise? Certainly, the view maintained by Rettig that the chief purpose of Aristophanes is to impugn παιδεραστία, and to preach up legitimate matrimony as the only true form of love and the sole road to happiness, is a view that is wholly untenable. And while we may acknowledge with Horn (*Platonstud.* p. 261) that the speech of Aristophanes marks a great advance upon the previous λόγοι, in so far as it recognizes the difficulty of the problem presented by the phenomena of Eros and looks below the surface for a solution,—yet how far we are intended to ascribe this sagacity on the part of the speaker to superior reasoning power rather than to a lucky inspiration (θεία μοίρα) is by no means clear.

In connexion with this question as to the design of the speech there is one point which seems to have been generally overlooked by the expositors,—the topical character, as we might term it, of its main substance. This appears, obviously enough, in the jesting reference (193 B) to the love-affairs of Pausanias and Agathon; and obvious enough too are the allusions to Eryximachus and his much-vaunted “art” in the mention made, both at the beginning (189 D) and at the end (193 D) of the healing power of Love, the good “physician.” But in addition to these topical allusions which *sautent αυα γευα*, we are justified, I think, in regarding the great bulk of the discourse as being neither more nor less than a caricature of the physiological opinions held and taught by the medical profession of the day. The Hippocratean tract *περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου* is sufficient evidence that there raged in medical circles a controversy concerning the unity or multiplicity of man’s nature: the author of the tract was himself an anti-unity man and assailed with equal vigour the views of all opponents, whether the unity they stood for was αἷμα or χολή or φλέγμα—*ἐν γάρ τι εἶναι φασιν, ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτέων βούλεται ὀνόμασας, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἔδν μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ἰδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν.* To this controversy Aristophanes, we may suppose, alludes when he speaks of man’s ἀρχαία φύσις, which was a unity until by the machinations of Zeus it became a duality. But with this theory of primeval unity of nature the poet combines a theory of sex-characteristics. And, here again, even more definitely, we can discover traces of allusion to current physiological doctrines. Aristophanes derives the different varieties of sex-characters from the bisection of the three primitive ὄλα, *viz.* φίλανδροι women and φιλογύναικες men from the ἀνδρόγυνον, φιλογύναικες women (ἑταιρίστριαι) from the original θῆλυ, and φίλανδροι men from the original ἄρρεν. Thus we see that Aristophanes analyses

existing sex-characters, classifies them under two heads for each sex, and explains them by reference to a three-fold original. If we turn now to Hippocrates *περὶ διαίτης* (cc. 28 f.) we find there also a theory of "the evolution of sex." Premising that the female principle is akin to water and the male to fire, the writer proceeds thus: "If the bodies secreted by both parents are male (*ἄρσενα*)...they become men (*ἄνδρες*) brilliant in soul and strong in body, unless damaged by after regiment (*i.e.* by lack of *ξηρῶν καὶ θερμῶν σίτων*, etc.). If, however, the body secreted by the male parent is male and that by the female female, and the male element proves the stronger...then men are produced, less brilliant (*λαμπροί*), indeed, than the preceding class, yet justly deserving of the name of 'manly' (*ἀνδρείοι*). And again, if the male parent secretes a female body and the female a male body, and the latter proves the stronger, the male element deteriorates and the men so produced are 'effeminate' (*ἀνδρόγυνοι*). Similarly with the generation of women. When both parents alike secrete female elements, the most feminine and comely women (*θηλυκώτατα καὶ εὐφύεστατα*) are produced. If the woman secretes a female, the man a male body, and the former proves the stronger, the women so produced are bolder (*θρασύτεραι*) but modest (*κόσμαι*). While if, lastly, the female element prevails, when the female element comes from the male parent and the male element from the female, then the women so produced are more audacious (*τολμηρότεραι*) than the last class and are termed 'masculine' (*ἀνδρείαι*)."

Here we find the sex-characters arranged under three heads for each sex, and explained by reference to four originals, two from each parent. Obviously, this theory is more complicated than the one which Aristophanes puts forward, but in its main lines it is very similar. According to both the best class of men is derived from a dual male element, and the best class of women from a dual female element (although the poet is less complimentary than the physician in his description of this class). The similarity between the two is less close in regard to the intermediate classes; for while Aristophanes derives from his *ἀνδρόγυνον* but one inferior class of men and one of women, Hippocrates derives from various combinations of his mixed (*θῆλυ + ἄρσεν*) secretions two inferior classes of both sexes. Yet here, too, under the difference lies a consentience in principle, since both theorists derive all their inferior sex-characters from a mixed type.

We may imagine, then, that Aristophanes, having before his mind some such physiological theory as this, proceeded to adapt it to his purpose somehow as follows. Suppose we take the male element latent,

as the Hippocrateans tell us, in each sex, combine them, and magnify them into a concrete personality, the result will be a Double-man. A similar imaginative treatment of the female elements will yield us a Double-wife. While, if—discarding the perplexing minutiae of the physiological combinations assumed by the doctors—we take a female element from one parent and blend it with a male element from the other, and magnify it according to our receipt, we shall thereby arrive at the Man-wife as our third primeval personality. Such a treatment of a serious scientific theory would have all the effect of a caricature; and it is natural to suppose that in choosing to treat the matter in this way Aristophanes intended to satirize the theories of generation and of sex-evolution which were argued so solemnly and so elaborately by the confrères of Eryximachus.

If in this regard the topical character of the speech be granted, one can discern an added point in the short preliminary conversation between Aristophanes and Eryximachus by which it is prefaced. The latter gives a warning (189 A—B) that he will be on the watch for any ludicrous statement that may be made; to which the former replies: "I am not afraid lest I should say what is ludicrous (*γελοῖα*) but rather what is absurd (*καταγέλαστα*)." In view of what follows, we may construe this to mean that Aristophanes regards as *καταγέλαστα* theories such as those of Eryximachus and his fellow-Asclepiads. Moreover, this view of the relation in which Aristophanes' speech stands to the treatises of the medical doctrinaires—of whom Eryximachus is a type—helps to throw light on the relative position of the speeches, and on the incident by which that position is secured and emphasized. For unless we can discover some leading line of connexion between the two which necessitates the priority of the medico's exposition, the motive for the alteration in the order of the speeches must remain obscure.

It may be added that the allusions in 189 E (see notes *ad loc.*) to the evolutionary theories of Empedocles confirm the supposition that Aristophanes is directly aiming the shafts of his wit at current medical doctrines; the more so as Empedocles shares with Hippocrates the view that the male element is hot, the female cold, and that the offspring is produced by a combination of elements derived from both parents. Other references to Empedocles may be discerned in the mention of Hephaestus (192 D) who, as personified Fire, is one of Empedocles' "four roots," and in the mention of Zeus (190 C), another of the "roots"; and the fact that these two deities play opposite



parts, the one as bisector, the other as unifier, is in accordance with Empedoclean doctrine. Also the statement that the moon "partakes of both sun and earth" (190 B) is, in part at least, Empedoclean.

In point of *style and diction*, the speech of Aristophanes stands out as an admirable piece of simple Attic prose, free at once from the awkwardness and monotony which render the speeches of Phaedrus and Eryximachus tedious and from the over-elaboration and artificial ornamentation which mar the discourses of Pausanias and Agathon. In spite of occasional poetic colouring—as, *e.g.*, in the finely-painted scene between Hephaestus and the lovers (192 c ff.)—the speech as a whole remains on the level of pure, easy-flowing, rhythmical prose, in which lucidity is combined with variety and vivacity of expression.

5. *Agathon*, the tragic poet, if born in 448 B.C., would be a little over thirty at the date of the Symposium (416). He was the *παιδικά* of Pausanias (193 B), and a man of remarkable beauty as well as of reputed effeminacy<sup>1</sup>. He appears in the dialogue as not only a person of wealth, position and popularity, but a man of refinement, education and social tact. The banquet itself is given by him to a select company of his friends in honour of his recent victory in the tragic contest, and throughout the dialogue he is, formally at least, the central figure—both as host and as victor, and, what is more, as the embodiment of external *κάλλος* alike in his person (*εἶδος*) and in his speech (*λόγοι*). His graceful politeness to his guests never varies, even when Socrates sharply criticises his oration, or when Alcibiades transfers the wreath from his head to that of Socrates (213 E); he himself shares in the admiration for Socrates, welcomes him most warmly and displays the

<sup>1</sup> Ar. *Theam.* 191-2 σὺ δ' εὐπρόσωπος, λευκός, ἐξυρημένος,  
 γυναικόφωτος, ἀπαλός, εὐπρεπῆς ἰδεῖν.  
 id. 200 ff. καὶ μὴν σύ γ', ὦ κατάπυγον, εὐρύπρωκτος εἶ  
 οὐ τοῖς λόγοισιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν, κτλ

And Mnesilochus' comments on Agathon's speech and womanish appearance in 130 ff.

ὡς ἦδὲ τὸ μέλος, ὦ πότνια Γενετυλλίδες,  
 καὶ θηλυδριώδες καὶ κατεγλωττισμένον, κτλ.

In estimating the value of Aristophanes' abuse of his contemporary—in the case of Agathon as in the case of Euripides—we must make due allowance for Ar.'s comic style. As Jevons well observes (*Hist. of Gk. Lit.* p. 274): "In polemics, as in other things, the standard of decency is a shifting one. Terms which one age would hesitate to apply to the most abandoned villain are in another century of such frequent use as practically to be meaningless.... The charges of immorality which Ar. brings against Eur. and his plays are simply Ar.'s way of saying that on various points he totally disagrees with Eur." Probably the same holds good of his treatment of Agathon.

utmost jubilation when Socrates promises to eulogize him (223 A). Finally, his consideration is shown in the social *καρτερία* with which he sticks to his post, drinking and talking, till all his guests, except Socrates, have either left or succumbed to drowsiness (223 D).

In his *speech* Agathon claims that he will improve on the *method* of his predecessors. In his attention to method he is probably taking a leaf out of the book of Gorgias, his rhetorical master and model. Besides the initial distinction between the nature and effects of Eros, another mark of formal method is his practice of recapitulation: at the close of each section of his discourse he summarises the results<sup>1</sup>. In his portrait of the nature of Eros—his youth, beauty, suppleness of form and delicacy of complexion—Agathon does little more than formulate the conventional traits of the god as depicted in poetry and art. His attempts to deduce these attributes are mere *παιδιά* (197 E), pieces of sophistical word-play. Somewhat deeper goes his explanation of the working of Eros upon the soul, as well as the body; but the thought that Eros aims at the beautiful (197 B) is his most fruitful deliverance and the only one which Socrates, later on, takes up and developes<sup>2</sup>.

We may observe, further, how Agathon, like Phaedrus, indulges in mythological references, and how—like most of his predecessors (cp. 180 D, 185 E)—he makes a point of criticising and correcting the views of others (194 E, 195 B). Cp. Isocr. *Busir.* 222 B, 230 A.

In *style and diction* the speech of Agathon gives abundant evidence of the influence of the school of Gorgias, especially in the preface (194 E—195 A) and in the 2nd part (197 C—E). Thus we find repeated instances of:—

<sup>1</sup> See 195 E, 196 C, D, 197 C; and cp. Gorg. *Hel.* (e.g.) 15 *καὶ ὅτι μὲν...οὐκ ἠδίκησεν ἀλλ' ἠτύχησεν, εἰρηται· τὴν δὲ τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῷ τετάρτῳ λόγῳ διέξεμι.* Cp. Blass, *att. Bered.* p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> Jowett is somewhat flattering when he writes (*Plato* i. p. 531): "The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain (*sc.* than Aristophanes'), and receives the real if half-ironical approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities....The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus (239 A, B) in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs....The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to 'sunlit heights'." One suspects that "the approval of Socrates" is more ironical than real. Agathon's speech belongs to the class condemned by Alcidas, *de Soph.* 12 *οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεργασμένοι καὶ μᾶλλον ποιήμασιν ἢ λόγοις εὐκότες*: cp. *ib.* 14 *ἀνάγκη...τὰ μὲν ὑποκρίσει καὶ βαψυδία παραπλήσια δοκεῖν εἶναι.*

*Short parallel Kola*<sup>1</sup> with homoeoteleuton: e.g. 194 E ε|γὼ δὲ δὴ | βούλομαι | πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν | ὡς χρῆ με εἰπεῖν | ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν: 197 D ἀλλοτριότητος μὲν κενοῖ, οἰκειότητος δὲ πληροῖ.

*Homoeoteleuton and assonance*: e.g. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὧν ὁ θεὸς αἰτοῖς αἴτιος (194 E); τρόπος ὀρθὸς παντός...περὶ παντός...οἶος <ῶν> οἶων αἴτιος ῶν (195 A); πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων οὔτων (195 A).

These rhetorical artifices are especially pronounced in the concluding section, as is indicated by the sarcastic comment of Socrates (198 B τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆς, κτλ.); in fact, the whole of this section is, as Hug puts it, a "förmliche Monodie." Another feature of A.'s style is his fondness for quotation, especially from the poets (196 C, E, 196 A, 197 B), and his tendency to break into verse himself—*ἐπέρχεται δὲ μοί τι καὶ ἕμμετρον εἰπεῖν* (197 C). He has no clear idea of the limits of a prose style, as distinguished from verse; and the verses he produces are marked by the same Gorgianic features of assonance and alliteration. In fine, we can hardly describe the general impression made on us by the style of Agathon better than by adapting the Pauline phrase—"Though he speak with the tongues of men and of angels, he is become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal<sup>2</sup>."

#### § iv. SOCRATES AND DIOTIMA.

To *Socrates* it falls to deliver the last of the encomia on Eros. This is no mere accident, but artistically contrived in order to indicate the relative importance of his encomium as the climax of the series. In form and content, as well as in extent, it holds the highest place, although to its speaker is assigned the *ἐσχάτη κλίνη*.

(A) *The substance and form of Socrates' λόγοι.*

(a) The encomium proper is preceded by a *preliminary dialectical discussion with Agathon*, the object of which is to clear the ground of some popular misconceptions of the nature of Eros. The notion of Eros, it is shown, is equivalent to that of Desire (*ἔρως* = τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν)

<sup>1</sup> Distinguish this from the more Isocratean style of the speech of Pausanias with its more developed *ισα* and *εὐρυθμία* of periods. Cp. Aristoph. *frag.* 800 καὶ κατ' Ἀγάθων ἀντίθετον ἐξυρημένον, "shaved Agathon's shorn antithesis."

<sup>2</sup> Horn summarises thus (*Platonstud.* p. 264): "Die ganze Rede mit ihrem anspruchsvollen Eingang, ihrem nichtigen Inhalt, ihren wol klingenden Phrasen und Sophismen und insbesondere mit dem grossen Schlussfeuerwerke von Antithesen und Assonanzen ist demnach nichts anderes als ein mit grosser Geschicklichkeit entworfenes Musterstück der...gorgianisch-sophistischen Rhetorik." See also the rhythmic analysis (of 195 D ff.) worked out by Blass, *Rhythmien*, pp. 76 ff.

—a quality, not a person. And the object of this Desire is the beautiful (τὸ καλόν), as had been asserted by Agathon (201 A—B). That Socrates refuses to embark on an eulogistic description of Eros without this preliminary analysis of the meaning of the name serves, at the start, to differentiate his treatment of the theme from that of all the preceding speakers: it is, in fact, an object-lesson in method, an assertion of the Platonic principle that dialectic must form the basis of rhetoric, and that argument founded on untested assumptions is valueless.

(b) *The speech proper* begins with a mythological derivation of Eros, in which his conflicting attributes as a δαίμων—a being midway between gods and men—are accounted for by his parentage. Eros is at once poor, with the poverty of Desire which lacks its object, and rich, with the vigour with which Desire strives after its object. And in all its features the Eros of Socrates and Diotima stands in marked contrast to the Eros of conventional poetry and art, the divine Eros of Agathon.

Eros is defined as Desire and as Daemon; and, in the next place, its potency<sup>1</sup> is shown to lie in the striving after the everlasting possession of happiness. But Eros implies also propagation in the sphere of beauty. It is the impulse towards immortality—the impulse displayed alike by animals and by men, the ground of parental love towards both physical and mental (φιλοτιμία) offspring.

But when we arrive at this point, the question suggests itself as to how, more precisely, these different determinations of Eros are related to one another. What is the link between Eros defined as “the desire for the abiding possession of the good” and Eros defined as “the desire for procreation in the beautiful”? The former conception involves a desire for abiding existence, in other words for immortality, inasmuch as the existence of the possessor is a necessary condition of possession; while the latter also involves a similar desire, inasmuch as procreation is the one means by which racial immortality can be secured. Thus the link between the two conceptions of Eros is to be found in the implicit notion common to both that Eros is the striving after immortality or self-perpetuation. But there is another point to be borne in mind in order to grasp clearly the connexion of the argument. The beautiful includes the good (τὰγαθὰ καλὰ 201 c); so that the desire for the good is already, implicitly, a desire for the beautiful (and *vice versa*).

<sup>1</sup> I.e. its generic notion (εἶναι, τὸ κεφάλαιον 205 D) as distinguished from the specific limitation (καλεῖσθαι 205 c, 206 B) to sex-love. See W. Gilbert in *Philologus* LXXIII. 1, pp. 52 ff.

Thus the main results of the argument so far are these: Eros is the striving after the lasting possession of the Good, and thereby after immortality; but immortality can be secured only through procreation (*τόκος*), and the act of procreation requires as its condition the presence of Beauty. We are, therefore, led on to an examination of the nature of Beauty, and it is shown that beauty is manifested in a variety of forms, physical, moral and mental—beauty of body, of soul, of arts and sciences, culminating in the arch-science and the Idea of absolute Beauty. Accordingly the Erastes must proceed in upward course<sup>1</sup> from grade to grade of these various forms of beauty till he finally reaches the summit, the Idea. On the level of each grade, moreover, he is moved by the erotic impulse not merely to apprehend the *καλόν* presented and to appreciate it, but also to reproduce it in another: there are two moments in each such experience, that of “conception” (*κῆσις*) or inward apprehension, and that of “delivery” (*τόκος*) or outward reproduction.

The emphasis here laid on the notion of reproduction and delivery (*τίκτειν, γεννᾶν*), as applied to the intellectual sphere, deserves special notice. The work of the intelligence, according to the Socratic method, is not carried on in solitary silence but requires the presence of a second mind, an interlocutor, an answerer of questions. For the correct method of testing hypotheses and searching out truth is the conversational method, “dialectic,” in which mind cooperates with mind. The practical illustration of this is to be seen in Socrates himself, the pursuer of beautiful youths who delights in converse with them and, warmed by the stimulus of their beauty, *λόγους τοιούτους τίκτει οἷτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους* (210 c).

(c) As the conception of Eros as a striving after the Ideal pursued not in isolation but in spiritual fellowship (*κοινωνία*) constitutes the core of the Socratic exposition, so *the form of* that exposition is so contrived as to give appropriate expression to this central conception. It commences with a piece of dialectic—the conversation between Socrates and Agathon. Agathon is the embodiment of that *κάλλος* which here stimulates the *ἐραστής* in his search for truth: it is in Agathon’s soul (*ἐν καλῷ*) that Socrates deposits the fruits of his pregnant mind. In much, too, of the exposition of Diotima the semblance, at least, of intellectual *κοινωνία* is retained, illustrating the speaker’s principle of philosophic co-operation. Thus the speech as a whole may be regarded

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to observe how Emerson makes use of this Platonic “anabasis” when he writes:—“There is a climbing scale of culture...up to the ineffable mysteries of the intellect.”

simply as a Platonic dialogue in miniature, which differs from the average dialogue mainly in the fact that the chief speaker and guiding spirit is not Socrates but another, and that other a woman. If asked for a reason why Socrates here is not the questioner but the answerer, a sufficient motive may be found in the desire to represent him as a man of social tact. Socrates begins by exposing the ignorance of Agathon: next he makes the amend honourable by explaining that he had formerly shared that ignorance, until instructed by Diotima<sup>1</sup>.

(B) *Diotima and her philosophy.*

(1) *Diotima.* Diotima is a fictitious personage. Plato, no doubt purposely, avoids putting his exposition of Eros into the mouth of any historical person: to do so would be to imply that the theory conveyed is not original but derived. It is only for purposes of literary art that Diotima here supplants the Platonic Socrates: she is presented, by a fiction, as his instructor, whereas in fact she merely gives utterance to his own thoughts. These thoughts, however, and this theory are, by means of this fiction, represented as partaking of the nature of divine revelation; since in Diotima of Mantinea we find a combination of two significant names. The description *γυνή Μαντινική* inevitably implies the "mantic" art, which deals with the converse between men and gods of which τὸ δαιμόνιον, and therefore the Eros-dæmon, is the mediating agent (202 E); while the name *Διοτίμα*, "She that has honour from Zeus," suggests the possession of highest wisdom and authority. This is made clear by the rôle assigned to Zeus and his servants in the *Phaedrus*: ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Zeus... πρῶτος πορεύεται, κτλ. (246 E); οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ... πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται, κτλ. (252 E ff.). The characteristics of Zeus, namely guiding power (*ἡγεμονία*) and wisdom (*σοφία*), attach also to his *οπαδοί*: consistently with this Diotima is *σοφή* (201 D), and "hegemonic" as pointing out the *ὀρθή* ὁδός to her pupil, and guiding him along it in a masterful manner (210 A ff., 211 B ff.)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 527): "As at a banquet good manners would not allow him (Socr.) to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (cp. *Menex.* 236 fol.)."

<sup>2</sup> Gomperz's suggestion (*G. T.* II. p. 396) that "the chief object of this etherealized affection" which Plato had in mind when "in the teaching (of Diotima) he

In the person of Diotima, "the wise woman," Plato offers us—in Mr Stewart's phrase—"a study in the prophetic temperament"<sup>1</sup>; she represents, that is to say, the mystical element in Platonism, and her discourse is a blend of allegory, philosophy, and myth. As a whole it is philosophical: the allegory we find in the imaginative account of the parentage and nature of Eros, as son of Poros and Penia; the mythical element appears in the concluding portion, in so far as it "sets forth in impassioned imaginative language the Transcendental Idea of the Soul"<sup>2</sup>. And as in the allegory the setting is derived from current religious tradition, so in the myth the language is suggested by the enthusiastic cult of the Orphics. It may be well to examine somewhat more closely the doctrine of the prophetess on these various sides.

(2) *Diotima's allegory.* The first point to notice is the artistic motive for introducing an allegory. It is intended to balance at once the traditional derivations of the God Eros in the earlier speeches, and the grotesque myth of Aristophanes. Socrates can match his rivals in imagination and inventive fancy. It also serves the purpose of putting into a concrete picture those characteristic features of the love-impulse which are subsequently developed in an abstract form. And, thirdly, the concrete picture of Eros thus presented allows us to study more clearly the features in which Socrates, as described by Alcibiades, resembles Eros and embodies the ideal of the philosophic character.

In the allegory the qualities which characterise Eros are fancifully deduced from an origin which is related in the authoritative manner of an ancient theogony. The parents of Eros are Poros and Penia. Poros is clearly intended to be regarded as a God (203 Β οἱ θεοί, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ δ...Πόρος): he attends the celestial banquet and drinks nectar like the rest. The nature of Penia is less clearly stated: she cannot be a divine being according to the description of the divine nature as εὐδαίμων and possessing τὰγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ given in the context preceding (202 c ff.); and the list of the qualities which she hands down to her son Eros shows that she is in all respects the very antithesis of Poros. We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is the source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as δαίμων, combined with the definition of τὸ δαμόνιον as μεταξὺ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ (202 B), we are justified

gave utterance to his own deepest feeling and most intimate experience" was Dion of Syracuse would supply, if admitted, a further significance to the name Diotima.

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, p. 428.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. Stewart, *loc. cit.*

in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality, and in regarding ἡ Πενία as a personification of ἡ θνητὴ φύσις<sup>1</sup>. It is interesting here to notice that Penia had already been personified by Aristophanes in his *Plutus*, and personified as one member of an antithesis<sup>2</sup>.

In the description of Poros, the father of Eros, it is significant that he is stated to be the son of Μῆτις. The idea of Plenty (Πόρος) had already been personified by Alcman, whether or not the Scholiast *ad loc.* is correct in identifying that Poros with the Hesiodic Chaos. And the idea of Wisdom (Μῆτις) also had played a part, as a personified being, in the speculations of the theologians. For it seems, at least, probable that the Orphic theologians had already in Plato's time evolved the equation Phanes = Ericapæus = Metis<sup>3</sup>, and that here as elsewhere in the language of Diotima there lie allusions to the doctrines of that school of mystics.

Of the incidental details of the allegory, such as "the garden of Zeus" where the intercourse between Penia and Poros took place and the intoxication of Poros which led up to that intercourse, the Neoplatonic commentators, as is their wont, have much to say. But we may more discreetly follow Zeller and Stallbaum in regarding such details as merely put in for purposes of literary effect, to fill up and round off the story. Poros could never have fallen a victim to the charms of Penia, since she had none; nor could Penia ever have hoped to win over Poros by persuasion or force, he being endowed with the strength and wisdom of a god. Obviously, therefore, the god must be tricked and his senses blinded—as in the case of the sleeping Samson or of the intoxicated Lot—that the woman might work her will upon him. Nor need we look for any mystical significance in ὁ τοῦ Διὸς κήπος. The celestial banquet would naturally be held in the halls of the King of the gods; that a king's palace should have a park or garden attached is not extraordinary; nor is it more strange that one

<sup>1</sup> So Plotinus is not far astray when he equates *penia* with *ἐλη*, matter, potency (*Enn.* III. p. 299 r).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Plato's Πόρος (Πενία with Ar.'s Πλοῦτος) (Πενία: also the description of *penia* as intermediate between *πλοῦτος* and *πτωχεία* in *Plut.* 552 with the description of Eros as intermediate between *πόρος* and *penia* in *Symp.* 208 ε (ὅτε ἀπορεῖ "Ἔρως ὅτε πλουρεῖ). Cp. also *Plut.* 80 f. (Πλοῦτος... ἀχμῶν βαδίζεις) with *Symp.* 208 ο ("Ἔρως ἀχμηρός). The date of the *Plutus* is probably 388 B.C.

Such pairs of opposites were common in earlier speculation. Cp. Spenser, "Hymn in Honour of Love":—

"When thy great mother Venus first thee bare,  
Begot of Plentie and of Penurie."

<sup>3</sup> Plato's mention of a *single* parent of Poros is in accordance with the Orphic notion of Phanes-Metis as bisexed.



of the banqueters, when overcome with the potent wine of the gods, should seek retirement in a secluded corner of the garden to sleep off the effects of his revels.

More important than these details is the statement that the celestial banquet was held in celebration of the birth of Aphrodite, so that the begetting of Eros synchronized with the birthday of that goddess. The narrative itself explains the reason of this synchronism: it is intended to account for the fact that Eros is the "attendant and minister" of Aphrodite. Plotinus identifies Aphrodite with "the soul," or more definitely with "the soul of Zeus" (Zeus himself being  $\delta\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ), but it seems clear from Plato's language that she is rather the personification of beauty (*Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὐσίας* 203 c).

As regards the list of opposite qualities which Eros derives from his parents, given in 203 c—E, there are two points which should be especially observed. In the first place, all these qualities, as so derived, are to be regarded not as merely accidental but inborn (*φύσει*) and forming part of the essential nature of Eros. And secondly, each of these characteristics of Eros, both on the side of his wealth and on the side of his poverty, has its counterpart—as will be shown presently<sup>1</sup>—in the characteristics of Socrates, the historical embodiment of Eros.

Lastly, we should notice the emphasis laid on the fluctuating character of Eros, whose existence is a continual ebb and flow, from plenitude to vacuity, from birth to death. By this is symbolised the experience of the *φιλόκαλος* and the *φιλόσοφος*, who by a law of their nature are incapable of remaining satisfied for long with the temporal objects of their desire and are moved by a divine discontent to seek continually for new sources of gratification. This law of love, by which  $\tau\omicron\ \text{ποριζόμενον αἰεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ}$ , is parallel to the law of mortal existence by which  $\tau\alpha\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ (\alphaἰεὶ)\ \gammaίγνεται$ ,  $\tau\alpha\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \alphaπόλλυται$  (207 D ff.)—a law which controls not merely the physical life but also the mental life (*ἐπιθυμίαι, ἐπιστήμαι*, etc.)<sup>2</sup>. Accordingly, the Eros-dæmon is neither mortal nor immortal in nature (*πέφυκεν* 203 E), neither wise nor foolish, but a combination of these opposites—*σοφὸς-ἀμαθῆς* and *θνητὸς-ἀθάνατος*—and it is in virtue of this combination that the most characteristic title of Eros is *φιλόσοφος* (which implies also *φιλ-αθανασία*).

(3) *Diotima's Philosophy.* The philosophic interest of the

<sup>1</sup> See § vi. 3.

<sup>2</sup> For an expansion in English of this thought see Spenser's "Two Cantos of Mutabilitie" (F. Q. vii.).

remainder of Diotima's discourse (from 204 A to its end) lies mainly in the relations it affirms to exist between Eros and certain leading concepts, *viz.* the Good, Beauty and Immortality.

(a) *The Problem of Immortality.* Enough has been said already as to the determination of these various concepts as expounded in the earlier part of the discourse (up to 209 E). But the concluding section, in which "*the final mysteries*" (τὰ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά) are set forth, calls for further investigation. We have already learnt that Eros is "the desire for procreation in the sphere of the beautiful with a view to achieving immortality"; and we have found also that, so far, all the efforts of Eros to achieve this end have been crowned with very imperfect success. Neither by way of the body, nor by way of the mind, can "the mortal nature" succeed, through procreation, in attaining anything better than a posthumous permanence and an immortality by proxy. We have to enquire, therefore, whether any better result can be reached when Eros pursues the ὀρθὴ ὁδὸς under the guidance of the inspired παιδαγωγός. The process that goes on during this educational progress is similar in the main to what has been already described. *Beauty* is discovered under various forms, and the vision of beauty leads to *procreation*; and procreation is followed by a search for fresh beauty. But there are two new points to observe in the description of the process. First, the systematic method and regularity of procedure, by which it advances from the more material to the less material objects in graduated ascent. And secondly, the part played throughout this progress by the activity of the *intellect* (νοῦς), which discerns the one in the many and performs acts of identification (210 B) and generalisation (210 C). Thus, the whole process is, in a word, a system of intellectual training in the art of dialectic, in so far as it concerns τὸ καλόν. And the end to which it leads is the vision of and converse with Ideal Beauty, followed by the procreation of veritable virtue. It is to be observed that this is expressly stated to be not only the final stage in the progress of Eros but the most perfect state attainable on earth by man (τὸ τέλος 211 B, ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ 211 D, τεκόντι...ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι 212 A). But the question remains, does the attainment of this state convey also personal immortality? It must be granted that this question is answered by Plato, as Horn points out, somewhat ambiguously, "To the man who beholds the Beautiful and thereby is delivered of true ἀρετή it is given to become θεοφιλής and to become ἀθάνατος—to him εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων": but in this last *if*-clause there still lies

a possible ground for doubt<sup>1</sup>. We cannot gain full assurance on the point from this sentence taken by itself; we must supplement it either by other indications derived from other parts of Diotima's argument, or by statements made by Plato outside the *Symposium*. Now it may be taken as certain—from passages in the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*—that personal immortality was a doctrine held and taught by Plato. It is natural, therefore, to expect that this doctrine will be also taught in the *Symposium*; or, at least, that the teaching of the *Symposium* will not contravene this doctrine. And this is, I believe, the case, in spite of a certain oracular obscurity which veils the clearness of the teaching. When we recal the statement that the generic Eros, as inherent in the individual, aims at the "everlasting possession" of the good as its τέλος, and when we are told that the ἐρωτικός-φιλόσοφος at the end of his progress arrives at the "possession" (κτηῖμα) of that specific form of Good which is Beauty, and finds in it his τέλος, and when emphasis is laid on the everlastingness (ἀεί ὄν) of that possession, then it is reasonable to suppose that the ἀθανασία of the ἐρωτικός who has reached this goal and achieved this possession is implied. It is to be noticed, further, that the phrase here used is no longer μετέχει τοῦ ἀθανάτου nor ἀθανατώτερός ἐστι but ἀθάνατος ἐγένετο. Nor does the language of the clause εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ necessarily convey any real doubt: "he, if any man" may be simply an equivalent for "he above all," "he most certainly<sup>2</sup>." The point of this saving clause may rather be this. The complete philosopher achieves his vision of eternal Beauty by means of νοῦς (or αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχῇ), as the proper organ φ' ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν (212 A): it is in virtue of the possession of that immortal object that he himself is immortalised: and accordingly immortality accrues to him not *qua* ἄνθρωπος so much as *qua* νοητικός or λογικός. In other words, while in so far as he is an ἄνθρωπος, a ζῶον, a ὄλον compounded of two diverse

<sup>1</sup> See F. Horn, *Platonstud.* pp. 276 ff. Horn also criticises the phrase ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι: "die Unsterblichkeit im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes...kann nicht erworben werden. Der Mensch kann nur unsterblich sein oder es nicht sein, er kann aber nicht unsterblich werden." But what Plato means by ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι is to regain the life of the soul in its divine purity—the result of right education, as a κάθαρσις or μελέτη θανάτου. See J. Adam, *R. T. G.* pp. 333 ff.

It seems quite certain that Plato—whether or not in earnest with his various attempts to prove it—did believe in personal immortality, and would assent to the dictum of Sir Thos. Browne, "There is surely a piece of divinity in us, something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun."

<sup>2</sup> See my note *ad loc.* It is to be noticed that similar expressions are used in a similar context in *Phaedr.* 253 A (ἐφαπτόμενοι (θεοῦ)...καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν): *Tim.* 90 B, C. Cp. θεῖος ὢν 209 B, θεῖον καλόν 211 E, θεοφιλεῖ 212 A. That the Idea (τάγαθόν) is οἰκεῖον to the Soul seems implied by 205 E.

elements body and soul, the philosopher is not entirely *ἀθάνατος* but still subject to the sway of sad mortality, yet in so far as he is a philosopher, a purely rational soul, grasping eternal objects, he is immortal. If we choose to press the meaning of the clauses in question, such would seem to be their most probable significance<sup>1</sup>.

Another criticism of this passage suggested by Horn is this. If it be true that the philosopher, or *ἐπωρικός*, does at this final stage attain to immortality, this does not involve the truth of the doctrine of immortality in general, but rather implies that men as such are not immortal and that immortality is the exceptional endowment of a few. Here again we must recal the distinction between *ἄνθρωπος* and pure *ψυχή* and *νοῦς*. The soul as immortal is concerned with the objects of immortal life<sup>2</sup>. In so far as it has drunk of the waters of Lethe and forgotten those objects, in so far as it is engrossed in the world of sense, it has practically lost its hold on immortality, and no longer possesses any guarantee of its own permanence. Although it may remain, in a latent way, in age-long identity, it cannot be self-consciously immortal when divorced from a perception of the eternally self-identical objects. If we may assume that Plato looked at the question from this point of view it becomes intelligible that he might refuse to predicate immortality of a soul that seems so entirely "of the earth, earthy" that the noëtic element in it remains wholly in abeyance.

All that has been said, however, does not alter the fact that individual and personal immortality, in our ordinary sense, is nowhere directly proved nor even expressly stated in a clear and definite way in the *Symposium*. All that is clearly shown is the fact of posthumous survival and influence. That Plato regarded this *athanasia* of personal *δύναμις* as an *athanasia* of personal *οὐσία*, and identified "Fortwirken" with "Fortleben," has been suggested by Horn, as an explanation of the "ganz neue Begriff der Unsterblichkeit" which, as he contends, is propounded in this dialogue. But it is certainly a rash proceeding to

<sup>1</sup> For this notion of immortality by "communion" or "participation" in the divine life as Platonic, see the passages cited in the last note, also *Theæt.* 176 A. Cp. also the Orphic idea of the mystic as *εὐθεός*, "God-possessed." This idea of supersession of personality by divinity ("not I but Christ that dwelleth in me") is a regular feature of all mystic religion.

<sup>2</sup> In other words, *ἀθανασία* may be used not simply of quantity but of quality of existence. This is probably the case in 212 A: "immortality" is rather "eternal life" than "everlastingness," as connoting "heavenliness" or the kind of life that is proper to divinities. So, as the "spark divine" in man is the *νοῦς*, *ἀθανασία* is practically equivalent to pure *νόησις*. On the other hand, in the earlier parts of the discourse the word denotes only duration (*ἀθάνατος εἶναι* = *δει εἶναι*).

go thus to the *Sophist*—an evidently late dialogue—for an elucidation of the problem. A sufficient elucidation, as has been suggested, lies much nearer to hand, in the doctrine of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. It is merely perverse to attempt to isolate the doctrine of the *Symposium* from that of its natural fellows, or to assume that the teaching of Diotima is intended to be a complete exposition of the subject of immortality. "Plato," we do well to remember, "is not bound to say all he knows in every dialogue"; and if, in the *Symposium*, he treats the subject from the point of view of the facts and possibilities of our earthly life, this must not be taken to imply that he has forgotten or surrendered the other point of view in which the soul is naturally immortal and possesses pre-existence as well as after-existence.

(b) *The Problem of Beauty*. A further point of interest in the latter section of this discourse is the different value attached to τὸ καλόν in the highest grade of love's progress as compared with the lower grades. In the latter it appeared as merely a means to τόκος and thereby to ἀθανασία; whereas in the former it seems to constitute in itself the final end. Horn, who notices this apparent reversal of the relations between these two concepts, explains it as due to the fact that in the highest grade Eros is supplanted by Dialectic, or "the philosophic impulse," which alone gives cognition of the Idea. But if this be so, how are we to account for the use of the term τεκόντι in the concluding sentence, where the attainment of ἀθανασία is described as having for its pre-condition not merely τὸ ὄρᾶν but τὸ τεκείν; This is precisely parallel to the language elsewhere used of the action of Eros in the lower grades, and precludes the supposition that Eros ceases to be operant on the highest grade. The truth is rather that, in this final stage, the Eros that is operant is the Eros of pure νοῦς—enthusiastic and prolific intellection, "the passion of the reason." And the fact that τὸ καλόν in this stage is no longer subordinated to ἀθανασία as means to end of desire is to be explained by the fact that this ultimate κάλλος being Ideal is ἀθάνατον in itself, so that he who gains it thereby gains ἀθανασία.

That there are difficulties and obscurities of detail in this exposition of the concepts we have been considering may be freely admitted. But the line of doctrine, in its general trend, is clear enough, and quite in harmony with the main features of Platonic doctrine as expounded in other dialogues of the same (middle) period. Nor must the interpreter of the dialogue lose sight of the fact that he is dealing here not with the precise phrases of a professor of formal logic but with the

inspired utterances of a prophetess, not with the dialectic of a *Parmenides* but with the hierophantic dogmata of the *Symposium*.

(c) *Eros as Philosophy*. The fact that Socrates himself is evidently presented in the dialogue as at once the exemplar of Philosophy and the living embodiment of Eros might be sufficient to indicate that the most essential result of the Socratic discussion of Eros is to show its ultimate identity with "the philosophic impulse." Since, however, this identification has been sometimes denied, it may be well to indicate more particularly how far this leading idea as to the nature of Eros influences the whole trend of the discussion. We notice, to begin with, the stress laid on the midway condition of Eros, as son of Poros and Penia, between wisdom and ignorance, in virtue of which he is essentially a philosopher (*φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητῆς... φιλοσοφεί* 203 D ff.). We notice next how the children of the soul (*λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῆς*) are pronounced superior in beauty to the children of the body (209 c), and *σοφία*, we know, is one form of *ἀρετή*. Then, in the concluding section (210 A ff.) we find it expressly stated that *κάλλος* attaches to *ἐπιστήμαι* (210 c), and that *φιλοσοφία* itself is the sphere in which the production of *καλοὶ λόγοι* is occasioned by the sight of *τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ*. Thus it is clearly implied throughout the discussion that *σοφία*, as the highest division of *ἀρετή* (being the specific *ἀρετή* of *νοῦς*), is the highest and most essential form of *τὸ ἀγαθόν* for man; whence it follows that, if Eros be defined as "the craving for the good," this implies in the first place the "craving for *σοφία*," which is but another way of stating "the philosophic impulse," or in a word *φιλοσοφία*.

It must not be supposed, however, that in virtue of this identification the love-impulse (Eros) is narrowed and devitalised. For *φιλοσοφία* is not merely a matter of book-study, it is also a method of life and a system of education. In reaching the ultimate goal, which is the union of the finite with the infinite in the comprehension of the Idea, the man who is driven by the spirit of Eros passes through all the possible grades of experience in which Beauty plays a part; and from social and intellectual intercourse and study of every kind he enriches his soul. He does not begin and end with what is abstract and spiritual—with pure intellection; nor does he begin and end with the lust after sensual beauty: like the Eros-daemon who is his genius, the true Erastes is *οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε θεός*, and his life is an anabasis from the concrete and the particular beauties of sense to the larger and more spiritual beauties of the mind.

Thus in its actual manifestation in life the Eros-impulse is far-

reaching. And, as already noticed, it is essentially propagative. The philosopher is not only a student, he is also, by the necessity of his nature, a teacher. This is a point of much importance in the eyes of Plato, the Head of the Academy: philosophy must be cultivated in a *school* of philosophy.

The significance of Eros, as thus conceived, has been finely expressed by Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 532): "(Diotima) has taught him (Socr.) that love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of divine loves under the figure of human (cp. Eph. v. 32); as the mediæval saint might speak of the 'fruitio Dei'; as Dante saw all things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge. Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ. The first tumult of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature 'moving about in worlds not realised,' which no art could satisfy. To most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and fact. The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme of the Symposium of Plato<sup>1</sup>."

(d) *Eros as Religion.* We thus see how to "the prophetic temperament" passion becomes blended with reason, and cognition with emotion. We have seen also how this passion of the intellect is regarded as essentially expansive and propagative. We have next to notice more particularly the point already suggested in the words quoted from Jowett—how, namely, this blend of passion and reason is accompanied by the further quality of religious emotion and awe. We are already prepared for finding our theme pass definitely into the atmosphere of religion not only by the fact that the instructress is herself a religious person bearing a significant name, but also by the semi-divine origin and by the mediatorial rôle ascribed to Eros. When we come, then, to "the greater mysteries" we find the passion of the

<sup>1</sup> See also J. Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 396 f.

intellect passing into a still higher feeling of the kind described by the Psalmist as "thirst for God." This change of atmosphere results from the new vision of the goal of Eros, no longer identified with any earthly object but with the celestial and divine Idea (*αὐτοκαλόν*). Thus the pursuit of beauty becomes in the truest sense a religious exercise, the efforts spent on beauty become genuine devotions, and the honours paid to beauty veritable oblations. By thus carrying up with her to the highest region of spiritual emotion both erotic passion and intellectual aspiration, Diotima justifies her character as a prophetess of the most high Zeus; while at the same time we find, in this theological passage of the Socratic *λόγοι*, the doctrine necessary at once to balance and to correct the passages in the previous *λόγοι* which had magnified Eros as an object of religious worship, a great and beneficent deity.

This side of Diotima's philosophising, which brings into full light what we may call as we please either the erotic aspect of religion or the religious aspect of Eros, might be illustrated abundantly both from the writers of romantic love-poetry and from the religious mystics. To a few such illustrations from obvious English sources I here confine myself. Sir Thos. Browne is platonizing when he writes (*Rel. Med.*) "All that is truly amiable is of God, or as it were a divided piece of him that retains a reflex or shadow of himself." Very similar is the thought expressed by Emerson in the words, "Into every beautiful object there enters something immeasurable and divine"; and again, "all high beauty has a moral element in it." Emerson, too, supplies us with a description that might fitly be applied to the Socratic *λόγοι* of the *Symposium*, and indeed to Plato generally in his prophetic moods, when he defines "what is best in literature" to be "the affirming, prophesying, spermatic words of man-making poets." To Sir Thos. Browne we may turn again, if we desire an illustration of that mental phase, so vividly portrayed by Diotima, in which enjoyment of the things eternal is mingled with contempt for things temporal. "If any have been so happy"—so runs the twice-repeated sentence—"as truly to understand Christian annihilation, ecstasies, exolution, liquefaction, transformation, the kiss of the spouse, gustation of God, and ingression into the divine shadow, they have already had an handsome anticipation of heaven; the glory of the world is surely over, and the earth in ashes with them" (*Hydriotaphia, ad fin.*). A similar phase of feeling is eloquently voiced by Spenser more than once in his "Hymns." Read, for instance, the concluding stanzas of the "Hymne



of Heavenly Love" which tell of the fruits of devotion to the "loving Lord":—

- "Then shalt thou feele thy spirit so possesst,  
 And raviht with devouring great desire  
 Of his deare self...  
 That in no earthly thing thou shalt delight,  
 But in his sweet and amiable sight.
- "Thenceforth all worlds desire will in thee dye,  
 And all earthes glorie, on which men do gaze,  
 Seeme durt and drosse in thy pure-sighted eye,  
 Compar'd to that celestiall beauties blaze,...
- "Then shall thy raviht soule inspired bee  
 With heavenly thoughts farre above humane skil,  
 And thy bright radiant eyes shall plainly see  
 Th' Idee of his pure glorie present still  
 Before thy face, that all thy spirits shall fill  
 With sweete enragement of celestiall love,  
 Kindled through sight of those faire things above."

From Plato, too, Spenser borrows the idea of the soul's "anabasis" through lower grades of beauty to "the most faire, whereto they all do strive," which he celebrates in his "Hymne of Heavenly Beautie." A few lines of quotation must here suffice:

- "Beginning then below, with th' easie vew  
 Of this base world, subject to fleshly eye,  
 From thence to mount aloft, by order dew,  
 To contemplation of th' immortall sky....
- "Thence gathering plumes of perfect speculation,  
 To impe the wings of thy high flying mynd,  
 Mount up aloft through heavenly contemplation,  
 From this darke world, whose damps the soule do blynd,  
 And, like the native brood of Eagles kynd,  
 On that bright Sunne of Glorie fixe thine eyes,  
 Clear'd from grosse mists of fraile infirmities."

These few "modern instances" may be sufficient to indicate in brief how the doctrines of Plato, and of the *Symposium* in special, have permeated the mind of Europe.

The doctrine of love in its highest grades is delivered, as we have seen, by the prophetess in language savouring of "the mysteries," language appropriate to express a mystical revelation.

On the mind of a sympathetic reader, sensitive to literary *nuances*, Plato produces something of the effect of the mystic φέγγος by his τὸ πολὺ πῆλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ and his ἐξαιφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν κτλ. Such phrases stir and transport one as "in the Spirit on the Lord's day" to heavenly places "which eye hath not seen nor ear heard";

they awake in us emotions similar to those which the first reading of Homer evoked in Keats :

“Then felt I like some watcher of the skies  
When a new planet swims into his ken;  
Or like stout Cortes when with eagle eyes  
He stared at the Pacific...Silent, upon a peak in Darien.”

#### § V. ALCIBIADES AND HIS SPEECH.

*Alcibiades* was about 34 years old at this time (416 B.C.), and at the height of his reputation<sup>1</sup>. The most brilliant party-leader in Athens, he was a man of great intellectual ability and of remarkable personal beauty, of which he was not a little vain. It was, ostensibly at least, because of his beauty that Socrates posed as his “erastes”; while Alcibiades, on his side, attempted to inflame the supposed passion of Socrates and displayed jealousy whenever his “erastes” showed a tendency to woo the favour of rival beauties such as Agathon. Other indications of Alcibiades’ character and position which are given in the dialogue show him to us as a man of wealth, an important and popular figure in the smart society of his day, full of ambition for social and political distinction, and not a little influenced, even against his better judgment, by the force of public opinion and the *on dit* of his set. With extraordinary *naïveté* and frankness he exposes his own moral infirmity, and proves how applicable to his case is the confession of the Latin poet, “video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.” He is guiltless, as he says, of pudency, nor would ever have known the meaning of the word “shame” (*αἰσχύνη*) had it not been for Socrates.

Yet, totally lacking in virtue though he be, the Alcibiades of the *Symposium* is a delightful, even an attractive and lovable person. Although actually a very son of Belial, we feel that potentially he is little short of a hero and a saint. And that because he possesses the capacity for both understanding and loving Socrates; and to love Socrates is to love the Ideal. Nominally it is Socrates who is the lover of Alcibiades, but as the story develops we see that the converse is more near the truth: Alcibiades is possessed with a consuming passion, an intense and persistent infatuation for Socrates. And in

<sup>1</sup> “The character of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices which meets us in history, is drawn to the life” (Jowett, *Plato* i. p. 526).

the virtue of this "eros" we find something that more than outweighs his many vices: it acts as the charity that "covers a multitude of sins."

The *speech* of Alcibiades, in spite of its resemblance in tone to a satyric drama composed under the influence of the Wine-god, fulfils a serious purpose—the purpose of vindicating the memory of Socrates from slanderous aspersions and setting in the right light his relations with Alcibiades<sup>1</sup>. And as a means to this end, the general theme of the dialogue, Eros, is cleverly taken up and employed, as will be shown in a later section<sup>2</sup>.

In regard to *style and diction* the following points may be noticed. In the *disposition and arrangement* there is a certain amount of confusion and incoherence. Alcibiades starts with a double parable, but fails—as he confesses—to work out his comparisons with full precision and with logical exactitude. This failure is only in keeping with his rôle as a devotee of Dionysus.

*Frequency of similes*: 216 A ὡςπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σευρήνων: 217A τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος...πάθος: 218 B κεκοινωνήκατε...βακχείας.

*Elliptical expressions*: 215 A, C; 216 B, D, E; 220 C, D; 221 D; 222 B.

*Anacolutha*: 217E; 218 A.

#### § vi. THE ORDER AND CONNEXION OF THE SPEECHES.

Disregarding the introductory and concluding scenes and looking at the rest of the dialogue as a whole, we see that it falls most naturally into three main divisions, *three Acts* as we might call them. In the First Act are comprised all the first five discourses; the Second, and central, Act contains the whole of the deliverances of Socrates; the Third Act consists of Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates<sup>3</sup>. We have to consider, accordingly, how each of these Acts is related to the others; and further, in regard to the first, we have to investigate the relative significance of each of its five sub-divisions or scenes.

##### 1. *The first five speeches and their relative significance.*

Plato's own opinion of the earlier speeches appears clearly enough in the criticism which he puts in the mouth of Socrates (198 D ff.).

<sup>1</sup> See *Introd.* § ii. (A) *ad fin.*; and Gomperz, *G. T.* II. pp. 394 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See *Introd.* § vi. 3, where some details of the way in which Alcib. echoes the language of the earlier speakers will be found.

<sup>3</sup> Rettig and von Sybel make the First Act conclude with Arist.'s speech, and the Second Act begin with Agathon's: but that this is a perverse arrangement is well shown by F. Horn, *Platonst.* p. 254 (cp. Zeller, *Symp.*).

Although that criticism is aimed primarily at the discourse of Agathon, it obviously applies, in the main, to the whole series of which his discourse formed the climax. Instead of endeavouring to ascertain and state the truth about the object of their encomia—such is the gist of Socrates' criticism—the previous speakers had heaped up their praises regardless of their applicability to that object (198 E *ad init.*). What they considered was not facts but appearances (*ὅπως ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξα*); consequently they described both the nature of Eros and the effects of his activity in such terms as to make him *appear*—in the eyes of the unsophisticated—supremely good and beautiful, drawing upon every possible source (198 E—199 A).

It thus seems clear that Plato intends us to regard all the first five speeches as on the same level, in so far as all alike possess the common defect of aiming at appearance only (*δόξα*), not at reality (*ἀλήθεια*), in virtue of which no one of them can claim to rank as a scientific contribution (*ἐπιστήμη*) to the discussion.

*The relative order of the first five speeches.* The question as to the principle upon which the order and arrangement of these speeches depends is an interesting one and has given rise to some controversy.

(a) It has been suggested (*e.g.* by Röscher) that the speeches are arranged in the order of ascending importance, beginning with that of Phaedrus, which is generally admitted to be the slightest and most superficial, and proceeding gradually upwards till the culminating point is reached in the speech of Agathon<sup>1</sup>. This view, however, is untenable in the face of the obvious fact that Agathon's speech is in no real sense the best or most important of the series; rather, from the point of view of Socrates, it is the worst. The fact that each speaker commences his oration by a critique of his predecessor might seem, at first sight, to lend some colour to the view that each was actually making some improvement, some advance; but this preliminary critique is plainly nothing more than a rhetorical trick of method<sup>2</sup>.

(b) Steinhart<sup>3</sup> would arrange the speeches in pairs, distinguishing each pair from the others according to the special spheres of the activity of Eros with which they deal. Phaedrus and Pausanias deal with the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Susemihl, *Genet. Entwickl. d. plat. Phil.* p. 407: "So bildet denn der Vortrag des Sokrates den eigentlichen theoretischen Mittelpunkt des Werkes, die übrigen aber mit dem Alkibiades eine aufsteigende Stufenreihe."

<sup>2</sup> Observe also how, in 198 E, Eryx characterizes the first four speeches as *πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπά*, "motley and heterogeneous."

<sup>3</sup> Similarly Deinhardt, *Über Inhalt von Pl. Symp.*

ethical sphere; Eryximachus and Aristophanes with the physical; Agathon and Socrates with the higher spiritual sphere.

This scheme, however, is no less artificial, although it contains some elements of truth; and a sufficient ground for rejecting it lies in the fact that the speech of Socrates cannot be classed along with the other five<sup>1</sup>.

(c) Hug's view is that the speeches are arranged from the aesthetic, rather than the logical, point of view, in groups of two each. The second speech in each of the groups is, he holds, richer in content than the first; and the groups themselves are arranged with a view to contrast and variety. But here again, little seems gained by the device of pair-grouping; and the development within the groups is obscure. Hug, however, is no doubt correct in recognizing that the arrangement of the speeches is governed mainly, if not entirely, by artistic considerations, and with a view to literary effect; and that an artistic effect depends largely upon the presence of variety and of contrast is beyond dispute.

(d) Any satisfactory explanation of the order in which the speeches are arranged must be based upon the internal indications supplied by the dialogue itself.

The first inference to be drawn from such indications is this: the speech of Socrates must be left to stand by itself, and cannot be grouped with any one of the first five speeches<sup>2</sup>. This is made quite evident by the tone of the whole interlude (198 A—199 C) which divides Agathon's discourse from that of Socrates, and in special by the definite expression οὐ γὰρ ἐπι ἐγκωμιάζω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον...ἀλλὰ τὰ

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 527): "The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs....But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato; they are the points of view of his critics, and seem to impede rather than to assist us in understanding him." This is sensibly observed; still, Jowett is inclined to dismiss the matter too lightly. I may add that, while from the artistic point of view it is absurd to class together the speeches of Arist. and Eryx., there is a certain connexion of thought between the two, in their common relation to physiological theories, and so far we may allow that Steinhart points in the right direction (see § iii. 4, above).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 256): "The successive speeches...contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax. They are fanciful, partly facetious, performances....All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them." This is well said.

γε ἀληθῆ...ἰθέλω εἰπεῖν κατ' ἔμαντόν, οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ὑμετέρους λόγους (199 A—B): these last words should finally settle the matter.

We are thus left with five speeches, not six; and this of itself might be enough to show that a division into pair-groups is not feasible. And when we further examine the internal indications, the arbitrary character of any such grouping becomes yet more obvious. For although the first two speeches possess a good deal in common, and were, apparently, confounded together by Xenophon, the method of grouping them in one pair tends to obscure the great difference between them in point of substance, style, and general ability of statement, and to obscure also the fact that a number of other discourses intervened between these two (*μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι* 180 c). The express mention of this last fact is a land-mark not to be ignored.

Moreover, while this distinction is marked between the first speech and the second, there are internal indications which point to a special connexion between the third and the second. Eryximachus starts from the same assumption (the duality of Eros) as Pausanias; and, moreover, he expressly states that his speech is intended to supplement that of Pausanias (186 A *ad init.*). Furthermore, we find Aristophanes classing together these two (189 c).

As regards the fourth discourse (Aristophanes'), we are forbidden by similar internal indications to class it along with any of the preceding discourses. Although much of its point lies in its allusiveness to Eryximachus' theories, Aristophanes himself expressly emphasizes the difference between his speech and the others (189 c, 193 D); and indeed it is evident to the most cursory inspection. Nor is it possible, without reducing the group-system to the level of an unmeaning artifice, to pair the speech of Aristophanes with that of Agathon, which follows next in order. The only ground for such a grouping would be the purely fortuitous and external fact that both the speakers are professional poets: in style and substance the two speeches lie leagues apart, while not even an incidental connexion of any kind is hinted at in the text.

The reason for the position of the fifth discourse (Agathon's) is not hard to discover. Once the general plan of the dialogue, as consisting of three Acts, with the discourse of Socrates for the central Act, was fixed in the author's mind, it was inevitable, on artistic grounds, that Agathon's oration should be set in the closest juxtaposition with that of Socrates,—in other words, at the close of the first Act. This disposition is already pointed to in the introductory incident, where Agathon promises to engage in a match "concerning wisdom" with

Socrates (175 ε); and we have another indication of it at the very opening of the dialogue, where Glaucon in speaking of the banqueters mentions these three names only—Agathon, Socrates, Alcibiades (172 Δ). If then, for the purpose of the dialogue as a whole, Agathon is the most important of the first five speakers, it is essential that his discourse should form the climax of the series, and stand side by side with that of Socrates his rival, to point the contrast.

This gives us one fixed point. Another fixed point is the first speech: once Phaedrus has been designated *πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου*, the primary inventor of the theme<sup>1</sup>, the task of initiating the series can scarcely fall to other hands than his. Why the three intermediate discourses are placed in their present order is not so clear. Considerations of variety and contrast count for something, and it may be noticed that the principle of alternating longer and shorter speeches is observed<sup>2</sup>. Similarity in method of treatment counts for something too; and from this point of view we can see that the order Phaedrus—Pausanias—Eryximachus is more natural than the order Phaedrus—Eryximachus—Pausanias; since the middle speech of Pausanias has some points in common with both the others, whereas the speech of Eryximachus has practically nothing in common with that of Phaedrus. Granting, then, that on grounds at once of continuity and of variety of extent these three speeches may most artistically be set in their present order, and granting, further, that the proper place for Agathon's speech is the last of the series, the only vacant place left for the speech of Aristophanes is the fourth. Although it is a speech *sui generis*, possessing nothing in common with that of Agathon, yet the mere fact of the juxtaposition of the two famous poets is aesthetically pleasing; while a delightful variation is secured by the interposition of a splendid grotesque which, alike in style and in substance, affords so signal a contrast both to the following and to the preceding speeches<sup>3</sup>. More-

<sup>1</sup> That he is so designated may be due, as Crain thinks, to the desire to connect this dialogue with the *Phaedrus*.

<sup>2</sup> The comparative lengths of the speeches, counted by pages of the Oxford text, are roughly these: Phaedrus 3 pp.; Paus. 6½; Eryx. 3½; Arist. 6; Agathon 4; Socr. (a) 3, (b) 14½; Alc. 9½. Thus, in round numbers, the total of the first five speeches comes to 23 pp., which very nearly balances the 24 pp. occupied by Socr. (b) and Alcib.

<sup>3</sup> Jowett explains (*Plato* i. p. 530) that the transposition of the speeches of Arist. and Eryx. is made "partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes 'the cause of wit in others,' and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident." No doubt these considerations count for something, but, as I have already tried to show, there is another and a deeper reason for the transposition (see § iii. 4).

over, as is elsewhere shown, Aristophanes handles his theme with special reference to the medical theorists of whom Eryximachus is a type.

The first five speakers are all actual historical personages, not mere lay figures. None the less, we must recognize the probability that Plato is not literally true, in all details, to historical facts but, choosing his characters with a view to scenic effect, adapts their personalities to suit the requirements of his literary purpose. That is to say, we probably ought to regard these persons less as individuals than as types, and their speeches less as characteristic utterances of the individual speakers than as the expressions of well-marked tendencies in current opinion. The view proposed by Sydenham, approved by Schleiermacher, and developed by Rückert<sup>1</sup>, that under the disguise of the personages named other and more important persons were aimed at by Plato probably goes too far. It is true that some of the traits of Gorgias are reproduced in Agathon, and some of those of Isocrates in Pausanias; but where is the *alter ego* of Aristophanes to be found? Nor, in fact, was Plato at any time much concerned to attack individuals as such: the objects of his satire were rather the false tendencies and the tricks of style which belonged to certain sets and schools of rhetors and writers. And here in the *Symposium* his purpose seems to be to exhibit the general results of sophistic teaching in various contemporary circles at Athens; which purpose would be obscured were we to identify any of the characters of the dialogue with non-Attic personages.

The five intellectual types of which Plato here presents us with studied portraits are distinct, yet all the five are merely species of one and the same genus, inasmuch as all represent various phases of ungrounded opinion (*δόξα*), and inasmuch as all alike, in contrast to the philosopher Socrates, are men of *unphilosophic* mind<sup>2</sup>.

2. *The relation of the speech of Socrates to the first five speeches.*

The speech of Socrates, as we have seen, stands in contrast not only to the speech of Agathon but also to the whole series of which

<sup>1</sup> Rückert makes the following identifications: Phaedrus = Tisias; Pausanias = Protagoras or Xenophon; Eryximachus = Hippias; Aristophanes = Prodicus; Agathon = Gorgias. Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 529) says of Pausanias: "his speech might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is specially referring to them." Sydenham supposed that Phaedrus stands for Lysias.

<sup>2</sup> So Reäl, *Verhältnis*, etc., p. 31: "Alle diese fünf Reden eine breite Basis, fast auf demselben Niveau stehend, bilden sollen für die später folgenden Reden des Sokrates und Alkiabiades."



Agathon's speech forms the climax and conclusion; since all of them alike are tainted with the same vice of sophistry. We have now to examine this contrast in detail.

(a) *Socrates v. Phaedrus*. Phaedrus had declared Eros to be μέγας θεός καὶ θαυμαστός (178 A): Socrates, on the contrary, argues that Eros is no θεός but a δαίμων (202 c ff.). Phaedrus had relied for his proofs on ancient tradition (τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου κτλ., 178 B; ὁμολογεῖται, 178 C): Socrates bases his argument on dialectic, and on the conclusions of pure reason (Diotima being Reason personified). Phaedrus had ascribed the noble acts of Alcestis and Achilles to the working of sensual Eros (179 B ff.): Socrates ascribes the same acts to a more deeply seated desire—that for everlasting fame (ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου κτλ., 208 D)<sup>1</sup>:

(b) *Socrates v. Pausanias*. Pausanias had distinguished two kinds of Eros—Uranios and Pandemos (180 D—E): Socrates, on the other hand, treats Eros as a unity which comprises in its single nature opposite qualities (202 B, 203 C ff.); further, he shows that an apparent duality in the nature of Eros is to be explained as due to a confusion between Eros as genus (= Desire) and Eros in the specific sense of sex-passion (205 B ff.).

Pausanias had argued that sensual Eros, of the higher kind, is a thing of value in social and political life as a source of ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία (182 B—C, 184 D—E, 185 B)<sup>2</sup>: Socrates shows that the production of ἀρετή in the sphere of politics and law is due to an Eros which aims at begetting offspring of the soul for the purpose of securing an immortality of fame (209 A ff., 209 D)<sup>3</sup>. And Socrates shows further that for the true Eros τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλόν (210 C) is not the τέλος. Lastly, the connexion between Eros (in the form of παιδεραστία) with φιλοσοφία which had been merely hinted at by Pausanias in 182 C, and superficially treated in 182 D—E, is explained at length by Socrates.

<sup>1</sup> This is the point noticed by Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 531): "From Phaedrus he (Socr.) takes the thought that love is stronger than death."

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 531): "From Pausanias (Socr. takes the thought) that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity."

<sup>3</sup> Gomperz (*G. T.* II. p. 396), à propos of his view that Plato is thinking of his παιδικὸν Dion in *Symp.*, writes: "they were busy with projects of political and social regeneration, which the philosopher hoped he might one day realise by the aid of the prince. On this view there is point and pertinence in that otherwise irrelevant mention of legislative achievement among the fruits of the love-bond." The suggestion is interesting, but the relevance does not depend upon its being true: Plato, in any case, taught politics.

(c) *Socrates v. Eryximachus.* Eryximachus, following Pausanias, had adopted the assumption of the duality of Eros: this Socrates denies (202 B).

Eryximachus had extended the sphere of influence of Eros so as to include the whole of nature (the objects of medicine, music, astronomy, religion): Socrates shows that the Eros-instinct affects animals as well as men (207 A)—as equally included under the head of *θηγά* (207 D),—and he ascribes to the Eros-daemon the mediation between gods and men and the control of the whole sphere of religion; but he confines his treatment in the main to the narrower subject of Eros proper as concerned with humanity<sup>1</sup>.

(d) *Socrates v. Aristophanes.* Aristophanes had defined Eros as "the desire and pursuit of wholeness" (τοῦ ὅλου τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα 192 E: cp. 192 B ὅταν...ἐντύχη τῷ αὐτοῦ ἡμίσει): Socrates corrects this by showing that wholeness, or one's other half, is only sought when it is good (οὔτε ἡμίσεος εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου εἶναι μὴ...ἀγαθὸν ὄν 205 E<sup>2</sup>). Both, however, agree in maintaining the negative position that Eros is not simply the desire for ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων συνουσία (192 C).

(e) *Socrates v. Agathon.* The strictly dialectical part of Socrates' speech (199 C—201 C), which takes the form of a cross-questioning of Agathon, consists, in the main, of a hostile critique and refutation of his speech. But in some few particulars Socrates indicates his agreement with statements made by Agathon. We may, therefore, summarize thus:—

(1) *Points of Agreement:* Socrates approves (199 C) of the rule of method laid down by Agathon (195 A) and of the distinction it implies (201 D *ad fin.*). Agathon stated the object of Eros to be the beautiful (197 B): Socrates adopts and develops this statement (201 A). Agathon ascribed ἀνδρεία to Eros (196 C—D): so does Socrates (203 D<sup>3</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> It is hardly correct to say with Jowett (*Plato* I. p. 581) that "from Eryximachus Socrates takes the thought that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature": this statement requires limitation.

<sup>2</sup> It may be observed, however, that while the Platonic Socrates is here simply in contradiction to Arist., the idea of a "fall" from a primeval state of perfection which underlies the myth of Arist. is very similar to the view put forth by Plato in the *Phaedrus* and elsewhere that the earthly life of the soul involves a "fall" from its pristine state of purity in a super-terrestrial sphere. And in both Eros is the impulse towards restoration: to achieve communion with the Idea is to regain τὸ αἰεῖον, τὸ ὅλον, ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις (198 D).

<sup>3</sup> Another "glimpse of truth" which appears in A.'s speech is thus indicated by

(2) *Points of Difference*: Agathon's Eros is κάλλιστος καὶ ἀριστος (197 c): Socrates makes out Eros to be οὔτε καλὸς οὔτε ἀγαθός (201 ε). In particular Socrates denies that Eros is σοφός (203 ε f.), or ἀπαλός (203 c), as Agathon (196 ε f., 195 c, d) had affirmed. Agathon had assumed Eros to be θεός (194 ε, *et passim*): this Socrates corrects (202 β ff., ε).

Agathon, like the rest, in his lavish laudations had confused Eros with the object of love (τὸ ἐρώμενον, τὸ ἐραστόν); whereas Socrates points out that Eros is to be identified rather with the subject (τὸ ἐρῶν, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, 204 c).

### 3. *The relation of Alcibiades' speech to the rest.*

(a) The speech of Alcibiades is related to that of Socrates "as Praxis to Theory<sup>1</sup>." Its main purpose is to present to us a vivid portrait of Socrates as the perfect exemplar of Eros (ὁ τελεὺς ἐρωτικός); and thus to compel us to acknowledge that in the living Socrates we have before us both a complete φιλόσοφος—even as Eros is φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (203 d),—and a δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ—even as Eros is a δαίμων. In addition to this main purpose, the speech serves the secondary purpose of vindicating the master against the charge of indulging in impure relations with his disciples (see § ii. A *ad fin.*).

But the language of Alcibiades echoes not only that of Socrates, in part, but also, in part, that of the earlier encomiasts of Eros. And this is due to the fact that Socrates—the Eros of Alcibiades—plays a double rôle; he is both ὁ ἐρώμενος and ὁ ἐρῶν. This ambiguity of the Socratic nature is already implied in the comparisons with satyrs and Sileni made by Alcibiades, which point to a character that is ἐραστός, however ἐνδεής in outward appearance. We may therefore tabulate the more detailed points of inter-relation as follows:—

(a) *The Eros of the ἐραστής (as exhibited in Socrates' encomium.*

203 d ἐπιβουλός· ἐστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς...ἀεὶ τινας πλέκων μηχανάς.

203 c φύσει ἐραστής ὧν περὶ τὸ καλόν.

*Socrates as ἐραστής (his outward appearance of ἐνδεΐα) in Alcibiades' encomium.*

213 c διεμνηχανήσω ὅπως παρὰ τῷ καλλίστῳ...κατακείσῃ.

216 d Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν.

Jowett (*Plato* i. p. 526): "When Agathon says that no man 'can be wronged of his own free will,' he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, v. 9)": see *Symp.* 190 c *ad init.* But, so far as I see, no reference is made to this point by Socrates.

<sup>1</sup> Hug, p. lxvii.

- 203 D ἀνυπόδητος καὶ δοικος, χαμαιπετής  
 δεῖ ὦν καὶ ἀστρωτος...ὕπαιθριος κοιμώ-  
 μενος.
- 203 B ἀνυπόδητος...ἐπορεύετο.
- 220 D εἰστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο (with the  
 context).
- 203 D φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητής.
- 220 C ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ φροντίζων τι ἔστηκε (cp.  
 174 D ff.).
- 203 D δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σο-  
 φιστής...πόριμος...ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ.
- 215 C ff. κηλεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (κατέχει,  
 ἐκπλήττει), κτλ. 223 A εὐπόρως καὶ  
 πιθανὸν λόγον ἡὔρεν.
- 209 B εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς.

It will be noticed that in this list the passages which find responsions in the language of Alcibiades are all drawn from the discourse of Socrates. This is due to the fact that it is his discourse alone, of the earlier encomia, which treats Ἔρως on the side of its ἔνδεια. The previous speakers had, as we have seen, regarded Ἔρως as altogether lovely, i.e. as τὸ ἐρώμενον. Accordingly, it is to the next list of parallels that we must look for the passages where Alcibiades echoes their sentiments.

(β) Ἔρως-ἐρώμενος as κάλλιστος καὶ  
 ἀριστος in the earlier encomia.

Socrates as the embodiment of Ἔρως-  
 ἐρώμενος in Alcibiades' encomium.

(1) *Courage.*

178 E (Phaedrus) στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν  
 ...μαχόμενοι γ' ἂν νικῶεν, κτλ.

220 E ὅτι...φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον,  
 κτλ.

197 D (Agathon) ἐν πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ...  
 παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτῆρ ἀριστος.

220 E συνδιέσωσε...αὐτὸν ἐμέ.

203 D (Socrates) ἀνδρείους ὦν καὶ ἰσῆς καὶ  
 σύντονος.

221 B μάλα ἐρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται.

219 E τοῖς πόνοις...ἐμοῦ περιῆν, κτλ.

220 E ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τάρσπεϊα.

(2) *Temperance.*

196 C (Agathon) ὁ Ἔρως διαφερόντως ἂν  
 σωφρονοῖ.

216 D πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει...σωφροσύνης;

(3) *Complete virtue.*

196 D περὶ μὲν ὄν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφρο-  
 σύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας τοῦ θεοῦ εἰρηται,  
 περὶ δὲ σοφίας λείπεται.

219 D ἀγάμενον...σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν  
 ...εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν.

(4) *Admirableness.*

180 B (Phaedrus) οἱ θεοὶ...μᾶλλον θαυμά-  
 ζουσιν καὶ ἀγανταί...ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος  
 (e.g. Achilles) τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, κτλ.

219 D ἀγάμενον τὴν τοῦτου φύσιν, κτλ.

221 C Socr., as οὐδεὶς ὁμοῖος, is superior  
 to Achilles.

197 D (Agathon) θεατὸς σοφοῖς, ἀγαστὸς  
 θεοῖς.

220 E ἀξίον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη.

210 E (Socrates) κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν  
 τὴν φύσιν καλόν.

216 E τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα...εἶδον...πάγκαλα  
 καὶ θαυμαστά.

(5) *Inspiration of a sense of honour.*

178 D (Phaedrus) (ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖ) τὴν  
 ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνῃν.

216 B ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι.

(6) *Indifference to personal beauty.*

210 B (Socrates) ἐνὸς δὲ (τὸ κάλλος) καταφρονήσαντα, κτλ. (cp. 210 D, 211 E).

219 C ἐμοῦ...κατεφρόνησεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας.

(7) *Fruitfulness.*

210 C (Socrates) τίκτειν λόγους...ὄλκιμες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους (cp. 210 D).

222 A (τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ εὐρήσει) θειοτάτους καὶ πλείστα ἀγάλματα ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ...τεινοντας...ἐπὶ πάντων ὄσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῶ κάγαθῶ ἔσεσθαι (cp. 218 D ὡς ἐστι βέλτιστον γενέσθαι).

212 A τίκτειν οὐκ εἰδωλα ἀρετῆς...ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ.

209 B εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ οἶον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν (cp. 185 B πολλὴν ἐπεμέλειαν...πρὸς ἀρετῆν).

210 D καλοὺς λόγους...τίκτειν...ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ.

218 A δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

(8) *Range of Influence.*

186 B (Eryximachus) ἐπὶ πάντων ὁ θεὸς τείνει.

222 A (τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ εὐρήσει) ἐπὶ πλείστον τεινοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων κτλ.

210 D (Socrates) ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαιος...τοῦ καλοῦ.

The foregoing lists contain, I believe, most if not all of the passages in which Alcibiades, describing Socrates, uses phrases which definitely echo the language or repeat the thought of the earlier encomiasts. When one considers the number of these "responsions" and the natural way in which they are introduced, one is struck at once both with the elaborate technique of Plato and, still more, with the higher art which so skilfully conceals that technique. For all its appearance of spontaneity, a careful analysis and comparison prove that the encomium by Alcibiades is a very carefully wrought piece of work in which every phrase has its significance, every turn of expression its bearing on the literary effect of the dialogue as a whole. Moreover, as we are now to see, the list of parallels already given by no means exhausts the "responsions" offered by Alcibiades.

(b) The speech of Alcibiades, although primarily concerned with Socrates, is also, in a secondary degree, concerned with *Alcibiades himself*. And Alcibiades, like Socrates, plays a double part: he is at once the παιδικὰ of Socrates the ἐραστής, and the ἐραστής of Socrates the ἐρώμενος. In his rôle of ἐραστής Alcibiades exhibits a spirit very similar to that described in the earlier speeches, in which every display of erotic passion is regarded as excusable if not actually commendable. We may call attention to the following echoes:—

- 218 A *pân êtôlμα δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν.*
- 219 E *ἠπρόρον δὴ καταδεδουλωμένος.*
- 218 D *ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τούτου ὡς οἱ βελτιστοὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι. τούτου δὲ οἶμαι μοι συλλήπτωρα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ. ἐγὼ δὲ τοιοῦτῳ ἀνδρὶ... ἀν μὴ χαριζόμενος αἰσχυνοίμην τοὺς φρονίμους.*
- 218 D *εἴπερ...τις ἐστ' ἐν ἐμοὶ, δύναμις δι' ἧς ἀν σὺ γένοιτο ἀμείνων.*
- 222 B *οὗτος ἐξαπατῶν ὡς ἐραστῆς παιδικᾶ...μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου.*
- 217 C *ὥσπερ ἐραστῆς παιδικοῖς ἐπιβουλεύων...D αἴθεις δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας.*
- 219 B *ταῦτα...ἀφείλε ὥσπερ βέλη.*
- 219 B *ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλινεὶς τὸν τουτοῦ, περιβαλὼν τῷ χεῖρε...κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα ὄλην.*
- 215 D *ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα.*
- 219 D *οὐθ'...εἶχον (δπως) ἀποστερηθῆην τῆς τούτου συνουσίας.*
- 221 A *παρακελεύομαι τε αὐτοῖν θαρρεῖν, καὶ ἔλεγον οἱ οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτῶν.*
- 182 E (Pausanias) *θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ...ποιεῖν ὁλίπερ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ, κτλ.*
- 184 C (Paus.) *ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ τινὰ θεραπεύειν ἠγούμενος δι' ἐκείνον ἀμείνων εἶσθαι... αἴτη αὐτῆ ἐθελοδουλεία οὐκ αἰσχρά.*
- 184 E *τότε δὴ...συνπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι.*
- 185 B *pân πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.*
- 184 D *ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς...ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι.*
- 184 E *ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.*
- 185 B *καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη.*
- 203 D (Socrates) *ἐπιβουλὸς ἐστὶ (ὁ "Ἐρως) τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς.*
- 203 D (Soocr.) *θηρευτῆς δεινός.*
- 191 E ff. (Aristoph.) *χαίρουσι συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπλεγόμενοι τοῖς ἀνδράσι... οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀναίσχυντίας τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θάρρους...ἀποβαίνουσιν εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἄνδρες οἱ τοιοῦτοι.*
- 192 B (Aristoph.) *θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται φιλίᾳ...καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες...χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ μικρὸν χρόνον.*
- 179 A (Phaedrus) *ἐγκαταλείπειν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύοντι, οὐδεὶς οὕτω κακός, κτλ.*

Since in this list echoes are found of the only two earlier encomiasts who were not represented in the former lists (*viz.* Pausanias and Aristophanes), it will be seen that the speech of Alcibiades contains references, more or less frequent, to sentiments and sayings expressed by every one of the previous speakers. It is chiefly in his description of himself that Alcibiades echoes the language of the first five speakers, and in his description of Socrates that he echoes the language of Socrates. The general impression made on the mind of the reader who attends to the significance of the facts might be summed up briefly in the form of a proportion: as Alcibiades is to Socrates in point of practical excellence and truth, so are the first five speeches to the discourse of Socrates-Diotima in point of theoretical truth and excellence. But while this is, broadly speaking, true of the

inner nature (*φύσις, τὰ ἔνδον*) of Socrates as contrasted with that of Alcibiades, we must bear in mind that in his outward appearance (*σχῆμα*) Socrates is "conformed to this world" and, posing as an *erastes* of a similar type to Alcibiades himself, serves to illustrate the theories and sentiments of the earlier speeches.

Lastly, attention may be drawn to one other parallel in Alcibiades' discourse which appears to have passed unnoticed hitherto. It can scarcely be a mere coincidence that Alcibiades' progress in erotics—in other words, "the temptation of saint" Socrates—is marked by a series of stages (*συνουσία, σὺγγυμνασία, συνδειπνῆν*, 217 A ff.) until it reaches its climax in *συνκείσθαι*, and that a similar *ἀνοδος* by gradual stages (210 A ff., 211 c ff.) up to the final communion with Ideal Beauty had been described as the characteristic method of the true *erastes*. It seems reasonable to suppose that the method of *false* love is designedly represented as thus in detail contrasting with, and as it were caricaturing, the method of *true* love: for thereby an added emphasis is laid upon the latter.

#### § vii. THE DIALOGUE AS A WHOLE: ITS SCOPE AND DESIGN.

No small degree of attention has been paid by the expositors of our dialogue to the question regarding its main purport—"de universi operis consilio." It is plausibly argued that there must be some one leading thought, some fundamental idea, which serves to knit together its various parts and to furnish it with that "unity" which should belong to it as an artistic whole. But wherein this leading idea consists has been matter of controversy. Some, like Stallbaum, are content to adopt the simplest and most obvious view that Eros is the central idea, and that the design of the whole is to establish a doctrine of Eros. Others, again, have supposed that Plato was mainly concerned to furnish his readers with another specimen of the right method of handling philosophical problems. But although either of these views, or both combined, might be thought to supply an adequate account of the design and scope of the dialogue if it had ended with the speech of Socrates, they are evidently inadequate when applied to the dialogue as it stands, with the addition of the Alcibiades scenes. In fact, this last part of the dialogue—the Third Act, as we have called it—might be construed as suggesting an entirely different *motif*,—namely, laudation of Socrates in general, or perhaps rather (as Wolf argued) a defence of Socrates against the more specific charge of unchastity.

That this is one purpose of the dialogue is beyond dispute: many indications testify, as has been shown, that Plato intended here to offer an *apologiam pro vita Socratis*. Yet it would be a mistake to argue from this that the main design of the dialogue as a whole lies in this apologetic. Rather it is necessary to combine the leading idea of this last Act with those of the earlier Acts in such a way as to reduce them, as it were, to a common denominator. And when we do this, we find—as I agree with Rückert in believing—that the dominant factor common to all three Acts is nothing else than the personality of Socrates,—Socrates as the ideal both of philosophy and of love, Socrates as at once the type of temperance and the master of magic. Our study of the framework as well as of the speeches has shown us how both the figure of Socrates and his theory dominate the dialogue, and that to throw these into bolder relief constitutes the main value of all the other theories and figures. This point has been rightly emphasized by Rückert (p. 252): “utique ad Socratem animus advertitur; quasi sol in medio positus, quem omnes circummeant, cuius luce omnia collustrantur, vimque accipiunt vitalem, Socrates proponitur, et Socrates quidem philosophus, sapiens, temperans. Quem iuxta multi plane evanescent, ceteri vix obscure comparent, ipse Agatho, splendidissimum licet sidus ex omnibus, ut coram sole luna pallescit.”

It seems clear, therefore, that the explanation of the “Hauptzweck” of our dialogue which was given long ago by Schleiermacher is the right one—“propositum est Platoni in Convivio ut philosophum qualem in vita se exhiberet, viva imagine depingeret”: it is in the portrait of the ideal Socrates that the main object of the dialogue is to be sought.

The theory of Teichmüller and Wilamowitz as to the occasion on which the dialogue was produced has no direct bearing on the question of design. They suppose that it was written specially for recital at a banquet in Plato's Academy; and, further, that it was intended to provide the friends and pupils of Plato with a model of what such a banquet ought to be. But it would be absurd to estimate the design of a work of literary art by the temporary purpose which it subserved; nor can we easily suppose that Plato's main interest lay in either imagining or recording gastronomic successes as such. Equally unproven, though more suggestive, is the idea of Gomperz that this dialogue *περὶ ἑρωτος* was inspired by an affection for Dion.



## § viii. THE DATE.

We must begin by drawing a distinction between (a) the date of the actual Banquet, (b) that of Apollodorus' narrative, and (c) that of the composition of the dialogue by Plato.

(a) That the date of the Banquet is B.C. 416 (*Ol.* 90. 4) is asserted by Athenaeus (v. 217 A): ὁ μὲν γὰρ (*sc.* Ἀγάθων) ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Εὐφύμου στεφανοῦται Ληναίους. It is true, as Sauppe and others have pointed out, that the description in 175 E (ἐν μάρτυσι...τριμυρίοις, cp. 223 B n.), would suit the Great Dionysia better than the Lenaea; but this discrepancy need not shake our confidence in the date assigned by Athenaeus. The year 416 agrees with the mention of Agathon as νέος (175 B), and of Alcibiades as at the height of his influence (216 B) before the ill-fated Sicilian expedition.

(b) The date of the prefatory scene may be approximately fixed from the following indications: (1) It was a considerable number of years after the actual Banquet (οὐ νεωστὶ 172 C, παίδων ὄντων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ 173 A); (2) several years (πολλὰ ἔτη 172 C) after Agathon's departure from Athens; (3) within three years of the commencement of Apollodorus' close association with Socrates (172 C); (4) before the death of Socrates (as shown by the pres. tense *συνδιατρίβω* 172 C); (5) before the death of Agathon (as shown by the perf. *ἐπιδημήμηκεν* 172 C). It seems probable that Agathon left Athens about 408, at the latest, and resided till 399 at the court of Archelaus of Macedon<sup>1</sup>. Hence any date before 399 will satisfy the two last data. And since the two first data demand a date as far removed as possible from the years 416 and 408, we can hardly go far wrong if we date the dramatic setting circ. 400 B.C.

(c) We come now to the more important question of the date of composition. The external evidence available is but slight. A posterior limit is afforded by two references in Aristotle (*Pol.* II. 4. 1262<sup>b</sup> 12; *de An.* II. 415<sup>a</sup> 26), a possible allusion by Aeschines (*in Timarch.* 345 B.C.), and a probable comic allusion by Alexis in his *Phaedrus* (*ap.* Athen. XIII. 562 A)—a work which probably cannot be dated before 370 at the earliest.

The internal evidence is more extensive but somewhat indefinite. It is commonly assumed<sup>2</sup> that in 193 A (*διφκίσθημεν...Λακεδαιμονίων*)

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche's view that *Ar. Ran.* 72 implies the previous death (*i.e.* ante 405) of A. is refuted by Rettig, *Symp.* pp. 59 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Zeller, *Plato* (E.T.) p. 189 n.; Teichmüller, *Litt. Fehd.* II. 262.

we have a definite reference to the *διοικισμός* of Mantinea in 385 B.C. But even if this be granted—as I think it must, in spite of the contradiction of Wilamowitz—it by no means follows that the dialogue must be dated 385—4. We find Isocrates (*Panegy.* 126) mentioning the same event five years later. All that it affords us is a prior limit. Little weight can be given to Dümmler's view that the previous death of Gorgias (*circ.* 380) is implied by the allusion to him in 198 C (*Γοργίου κεφαλὴν κτλ.*)<sup>1</sup>. Nor can we lay much stress on the conclusions drawn (by Rückert and others) from the absence of reference to the re-establishment of Mantinea in 370, or to the exploits of the Theban "Sacred Band" at Leuctra (371), which (as Hug thinks) might naturally have been alluded to in 178 E.

The evidence of date afforded by "stylometric" observations is not of a convincing character. M. Lutoslawski, it is true, dogmatically asserts that the *Symposium* stands between the *Cratylus* and *Phaedo* in the "First Platonic Group"; but his arguments, when examined, prove to be of the most flimsy character. Beyond affording a confirmation of the general impression that our dialogue stands somewhere in the "middle" period, the labours of the stylometrists give us little assistance. If we choose to date it in 390 they cannot refute us, nor yet if we date it 10 or 15 years later. The question as to whether the *Symposium* preceded the *Phaedrus* or followed it is one of special interest in view of the number of points at which the two writings touch each other. The evidence on the whole seems in favour of the priority of the *Phaedrus*<sup>2</sup>; but, even if this be granted, little light is shed on the date of composition of the *Symp.*, since that of the *Phaedrus* eludes precise determination.

Equally difficult is it to draw any certain conclusions from the relation in which our dialogue stands to the *Symposium* of Xenophon. That there are many points of connexion, many close parallels, between

<sup>1</sup> See Dümmler, *Akademica*, p. 40; and the refutation by Vahlen, *op. Acad.* i. 482 ff.

<sup>2</sup> So I hold with Schleierm., Zeller, I. Bruns, Hahn and others; against Lutosl., Gomperz and Raeder. It is monstrous to assert, as Lutosl. does, "that the date of the *Phaedrus* as written about 379 B.C. is now quite as well confirmed as the date of the *Symp.* about 385 B.C." I agree rather with the view which makes *Phaedr.* P.'s first publication after he opened his Academy, *i.e.* *circ.* 388—6 (a view recently supported in England by E. S. Thompson, *Meno* xliiii ff., and Gifford, *Euthyd.* 20 ff.). The foll. are some of the parallels: *Ph.* 232 E = *Symp.* 181 E, 183 E; 234 A = 183 E; 234 B = 188 C; 250 C = 209 E; 251 D (240 C) = 215 E, 218 A; 251 A = 215 B, 222 A; 252 A = 189 D; 266 A = 180 E; 267 A (273 A) = 200 A; 272 A = 198 D; 276 A = 222 A; 276 E = 209 B; 278 D = 208 E; 279 B = 216 D, 215 B.

the two works is obvious, but which of the two is prior in date is a problem which has called forth prolonged controversy<sup>1</sup>. This is not the place to investigate the problem: I can only state my firm opinion that the Xenophontic *Sympos.* (whether genuine or not) is the later work. But attempts to fix its date are little better than guess-work: Roquette puts it *circ.* 380—76; Schanz, after 371; K. Lincke (*Neue Jahrb.* 1897), after 350.

It will be seen that the available evidence is not sufficient to justify us in dogmatizing about the precise date of composition of our dialogue. The most we can say is that *circ.* 383—5 seems on the whole the most probable period.

### § ix. THE TEXT.

(1) *Ancient authorities.* The chief manuscripts which contain the text of the *Symposium* are:—

B = codex Bodleianus (or Clarkianus or Oxoniensis); Bekker's α.

T = codex Venetus append. class. 4, cod. 1: Bekker's τ ("omnium librorum secundae familiae fons" Schanz).

<sup>1</sup> Among those who claim priority for Xenophon are Böckh, Ast, Delbrück, Rettig, Teichmüller, Hug, Dümmler, Pfeiderer; on the other side are C. F. Hermann, I. Bruns, Schenkl, Gomperz. Beside the broader resemblances set forth by Hug, the foll. refs. to echoes may be of interest:—

<i>Xen.</i>	<i>Plat.</i>	<i>Xen.</i>	<i>Plat.</i>
i. 1	= 178 A, 197 E	iv. 53	= 219 B
ii. 23	= 213 E, 214 A	v. 1, 7	= 218 E (175 E)
ii. 26 (iv. 24)	= 185 C, 198 C	viii. 1	= 218 B (187 D)
iv. 14	= 183 A, 184 B, 179 A	„ 8	= 219 D
„ 15	= 178 E, 179 B, 182 C	„ 13	= 184 B
„ 16	= 178 E	„ 21	= 214 C
„ 17	= 181 E, 183 E	„ 23	= 183 A (203 B), 172 C
„ 19 (v. 7)	= 215 A (216 D, 221 D)	„ 24	= 217 E, 222 C
„ 23	= 181 D	„ 31	= 179 E
„ 25	= 193 D	„ 38	= 209 E
„ 28	= 217 E	„ 32 (iv. 16)	= 178 E
„ 47—8	= 188 D	„ 34	= 182 B
„ 48	= 188 D	„ 35	= 179 A
„ 50	= 189 A, 197 E		

The last three parallels are specially interesting, since Xen. ascribes to Pausan. some of the sentiments which Pl. gives to Phaedrus. Possibly (as Hug, Teichm. and others suppose) both writers are indebted to an actual *apologia* of the real Pausan., which Pl. is handling more freely, Xen. more exactly (cp. I. Bruns, *Vorträge*, p. 152).

W = codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. phil. Gr. 7: Stallbaum's Vind. I.

To these we have now to add, as a new authority,

O.-P. = Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (no. 843 in Grenfell and Hunt's collection).

Since this last authority for the text was not forthcoming until after the publication of the latest critical text of the *Symposium*, I add the description of it given by the editors:—

“The part covered is from 200 B [beginning with the word βουλο[το] after which 40 lines are lost, the next words being *av ενδεια* at the end of 200 E] to the end, comprised in 31 columns, of which four (xix—xxii) are missing entirely, while two others (i and xviii) are represented by small fragments; but the remainder is in a very fair state of preservation....The small and well-formed but somewhat heavy writing exemplifies a common type of book hand, and probably dates from about the year 200 A.D....The corrector's ink does not differ markedly in colour from that of the text, and in the case of minor insertions the two hands are at times difficult to distinguish. But as they are certainly not separated by any wide interval of time the question has no great practical importance....The text, as so often with papyri, is of an eclectic character, showing a decided affinity with no single ms. Compared with the three principal witnesses for the *Symposium* it agrees now with B against TW, now with the two latter as against the former, rarely with T against BW<sup>1</sup> or with W against BT<sup>2</sup>. Similarly in a passage cited by Stobaeus some agreements with his readings against the consensus of BTW are counterbalanced by a number of variations from Stobaeus' text<sup>3</sup>. A few coincidences occur with variants peculiar to the inferior mss., the more noticeable being those with Vindob. 21 alone or in combination with Venet. 184<sup>4</sup> and Parisin. 1642 alone or with Vat. 229<sup>5</sup>. Of the readings for which there is no other authority, including several variations in the order of the words, the majority, if unobjectionable, are unconvincing. The more valuable contributions, some of which are plainly superior to anything found in other mss., are: l. 92 [201 D] *επ* l. 112 [202 A] the omission of *καί* (so Stallbaum), l. 239 [204 B] *av ενη*, where BTW have a meaningless *αν*, l. 368 [206 c] *καλω* as conjectured by Badham

<sup>1</sup> See crit. notes on 202 A, 203 A, 205 B, 206 B, 207 D, 211 C.

<sup>2</sup> See crit. notes on 203 B, 211 D, 213 B, 219 E, 220 C (*bis*).

<sup>3</sup> See crit. notes on 202 C—203 A.

<sup>4</sup> See crit. notes on 201 A (*ad fin.*), 218 D, 220 A, 220 B, 223 C.

<sup>5</sup> See crit. notes on 206 B (*ad init.*), 208 A, 223 C.

for τῷ κ., l. 471 [208 B] μετεχει as restored by Stephanus (μετέχειν MSS.), l. 517 [209 A] τεκειν confirming a conjecture of Hug (κύνειν MSS.), l. 529 [209 B] επιθυμη as conjectured by Stephanus (ἐπιθυμει MSS.), l. 577 [210 A] και συ omitted by MSS., l. 699 [212 A] θεοφιλει (-ῆ BTW), l. 770 [213 B] καταιδε[ν (?) (καθίζειν MSS), l. 898 [218 D] μοι (probably with Vind. 21 (μου BTW), l. 1142 [222 D] διαβαλει as conjectured by Hirschig (διαβάλη BTW). On the other hand in many cases the papyrus once more proves the antiquity of readings which modern criticism rejects or suspects."

It may be added that the editors of the papyrus in citing W have made use of a new collation of that ms. by Prof. H. Schöne of Basel "which often supplements and sometimes corrects the report of Burnet." And in this edition I have followed the report of W in their apparatus, where available, while relying elsewhere upon that given by Burnet.

(2) *Modern criticism.* Much attention has been paid by Continental critics during the last century to the text of the *Symposium*, and for the most part they have proceeded on the assumption that the text is largely vitiated by interpolations<sup>1</sup>. Even Schanz and Hug, who may be regarded as moderate and cautious critics in comparison with such extremists as Jahn and Badham, have gone to unnecessary lengths in their use of the obelus. Hug, while admitting that we must take into account the freedom and variety of Plato's style and that it is folly to rob a writer of his individuality by pruning away any and every expression which is in strict logic superfluous, and while admitting also that regard must be paid to the characteristic differences of the various speeches in our dialogue, which forbid our taking any one speech as the norm with which others should be squared,—yet maintains that in the speeches, and especially in those of Pausanias and Socrates, he can detect a number of unquestionable glosses. No doubt there are some cases in these speeches in which it is not unreasonable to suspect interpolation, but even Hug and Schanz have, I believe, greatly exaggerated the number of such cases; and I agree with the editor of the Oxford text in regarding the certain instances of corruption or interpolation as extremely few. Consequently, in the text here printed I have diverged but seldom from the ancient tradition, and such changes as I have made have been more often in the

<sup>1</sup> E.g. O. Jahn, Hirschig, Badham, Cobet, Naber, Hartmann. On the other hand, sensible protests have been made by Teuffel and Vahlen; and Bettig's text is, if anything, ultra-conservative.

direction of verbal alteration than of omission. I have, however, recorded in the textual notes a selection of the proposed alterations, futile though I consider most of them to be.

### § x. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The main authorities which I have cited or consulted are<sup>1</sup>:—

i. *Texts*: Bekker (1826), the Zurich ed. (Baiter, Orelli and Winckelmann, 1839), C. F. Hermann (1851), O. Jahn (1864), Jahn-Usener (1875), C. Badham (1866), M. Schanz (1881), J. Burnet (1901).

Critical essays or notes by Bast (1794), Voegelin, Naber, Teuffel, M. Vermehren (1870), J. J. Hartmann (1898).

ii. *Annot 'ed Editions*: J. F. Fischer (1776), F. A. Wolf (1782), P. A. Reynders (1825), L. I. Rückert (1829), A. Hommel (1834), G. Stallbaum (2nd ed. 1836), G. F. Rettig (2 vols. 1875—6), A. Hug (2nd ed. 1884).

iii. *Treatises on the subject-matter*: M. H. L. Hartmann (*Chronol. Symp. Pl.* 1798), G. Schwanitz (*Observ. in Pl. Conv.* 1842), M. Lindemann (*De Phaedri orat.* 1853, *De Agath. or.* 1871), J. H. Deinhardt (*Ueber den Inhalt u. s. w. von Pl. Symp.* 1865), M. Koch (*Die Rede d. Sokr. u. das Problem der Erotik*, 1886), W. Resl (*Verhältnis der 5 erster in Pl. Symp. Reden u. s. w.* 1886), C. Boetticher (*Eros u. Erkenntnis bei Pl.* 1894), C. Schirlitz (*Beiträge z. Erklärung d. Rede d. Sokr. u. s. w.* 1890), P. Crain (*De ratione quae inter Pl. Phaedr. et Symp. intercedat*, 1906).

Other more general works consulted are: Teichmüller (*Litt. Fehden*, 1881), F. Horn (*Platonstudien*, 1893), W. Lutoslawski (*Plato's Logic*, 1897), T. Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, E.T. II. 1905), H. Raeder (*Platons Philos. Entwicklung*, 1905), J. Adam (*Religious Teachers of Greece*, 1908).

iv. *Translations*: E. Zeller (1857), A. Jung (2nd ed. 1900), B. Jowett, J. A. Stewart (selections, in *The Myths of Plato*, 1905).

<sup>1</sup> *Abbreviations used are*—Bdhm. = Badham; Bt. = Burnet; Jn. = Jahn; J.-U. = Jahn-Usener; Sz. = Schanz; Verm. = Vermehren; Voeg. = Voegelin.

## § xi. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

The following *Notes* are mainly intended to summarise briefly some of the more important views propounded either by critics of my First Edition or in subsequent publications.

(1) *Bibliography*. Later editions of the *Symposium* are by Burnet (text only, 2nd ed. 1910); A. Hug (3rd ed. revised by H. Schöne, 1909); W. R. M. Lamb (text and translation in Loeb *Plato*, vol. v), 1925; L. Robin (introduction, text and translation, in Budé *Platon*, Tome iv, Pt. 2), 1929. There are also separate Translations by F. Birrell and S. Leslie (Nonesuch Press); K. Hildebrandt (1912); C. Ritter (in his "Platonische Liebe," 1931). The larger works on "Plato" by A. E. Taylor, C. Ritter (2 vols.), Wilamowitz-Möllendorf (2 vols.), P. Friedländer, contain chapters on the *Symposium*; and it is also dealt with to some extent in such other studies of Platonism as A. Diès, *Autour de Platon* (pp. 400 ff.), R. Lagerborg, "Die platonische Liebe," K. Reinhardt, "Platons Mythen," P. Frutiger, "Les Mythes de Platon," L. Robin, "Théorie platonicienne de L'Amour" (1908). (For Wilamowitz I use the abbreviation "W.-M.>"). Schöne's text (as contrasted with Hug's) is, like Robin's, very conservative and takes due account of O.-P. Robin's elaborate "Notice" (or Introd.) gives the best and fullest analysis and discussion of the contents.

(2) *Textual Notes*.

- 172 A. I now prefer to let Ἀπολλόδωρος stand, accepting (with Robin) the view of Schütz and Hug.
- 172 c. Burnet's <ἐφη> is adopted by Lamb, not by Robin.
- 173 D. μακρὸς is read by Lamb, W.-M., Ritter, Hildebrandt: μαλακὸς by Robin.
- 174 B. I should now restore ἀγαθῶν (for Lachmann's Ἀγάθων) and follow Stallbaum, in deference to the arguments of R. Adam and W.-M.; so too Robin.
- 174 c. ὄρα...τί. Robin (who ascribes it to Ficinus) and Lamb adopt this: Schöne keeps ἄρα...τι.
- 175 D. εἰς τὸν κενώτερον seems likelier than εἰς τὸ κ., which Robin retains, placing the comma before, instead of after, ἡμῶν (hardly probable).
- 176 B. ἀκούσαι...Ἀγάθων. W.-M.'s reading ἀκούσαι· πῶς ἔχεις...πίνειν, Ἀγαθων; is adopted by Robin: Burnet and Schöne follow Vahlen.
- 178 A. Robin punctuates πάντα, ἃ δὲ μάλιστα· καὶ ὧν (not attractive).

- 178 B. W.-M. prefers *γοναί* to *γονῆς*. Lamb and Ritter adopt the transposition of *Ἡσιόδω...δμολογεῖ*, but without bracketing *φησι...* *Ἐρωτα*: Robin retains the mss.' order and inserts *δὴ* after *φησι*.
- 178 E. The *ῆ* before *ἀπεχόμενοι* is retained by Lamb and Robin, and well defended by R. Adam.
- 180 E. *πραττομένη* is retained by Lamb, Schöne, Robin, but left out by Ritter. H. Richards proposed *⟨μῆ⟩ πρ.*
- 181 C. *καί...ἔρωσ* bracketed by Lamb, doubted by Robin.
- 182 A. *καί ἐν Λακ.* is transposed so as to follow *γάρ* by Robin (without ref. to my *Note!*): Lamb brackets.
- 183 A. *φιλοσοφίας* is (vainly) defended by Robin, but rejected by Lamb and Ritter. Richards conj. *φιλοτιμίας*.
- 183 B. *ὄρκον...εἶναι*. The ms. text is left unchanged by Lamb and Robin, who, like Ritter, translate as though *ὄρκον* were repeated.
- 184 A. *καί...διαφεύγειν* is retained by Lamb, Robin, Ritter.
- 184 D. *ὑπουργῶν ⟨ὑπουργεῖν⟩* Lamb; "*ὑπουργεῖν ὑπουργῶν scripsi*" Robin (as if his own conj.!).
- 187 B. *καί μὴ...ἀρμόσαι*. My correction here is adopted by Lamb, but not by Robin.
- 189 E. Robin punctuates *εἶδος, στρόγγυλον νῶτον κτλ.*
- 190 E. *ῆ...θριξίν* is kept by Lamb, Robin and Ritter, but not by W.-M.
- 191 C. My reading *⟨ταῦτ'⟩ αὐτῶν* is adopted by Lamb: Robin has *αὐτῶν*.
- 191 E. *ἐκ...γίγονται* is kept by Lamb, Robin and Ritter.
- 194 A. Vahlen's punctuation *εἶ, καί μαλ' ἄν* is adopted by Robin, but not by Lamb, nor by W.-M., who would excise *εἶ*.
- 195 A. Robin reads *οἶος ὦν*: Lamb *οἶος οἶων*: my reading is approved by J. I. Beare and others.
- 195 B. For *ἔστιν* Diels and Schöne would write *ἔσται*.
- 197 C. *εἰρήνην...κῆδει*. Lamb reads as I, Robin only puts a comma after *γαλήνην*. W.-M. puts commas after *νηνεμίαν* and *κοίτην*, and reads *ὑπνον νηκηδῆ* (so too Schöne), which may be right.
- 197 D. Lamb reads *ἀγανός*: Robin keeps *ἀγαθός*: Ritter seems to read *ἀγαθοῖς*.
- ibid.* My reading *πότψ* is adopted by Lamb, but Robin and Ritter keep *πόθψ*.
- 198 D. *τοῦ ἐπ. οἷουῖν* is bracketed by Lamb, but not by Robin.
- 199 A. Lamb and Robin read *οὐ γάρ που*: Schöne *οὐ γάρ ἄν που*.
- 200 D. *καί ⟨ἀεί⟩ παρόντα* Lamb: *καί παρόντα* Schöne, Robin.
- 201 D. *διηγῆσω*: *ἡγήσω* W.-M.: *ἐξηγήσω* Richards.



- 202 E. Robin keeps τῶν θνσιῶν, but Lamb brackets.
- 203 A. Schöne, Lamb and Robin read *μαντείαν*, which may be right (echoing the *μαντική* of 188 B).
- ibid.* Lamb adopts the insertion (καὶ...ἀνθρώποις).
- 203 B. Schöne reads *ἐξεληθὼν*, after O.-P.; and W.-M. *κεκαρωμένος* (cp. Galen xvi. 645) for *βιβαραμμ*.
- 203 E. W.-M. would transpose *ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ* so as to follow *ἀναβιώσκ.*: so too Robin.
- 204 B. For *ὦν αὖ*, kept by Lamb, Schöne and Robin adopt O.-P.'s *ὦν ἂν εἴη*.
- 204 D. Schöne and Robin print *ἐρᾶ*, not *ἐρῶ*.
- 204 E. Schöne and Robin keep *ἐρᾶ*: Lamb has *ἐρῶ*: I still prefer *δρα*.
- 205 D. Lamb brackets *ἔρωτά τε*.
- 206 B. Bast's *τούτον* is printed by Lamb, but Robin keeps *τούτο*.
- 206 C. Robin and Lamb read *ἐν τινι*, not *ἐν τῇ*, and also retain the words bracketed by me. *ἡ γὰρ...ἐστιν* Ritter trs. after *γέννησις*.
- 206 E. *ἔχοντα*: *ἐλόντα* W.-M.
- 207 A. Lamb adopts my *τοῦ ἀγαθὸν*: Robin has *τοῦ τἀγαθὸν*.
- 207 D. *ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος*: so too Lamb, but Robin follows O.-P.
- 208 A. Robin keeps *μνήμην*: Lamb brackets it: Ritter accepts *μνήμη*.
- 208 B. Lamb adopts Creuzer's *ἀδύνατον*, as does Ritter: Schöne, Friedl. and Robin keep *ἀθάνατον*.
- 208 C. W.-M. proposes *θανυμάζοιμί σ' ἂν*: he and Lamb bracket the *περὶ*, which Robin keeps.
- 209 B. Taylor, like Bt., accepts *ἦθεος*, which Robin expressly rejects.
- 209 C. *περὶ οἶον χρῆ*: R. Adam cites *Rep.* 352 D in defence of the *περὶ*, which Lamb and Robin retain.
- ibid.* W.-M. also rejects *τῆς τῶν παίδων*: Richards conj. *τῶν ἄλλων*: M. Koffka *τῶν γάμων*.
- 209 E. Schöne adopts *ἄλλα* and (καὶ) from O.-P.
- 210 A. Both Schöne and Lamb accept O.-P.'s (καὶ σὺ).
- ibid.* *ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτόν*: here too W.-M. (without ref. to me) adopts my conj. *αὖ* for *αὐτόν*, which Robin wrongly records "*αὐτόν αὖ* conj. Bury."
- 210 D. *τῷ παρ' ἐνί...δουλεύων*: so Lamb: Schöne and Robin keep *τὸ*, as does W.-M., who rejects *δουλεύων*.
- 211 C. *μαθήματα, καὶ κτλ.*: so Lamb, who also adopts Usener's *τελευτήσαι* and *ἵνα*: Robin prints *μαθ.*, *ἔστ' ἂν...τελευτήσῃ*: Schöne *μαθ.*, *ἵνα*: W.-M. approves *μαθ.*, *ὥς*.
- 212 ᾄ. Robin reads *περὶ τοῦ λόγου* ("a certain theory").
- 212 ἕ. *ἐὰν εἴπω*: *ἀνεπιπῶν* Hermann, W.-M., Robin: *ἐὰν εὖρω* Richards.

- 213 B. κατᾶδεν : κατιδεῖν (cp. 174 E) Bt., W.-M., Schöne, Lamb : καθίζειν Robin.
- 215 B. Lamb and Robin print Baiter's ἄν που.
- 215 C. που, τοῦ : τούτου Robin : τοῦ Lamb.
- 218 A. Lamb and Robin read τὴν καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ ψ.
- 219 C. περὶ ἐκεῖνο (δ) γε : Lamb adopts this ; Robin prints περὶ ἐκεῖνό γε.
- 220 C. Ἰώνων is retained by Lamb and Ritter : Robin adopts ἰδόντων.
- 221 B. ἐταῖρος Lamb : ἕτερος Robin.
- 221 E. Robin has πάνυ γελοῖοι, Lamb γελοῖοι : both adopt Baiter's δῆ τινα.
- 222 D. Robin wrongly ascribes διαβάλλη to me.
- 223 B. W.-M. approves O.-P.'s εἴσω ἄντικρυς.
- 223 D. Lamb and Robin accept, Schöne rejects, the additions (καί) and (ἐ).

(3) *Introduction.*

- p. xvii (*ad fin.*). My inference from 172 B ff. of a "controversial intention" is contested by Taylor, Friedländer and others, but Robin is inclined to accept it.
- p. xviii. "Xenophon's *Symposium*...later than Plato's" (cp. pp. lxvii f.): this view seems now to be generally endorsed.
- p. xix. (B) (a). The emphasis on καλός in 174 B should also be noticed, as striking the key-note of the Dialogue (so Friedl.). (b) "Socrates...lost in thought" (174 D ff., 220 C). Taylor makes much of these passages as proving the "historical Socrates" a Mystic—but was he?
- p. xxii. (C). There are no "hidden allusions" here, says Taylor : Robin agrees with Stallbaum.
- p. xxv. Friedl. points out that several features of Phaedrus's "Erastes" are reproduced in Socrates (as ἐνθεος, dying for Love's sake, etc.).
- p. xxvi f. Taylor regards my estimate of Pausanias as unduly "disparaging."
- p. xxviii. As Taylor points out, Eryximachus and his father were accused of "profaning the mysteries" (Andoc. i. 35). T. maintains that Eryx's "pedantry" is "intentional," and that there is "no serious satire" of his science: Robin is less favourable to this "man of rules, protocols and catalogues," more interested in "technicity" than cosmology. Hicks (*De Anima*, p. 231) notes that "the speech of Eryx seems to owe not a little to Alcmaeon."

- p. xxxiii. "The allusions to...Empedocles": so too Taylor describes A.'s speech as a "humorous parody of E.," and he compares also the "burlesque of an Orphic cosmogony in *Birds* 693 ff." For the *style*, compare the Myth in *Protag.* 320 c ff. (with Norden).
- p. xxxv. A higher opinion of Agathon's speech is held by Hildebrandt and Friedl.: Robin and Taylor agree pretty nearly with my estimate.
- p. xxxix. "Diotima is a fictitious personage": Schöne and Taylor deny this, T. maintaining the "historicity" of the whole account of the relations between D. and Socr. As against this see Robin's *Notice*, pp. xxii ff. Even if such a person as D. did exist, the D. of the *Symp.* is a creation of Plato's.
- p. xlvi. "The philosopher is...a teacher" etc. Cp. Robin, pp. xc ff., on the relation of Plato's "Erotic" to his work in the Academy.
- p. liii. (a) Röscher's view is to some extent supported by Taylor and others, as the "Eros" of Phaedrus is enlarged by later encomiasts, till it becomes a civic and cosmic power.
- p. lx. 3. (a) "Ambiguity of the Socratic nature": this point also is taken up and developed by Robin, p. cvii.
- p. lxvii. Schöne alone seems to adopt Wilamowitz's view of the *δικαιοσύνη*.  
As to "the priority of the *Phaedrus*," I now retract my statement and accept the conclusions of Raeder, Ritter etc. For Xenophon's *Symp.*, cp. Robin, *Notice*, pp. cix ff.

#### (4) *Commentary.*

- p. 3. 172 c. Robin and Hildebr. regard this "Glaucón" as distinct from the two mentioned.
- p. 5. 173 D. Robin construes ἀπεχνῶς with ἀθλίους, Ritter with πάντας.
- p. 6. *ibid.* Robin and Taccone prefer μαλακός: μανικός is adopted by Ritter and Friedl. and defended at length by W.-M.
- p. 10. 174 D. For the Homeric quotation cp. also *Eth. Nic.* viii. 1155<sup>a</sup> 15.
- p. 12. 175 B. The right explanation of πάντως παραίθετε was first given, I think, by J. I. Beare (in *Hermathena*, xvi.)—"In any case (*i.e.* whether there be guests or not) you serve up whatever you please, whenever no one is set over you to direct you—a thing which I myself never

did," etc. *I.e.* παραρ. is pres. *indic.* So too Taylor, W.-M., Richards and Robin: but Lamb still treats π. as imperative.

- p. 19. 177 A. "hymns of a eulogistic character": this is rightly queried by Taylor and Robin.
- p. 31. 180 D. An *Athenaeum* critic objects—"Plato inverts the actual positions in Greek cult of the Uranian Aphrodite and Aphr. Pandemos, the latter never having had anything to do with *ἑταῖραι*, while the former, at Corinth, certainly had."
- p. 37. 183 A. Schöne explains φιλοσοφίας as acc. pl.: Friedl. (like Robin) as gen. sing. after τοῦτο.
- p. 44. 185 C. ἴσα λέγειν: Robin suggests a ref. here to *Isocrates*.
- p. 51. 187 E. Πολυμνίας. Why this Muse? See the discussion in Robin, p. lv, n. 1.
- p. 80. 197 B. Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν. Cp. also *Apol.* 37 c, *Ar. Ach.* 197, *Eur. Alc.* 879.
- p. 81. 197 C. νηνεμίαν κτλ.: cp. (with W.-M.) *Aesch. Ag.* 565, and (with Robin) *Ar. Theem.* 43 ff.
- p. 88. 199 A. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι: "I cannot go on to eulogize" (Beare).
- p. 89. 199 D. οὐκ εἰ μηρός κτλ.: Ritter has the *Note*—"ich meine keine Possessiv- oder Subjektsbeziehung, wie sie z. B. in Verwandtschaftsbegriffen steckt, sondern eine Objektsbeziehung." Robin (p. lxxiii) makes the point lie in the distinction between a particular (μηρός) and an indeterminate (τινος) correlative object.
- p. 93. 201 A. γ' ἔλεγες: Robin prefers the "ambiguous" λέγεις as "appropriate to Socr.'s tone."
- p. 102. 203 D. αὐχμηρός κτλ.: cp. also *Ar. Nuθ.* 442, 445.
- p. 106. 205 A. πάντα.. δέι: Robin and Ritter connect δέι with εἶναι; Lamb construes as I do.
- p. 107. 205 D. τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν κτλ.: here Robin follows *Ficinus*; Lamb and Ritter agree with *Prantl*.
- p. 116. 207 D. νέος κτλ. Cp. also *Vahlen* on *Arist. Poet.* 1447<sup>b</sup> 14; *Phaedo* 87 B, *Tim.* 43 A.
- p. 117. 208 B. ἀλλὰ τῷ κτλ. Cf. also *Laws* 721 B, C.  
 „ *ibid.* δδύνατον: Robin and Friedl. still argue for δθάνατον: Ritter and Lamb rightly prefer δδύν.
- p. 120. 209 A. δν δή κτλ.: Robin (alone) construes δν as masc., "De ces hommes sont...les poètes qui donnent le jour à des œuvres,"

- p 122. 209 c. *καὶ περὶ κτλ.* R. Adam quotes *Rep.* 352 D for *περὶ*, and Friedl. *Laws* 772 D in defence of *τῆς τῶν παίδων*.
- p. 123. 209 ε. Stenzel follows Hug as to *κἄν σὺ μ.*, but Taylor condemns H.'s view as "unfortunate nonsense," and Friedl. also rejects it.
- p. 129. 211 A. *λόγος*: Robin and J. Adam render by "discourse"; Lamb, "description"; Ritter, "Wortgestalt"; Beare, "intellectual conception."
- p. 130. 211 c. *καὶ ἀπὸ κτλ.*: W.-M., reading *ὡς* for *καὶ*, cites *Rep.* 349 c, *Tim.* 92 A. Fraccaroli approves my *(ἵνα) καὶ*.
- p. 136. 212 ε. *ἐὰν εἶπω κτλ.*: Ritter keeps the ms. text, in the sense "if I say so (i.e. call him wisest and fairest), so it is, or who dare contradict me." Lamb, putting a dash after *εἶπω*, renders "if I may speak the—see, like this!", with the note "His drunken gesture interrupts what he means to say and resumes later,—'If I may speak the truth.'" W.-M. is strong for *ἀνειπῶν*, "the formula of honorific decrees," which Robin also adopts, rendering "tels sont les titres que je lui confère." None of these views seems wholly satisfactory. I now rather incline to Bergk's *ἐὰν εἰσῶ*, construed as parenthetic: it is an easy correction and leaves *οὐτωςὶ* with *ἀναδήσω*.
- ibid.* 213 A. *ἐπίπροσθε κτλ.*: Robin's note overlooks the explanation given by me (after Zeller) that "the garlands," not "Socrates," is the object of *ἔχοντα*, and ascribes it to M. Bourguet.
- p. 137. 213 B. *ὡς...καταΐδεν*: I now prefer *κατιδεῖν*, with Schöne, W.-M., and Lamb. Robin prefers *καθίζειν*, "pour qu' Agathon fit asseoir Alcibiade," saying that *κατιδεῖν* would mean "pour qu'il pût apercevoir celui-là" (i.e. *ὡς* for *ὡστε*); but Lamb, citing 174 ε, rightly renders "when he caught sight of Alc." Ritter and Hildebr. seem to keep *καθίζειν*.
- p. 159. 219 ε. *σιδήρω ὁ Αἴας*: Taccone suggests that the ref. may be, not to A.'s shield (as Robin), but to another legend, cp. Schol. on *Aj.* 833, Lycophron 455 ff.
- p. 161. 220 c. If *Ἰώνων* be rejected, either *νησιωτῶν* or *νεανιῶν* would be an easy correction.

# ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ· ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

St. III.

P.

172

I. Δοκῶ μοι περὶ ὧν πυνθάνεσθε οὐκ ἀμελέτητος εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον πρῶην εἰς ἄστου οἴκοθεν ἀνίων Φαληρόθεν· τῶν οὖν γνωρίμων τις ὀπισθεν κατιδὼν με πόρρωθεν ἐκάλεσε, καὶ παίζων ἴμα τῇ κλήσει, ὦ Φαληρεὺς, ἔφη, οὗτος [Ἀπολλόδωρος], οὐ περιμενεῖς; κἀγὼ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα. καὶ ὅς, Ἀπολλόδωρε, ἔφη, καὶ

172 A. (νῦν) οὐκ Methodius vulg. Φαληρόθεν del. Naber δ: ὁ vulg. Ἀπολλόδωρος secl. Bdhm. J.-U. οὐ (σὺ) Sauppe περιμενεῖς vulg. Sz.: περιμενεῖς B: περιμένεις TW, Bt. (ὦ) Ἀπολλόδωρε Sz. Ἀπολλόδωρε... ἐζήτουν om. Coisl.

172 A. Δοκῶ μοι κτλ. The speaker, Apollodorus (see *Introd.* § II. A), is replying to certain unnamed ἑταῖροι who had been questioning him concerning the incidents and speeches which took place at Agathon's banquet. The plural πυνθάνεσθε (and ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς 173 C, D *infra*) indicates that there were several ἑταῖροι present: the traditional heading of the dialogue, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, is due to the fact that all but one are κωφὰ πρόσωπα.

οὐκ ἀμελέτητος. μελέτη and μελετᾶν are regular terms for the "conning over" of a speech or "part": cp. *Phaedr.* 228 B.

καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον. These words explain the preceding statement δοκῶ... οὐκ ἀμελέτητος εἶναι, and serve to introduce not only the sentence immediately following but the whole of the succeeding passage down to 173 B where the initial statement is resumed by the words ὥστε...οὐκ ἀμελετήτως ἔχω.

Φαληρόθεν. Phalerum, the old port of Athens, was about 20 stadia (2½ miles) distant from the city on the S.E.

καὶ παίζων...περιμενεῖς; Where does the joke come in?

(1) Ast, Hommel, Stallbaum and Jowett look for it in the word Φαληρεὺς, which they take to be a play on φαλαρῖς ("bald-headed," so Jowett) or φαλαρῖς ("bald-coot") in allusion to the bald crown or the peculiar gait of Apollodorus. But what evidence is there to show that A. either was bald or walked like a coot?

(2) Another suggestion of Hommel's is to write (with the vulgate) ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος and assume an etymological allusion to the opportuneness of the meeting (as "Apollo-given"). This also is far-fetched.

(3) Schütz, followed by Wolf and Hug, finds the παιδιά in the playfully

μην καὶ ἔναγχός σε ἐξήτουν βουλόμενος διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγά-  
 Β θωνος ξυνουσίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν  
 λόγων τίνες ἦσαν. ἄλλος γὰρ τίς μοι διηγεῖτο ἀκηκῶς Φοίνικος  
 τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἔφη δὲ καὶ σὲ εἶδέναι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφὲς  
 λέγειν. σὺ οὖν μοι διήγησαι· δικαιοτάτος γὰρ εἶ τοὺς τοῦ ἑταίρου  
 λόγους ἀπαγγέλλειν. πρότερον δέ μοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἶπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς  
 C παρεγένου τῇ συνοσίᾳ ταύτῃ ἢ οὐ; καὶ γὰρ εἶπον ὅτι Παντάσασιν

172 B ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ secl. Baiter J.-U. συνδειπνεῖν T: συνδείπνῳ W

official style of the address, in which the person is designated by the name of his deme, this being the regular practice in legal and formal proceedings (cp. *Gorg.* 495 D Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεύς...Σωκράτης...ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν: *Ar. Nub.* 134); but (as Stallb. objected) the order of the words in that case should be rather ὁ οὗτος Ἀ. ὁ Φαληρεύς. Hug also finds παιδιά in the hendecasyllabic rhythm (ὁ Φαλ. οὗτος Ἀπ.), and the poetic combination ὁ οὗτος (*Soph. O. C.* 1627, *Aj.* 89).

(4) Rettig, reading ὁ Φαληρεύς, omits (with Badham) the proper name Ἀπολλόδωρος as an adscript. This seems, on the whole, the best and simplest solution. Glaucon, at a distance behind, feigns ignorance of the identity of "the Phalerian," and shouts after Apollodorus "Ho there! you Phalerian, halt," in a "stop thief!" tone. It is plausible to suppose also that a certain contempt is conveyed in the description Φαληρεύς ("Wapping-ite"): port-towns are often places of unsavoury repute: cp. *Phaedr.* 243 C ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένον: *Juv. Sat.* VIII. 174 "permixtum nautis et furibus ac fugitivis."

For the summons to halt cp. *Ar. Plut.* 440 οὗτος, τί δρᾶς; ὁ δειλότατον σὺ θηρίον, | οὐ περιμενεῖς; *Thest.* 689 ποῖ ποῖ σὺ φεύγεις; οὗτος, οὗτος, οὐ μενεῖς; also *Eq.* 240, 1354. These passages support the futuro περιμενεῖς rather than the present: "futurum est fortius imperantis; praesens modeste cohortantis aut lenius postulantis" (Stallb.). For the future as a lively imperative cp. 175 A, 212 D.

172 B ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ. Similarly in Aristoph. *Gerytades* (*frag.* 204 ἐν τοῖσι συνδείπνοις ἐπαιῶν Αἰσχύλου) σύνδειπνον is used for the more precise συμπόσιον: and a lost play of Sophocles bore the title Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος ἢ σύνδειπνον ἢ σύνδειπνοι (see *frag.* 146 ff., Dindf.).

τίνες ἦσαν. For phrases of this kind, "satis libere subjecta orationi," see Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* II. 393.

Φοίνικος τοῦ Φιλίππου. Nothing is known of this man. See *Introd.* § II. A. δικαιοτάτος γὰρ κτλ. τοῦ ἑταίρου is almost equivalent to ἑταῖρου γε ὄντος, giving the reason why Apollodorus is δικαιοτάτος.

παρεγένου τῇ συνοσίᾳ. Cp. *Hom. Od.* XVII. 173 καὶ σφιν παρεγίγμετο δαιτί: and the exordium of the *Phaedo* (57 A) αὐτὸς, ὁ Φ., παρεγένου Σωκράτες...ἢ ἄλλου του ἠκούσας;

172 C Παντάσασιν ἰοικέ σοι κτλ. "It is quite evident that his narration

ἔοικέ σοι οὐδὲν διηγείσθαι σαφές ὁ διηγούμενος, εἰ νεωστὶ ἤγγει τὴν συνουσίαν γεγονέναι ταύτην ἣν ἐρωτᾷς, ὥστε καὶ ἐμὲ παραγε-  
νέσθαι. Ἐγῶγε δὴ, <ἔφη>. Πόθεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων; οὐκ  
οἶσθ' ὅτι πολλῶν ἐτῶν Ἀγάθων ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπιδεδήμηκεν, ἀφ' οὗ  
δ' ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποιήμαι ἐκάστης  
ἡμέρας εἰδέναι ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, οὐδέπω τρία ἔτη ἐστίν;  
πρὸ τοῦ δὲ περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι καὶ οἰόμενος τί ποιεῖν ἀθλιώ- 173  
τερος ἢ ὄτουσιν, οὐχ ἤττον ἢ σὺ νυνί, οἰόμενος δεῖν πάντα μᾶλλον  
πράττειν ἢ φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ ὅς, Μὴ σκώπτ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι  
πότε ἐγένετο ἡ συνουσία αὕτη. καὶ γὰρ εἶπον ὅτι Παίδων ὄντων  
ἡμῶν ἔτι, ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγωδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ  
ἢ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἄρα

172 C καμὲ Athenaeus, Sz. ἐγὼ γε δὴ, ἔφη Bt.: ἐγὼ γε δὴ BTW: ἐγὼ  
γὰρ ἔφη(ν) Athen.: ἐγῶγε γὰρ, ἔφη Voeg.: ἐγῶγ', ἔφη Bdhm. ὦ Λύκων  
Athen. ἐνθάδε om. Athen. 173 A ἢ Tb: ἦν pr. B: ἢ Wt νῦν TW  
ἔτι ὄντων ἡμῶν Athen. πρώτη om. Athen.: τὸ πρῶτον Usener ἢ om.  
Priscian: ἢ ἢ T: ἢ Sz. τὰ πινίκια Cobet

was of the vaguest kind." διηγείσθαι is here the infin. of διηγείτω. The em-  
phatic repetition of οὐδὲν σαφές is a ground for suspecting that the reference  
is to a *published* account in which the facts were distorted.

Πόθεν...ὦ Γλαύκων; "What makes you think so, Glaucon?" There is an  
implicit negation in the question put thus: cp. *Gorg.* 471 D, *Menex.* 235 C.  
This Glaucon is perhaps the same as the father of Charmides (*Charm.* 154 A,  
etc.), but probably not the same as the Glaucon of the *Republic*, though  
Böckh and Munk would identify the two.

πολλῶν ἐτῶν κτλ. For the bearing of this passage on the dramatic date of  
this prologue, see *Introd.* § VIII.

ἐπιμελὲς πεποιήμαι...εἰδέναι. The nearest Platonic parallel for this con-  
struction is *Ep.* vii. 334 A πολλοῖς...ἰμνεῖν ταῦτα ἐπιμελές.

173 A περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι, i.e. with no fixed principle of conduct,—  
"like a wave of the sea, driven with the wind and tossed." Cp. *Tim.* 43 B  
ἀτάκτως ὅπῃ τύχοι προίμαι: Seneca *de vita beata* I. 2 "quamdiu quidem  
passim vagamur non ducem secuti...conteretur vita inter errores brevis" etc.

οἰόμενος τί ποιεῖν. For τι, *magnum quid*, cp. 219 C, *Phaedr.* 242 E, etc.

Παίδων ὄντων ἡμῶν ἔτι. Sc. Apollodorus and Glaucon. Plato, too, born  
about 427 B.C., was a παῖς at the date of Agathon's victory (416 B.C.).

τῇ πρώτῃ τραγωδίᾳ. "Respicit Plato ad tetralogias" (Reynders).

τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἢ. For this (compendious) construction cp. *Thuc.* I. 60  
τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὑστερον...ἢ Πορίδαυα ἀπίστη (with Shilleto's note);  
*Lys.* XIX. 22.

τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν. "Made a sacrificial feast in honour of his victory." On  
this occasion it was the author himself who provided the feast and offered the  
sacrifice. Sometimes however it was the Choregus (e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 886), and



παλαι, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ τίς σοι διηγείτο; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης; Οὐ  
 B μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ Φοίνικι· Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις,  
 Κυδαθηναίεύς, σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος αἰεὶ· παρεγεγόνει δ' ἐν τῇ  
 συνουσίᾳ, Σωκράτους ἐραστής ὢν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε, ὡς  
 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ Σωκράτη γε ἕνια ἤδη ἀνηρόμην  
 ὢν ἐκείνου ἤκουσα, καὶ μοι ὠμολόγει καθάπερ ἐκείνος διηγείτο. Τί  
 οὖν, ἔφη, οὐ διηγῆσω μοι; πάντως δὲ ἡ ὁδὸς ἢ εἰς ἄστν ἐπιτηδεῖα  
 πορευομένοις καὶ λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν.

C Οὗτω δὴ ἰόντες ἅμα τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦμεθα, ὥστε,  
 ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, οὐκ ἀμελετήτως ἔχω. εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν  
 διηγῆσασθαι, ταῦτα χρῆ ποιεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλως, ὅταν  
 μὲν τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων

173 A τί TW B ἄλλοσπερ BT ἀνυπόδητος τ' Ast  
 παραγεγόνει BT καὶ om. T διηγῆση W: διηγῆ σὺ vulg. δε  
 om. al.: γε J.-U.: γὰρ Susemihl C δεῖ: δοκεῖ Hirschig

sometimes the friends of the successful competitor (e.g. Xen. *Symp.* I. 4). Similarly at Rome it was customary for the *dux gregis* to entertain his troupe after a victory (see Plaut. *Rud.* 1417 ff.).

173 B Ἀριστόδημος. See *Introd.* § II. A.

Κυδαθηναίεύς. Schol. Κυδαθηναίων· δῆμος ἐν ἄστει τῆς Πανδιονίδος φυλῆς. καλεῖται δὲ καὶ Κύδαθον. The poet Aristophanes also belonged to this deme. ἀνυπόδητος. In this peculiarity A. imitated Socrates, see 174 A, 220 B, Ar. *Nub.* 103 τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις· | ὢν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν, *ibid.* 362. It is a peculiarity which would appeal to disciples with a *penchant* for the simple life, such as those of the Cynic persuasion.

ἐραστής. "An admirer." Cp. the application of *ἐταῖρος* in 172 B *supra*.

ἐκείνου...ἐκείνος. Both pronouns refer to the same person, Aristodemus. The statement here made is not without significance, see *Introd.* § II. A.

Τί οὖν...οὐ διηγῆσω. "Haec interrogatio alacritatem quandam animi et aviditatem sciendi indicat" (Stallb.). Cp. *Meno* 92 D (with E. S. Thompson's *note*, where a full list of the Platonic exx. is given).

πάντως δὲ κτλ. "For to be sure," confirming the preceding clause with a new argument. A good parallel is *Laws* I. 625 A πάντως δ' ἢ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἰκανῆ.

173 C ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον. See 172 A *ad in.*

εἰ οὖν δεῖ...χρῆ. The comma is better placed before ταῦτα, with Usener and Burnet, than after it, with Hug and earlier editors. A similar turn of expression is Soph. *Trach.* 749 εἰ χρῆ μαθεῖν σε, πάντα δὲ φωνεῖν χρεῶν.

αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι. Here Apollodorus seems to claim to be no mere disciple, but himself an exponent of philosophy. So far as it goes this might indicate that Apollodorus represents the real author, Plato. For A.'s delight in philosophic λόγοι, cp. what is said of Phaedrus in *Phaedr.* 228 B, where Socr. too is called ὁ νοσῶν περὶ λόγων.

ἀκούω, χωρὶς τοῦ οἶεσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτὸς τε ἄχθομαι ὑμᾶς τε τοὺς ἐταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἶεσθε τὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιῶντες. καὶ ἴσως αὐ ὑμεῖς ἐμὲ D ἠγείσθε κακοδαίμονα εἶναι, καὶ οἶομαι ὑμᾶς ἀληθῆ οἶεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲντοι ὑμᾶς οὐκ οἶομαι ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα.

ΕΤΑΙ. Ἄει ὅμοιος εἶ, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρε· αἰεὶ γὰρ σαυτὸν τε κακῆγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλίους ἠγείσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. καὶ

173 C χρηματιστῶν vulg.

D ἠγείσθε Coisl.: ἠγείσθαι BT

ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω. This may be explained as a mixture of two constructions, viz. (1) ὑπερφυῆς ἔστιν ὡς χαίρω, (2) ὑπερφυῶς χαίρω: it is found also in *Gorg.* 498 c, *Phaedr.* 66 a, *Theaet.* 155 c (but in all these places some codd. and edd. omit ὡς).

χρηματιστικῶν. For this word in the masc., "money-makers," cp. *Rep.* 581 c ὁ γε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἶ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ: also *Phaedr.* 248 d. In *Meno* 78 c (ἀγαθὰ...χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι) we have an expression of the sentiments of a χρηματιστικὸς. For Apollodorus' sentiment, cp. *Isocr. c. Sophr.* 291 d λέγουσι μὲν ὡς οὐδὲν δέονται χρημάτων, ἀργυρίδιον καὶ χρυσίδιον τὸν πλοῦτον ἀποκαλοῦντες (where the ref. is probably to Antisthenes): cp. also what Alcib. says of Socr., 216 E, 219 E. The gloss-hunting critics, strangely enough (as Vahlen remarks), have left the words ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐταίρους unscathed.

173 D ἀληθῆ οἶεσθαι. οἶεσθαι here is substituted for ἠγείσθαι, and the following οὐκ οἶομαι is in antithesis, not to the οἶομαι preceding, but to ἠγείσθε. Apollodorus, conscious of his inferiority to Socrates, his ideal, is willing to admit that he is not as yet wholly εὐδαίμων.

ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα. *Sc.* ὅτι κακοδαίμονες ἔστε. For this exposure of the true condition of "the children of this world" who are εὐδαίμονες in their own conceit, and despise others, one may cite *Aroc.* iii. 17 "Thou sayest, I am rich and increased with goods and have need of nothing; and knowest not that thou art wretched and miserable and poor and blind and naked."

Ἄει ὅμοιος εἶ. "Semper tibi hac in re constas" (Stallb.): "you are quite incorrigible." So below we have αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ. Cp. *Charm.* 170 A ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω αἰεὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι.

ἀτεχνῶς πάντας. This seems to be the sole instance in Plato of this combination "all without exception"; but cp. *Rep.* 432 A δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται.

ἀθλίους. Here a synonym for κακοδαίμονας, the word used above. Cp. *Meno* 78 A τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε...τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀθλίον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

πλὴν Σωκράτους. "Save Socrates only": notice the emphasis on these words, repeated twice. We may discern, perhaps, in this an allusion, by way

ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ· σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους.

**E** ΑΠΟΛ. Ὡ φίλτατε, καὶ δῆλόν γε δὴ ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι καὶ παραπαίω;

ΕΤΑΙ. Οὐκ ἄξιον περὶ τούτων, Ἀπολλόδωρε, νῦν ἐρίζειν· ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐδεόμεθά σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσης, ἀλλὰ διήγησαι τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι.

ΑΠΟΛ. Ἦσαν τοίνυν ἐκείνοι τοιοῦδε τινές—μᾶλλον δ'

173 D <sup>u</sup>μαλακός TW: μαλακός B, Naber. οὐκ: εὐ Bast μὲν γὰρ: μέν γε Bdm. Sz.: μέντ' ἄρα Mdv. **E** (δ) Ἀπολλόδωρε Method. Sz.

of antithesis, to the κατηγορία Σωκράτους of the sophist Polycrates (see *Introd.* § II. A).

τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι. There can be little doubt (*pace* Naber) that μανικός, not μαλακός, is the true reading: it is supported by the words μαίνομαι καὶ παραπαίω in Apollodorus's reply. Stallbaum supposes an ellipse of some such phrase as δοκεῖς δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτόθεν before ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ., and (with Wolf) explains μανικός as referring to the vehemence and excess of Apollodorus both in praise and blame: cp. *Polit.* 307 B, and *Apol.* 21 A where Chaerephon (termed μανικός in *Charm.* 153 B) is described as σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειεν. But the connexion of the sentence ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ. with the preceding clause is better brought out by Hug; he supplies (after οὐκ οἶδα) "so ganz ohne Grund wüßte wohl nicht sein," so that the line of thought is—"Though I do not know exactly why you got the nickname 'fanatic'—yet in your speeches at any rate you do something to justify the title." For a similar use of μὲν γὰρ cp. *Polit.* 264 C ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κρήναις τάχ' ἂν ἴσως εἴης ἡσθημένος. For μανικός cp. also *Meno* 91 C where Anytus regards παρὰ σοφιστὰς ἔλθειν as a sign of μανία: and *Acts* xxvi. 24 Μαίνη Παῦλε· τὰ πολλὰ σε γράμματα εἰς μανίαν περιτρέπει.

ἀγριαίνει. "Rage like a wild beast," "snarl and snap." Cp. *Rep.* 493 B (θρέμμα μέγα) ἡμεροῦνται τε καὶ ἀγριαίνειν.

173 E Ὡ φίλτατε κτλ. Ironic—"Why, my very dear Sir, it is surely quite obvious that in holding this view about myself and others I display madness and eccentricity!"

παραπαίω. Ἄ ἄπαξ εἰρημένον in Plato. For the musical metaphor cp. Ophelia's "I see that sovereign and most noble reason, Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh."

Οὐκ ἄξιον... ἐρίζειν. "We mustn't quarrel." ἐρίζειν, though here used jocularly, is properly a strong term, cp. *Prot.* 337 B ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή: *Rep.* 454 A οὐκ ἐρίζειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι (see Adam *ad loc.*).

μᾶλλον δ'. Instead of beginning at once with the speech of Phaedrus, Apollodorus proceeds to give an account of the preliminary incidents which led up to the λόγοι. For the significance of this, see *Introd.* § II. A.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκεῖνος διηγείτο καὶ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι διηγῆ-  
σασθαι.

II. "Ἐφη γάρ οἱ Σωκράτη ἐντυχεῖν λελουμένον τε καὶ τὰς  
βλαύτας ὑποδεδεμένον, ἃ ἐκεῖνος ὀλιγάκις ἐποίει· καὶ ἐρέσθαι  
αὐτὸν ὅποι ἴοι οὕτω καλὸς γεγεννημένος. καὶ τὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι 'Ἐπὶ  
δεῖπνον εἰς Ἀγάθωνος. χθὲς γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινικίοις,  
φοβηθεῖς τὸν ὄχλον· ὠμολόγησα δ' εἰς τήμερον παρέσεσθαι. ταῦτα  
δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω. ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦ δ' ὅς,  
πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἂν ἰέναι ἄκκλητος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον; καὶ γὰρ, B

174 A ἀ: δ Hertlein (ἐ) ἐρέσθαι Voeg. Sz. τήμερον: τὴν  
σήμερον vulg. B ἐθέλειν ἂν secl. Cobet Jn. ἂν ἰέναι Steph.: ἀνίεναι BT

ἐξ ἀρχῆς...πειράσομαι διηγῆσασθαι. The same formula occurs in *Phaedo*,  
59 c, *Euthyd.* 272 D, *Erist.* vii. 324 B.

174 A "Ἐφη γάρ. *Sc.* δ' Ἀριστοδήμος. The whole narrative of the dialogue  
from this point on is dependent upon this initial ἔφη and therefore written in  
*or. obliqua*. οἱ (*εἰδι*) = Ἀριστοδήμῳ.

λελουμένον. For the practice of bathing and anointing before meals see  
Hom. *Od.* vi. 96—7, Xen. *Symp.* i. 7: Ar. *Plut.* 614 εὐχεῖσθαι...λουσάμενος,  
λιπαρὸς χωρῶν ἐκ βαλανείου. The comic poets were fond of gibing at Socrates  
and philosophers in general as "unwashed," e.g. Ar. *Av.* 1554 ἄλντος οὐ  
ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης: id. *Nub.* 835 ff.: Aristophan *ap. Mein.* iii. 360 ff.  
Aristotle, however, was a champion of the bath, *Athen.* 178 F ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ  
ἦν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης (*fr.* 165), ἤκειν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον σὺν ἰδρωτὶ πολλῷ  
καὶ κοινορῶ.

τὰς βλαύτας. Schol. βλαύτας· ὑποδήματα. οἱ δὲ βλαυτία, σανδάλια ἰσχνά.  
For Socrates' habit of going barefoot, see 220 B *infra*, *Phaedr.* 229 A, Xen.  
*Mem.* i. 6. 2, and the note on ἀνυπόδητος, 173 B *supra*.

ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην. ταῦτα is better taken (with Hug and Hommel)  
as accus. of "internal object" than (with Stallb.) as accus. of "remoter  
object," equiv. to διὰ ταῦτα (cp. *Prot.* 310 E). Elsewhere in Plato καλλωπι-  
ζεσθαι means to "plume oneself," "swagger," e.g. *Rep.* 605 D. Observe the  
word-play: "I have put on my finery, because he is such a fine man"  
(Jowett): cp. the proverb ὁμοιος ὁμοίῳ (195 B).

παρὰ καλὸν. *Sc.* Ἀγάθωνα—"to Agathon's (house)"; equiv. to εἰς Ἀγά-  
θωνος above. For "the handsome Agathon," see *Prot.* 315 D—E (τὴν ἰδίαν  
πάνυ καλός), Ar. *Theam.* 191 ff.

πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς κτλ. Cp. 176 B πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν; *Prot.*  
352 B, *Parm.* 131 E. Cobet's excision of ἐθέλειν ἂν is wanton: cp. (with Ast)  
*Phaedo* 62 C τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν.

174 B ἄκκλητος. The jester (γελοιοποιός) who frequents feasts as an  
uninvited guest seems to have been a stock character in Epicharmus; and  
in Xen. *Symp.* Philippus is a person of this type. Araros the comic poet  
was, apparently, the first to dub them παράσιτοι. Cp. also Archil. 78. 3 οὐδὲ

ἔφη, εἶπον ὅτι Οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύης. "Ἐπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ

174 B μεταβάλλοντες B, Athen., Sz.: μεταβαλόντες T, Bt.

μὴν κληθεῖς (ὑφ' ἡμῶν) ἦλθες, οἷα δὴ φίλος; and Plut. *Q. Conv.* VII. 6. 1, p. 707 B τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐπικλήτων ἔθος, οὓς νῦν "σκιάς" καλοῦσιν, οὐ κεκλημένους αὐτούς, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν κεκλημένων ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἀγομένους, ἐζητεῖτο πόθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐδούκει δ' ἀπὸ Σωκράτους Ἀριστοῦδημον ἀναπέσαντος οὐ κεκλημένον εἰς Ἀγάθωνος ἰέναι σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ παθόντα "τι γελοῖον" (see 174 C, with note). In Lat. *vocare* is similarly used of "inviting" (*aliquem ad cenam Ter. And.* 2. 6. 22), and *invocatus* = ἄκλητος in Plaut. *Capt.* 1. 1. 2 ("invocatus soleo esse in convivio").

**διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες.** διαφθείρω is sometimes used of "spoiling" or "stultifying" a statement or argument, e.g. *Gorg.* 495 A, *Prot.* 338 D. And μεταβάλλειν of linguistic alteration (transposition, etc.), as in *Cratyl.* 404 C (Φερσεφόνη for Φερρέφατρα).

ὡς ἄρα κτλ. The force of ἄρα is to indicate that the proverb, when amended, "still, after all" holds good. Two forms of the proverb are extant, viz. (1) αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασι (see Schol. *ad h. l.*, Athen. IV. 27); and (2) αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴασι. The latter form is vouched for by the *poeta anon.* quoted by Athen. I. 8 A (Bergk *P. L. G.* p. 704), ἀγαθὸς πρὸς ἀγαθοῦς ἄνδρας εἰστιασάμενος ἦκον: Bacchyl. *fr.* 33 (22 Blass) αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθῶν δαίτας εὐχθούς ἐπέρχονται δίκαιοι φῶτες [cp. Zenob. II. 19 αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν κτέ. οὕτως ὁ Βακχυλίδης ἐχρήσατο τῇ παροιμίᾳ, ὡς Ἡρακλείους ἐπιφουήσαντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν Κήκκος τοῦ Τραχινίου καὶ οὕτως εἰπόντος]: Cratinus *fr.* 111 (Mein.) οἷδ' ἡμεῖς, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς | λόγος, αὐτομάτους ἀγαθοῦς ἰέναι | κομψῶν ἐπὶ δαίτα θεατῶν: also a number of post-Platonic passages cited by Hug, such as Plut. *Q. Conv.* VII. 6 *ad fin.* According to the Scholiast (1) is the original form, which was altered (μεταλλάξας) to (2) by Cratinus and Eupolis; and this is the view adopted by Stallbaum, Rettig and others. But Hug's elaborate investigation of the matter proves convincingly, I think, that the Scholiast is wrong and that the form with ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν was the original, of which the form with ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν is a parody by Eupolis (or Cratinus). This view, first suggested by Schleiermacher, is also supported by Bergk (*ad Bacchyl. fr.* 33): "Schol. Plat. Symp. 174 B a vero aberrat cum dicit a principis δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας fuisse, quamquam fidem habuerunt cum alii tum Müller *Dor.* II. 481: neque enim par fuit Herculem tam gravi opprobrio hospitem laedere. Eupolis primus, ut videtur, ludibundus δειλῶν substituit. Locum difficilem Platonis, qui falso criminatur Homerum corrupisse proverbium quod ille omnino non respexit, nemodum probabiliter expedit. Alia varietas, quam nostri homines commenti sunt, δειλοὶ δειλῶν, omni auctoritate destituta est." The main difficulty in the way of accepting this view lies in the words διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες. For even if (with most modern editors) we accept Lachmann's brilliant conjecture Ἀγαθῶν(ι), the change thus involved is so slight that it could hardly be called a διαφθορά, nor could the alteration involved in the Homeric account be spoken of as a

“Ἀγάθων’ ἐπὶ δαΐτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί.” “Ὀμηρος μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον διαφθεῖραι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑβρίσαι εἰς ταύτην τὴν παροιμίαν· ποιήσας γὰρ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα διαφερόντως ἀγαθὸν C ἄνδρα τὰ πολεμικά, τὸν δὲ Μενέλεων “μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν,” θυσίαν ποιουμένου καὶ ἐστιῶντος τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἄκλητον ἐποίησεν ἐλθόντα τὸν Μενέλεων ἐπὶ τὴν θοίνην, χεῖρω ὄντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ

174 B Ἀγάθων’ Lachmann: ἀγαθῶν BT      διαφερόντως + ἄνδρα + καὶ ἐστιῶντος om. Athen.

double one (διαφθεῖραι καὶ ὑβρίσαι). The former objection, if it stood alone, might be obviated by the device of inserting μή before διαφθεύωμεν: but in view of the passage as a whole this device is inadmissible. We seem forced to conclude that, whatever the original form of the proverb may have been (and as to this Hug’s view is probably right), the form which Plato had here in mind was the form (1) given by Eupolis: and if Plato knew this form to be only a parody of the original (2), we must suppose further that the serious way in which he deals with it, as if it really were a “wise saw,” is only a piece of his fun—a playful display of Socratic irony. (Cp. Teuffel, *Rhein. Mus.* xxix. pp. 141—2.)

Ἀγάθων’...ἀγαθοί. For the dative cp. *Prot.* 321 c ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεύς. Similar exx. of paronomasia occur in 185 c, 198 c, *Gorg.* 513 B (δῆμος and Demus, son of Pyrilampes), *Rep.* 614 B (ἄλκιμος, Alcinous): cp. Riddell *Digest* § 323. Teuffel (*loc. cit.*) prefers to retain ἀγαθῶν, partly because of the plur. δαΐρας, partly to avoid the elision of the *iota*; but neither of these objections is serious, and as to δαΐρας, the feast in question lasted at least two days, which might in itself suffice to justify the plural. Jowett’s transl. implies that he retains ἀγαθῶν and supposes (1) to have been the original form of the proverb “demolished” by Socr. and Homer.

Ὀμηρος μὲν γὰρ. The antithesis—ἡμεῖς δὲ μόνον διαφθεύομεν, or the like—is easily supplied from the context: for μὲν γὰρ, elliptical, cp. 176 c, and 173 D *supra*. The suggestion that Homer wilfully distorted a proverb which in his day was non-existent is, as Hug observes, obviously jocose.

ὑβρίσαι. The word may retain a flavour of its juridical sense—“liable to a criminal prosecution for assault and battery”: and if so, διαφθεῖρα too may hint at the crime of “seduction.” Homer is chargeable not only with seducing but with committing a criminal assault upon the virgin soundness of the proverb.

174 C μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν. “A craven spearman.” *Il.* xvii. 587 οἷον δὴ Μενέλαον ὑπετρέσας, δε τὸ πάρος περ | μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής. μαλθακός, as a variant for μαλακός, is used by P. also in 195 D, *Phaedr.* 239 c. Both forms, Μενέλεως and Μενέλαος, are found in Attic prose; the latter, e.g., in *Euthyd.* 288 c. In Athenaeus v. 3, 188 B we have a criticism of this treatment of Menelaus.

ἄκλητον ἐποίησεν ἐλθόντα. See *Il.* ii. 408 αὐτόματος δὲ οἱ ἦλθε βοῖν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος: cp. Athen. v. 178 A. Thus the ὑβρίσι with which Homer is charged

ἀμείνονος. ταυτ' ἀκούσας εἰπεῖν ἔφη "Ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ὀμηρον φαῦλος ὦν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θοίνην ἄκλητος. ὄρα οὖν ἄγων με τί ἀπο-  
**D** λογήση, ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὁμολογήσω ἄκλητος ἦκειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σου κεκλημένος. "Σύν τε δύ'," ἔφη, "ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁ τοῦ" βουλευ-  
 σόμεθα ὅ τι ἐροῦμεν. ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν.

Τοιαυτ' ἄττα σφᾶς ἔφη διαλεχθέντας ἰέναι. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη  
 εἰπαυτῷ πως προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν πορεύεσθαι ὑπο-  
 λειπόμενον, καὶ περιμένοντος οὐ κελεύειν προϊέναι εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.  
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος, ἀνεωργμένην κατα-  
**E** λαμβάνειν τὴν θύραν, καὶ τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν. οἱ μὲν  
 γὰρ εὐθύς παῖδά τινα ἔνδοθεν ἀπαντήσαντα ἄγειν οὐ κατέκεντο οἱ  
 ἄλλοι, καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ἤδη μέλλοντας δειπνεῖν· εὐθύς δ' οὖν

174 **C** ὄρα...τί Bdhm.: ἀρα...τι B; ἀρα...τι T (τί W) ἀγαγὼν Creuzer  
**D** ὁ τοῦ Gottleber (Hom. K 224): ὁδοῦ BTW: om. Hermog. ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν  
 T: ἀλλ' ἔωμεν B πορευόμενον ὑπολείπεσθαι Rohde Sz. δὲ (ἐ) Cobet Sz.:  
 δ' ἐ Baiter J.-U. **E** οἱ Photius, b: οἱ BT: τὸν W (τῶν) ἔνδοθεν  
 Porson Sz. J.-U. Bt.: τῶν ἔνδοθεν Photius, Jn.

consists in making not an ἀγαθός but a μαλθακός (=δειλός) come ἄκλητος ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας.

ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς. σοφός, "accomplished," was "a fashionable epithet of praise in Plato's time, especially applied to poets" (see *Rep.* 331 E, 489 B, with Adam's notes).

ὄρα οὖν κτλ. This correction of the traditional ἀρα...τι is certain. Cp. 189 A ὄρα τί ποιεῖς: *Phaedo* 86 D ὄρα οὖν...τί φήσομεν. For the dangers of violating etiquette on such occasions, see *Ar. Av.* 983 ff. αὐτὰρ ἐπὶν ἄκλητος ἴων ἀνθρωπος ἀλαζῶν | λυπῆ θύοντας καὶ σπλαγχνεύειν ἐπιθυμῆ, | δὴ τότε χρῆ τύπτειν αὐτὸν πλευρῶν τὸ μεταξύ.

174 **D** Σύν τε δύ' κτλ. See *Il.* x. 224 (Diomedes loq.) σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω καὶ τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν· ὅπως κέρδος ἔη. The same verses are quoted more exactly in *Prot.* 348 c: cp. also *Arist. Pol.* III. 1287<sup>b</sup> 13; *Cic. ad fam.* IX. 7. For exx. of how Plato "variis modis multis affert aliena," see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. pp. 476 ff.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι. The infin. in place of the indic. is due to assimilation: cp. *Rep.* 614 B ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πορεύεσθαι: see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 755.

174 **E** καὶ τ...γελοῖον παθεῖν. It was an awkward situation in smart society. Cp. *Plut. Conv.* 6 p. 628 ἔλαθε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑπολειφθεῖς ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ δὲ παρεῖηλθεν, ἀτεχνῶς σκιά προβαδίζουσα σώματος ἐξόπισθε τὸ φῶς ἔχοντος.

οἱ (εἰδὶ) goes with ἀπαντήσαντα. Porson's insertion (from Photius) of τῶν before ἔνδοθεν is no improvement: ἔνδοθεν is to be taken with ἀπαντήσαντα, and there is no indication that there were any ἔξωθεν παῖδες.

ὡς ἰδεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, ὦ, φάναι, Ἀριστόδημε, εἰς καλὸν ἦκεισθε ὅπως συνδειπνήσης· εἰ δ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἤλθες, εἰς αὐθις ἀναβαλοῦ, ὡς καὶ χθὲς ζητῶν σε ἵνα καλέσαιμι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ ἰδεῖν. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτη ἡμῖν πῶς οὐκ ἄγεῖς; καὶ ἐγὼ, ἔφη, μεταστρεφόμενος οὐδαμοῦ ὀρώ Σωκράτη ἐπόμενον· εἶπον οὖν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ Σωκράτους ἦκοιμι, κληθεὶς ὑπ' ἐκείνου δεῦρ' ἐπὶ δεῖπνον. Καλῶς γ', ἔφη, ποιῶν σύ· ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἔστιν οὗτος; Ὅπισθεν ἐμοῦ 175 ἄρτι εἰσήει· ἀλλὰ θαυμάζω καὶ αὐτὸς ποῦ ἂν εἴη. Οὐ σκέψη, ἔφη, παῖ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ εἰσάξεις Σωκράτη; σὺ δ', ἦ δ' ὅς, Ἀριστόδημε, παρ' Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακλίνου.

III. Καὶ ἔ μὲν ἔφη ἀπονίξιν τὸν παῖδα, ἵνα κατακέοιτο· ἄλλον δέ τινα τῶν παιδῶν ἦκειν ἀγγέλλοντα ὅτι Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ ἔστηκε καὶ οὐ καλοῦντος οὐκ ἐθέλει εἰσιέναι. Ἄτοπόν γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐκ οὐ καλεῖς αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ἀφήσεις; καὶ ὁς ἔφη εἰπεῖν Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἔατε

174 E δ T: φ B συνδειπνήσεις Laur. XIV. 85, Bekk. Sz. τ' ἦ T:  
 τε B ἔφην T οὐδαμῇ TW ἦκοιμι Tb: ἦκοι μη B γ' T: om. B  
 175 A εἰσήει Cobet ὅπου Hirschig ἔ μὲν Bast: ἔ Steph.: ἐμέ BT  
 ἔφην T ἵνα (που) vulg.: ὅπου Tmg. ἐν τῷ Steph. J.-U.: ἐν του Mdvg.  
 καὶ οὐ BT: κάμου W, Bt.: καὶ σου t καλοῖς Tmg. W: κάλει rec. b  
 αὐτὸν: αὐθις Herwerden ἀφήσης T

εἰς καλὸν ἦκει. "Soyez le bienvenu!" For the construction see Goodwin, § 317.

χθὲς ζητῶν σε κτλ. Hug regards this as a piece of polite mendacity on the part of Agathon. Are we, then, to construe Alcibiades' statement, χθὲς μὲν οὐχ οἷός τε κτλ. (212 E) as a similar exhibition of "Salonweltlichkeit"?

175 A παρ' Ἐ. κατακλίνου. Usually each κλίνη held two, but in 175 c it is said that Agathon had a couch to himself, while in 213 A we find three on the same couch.

ἀπονίξιν τὸν παῖδα. The article indicates that a special slave was set apart for this duty. For the custom of foot-washing see Plut. Phoc. 20; Petron. Sat. 31; Evang. Luc. vii. 44; Joann. xiii. 5. For the hand-washing see Ar. frag. 427 φέρε, παῖ, ταχέως κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδαρ, | παράπεμπε τὸ χειρόμακτρον.

Σωκράτης οὗτος κτλ. The *ipsissima verba* of the παῖς are here repeated, hence the use of οὗτος and of the def. article with προθύρῳ: in the corrections proposed by Madvig and Herwerden this point is overlooked. For πρόθυρον, "porch," i.e. the space between the house-door (αὐλεία) and the street, see Smith D. A. I. 661<sup>b</sup>.

οὐκ οὐ καλεῖς κτλ. καλεῖς is of course future, not pres. as Rückert wrongly supposed. For the constr. see Goodwin G. M. T. § 299.



**B** αὐτόν. ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτ' ἔχει· ἐνίοτε ἀποστὰς ὅποι ἂν τύχη ἔστηκεν. ἤξει δὲ αὐτίκα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. μὴ οὖν κινεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἔατε. Ἄλλ' οὕτω χρῆ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη φάναι τὸν Ἀγαθωνα. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες, τοὺς ἄλλους ἐστιᾶτε. πάντως παρατίθετε ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἐπειδὴν τις ὑμῖν μὴ ἐφεστήκη—ὃ ἐγὼ οὐδεπώποτε ἐποίησα· νῦν οὖν, νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν κεκλή-

**C** σθαι ἐπὶ δείπνον καὶ τούσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε, ἵνα ὑμᾶς ἐπαινώμεν.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἔφη σφᾶς μὲν δειπνεῖν, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτη οὐκ

175 B τούτο T Priscian: τοιούτων W ἐνίοτε...ἔστηκεν del. Voeg. ἔφη T: om. B ἐπειδὴν τις...μὴ BT: ἐπεὶ τις...οὐ μὴ L. Schmidt: ἐπεὶ οὐ δὴ τις...μὴ Hug: ἐπεὶ δὴ τις...οὐ μὴ Sz: ἐπεὶ καὶ τίσις...μὴ (ἐφεστήκει) Verm.: εἴ γ' ὁ ταμίας...μὴ Usener: ἐπειδὴν αὐτὸς...μὴ cj. Bt.: εἴγε ἀνάγκη τις... μὴ coniciebam ἐφεστήκη T: ἐφεστήκη W: ἐφεστήκει B: "latet ἐφέστηκεν" Usener

175 B πάντως παρατίθετε. For the use of πάντως with imper., cp. Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 3. 27 πάντως τοῖνον...δείξόν μοι: *id. Oecon.* XII. 11, III. 12. For παρατίθημι of "putting on the table," cp. *Rep.* 372 C τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς κτλ. Reynders adopts the reading πάντως, καὶ παρατίθετε.

ἐπειδὴν...μὴ ἐφεστήκη. These words are difficult. They should naturally mean (as Stallb. puts it) "si quando nemo vobis est propositus"; and so Stallb. proposes to construe them, taking the clause as dependent on and limiting ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε. This, however, is, as Hug argues, almost certainly wrong. If we retain the text of the mss. we can only explain the phrase by assuming an ellipse—"serve up what dishes you like (as you usually do) whenever no one is in command." So Zeller renders "tragt uns getrost auf, was ihr wollt, wie ihr es gewohnt seid, wenn man euch nicht unter Aufsicht nimmt," etc.; and Rieckher (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxiii. p. 307) "Machet es wie ihr es immer macht, wenn man euch nicht beaufsichtigt (und das habe ich ja noch nie gethan), und setzt uns vor was ihr möget." Most of the emendations offered (see *crit. n.*) are based on the assumption that the clause in question qualifies the leading clause (πάντως παρατίθετε): none of them are convincing, and the construction οὐ μὴ...ἐφεστήκη (the pres. perf.) assumed by Schanz and Hug lacks support. If compelled to resort to conjecture, the best device might be to read εἴ γε μὴ for ἐπειδὴν, cut out the μὴ after ὑμῖν, and change the mood of the verb to ἐφέστηκεν—following in part the suggestions of Usener. The ordinary text does not admit of Jowett's rendering, "serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves." As regards the force of δ...ἐποίησα, L. Schmidt explains the clause to mean "nunquam autem rem ita ut nunc institui," implying that the concession to the slaves was unusual: Teuffel, on the contrary, sees in it a piece of ostentation on the part of Agathon, boasting of his humanity. The former is clearly wrong.

εἰσιέναι. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα πολλάκις κελεύειν μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἔ δὲ οὐκ ἔβν. ἤκειν οὖν αὐτὸν οὐ πολὺν χρόνον, ὡς εἰώθει, διατρίψαντα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα σφᾶς μεσοῦν δειπνοῦντας. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα—τυγχάνειν γὰρ ἔσχατον κατακείμενον μόνου— Δεῦρ', ἔφη φάναι, Σώκρατες, παρ' ἐμὲ κατάκεισο, ἵνα καὶ τοῦ D σοφοῦ ἀπτόμενός σου ἀπολαύσω, ὃ σοι προσέστη ἐν τοῖς προθύ-


175 C ἔ δὲ BW: \*\*\* δὲ T (τὸν δὲ fuisse videtur): αὐτὸν δὲ vulg.: ἰ δὲ oj. Bekk. οὐκ ἔβν B: οὐκαν T D ἀπτόμενός σου TW: om. B, J.-U. Sz. προσέστη T: πρόσσστιν B

175 C **πολλάκις κελεύειν.** This is an ex. of the pres. infin. representing an impf. indic.: "He said, *ἐδειπνοῦμεν, ὃ δὲ Σ. οὐκ εἰσήει· ὃ οὖν Ἀ. ἐκέλευεν· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ εἶων*" (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 119, where see parallels). The accus. ζ, of the speaker, is here used in preference to the more regular nomin. (αὐτός) in order to balance the accus. τὸν Ἀγάθωνα: cp. *Gorg.* 474 B *ἐγὼ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σέ...ἡγείσθαι*, and below 175 E.

**ὡς εἰώθει.** To be taken closely with οὐ π. χρ.: we should rather say "contrary to his usual custom," the sense being "he arrived unusually soon for him." For a striking instance of Socrates' ἔθος see 220 c, where πολὺν χρόνον διέτριψεν.

**μάλιστα...δειπνοῦντας.** For μάλιστα of approximate measurement, cp. *Partm.* 127 B *περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα: Τιμ.* 21 B, *Crilo* 43 A. Nowhere else in Plato is μεσοῦν joined with a participle, nor does L. and S. supply any parallel.

**ἔσχατον...μόνου.** Agathon occupied the last κλίη on the right: this was the "lowest seat" at the table, and commonly taken, in politeness, by the host. The seat of honour (προνομή) was the left-hand place on the κλίη furthest to the left. Thus if four κλίηαι are placed in a row, numbered A—D, and each seating two persons, the person who occupies A<sup>1</sup> is termed πρῶτος, and the occupant of D<sup>2</sup> ἔσχατος: as thus



At this "Banquet" Phaedrus as occupying A<sup>1</sup> is described as πρῶτος in 177 D: see also the discussion between Socrates and Alcibiades in 222 E. Cp. Theophr. *Char.* 21 *ὃ δὲ μικροφίλοτιμος τοιοῦτός τις οἶος σπουδάσαι ἐπὶ δείπνον κληθεῖς παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καλέσαντα δειπνήσαι: Stob. Flor.* XIII. 36 *Διονύσιος...ἀτιμάζων αὐτὸν...κατέκλινεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἔσχατῇ χώρᾳ.*

175 D **τοῦ σοφοῦ...ἀπολαύσω.** τοῦ σοφοῦ is neut., being the antecedent of ὃ, not in agreement with σου: "that I may enjoy the piece of wisdom which occurred to you." The omission of ἀπτόμενός σου by B is probably accidental: without the words (as Teuffel observes) Socr.'s remark (ἐὰν ἀπτ.) would be less natural.

ροισ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εὖρες αὐτὸ καὶ ἔχεις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης. καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη καθίξασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὐ ἂν ἔχοι, φάσαι, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ἢ σοφία ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ πληρεστέρου εἰς τὸ κενώτερον ρεῖν ἡμῶν, ἐὰν ἀπτῶμεθα ἀλλήλων, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς κύλιξιν ὕδωρ τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου ρέον ἐκ τῆς πληρεστέρας εἰς τὴν **E** κενωτέραν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ σοφία, πολλοῦ τιμῶμαι τὴν παρὰ σοὶ κατακλινῖν· οἶμαι γὰρ με παρὰ σοῦ πολλῆς καὶ καλῆς σοφίας πληρωθήσεσθαι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὴ φαύλη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος, ὥσπερ ὄναρ οὔσα, ἡ δὲ σὴ λαμπρά τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, ἢ γε παρὰ σοῦ νέου ὄντος οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐκφανῆς ἐγένετο πρῆψιν ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυριοῖς. Ὑβριστῆς εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Ἀγάθων. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον διαδικασόμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ

175 D τὸ BT: τὸν corr. Coisl., J.-U. Sz. ἐρίου: ὄργανου Cornarius: ὕλιστηρίου vel ἠθηνίου Fischer ἐκ τῆς...κενωτέραν del. Voeg. Naber  
**E** τιμῶμαι T: τιμῶμεν B: τιμῶ μὲν Stallb. με del. Usener καὶ B:  
 ἢ καὶ TW ἢ γε T: εἶ γε B καὶ: ἀλλὰ vulg.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν προαπέστης. The protasis is suppressed: Stallbaum supplies *εἰ μὴ εὖρες αὐτό*: while Hug explains the phrase as a conflate of two thoughts, viz. (1) *οὐκ ἂν ἀπέστης εἰ μὴ εὖρες*, and (2) *οὐ προαπέστης πρὶν εὐρεῖν*.

*εἰς τὸ κενώτερον*. Ficinus renders "ut in vacuum hominem ex pleniore ipso contactu profueret," and many edd. adopt *τόν* in preference to *τό* (so too Jowett's transl.).

*ὥσπερ τὸ...ὕδωρ κτλ.* Editors from Rückert down generally accept the explanation of this passage offered by Geel. Two cups, one empty the other full, are placed in contact: a woollen thread, with one end inserted in the full cup, the other hanging into the empty cup, serves by the law of capillarity to convey the fluid from the one to the other.

175 **E** *φαύλη...καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος*. "Meagre" in quantity and "questionable" in quality, in antithesis to *πολλή* in quantity and *καλή* in quality.

*πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα*. Hug supposes an astral allusion—"like a quickly-rising star." This, however, is not necessarily conveyed by the term *ἐπίδοσις*, for which cp. *Theaet.* 146 B ἢ νεότης *εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει*, and the intrans. use of *ἐπιδιδόναί*, *Prot.* 318 A, *Theaet.* 150 D, etc.

*οὕτω σφόδρα κτλ.* Notice the ironical tone—exaggeration coupled with a purple patch of poetic diction: "shone out with such dazzling splendour before the eyes of three myriads of Greek spectators."

*Ὑβριστῆς εἶ*. "What a scoffer you are!" Observe that *ὑβρις* is one of the main charges laid against Socr. by Alcibiades also (219 c, etc.); cp. *Introd.* § II B.

*ταῦτα...διαδικασόμεθα*. "We will formally plead our claims in regard to these heads." "Technically *diadicasia* denotes the proceedings in a contest for preference between two or more rival parties either as to the possession

περὶ τῆς σοφίας, δικαστῆ χρώμενοι τῷ Διονύσῳ· νῦν δὲ πρὸς τὸ δεῖπνον πρῶτα τρέπου.

IV. Μετὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, κατακλιθέντος τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ 176  
 δειπνήσαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, σπουδὰς τε σφᾶς ποιήσασθαι καὶ  
 ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν  
 πότον· τὸν οὖν Πausανίαν ἔφη λόγου τοιοῦτου τινὸς κατάρχειν.  
 Εἶεν, ἄνδρες, φάσαι, τίνα τρόπον ῥᾶστα πόμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν  
 λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πάνυ χαλεπῶς ἔχω ὑπὸ τοῦ χθῆς πότου καὶ

175 E περὶ τῆς σοφίας del. Hirschig 176 A (ὡς) καὶ τῶν Rohde  
 καὶ τᾶλλα: κατὰ Ast: καί...νομιζόμενα post ποιήσασθαι transp. Steinhart  
 ἄνδρες: ὄνδρες Sauppe Sz. ῥᾶστα BT: ἥδιστα γρ. t

of property or as to exemption from personal or pecuniary liabilities...The essential difference between *diadicasia* and the ordinary *dikai* is, that all claimants are similarly situated with respect to the subject of dispute, and no longer classified as plaintiffs and defendants" (Smith, *D. A.* i. 620<sup>b</sup>). *περὶ τῆς σοφίας*, added loosely as an afterthought, serves to define *ταῦτα*: Teuffel, as against Jahn, rightly defends the words; and they serve to strike one of the keynotes of the dialogue.

**δικαστῆ...τῷ Διονύσῳ.** Dionysus is an appropriate choice since it was under his auspices that Agathon (*πρόην*) had engaged in an *ἀγών* and won a prize for poetic *σοφία*. There may also lie in the words (as Wolf and Rettig suppose) a jocular allusion to the *σοφία* which is *ars bibendi*, wherein also Agathon was *δυνατώτατος* (176 c). Compare also the pastoral pipe-contests of Theocritus, and Theognis 993 ff. *εἰ...ἄθλον... | σοὶ τ' εἴη καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίης πέρι θηρισάντων, | γνοίης·χ' ὄσσον ὄνων κρέσσονες ἡμίονοι.* Cp. *Intro.* § II. B.

**176 A σπονδὰς...νομιζόμενα.** Plato spares us the details of the ritual proper to such occasions. From other sources we may gather that it included (1) a libation of unmixed wine to *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων* (*Ar. Eq.* 105, etc.); (2) the clearing, or removal, of the tables (*Xen. Symp.* II. 1); (3) the fetching, by the *παῖδες*, of a second supply of water for the hands (*Ar. Vesp.* 1217 etc.); (4) the distribution of wreaths among the guests (Theogn. 1001, *Ar. Acharn.* 1145); (5) the pouring out of three libations, viz. (a) to Zeus Olympius and the Olympian gods, (b) to the Heroes, and (c) to Zeus Soter (*Schol. ad Philob.* 66 D; *Aesch. Suppl.* 27, etc.); (6) the singing of a *Te Deum* (*ἄδειν τὸν θεόν, παιανίζειν* *Xen. Symp.* II. 1, *Alcman fr.* 24 B, etc.): see Hug's exhaustive note. Rückert wrongly makes τᾶλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα depend on ἄσαντας: supply (as Reynders) *ποιησαμένους*. For καὶ τᾶλλα, cp. (with Vahlen) *Euthyd.* 294 c, *Rep.* 400 D: for τὰ νομιζόμενα, *quae moris sunt*, cp. *II. Alc.* 151 B.

τίνα τρόπον ῥᾶστα. *Schol. ῥᾶστα*: τὸ ἥδιστα ἐνταῦθα σημαίνει. Cp. *Od.* IV. 565 τῇ περ (*sc.* in Elysium) *ῥηίστη βιοσῇ*: and the combination ῥᾶστα καὶ ἥδιστα, *Xen. Mem.* II. 1. 9. (See also Vahlen *Op. Acad.* II. 212 ff. *ad Phaedo* 81 c).

πάνυ χαλεπῶς ἔχω. The notion is "I was roughly handled in my bout with the wine-god yesterday": cp. *Theaet.* 142 B *χαλεπῶς ἔχει ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν*.

δέομαι ἀναψυχῆς τῆνός, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς—παρήστε  
**B** γὰρ χθές· σκοπεῖσθε οὖν, τίνι τρόπῳ ἂν ὡς ῥᾶστα πίνοιμεν. τὸν  
οὖν Ἀριστοφάνη εἰπεῖν, Τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Πανσανία, τὸ  
παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευάσασθαι ῥαστώνην τιὰ τῆς πόσεως· καὶ  
γὰρ αὐτὸς εἰμι τῶν χθές βεβαπτισμένων. ἀκούσαντα οὖν αὐτῶν  
ἔφη Ἐρυξίμαχον τὸν Ἀκουμενοῦ Ἡ καλῶς, φάναι, λέγετε. καὶ  
ἔτι ἐνὸς δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀκούσαι, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πίνειν  
Ἀγάθων. Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐρρωμαι. Ἐρμαιον ἂν εἴη  
**C** ἡμῖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ Φαίδρῳ καὶ  
τοῖσδε, εἰ ὑμεῖς οἱ δυνατώτατοι πίνειν νῦν ἀπειρήκατε· ἡμεῖς μὲν  
γὰρ αἰεὶ ἀδύνατοι. Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ  
ἀμφοτέρα, ὥστ' ἐξαρκέσει αὐτῷ ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν  
μοι δοκεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν παρόντων προθύμως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πολλὴν  
πίνειν οἶνον, ἴσως ἂν ἐγὼ περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεισθαι οἶόν ἐστι τὴνληθῆ  
λέγων ἦττον ἂν εἴην ἀηδής. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε οἶμαι κατὰ  
**D** δηλον γεγοῦναι ἐκ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ  
μέθη ἐστί· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐκὼν εἶναι πόρρω ἐθελήσαιμι ἂν πιεῖν

176 A παρήστε BTW: παρήτε in mg. rec. b B παρασκευάσασθαι TW:  
παρασκευάζεσθαι B αὐτῶν T: αὐτὸν B Ἐρυξίμαχον T: τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον B  
ἀκουμενοῦ W: ἀκουμένου BT καὶ: καίτοι Rohde ἐρρῶσθαι secl. Cobet  
πίνειν, Ἀγάθωνος Vahlen C ἐξαιρῶ Heindorf: ἐξαιρῶ BT ἀηδής T: ἀηλης B

176 B βεβαπτισμένων: "soaked," "drenched." Cp. Lucian *Bucch.* 7 καρῆ-  
καὶ βεβαπτισμένῳ; and the use of βεβρεγμένους, Eubul. *Incert.* 5; μέθη βαρῶντι  
βρεχθεῖς Eur. *El.* 326; Sen. *Ep.* 83 mersus vino et madens; Hor. *C.* iv. 5. 39  
dicimus...sicci...dicimus uvidi. A similar "baptism" is described in Euenos  
2. 5—6, εἰ δὲ πολὺς πνεύσειεν (sc. ὁ Βάκχος) ἀπέστραπται μὲν ἔρωτας, | βαπτίζει  
δ' ὑπὸν γείτονι τοῦ θανάτου: of which we find an echo in Clem. Alex. *Paed.*  
II. ii. 27<sup>2</sup> (Stählin) ὑπὸ μέθης βαπτίζομενος εἰς ὑπνον. There may be an  
underlying allusion to Eupolis' play *Βαπταί* (cp. Bergk *P. L. G.* II. p. 268).

176 C ἐξαιρῶ λόγου: "I leave out of account": cp. *Phaedr.* 242 B, *Rep.*  
394 B, 492 E. For Socrates as inconvincible "with wine and wassail," see  
Alcibiades' description, 220 A.

περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεισθαι. A favourite subject of discussion with moralists,  
e.g. Theognis 473 ff., 560 ff.; *Laus* I. 677 D ff., Xen. *Symp.* II.; and the treatise  
περὶ μέθης of Antisthenes.

ἦττον...ἀηδής. "Less likely to bore you," sc. than if you were in the mood  
for wine-bibbing. Compare (with Wolf) Hor. *Sat.* II. ii. 1 ff. quae virtus et  
quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo...discite non inter lances mensasque nitentes.

176 D χαλεπὸν...ἢ μέθη. Similarly in 180 B we have neut. adj. with  
masc. subst. (θειότερον...ἐραστής). For the sentiment cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 1253  
κακὸν τὸ πίνειν· κτλ.: Theogn. 211 οἶνόν τοι πίνειν πούλην κακόν: Xen.

οὔτε ἄλλω συμβουλευσάμε, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραιπαλῶντα ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προτεραίας. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη φάναι ὑπολαβόντα Φαῖδρον τὸν Μυρρινούσιον, ἔγωγέ σοι εἴωθα πείθεσθαι ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄτ' ἂν περὶ ἰατρικῆς λέγῃς· νῦν δ', ἂν εὖ βουλεύωνται, καὶ οἱ λοιποί. ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας συγχωρεῖν πάντας μὴ διὰ μέθης ποιήσασθαι **E** τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν.

V. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, τοῦτο μὲν δέδοκται, πίνειν ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, ἐπάναγκες δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθούσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον, ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον· καὶ

176 D κραιπαλῶντα T: κραιπαλοῦντα B: κραιπαλῶντι Hirschig φαῖδρον T: φαιδρων B μυρρινούσιον T λέγεις T ἂν TW: αὖ B βουλεύονται corr. Coisl. Baist: βούλωνται BTW: βούλονται vulg.: (αὖ) βούλονται ἂν Thiersch: (αὖ) βούλονται Ast: (αὖ) ἂν βούλωνται Kreyenbühl **E** αὐλητρίδα T: αὐλιτρίδα B ἢ ἂν: ἦν B: ἔαν T

*Symp.* II. 26 ἦν μὲν ἄθρόον τὸ ποτὸν ἐγχεώμεθι, ταχὺ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ αἰ γνῶμαι σφαλοῦνται κτλ. For the pedantic reference to ἡ ἰατρικὴ, cp. 186 A.

κραιπαλῶντα. *Tim. Lex. Plat.* explains by ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης βαρυνόμενον. For the accus., in place of dat. (in appos. to ἄλλω), cp. 188 D ἡμῖν...δυναμένους: *Rep.* 414 A, etc.

νῦν δ'...οἱ λοιποί. With οἱ λοιποί we must supply σοὶ πείσονται, as Stallb. and Winckelmann observed. Rettig alone, of later editors, retains the reading νῦν δ' αὖ εὖ βούλονται, with Wolf's rendering, "nunc bene est, quod item reliquos id velle video"; but, as Hug remarks, that εὖ βούλονται can mean "bene est quod volunt" lacks proof.

176 E οὕτω...πρὸς ἡδονήν. οὕτως is frequently used thus in combination with adverbs (esp. *ράδιως*, *εἰκῆ*, *ἀπλῶς*, and the like; see Blaydes on *Ar. Vesp.* 461) where it has "a diminishing power" (L. and S.), e.g. 180 C *ἔνδρα*, *Gorg.* 503 D; cp. the force of *sic* in such phrases as "iacentes sic temere" (*Hor. C. II. xi. 14*).

τοῦτο μὲν κτλ. The antithesis to the μὲν-clause lies, not in the clause ἐπάναγκες δὲ μ. εἶναι, but in τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο κτλ. Cp. *Arist. Pol.* 1278<sup>b</sup> 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτόον πρότερον κτλ.

ἐπάναγκες. Cp. *Theogn.* 472 πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνιερὸν ἔφν· | τῷ πίνειν δ' ἐθέλοντι παρασταδὸν οἰνοχοεῖτω—where a similar relaxation of compulsory rules is advocated.

| εἰσηγοῦμαι. "I propose," *suadeo*: cp. *Crito* 48 A; *Xen. Mem.* II. 7. 10.

τὴν...αὐλητρίδα. It was the fashion at *convivia* to provide pipers, dancers, jesters, jugglers *et hoc genus omne* to amuse the guests. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* II. 1, *Rep.* 373 A κλῖναι τε...καὶ εἰσάγειν καὶ πέμματα (with Adam's note); *Ar. Ach.* 1090 ff.; also *Protag.* 347 C, D (see next page).

ταῖς ἔνδον. *Sc. ἐν τῷ γυναικῶνι.*

177 δι' οἶων λόγων, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι. Φάναί δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ κελεύειν αὐτὸν εἰσηγεῖσθαι. εἴπειν οὖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον ὅτι Ἡ μὲν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν. Φαῖδρος γὰρ ἐκάστοτε πρὸς με ἀγανακτῶν λέγει Οὐ δεινόν, φησίν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ἄλλοις μὲν τισι θεῶν ὕμνους καὶ παιῶνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους, τῷ δὲ

177 A καὶ ante βουλ. secl. Hermann Sz.: καὶ βούλεσθαι del. Voeg.

<sup>ω</sup> παιῶνας W: παίονας BT: παιῶνας bt

δι' οἶων λόγων. For an appreciation of the συνουσία διὰ λόγων, cp. Theogn. 493 ff. ἡμεῖς δ' εὖ μυθεῖσθε παρὰ κρητῆρι μένοντες... | ἐς τὸ μέσον φωνεῦντες ὁμῶς ἐνὶ καὶ συνάπασιν· | χούτως συμπόσιον γίνεται οὐκ ἄχαρι. *Simplic. in Erist.* 33. 6, p. 266 καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ χωρὶς λόγων τράπεζα φάτης οὐδὲν διαφέρει which is probably a reminiscence of *Protag.* 347 c, d καὶ γὰρ οἱτοί (sc. οἱ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι), διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλους δι' ἐαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας κτλ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 276 d.

177 A Φάναί δὴ κτλ. It is tempting to excise (with Hermann, Teuffel and Hug) the first καὶ and to construe φάναί closely with βούλεσθαι, as balancing κελεύειν εἰσηγεῖσθαι, πάντας being the subject of both the leading infinn., φάναί and κελεύειν: cp. 177 E ξυνέφασάν τε καὶ ἐκέλευον: *Euthyd.* 274 c ὁ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη...καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον...ἐπιδείξασθαι κτλ. If the first καὶ be retained, it seems most natural to take κελεύειν as dependent on φάναί: Stallb., however, puts a comma after βούλεσθαι, as if making κελεύειν parallel to φάναί: and so too, apparently, Zeller.

κατὰ τὴν Μελανίππην. Euripides wrote two plays of this name, M. ἡ σοφὴ and M. δεσμώτις. The reference here is to the former (*Frag.* 488 Nauck), οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα, κτλ. Melanippe, a daughter of Aeolus, bore two sons to Poseidon; they were suckled by a cow, and brought to their grandfather Aeolus as βουγενῆ τέρατα: when he proposed to burn them, Melanippe appeared and tried to dissuade him, arguing ὅτι οὐδὲν τέρας ἐστίν. According to another account, M. was a daughter of Cheiron, seduced by Aeolus, and finally metamorphosed into a mare. Cp. *Apol.* 20 E οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, κτλ.: Hor. *Sat.* II. ii. 2 nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praecepit Ofellus.

Οὐ δεινόν κτλ. With this passage, cp. Isocr. ix. 5—8, and x. 12 with its scornful reference to encomiasts of "humble-bees, salt-diets, and the like" (see *Introd.*, § II. B (e)).

ὕμνους καὶ παιῶνας. Properly speaking ὕμνοι are odes set for the lyre, παιῶνες odes set for the flute and sung esp. in honour of Apollo. "The paean is a hymn (1) of supplication or propitiation during the pain or danger; (2) a thanksgiving after it is past" (see Smith, *D. A.* II. 307 s.v.).

Ἔρωτι, τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσοῦτῳ θεῷ, μὴδὲ ἕνα πώποτε τοσοῦ- B  
των γεγονότων ποιητῶν πεποιηκέναι μὴδὲν ἐγκώμιον; εἰ δὲ βούλει  
αὐτὸ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ  
ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην ξυγγράφειν, ὥσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος  
Πρόδικος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἦττον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἤδη  
τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνήσαν ἅλες ἐπαινῶν  
θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχρὰ ἴδοις  
ἀν' ἐγκεκωμιασμένα· τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν περί πολλὴν σπουδὴν C  
ποιήσασθαι, Ἔρωτα δὲ μὴδένα πῶ ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς  
ταυτηνὴ τὴν ἡμέραν ἀξίως ὑμνῆσαι· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται τοσοῦτος  
θεός. ταῦτα δὴ μοι δοκεῖ εὐ λέγειν Φαῖδρος. ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ

177 B μὴδὲν: μὴδὲ Valckenaer καὶ ante τοῦτο del. Thiersch καὶ  
ἦττον θαυμαστόν Wolf Thiersch καὶ ante θαυμαστόν om. Steph. Bast.  
ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ T: om. B, Sz. ὠφελίαν T: ὠφέλειαν B C (πολλοὺς)  
πολλὴν Hirschig ἀξίως T: ἀξίῳ B (ὅτι) οὕτως Wytttenbach  
ἡμελησθαι τοσοῦτον θεόν Steph. λέγειν: ψέγειν cj. Bdhm.

τηλικούτῳ. "A god so venerable": Phaedrus holds Eros to be the most  
ancient of deities, see 178 B. The complaint was not entirely well-grounded,  
since before this date (416 B.C.) hymns to Eros of a eulogistic character had  
already been published by Sophocles (*Antig.* 781 ff.), and Euripides (*Hippol.*  
525 ff.), and possibly others.

177 B εἰ δὲ βούλει. This phrase serves to introduce a fresh point, marking  
the transition from poets to "sophists"; cp. 209 D, 220 D (εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε),  
*Lach.* 188 c, etc.: but to add an infin., as here (σκέψασθαι), is unusual.

τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς. "The worthy sophists"; considering that  
Phaedrus is the speaker, we must suppose that the adj. is seriously meant,  
not ironical.

καταλογάδην ξυγγράφειν. "Writing in prose," *oratione soluta*. Cp. Isocr.  
II. 7 καὶ τῶν μετὰ μέτρον ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων: *Lysis*  
204 D, *Laws* 811 E, 975 D.

ὥσπερ...Πρόδικος. This alludes to Prodicus's celebrated parable "The  
Choice of Heracles," for which see Xen. *Mem.* II. i. 21 ff. For Prodicus of  
Ceos, see Zeller *Presocr. Phil.* vol. II. pp. 416 ff., 473 (E. T.); Gomperz  
*Gr. Thinkers* (E. T.) I. pp. 425 ff.

ἦττον καὶ. For the unusual position of καὶ after the comparative, cp. Xen.  
*Cyr.* I. vi. 38 ταῦτα γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν δύναται.

ἐνήσαν ἅλες. Logically, of course, the subject ought to be ἐπαινος, not  
ἅλες. The same βιβλίον is alluded to in Isocr. x. 12 τῶν...τοὺς βομβυλιούς  
καὶ τοὺς ἄλας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα βουλευθέντων ἐπαινείν: its authorship is now  
generally ascribed (as by Sauppe, Blass, Hug) to the rhetor Polycrates: see  
further *Introd.* § II. B (e).

177 C τὸ οὖν...ὑμνῆσαι. The infin. may be explained (with Ast) as an ex.  
of the infin. "indignantis," cp. Ar. *Nub.* 819 τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὄντα τηλικουτονί.



ἄμα μὲν τοῦτω ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν καὶ χαρίσασθαι, ἄμα δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρέπον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡμῖν τοῖς παροῦσι κοσμηθῆναι τὸν D θεόν. εἰ οὖν ξυνδοκεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν, γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν λόγοις ἰκανὴ διατριβή· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον, ἄρχειν δὲ Φαῖδρον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος κατάκειται καὶ ἔστιν ἄμα πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. Οὐδεὶς σοι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν που ἐγὼ ἀποφῆσαιμι, δς οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο E ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά, οὔτε που Ἀγάθων καὶ Πανσανίας, οὐδὲ μὴν Ἀριστοφάνης, φ' περὶ Διόνυσον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην πᾶσα ἢ δια-

177 C τουτωι Bdhm. καὶ χαρίσασθαι del. Hartmann D (περὶ)  
Ἐρωτος Hirschig κάλλιστα W ἀρχειν: λέγειν Hirschig δὲ πρῶτον  
Φαῖδρον vulg. E ἀφροδίτη T ἢ om. T

ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν. *Symbolum dare*: cp. *Laus* 915 E, 927 C ὡς ἔρανον εἰσφέρειντα ἑαυτῷ—the only other instances of ἔρανος in Plato. For a defence of the text against Hartmann, who excises καὶ χαρίσασθαι, see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* II. 296. This passage is echoed in Aristid. *Or.* t. i. p. 18.

177 D δοκεῖ γάρ μοι. "My sentence is," an official formula: cf. *Dem.* I. 2, IV. 17. Hence the point of Socrates' phrase ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται, four lines below.

λόγον...ἔπαινον. Cp. 214 B, *Phaedr.* 260 B συντιθεῖς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου.

ἐπὶ δεξιὰ. "From left to right": cp. *Rep.* 420 E (with Adam's note); *Theaet.* 175 E. Critias 2. 7 καὶ προπόσεις ὀρέγειν ἐπιδέξια.

κάλλιστον. Notice that, in Eryximachus' view, the first requisite is κάλλος, and contrast the view of Socrates in 198 D ff.

πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. I.e. εἰσηγητῆς τοῦ λ., as Plutarch explains (*Plat. Q.* 1000 F): the same phrase recurs in *Phaedr.* 257 B, cp. *Theaet.* 164 E ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ μύθου: *Lys.* 214 A πατέρες τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἡγεμόνες.

τὰ ἐρωτικά. The objects or principles with which ἡ ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (*Phaedr.* 257 A) is concerned; cp. 186 C, 212 B, *Lysis* 204 B. This passage is alluded to by Themist. *Or.* XIII. p. 161, Max. Tyr. *diss.* XXIV. p. 288: for its significance here, see *Introd.* § II. B.

οὔτε που...καὶ. καὶ is used rather than οὔτε because Pausanias and Agathon formed "ein Liebespaar" (Hug).

177 E περὶ Διόνυσον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην. There are many points of mutual connexion between Eros, Dionysus and Aphrodite. Thus, Dionysus is the patron-god of the theatre, as shown by the phrases οἱ περὶ τὸν Δ. τεχνίται, "actors" (*Arist. Probl.* XXX. 10), and Διονυσοκόλακες, "stage-lackeys" (*Arist. Rhet.* III. 1205<sup>a</sup> 23); and on the comic stage erotic scenes were frequent. Moreover, Dionysus was sometimes represented (as by Praxilla of Sicyon, c. 450 B.C.) to be a son of Aphrodite; and in *Aristoph. fr. incert.* 490 (Df.) οἶνος is termed Ἀφροδίτης γάλα. For the traditional inter-connexion of "Wein, Weib und Gesang," we may also compare Solon 26 ἔργα δὲ Κυπρο-

τριβή, οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τουτωνῶν ὧν ἐγὼ ὀρώ. καίτοι οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου γίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς ὑστάτοις κατακειμένοις· ἀλλ' ἐὰν οἱ πρόσθεν ἰκανῶς καὶ καλῶς εἴπωσιν, ἐξαρκέσει ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ τύχη ἀγαθῆ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἐρωτα. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα ξυνέφασάν τε καὶ ἐκέλευον ἅπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. πάντων μὲν οὖν ἂ ἕκαστος εἶπεν, οὔτε πάνυ ὁ Ἀριστοδῆμος ἐμέ- 178  
μνητο οὐτ' αὐ ἐγὼ ἂ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε πάντα· ἂ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιωμακόμενον, τούτων ὑμῖν ἐρῶ ἑκάστου τὸν λόγον.

VI. Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἔφη Φαῖδρον ἀρξάμενον ἐνθένδε ποθὲν λέγειν, ὅτι μέγας θεὸς εἶη ὁ Ἐρως καὶ θαναμαστὸς ἐν

...177·E· και·καλῶς·del·Naber·...·ἡμῖν·ὑμῖν·J·:·U·:·...·ταῦτα·:·ταῦτα·Usener  
ἀρα·:·ἀμα·Wytttenbach·...·178·A·:·ἂ·BT·:·ἔσα·mg·t·...·ἀξιωμακόμενον  
(εἶναι)·TW·:·ἀξιωμακόμενων·b·:·ἀξιωμακόμεντα·εἶναι·vulg·:·ἄξια·μνημονεύειν  
cj·Liebhold·...·ἕκαστα·Bdhm·...·τὸν·λόγον·secl·Bdhm·...·

γενούς νῦν μοι φίλα καὶ Διονύσου | καὶ Μουσέων, ἃ τίθησ' ἀνδράσιν εὐφροσύνας.  
Echoes of this phrase are to be found in Aristaeon. I. ep. 3, p. 11; Plut. amat.  
750 A; Lucian Symp. p. 444.

ἡμῖν τοῖς ὑστάτοις. ὑστατος here is equivalent to ἔσχατος as used in 175 c (where see note), i.e. placed on the extreme right.

ἐξαρκέσει ἡμῖν. "We shall be content," i.e. we shall not be called upon to speak: for the impers. ἐξαρκεί c. dat. cp. 176 c, 192 B, 210 c.

τύχη ἀγαθῆ. "In Gottes Namen" (Wolf); cp. Philob. 57 E, Tim. 26 E.

πάντες ἄρα. For the position of ἄρα cp. Prot. 319 A ἢ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτηται: Rep. 358 c πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα κτλ.

178 A ἀξιωμακόμενον. We should expect rather the plural. We must suppose that the sentence is slightly confused, the original idea being to put ἂ δὲ μάλιστα ἔδοξέ μοι ἀξιωμακόμεντα (ταῦτα ἐρῶ), which was altered owing to the insertion, as an afterthought, of καὶ ὧν: then, instead of proceeding ὧν ἔδοξέ μοι ἄξιον τὸ μεμνησθαι (or μεμνήσθαι τοῦ λόγου), the word originally in mind was put down, but in the sing.: but it is tempting to restore either ἀξιωμακόμενεν εἶναι (supposing εἶναι to be corrupted from a compendium), or ἄξιον μνημονεύειν. Prot. 343 A (ρήματα βραχεία ἀξιωμακόμεντα) is the only other instance of the word in Plato: there may be an echo of the present passage in Xen. Symp. I. 1 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα...ἀξιωμακόμεντα εἶναι. For the significance of the statement here made by Apollod., see *Introd.* § II. B (g).

Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ κτλ. For the discourse of Phaedrus (178 A—180 B) see *Introd.* § I. (analysis), § III. (1).

ὥσπερ λέγω. "As has been stated": the present tense (186 E, 193 A, etc.) is commoner than the past tense (εἶπον 173 c, 182 D, etc.) in this formula. The reference is to 177 D.

ἐνθένδε ποθὲν. "Roughly at this point," *hinc fere*: the combination recurs 199 c, *Phaedr.* 229 B, *Euthyd.* 275 E; so ἐντεῦθεν ποθὲν *Phaedr.* 270 A, *Rep.* 524 C.

ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θεοῖς, πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλη, οὐχ ἥμιστα δὲ  
κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν  
B τίμιον, ἢ δ' ὅς· τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· γονῆς γὰρ Ἔρωτος οὐτ' εἰσὶν  
οὔτε λέγονται ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἰδιώτου οὔτε ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' Ἡσίοδος  
πρῶτον μὲν Χάος φησὶ γενέσθαι,

αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

Γαί' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί,  
ἢ δ' Ἔρος.

178 A ἄλλοι Stobaeus πρεσβύτατον BW, Stob.: πρεσβυτάτοις T  
τὸν θεὸν W: τῶν θεῶν BT B ἢ δ' ὅς del. Bast: ὄνειδος Creuzer τεκμή-  
ριον δὲ· τούτου (Ἔρωτος delete) Naber γοναὶ Stob., vulg. Ἔρωτος:  
Χάους cj. Bdhm. Ἡσίοδος (ὅς) Heindorf γαί'...Ἔρος secl. Herm.

κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. "In respect of his origin."

ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατον. For the doctrine of the antiquity of Eros, cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 1 τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ ἰσῆλικος τοῖς αἰγεγενέσι θεοῖς...Ἔρωτος: Ar. *An.* 700 πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν Ἔρος συνέμιξεν ἅπαντα. Agathon, in 195 A, expressly contradicts Phaedrus on this point. Bast excised ἢ δ' ὅς on the ground that "in fine periodi Platonicae non magis usurpatur quam inquit Latinorum."

178 B τεκμήριον δὲ...γάρ. Cp. *Critias* 110 E, *Apol.* 40 c: Xen. *Symp.* IV. 17 τεκμήριον δὲ· θαλλοφόρους γὰρ...ἐκλέγονται.

γονῆς...οὔτε λέγονται. This is a rash statement on the part of Phaedrus; for Alcaeus (*fr.* 13 Bgk.) makes Eros son of Zephyros and Iris; Simonides (*fr.* 43), son of Ares and Aphrodite; Euripides (*Hippol.* 534), son of Zeus; Sappho (*fr.* 132), of Gê and Uranos; Ibycus (*fr.* 31), of Chaos; see also the statements in 199 D, 203 ff. *infra*. On the other hand ignorance or doubt as to the parentage of Eros is expressed in Theocr. *Id.* XIII. 1, 2 οὐχ ἀμὴν τὸν Ἔρωτα μόνους ἔτεχ'...ἔτινι τοῦτο θεῶν ποκα τέκνον ἔγεντο; *Anth. Pal.* v. 176. 7—8 πατὴρ δ' οὐκέτ' ἔχω φράζειν τίνος· οὔτε γὰρ Αἰθήρ, | οὐ Χθῶν φησι τεκεῖν τὸν θρασύν, οὐ Πέλαγος. For the usual Greek assumption that the poets are religious teachers, cp. Ar. *Ran.* 1054 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν | ἔστι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖς ἡβῶσιν δὲ ποιηταί: and see Adam, *R. T. G.* pp. 9 ff.

ἰδιώτου. For this distinction between the prose-writer and the poet, cp. *Phaedr.* 258 D; *Laws* 890 A; *Rep.* 366 E. The term ἰδιώτης may be taken as a survival of the time when the poet alone had his work "published"—at religious festivals, theatrical shows, κῶμοι, etc.

Ἡσίοδος κτλ. The reference is to *Theog.* 116 ff. ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα Χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ κτλ. Cp. Ar. *An.* 693 ff. Χάος ἦν καὶ Νύξ κτλ. The order of the text I have adopted, in the passage following, is that proposed by Schanz, except that he reads ὁμολογεῖ (ὅς) φησι, while Burnet, accepting the transposition, prints σύμφησι instead of ὁμολογεῖ φησι. Hug and others eject the clause φησι...Ἔρωτα as a marginal prose paraphrase of the words of Hesiod; since, as it stands in the traditional order, the clause is obviously tautologous: but tautology is in itself no objection, but rather characteristic of Ph.'s style

'ΗΣΙΟΔΩ δὲ καὶ 'Ακουσίλειωσ ὁμολογεῖ [φησὶ μετὰ τὸ Χάος δύο ταύτω γενέσθαι, Γῆν τε καὶ Ἔρωτα]. Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει

πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

οὕτω πολλαχόθεν ὁμολογεῖται ὁ Ἔρωσ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατος εἶναι. C

178 B Ἐσιόδω...ὁμολογεῖ (quae in BT post πάντων extant) transposui, auctorr. Wolf Sz. Bt. ὁμολογεῖ BT: ξύμφησιν Stob.: σύμφησιν Bt. φησὶ...Ἔρωτα secl. Hommel Jn. Hug: φησὶ...πάντων secl. Ast Turr. J.-U. φησὶ om. Stob.: (ὅς) φησὶ Schanz Παρμενίδης...πάντων om. Stob., Heyne Wunder τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει secl. Jn.: τὴν γένεσιν secl. Rettig C πρεσβυτάτοις Stob.

(see Teuffel in *Rhein. Mus.* xxix. p. 133); and there is force in Hermann's remark "aegre intelligo quomodo aliquis clarissimis poetae verbis (paraphrasin) addendam existimaverit, multoque verisimilius videtur Hesiodi locum...postmodo adscriptum...irrepsisse." I bracket the clause as a gloss on ὁμολογεῖ. The clause Παρμενίδης...πάντων is rightly defended by Hug, against Voegelin and others, on the grounds that (1) οὕτω πολλαχόθεν in the following sentence is more appropriate after three than after two instances, and (2) Agathon in 195 c, when alluding to Phaedrus's speech, expressly mentions Ἐσιόδου καὶ Παρμενίδης. The authority of Hesiod is similarly cited by Plut. *amat.* 756 E.

'Ακουσίλειωσ. Acusilaus of Argos, the "logographer," about B.C. 475 (1), wrote in the Ionic dialect several books of Genealogies, largely based on Hesiod (see the frag. in A. Kordt, *De Acusilaio*, 1903). But the reputed work of A., extant in the time of Hadrian, was probably a forgery: a collector of myths is not, properly speaking, a "logographer" at all (see Jevons, *Gk. Lit.* p. 299). Cp. Clem. Alex. vi. ii. 26. 7 τὰ δὲ Ἐσιόδου μετήλαξαν εἰς πεζὸν λόγον καὶ ὡς ἴδια ἐξένεγκαν Εὐμηλὸς τε καὶ Ἄκουσίλειωσ οἱ ἱστοριογράφοι. Hug, retaining the order of the mss., would explain the fact that A. is put last as due to his being an ἰδιώτης, the others ποιηταί.

Παρμενίδης. See Parmen. *frag.* 132 (Karsten), R. and P. 101 A; Arist. *Met.* i. 4. 984<sup>b</sup> 25; Plut. *amat.* 756 F. It is to be presumed that the famous Eleate relegated this theogony to his "Way of Opinion." Cp. Spenser's lines (*H. to Love*), "Or who alive can perfectly declare The wondrous cradle of thine infancie... For ere this worlds still moving mightie masse Out of great Chaos ugly prison crept... Love... Gan reare his head, by Clotho being waked."

τὴν Γένεσιν...μητίσατο. Hermann and Hug follow Stallbaum in supplying Γένεσις as the subject of μητίσατο: cp. *Phaedo* 94 D οὗ ἔχει τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠρίπαπε μύθη. For the personification of γένεσις, cp. Hom. *Il.* xiv. 201 Ὠκεανὸν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύον (cited by Plato in *Theaet.* 180 D, *Crat.* 402 B). Plutarch (*loc. cit.*) differs by making Ἀφροδίτη the subject of μητίσατο. It is, of course, possible that another (suppressed) subject is intended; since we do not know what the context was in the original.

πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἰτιός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν ὃ τι μείζον ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν εὐθύς νέφ' ὄντι ἢ ἔραστῆς χρηστός καὶ ἔραστῇ παιδικά. ὃ γὰρ χρῆ ἀνθρώποις ἠγεῖσθαι παντὸς τοῦ βίου τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βιώσεσθαι, τοῦτο οὔτε συγγένεια οἶα τε ἐμποιεῖν οὕτω καλῶς οὔτε τιμαὶ οὔτε D πλοῦτος οὔτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὡς ἔρωσ. λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτων οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην μεγάλην καὶ καλά ἔργα ἐξεργάζεσθαι. φημί τοίνυν ἐγὼ ἄνδρα ὅστις ἐρᾷ, εἴ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιῶν κατάδηλος γίγνεται ἢ πάσῃσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ δι' ἀναν-

178 C πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν: πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Bast (μέγιστός τε καὶ) μεγίστων Bdhm. αἰτιός ἡμῖν Stob. (ἢ) παιδικά Hommel Jn. εὐγένεια Wytttenbach καλῶς (οὔτε κάλλος) vulg.: οὕτως οὔτε κάλλος Reynd. Jacobs

178 C πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὧν κτλ. The partic. gives the impression of a causal connexion—as if beneficence must be in direct proportion to antiquity! μεγίστων...αἰτιός. Cp. 197 c *infra*; Ar. *Plut.* 469 ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων αἰτιάν.

εὐθύς νέφ' ὄντι. "From his earliest youth": this properly applies only to the παιδικά. With παιδικά supply χρηστά. For a similar estimate of the value of φίλοι, see *Lys.* 211 E, *Xen. Mem.* II. 4. 1 ff.

ἀνθρώποις...βίου. For ἠγεῖσθαι c. dat. of person and gen. of thing, cp. *Hom. Od.* xxiii. 134 ἡμῖν ἠγεῖσθω ὀρχηθμοῖο: *Xen. Cyr.* viii. 7. 1 τοῦ χρόνου ἠγήσατο Πέρσαις. It would be easy, however, by inserting διά after the termin. -αι, to restore a favourite Platonic phrase διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (cp. 203 D, *Phil.* 39 E).

συγγένεια. "Kindred," implying nobility of kin: for the concrete use cp. *Gorg.* 472 B, *Laws* 730 B, 874 A, etc., and esp. *Rep.* 491 C κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει. Taking συγγένεια here in a similar sense, we can dispense with Wytttenbach's plausible conj., εὐγένεια (for which cp. *Euthyd.* 279 B, Ar. *Rhet.* II. 15, *Soph. Antig.* 38), which Reynders adopts.

178 D αἰσχύνην...φιλοτιμίαν. Cp. *Lys.* xiv. 2, and 42 (*in Alcib.*) ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς φιλοτιμείεσθαι, "taking glory for shame and shame for glory." Remembering that Phaedrus was a professed admirer of Lysias, we may, perhaps, recognize here a verbal echo. For a discussion of αἰσχύνη (not distinguished from αἰδώς) see *Arist. Eth. Nic.* iv. ix. 1128<sup>b</sup> 10, and *Rhet.* II. vi. 1383<sup>b</sup> 12.

οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην. Notice that in the subsequent treatment of these two heads the order is reversed (to secure rhetorical "Chiasinus").

εἴ τι αἰσχρὸν κτλ. Cp. *Xen. Cyneg.* xii. 20 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τις ὁράται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου ἄσπας ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶ βελτίων καὶ οὔτε λέγει οὔτε ποιεῖ αἰσχρὰ οὐδὲ κακά, ἵνα μὴ ὀφθῆ ὑπ' ἐκείνων. Also 194 c *infra*.

ἢ πάσῃσιν κτλ. Cp. "It hath been said by them of old time, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." Ordinary Greek ethics approved of retaliation:

δρίαν μὴ ἀμυνόμενος, οὐτ' ἀμὲν ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὀφθέντα οὕτως ἀλγήσαι οὔτε ὑπὸ ἐταίρων οὔτε ὑπ' ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ὡς ὑπὸ παιδικῶν. ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὀρώμεν, ὅτι διαφερόντως τοὺς Ἐ ἐραστὰς αἰσχύνεται, ὅταν ὀφθῆ ἐν αἰσχυρῷ τινὶ ὦν. εἰ οὖν μηχανή τις γένοιτο ὥστε πόλιν γενέσθαι ἢ στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν τε καὶ παιδικῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν τὴν ἐαυτῶν [ἢ] ἀπεχόμενοι πάντων τῶν αἰσχυρῶν καὶ φιλοτιμούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ μαχόμενοί γ' ἂν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῶν ἂν 179 ὀλίγοι ὄντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντα ἀνθρώπους. ἐρῶν γὰρ ἀνήρ

178 E τὸν ἐραστὴν Hirschig ἢ στρατόπεδον secl. J.-U. (ἐξ) ἐραστῶν Hirschig ἐαυτῶν (πόλιν) Hirschig ἢ seclusi, auctorr. Rückert Jn. Bdhm. Sz. Naber: καὶ J.-U. καὶ (ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς) φ. Ast 179 A γ' ἂν BT: γ' αὐ Verm. J.-U.: δ' γ' ἂν W

cp. Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 7. 7; see Dobbs, *Philos. and Popular Morals*, etc. p. 39. For another incentive to courage, see *Rep.* 467 B.

178 E ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο. "In exactly similar fashion," adverbial accus.: so ταῦτά ταῦτα *Meno* 90 E.

τοῖς ἐραστὰς. The plural is due to the fact that it was usual for a number of ἐρασταί to pay court to the same παιδικά (cp. *Charm.* 154 A).

εἰ οὖν μηχανή τις κτλ. Here Ph. passes on to his second head,—the benefits derived from Eros in civic and national life (πόλιν, 178 D *supra*). For the phrase cp. *Laus* 640 B εἰ δ' ἦν τις μηχανή κτλ.: *Parm.* 132 D, *Phileb.* 16 A.

στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν. It is noteworthy that Xen. (*Symp.* VIII. 32) puts a similar statement in the mouth of Pausanias—Πausanias γε... εἶρηκεν ὡς καὶ στρατεύμα ἀλκιμώτατον ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ παιδικῶν τε καὶ ἐραστῶν (cp. *Introd.* § VIII. *ad fin.*). Cp. also Xen. *Cyrop.* VII. 1. 30 οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσχυροτέρα φάλαγξ ἢ ὅταν ἐκ φίλων συμμάχων ἠθροισμένη ἦ. This principle was exemplified in the famous ἱερός λόχος of the Thebans, organized by Gorgidas (or Epaminondas), which fought first at Leuctra, 371 B.C., see Athen. XIII. 561 F, 602 A. A Roman analogy is afforded by Scipio's φίλων Ἰλην. The parallel in Xenophon is of itself sufficient to refute Jahn's athetesis of ἢ στρατόπεδον.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν κτλ. Hug, retaining ἢ before ἀπεχόμενοι, would supply, with the participles, from the context "welche Gefühle allein durch den Eros in wirksamer Weise erregt werden." This, however, is exceedingly awkward; and his further remark that οὐκ ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν ἂν ἢ ἀπεχόμενοι is equivalent to ἄριστ' ἂν οἰκ. ἀπεχ. does nothing to lessen the difficulty. By ejecting ἢ, as a very natural interpolation after the comparative by a copyist careless of the sense, we obtain the meaning required—"it would be impossible for them to secure a better constitution of their city, since thus they would abstain" etc.

179 A μαχόμενοι κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* 471 D ἄριστ' ἂν μάχοιντο τῷ ἧκιστα ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους... ἀμαχοὶ ἂν εἶεν: Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 32 ff.

ὑπὸ παιδικῶν ὀφθῆναι ἢ λιπῶν τάξιν ἢ ὕπλα ἀποβαλῶν ἦττον ἂν δὴ που δέξαιτο ἢ ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ πρὸ τούτου τεθνάναι ἂν πολλάκις ἔλοιτο· καὶ μὴν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύουσι, οὐδείς οὕτω κακὸς ὄντινα οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ Ἔρωσ ἐνθεὸν ποιήσειε πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ὥσθ' ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ ἀρίστῳ. B φύσει· καὶ ἀτεχνῶς, ὃ ἔφη Ὀμηρος, “ μένος ἐμπνεύσαι” ἐνίοις τῶν ἠρώων τὸν θεόν, τοῦτο ὁ Ἔρωσ τοῖς ἐρώσι παρέχει γιγνόμενον παρ' αὐτοῦ.

VII. Καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γε μόνου ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρώωντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες. τούτου δὲ καὶ ἡ

179 A μὴν B: μὴ T hiatum ante οὐδείς notav. J.-U. B (πάσι) παρέχει Orelli οὐ μόνον ὅτι: οὐ μόνον οἱ Steph. Sz.: οὐχ ὅτι Fischer J.-U. αἱ B: om. T τούτου: δοκεῖ Verm.

λιπῶν τάξιν ἢ ὕπλα ἀποβαλῶν. “The principal military offences at Athens were dealt with by one law. A citizen was liable to indictment, and, if convicted, to disfranchisement for (1) Failure to join the army—ἀστρατείας: (2) Cowardice in battle—δειλίας: (3) Desertion of his post—λιποταξίου: (4) Desertion from the army—λιποστρατίου. Of these terms, λιποταξίου was that used in the widest sense, and might include any of the others” (Smith, *D. A. I.* 212<sup>b</sup>). Cp. *Rep.* 468 A, *Laws* 943 D ff., and the compounds *ρίψασπις* (*Laws* 944 B, C; *Ar. Vesp.* 19), *ἀσπιδαποβλής* (*Vesp.* 592). The conduct of the ideal *εραστής* on such an occasion is shown in 220 E *infra*.

κινδυνεύουσι. For the sing. dat. referring to παιδικοῖς, cp. *Phaedr.* 239 A, and 184 D *infra*. After κινδυνεύουσι we should expect the sentence to conclude with οὐδείς τολμῆ ἂν or the like: the fact that a new ending is substituted may be regarded (with Ast) as due to the agitation (real or pretended) of the speaker “vom furor eroticus ergriffen.”

ἐνθεὸν πρὸς ἀρετὴν. For ἐνθεός, “god-inhabited,” “inspired,” cp. *Ion* 533 E ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι: *ibid.* 534 B and below, 180 B. φύσει, denoting “natural” temper, is here opposed to this supervenient grace. For the thought cp. Spenser (*H. to Love*), “(The lover) dreads no danger, nor misfortune feares... Thou carriest him to that which he hath eyde Through seas, through flames, through thousand swords and speares.”

179 B Ὀμηρος. See *Il.* x. 482 τῷ δ' ἐμπνευσε μένος γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη: *ib.* xv. 262, *Od.* ix. 381. Cp. the (Lacedaemonian) term *εἰσπνήλας* for *εραστής*: also Xen. *Symp.* iv. 15.

ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. Cp. *Isocr. Hel.* 217 C ἧς ἐνεκα πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποθνήσκειν ἠθέλησαν.

οὐ μόνον ὅτι. This expression may be defended by *Thuc.* iv. 85. 6 καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἡσσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισιν: *Arist. Pol.* vii. 11. 1331<sup>a</sup> 11 οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον (with Newman's *Xen. Mem.* ii. 9. 8. Jahn's οὐχ ὅτι would give, as Teuffel argues, the

Πελίου θυγάτηρ Ἀλκηστις ἰκανὴν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται ὑπὲρ τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐβελήσασα μόνη ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀνδρὸς ἀποθανεῖν, ὄντων αὐτῷ πατρός τε καὶ μητρός· οὗς C ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβιάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, ὥστε ἀποδείξαι αὐτοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ὄντας τῷ νείει καὶ ὀνόματι μόνον προσήκοντας· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν ἔδοξεν ἐργάσασθαι οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῖς, ὥστε πολλῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργασαμένων εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Ἄιδου ἀνεῖναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσαν ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ· οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα D

179 B παρέχσθαι Verm. ὑπὲρ...Ἕλληνας secl. Bdhm.: ὑπὲρ... λόγου secl. Wolf Sz., post Ἕλληνας posuit Bast: ὑπὲρ τοῦδε del. et τοῦ λόγου post τούτου δὲ posuit Steph.: ὑπὲρ τοῦδε del. Wytttenbach Winkelmann C κατεργασαμένων Methodius δὴ τοῦτο TW τὸ γέρας vulg. ἀνείναι Hommel ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνη Earle τῷ ἔργῳ secl. Baiter: τῷ...θεοὶ secl. Bdhm.

wrong sense "I do not say men do so, *celu va sans dire*." We may explain οὐ μόνον ὅτι as elliptical for οὐ μόνον (λέγω) ὅτι.

ἄνδρες...αἱ γυναῖκες. The addition of the article serves to signalize the second case as the more striking; cp. *I. Alcib.* 105 B ἐν Ἕλλησιν...ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις: *Phileb.* 45 E, *ib.* 64 C; Vahlen on *Arist. Poet.* iv. 1449<sup>a</sup> 1.

Ἀλκηστις. Besides Euripides, Phrynichus (438 B.C.) and later Antiphanes (354 B.C.) made Alcestis the theme of a tragedy: see also the *Skolion* by Praxilla in Bergk *P. L. G.* III. § 1293.

ὑπὲρ τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου. "In support of my argument."

εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Cp. *Protag.* 312 A εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων: *Gorg.* 526 B: *Thuc.* I. 33. 2.

ἐβελήσασα μόνη κτλ. Cp. *Eur. Alc.* 15 ff. πάντας δ' ἐλέγξας...Οὐχ εὖρε πλὴν γυναικὸς ἧτις ἤθελε | θαεῖν πρό κείνου.

179 C οὗς ἐκείνη κτλ. See *Eur. Alc.* 683 ff. where the appeal of Admetus is thus answered by his father Pheres: οὐ γὰρ πατρῶν τόνδ' ἐδεξάμην νόμον | παίδων προθνήσκειν πατέρας οὐδ' Ἑλληνικόν.

ἀλλοτρίους. Admetus might have described his ἀλλότριοι προσήκοντες as "a little more than kin and less than kind."

εὐαριθμήτοις. A grandiose synonym for ὀλίγοις.

ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας...ἀγασθέντες. Cp. *Phaedr.* 259 B ὁ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις δίδοναι, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες. ἀγαμαί can take either the genitive (*Rep.* 426 D, etc.) or the accus. (*Symp.* 219 D, etc.). This passage is alluded to by *Plut. amat.* 762 A λέγοντες ἐξ Ἰδου τοῖς ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνοδὸν εἰς φῶς ὑπάρχειν.

οὕτω...τιμῶσιν. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 28 ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἥρωες τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φιλίαν περὶ πλείονος...ποιοῦνται.



σπουδὴν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα τιμῶσιν. Ὀρφεία δὲ τὸν Οἰάγρου ἀτελῆ ἀπέπεμψαν ἐξ Ἄιδου, φάσμα δείξαντες τῆς γυναικὸς ἐφ' ἣν ἦκεν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὐ δόντες, ὅτι μαλθακίεσθαι ἐδόκει, ἅτε ὦν κιθαροδός, καὶ οὐ τολμᾶν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀποθνήσκειν ὡσπερ Ἄλκηστις, ἀλλὰ διαμνηχανᾶσθαι ζῶν εἰσιέναι εἰς Ἄιδου. τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, καὶ ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον **E** αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν γενέσθαι, οὐχ ὡσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα τὸν τῆς Θέτιδος υἱὸν ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν, ὅτι πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο ἀποκτείνας Ἔκτορα, μὴ ἀποκτείνας δὲ τοῦτον οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν γηραιὸς τελευτήσοι, ἐτόλμησεν

179 D μάλιστα τιμῶσιν secl. Bdhm. φάντασμα TW τολμῶν Naber διαμνηχανῆσθαι W, vulg. ζῆν ἰέναι T ἐποίησαν ἔργον γενέσθαι γυναικῶν Naber **E** καὶ...ἀπέπεμψαν damnat Naber ἀποθάνοιτο T: ἀποθάνοι B ἀποκτείνας δὲ τοῦτον B: ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο T οἴκαδ' T: οἴκαδε δ' B

179 D Ὀρφεία. For the legend of Orpheus and his wife Eurydice, see Paus. ix. 30, Virg. *Georg.* iv. 454 ff., Ovid *Met.* x. 1 ff. Phaedrus modifies the usual story (1) by making Eurydice a φάσμα, and Orpheus consequently ἀτελής (cp. Stesichorus' treatment of the Helen-legend, followed also by Euripides in his *Helena*, and *Phaedr.* 243 B): (2) by making O.'s descent an act of μαλακία rather than of τόλμα (as Hermesianax 2. 7, Ov. *Met.* x. 13 ad Stygia Taenaria est ausus descendere porta): (3) by representing O.'s death to be a penalty for this cowardice rather than for his irreverence to Dionysus (as Aeschylus *Bassarai*, etc.). For Orpheus and Orphism in general, see Miss J. Harrison *Proleg.* pp. 455 ff.

ἅτε ὦν κιθαροδός. As if the "soft Lydian airs" of the cithara conduced to effeminacy. For the cithara, as distinguished from the λύρα, see *Rep.* 399 D—E (with Adam's note). It is worth noticing that Spenser (*H. to Love*) cites Orpheus as an instance of ἔνθεος τόλμα—"Orpheus daring to provoke the ire Of damned fiends, to get his love retyre."

τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα. Cp. Isocr. vii. 52, Andoc. i. 108, Dem. xxiii. 203; an example of the rhetorical trick of amplitude. Phaedrus, as Hug observes, is blind to the obvious corollary that Eros sometimes fails to implant τόλμα.

179 E οὐχ ὡσπερ. "Whereas, on the contrary": cp. *Gorg.* 522 A, 189 C *infra*.

εἰς μακάρων νήσους. Cp. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 78 ff., *Skolion* sp. Bgk. *P. L. G.* III. 1290. Achilles, after death, is variously located, by Homer (*Od.* xi. 467 ff.) in Hades, by Ibycus (*fr.* 37) in Elysium, by Aretinus and others in Leuke ("white-island"), for which see Pind. *Nem.* iv. 49, and Rohde *Psyche* II. 369 ff. For the situation of the μ. νῆσοι, see Strabo i. 3: cp. Adam *R. T. G.* 135 f.

ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο. See Hom. *Il.* xviii. 96 αὐτίκα γάρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοίμος: *ibid.* ix. 410 ff.; *Apol.* 28 c, D.

οἴκαδ'...τελευτήσοι. This clause is echoed, as Wolf observed, by Aeschines i. 145 ἐπανελθὼν οἴκαδε γηραιὸς...ἀποθανεῖται.

ἐλέσθαι βοηθήσας τῷ ἔραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθανεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ 180 ὑπεραγασθέντες οἱ θεοὶ διαφερόντως αὐτὸν ἐτίμησαν, ὅτι τὸν ἔραστὴν οὕτω περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιεῖτο. Αἰσχύλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ φάσκων Ἀχιλλεῖα Πατρόκλου ἐρᾶν, ὃς ἦν καλλίων οὐ μόνον Πατρόκλου ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ τῶν ἡρώων ἀπάντων, καὶ ἔτι ἀγένειος, ἔπειτα νεώτερος πολὺ, ὡς φησιν Ὅμηρος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μάλιστα μὲν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ θεοὶ τιμῶσι τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα, μᾶλλον B μέντοι θαυμάζουσι καὶ ἄγανται καὶ εὖ ποιοῦσιν, ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἔραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἔραστής τὰ παιδικά. θειότερον γὰρ ἔραστής παιδικῶν· ἔνθεος γάρ ἐστι. διὰ τὰυτα καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα

179 E βοηθήσαι W Πατρόκλῳ del. Naber 180 A Αἰσχύλος...  
 Ὅμηρος del. Valckenaer ἀλλ' ἄρα W: ἀλλὰ ἄρα T: ἀλλὰ B: ἀλλ' ἄμα Bt.  
 καί...ἀγένειος post πολὺ transp. Petersen B ἔραστής...ἐστι secl. Bdhm.

**βοηθήσας.** Cp. Arist. *Rhet.* I. 3. 1359<sup>a</sup> 3 οἷον Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐξὸν ζῆν. Isocrates (in *Panegy.* 53) lauds the Athenians for a similar nobility of conduct.

**180 A ἐπαποθανεῖν.** This and 208 D are the only classical instances cited of this compound; nor does there seem to be another class. instance of ὑπεραγασθῆναι.

**Αἰσχύλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ.** The reference is to Aesch. *Myrmidons* (fr. 135, 136 N.). Sophocles, too, wrote an Ἀχιλλεῖως Ἐρασταί: cp. also Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 31. Achilles, like Asclepius and others, was worshipped in some places (e.g. Epirus) as a god, in others (e.g. Elis) as a hero.

**ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ.** "Ἄρα h. l. stare potest, valet: *nimirum*" (Wytténbach): for ἄρα affirmative in a universal statement, cp. 177 E, *Rep.* 595 A. To alter to ἄμα, as Burnet, is unnecessary.

**καλλίων.** For the beauty of Achilles, see *Il.* II. 673. *Ov. Trist.* II. 411 refers to Sophocles' play—"nec nocet auctori mollem qui fecit Achillem": cp. Luciaia *dial. mort.* 18. 1.

**ἀγένειος.** The hero is so represented in art; and the Schol. *ad Il.* I. 131 applies to him the epithet *γυναικοπρόσωπος*. Similarly Apollo, in Callim. *H.* II. 36 f. οὐποτε Φοῖβου | θηλείησ' οὐδ' ὄσσον ἐπὶ χνόος ἦλθε παραιαίς.

**νεώτερος.** See *Il.* XI. 786 γενέη μὲν ὑπέρτερός ἐστιν Ἀχιλλεὺς | πρεσβύτερος δὲ σύ (sc. Πάτροκλος) ἐσσι: and Schol. *ad Il.* XXIII. 94. For the relative ages of παιδικά and ἔραστής, see 181 B ff. *infra*; Xen. *Anab.* II. 6. 28 αὐτὸς δὲ (sc. Meno) παιδικὰ εἶχε Θαρύπαν ἀγένειος ὦν γενειῶντα (mentioned as an enormity); *Ov. Met.* x. 83 ff.

**μάλιστα μὲν...μᾶλλον μέντοι.** This savours of a Hibernicism: cp. *Gorg.* 509 B μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν...καὶ ἔτι τούτου μείζον.

**180 B θαυμάζουσι.** Cp. *Rep.* 551 A ἐπαινοῦσί τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀγούσι: Xen. *Symp.* IV. 44.

**θειότερον...ἐνθεος.** Cp. 179 A, 209 B *ad iná*; Schol. *ad Eur. Hippol.* 144

τῆς Ἀλκῆστιδος μᾶλλον ἐτίμησαν, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀποπέμψαντες.

Οὕτω δὴ ἔγωγε φημι Ἐρωτα θεῶν καὶ πρεσβύτατον καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ κυριώτατον εἶναι εἰς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας κτῆσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ζῶσι καὶ τελευτήσασιν.

- C VIII. Φαῖδρον μὲν τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἔφη εἰπεῖν, μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι, ὧν οὐ πάνυ διεμνημόνευεν· οὐς παρὲς τὸν Πausανίου λόγον διεγείτο. εἰπεῖν δ' αὐτὸν ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, προβεβλήσθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἀπλῶς οὕτως παρηγγελῆσαι ἐγκωμιάζειν Ἐρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἦν ὁ Ἐρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε, νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνὸς
- D ὀρθότερόν ἐστι πρότερον προρρηθῆναι ὁποῖον δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι τοῦτο ἐπανορθώσασθαι, πρῶτον μὲν Ἐρωτα φράσαι ὃν δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν, ἔπειτα ἐπαινεῖσαι ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ. πάντες γὰρ

180 B τῆς Ἀλκῆστιδος del. Schütz Bdhm. καὶ post θεῶν om. T καὶ τιμιώτατον om. T (add. in mg. t) κυριώτερον T C εἶναι del. Hirschig: εἰπεῖν postea idem cj. D ὁποῖον: ὀπότερον Herm.

ἔνθεοι λέγονται οἱ ὑπὸ φάσματός τινος ἀφαιρεθέντες τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ φασματοποιοῦ κατεχόμενοι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐκείνῳ ποιοῦντες. See Rohde *Psyche* II. 19 ff.

Οὕτω δὴ κτλ. In this epilogue καὶ πρεσβ. καὶ τιμ. summarize the first part of the speech; καὶ κυριώτατον κτλ., the second part. Cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 218 D κίλλους...μετέσχεν ὁ σεμνότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ θειότατον τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν.

180 C ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι. The construction here has been misunderstood: Hirschig proposed to write εἰπεῖν for εἶναι, while Hug bids us supply λέγοντας. Evidently both suppose that ἄλλοι τινές mean persons, but it seems better to take them to be λόγοι and to construe μετὰ Φαῖδρον as a compendium for μετὰ τὸν Φαῖδρον λόγον. By this means we secure the word required, λόγους, as the antecedent to ὧν: for διαμνημονεύειν would be less naturally used of a person than of a speech (cp. 178 A πάντων...ἐμμένητο). For the brachylogy, cp. Thuc. I. 71. 2 ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν (with Shilleto's n.).

τὸ...ἐγκωμιάζειν Ἐρωτα. This clause is best taken, with Stallb. and Hug, as nomin. in epexegetic apposition to προβεβλήσθαι ὁ λόγος. Equally improbable are Rückert's view that the clause is accus. ("quatenus sic simpliciter" etc.), and Hommel's that it is exclamatory.

ἀπλῶς οὕτως. Cp. 176 E.

νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ. We may assume the ellipse of οὐ καλῶς ἔχει after νῦν δέ: cp. *Theaet.* 143 E, *Apol.* 38 B, etc.

προρρηθῆναι. Hommel renders by "prius praefari," Hug by "edicere." In favour of Hommel's view cp. προρρηθῆ 198 E, τούτων προρρηθέντων *Laus* 823 D; *Rep.* 504 A.

ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἐρωτος Ἀφροδίτη. μιᾶς μὲν οὖν οὔσης εἰς ἂν ἦν Ἐρως· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ δύο ἐστών, δύο ἀνάγκη καὶ Ἐρωτε εἶναι. πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τῶ θεά; ἡ μὲν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἦν δὴ καὶ Οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἦν δὴ Πάνδημον καλοῦμεν. ἀναγ- **E** καῖον δὴ καὶ Ἐρωτα τὸν μὲν τῇ ἑτέρα συνεργὸν Πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Οὐράνιον. ἐπαινεῖν μὲν οὖν δεῖ πάντας θεούς, ἃ δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος εἴληχε πειρατέον εἰπεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ πράξις ὧδ' ἔχει· αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς [πραττομένη] οὔτε καλῇ οὔτε αἰσχρά. οἶον 181

**180 D** ἄνευ Ἐρωτος Ἀφροδίτης. Ἀφροδίτης δὲ μιᾶς Graser (ἦς) μιᾶς Rückert οὖν om. Stob. Bekk. δὲ δὴ BW: δὲ T, Stob. ἔρωτας Stob. τὰ θεά Stob.: τῶ θεῶ Cobet διώνης T: διώνης B **E** ἐπαινεῖν... θεούς del. Orelli J.-U. δεῖ πάντας θεούς: οὐ δεῖ πάντα· Bast: οὐ δεῖ πάντα γ' ὁμοίως· Vermehren: hiatus ante ἃ notavit Sz. δ' οὖν: οὖν Orelli: δ' Ast (πράττειν) πειρατέον Kreyenbühl ὧδι Stob. πραττομένη BT, Stob. Gell.: om. Proclus Steph. Sz.: ταττομένη Bernays: ἐξεταζομένη Liebhold.

**180 D** οὐκ ἔστιν... Ἀφροδίτη. Cp. Hes. *Theog.* 201 τῇ δ' Ἐρος ὠμάρτησε καὶ ἡμερος ἔσπετο καλὸς | γεινομένη τὰ πρῶτα θεῶν τ' εἰς φύλον ἰούση: *Orph. H.* 55. 1 Οὐρανίη πολύνυμε, φιλομειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη... (8) μήτηρ ἐρώτων.

μιᾶς οὔσης. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 9 εἰ μὲν οὖν μία ἐστὶν Ἀφρ. ἡ διτταὶ κτλ.

τῶ θεά. Plato uses both θεός (181 c, *Rep.* 327 A, etc.) and θεά (*Rep.* 388 A, 391 c, etc.) for "goddess," and θεά here serves to preclude confusion with Ἐρως. For the notion of a dual Aphrodite cp. Xen. *l. c.*, Apuleius *apol.* 12, Plotin. *Enn.* III. 5. 293 B. For Aphrodite Urania, with a temple in Athens, see Hdt. I. 105, 131, etc.; Paus: I. 14. 6. See also Cic. *N. D.* III. 23; Pind. *fr.* 87.

Πάνδημον. For the temple in honour of A. Pandemos, see Paus. I. 22. 3. It is doubtful whether the title originally attached to her as the common deity of the deme, or as the patroness of the *εταίραι*. But whatever its origin, the recognized use of the title at the close of the 5th century was to indicate *Venus meretrix*.

**180 E** καὶ Ἐρωτα κτλ. The notion of a duality, or plurality, in Eros is also hinted at in Eurip. *fr.* 550 ἐνὸς δ' Ἐρωτος ὄντος οὐ μὴ ἡδονή· | οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρώσω, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν: *fr. adesp.* 151 δισσὰ πνεύματα πνεῖς Ἐρως. Cp. *Phaedr.* 266 A.

ἐπαινεῖν... θεούς. This is merely a formal saving clause, to avert possible Nemesis, and although it involves the speaker in something like self-contradiction, there is no good reason to suspect corruption in the text (if correction be required, the easiest would be εὐφημεῖν, cp. *Ἐρην.* 992 D εὐφημεῖν πάντας θεούς κτλ.). The laudation of base gods would sound less strange in ancient than in modern ears; and Eryximachus uses very similar language in 188 D (cp. 195 A).

**181 A** αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς κτλ. Gellius XVII. 20 ignores *πραττομένη* in his rendering ("Omne," inquit, "omnino factum sic sese habet: neque turpe est,

ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιούμεν, ἢ πίνειν ἢ ἄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἂνπραχθῆ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη· καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρωσ οὐ πᾶς ἔστι καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν.

IX. Ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς Πανδήμου Ἀφροδίτης ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδη-  
 B μός ἐστι καὶ ἐξεργάζεται ὁ τι ἂν τύχη· καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὃν οἱ  
 φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐρῶσιν. ἐρῶσι δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν  
 οὐχ ἥττον γυναικῶν ἢ παιδῶν, ἔπειτα ὧν καὶ ἐρῶσι τῶν σωμάτων  
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν, ἔπειτα ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων, πρὸς  
 τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελοῦντες δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μῆ.  
 ὅθεν δὴ ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς, ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι, τοῦτο πράττειν, ὁμοίως  
 μὲν ἀγαθόν, ὁμοίως δὲ τούναντίον. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς θεοῦ  
 C νεωτέρας τε οὔσης πολὺ ἢ τῆς ἐτέρας, καὶ μετεχούσης ἐν τῇ  
 γενέσει καὶ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος. ὁ δὲ τῆς Οὐρανίας πρῶτον μὲν οὐ  
 μετεχούσης θήλεος ἀλλ' ἄρρενος μόνον, [καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ τῶν

181 A αὐτὸ (καθ' αὐτὸ) τ τῇ om. Stob. καλὸς B: καλῶς T  
 B ἀνοητοτάτως W ἀπὸ τῆς: ἀπὸ secl. Sz. Hug: τοιαύτης J.-U.  
 C καί...ἔρωσ secl. Schütz Teuffel Hug Sz. Bdm. J.-U.

quantum in eo est, neque honestum, uelut est quas nunc facimus ipsi res, bibere cantare disserere. nihil namque horum ipsum ex se honestum est; quali cum fieret modo factum est, tale extitit," etc.): Proclus also (*in Alcib. I.* p. 215) omits it. It must certainly, I think, be ejected, since it only serves to confuse the argument; none of the alternatives proposed are at all probable; while Rettig's attempt to justify its retention by the device of setting a comma before it is merely absurd. For the language cp. *Meno* 88 c πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερὰ ἔστιν: *Phaedr.* 258 c, D. See also *Eryx.* 397 κ; *Arist. Pol.* 1333<sup>a</sup> 9, for the moral indifference of πράξεις καθ' αὐτάς.

ὁ τι ἂν τύχῃ. "At random"; so ὁ τι ἂν τύχῃσι 181 B *infra*: *Prot.* 353 A οἱ ὁ τι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο λέγουσι.

181 B ὧν καὶ ἐρῶσι. "In the actual objects of their passion": the full statement would be ἐρῶσι τῶν σωμάτων ἐκείνων (sc. παιδῶν ἢ γυναικῶν) ὧν ἐρῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψ.

τὸ διαπράξασθαι. A polite euphemism for the sexual act: cp. 182 c, *Phaedr.* 256 ζ; *Lysias* I. 33.

ἔστι γὰρ...ἄρρενος. Observe that the reasons are put in chiasmic order.

181 C καὶ ἔστιν...Ἔρωσ. This clause is obviously open to suspicion as (1) anticipating the sense of ὅθεν δὴ κτλ., and (2) standing in partial contradiction to the later statement (181 D *ad init.*) οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παῖδων.

παιδων ἔρωσ·] ἔπειτα πρεσβυτέρας, ὕβρεως ἰμοίρου· ὅθεν δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τρέπονται οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἐπιπνοι, τὸ φύσει ἔρρωμενέστερον καὶ νοῦν μᾶλλον ἔχον ἀγαπῶντες. καί τις ἂν γνοιή καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παιδεραστία τοὺς εἰλικρινῶς ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ὠρμημένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐρώσει παιδων, ἀλλ' **D** ἐπειδὴν ἤδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἴσχειν, τούτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῷ γενειάσκειν. παρεσκευασμένοι γάρ, οἶμαι, εἰσὶν οἱ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχόμενοι ἐρᾶν ὡς τὸν βίου ἅπαντα ξυνεσόμενοι καὶ κοινῇ συμβιωσόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξαπατήσαντες, ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λαβόντες ὡς νέον, καταγελάσαντες οἰχήσεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλον ἀποτρέχοντες. χρῆν δὲ καὶ νόμον εἶναι μὴ ἐρᾶν παιδων, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄδηλον πολλῆ σπουδῇ ἀηλίσκετο· τὸ γὰρ τῶν παιδων τέλος ἄδηλον οἱ τελευτᾶ **E**

**181 C** παιδων in παιδεραστῶν mutato post ἀγαπῶντες trs. Verm. πρεσβυτέρας (οὔσης καὶ) Christ ἰμοίρου libri: ἰμοίρος Ficinus Bast Bdhm.: ὕβρεως ἰμοίρου addub. Sz. **D** ἀλλ' (ἤ) Steph. Hug οἰχεσθαι Herwerden παῖδας Markland **E** τέλος secl. Bdhm.

**ὕβρεως ἰμοίρου.** For ὕβρις as especially associated with juvenile "lustihead," cp. *Euthyd.* 273 B ὕβριστῆς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι: *Lysias* XXIV. 16 ὕβριζειν εἰκὸς... τοὺς ἔτι νέους καὶ νέαις ταῖς διανοίαις χρωμένους: *Soph. fr.* 705 ὕβρις δὲ τοι... ἐν νέοις ἀνθεὶ τε καὶ φθίνει πάλιν.

**ἐπιπνοι.** "Driven by the spirit": the only other exx. of the word in Plato are *Cratyl.* 428 C and *Meno* 99 D φαίμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνουσιαίεω, ἐπιπνοὺς ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (cp. 179 A n., 180 B n.).

**181 D** τούτο δὲ. *Sc.* τὸ νοῦν ἴσχειν. This is in contradiction to the statements of Phaedrus, 178 C (εὐθὺς νέφ' ὄντι), 180 A (ἔτι ἀγένητος ἦν). For γενειάσκειν (*rubescere*), cp. *Solon* 27. 5—6 τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεζομένων ἔτι γυῖον | λαχνοῦται, χροῖς ἀνθος ἀμειβομένης. Cp. *Spenser F. Q.* II. xii. 79 "And on his tender lips the downy heare Did now but freshly spring, and silken blossoms beare": *Hor. C.* IV. 10. 2 (*pluma*).

**παρεσκευασμένοι** κτλ. For the change of construction from ὡς with fut. partic. to (fut.) infn., cp. *Charm.* 164 D. *Rep.* 383 A ποιῖν ὡς μήτε... ὄντας... μήτε... παράγειν. The clause ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ... νέον is best taken closely with the preceding participle, and καταγελάσαντες... ἀποτρέχοντες closely together. For ἐξαπατήσαντες cp. 184 E, 185 A: *Theogn.* 254 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγους μ' ἀπατᾶς. This ἀπάτη and καταγελάω are forms of the ὕβρις mentioned above, 181 c: cp. 219 c, 222 A.

**μὴ ἐρᾶν παιδων.** πᾶσι, as here used, is *Theognis'* μικρὸς παῖς, the παιδάριον of 210 B in *fr.*

**181 E** ἄδηλον οἱ τελευτᾶ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 232 E τῶν μὲν ἐρώτων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἐγνώσαν κτλ.: *Theogn.* 1075 ff. πρήγματος ἀπρήκτου χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶ τελευτῆν | γυνῶναι... ἄρφην γὰρ τέταται: *Alcid. Odys.* 5 πᾶσά τε ἀπορία ἦν ποί ποτε προβήσοιτο ἢ... τελευτῆ. A similar

κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ψυχῆς τε περὶ καὶ σώματος. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκόντες τίθενται, χρῆν δὲ καὶ τούτους τοὺς πανδήμους ἐραστὰς προσαναγκάζειν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων γυναικῶν προσαναγκάζομεν αὐτοὺς 182 καθ' ὅσον δυνάμεθα μὴ ἐρᾶν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ τὸ δνεῖδος πεποικηκότες, ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς· λέγουσι δὲ εἰς τούτους ἀποβλέποντες, ὀρώντες αὐτῶν τὴν ἀκαιρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δὴ πού κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως ὀτιοῦν πραττόμενον ψόγον ἂν δικαίως φέροι.

Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα νόμος ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι

181 E κακίας ἢ edd. Stobaei, Hommel  
τῶν τοιούτων W 182 A τινὰ vulg.  
γε: τε vulg. ὀτιοῦν (πρᾶγμα) mg. t, Bt.

χρῆν W: χρην B: χρῆ T  
ἀκαιρίαν: ἀκοσμίαν Liebhold

sentiment occurs in the Clown's song in *Twelfth-Night*: "What's to come is still unsure... Youth's a stuff will not endure."

κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς. Possibly these genitives are to be construed (with Rückert) as dependent on the preceding adverb οἱ: cp. Soph. *O. T.* 413 οὐ βλέπεις ἴν' εἰ κακοῦ (Madv. *Gr. Syni.* § 50 B). Hug, however, takes them to be governed by περὶ, comparing for the separation of prepos. from case *Apol.* 19 c, Soph. *Aj.* 793.

τούτους...ἐραστὰς. For οὗτος contemptuous cp. *Apol.* 17 B, *Rep.* 492 D οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταὶ τε καὶ σοφισταὶ ("οὗτος is the contemptuous *isti*" Adam).

τὸ τοιοῦτον. Sc. μὴ ἐρᾶν παίδων (D *ad fin.*). For the db. accus. with -αναγκάζω, cp. *Rep.* 473 A τοῦτο μὴ ἀνάγκαζέ με: *Phaedr.* 242 B. Hommel, perversely, construes τὸ τοιοῦτον as an adverbial accus., "ganz in der Weiso wie" etc.

τῶν ἐλευθέρων γυναικῶν. For the legal penalties (by a γραφή μοιχείας or ὕβρεως or a δίκη βιαιῶν) for rape and adultery, see *Lysias* I. 26, 30, 49. One of the lesser penalties was that alluded to by *Catullus* xv. 18 f., *Quem...Per-current raphanique mugilesque*.

182 A χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς. χαρίζεσθαι, *obsequi*, "to grant favours"—the converse of ἀπαρξίεσθαι—is a *vox propria* in this connexion: cp. Schol. ad *Phaedr.* 227 C τὸ χαριστέον ἐστίν...τὸ πρὸς ἀφροδίσιον ἑαυτὸν συνουσίαν ἐπιιδόνα τινί. For the sentiment here disputed, see *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 19 ff.; *Mem.* I. 2. 29; and the paradox in *Phaedr.* 233 E ἴσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι. *Aeschines* I. 136 agrees with *Pausanias*.

τὴν ἀκαιρίαν. "Impropriety" or "tactlessness": for exx. of such ἀκαιρία, see 181 D, *Phaedr.* 231 D ff.

δ...νόμος. νόμος here includes both "law" proper and "public sentiment" or "custom" ("die Anschauungen des Volkes," Hug) which are distinguished in *Dem. de Cor.* 114: cp. *Thuc.* VI. 18. 7: but in *Thuc.* VI. 16. 2 νόμος is "custom."

νοῆσαι ῥάδιος, ἀπλῶς γὰρ ὄρισται· ὁ δ' ἐνθάδε [καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] ποικίλος. ἐν Ἡλιδι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ οὐ μὴ Β σοφοὶ λέγειν, ἀπλῶς νενομοθέτηται καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις εἴποι οὔτε γέος οὔτε παλαιὸς ὡς αἰσχρὸν, ἴνα, οἶμαι, μὴ πράγματ' ἔχωσι λόγῳ πειρώμενοι πείθειν τοὺς νέους, ἅτε ἀδύνατοι λέγειν· τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρὸν νενομίσται, ὅσοι ὑπὸ βαρβάροις οἰκοῦσι. τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας αἰσχρὸν τοῦτό γε καὶ ἦ γε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἦ

182 A (δ) ἐν Hirschig καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι secl. Winckelmann Hug Sz. J.-U.: fort. post γὰρ transpon. (cf. Teuffel) ὁ supra ἐν Λακεδαίμονι add. T B οὐ T: οὐ B τὸ BT: del. t τοῖς δὲ Ἰωνίας Ast: τῇ δὲ Ἰωνίᾳ Thiersch πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι cj. Steph. (καὶ) ὅσοι Rückert γε (post τοῦτό): τε Herm. Sz.

182 A καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι. I follow Winckelmann and others (see *crit. n.*) in bracketing these words: possibly they should be transposed to a place in the next clause, either after γὰρ or after Βοιωτοῖς (in suggesting this I find myself anticipated by an anonymous critic, *ap. Teuffel, Rhein. Mus.* xxix. p. 145). That Laconia was a hot-bed of paederasty might be inferred *a priori* from its military-oligarchical constitution, and is betokened by the verb *λακωνίζειν* used as a synonym for *παιδικῶς χρῆσθαι* (*Ar. frag.* 322), (and the adj. *κυσολάκων* for *παιδεραστής*). It is certainly unlikely that a *ποικίλος νόμος* would be ascribed to the Laconians, and unlikely too that they would be classed apart from the *μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν*. Moreover, in 182 D ff. it is ὁ ἐνθάδε (*ἡμέτερος*) νόμος which is treated as *ποικίλος*, and no mention is made there of a similar Laconian νόμος. For Laconian *mores*, Stallb. cites *Xen. Rep. Lac.* II. 13; *Plut. Lac. Inst.* p. 237 B; *Aelian V. H.* III. 10. 12. In *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 35 the Lacedaemonians are lauded—*θεὰν γὰρ οὐ τὴν Ἀναίδειαν ἀλλὰ τὴν Αἰδῶ νομίζουσι* (which ought, perhaps, to be construed as implying that they are slighted here).

182 B ἐν Ἡλιδι κτλ. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 34, *Rep. Lac. l.c.*, *Athen.* XIII. 2. The Cretan ἀπαγωγὸς παιδῶν (*Laws* VIII. 836) points to a similar state of things. τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας. The genitive is taken by Hug as dependent on πολλαχοῦ, by Stallb. as dependent on ὅσοι, "vel potius ex demonstrativo ante ὅσοι intelligendo." Hug quotes *Xen. Hell.* IV. 4. 16 πολλαχόσε καὶ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐμβalόντες.

ὅσοι...οἰκοῦσι. The grammar is loose—"per synesin additur ὅσοι perinde ac si praecessisset 'apud Ionas autem et multos alios'" (Stallb.). The language is most appropriate to a time after the Peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.), when the Greeks of Asia Minor were again reduced to subjection to the Great King (see Bury, *Hist. Gr.* p. 552); cp. *Cratyl.* 409 E οἱ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες: *Laws* 693 A.

τοῦτό γε καὶ κτλ. Strictly we should supply, with τοῦτο, τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, but the notion latent is probably the more general one τὸ ἐρᾶν (παιδῶν). The palaestrae (gymnasia) were recognized as the chief seats of



Ο φιλογυμναστία· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, συμφέροι τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονήματα  
μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ  
κοινωνίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως  
ἐμποιεῖν. ἔργω δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι· ὁ γὰρ  
Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἀρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη  
κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν. οὕτως οὐ μὲν αἰσχροὺν ἐτέθη χαρὶ-

182 Ο γίγνεσθαι Jn. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ex emend. Vindob. 21: τῶ  
ἀρχομένῳ Rohde: τῶν ἀρχομένων (ταῖς ψυχαῖς) Bdhm. μάλιστα post καὶ  
trs. Ast ἄλλα: καλὰ J.-U. πάντα: ταῦτα Schleierm. καὶ ὁ: καὶ secl.  
Bdhm. Sz. οὐ Tb: ου B

φιλοσοφία and παιδεραστία as well as of φιλογυμναστία. Cp. (for παιδεραστία)  
Ar. *Nub.* 973 ff., 980 αὐτὸν ἐαυτὸν προαγωγέων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς: *Laws* 636 B:  
Xen. *Cyrop.* II. 3. 21: Cic. *Tusc.* IV. 33. 70 in Graecorum gymnasiis...isti  
liberi et concessi sunt amores. Bene ergo Ennius: flagiti principium est  
nudare inter cives corpora: Plut. *amat.* 751 F ff. The gymnasia also served,  
at Athens, as headquarters of political clubs, cp. Athen. XIII. 602.

182 Ο φρονήματα...ἐγγίγνεσθαι. For φρον. μεγάλη cp. 190 B. For ἐγγίγ-  
νεσθαι cp. Xen. *Rep. Lac.* v. 6 ὥστ' ἐκεῖ ἤκιστα μὲν ὕβριν...ἐγγίγνεσθαι: and  
184 A *infra*. The genitive τῶν ἀρχομένων, in place of the more natural dative,  
may be explained, with Stallb., as due to "a confusion of two constructions,"  
the gen. being dependent on φρον. μεγ. and the dat. after the verb omitted.  
For the thought, cp. (with Jowett) Arist. *Pol.* v. 11. 15.

ὁ δὴ...ἐμποιεῖν. The neut. sing., which is acc. after ἐμποιεῖν, serves to grasp  
under one general head the preceding plurals. For this common use of φιλεῖ,  
*solet*, cp. 188 B *infra*, *Phileb.* 37 B. Hug, excising the καὶ after πάντα, con-  
strues τὰ ἄλλα πάντα as a second object, parallel to ὃ. But no change is  
needed: the phrase means "prae ceteris omnibus maxime amor," as Stallb.  
renders, cp. the usage of ἄλλος τε καὶ, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ in 220 A, *Apol.* 36 A, etc.

ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος κτλ. For the exploits of these tyrannicides, who  
slew the Pisistratids in 514 B.C., see Bury *H. G.* p. 205. Aristogeiton was the  
ἐραστής of Harmodius, and popular sentiment invested the pair, in later days,  
with a halo of glory as the patron-saints and martyrs of Love and Liberty.  
Cp. *Skolia* 9 (Bgl. *P. L. G.* III. p. 646) ἐν μύρτου κλαδί τὸ ξίφος φορήσω, |  
ὥσπερ Ἀρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων, | ὅτε τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην | ἴσονόμους τ'  
Ἀθήνας ἐποίησάντην: Ar. *Ach.* 980, *Lys.* 632. The exploit was also com-  
memorated by Antenor's bronzes and a group by Critias and Nesiotes (repro-  
duced in Bury *H. G.* p. 209).

ἐτέθη. As aor. pass. of τίθεσθαι, this is equiv. to ἐνομίσθη (cp. two  
ll. below). It is plain that θεμένων must here be taken to include both rulers  
and subjects. For πλεονεξία, "arrogant greed," as opposed to ἡ τοῦ ἴσου τιμή,  
see *Rep.* 359 c. For the theory implied in the following passage, that ἔρως  
and ἀνδρεία go together (as Phaedrus also had contended, 178 D ff.), cp.  
Bacon, *Essay* x. (*Of Love*): "I know not how, but Martiall men are given to  
Love: I think it is but as they are given to Wine; for perils commonly aske  
to be paid in pleasures."

ζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, κακία τῶν θεμένων κείται, τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων πλεονεξία, τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων ἀναυδρία· οὐ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς ἐνο- **D**  
μίσθη, διὰ τὴν τῶν θεμένων τῆς ψυχῆς ἀργίαν. ἐνθάδε δὲ πολὺ  
τούτων κάλλιον νενομοθέτηται, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐ ῥάδιον κατα-  
νοῆσαι.

X. Ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ ὅτι λέγεται κάλλιον τὸ φανερώς ἐρᾶν  
τοῦ λάθρῃ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν γενναιοτάτων καὶ ἀρίστων, κἂν  
αἰσχιούς ἄλλων ὦσι, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῇ ἢ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἐρώντι παρὰ  
πάντων θαυμαστή, οὐχ ὡς τι αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντι, καὶ ἐλόντι τε  
καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐλόντι αἰσχρὸν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν **E**  
ἐλεῖν ἐξουσίαν ὁ νόμος δέδωκε τῷ ἐραστῇ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἐργα-  
ζομένῳ ἐπαινέσθαι, ἃ εἴ τις τολμῆ ποιεῖν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν διώκων  
καὶ βουλόμενος διαπράξασθαι πλὴν τούτου [φιλοσοφίας], τὰ μέ- **183**  
γιστα καρποῖτ' ἂν ὀνειδῇ· εἰ γὰρ ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρὰ

**182 D** οὐ δὲ T: οὐ δὲ B δὲ B: om. TW κατανοῆσαι ἐνθ. γ' ὅτι  
Bdhn. ἐνεθυμήθη in mg. W τε T: om. B **E** πρὸς τῷ Ast  
ἃ εἰ TW: αἰεὶ B: γρ. καὶ αἰεὶ W **183 A** φιλοσοφίας secl. Schleierm. Bekk.  
Hug Sz. Bdhn. Bt.: φιλίας, τοῦτο delete, Herm.: φίλοις ὀφθεῖς cj. Bdhn.:  
alii alia εἰ BT: ἡ W

**182 D** Ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ κτλ. The construction is grammatically incom-  
plete: one would expect δόξειεν ἂν, or the like, to govern the dative. It is  
not till we get to 183 c (ταύτη μὲν οὖν κτλ.) that we find the sense resumed.

παρὰ πάντων. Jowett's "all the world" is misleading: the treatment is  
here confined to Athenian νόμος.

**182 E** πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν κτλ. "Quod attinet ad amasii capiendi conatum"  
(Stallb.).

ἐξουσίαν...ἐπαινέσθαι. Here, as often, the main idea is put in the  
participle. Again Jowett misleads, in rendering ὁ νόμος "the custom of  
mankind."

θαυμαστὰ ἔργα. "θαυμαστὰ vel θαυμάσια ποιεῖν vel ἐργάζεσθαι est sich  
wunderlich geberden...quod dicitur de iis qui vel propter dolorem et indigna-  
tionem vel ob ingentem laetitiam vel etiam prae vehementi aliqua cupiditate  
insolito more se gerunt" (Stallb.). Cp. 213 D, *Apol.* 35 A, *Theaet.* 151 A.

**183 A** πλὴν τούτου [φιλοσοφίας]. φιλοσοφίας is most probably corrupt: if  
retained, it would be better to construe it as genit. of object ("the reproaches  
levelled against philosophy") than as genit. of subject or origin (as Ast,  
Stallb., Kreyenbühl), for which we should expect rather φιλοσόφων. The  
simplest and best remedy is, with Schleiermacher, to eject φιλοσοφίας as a  
gloss on the misreading τούτου. For ὀνειδος, cp. *Rep.* 347 B τὸ φιλότιμόν τε  
καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὀνειδος λέγεται. For καρποῦσθαι, in *palam partem*, cp.  
*Rep.* 579 c; *Eur. Hipp.* 1427 κ. πένθη. In their translations, Jowett follows  
Ast, but Zeller adopts Schl.'s excision.

του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἢ τιν' ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν οἷάπερ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ, ἰκετείας τε καὶ ἀντιβολήσεις ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσι ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὄρκους ὀμνύντες, καὶ κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις, καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οἷας οὐδ' ἂν δούλος οὐδεὶς, ἐμποδίζοιτο ἂν μὴ πράττειν οὕτω τὴν πράξιν καὶ ὑπὸ φίλων καὶ  
**B** ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν, τῶν μὲν ὀνειδιζόντων κολακείας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας, τῶν δὲ νοουθετούντων καὶ αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν· τῷ δ' ἐρώντι πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντι χάρις ἔπεται, καὶ δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἄνευ ὀνειδούς πράττειν, ὡς πάγκαλόν τι πρᾶγμα διαπραττομένου· ὃ δὲ δεινότατον, ὡς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὀμνύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τῶν ὄρκων—ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὄρκον

**183 A** ἄρξαι secl. Verm. Hug Sz. ἢ τιν' : δὴ τιν' Bdhm. ἄλλην δύναμιν secl. Bdhm. ἐθέλει T καὶ...ὀμνύντες del. Voeg. J.-U.: ὀμνύντες secl. Hertz Hug Sz. καὶ κοιμ...θύραις secl. Wolf Jn.: post ποιούμενοι transp. Rückert ἐθελοντάς vulg.: ἐθελονται (δ. δουλεύοντες) Ast **B** αὐτῶν: αὐτοῦ Orelli Sz. ταῦτα πάντα T ἔπεται T: ἐπεται B: ἔπεται J.-U. Sz. διαπραττομένῳ vulg. μόνον Stob. τῶν ὄρκων T: τῶν ὄρκων B: τὸν ὄρκον al., J.-U. ὄρκον (κύριον) scripsi: ὄρκον (ὄρκον) Hertz Hug

κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις. Cp. 203 D; Ov. A. A. II. 238 frigidus et nuda saepe iacebis humo: Hor. C. III. 10. 2 asperas | porrectum ante fores, etc. For the other love-symptoms cp. also Xen. *Cyrop.* v. 1. 12.

**183 B** αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. For this construction cp. *Euthyd.* 305 A, *Charm.* 175 D. With the whole of this passage cp. Xen. *Symp.* IV. 15, VIII. 12 ff.: Isocr. *Hel.* 219 B μόνους αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς καλοὺς) ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀπαγορεύομεν θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ' ἡδὶον δουλεύομεν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχομεν...καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπ' ἄλλῃ τινὶ δυνάμει γιγνομένους λοιδοροῦμεν καὶ κόλακας ἀποκαλοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ τῷ κάλλει λατρεύοντες φιλοκάλους καὶ φιλοπόνους εἶναι νομίζομεν (with which cp. also 184 c *infra*).

τῷ δ' ἐρώντι...διαπραττομένου. For the gen. absolute after a dative, cp. *Laves* 839 B ἡμῖν τις παραστὰς ἀνὴρ...λοιδορήσειεν ἂν ὡς ἀνόητα...τιθέντων: *Phileb.* 44 c is a less certain case. For the sense of the passage, cp. Bacon, *Essay* x. (*Of Love*): "It is a strange thing to note the excess of this passion; and how it braves the nature and value of things; by this, that the speaking in a perpetual hyperbole is comely in nothing but in Love."

ὡς γε λέγουσιν κτλ. These words qualify the following, not the preceding, clause: Pausanias himself censures perjury in 183 ε. For ὡς γε, cp. *Rep.* 352 D, 432 B.

ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὄρκον κτλ. This proverbial expression is found in two forms,—ἀφροδίσιος ὄρκος οὐ δάκνει (Hesych.) and ἀφρ. ὄρκος οὐκ ἐμποίνιμος (Suid.). The Scholiast quotes Hesiod (*fr.* 5 G.) ἐκ τοῦδ' ὄρκον ἔθηκεν ἀμεινονα (ἀπήμονα G. Hermann) ἀνθρώποισι | νοσφιδίων ἔργων πῆρι Κύπριδος. Cp. *Soph. fr.* 694 ὄρκους δὲ μοιχῶν εἰς τέφραν ἐγὼ γράφω: Callim. *Epigr.* 27 (*Anth. Pal.* v. 5. 3) ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν ἀληθία, τοὺς ἐν ἔρωτι | ὄρκους μὴ δύνειν οἶσά' ἐς

<κύριον> οὐ φασιν εἶναι—οὕτω καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν πεποιήκασιν τῷ ἐρώντι, ὡς ὁ νόμος φησὶν ὁ ἐνθάδε· C ταύτη μὲν οὖν οἰηθείη ἂν τις πάγκαλον νομίζεσθαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ τὸ φίλους γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς. ἐπειδὴν δὲ παιδαγωγούς ἐπιστήσαντες οἱ πατέρες τοῖς ἐρωμένοις μὴ ἔωσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς, καὶ τῷ παιδαγωγῷ ταῦτα προστεταγμένα ἦ, ἡλικιωτὰι δὲ καὶ ἐταῖροι ὀνειδίζωσιν, ἐάν τι ὀρώσι τοιοῦτο γυγνόμενον, καὶ τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας αὐτὸ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι μὴ διακωλύωσι μηδὲ λοιδορῶσιν ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντας, εἰς δὲ ταῦτά τις αὐτὸ βλέψας ἡγήσασιν ἂν πάλιν αἰσχιστον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνθάδε νομίζεσθαι. τὸ δέ, οἶμαι, ὧδ' ἔχει· οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς

183 B εἶναι BT Stob. Cyril.: δάκνειν Teuffel: εἶναι ἐμποίνιμον Osann Jn. Sz. καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι W. Cyril. vulg. C πεποιήκασιν πᾶσαν Cyril. διαλ. τοὺς ἐραστὰς Orelli καὶ...ἦ secl. Jn.: καὶ...προστεταγμένα secl. Hug Sz. ἦ TW: οἱ B: ἦ οἱ al. ἐταῖροι Heindorf: ἕτεροι BT D οὐχ ἀπλοῦν: ἀπλοῦν Bast: οὐχ ἀπλῶς Ast

ἀθανάτων: Aristaeon. II. 20: Ov. A. A. I. 633 Iuppiter ex alto periuria ridet amantum: Tibull. I. 4. 21 ff. nec iurare time: Veneris periuria venti | irrita... ferunt, etc. As to the text, the parallels quoted lead us to expect a fuller expression. Hertz's ὄρκον (ἄρκον), adopted by Hug, is ingenious but rather weak in sense. I prefer to insert κύριον (abbreviated κῶν) after ὄρκον. For κύριος, "valid," cp. *Laus* 926 D: *Ep.* vi. 323 C, and see L. and S. s.v. II. 2: οὐ κύριος is equiv. to ἄκυρος, *irritus*. To Jahn's insertion (ἐμποίνιμον) Teuffel rightly objects that it smacks but little of the proverbial manner.

καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι. This serves to balance the statement made by Phaedrus, 179 C—D.

183 C τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. From this dative (governed by ἐπιστήσαντες), we must supply an acc. (τοὺς ἐρωμένους) to act as subject to διαλέγεσθαι. For the general sense of the passage, cp. *Phaedr.* 255 A ἐάν...ὑπὸ ξυμφοιτητῶν ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἦ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἐρῶντι πλησιάζειν: *ibid.* 234 B.

καὶ...προστεταγμένα ἦ. Hug, after Jahn and others, condemns this clause on the grounds that (1) ἦ is wanting in B; (2) the change of number, from παιδαγωγούς to παιδαγωγῷ, is awkward; (3) the clause contains nothing new. But there is point in the change from plur. to sing. as serving to individualize the parents' action; and the clause does add to the statement in the context the further idea that the paedagogi are appointed not only as a general safeguard, but with special instructions to ward off this particular danger. ταῦτα, the subject of *προστ.* ἦ, represents (as Stallb. notes) μὴ ἔωσι διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς.

183 D τὸ ἴδιον ἔχει. For this formula, introducing the solution of a problem, cp. 198 D; *Theast.* 166 A.

οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν. Stallbaum, ejecting οὐχ with Bast, renders ἀπλοῦν by

ἐλέχθη οὔτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε αἰσχροῦν, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχροῦς δὲ αἰσχροῦν. αἰσχροῦς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πονηρῶ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῶ τε καὶ **E** καλῶς. πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος ὁ ἐραστῆς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν, ἅτε οὐ μόνιμου ἐρῶν πράγματος. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὐπερ ἦρα, “οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος,” πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύνας· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἥθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστῆς διὰ βίου μένει, ἅτε μόνιμῳ συντακεῖς. τούτους δὲ βού-

183 D εἶναι del. Steph. Ast (οὐδὲν) οὔτε Bdhm. αἰσχροῦς μὲν: αἰσχροῦν μὲν Steph. καλῶς δὲ Par. 1810: καλὸν δὲ BT καὶ καλῶς: καὶ χρηστῶς Sauppe Sz. **E** ἐρῶν η τῆς ψυχῆς T ἅτε οὐ B: ἅτε οὐδὲ T

“verum simpliciter,” citing *Phaedo* 62 A, *Phaedr.* 244 A, *Protag.* 331 B. Retaining οὐχ, we cannot take the foll. accus. and infin. as the subject (with Wolf), but must supply τὸ χαρίζεσθαι (with Hug) from the context.

αἰσχροῦς μὲν...καλῶς δὲ. With each adverb, sc. χαρίζεσθαι: cp. *Rep.* 339 c τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς...τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς (sc. τιθέναι).

183 E τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λ. Youth “is like the flower of the field, so soon passeth it away, and it is gone.” Cp. *Mimn.* 2. 7 μίνυνθα δὲ γίγνεται ἤβης κάρπος: *Theogn.* 1305 παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος | ὠκύτερον σταδίου: *Ségur's* refrain “Ah! le Temps fait passer l'Amour”: *Spenser (H. to Beautie)* “For that same goodly hew of white and red, With which the cheeks are sprinkled, shal decay, And those sweete rosy leaves, so fairely spred Upon the lips, shall fade and fall away” etc.: *Rep.* 601 B οὐκοῦν ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων προσώποις... ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη: *Xen. Symp.* VIII. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παραμάζει, κτλ.: *Tyrt.* 10. 28 ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἤβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχη: *Mimn.* 1. 4. So *Emerson (On Beauty)* “The radiance of the human form...is only a burst of beauty for a few years or a few months, at the perfection of youth, and in most rapidly declines. But we remain lovers of it, only transferring our interest to interior excellence.”

οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος. A reminiscence of *Il.* II. 71. For the thought, cp. 181 D *supra*: *Xen. Symp.* l.c. ἀπολείποντος δὲ τούτου (sc. τοῦ τῆς ὥρας ἄνθους), ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συναπομαραινέσθαι. Cp. also *Phaedr.* 232 E, 234 A.

συντακεῖς. “Fused into one” by the flame of love. Cp. 192 D, *Eur. fr.* 964 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀγαθὴ γυνὴ | ἦτις ἀνδρὶ συντέθηκε σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται: *id. Supp.* 1029.

τούτους δὲ. With the text as it stands in the MSS., τούτους refers to the ἐρασταί only, who are divided into two classes, the good (τοῖς μὲν) and the bad (τοῖς δὲ). But in the next clause τοῖς μὲν refers to the ἐρασταί *en bloc*, and τοῖς δὲ to the ἐρώμενοι. This is extremely awkward; and it is a further objection to the clause that the statement it contains is premature, and would fit in better below (184 D—E). I therefore follow *Voegelin* and *Hug* in obelizing. For the language, cp. *Theogn.* 1299 ff. ὦ παῖ, μέχρι τίνος με προφειδεῖαι; ὡς σε διώκων | διζήμ'...ἀλλ' ἐπίμεινον, ἐμοὶ δὲ δίδου χάριν.

λεται ὁ ἡμέτερος νόμος εὖ καὶ καλῶς βασανίζειν [καὶ τοῖς μὲν 184  
 χαρίσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ διαφεύγειν]. διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τοῖς μὲν διώκειν  
 παρακελεύεται, τοῖς δὲ φεύγειν, ἀγωνοθετῶν καὶ βασανίζων ποτέ-  
 ρων ποτέ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐρών καὶ ποτέρων ὁ ἐρώμενος. οὕτω δὲ ὑπὸ  
 ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀλίσκεσθαι ταχὺ αἰσχρὸν νενό-  
 μισται, ἵνα χρόνος ἐγγένηται, ὅς δὴ δοκεῖ τὰ πολλὰ καλῶς βασα-  
 νίζειν, ἔπειτα τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ πολιτικῶν δυνάμεων  
 ἀλῶναι αἰσχρὸν, ἐάν τε κακῶς πάσχων πτήξῃ καὶ μὴ καρτερήσῃ, B  
 ἂν τ' εὐεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα ἢ εἰς διαπράξεις πολιτικὰς μὴ  
 καταφρονήσῃ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μόνιμον  
 εἶναι, χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲ πεφυκέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν γενναίαν φιλίαν. μία  
 δὲ λείπεται τῷ ἡμέτερῳ νόμῳ ὁδός, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι  
 ἐραστῇ παιδικῇ. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἦν  
 δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα ἡντινοῦν δουλείαν παιδικοῖς μὴ κολακείαν εἶναι C

184 A καὶ...διαφεύγειν secl. Bdhm. Sz. διαφυγεῖν Hirschig διὰ...  
 ἐρώμενος del. Schütz Ast καὶ ποτέρων del. Bast: καὶ...ἐρώμενος secl. J.-U.  
 δὴ BT: δὴ καὶ W ὑπὸ...αἰτίας del. Baiter τὸ (ἢ) Hirschig καὶ ὑπὸ:  
 ἢ ὑπὸ Hirschig B αἰσχρὸν del. Hirschig ἀνευεργετούμενος T εἰς  
 χρ....πολιτικὰς secl. Hirschig J.-U. Hug Sz. μόνιμον: νόμιμον Wolf ἔστι:  
 ὡς J.-U.: ὥσπερ Bdhm.: ἔστι...νόμος om. Verm. Sz. Hug ὥσπερ T: ὅσπερ  
 B Stob. Jn.: ὥσπερ γὰρ Verm. Sz.: ὡς γὰρ Hug: del. Bdhm. ἐθέλοντα BT:  
 ἐθέλοντας vel ἐθειλοντάς Stob. Sz.: ἐθειλοντήν Bast: ἐθειλοντι Bdhm.

184 A ἵνα χρόνος κτλ. For the touchstone of time, cp. Simon. fr. 175  
 οὐκ ἔστιν μείζων βάσανος χρόνου οὐδενὸς ἔργου | ὅς καὶ ὑπὸ στέρνοις ἀνδρὸς  
 ἔδειξε νόον: Soph. O. T. 614 χρόνος δίκαιον ἀνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος: Eur.  
 Hippol. 1051 μηνυτὴν χρόνον. On the signif. of βάσανος, see Vahlen *Op. Acad.*  
 II. 7 ff.: cp. Gorg. 486 D, Rep. 413 E; Clem. Al. Strom. I. 291 D.

τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων...ἀλῶναι. Cp. 185 A πλούτου ἕνεκα χαρισάμενος: 216 D  
 μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδὲν...εἴ τις πλούσιος: Ar. Plut. 153 ff. καὶ τοὺς γε παῖδας...δρᾶν...  
 τάργγριον χάριν. As against the deletion of the second αἰσχρὸν by Hirschig,  
 see the parallels collected by Vahlen *Op. Acad.* II. 359. For πολιτ. δυνάμεων,  
 cp. Xen. Mem. IV. 2. 35; this may be a hit at Alcibiades, cp. 216 B.

184 B εἰς χρήματα...πολιτικὰς. The reasons for which Hug, after Hirschig  
 and others, rejects these words—as (1) superfluous for the sense, and (2)  
 spoiling the responsion of the clauses ἐάν τε καρτερήσῃ and ἂν τε...καταφρο-  
 νήσῃ—are not convincing. This is the only ex. of διάπραξις, actio, cited by  
 L. and S.

ἔστι γὰρ κτλ. Hug, objecting to the “ganz unerträgliche Anakolutie,”  
 follows Vermehren in excising the clause ἔστι...νόμος, as a gloss on the  
 following νενόμισται, and writing ὡς γὰρ for ὥσπερ. This is too rash. For  
 the sense, cp. 183 B and the passage from Isocr. Hel. 219 B there quoted.

|| ἦν...εἶναι. For simple ἦν (ἔστι) with accus. and infin. cp. Phaedo 72 D  
 ἄλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι...τάς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι. For ἐθέλων as adj. (“volun-

μηδὲ ἐπονείδιστον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη μία μόνον δουλεία ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν.

XI. Νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ τινὰ θεραπεύειν ἡγούμενος δι' ἐκείνων ἀμείνων ἔσσεσθαι ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν μέρος ἀρετῆς, αὕτη αὖ ἡ ἐβελοδοουλεία οὐκ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία. δεῖ δὴ τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ ξυμβαλεῖν εἰς ταῦτό, **D** τὸν τε περὶ τὴν παιδευαστίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, εἰ μέλλει ξυμβῆναι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῆ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι. ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά, νόμον ἔχων ἐκάτερος, ὁ μὲν χαρισαμένοις παιδικοῖς ὑπηρετῶν ὅτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ποιοῦντι αὐτὸν σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν δικαίως αὖ ὅτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργῶν <ὑπουργεῖν>,

184 C μία μόνον T: μία μὼν B: μόνῃ μία Stob.: μία μόνῃ vulg., Bt.: μία νόμφ Ficinus: μία παιδικῶν Verm.: μία ἐρωμένῳ Usener: μία νέων Hug: ἡμῖν νόμφ Kreyenbühl: μία (τῶν ἐρωμένων τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νόμφ) Sz: μία τῷ ἐρωμένῳ Steinhart: μὼν δουλεία secl. Bdhm.: μὼν...ἐκούσιος fort. delenda τίς τινὰ θέλη Stob. ἐκείνον T, Stob.: ἐκείνο B τινὰ del. Hirschig εἶναι: ἐστὶν Stob. τῷ νόμῳ-τούτῳ apographa: τῷ νόμφ τούτῳ BT **D** τὴν σοφίαν Hirschig τὸ T: τῷ BW χαρισαμένοις secl. J.-U.: (τοῖς) χαρ. Hirschig: χαρ. (τοῖς) Baiter ἂν T: οὖν B ὑπηρετῶν Bast αὐτὸν Sauppe <ὑπουργῶν> δικαίως Rettig: δικαίως <ὑπουργῶν> Sz. ἂν T: αὖ B ὑπουργῶν <ὑπουργεῖν> Baiter Vahlen: ὑπουργῶν BTW: ὑπουργεῖν vulg., J.-U.: <ὑπουργεῖν> ὑπουργῶν Bt.

tarily") in prose, cp. Xen. *Anab.* vi. 2. 6; Lys. xix. 6: in poetry the use is common, e.g. Soph. *O. T.* 649.

184 C οὕτω δὴ κτλ. In this clause the method of action permissible to παιδικὰ is presented as parallel to that permissible to ἐρασταί. That there is some corruption in the text is indicated by the divergence of the mss. in regard to the words after ἄλλη: but of the many emendations suggested (see *crit. n.*) none is convincing. Perhaps the safest plan is to bracket μὼν...ἐκούσιος, as an adscript meant to suggest a subject for λείπεται, and to supply δὲ as subject from the preceding context.

σοφίαν...μέρος ἀρετῆς. Cp. *Protag.* 329 E, *Rep.* 427 E (with Adam's n.): "the nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in Xen. *Mem.* III. 9. 1—5." How many μέρη ἀρετῆς are assumed here by Pausanias is, of course, left indefinite. (See also 196 B n.)

184 D ὅταν γὰρ κτλ. Notice the balance and rhythm of the clauses in this sentence—(a<sup>1</sup>) ὅταν...ἐκάτερος, (b<sup>1</sup>) ὁ μὲν...ὑπηρετῶν, (b<sup>2</sup>) ὁ δὲ...ὑπουργῶν, (c<sup>1</sup>) ὁ μὲν...ξυμβάλλεσθαι, (c<sup>2</sup>) ὁ δὲ...κτᾶσθαι, (a<sup>2</sup>) τότε δὴ...ἐνταῦθα, (a<sup>3</sup>) ξυμπίπτει...οὐδαμοῦ.

ὑπηρετεῖν...ὑπουργεῖν. Both words are used in an erotic sense. So ὑπουργία is used in *re venerea*, Amphis *Ἰαλ.* That ὑπουργῶν (<ὑπουργεῖν>) is the best restoration is shown by Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. 490 ff.: cp. 193 c.

καὶ ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ξυμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι, **E** τότε δὴ τούτων ξυνιόντων εἰς ταῦτον τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ξυμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ ἐξαπατωμένῳ αἰσχύνῃν φέρεται καὶ μὴ. εἰ γάρ τις ἐραστῇ ὡς πλουσίῳ πλούτου ἕνεκα χαρισάμενος ἐξαπα- 185 τηθείη καὶ μὴ λάβοι χρήματα, ἀναφανέντος τοῦ ἐραστοῦ πένητος, οὐδὲν ἦττον αἰσχρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος τό γε αὐτοῦ ἐπιδείξαι, ὅτι ἕνεκα χρημάτων ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὄψοιεν ὑπηρετοῖ, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ καλόν. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λόγον κᾶν εἴ τις ὡς ἀγαθῷ χαρισάμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἀμείνων ἐσόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ ἐξαπατηθείη,

184 D ξυμβάλλεσθαι T: ξυμβαλέσθαι B **E** εἰς del. Schütz J.-U. κτᾶσθαι: ἴστασθαι Sz.: κτᾶσθαι τι cj. Hug τότε δὲ Wolf τῶν νόμων del. Bast  
185 A ὡς πλουσίῳ secl. Cobet καὶ...χρήματα del. Cobet κᾶν: καὶ  
Hirschig χαρισόμενος cj. Steph. διὰ...ἐραστοῦ secl. Hug τοῦ ἐραστοῦ  
apogr. Coisl. 155

184 **E** εἰς παιδευσιν...κτᾶσθαι. If the text is right we must suppose that κτᾶσθαι is here equiv. to ὥστε κτᾶσθαι, appended to the main verb ξυμβάλλεσθαι which is to be supplied with εἰς παιδευσιν κτλ. (so Vahlen). Of the corrections suggested (see *crit. n.*) Schanz's is the neatest, but spoils the sense-balance with ξυμβάλλεσθαι. The corruption is, perhaps, to be sought elsewhere: the expression τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν is open to suspicion, since σοφίαν as here used after ἄλλην stands as a generic subst. whereas σοφία has just been termed (184 ε) μέρος ἀρετῆς: moreover, we should expect that σοφία should itself constitute the κτῆμα of the recipient, just as φρόνησις is itself the contribution of ὁ ξυμβαλλόμενος. On these grounds, I venture to suggest that another fem. subst., such as διδαχὴν, may have fallen out after ἄλλην (ἐκπαιδευσιν for εἰς π. is just possible).

ἐπὶ τούτῳ. "In this case," i.e. in the quest for ἀρετή, in contrast to "the other cases" where lucre or position is coveted (184 A).

εἰ γάρ τις κτλ. Observe the effort after rhythm, with strophe and anti-strophe. For the thought, see 184 A and cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 C τῶν ἐχόντων τὸ κάλλος τοὺς μὲν μισθαρνήσαντας...ἀτιμάζομεν.

185 A καὶ μὴ λάβοι χρήματα. In defence of the text here, against the excisions of Cobet and Hug, see Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* II. 366: cp. *Hipp. Min.* 372 E σὺ οὖν χάρισαι καὶ μὴ φθονήσης ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μου: Thuc. II. 13. 1 μὴ τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπη καὶ μὴ θλώσῃ.

διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ. This phrase also is rejected by Hug (followed by Hirzel) on the grounds that (1) "an der correspondierenden Stelle nichts steht," (2) we should expect rather διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐραστοῦ (cp. 182 c). The latter objection falls if, with Rückert, we take ἐραστοῦ as object. gen. ("suam caritatem erga amatorem"). φιλία ἐραστοῦ here is, I take it, equiv. to the compound φιλεραστία (213 D, cp. 192 B).



**B** ἀναφανέντος ἐκείνου κακοῦ καὶ οὐ κεκτημένου ἀρετῆν, ὅμως καλῆ ἢ ἀπάτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ οὗτος τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν δεδηλωκένας, ὅτι ἀρετῆς γ' ἔνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι πᾶν ἂν παντὶ προθυμηθείη, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῷ πάντων κάλλιστον· οὕτω πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα χαρίζεσθαι.

Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρωσ καὶ οὐράνιος καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιος καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις, πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκάζων ποιείσθαι πρὸς ἀρετῆν τὸν τε ἐρώντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον· οἱ δ' ἕτεροι πάντες τῆς ἐτέρας, τῆς πανδήμου. ταῦτά σοι, ἔφη, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, περὶ Ἐρωτος συμβάλλομαι.

Παυσανίου δὲ παυσάμενου, διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί, ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστοδῆμος δεῖν μὲν Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινα ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλου λύγγα

185 B καὶ οὐ...ἀρετῆν secl. Hug ἢ om. pr. T (πᾶν) πάντως Stob., Bt. ἀρετῆς γ' ἔνεκα T: ἔνεκα ἀρετῆς Stob. C ἔρωτα Stob. αὐτοῦ (τε) Ast τοῦ ἐρωμένου Bast Ast συμβάλλομαι T, Method.: συμβάλλομεν B οὕτως om. Hermog.

185 B καλῆ ἢ ἀπάτη. Sc. τῷ ἐξαπατωμένῳ.

δοκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ οὗτος. This corresponds to δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος κτλ. in 185 A.

185 C ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα. For the sense *subito* s. *ex tempore*, cp. *Crat.* 399 D, *Critias* 107 E. On extempore, as opposed to premeditated orations, see Alcidasmas *de Soph.* 3 εἰπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ παραντίκα κτλ.

συμβάλλομαι. "This is my contribution," with allusion to the literary ἔρανος mentioned in 177 c.

ἴσα λέγειν. This alludes to the ἴσα σχήματα (including sound-echoes etc., as well as "isokolia") of the rhetorical τεχνίταις (see Spengel, *rhet. Gr.* II. pp. 436—7). We may render (after Jowett): "When Παισανίας had come to a pause—a pretty piece of 'isology' I have been taught by the professors—" etc. The title οἱ σοφοί is variously applied in Plato to the Orphics (*Rep.* 583 B), to poets (*Rep.* 489 B), and, as here, to linguistic craftsmen. For σοφία as applied to etymological "puns," cp. *Crat.* 396 c, D, and the use of σοφίζεσθαι (in connexion with the etymology of οὐράνιος) in *Rep.* 509 D (see Adam's n. *ad loc.*). For a rhetorical repetition of the same word (παύω), see *Gorg. Hel.* 2 τὴν μὲν κακῶς ἀκούουσαν παύσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μωφομένους...παύσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας.

λύγγα. The Scholiast has a long note here: τὸ τοῦ λυγμοῦ σύμπτωμα ἐπιγίνεται τῷ στομάχῳ διὰ πλήρωσιν ἢ κένωσιν ἢ ψύξιν, ἐπίσσει δὲ καὶ διὰ δῆξιν δριμέων ὑγρῶν καὶ φαρμακῶδων ταῖς ποιότησιν...ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ πληρώσεως λυγμὸς γένηται, ἕμετος τοῖσι ἴαμα καὶ τῶν ἄκρων τρίψις καὶ πνεύματος κατοχὴ. The hicough of Aristophanes is part of the comic relief in the piece (see *Introd.* § II. c). For πλησμονή, as a cause of disorder, cp. 186 c n., Hippocr. *de dietet.* III. 72 ff.

ἐπιπεπτωκυῖαν καὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' εἰπεῖν αὐτόν—  
 ἐν τῇ κάτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἰατρὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακείσθαι—Ω D  
 Ἐρυξίμαχε, δίκαιος εἰ ἢ παύσαι με τῆς λυγγὸς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ,  
 ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι. καὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον εἰπεῖν Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω  
 ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἐρῶ ἐν τῷ σῶ μέρει, σὺ δ' ἐπειδὴν  
 παύσῃ, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ. ἐν ᾧ δ' ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω, εἰ μὲν σοι ἐθέλη  
 ἀπνευστὶ ἔχοντι πολὺν χρόνον παύεσθαι ἢ λύγξ· εἰ δὲ μή, ὕδατι  
 ἀνακογχυλίασον. εἰ δ' ἄρα πάνν ισχυρά ἐστιν, ἀναλαβὼν τι E  
 τοιοῦτον οἶφ κνήσας ἂν τὴν ῥίνα, πτάρε· καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ποιήσης  
 ἕπαξ ἢ δῖς, καὶ εἰ πάνν ισχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις  
 λέγων, φάναι τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη· ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσω.

XII. Εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον  
 εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ Πausanias ὀρμήσας ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καλῶς οὐχ ἰκανῶς 186  
 ἀπετέλεσε, δεῖν ἐμὲ πειρᾶσθαι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ. τὸ μὲν  
 γὰρ διπλοῦν εἶναι τὸν Ἐρωτα δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς διελέσθαι· ὅτι δὲ

185 C λέγειν om. W D ἐν τῇ κάτω: ἐγγυτάτω Steph. τὸν ἰατρὸν T:  
 τῶν ἰατρῶν B (οὐ) πολὺν Sauppe παύσασθαι Stob. E ἀναλαβὼν:  
 λαβὼν Stob. οἶφ: ἔτφ Cobet κνήσας Wytttenbach: κνήσαιο Luzac:  
 κινήσας BT, Stob. Athen. πταρῶν Stob. φάναι B: εἰπεῖν TW  
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι del. Sz. οὐχ ἰκανῶς: οὐχὶ καλῶς olim Sz. 186 A δεῖν  
 om. Method. Sz.: δεῖν ἐμὲ del. Hirschig

ἐν τῇ κάτω αὐτοῦ. Sc. κλίνη—referring to what might jocosely be termed  
 the *clinical* position of the worthy doctor. Cp. n. on ἔσχατον κατακείμενον,  
 175 c.

185 D ἐν τῷ σῶ μέρει. Cp. Meno 92 E ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ εἶπέ.

εἰς μὲν σοι κτλ. We have here a case of "aposiopesis" or suppressed  
 apodosis; cp. *Protag.* 311 D; *Hom. Il.* I. 135 ff.: see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 482.

ἀνακογχυλίασον. Schol. ἀνακογχυλίασαι· τὸ κλύσαι τὴν φάρυγγα, ὃ λέγομεν  
 ἀναγαργαρίσαι. With Eryximachus's treatment of λύγξ, cp. Hippocr. *de diaet.*  
 III. 75 ff. γίνεται δὲ καὶ τοιάδε πλησμονή· ἐς τὴν ὑστερίην τὸν σίτον ἐρυγ-  
 γάνεται κτλ.

185 E πτάρε. Cp. Hippocr. *Aphor.* VI. 13 ὑπὸ λυγμοῦ ἐχομένῳ πταρμοὶ  
 ἐπιγενόμενοι λύουσι τὸν λυγμόν: Arist. *Probl.* 33.

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις λέγων. A familiar idiom: "the sooner you speak the better"  
 (see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 894): more rarely of 1st person, 214 E *infra*.

οὐχ ἰκανῶς. Schanz's οὐχὶ καλῶς is ingenious but needless: for a similar  
 variety in antithesis Vahlen cites *Theaet.* 187 E κρείττον γάρ που σμικρὸν  
 εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανῶς περᾶναι. For δεῖν redundant cp. *Alc. II.* 144 D, 146 B,  
*Rep.* 535 A, *Laws* 731 D, E: Schanz in *nov. comm.* p. 83 regards both ἀναγκαῖον  
 εἶναι and δεῖν ἐμὲ as interpolations by copyists who failed to see the force of  
 δοκεῖ=aptum videtur; but in his text he excises only δεῖν: against this, see  
 Teuffel, *Rh. Mus.* XXIX. p. 140.

οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς τε σώμασι τῶν πάντων ζῶων καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῆ φνομένοις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσι, καθεωρακέναι μοι δοκῶ ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς **B** ἡμετέρας τέχνης, ὡς μέγας καὶ θαυμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπινα καὶ κατὰ θεῖα πράγματα. ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην. ἡ γὰρ φύσις τῶν σωμάτων τὸν διπλοῦν Ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἔχει. τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογουμένως ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσῶδει. ἐστὶ δὴ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι Πausanίας ἔλεγε τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς καλὸν χαρί- **C** ζεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῖς δὲ ἀκολάστοις αἰσχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν

186 A πάντων τῶν Hirschig - δοκῶ (γνοῦς) Herwerden τῆς ἰατρικῆς  
secl. Hirschig ὡς (καὶ) Ficinus Steph. **B** κατὰ τὰνθρώπινα Stob.  
κατὰ τὰ θεῖα Stob. καὶ om. Stob. πρεσβεύω μου Bdhm. ἡ γὰρ:  
ἦ τε γὰρ Sauppe: καὶ γὰρ J.-U. ἔχει T: ἔχη B ὁμολογοῦμεν ὡς TW,  
Stob. τε: τί Stob., Thiersch ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ T: ὑγιεινοερος B ἔστι  
δὴ: ἔτι δὲ Bdhm. τῶν ἀνθρώπων del. Thiersch

186 A τῆς ἰατρικῆς. Eryx. speaks, as a member of the Asclepiad guild, of "our art": for his glorification of "the art," see also 176 D, 196 A, and Agathon's allusion in 196 D. Cp. *Theaet.* 161 E τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς κτλ., where also Naber excises τῆς μ. (cp. Vahlen *Op. Ac.* II. 273).

ὡς μέγας κτλ. This ὡς-clause serves to repeat in another form the initial ὅτι-clause, thus making two object-clauses to one main clause in the sentence, for which cp. 211 E *infra*, *Apol.* 20 C.

186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν...τείνει. Cp. 222 A ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντας (λόγους): we might render "of universal scope."

πρεσβεύωμεν. For the sense, "venerate," cp. 188 C, and πρεσβύτερον 218 D: *Crito* 46 C τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ: *Rep.* 591 C.

τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον κτλ. "Things dissimilar in themselves crave dissimilar objects": e.g. the appetites of the sound body differ from those of the sick body. Cp. *Hippocr. de nat. hom.* 9 ὁκόσα πλησμονὴ τίκτει νοσήματα, κένωσις ἴηται, ὁκόσα δὲ ἀπὸ κενώσιος γένεται νοσήματα, πλησμονὴ ἴηται...τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν γνῶναι, δεῖ τὸν ἰητρὸν ἐναντίον ἴστασθαι τοῖσι καθεστειῶσι καὶ νοσήμασι καὶ εἶδеси κτλ.

ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ. "The craving felt by the sound body": cp. ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, 186 A. In the doctor's parable, τὸ ὑγιεινὸν corresponds to the good, τὸ νοσῶδες to the bad ἐραστῆς.

ἴσθι δὴ. This is, as Hug observes, a favourite opening with Eryx.: cp. ἔστι γάρ, 186 C; ἔστι δέ, 186 D, 187 A.

αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἐκάστου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὑγιεινοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ᾧ ὄνομα τὸ ἰατρικόν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ νοσώδεσιν αἰσχρὸν τε καὶ δεῖ ἀχαριστεῖν, εἰ μέλλει τις τεχνικὸς εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ ἰατρικὴ, ὡς ἐν κεφαλῇ εἰπεῖν, ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν, καὶ ὁ διαγιγνώσκων ἐν τούτοις τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔρωτα, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἰατρικώτατος, καὶ ὁ μεταβάλλειν D ποιῶν, ὥστε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἔρωτος τὸν ἕτερον κτᾶσθαι, καὶ οἷς μὴ ἔνεστιν ἔρος, δεῖ δ' ἐγγενέσθαι, ἐπιστάμενος ἐμποιῆσαι καὶ ἐνόητα ἐξελεῖν, ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη δημιουργός. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἔχιστα

186 C αὐτοῖς: αὐ Rohde καὶ δεῖ, καί: καὶ δὴ καὶ Naber τὸν ante καλὸν delend. cj. Usener D κτᾶσθαι B: κτήσασθαι T: fort. ἴσασθαι ἔρος secl. J.-U. καί...ἐξελεῖν secl. Sz. ἐνόητα (οἷς μὴ δεῖ) Herw.

186 C ἔστι γὰρ ἰατρικὴ κτλ. Cp. (with Poschenrieder) Hippocr. *de stat.* I. p. 570 K. πάλιν αὐτὴ πλησμονὴν ἵηται κένωσιν· κένωσιν δὲ πλησμονή...τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντιῶν ἐστὶν ἰήματα. ἰατρικὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ πρόσθεσις καὶ ἀφαιρέσις, ἀφαιρέσις μὲν τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων, πρόσθεσις δὲ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων· ὁ δὲ κάλλιστα τοῦτο ποιῶν ἄριστος ἰητρός. Also *Phileb.* 32 A, 35 A for "repletion" and "depletion" in connexion with bodily φύσις: and *Tim.* 82 A γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατος τε καὶ ἀέρος...ἡ παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια...στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει.

ὁ διαγιγνώσκων κτλ. In this passage there is a distinction implied between pure and applied ἰατρική, between medicine as a science (ἐπιστήμη) and as an art (τέχνη). διαγιγνώσκω is here used almost in the technical sense of making a medical diagnosis (cp. Hippocr. *de nat. hom.* 9 τὴν διάγνωσιν...ποιέεσθαι): possibly earlier "Asolepiads" than Hippocrates may have earmarked διάγνωσις as a medical term. Cf. the distinction between κατὰ γνώμην and κατὰ χειρουργίην in Hippocr. *de morbis* I. 6.

186 D ὁ μεταβάλλειν ποιῶν κτλ. Cp. Hippocr. *de morbo sacro*, p. 396 L. ὅστις δὲ ἐπίσταται ἐν ἀνθρώποισι τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν καὶ δύναται ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ποιεῖν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὑπὸ διαίτης τὸν ἀνθρώπων, οὗτος καὶ ταύτην τὴν νοῦσον ἴφω ἂν: *id.* *de nat. hom.* 9 τὴν θεραπείην χρὴ ποιεέσθαι...τῇ τῶν διαιτημάτων μεταβολῇ κτλ. In later Greek δημιουργός becomes the *vox propria* for a medical "practitioner," as δημοσιεύειν for "to practise": similarly χειροτέχνης, Hippocr. *περὶ παθῶν* I.

ὥστε...κτᾶσθαι. Supply as subject τὰ σώματα.

καὶ ἐνόητα ἐξελεῖν. Schanz would excise these words; but though they present a rather awkward case of brachylogy, they are otherwise unobjectionable. Herwerden's proposal (see *crit. n.*), though supplying the right sense, is needless; while Lehrs is obviously blundering when he construes ἐνόητα as neut. plural, "und wieder auch das Vorhandene fortzubringen." Hommel gives the meaning rightly, "und die einwohnende (Neigung), die nicht einwohnen darf, heraus zu treiben."

δεῖ γὰρ δεῖ. "For he must, as a matter of fact"—an appeal to recognized

δυντα ἐν τῷ σώματι φίλα οἶόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων.  
 ἔστι δὲ ἔχθιστα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, ψυχρὸν θερμῷ, πικρὸν γλυκεῖ,  
 Ἐξηρὸν ὑγρῷ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· τούτοις ἐπιστηθεῖς ἔρωτα ἐμποιῆ-  
 σαι καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός, ὡς φασιν οἶδε  
 οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, συνέστησε τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην.  
 ἢ τε οὖν ἰατρικὴ, ὥσπερ λέγω, πᾶσα διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου κυβερ-  
 187 νᾶται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ γεωργία· μουσικὴ δὲ καὶ

186 D φίλια Hirschig πικρὸν γλυκεῖ del. Thiersch Hug (καὶ) πάντα  
 Wolf E τοῦ θεοῦ secl. Bdhm. 187 A καὶ γεωργία del. Saurpe Jn.

axioms of "the Art." Hippocrates based his medical theory on the assumption of two pairs of opposite and primary qualities, ψυχρὸν(θερμὸν, and ξηρὸν)(ὑγρὸν). By the permutations and combinations of these he sought to account for all varieties of physical health and disease: see e.g. Hippocr. *de morb.* 1. 2; *de affect.* 1. Cp. *Lys.* 215 E: Theo. Smyrn. *Math.* p. 15 Bull. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέγιστον ἔργον θεοῦ κατὰ μουσικὴν τε καὶ ἰατρικὴν, τὰ ἐχθρὰ φίλα ποιεῖν: also *Tim.* 82 A for the "hot" and "cold" in health and disease.

πικρὸν γλυκεῖ. Ast's excision of these words (approved by Stallb., Hug, and others) is, at first sight, plausible, inasmuch as these opposites of taste seem hardly on a par with the other two pairs of primary opposites. But in *Lysis* 215 E the same three pairs are mentioned, with δξύ(ἀμθλύ as a fourth, as exx. of the law of ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἐναντίων. Moreover, it is obvious that the question of savours is of special importance in medical science: cp. *Theaet.* 166 E τῷ...ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ εἶσθίει καὶ ἔστι: Hippocr. *περὶ διαίτης* II. 56 τὰ γλυκέα...καὶ τὰ πικρὰ...θερμαίνειν πέφυκε, καὶ ὅσα ξηρὰ ἔστι καὶ ὅσα ὑγρά: *id. de nat. hom.* 2, 6: and the connexion between πικρότης and χολή brought out in *Tim.* 83 A ff. Further, as Hommel observed, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα after only two exx. is unusual.

186 E ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀ. Asclepius in Homer is not more than ἱητῆρ ἀμύμων: in Pindar (*Pyth.* III.) and later poets he is the son of Apollo and Coronis. The earliest seats of his worship seem to have been Thessaly and Boeotia, and his cult, as a "chthonic" and "mantic" deity, may have its roots in a primitive ophiolatry. (see Rohde, *Psyche* 1. 141 ff.). Cp. *Orph. Fr.* 272 διὸ καὶ οἱ θεολόγοι τὴν μὲν εἰς Ἀσκληπιὸν ἀναφέρουσιν ὑγίειαν τὴν ἰατρικὴν πᾶσαν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κτλ. Also *Orph. H.* 67, addressed to A. as Ἴητῆρ πάντων, Ἀσκληπιέ, δέσποτα παιῶν κτλ. The Asclepiadae were a recognized medical guild, with hereditary traditions; their most famous schools were at Cos and Cnidus, for which see the account in Gomperz *G. T.* (E. tr.) vol. 1. pp. 275 ff.: cp. *Phaedr.* 270 c (with Thompson's note).

οἶδε οἱ ποιηταί. The "deictic" οἶδε points to the presence of Aristophanes and Agathon.

187 A γυμναστικὴ. The curative value of physical training is said to have been emphasized especially by Iccos of Tarentum and Herodicus of Selymbria, both 5th century experts in dieting. For the latter as an advocate of walking exercise see *Phaedr.* 227 D (with Schol. *ad loc.*); cp. *Rep.*

παντὶ κατὰ δὴλος τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν ὅτι κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχει τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἴσως καὶ Ἡράκλειτος βούλεται λέγειν, ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε ῥήμασιν οὐ καλῶς λέγει. τὸ ἐν γὰρ φησι “διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἀρμονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας.” ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρμονίαν φάναι διαφέρεισθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφορομένων ἔτι εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ἴσως τόδε ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφορομένων πρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον B

187 A ἔχοντι νοῦν Hirschig ταῦτὰ T: ταῦτα B ἐν: ἐν vel  
πᾶν Ast τόξου...λύρας: τοῦ ὀξέος τε καὶ βαρέος Bast Gladisch λύρας:  
νεύρας Bergk

406 A: for the former, as an example of abstinence, see *Laus* 839 E. That Plato himself recognizes the connexion between *ιατρική* and *γυμναστική* is shown by such passages as *Gorg.* 452 A ff., 464 B ff., *Soph.* 228 E, *Polit.* 295 C.

καὶ γεωργία. The appositeness of *γεωργία* is not so evident as that of *γυμναστική*, but the use of the word here is defended by 186 A (τοῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ φυομένοις) and by other exx. of a similar collocation, such as *Luch.* 198 D, *Laus* 889 D (cp. also *Protag.* 334 A f.). The art which deals with *φυτά* is regarded as analogous to that which deals with *ζῶα*, involving a similar command of the permutations and combinations, the attractions and repulsions (τὰ ἐρωτικά), of the fundamental qualities.

τὸ ἐν γὰρ φησι κτλ. The words of Heraclitus (*Fr.* 45) are given in *Hippol. refut. haer.* IX. 9 thus: οὐ ξυνίσιον ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἐαυτῷ ὁμολογείει· παλίντροπος ἀρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης: cp. *Plut. de Is.* 45 παλίντροπος γὰρ ἀρμονίη κόσμου ὅκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον: *Soph.* 242 E. Probably, as Burnet holds, the original word used by H. was *παλίντροπος*, not *παλίντροπος*, and *ἀρμονίη* combines the original sense of “structure” with the musical sense “octave,” the point of the simile being (see Campbell, *Theaet.* p. 244) “as the arrow leaves the string the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato, *Rep.* 4. 439); and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention. The secret of the universe is the same.” That is to say, the world, both as a whole and in its parts, is maintained by the equilibrium resultant from opposite tensions. For more detailed discussion of the theory see Burnet, *Early Gk. Phil.* pp. 158 ff., Zeller, *Pre-Socr.* (E. T.) vol. II. pp. 33 ff. The τόξον H. had in mind is probably, as Bernays suggested, the Scythian bow—the φόρμιγγι ἄχορδος of *Arist. Rhet.* III. 1412<sup>b</sup> 35 (see the woodcut in Smith, *D. A. s.v.* “arcus”).

ἀλλ’ ἴσως κτλ. Eryximachus argues that H.’s dictum is defensible only if we understand the opposites to be not co-existent: the discordant cannot be simultaneously concordant, though it may be capable of becoming so in lapse of time (πρότερον...ὑστερον). For τὸ ὀξύ καὶ βαρὺ as matter for ἀρμονία cp. Heraclit. *Fr.* 43 (R. and P. § 27) οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ θηλέος καὶ ἀρρενος, ἐναντίων ὄντων: *Soph.* 253 A; *Phileb.* 17 C, 26 A; *Laus* 665 B.

ὁμολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δὴ που ἐκ διαφορομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη· ἡ γὰρ ἁρμονία συμφωνία ἐστί, συμφωνία δὲ ὁμολογία τις. ὁμολογίαν δὲ ἐκ διαφορομένων, ἕως ἂν διαφέρωνται, ἀδύνατον εἶναι. διαφορόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ἀδυνατοῦν <δυνατὸν> ἁρμόσαι, C ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος ἐκ διενηνεγμένων πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ ὁμολογησάντων γέγονε. τὴν δὲ ὁμολογίαν πᾶσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἰατρικὴ, ἐνταῦθα ἡ μουσικὴ ἐντίθησιν, ἔρωτα καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐμποιήσασα· καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ μουσικὴ περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη. καὶ ἐν μὲν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ

187 B τέχνης (ἡ ἁρμονία) vulg. δὲ αὐτὸ δὲ δὴ Sz.: δὴ οὖν Rohde ὁμολογεῖν scripsi: ὁμολογοῦν codd., edd. ἀδυνατοῦν (δυνατόν) scripsi: ἀδύνατον codd.: δυνατόν Susem. C ἐκ post βραδέος om. edd. rec. cum Vindob. 21 ὁμόνοιαν: ἁρμονίαν Wolf ἀλλήλοις T (τῶν) περι Ast

187 B ὁμολογησάντων κτλ. Cp. Theo. Smyrn. *math.* p. 15 καὶ οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ δέ, οἷς πολλαχῇ ἔπεται Πλάτων, τὴν μουσικὴν φασιν ἐναντίων συναρμογὴν καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἔνωσιν καὶ τῶν δίχα φρονούντων συμφρόνησιν, οὐ γὰρ ῥυθμῶν μόνον καὶ μέλους συντακτικὴν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς παντὸς συστήματος· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ ἐνοῦν τε καὶ συναρμόζειν. For the Pythagorean ἁρμονία see Philolaus, *fr.* 4. 3 (R. and P. § 56) τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια...ἀνάγκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁρμονία συγκεκλείσθαι κτλ. The same notion of a *cosmice ἁρμονία* or ὁμολογία appears in *Ugryh. fr.* 139 τὴν Ἀφροδίτην...τάξιν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐγκοσμίαις... (δ δημιουργὸς) φιλίας ἐστὶν αἴτιος τοῖς δημιουργήμασιν καὶ ὁμολογίας.

συμφωνία. Cp. *Crat.* 405 D περὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψῆδῃ ἁρμονίαν, ἡ δὴ συμφωνία καλεῖται: *Rep.* 430 E, 398 D, E with Adam's notes: "in its musical application συμφωνία is used both of consonance in the octave or double octave and also of other musical intervals": "ἁρμονία 'reconciles' ὀξύ and βαρύ by a proper arrangement of notes of higher and lower pitch. In the wider sense, therefore, any ὁμολογία of ὀξύ and βαρύ is a ἁρμονία, but in practice the word was used specifically of certain scales or modes."

διαφορόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ κτλ. With the ms. text the sequence of thought is disjointed and obscure; αὐτὸ seems out of place, and the next clause (ὥσπερ γε καὶ κτλ.) seems to imply that the possibility rather than the impossibility of harmonizing opposites is stated in the present clause (cp. Susemihl, *Philol. Anz.* vii. 412). Hence, rather than alter αὐτὸ with Schanz, I prefer to read διαφορόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ἀδυνατοῦν (or ἀδύνατον) (δυνατόν) ἁρμόσαι: this gives a proper antithesis to the clause preceding.

187 C ὁμόνοιαν. It is possible that this word may contain an allusion to Antiphon's work *περὶ ὁμονοίας*, for which see Dümmler, *Akad.* p. 79.

αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας. "In the constitution of harmony *per se*": ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ might have sufficed, but the addition of συστάσει serves to emphasize the fact that ἁρμονία is a synthesis—ὁμολογία—of a plurality of

ἔρωτικά διαγιγνώσκειν, οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρωσ ἐνταυθά πω ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν δέη πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καταχρησθαι ῥυθμῷ τε D καὶ ἄρμονιά ἢ ποιούντα, ὃ δὴ μελοποιίαν καλοῦσιν, ἢ χρώμενον ὀρθῶς τοῖς πεποιημένοις μέλεσιν τε καὶ μέτροις, ὃ δὴ παιδεία ἐκλήθη, ἐνταυθα δὴ καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ δημιουργοῦ δεῖ. πάλιν γὰρ ἔκει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν κοσμίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὡς ἂν κοσμιώτεροι γίγνοιτο οἱ μήπω ὄντες, δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν τὸν τούτων ἔρωτα, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ καλός, ὁ οὐράνιος, ὁ τῆς Οὐρανίας μούσης Ἔρωσ· ὁ δὲ Πολυμνίας ὁ πάν- E δημοσ, ὃν δεῖ εὐλαβούμενον προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσεται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἐμποίησιν, ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ μέγα ἔργον ταῖς περὶ τὴν ὀψοποιικὴν τέχνην ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι, ὡστ' ἄνευ νόσου τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσασθαι. καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ δὴ καὶ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις καὶ τοῖς θείοις, καθ' ὅσον παρῆκει, φυλακτέον ἐκάτερον τὸν Ἔρωτα· ἔνεστον γάρ.

187 C οὐδὲ...ἔστιν del. Schütz πω Bdhm. Mdvg: πῶς BT D μέτροις BT: ῥυθμοῖς W τούτων BT: τοιούτων W μούσης del. Sauppe E ἔργον ταῖς Tb: ἐργῶντες B παρῆκει W rec. t: παρήκει BT ἐν ἐστὸν W

elements: cp. *Laws* 812 C τὰς τῶν ἁρμονιῶν συστάσεις: *Erin.* 991 E ἁρμονίας συστάσιν ἅπασαν. For ῥυθμός, see Adam's note on *Rep.* 398 D: "The elements of music are ῥυθμός and ἄρμονία. The former 'reconciles' ταχύ and βραδύ by arranging a proper sequence of short and long notes and syllables": also *Laws* 685 A τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὐτῆς φωνῆς... ἁρμονία, κτλ., *Phileb.* 17 D (with my note).

Eryximachus analyses Music into Theory (αὐτὴ ἡ σύστασις) and Practice (καταχρησθαι β.), the latter being further subdivided into μελοποιία and παιδεία.

187 D παιδεία ἐκλήθη. For "education" as "the right use of melody and verse," compare what Plato has to say about the psychological effects of music and its place in education in *Rep.* II, III, *Laws* II, VIII. Of course παιδεία in the ordinary sense includes also gymnastic; cp. *Rep.* II. 376 E, *Laws* 689 D: in dancing to music (ὄρχηστική *Laws* 816 A) we have a combination of both. It is worth noticing that in the Pythagorean *quadripartitum* μουσική had a place beside ἀριθμητική, γεωμετρία and σφαιρική or ἀστρονομία: see Adam's *Republic* vol. II. pp. 163 ff.

πάλιν...ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Pausanias was the author of the λόγος, cp. 186 B *supra*.

187 E Πολυμνίας. "The Muse of the sublime hymn" here replaces Aphrodite, being selected out of the Nine probably, as Ast supposes, because the first part of her name is congruous with the character of Aphr. πάνδημος.

προσφέρειν...καρπώσεται...ἐμποίησιν. Supply as subject the indef. τις.

καθ' ὅσον παρῆκει. "So far as possible." Cp. *Rep.* 374 E, *Laws* 734 B.



188β · XIII. Ἐπει καὶ ἡ τῶν ὥρων τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις μεστὴ ἐστὶν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, καὶ ἐπειδὴν μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλα τοῦ κοσμίου τύχῃ ἔρωτος ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τά τε θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά, καὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σῶφρονα, ἡκεὶ φέροντα εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ τῆς ὕβρεως Ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὥρας **B** γένηται, διέφθειρέν τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠδίκησεν. οἳ τε γὰρ λοιμοὶ φιλοῦσι γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἄλλ' ἀνόμοια πολλὰ νοσήματα καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ πάχυναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσίβαι ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας περὶ ἀλλήλα τῶν τοιούτων γίνεται ἐρωτικῶν, ὧν ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἀστρων τε

188 A κοσμίου Bt, Stob.: κόσμου T ἐγὼ ἔλεγον BT: λέγω Stob.: ἔλεγον Wolf τὰ ξηρὰ Stob. (καὶ) περὶ Stob. B διέφθειρεν T: διέφθειρε Stob.: διαφθείρει B ἀνόμοια καὶ Stob.: ὁμοια Schütz Bdhm.: ἄν ὁμοια Orelli: αὐ ὁμοια Hermann: δὴ ὁμοια Sauppe: ἄτ' ὁμοια Ast Jn.: ἄνομα Sommer: ἀλλόκοτα Rohde: παντοῖα Winckelmann: ἀνήνυτα Stallb. γίνεται del. Sauppe: γίνονται Canter: fort. γίνεται. ἐρωτικῶν οὖν ἐπιστήμη κτλ. ὧν...καλεῖται del. Schütz τε: γε Christ

188 A ἡ τῶν ὥρων...σύστασις. For the influence of the seasons on health see Hippocr. *de nat. hom.* 7 ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐνιαυτός μετέχει μὲν πᾶς πάντων καὶ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ τῶν ξηρῶν καὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν κτλ.: cp. *Phileb.* 26 B.

ἃ νῦν δὴ...ἔλεγον. See above, 186 D.

οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν κτλ. For these aorists, following presents, see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 155.

188 B ἀνόμοια...νοσήματα. "Divers diseases": the adj. is similarly used in Arist. *Poet.* 24. 1459<sup>b</sup> 30 ἐπεισοδιῶν ἀνομοίους ἐπεισοδίου, "relieving the story with varying episodes" (Butcher): cp. *id. H. An.* IV. 1. 523<sup>b</sup> 12: Hippocr. *de flat.* 3 δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν τὰ νοσήματα οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοισιν εἰκέναι διὰ τὴν ἀλλοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα τῶν τόπων.

πάχυναι...καὶ ἐρυσίβαι. Timaeus defines thus: ἐρυσίβη μιλιώδης δρόσος· πάχνη δὲ δρόσος χιονώδης. Roman religion had a goddess *Rubigo*. Ruhnken (*ad Tim.* p. 122) cites *Orph. de lap.* 15, v. 91 καὶ αἰθερίην ἐρυσίβην, | ἦτε κατουρανόθεν παταμένη ποτὶ καρπὸν ἐρυσίβην, | ἀμφὶ περὶ σταχύεσσι περισμύχουσα κάθηται.

τῶν τοιούτων γίνεται κτλ. There are two difficulties in this passage: (1) the singular verb after the plural subjects is harsh; to explain it we must assume a mental unification of the subjects, of which similar but easier instances occur in *Rep.* 363 A, 618 D, *Laws* 925 E. We might evade this difficulty by removing the colon at φυτοῖς, marking καὶ γὰρ...ἐρυσίβαι as parenthetical, and thus construing ἄλλα...νοσήματα as the direct subject of γίνεται. (2) We should naturally expect τοιούτων to have the same reference

φορὰς καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν ὥρας ἀστρονομία καλεῖται. ἔτι τοῖνυν καὶ αἱ θυσίαι πᾶσαι καὶ οἱς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ—ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία—οὐ περὶ ἄλλο C τί ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ Ἐρωτος φυλακὴν τε καὶ Ἰασιν. πᾶσα γὰρ [ἡ] ἀσέβεια φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τις τῷ κοσμίῳ Ἐρωτι χαρίζεται μηδὲ τιμᾷ τε αὐτὸν καὶ πρεσβεύῃ ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ [περὶ] τὸν ἕτερον, καὶ περὶ γονέας καὶ ζῶντας καὶ τετελευτηκότας καὶ περὶ θεοῦ· ἃ δὴ προστέτακται τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν τοὺς Ἐρωτας καὶ ἰατρεύειν, καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἡ μαντικὴ φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργοῦ τῷ ἐπίστασθαι τὰ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτικά, ὅσα D τείνει πρὸς θέμιν καὶ εὐσέβειαν.

188 B φορὰς W, Stob.: φορας B: φορᾶς T καὶ...ὥρας del. Bast. ὥρας: ὄρους Creuzer αἱ T, Stob.: om. B πᾶσαι B Stob.: ἅπασαι T (ἡ) μαντικὴ Fischer ἐπιστατεῖ (τέχνη) Stob. ταῦτα...κοινωνία del. Schütz C ἀσεβεία Stob.: ἡ ἀσεβεία BT μὴ τις: μήτε ἐν Stob. (μὲν) ἐν Pflugk τὸν Stob.: περὶ τὸν BT: περιττῶς τὸν Koch: θεραπεύη Winckelm.: περιττότερον τὸν Pflugk: fort. πη τὸν (περὶ) ἃ Verm. προτέτακται Stob. ἔρωτας BT: ἐρῶντας Stob., Bt.: ἐρωτῶντας cj. Verm.: τοὺς ἐρωτας secl. Herm. Hug Sz. D εὐσέβειαν Stob.: ἀσέβειαν BT

here as τῶν τοιούτων has above (*viz.* to the combinations of elements in which the bad Eros predominates), whereas it seemingly stands in agreement with ῥωτικῶν: this being so, what does ἐρωτικῶν precisely mean? For it cannot well retain, in this connexion, its proper meaning as genitive of τὰ ἐρωτικά "the laws of affinity" (186 c, 187 c). Ought we, then, to put a stop after γίγνεται and begin a new sentence with ἐρωτικῶν οὖν ἐπιστήμη κτλ.?

ἀστρονομία. The term as here used includes what we should rather call "meteorology": cp. *Rep.* 527 D τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν;...τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐαίσθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν...ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει. For "astronomy" as a regular part of the school curriculum see *n.* on παιδεία 187 D, and cp. *Theaet.* 145 c, d; *Protag.* 318 E.

ἡ περὶ θεοῦ...κοινωνία. Simpler would have been ἡ θεῶν...κοινωνία, but, as Hug remarks, "Eryximachus liebt das unbestimmte περὶ c. accus."

188 C ἀσέβεια. "Undutifulness," *impietas*. Reverence to parents and country was a matter of religious obligation; cp. Xen. *Mem.* II. 2. 13 ἐὰν δέ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπεύῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθῃσι (ἡ πόλις) κτλ.; *ib.* IV. 4. 20; *Rep.* 615 c.

[περὶ] τὸν ἕτερον. Perhaps an original πη was mistaken for a compendium ὀφεί: for the combination ἀλλὰ πη, cp. *Theaet.* 191 B ἀλλὰ πη δυνατόν.

ἃ δὴ...ἰατρεύειν. The infinitives may be taken as *exegetic* of ἃ (so Stallb., Zeller), or ἃ may be construed separately as accus. of respect ("qua in causa" Ast; "in welcher Beziehung" Hommel). There is no need to eject or emend τοὺς Ἐρωτας: the phrase used 4 ll. above, περὶ Ἐρωτος φυλακὴν τε καὶ Ἰασιν, supports Ἐρωτας here.

Οὕτω πολλήν καὶ μεγάλην, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἔχει  
 φυλλήβδην μὲν ὁ πᾶς Ἔρως, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ γαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης  
 καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς,  
 οὗτος τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν  
 παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὀμιλεῖν καὶ φίλους εἶναι  
**E** καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς. ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Ἔρωτα  
 ἐπαινῶν πολλὰ παραλείπω, οὐ μέντοι ἐκὼν γε. ἀλλ' εἴ τι ἐξέ-  
 λιπον, σὸν ἔργον, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, ἀναπληρῶσαι· ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως  
 ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐγκωμιάζειν τὸν θεόν, ἐγκωμιάζε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς  
 λυγγὸς πέπαυσαι.

189 Ἐκδεξάμενον οὖν ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ'  
 ἐπαύσατο, οὐ μέντοι πρὶν γε τὸν πταρμὸν προσενεχθῆναι αὐτῆ,  
 ὥστε με θαυμάζειν εἰ τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμεῖ τοιούτων  
 ψόφων καὶ γαργαλισμῶν, οἶον καὶ ὁ πταρμὸς ἐστὶ· πάνυ γὰρ  
 εὐθύς ἐπαύσατο, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ τὸν πταρμὸν προσήνεγκα. καὶ τὸν

188 D καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν...θεοῖς secl. Hug δύναμένοις Stob. φίλους  
 Stob. **E** καὶ del. Rückert ἡμῶν θεοῖς secl. J.-U. 189 A ὥστ'  
 ἐμέ Bekk.

188 D Οὕτω πολλήν. The German translators mostly take οὕτω as  
 qualifying the adj., "so vielfach und gross" (Zeller, Schleierm.), but Hommel  
 is probably right in taking οὕτω by itself ("hoc modo," "itaque") comparing  
 οὕτω πολλαχόθεν 178 c. Cp. Hippocr. *de flat.* 3 οὗτος (sc. ὁ ἀήρ) δὲ μέγιστος ἐν  
 τοῖσι πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης ἐστίν· ἄξιον δὲ αὐτοῦ θεήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν.

καί...παρὰ θεοῖς. Hug condemns these words, as implying a slur on the  
 righteousness of the gods. But the phrase is merely a stock formula, like  
 our "heaven and earth," not intended to bear rigid analysis; cp. 186 B, 187 E  
 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπέοις καὶ τοῖς θείοις.

καὶ ἀλλήλοις...θεοῖς. For the accus. δυναμένους after ἡμῖν cp. 176 D. The  
 καὶ after εἶναι is rendered "auch" by Hug, as if ὀμιλεῖν governed ἀλλήλοις and  
 φίλους εἶναι the other datives, but Zeller's rendering, which makes both the  
 infinitives govern both sets of datives, seems more natural.

188 E καὶ ἐγὼ, i.e. "I as well as Pausanias": see 185 E *ad fin.*

ἐπειδὴ καὶ. καὶ implies a suppressed reason—"since (it is your turn) and  
 you are cured of your cough."

189 A τὸν πταρμὸν. This was one of the remedies prescribed by Eryx.  
 in 185 E, hence the def. article. προσφέρειν is a vox propria for medical  
 "applications," cp. 187 E, *Phaedr.* 268 A; Hippocr. *de flat.* 1 οἷος τ' ἂν  
 προσφέρειν τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῷ σώματι: *id. de affect.* 1 ὅσα δὲ τοῖς χειροτέχναις  
 εἰκὸς ἐπίστασθαι καὶ προσφέρειν καὶ διαχειρίζειν κτλ.

τὸ κόσμιον. This is in ridicule of the theory of medicine stated in 186 c ff  
 and of the use of the term κόσμιος in 187 D, 188 c.

'Ερυξίμαχον, Ὠγαθέ, φάναι, [Ἀριστόφανες,] ὄρα τί ποιεῖς. γελοιοποιεῖς μέλλων λέγειν, καὶ φύλακά με τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκάζεις γίγνεσθαι τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ἐάν τι γελοῖον εἴπῃς, ἐξόν σοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ **B** λέγειν. καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη γελάσαντα εἰπεῖν Εὐδ λέγεις, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, καὶ μοι ἔστω ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἀλλὰ μὴ με φύλαττε, ὡς ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, οὐ τι μὴ γελοῖα εἶπω,—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν κέρδος εἴη καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας μούσης ἐπιχώριον,—ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα. Βαλὼν γε, φάναι, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, οἷε ἐκφεύξεσθαι; ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὕτω λέγε ὡς δώσω λόγον· ἴσως μέντοι, ἂν δόξῃ μοι, ἀφήσω σε. **C**

XIV. - Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἄλλη γέ πη ἐν νῶ ἔχω λέγειν, ἢ ἢ σύ τε καὶ Πausanίας εἰπέτην. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ἠσθήσθαι, ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμενοί γε μέγιστ' ἂν αὐτοῦ ἱερὰ κατα-

189 **A** Ὠγαθέ φάναι T: Ὠγαθέ φάναι Ὠγαθέ B Ἀριστόφανες del. Sauppe Hug **B** ὦ om. vulg. μὴ γε Bdhm. ῥηθήσεσθαι T: ἠτηθήσεσθαι (sed ἦτ extra versum) B: ἦδη ῥηθήσεσθαι Rettig: fort. ἔτι ῥ. **C** εἶπετον Blass ἄνθρωποι Bekk.: ἄνθρωποι BT: οἱ ἄνθρωποι W, vulg.

[Ἀριστόφανες]. I follow Sauppe and Hug in regarding the proper name as a gloss on Ὠγαθέ: as a rule, Ὠγαθέ stands alone.

189 **B** οὐ τι...εἶπω. In γελοῖα Arist. applies the term used by Eryx. in a different sense, distinguishing between γελοῖα, *ridicula*, and καταγέλαστα, *deridendu*; whereas Eryx. had meant by γελοῖον what A. calls καταγέλαστον, cp. 199 d, 221 e.

τῆς ἡμετέρας μούσης. This may allude (as Rettig thinks) to Eryximachus's Οὐρανία μουσα and Πολυμνία, and to his phrase ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα τέχνῃ (187 d, e).

Βαλὼν γε κτλ. "So you think you are going to get off scot-free!" Suidas s.v. βαλὼν explains by πρὸς τοὺς κακὸν τι δράσαντας καὶ οἰομί-ους ἐκφεύγειν. Cp. *Rep.* 344 d οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπίεσαι: *Phaedo* 91 c; *Plut. de s. n. v.* 548 b ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ βαλὼν, εἶπεν, ἀπηλλάγη, καλῶς εἶχε περιορᾶν τὸ βέλος ἐγκείμενον.

189 **C** Καὶ μὴν κτλ. This clause has reference to what Eryx. had said, not in 189 b, but in 188 e (εἴ πως ἄλλως ἐν νῶ ἔχεις κτλ.)—"Yea verily, it is my intention to act as you suggested."

παντάπασι...οὐκ. "To have completely failed to discern." For δύναμις ()( φύσις) as a rhetorical category, cp. *Isocr. Hel.* 218 d ῥάδιον δὲ γνῶναι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ κτλ.

ἐπεὶ αἰσθ. γε κτλ. For ἐπεὶ...γε cp. *Rep.* 352 c. The following infinitives (with ἄν) are governed by δοκοῦσιν, repeated in thought from the main clause. For the sense, cp. *Isocr. Hel.* 221 a ὡς...δυναμένην, ἀναθήμασι καὶ θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλαις προσόδοις διάσκεισθαι καὶ τιμῶν αὐτὴν χρῆ.

σκευάσαι καὶ βωμούς, καὶ θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν μεγίστας, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται περὶ αὐτόν, δέον πάντων μάλιστα **D** γίγνεσθαι. ἔστι γὰρ θεῶν φιλανθρωπότατος, ἐπικουρός τε ὦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰατρός τούτων, ὦν ἰαθέντων μεγίστη εὐδαιμονία ἂν τῷ ἀνθρωπέῳ γένοι εἶη. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ἔσεσθε. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑμᾶς μαθεῖν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτῆς. ἡ γὰρ πάλαι ἡμῶν φύσις οὐχ αὐτὴ ἦν ἤπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀλλοία. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τρία ἦν τὰ γένη τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ **E** ὥσπερ νῦν δύο, ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτον προσῆν κοινὸν ὄν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οὐ νῦν ὄνομα λοιπόν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἠφάνισται· ἀνδρόγυνον γὰρ ἐν τότε μὲν ἦν καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων

**189 C** καὶ βωμούς del. Blass ποιεῖσθαι Hirschig **D** εὐδαιμονία ἂν BTW: ἂν εὐδαιμονία vulg. εἰσηγήσασθαι post αὐτοῦ trs. Blass ἔσεσθαι T δεῖ δὲ Blass παλαιά Blass αὐτὴ B: αὐτὴ T, Stob.: ἡ αὐτὴ Euseb., Blass ἀλλὰ ἄλλη Euseb. πρῶτα W τὰ τῶν BT: τῶν W, Euseb. Stob. **E** δύο om. Stob. ἀλλὰ καὶ: ἀλλὰ Stob. Eusebii codd. aliquot on om. Stob. Euseb. ἐν B: ὄμ. T, Euseb. Stob., Sz.

οὐχ ὥσπερ. "Whereas": cp. 179 E.

**189 D** ἰατρός. This term recalls the doctor's speech, esp. 186 B ff., 188 c ff.; cp. *Phaedr.* 252 A.

ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι. "Parodie des Pausanias (180 D) und Eryximachos (186 A)" (Rettig).

εἰσηγήσασθαι. The force of this word is lost if we render it "narrate," "relate" with L. and S.: it means "to initiate into": cp. 176 E, Xen. *Mem.* II. 7. 10. For the next clause cp. *Menex.* 240 D ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι.

φύσιν...παθήματα. This is the order of A.'s exposition—περὶ φύσεως 189 D—190 C, περὶ παθημάτων 190 C—193 A. For various views of physiologists as to the φύσις ἀνθρώπου, see Hippocrates' tract with this title, where the theory that man ἐν τι εἶναι (αἷμα, χολή, φλέγμα, etc.) is combated. Aristophanes' exposition is intended, no doubt, as a caricature of the medicos of his age (see *Introd.* § iii. 4).

**189 E** ἀνδρόγυνον κτλ. Suidas ἀνδρόγυνος· ὁ τὰ ἀνδρὸς ποιῶν καὶ τὰ γυναικῶν πάσχων. Rückert wrongly renders εἶδος by "genus": it means "forma" (as Stallb.). εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα are taken by Rückert and Hug as nomin., by Stallb. as accus. of respect, the construction being ἐν γὰρ (sc. τῶν γενῶν) ἦν τότε ἀνδρόγυνον: the latter way seems the better. Rettig proposes to insert τό before ἐν, which would give the same sense. If εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα are construed as accus., it is better to take them closely with ἀνδρόγυνον

κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἄρρενος καὶ θήλεος, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν  
 ὄνειδει ὄνομα κείμενον. ἔπειτα ὄλον ἦν ἐκάστου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ  
 εἶδος στρογγύλον, νῶτον καὶ πλευρὰς κύκλω ἔχον, χεῖρας δὲ  
 τέτταρας εἶχε, καὶ σκέλη τὰ ἴσα ταῖς χερσί, καὶ πρόσωπα δὲ ἐπ'  
 αὐχένι κυκλοτερεῖ, ὁμοια πάντα· κεφαλὴν δ' ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς 190  
 προσώποις ἐναντίοις κειμένοις μίαν, καὶ ὄτα τέτταρα, καὶ αἰδοῖα  
 δύο, καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὡς ἀπὸ τούτων ἂν τις εἰκάσειεν. ἔπορεύετο  
 δὲ καὶ ὀρθὸν ὡσπερ νῦν, ὀποτέρωσε βουληθείη· καὶ ὅποτε ταχὺ  
 ὀρμήσειε θεῖν, ὡσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες καὶ εἰς ὀρθὸν τὰ σκέλη περι-

189 E (τοῦ) θήλεος Euseb., Blass ἐν ὄνειδει T: ἐν ὄν εἶδει B νῶτον τε  
 καὶ Stob., Blass τὰ σκέλη ἴσα Hirschig: σκέλη (δὲ) Blass 190 A κει-  
 μένοις om. Stob. ὡς: ὅσα Stob. ὀποτέρως Stob. θεῖν B, Stob.: ἐλθεῖν T  
 καὶ BT, Stob.: om. al. ὀρθὸν τὰ: ὀρθὰ ὄντα Stob.: ὀρθὰ Blass

than with ἐξ ἀμφοτ. κτλ. (as Stallb.). For ἀνδρόγυνος, see also Hippocr.  
*de diaet.* 28.

For the description cp. Emped. 257 ff. (St.) πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ  
 ἀμφίστερι φέσθαι | ...μεμιγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν | τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῇ, στείροις  
 ἡσκημένα γυῖοις: Lucr. v. 837 ff. portenta...androgynum, interutrasque nec  
 utrum, utrimque remotum: Ov. *Met.* iv. 378 nec femina dici | nec puer ut  
 possint; neutrumque et utrumque videtur: Livy xxvii. 11. 4. Theophrastus  
 (*Char.* 16) mentions Hermaphroditus-statues; and the Orphic conception of  
 Eros-Phanes may also be compared.

νῦν δὲ κτλ. "But now the name exists solely as a term of reproach": cp.  
 the use in Latin of *semivir*, Virg. *A.* iv. 215 ille Paris cum semiviro comitatu:  
 Livy xxxiii. 28. 7.

ὄλον ἦν κτλ. Cp. Emped. 265 (St.) οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς  
 ἐξανέτελλον. ὄλον is predicate and not merely (as Ast, Schleierm.) a quali-  
 fying adj. with τὸ εἶδος. Certainly, as Rettig notes, Zeller's "ganz rund" is  
 impossible. Rabelais (I. 8) has a reference to this passage—"ung corps  
 humain ayant deux testes, l'une virée vers l'autre, quatre bras, quatre pieds,  
 et deux culs; tel que dict Platon, in *Symposio*, avoir esté l'humaine nature  
 à son commencement mysticq"—in his description of Gargantua's equipment.

190 A κεφαλὴν δ' ἐπ' κτλ. "Quis non Iani meminert?" (Hommel). The  
 notion of a similar double-fronted, androgynous being is found in the Talmud,  
 and Euseb. *pr. Evang.* xii. 12 quotes our passage as a plagiarism from Moses.

οἱ κυβιστῶντες. Schol. κυβιστῆρ ὁ ὀρχηστής, καὶ κυβιστῶν τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι. Cp.  
*Il.* xvi. 750, and the evolutions of the "tumbler" Hippocleides described in  
*Hdt.* vi. 129; also Xen. *Symp.* ii. 11, vii. 3. The καὶ before εἰς ὀρθὸν reads  
 awkwardly; if retained, we must render it "actually" (*adeo*, Wolf), but  
 possibly ἴσα or ἴσα καὶ may have been the original. Rettig quotes Cic.  
*de Fin.* v. 35 si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante sed retro fugere,  
 plane se ipse et hominem exuens ex homine naturam odisse (videtur).

φερόμενοι κυβιστώσι κύκλω, ὁκτῶ τότε οὔσι τοῖς μέλεσιν ἀπει-  
 δόμενοι ταχὺ ἐφέροντο κύκλω. ἦν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα τρία τὰ γένη καὶ  
 Β τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν ἦν τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκγονου, τὸ δὲ  
 θῆλυ τῆς γῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον τῆς σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ  
 σελήνη ἀμφοτέρων μετέχει· περιφερῆ δὲ δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἡ  
 πορεία αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὅμοια εἶναι. ἦν οὖν τὴν ἰσχὺν  
 δεινὰ καὶ τὴν βώμην, καὶ τὰ φρονήματα μεγάλα εἶχον, ἐπεχει-  
 ρησαν δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ὃ λέγει "Ὀμηρος περὶ Ἐφιάλτου τε καὶ  
 C Ἔτου, περὶ ἐκείνων λέγεται, τὸ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάβασιν ἐπιχει-  
 ρεῖν ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐπιθησομένων τοῖς θεοῖς.

XV. Ὁ οὖν Ζεὺς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἐβουλεύοντο ὃ τι χρῆ  
 αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι, καὶ ἠπόρουν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναιεν εἶχον

190 A κυβιστώσι κύκλω del. Sauppe Bdhm Sz. τότε ὁκτῶ T, Stob.  
 ἀπειδόμενοι T: ἀπερ εἰδομεναι B: ἐπειδόμενοι ej. Steph. B ἀμφοτέρον T  
 ὅτι...μετέχει del. Jn. μετείχον Stob., Blass (καὶ) περιφερῆ Blass δὴ om.  
 Stob. αὐτῶν del. Blass τε καὶ BT: καὶ W C ὡς...θεοῖς post Ἔτου  
 transp. Steinhart ὃ γοῦν Stobaei A

190 B ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν κτλ. Aristophanes too can pose as an erudite  
 physicist. His astronomical lore may come partly from Parmenides, partly  
 from the Pythagoreans. Cp. Arist. *de gen. an.* I. 2 ἄρρεν γὰρ λέγομεν ζῶν  
 τὸ εἰς ἄλλο γεννῶν, θῆλυ δὲ τὸ εἰς αὐτό· διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ τὴν τῆς γῆς φύσιν ὡς  
 θῆλυ καὶ μητέρα νομίζουσιν, οὐρανὸν δὲ καὶ ἥλιον...ὡς γεννῶντας καὶ πατέρας  
 προσαγορεύουσιν. For the moon as bisexual, cp. *Orph. Hymn.* IX. 4 (θῆλύς τε  
 καὶ ἄρσιν); Macrob. III. 8 Philochorus affirmat Venerem esse lunam et ei  
 sacrificium facere viros cum veste muliebri, mulieres cum virili, quod eadem  
 et mas aestimetur et femina. Procl. *in Tim.* p. 326 C (οὕτω δὲ καὶ σεληνιακὴν  
 ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνδρὸς κατεῖναι φύσιν, καθὰ τὴν Μουσαίου φασί, καὶ ἀπολλωνιακὴν  
 (ἡλιακὴν Jahn) εἰς γυναικός, καθάπερ ἱστοροῦσι τὴν Σίβυλλαν) shows that  
 opinion on the matter was not uniform: see also Plutarch, *Is. et Os.* II.  
 368 c, 371 f ff.

ὅτι...μετέχει. Vögelin and others rightly defend this clause against athe-  
 tizers like Jahn: it adds to the impression of "komische Gelehrsamkeit."

περιφερῆ. "Globular" rather than "circular" ("kreisformig," Ast,  
 Schleierm.). For πορεία, *incessus*, cp. *Tim.* 45 A, *Polit.* 266 B.

τὰ φρονήματα μεγάλα εἶχον. They were "high minded" and had "proud  
 looks"; they did not "refrain their soul and keep it low": "μεγάλα φρονήματα  
 dicuntur habere qui contra dominos conspirant, cp. 182 c" (Hommel).

ὃ λέγει Ὀμηρος. See *Od.* XI. 305 ff., *Il.* v. 385 ff. We may compare also  
*Rh.* II. 2, "The kings of the earth set themselves...against the Lord"; and  
 the Babel tradition (*Gen.* xi. 4 ff.; cp. *Orig. c. Cels.* IV. p. 515 A ff.).

190 C οὔτε γὰρ...εἶχον. This obviously implies, as Hug remarks, moral  
 rather than physical impossibility—the inexpediency of killing the goose that  
 lays the golden egg. Supply ἠφάνισαν with *κεραυνώσαντες*.

καὶ ὡσπερ τοὺς γίγαντας κεραυνώσαντες τὸ γένος ἀφανίσαιεν—αἱ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἱερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠφανίζετο—οὐθ' ὅπως ἔφην ἀσελγαίνειν. μόγις δὴ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐννοήσας λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἔφη, ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἂν εἶεν τε ἄνθρωποι καὶ παύσαιτο τῆς ἀκολασίας ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ D αὐτούς, ἔφη, διατεμῶ δίχα ἕκαστον, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἀσθενέστεροι ἔσονται, ἅμα δὲ χρησιμώτεροι ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν γεγονέναι· καὶ βαδιούνται ὀρθοὶ ἐπὶ δυοῖν σκελοῖν. ἐὰν δ' ἔτι δοκῶσιν ἀσελγαίνειν καὶ μὴ 'θέλωσιν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, πάλιν αὖ, ἔφη, τεμῶ δίχα, ὥστ' ἐφ' ἐνὸς πορεύσονται σκέλους ἀσκολίζοντες. ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἔτεμνε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα, ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα τέμ-

190 C γὰρ (ἂν) Ast (τὰ) ἱερὰ Stob., J.-U. μόγις δὲ Stob. εἶεν τε: ἰώνται Stob. ἀνθρωποι Voeg.: ἀνθρωποι BT ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι secl. Kreyenbühl Sz. D δ' ἔτι Stob., vulg.: δέ τι BT 'θέλωσιν Baiter BT: θέλωσιν B, Stob.: ἐθέλωσιν T ἀσκολίζοντες Stob. ὄα Timaeus Pollux: ὄα BT, Suidas: ὄα Stob. Photius: ὄα Euseb.

ἠφανίζετο. For the impf. without ἂν, cp. (with Stallb.) *Rep.* 450 D, *Euthyd.* 304 D; *Ar. Nub.* 1212.

μόγις...ἐννοήσας. Notice the comic touch: the omniscient Zeus has to cudgel his brains over the business!

ὡς ἂν εἶεν. For this construction after a present, cp. *Xen. Cyrop.* I. 2. 5 (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 349, ὅρ. § 351).

ἀσθενέστεροι γενόμενοι. Although these words are superfluous, a little legal verbosity may be excused in a comedian's Zeus.

190 D χρησιμώτεροι. "More lucrative." Zeus, with a sharp eye to "the loaves and fishes," contrives to kill two birds with one stone. The propagation of piety by making fissures in men is an idea that tickles, and the discovery of the benefits—from the Olympian point of view—which result from schisms of this sort is νόημα γελοιότατον. This passage is alluded to by Musonius *ap. Stob. flor.* LXVII. 20; *Julian, Ep.* LX. p. 448 C.

ἐὰν δ' ἔτι κτλ. The ingenious Deity has still "a rod in pickle": the process of bisection may be repeated *ad lib.* until the wicked are left literally with not a leg to stand on.

ἀσκολίζοντες. Schol. ἀσκολιάζειν κυρίως μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀσκούς ἀλλεσθαὶ ἀληγμένους, ἐφ' οὓς ἐπήδων γελοίου ἕνεκα· τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπεφυκόσι τοῖς σκέλεσιν ἀλλομένων. ἤδη δὲ τιθέσι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλλεσθαὶ τὸ νεῦρον (τὸν ἕτερον cj. Bekk.) τῶν ποδῶν ἀνέχοντα, ἢ ὡς νῦν ἐπὶ σκέλους ἐνὸς βαίοντα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ χαλαίνειν. Hesych. ἀσκολίζοντες· ἐφ' ἐνὸς ποδὸς ἐφαλλόμενοι. Cp. Schol. ad *Ar. Plut.* 1130; *Virg. Georg.* II. 383 inter pocula laeti | mollibus in pratis unctos saluere per utres. See also Smith *D. A. s.v.* "ascoliasmus."

ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα κτλ. For ὄα (see *crit. n.*) cp. *Pollux* VI. 79 ἦν δὲ τραγάλια κάρνα μυρτίδες μέσπιλα, ἃ καὶ ὄα καλεῖται: *Tim.* (Phot., Suid.) ὄα· ἀκροδρῶν



**Ε** νοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν [ ἡ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὠὰ ταῖς θριξίν· ὄντινα δὲ τέμοι, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐκέλευε τό τε πρόσωπον μεταστρέφειν καὶ τὸ τοῦ αὐχένος ἥμισυ πρὸς τὴν τομήν, ἵνα θεώμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ τμήσιν κοσμιώτερος εἶη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰλλα ἰᾶσθαι ἐκέλευεν. ὁ δὲ τό τε πρόσωπον μετέστρεφε, καὶ συνέλκων πανταχόθεν τὸ δέρμα ἐπὶ τὴν γαστέρα νῦν καλουμένην, ὥσπερ τὰ σύσπαστα βαλλάντια, ἐν στόμα ποιῶν ἀπέδει κατὰ μέσσην τὴν γαστέρα, ὃ δὴ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καλοῦσι. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ρυτίδας

190 D τέμνοντες καὶ secl. Kreyenbühl Bt.: καὶ secl. Bdhm. Hug Sz. **Ε** ταριχεύειν Photius Suidas ἡ...θριξίν secl. Sydenham Sz. Bt. οἱ T, Stob.: om. B θριξι (διαιροῦντες) Toup καὶ...ἥμισυ del. Sauppe καὶ τὸ: κατὰ τὸ Verm. αὐτοῦ T: αὐτοῦ B, Stob. τμήσιν: πρόμμησιν Naber βαλλάντια T: βάλλοντα B ἀπέδεσε Stob. τὸν del. Hommel τὰς om. Stob.

εἶδος μήλοισ μικροῖς ἐμπερές. It is the "sorb-apple" or "service-berry," Lat. *sorbium*; for the mode of preserving these cp. Varro *de re rust.* i. 59 (putant manere) sorba quidam dissecta et in sole macerata, ut pira, et sorba per se ubicumque sint posita, in arido facile manere: and for ταριχεύειν in this sense of "drying," cp. Phot. (Suid.) ταριχεύειν...σημαίνειν δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηραίνειν.

The clause ἡ ὥσπερ...ταῖς θριξίν is condemned by most edd. It is an objection to the phrase that, as Rettig notes, we ought naturally to supply with it not only the appropriate τέμνοντες but also the inappropriate μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν: this objection however is not insuperable, and if necessary τέμνοντες might be transposed. It is argued on the other hand by Hommel and Vögelin that a second simile is really required, the sorb-slicing describing only the mode of operation, whereas the egg-slicing adds the idea of ease and facility. That πᾶ θριξὶ διαρῆν was a proverbial saying is shown by Plut. *amat.* 24, p. 770 B οἶσθα τοὺς παιδικοὺς ἔρωτας (εις) ἀβεβαιότητα πολλὰ λέγουσι καὶ σκώπτοισι λέγοντες ὥσπερ φῶν αὐτῶν τριχὶ διαρῆσθαι τὴν φιλίαν. Rückert supposes "onorum per crines dissectionem ludi genus fuisse; fortasse ex onorum dissectione per crines facta convivæ futura praedicere solebant": Zeller writes "vielleicht ein Gesellschafts- oder Liebespiel, das darin bestanden haben könnte, dass zwei Tischgenossen sich in die zwei Hälften eines hartgesottenen Eies theilten, nachdem es mit einem dem Einen von ihnen ausgezogenen Haare zerschnitten war, also ein griechisches Vielliebchen." It is, perhaps, possible that it had some connexion with (Orphic) magic and divination by φασκοπία. For the process of bisection, cp. *Phaedr.* 265 E.

190 E τὴν αὐτοῦ τμήσιν. Here τμήσις denotes, of course, the result rather than the process: Naber's πρόμμησιν, *umbilicum*, is ingenious but needless.

τὰλλα ἰᾶσθαι. Apollo, as ἀκείσιος and ἱητήρ, very properly plays the part of surgeon's assistant.

τὰ σύσπαστα βαλλάντια. "Round pouches with strings to draw": see Smith *D. A.* i. 565.

τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαινε καὶ τὰ στήθη διήρθρου, ἔχων τι τοιοῦτον 191  
 ὄργανον οἷον οἱ σκυτοτόμοι περὶ τὸν καλάποδα λεαίνοντες τὰς  
 τῶν σκυτῶν ῥυτίδας· ὀλίγας δὲ κατέλιπε, τὰς περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν  
 γαστέρα καὶ τὸν ὀμφαλόν, μνημείον εἶναι τοῦ παλαιοῦ πάθους.  
 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡ φύσις δίχα ἐτμήθη, ποθοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ ἥμισυ τὸ  
 αὐτοῦ ξυνηί, καὶ περιβάλλοντες τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συμπλεκόμενοι  
 ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιθυμοῦντες συμφύναι, ἀπέθνησκον ὑπὸ λιμοῦ καὶ τῆς  
 ἄλλης ἀργίας διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐθέλειν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ποιεῖν. καὶ B  
 ὅποτε τι ἀποθάνοι τῶν ἡμίσεων, τὸ δὲ λειφθεῖη, τὸ λειφθέν ἄλλο  
 ἐζήτει καὶ συνεπλέκετο, εἴτε γυναικὸς τῆς ὅλης ἐντύχοι ἡμίσει,  
 ἢ δὴ νῦν γυναιῖκα καλοῦμεν, εἴτε ἀνδρός· καὶ οὕτως ἀπώλλυντο.  
 ἐλεήσας δὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄλλην μηχανὴν πορίζεται, καὶ μετατίθησιν  
 αὐτῶν τὰ αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν· τέως γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκτὸς εἶχον,  
 καὶ ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτικτον οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀλλ' εἰς γῆν, ὥσπερ οἱ C

191 A ὄργανον del. Creuzer καλάποδα T, Pollux Stob.: καλόποδα B  
 ἐπειδὴ: ἐπεὶ Stob. ἡ φύσις (αὐτῶν) vel (ἡμῶν) Ast ἐπόθουν Verm. J.-U.  
 ἕκαστοι τῷ ἡμίσει Verm. τὸ libri: τε Stob. Priscian: τῷ Verm. J.-U.  
 αὐτοῦ om. Priscian ξυνηί T, Stob. Priscian: ξυνεῖναι B, Verm. J.-U.: del.  
 Rettig ἀμπλεκόμενοι Stob. λιμοῦ B: τοῦ λιμοῦ T, Stob.: τῆς λιμοῦ W,  
 vulg. B τὸ δὲ T: τότε B ξυνεπέπλεκτο Stob. ἡμίσειας Stob.  
 ἀπώλλοντο T: ἀπόλλυντο B: ἀπώλλυτο Stob.

191 A διήρθρου. "Shaped out," "moulded"; cp. *Phaedr.* 253 D. Cp. Aelian, *H. A.* II. 19, v. 39, VI. 3.

τὸν καλάποδα. "The (cobbler's) last": Lat. *forma* (Hor. *Sat.* II. 3. 106), or *tentipellium*. Suidas (*s.v.* κάλα) κάλον γὰρ τὸ ξύλον· ἐξ οὗ καὶ καλόπους, ὁ ξύλινος ποῦς.

μνημείον...πάθους. The residue of the wrinkles was intended to serve as a memorial "of man's first disobedience.. and all our woe." This repeats the idea already expressed in 190 E *supra* (*ἵνα θεώμενος κτλ.*).

† φύσις. Creuzer renders this by "nos homines," disapproving of Ficinus' "natura" and Schleierm.'s "forma": but φύσις is no mere periphrasis but connotes *original* nature or form.

ποθοῦν ἕκαστον κτλ. To attempt to restore the Bodleian reading ξυνεῖναι, as several of the later critics do, involves too much alteration; thus Hug writes τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνεῖναι, Usener ἐπόθουν...τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνεῖναι. Notice the "constructio ad sensum," ποθοῦν...περιβάλλοντες...ἀπέθνησκον. There is an echo of this passage in Philo *de op. mund.* 53 p. 36 M.

τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας. "General inactivity," implying that the λιμός itself was due to ἀργία. Cp. *Rep.* 554 A, c (with Adam *ad loc.*).

191 B εἴτε ἀνδρός. Abbreviated for εἴτε ἀνδρός τοῦ ὅλου ἐντύχοι ἡμίσει. Notice that the third possibility (εἴτ' ἀνδρογόνου) is omitted.

191 C ὥσπερ οἱ τέττιγες. This is not merely a piece of natural history;

τέττιγες· μετέθηκέ τε οὖν οὕτω <ταῦτ'> αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν καὶ διὰ τούτων τὴν γένεσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐποίησε, διὰ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἐν τῷ θήλει, τῶνδε ἕνεκα, ἵνα ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἅμα μὲν εἰ ἀνήρ γυναικί ἐντύχοι, γεννῶεν καὶ γίγνοιτο τὸ γένος, ἅμα δ' εἰ καὶ ἄρρην ἄρρени, πλησμονὴ γοῦν γίγνοιτο τῆς συνουσίας καὶ διαπαύοιντο καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τρέποιντο καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου ἐπιμελοῦντο. ἔστι D δὴ οὖν ἐκ τόσου ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως συναγωγεὺς καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἐν ἐκ δυοῖν καὶ ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην.

191 C τε: δὲ Ast οὕτω αὐτῶν: ὁμοῦ πάντων cj. Usener (ταῦτ') αὐτῶν scripsi: αὐτῶν B: αὐτῶν T: αὐ Schanz: αὐτὰ vulg.: del. Rückert αὐτῶν... πρόσθεν del. Jn. Hug ἔμπροσθεν Stob. fort. (τὰ αἰδοῖα) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Stob. γέννησιν Verm. Sz. ἐν: νέαν Stob. διὰ...θήλει del. Jn. Sz. (σῶν) (vel ἔτι) γίγνοιτο Rückert: γένοιτο Stob.: σώζοιτο Susemihl τὸ γένος BT, Stob.: γένος J.-U.: τόκος Verm.: ὁ γόνος Hommel ἄρρην apogr. Coisl. 155 Stob. D συναγωγὸς Stob. ἕνα Stobaei A

it contains also an allusion to the cicada as the symbol of Athenian autochthony: cp. *Polít.* 271 A τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἦν ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει γεννώμενον, τὸ δὲ δὴ γηγενὲς εἶναι ποτε γένος λεχθέν κτλ.: Thuc. I. 6, Ar. *Eq.* 1331. For the mode of propagation of cicadae, cp. Ael. *H. A.* II. 22 ταῖς ἀφύαις ὁ πηλὸς γένεσις ἔστι· δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ οὐ τίκτουσιν οὐδὲ ἐπιγίνονται κτλ.: the female lays her eggs in the sand, where the young are hatched out by the sun's heat. Cp. also Plut. *amat.* 787 c.

οὕτω...πρόσθεν. Hommel explains οὕτω by *hac ratione, qua dixi*; Rückert by *uti nunc posita sunt*, which seems preferable. αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ αἰδοῖα) by itself reads rather awkwardly; but, as Vögelin points out, a glossator would certainly have added the missing words. It is, perhaps, just possible that τὰ αἰδοῖα fell out before καὶ διὰ, owing to similarity of letters; but the insertion of ταῦτ' is a simpler change.

γίγνοιτο τὸ γένος, i. e. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, cp. 190 D τὸ γένος...ἀνθρωποι. There is no reason to tamper with the text: the present tense secures the notion of continuance without need of supplements such as Rückert's σῶν or ἔτι. (A neater change would be *ρεῖνοιτο*.)

ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα. In contrast to their former ἀργία (191 B). Cp. Hesiod's title *ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι*. βίος is here practically equiv. to ἡ τοῦ βίου κατασκευή (*Laws* 842 c); and the phrase means "husbandry and other means of subsistence."

ἔστι δὴ οὖν. Here at last we come to the point of the whole tale—the function and value of Eros.

! ἐκ τόσου. "From such early times," *tam longo ex tempore*: the only other ex. in Plato is *Laws* 642 B, but the phrase is common in Hdt., e.g. v. 88, vi. 84.

191 D συναγωγὸς. "A unifier," in the sense of "restorer." This subst. is unique in Plato, and rare elsewhere; cp. the use of *συναγωγός*, *Prot.* 322 c, *Tim.* 31 c.

XVI. "Ἐκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον, ἅτε τετμημένος ὥσπερ αἱ ψῆτται, ἐξ ἐνὸς δύο. ζητεῖ δὴ αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ξύμβολον. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ τμημά εἰσιν, ὃ δὴ τότε ἀνδρόγυννον ἐκαλεῖτο, φιλογύναικές τ' εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μοιχῶν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γεγόνασι, καὶ ὅσαι αὐτῶν γυναικες φίλανδροί τε καὶ μοιχεύτριαι [ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γίνονται]. ὅσαι δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν γυναικὸς τμημά εἰσιν, οὐ πάνυ αὐταὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸν νοῦν προσέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς γυναικας τετραμμένα εἰσὶ, καὶ αἱ ἑταιρίστριαι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ

191 D οὖν: γοῦν cj. Usener ἕκαστος TW: ἕκαστον B, Stob. τμήματος Stob. E φιλομοιχευτρία Stob. ἐκ...γίνονται del. Bdhm. Sz. γυναικῶν W καὶ αἱ...γίνονται del. Voeg. αἱ om. Stob.

ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον. "But the indenture of a man" (Jowett): *σύμβολον* here is the *tessera hospitalis*; the host presents his departing guest with one half of a broken die (*ἀσράγαλος*), retaining the other half 'himself' (see Smith *D. A. s.v.* "hospitium"). Cp. the use of the word by Empedocles, in his theory of reproduction stated in Arist. *de gen. an.* I. 18. 772<sup>b</sup> 10 'Ἐμπεδοκλῆς...φησὶ ἐν τῷ ἄρρηνι καὶ ἐν τῷ θήλει οἶον σύμβολον εἶναι, ὄλον δ' ἀπ' οὐδετέρου ἀπιέναι—"ad quod decretum philosophi respexit fortasse Aristophanes" (Stallb.).

αἱ ψῆτται. Lat. *rhombi*, a kind of flat-fish (perhaps plaice or turbot): Schol. ἰχθύδιόν τι τῶν πλατειῶν ἢ ψῆττα, ἐκ δύο δερμάτων συγκείσθαι τὴν ἰδέαν δοκοῦν, ὃ τινες σανδάλιον καλοῦσιν κτλ.: "genus piscium, quod oculos et nares in altera tantum parte capitis habet" (Stallb.). Cp. Ar. *Lys.* 115 (where the Schol. curiously defines ψ. as ὄρνεον τετμημένον κατὰ τὸ μέσον, ὡς οἱ σφῆκες), Athen. VIII. p. 329.

φιλογύναικές. Cp. Cic. *Tusc.* IV. 11. 25 *similiterque ceteri morbi...ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam, quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur, etc.* The sing. is *φιλογύνης* (see L. and S.).

191 E φίλανδροί. The word here has the bad sense noted in Hermog. *de id.* III. p. 324 W. τὴν γὰρ ἀκολασίαν βούλεται νῦν δήπου σημαίνειν καὶ τὸ μοιχεύεσθαι. Somewhat different is the force in Soph. *fr.* 1006 N. (Hermog. *Rhet.* III. p. 324) καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς δὲ φίλανδρόν που τὴν Ἀταλάντην εἶπε διὰ τὸ ἀσπάξεσθαι σὺν ἀνδράσιν εἶναι: and Eur. *Androm.* 229; while in Ep. *Titus* II. 4 *φιλανδρία* is a virtue.

ἐκ τούτου...γίνονται. I follow Badham and Hug in rejecting these words as an adscript derived from the context (a view already suggested by Hommel). Badham writes, "si altero praedicato opus esse credidisset Plato, quod aegre adducar ut credam, aliquanto pulcrius orationem variasset quam γεγόνασι in γίνονται mutando." The three-fold repetition sounds clumsy.

γυναικὸς τμημά, i.e. a section of the γυνή δηλ. ("Doppelweib") of 191 B. Similarly below ἄρρηνος τμημά refers to the ἀνήρ ελος ("Doppelmann"). With the theory of sex-characters here expounded, cp. Hippocr. *de diaet.* I. 28 ff.

αἱ ἑταιρίστριαι. Timaeus ἑταιρίστριαι· αἱ καλούμεναι τριβάδες. Cp. Clem. Alex. *Paed.* III. 21, p. 264 P. γυναικες ἀνδρίζονται παρὰ φύσιν γαμούμεναι τε καὶ γαμοῦσαι γυναῖκες: and Ep. *Rom.* I. 26.

γένους γίγνονται. ὅσοι δὲ ἄρρενος τμημά εἰσι, τὰ ἄρρενα διώ-  
 192 κουσι, καὶ τέως μὲν ἂν παῖδες ὦσιν, ἅτε τεμάχια ὄντα τοῦ ἄρρενος,  
 φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ χαίρουσι συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπε-  
 πλεγμένοι τοῖς ἀνδράσι, καὶ εἰσιν οὗτοι βέλτιστοι τῶν παιδῶν καὶ  
 μειρακίων, ἅτε ἀνδρειότατοι ὄντες φύσει. φασι δὲ δὴ τινες αὐτοὺς  
 ἀναισχύντους εἶναι, ψευδόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀναισχυντίας τοῦτο  
 δρῶσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θάρρους καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀρρενωπίας, τὸ ὅμοιον  
 αὐτοῖς ἀσπαζόμενοι. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τελεωθέντες  
 μόνον ἀποβαίνουσιν εἰς τὰ πολιτικά ἄνδρες οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἐπειδὴν  
 B δὲ ἀνδρωθῶσι, παιδεραστοῦσι καὶ πρὸς γάμους καὶ παιδοποιίας οὐ  
 προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν φύσει, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀναγκάζονται·

191 E (ἄρρες) ἄρρενος Bast      τέως: ἕως Ast Sz.      τεμάχια om. Stob.  
 192 A οἱτοι (οἱ) Hommel Sz.      τῶν μειρακίων Stob.      δὲ δὴ: δὴ Stob.  
 οὔτε γὰρ Stob. αὐτοῖς vulg.      B φύσει...ἀναγκάζονται del. Hug      ἀλλὰ...  
 ἀναγκάζονται del. Jn. Sz.

τέως ἂν. "I. q. ἕως ἂν, *quamdiu*" (Ast). As this use is unique in Plato, Ast proposed to write ἕως ἂν. In 191 B τέως has its usual force, *adhuc*.

τεμάχια. "Slices": this recalls the comparison with *ψήτται, τέμαχος* being used esp. of fish.

συγκατακείμενοι. An example of this is Alcibiades: see his own account in 217 D ff.

192 A ἀνδρειότατοι. An allusion, as Hommel remarks, to the ambiguity of the word *ἀνδρείος*. Cp. Hippocr. *de diæt.* I. 28 ἦν μὲν οὖν ἐς ἄρσενα τὰ σώματα ἀποκριθέντα ἀμφοτέρων τύχη...γίνονται οὗτοι ἄνδρες λαμπροὶ τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἰσχυροί.

φασι...τινες. Cp. what Pausanias says in 182 A (ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν κτλ.).

ἀρρενωπίας. Etym. M. s.v. ἀρρενωπός· ὁ ἄρρενος πρόσωπον ἔχων, κατὰ συνεκδοχὴν. ἦγουν ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ δυνάμενος πρὸς ἐχθρὸν ἀντιταχθῆναι. The subst. is ἄπ. λεγ., but the adj. occurs in *Λαῶς* 802 E τὸ δὴ μεγαλοπρεπὲς οὖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον ἀρρενωπὸν φατέον εἶναι. Rettig regards all these apparently encomiastic terms as ironical.

τελεωθέντες. "When grown up," cp. *Rep.* 377 B, 466 E.

ἄνδρες is predicative: "Such as these, and they alone, turn out *men* (*i.e.* manly, capable) in public affairs": Ficinus wrongly renders "cum adoleverint, soli ad civilem administrationem conversi, viri praestantes evadunt"; and Schleierm. also goes wrong. For the connexion between the paederastic temper and politics, cp. 182 c, Ar. *Nub.* 1093, *Eg.* 333 ff., etc.

ἀνδρωθῶσι. This verb is not found elsewhere in Plato: cp. *Hdt.* I. 123, *Eur. H. F.* 42.

192 B φύσει...ἀναγκάζονται. Hug, on quite insufficient grounds, expunges these words. It is true that there was, so far as is known, no law at Athens to enforce matrimony, though there was such a law at Sparta, according to Stob. (*Serm.* 65 p. 410) and Pollux (VIII. 40), by which citizens were liable to a

ἀλλ' ἔφαρκεῖ αὐτοῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων καταξῆν ἀγάμοις. πάντως μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος παιδευαστῆς τε καὶ φιλευαστῆς γίγνεται, αἰεὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἀσπαζόμενος. ὅταν μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐντύχη τῷ αὐτοῦ ἡμίσει καὶ ὁ παιδευαστῆς καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς, τότε καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται φιλία τε καὶ οἰκειότητι καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες, ὡς C ἔπος εἰπεῖν, χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον. καὶ οἱ διατελοῦντες μετ' ἀλλήλων διὰ βίου οὗτοί εἰσιν, οἳ οὐδ' ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν ὅ τι βούλονται σφίσι παρ' ἀλλήλων γίνεσθαι. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων συνουσία, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτου ἔνεκα ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ χαίρει ξυνὸν οὕτως ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς· ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι βουλομένη ἐκατέρου ἢ ψυχῇ δῆλη ἐστίν, ὃ οὐ δύναται D

192 B ἀγάμοις οὖσι· Stob. μὲν οὖν (post ὅταν): μέντοι Sauppe: μὲν Sz. καὶ om. Stob. θαυμαστόταρ' Bdhm. C ἐκπλήττονται T: ἐκπλήττοντα B (ἐπι) σμικρὸν Stob. οὐδενὶ Stob., Bt.: οὐδέν BTW: οὐδὲ recc., J.-U. ἑτέρῳ: ἐκατέρῳ Stob. χαίρει T: χαίρειν B D ἢ ψυχῇ ἐκατέρου Stob.

γραφῇ ἀγαμίου (or ὄψιγαμίου). But, as Hommel notes, νόμος covers not only law but custom; and it appears that "certain disabilities attached, at Athens, to the state of celibacy; those who entered public life, as *ῥήτορες* or *στρατηγοί*, were required παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (Deinarch. c. *Demosth.* p. 99 § 72)": see Smith *D. A. I.* 43 a. And it is to be noticed that it is precisely public men who are spoken of in the text. The antithesis φύσει ( νόμῳ derives from the Sophists (Hippias v. Protagoræ), see my *Philebus* p. xxviii n., Adam *R. T. G.* pp. 279 ff., Gomperz *G. T. I.* pp. 401 ff.

φιλευαστῆς. This applies to the ἐρώμενος; cp. the use of φιλευαστία in 213 D. Those who are παιδευασταί in manhood were φιλευασταί in boyhood (φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας 191 E), so that the words here are put in chiasmic order, as Stallb. observes. Hommel absurdly suggests that π. τε καὶ φιλευαστῆς may denote "virum qui neque alios vituperet amatores puerorum, et ipse pueros amet." The point is also missed by Rückert's "amicorum amator," and Wolf's "sodalium amator."

αὐτῷ...ἡμίσει. This refers to 191 D, ζητεῖ δὲ αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ξύμβολον.

ἄλλος πᾶς. This is a short way of referring comprehensively to the segments of the other δλα, viz. the androgynous and the "Doppelweib" (191 D, E).

θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται κτλ. Cp. 211 D.

192 O ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. This qualifies the negatives in the clause, like *paene dixerim*: "Barely consenting to be sundered for even a moment."

καὶ οἱ διατελοῦντες κτλ. "It is these who continue in fellowship their life long although they could not so much as say what gain they expect from one another." Schleierm. misses the force of οὗτοι by making it direct antecedent to οἱ ("diese sind es welche" etc.). For the thought of this passage, cp. 181 D, 183 E, *Phaedr.* 254 A ff., 255 E ff.

τοῦτου ἔνεκα, i.e. τῆς τῶν ἀφρ. συνουσίας ἔνεκα.

εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαντεύεται ὃ βούλεται καὶ αἰνίττεται. καὶ εἰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατακειμένοις ἐπιστάς ὁ Ἥφαιστος, ἔχων τὰ ὄργανα, ἔροιτο· Τί ἔσθ' ὃ βούλεσθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν παρ' ἀλλήλων γενέσθαι; καὶ εἰ ἀπορούντας αὐτοὺς πάλιν ἔροιτο· Ἄρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων; εἰ γὰρ τούτου  
**E** ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐθέλω ὑμᾶς συντήξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε δύ' ὄντας ἓνα γεγονέναι καὶ ἕως τ' ἂν ζητε, ὡς ἓνα ὄντα, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνητε, ἐκεῖ αὖ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἓνα εἶναι κοινῇ τεθνεώτε· ἀλλ' ὁράτε εἰ τούτου ἐράτε καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν ἂν τούτου τύχητε· ταῦτα ἀκούσας ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐξαρνηθεῖη οὐδ' ἄλλο τι ἂν φανεῖη βουλόμενος, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς οἶοιτ' ἂν ἀκκοεῖναι τούτο ὃ πάλαι ἄρα ἐπεθύμει, συνελθὼν καὶ συντακείς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυοῖν εἰς γενέσθαι. τούτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχαία φύσις ἡμῶν ἦν αὕτη καὶ ἡμεν ὅλοι· τοῦ  
**193** ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα. καὶ πρὸ τοῦ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἐν ἡμεν, νυνὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν διφκίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ,

**192 D** θέλω B **E** συμφυσῆσαι BTW: συμφύσαι b t, vulg. ζῆτε ὡς T: ζητήσεως B ἄλλο ὅτι TW τοῦτο δ: τοῦ οὐ Bdhn. τούτου γὰρ Ficinus Bast: τούτου ἄρ' Wolf **193 A** διφκίσθημεν: διεσχίσθημεν Cornarius ὑπὸ: ἀπὸ Hommel

**192 D** καὶ εἰ...ἔροιτο. The apodosis to this duplicated protasis is to be found in ἴσμεν ὅτι κτλ. (192 E). For Hephaestus and his tools, see *Od.* VIII. 266 ff., esp. 274 ἐν δ' ἔθετ' ἀκμοθέτῳ μέγαν ἄκμονα, κόπτε τε δεσμούς | ἀρρήκτους ἀλύτους ὄφρ' ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένοιεν. He would also have his bellows (φύσαι), tongs (πύραγρα), and hammer (σφύρα, ραιστήρ): see *Il.* XVIII. 372 ff., 474 ff.

**192 E** συντήξαι. Cp. 183 E, *Tim.* 43 Δ πυκνοῖς γόμοις ξυντήκοντες: Eur. *fr.* 964 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀγαθὴ γυνή, | ἢ τις ἀνδρὶ συντέηκε, σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται. For τῆκειν of the effects of love, cp. Theocr. *id.* I. 66; Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 3.

συμφυσῆσαι. Stallb., Hommel and Jowett retain the vulgate, συμφύσαι, but the other lection gives a better sense—"to weld together," conflare: cp. *Il.* XVIII. 470. There is a ref. to this passage in Arist. *Pol.* II. 4. 1262<sup>b</sup> 11 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφύσαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἓνα (Newman here reads συμφυθῆναι), but the word συμφύσαι is probably due to a reminiscence of 191 A. For the sense, cp. *Orph. Fr.* 139 παρήγαγεν...τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἐνοποιὸν ὄντα τῶν ὄλων.

τοῦ ὅλου...ὄνομα. This *definition* sums up the description of Eros given in 191 D *ad iní.*

**193 A** διφκίσθημεν κτλ. This is apparently a reference—in spite of the audacious anachronism (cp. *Introd.* § VIII), to the διοικισμός of Mantinea in

καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. φόβος οὖν ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ κόσμιοι ὤμεν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὐθις διασχισθησόμεθα, καὶ περίμεν ἔχοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς στήλαις καταγραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι, διαπεπρισμένοι κατὰ τὰς ῥίνας, γηγυότες ὥσπερ λίσσαι. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντ' ἄνδρα χρὴ ἅπαντα παρακελεύεσθαι εὖσεβεῖν περὶ θεούς, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ Β τύχωμεν, ὡς ὁ Ἔρωσ ἡμῖν ἡγεμῶν καὶ στρατηγός. ᾧ μηδεὶς ἐναντία πραττέτω—πράττει δ' ἐναντία, ὅστις θεοῖς ἀπεχθάνεται— φίλοι γὰρ γενόμενοι καὶ διαλλαγέστες τῷ θεῷ ἐξευρησόμεν τε καὶ ἐντυξόμεθα τοῖς παιδικοῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις αὐτῶν, ὃ τῶν νῦν ὀλίγοι ποιοῦσι. || καὶ μὴ μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐρυσίμαχος, κωμῶδων τὸν λόγον, ὡς Πανσαυαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω· ἴσως μὲν γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τούτων τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καὶ εἰσὶν ἀμφοτέροι τὴν φύσιν ἄρρενες· λέγω C

193 A διασχισθησόμεθα T: διασχισθησόμεθα B καταγραφῆ Schneider: κατὰ γραφὴν Ruhnken Sz. διαπεπρισμένοι T: διαπεπρησμένοι B: δίχα πεπρισμένοι Ruhnken ἅπαντι Hirschig Sz. B ὡς BT: ὡν recc. vulg., Herm. J.-U.: fort. ὄσων ἡμιτόμοι αὐτῶν Bast μοι B: μου T γὰρ καί: γὰρ Wolf C ἄρρενος Bast: ἄρρενος ἐνός Orelli

385 B.C., for which see Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 1 ff. ἐκ δὲ τούτου καθήρηθ' ἡμῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διωκισθὴ δὲ ἡ Μαντινεία τετραχὴ καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον φέκον (i.e. κατὰ κόμης): Isocr. *Ran.* 67 A: Arist. *Pol.* II. 2, § 3.

καταγραφὴν. Many editors divide the word κατὰ γραφὴν. Probably whichever reading we adopt the meaning is the same, "in profile," the figures being bas-reliefs (*crusta*). Cp. Plin. xxxv. 34 hic catagrapha invenit, hoc est obliquas imagines.

ὥσπερ λίσσαι. These are διαπεπρισμένοι ἀστράγαλοι (Schol. *ad loc.*, Suidas), like the σύμβολον of 191 D: cp. Ar. *Ran.* 826, Schol. *ad Eur. Med.* 610.

193 B ὡς ὁ Ἔρωσ. The Bodleian's ὡς, though doubtful, is possible. Perhaps the variants arose from an original ὄσων or ἐν φ.

πράττει... ἀπεχθάνεται. This may contain an allusion, as Usener suggests, to some familiar verse such as, e.g., πράττει δ' ἐναντί' δε θεοῖς ἀπήχθετο.

μὴ μοι ὑπολάβῃ. This is one of three cases in Plato of "μὴ with the (independent) subjunctive implying apprehension coupled with the desire to avert the object of fear,"—the other cases being *Euthyd.* 272 c, *Laws* 861 ε (see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 264).

κωμῶδων τὸν λόγον. "Ridiculing my discourse," cp. 189 B: so ἐπικωμῶδων, *Apol.* 31 d. As Hug observes, A. is really κωμῶδων himself when, in comic contrast to the picture drawn of Agathon in *Theom.* 31 ff., he here suggests that he is τὴν φύσιν ἄρην.

193 C ἀμφοτέροι... ἄρρενες. "H. e. ἄρρενος ἐνός" Stallb. As Wolf (like Stallb.) says, ἄρρενες τὴν φύσιν means "mares origine, τμήματα seu τεμάχια τοῦ ἄρρενος," and implies further, as Rettig notes, "mares natura, geborene Päderasten."





XVII. Ἄλλὰ πείσομαί σοι, ἔφη φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον· καὶ γὰρ μοι ὁ λόγος ἡδέως ἐρρήθη. καὶ εἰ μὴ ξυνήδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὖσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά, πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ εἰρήσθαι· νῦν δὲ ὄμως θαρρῶ. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη εἰπεῖν Καλῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἠγώνισαι, 194 ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε· εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὐ νῦν ἐγὼ εἰμι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὐ ἔσομαι, ἐπειδὴν καὶ Ἀγάθων εἶπη εὖ, καὶ μάλ' ἂν φοβοίω καὶ ἐν

193 E ξυνήδη Cobet: ξυνήθειν libri ἀπορήσωσι T: ἀπορήσω B  
194 A ου νῦν B ἴσως ου B: οὐ ἴσως Sz.: οὐ Jn. εὖ, καὶ μάλ' distinxi  
auctore Vahlen: εὖ καὶ μάλ' BT, Bt.: εὖ μάλ' Hirschig Sz.: καὶ μάλ' Verm.

καὶ γὰρ... ἐρρήθη. "Indeed I was quite pleased with your discourse": hence, Eryximachus could "let off" Aristophanes (cp. 189 C ἴσως... ἀφήσω σε). Whatever the esoteric meaning of A.'s discourse may have been, Eryx. apparently regards it simply as a piece of pleasantry—"er hat sich also offenbar nicht verstanden, sondern hat sich blos an die lustige Aussenseite derselben gehalten" (Rettig).

εἰ μὴ ξυνήδη κτλ. For this construction with ξίνοιδα, cp. *Prot.* 348 B ἵνα τοῦτο μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν (with Adam's note); *Phaedo* 92 D, *Apol.* 34 B.

πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην. For the imperf. here (in an unfulfilled condition) as a primary tense, cp. *Theaet.* 143 E (Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 172).

194 A Καλῶς... ἠγώνισαι. This implies that the various encomiasts are engaged in a rhetorical contest (ἀγών): "your display in the competition was a fine one."

εἰ δὲ γένοιο κτλ. Cp. *Ter. Andr.* II. 1. 9 tu si hic sis, aliter censeas. For μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως (rashly altered by critics) cp. *Rep.* 589 D, *Ar. Vesp.* 1486, and see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. 494 f.

ἐπειδὴν κτλ. Notice the elaborate courtesy, not devoid of irony, with which S. treats Agathon, who evidently is a man with a taste for flattery. Since the combination εὖ καὶ μᾶλα is open to suspicion, the regular forms being either εὖ μᾶλα (*Gorg.* 496 C, etc.) or καὶ μᾶλα (*Phaedr.* 265 A, etc.), I adopt the punctuation suggested by Vahlen. Other critics have proposed to eject either the καὶ or the εὖ: it would be equally easy to alter εὖ to σί, or transpose to καὶ εὖ. The text, punctuated after εἶπη, has been construed (1) as "plenius dictum pro εὖ μᾶλα" (Stallb.), the καὶ connecting μᾶλα with εὖ (Hommel), or (2) as εὖ μᾶλα with καὶ, corresponding to the following καὶ, interjected (so Ast); but neither of these explanations is tenable. In favour of construing εὖ with εἶπη may be cited εὖ ἐρούντος three ll. below and εὖ ἱρεῖ 198 A: for the order, cp. *Rep.* 613 B ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ: *Laws* 805 B, 913 B (see Vahlen *Op. Acad.* I. 494 ff.): add *Thuc.* I. 71. 7 πρὸς τὰδε βουλευέσθε εὖ, καὶ κτλ.

ἐν παντὶ εἴης. "You would be at your wits' end," in *summa consilii inopia* || (Ast). Cp. *Euthyd.* 301 A ἐν παντὶ ἐγενομένη ὑπὸ ἀπορίας: *Rep.* 579 B; *Xen. Hell.* v. 4. 29. Cp. the use of παντοῖος εἶναι (γίγνεσθαι).

παντὶ εἴης ὡσπερ ἐγὼ νῦν. Φαρμάττειν βούλει με, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, ἵνα θορυβηθῶ διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι τὸ θέατρον προσδοκίαν μεγάλην ἔχειν ὡς εὐ ἐρούντος ἐμοῦ. Ἐπιλήσμων μεντὰν εἶην, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, εἰ ἰδὼν τὴν σὴν B ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην ἀναβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὸν ὀκρίβαντα μετὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ βλέψαντος ἐναντία τοσοῦτω θεάτρῳ, μέλλοντος ἐπιδειξέσθαι σαυτοῦ λόγους, καὶ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἐκπλαγέντος, νῦν οἰηθείην σε θορυβηθήσεσθαι ἕνεκα ἡμῶν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸν Ἀγάθωνα φάναι, οὐ δὴ πού

194 B ἀκρίβαντα B ἐπεδείξασθαι T θορυβήσεσθαι TW σὺ δὴ που cj. Steph.

Φαρμάττειν β. με. "To cast a spell upon me." Extravagant praise was liable to cause nemesis and the evil eye: cp. *Phaedo* 95 B μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῶν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα λέγεσθαι (with Stallb. *ad loc.*): *Virg. Ecl.* vii. 27, and the Latin terms *fascinum*, *mala lingua*. For φαρμάττειν, cp. *Meno* 80 A γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις. Both here and in *Meno* l. c. the phrase may be reminiscent of *Gorg. Hel.* 15 οἱ δὲ τῶν λόγων πειθοὶ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν.

τὸ θέατρον. "The house,"—rather absurdly applied to the small gathering of banqueters, but A. is still full of his recent triumph in the θέατρον proper and readily takes up the idea that he is again engaged in a literary ἀγὼν (cp. ἡγωνίσαι, 194 A n.).

Ἐπιλήσμων. Cp. *Ar. Nuῦ.* 129 γέρον ὦν ἀπιλήσμων καὶ βραδύς. As Hommel notes, the word is "senum decrepitorum constans epitheton." Socrates applies it to himself also in *Prot.* 334 c, d.

τὴν σὴν... ἀναβαίνοντος. For the construction, cp. *Ar. Ach.* 93 (ἐκκόψει...) τὸν γε σὸν (ὀφθαλμὸν) τοῦ πρέσβεως. See *Madv. Gr. Syntax* § 67.

194 B ἐπὶ τὸν ὀκρίβαντα. It seems to have been usual for the poet, as well as the players and choreutae, to appear before the audience, wearing crowns but not in costume, at the προαγῶν of the great Dionysia held in the Odeum of Pericles on the 8th of Elaphebolion: see *Aesch.* III. 67 (Schol.), *Ar. Vesp.* 1109 (Schol.). The ὀκρίβας was apparently a platform (βῆμα, cp. *Ion* 535 E) in the Odeum, and πόντ, as formerly supposed, the λογεῖον or stage in the theatre itself (cp. *Smith D. A.* II. 813 b, 818 b): Schol. ὀκρίβαντα· τὸ λογεῖον, ἐφ' οὗ οἱ τραγωδοὶ ἡγωνίζονται. τινὲς δὲ κιλίβαντα τρισκελῆ φασίν, ἐφ' οὗ ἴστανται οἱ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ τὰ ἐκ μετέωρου λέγουσιν. Another meaning of ὀκρίβας is a painter's "ensel."

μέλλοντος ἐπιδειξέσθαι. The force of μέλλοντος is seen when we remember that the ἀνάβασις of the poets took place at the προαγῶν, before the actual performance of the play. For ἐπιδείκνυσθαι of theatrical displays, cp. *Ar. Ran.* 771 ὅτε δὴ κατῆλθ' Εὐριπίδης, ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς λωποδύταις κτλ. With Agathon's self-assurance cp. *Isocr. Paneg.* 43 C μικρὸν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ θρασυάμενος... ποιήσομαι τοὺς λόγους.

με οὕτω θεάτρου μεστὸν ἡγεῖ, ὥστε καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι νοῦν ἔχοντι ὀλίγοι ἔμφρονες πολλῶν ἀφρόνων φοβερώτεροι; Οὐ μεντὰν καλῶς C ποιοίην, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων, περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ ἄγροικον δοξάζων· ἀλλ' εὐ οἶδα, ὅτι εἴ τισιν ἐντύχοις οὐς ἡγοῖο σοφούς, μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν φροντίζοις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὗτοι ἡμεῖς ὤμεν—ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖ παρήμεν καὶ ἡμεν τῶν πολλῶν—εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις ἐντύχοις σοφοῖς, τάχ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο αὐτούς, εἴ τι ἴσως οἰοιο αἰσχρὸν ὄν ποιεῖν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. Τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο, εἴ τι οἰοιο αἰσχρὸν D ποιεῖν; καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον ἔφη ὑπολαβόντα εἰπεῖν Ὡ φίλε Ἀγάθων, εἰς ἀποκρίνη Σωκράτει, οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει αὐτῷ ὄρησιν τῶν ἐνθάδε ὀτιοῦν γίγνεσθαι, εἰς μόνον ἔχη ὅτῳ διαλέγεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῶ. ἐγὼ δὲ ἡδέως μὲν ἀκούω Σωκράτους διαλεγόμενον, ἀναγκαῖον δέ μοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἐρωτι καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι

194 C φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη vulg. ἄλλοις: ἀλλ' Bdhm. ἴσως secl. Sz. Bt.: πως cj. Usener: fort. transp. post τάχ' ἂν ὄν secl. Wolf: ἂν cj. Bt. D οἰοῖτο B. γίγνεται Mdv.

οὕτω θεάτρου μεστὸν. This means "theatri applausu inflatum esse" (Stallb.); rather than "stage-struck," cp. Themist. 26. 311 B; Synes. *de provid.* 105 B θεάτρον καὶ ἀγορᾶς ἀπληστος.

194 C πολλῶν ἀφρόνων. As Wolf observes, "ein feines Compliment für das Parterre in Athen." But such a lofty contempt for the bourgeois of the pit and gallery is quite in keeping with A.'s position as the artistic aristocrat. If Aristophanes flatters his public on their σοφία (as in *Ran.* 1109 ff.), it is obvious that he does so with his tongue in his cheek. Cp. *Laws* 659 A, οὐτε γὰρ παρὰ θεάτρον δεῖ τὸν γε ἀληθῆ κριτὴν κρίνειν μανθάνοντα.

περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ. "Nota vim pronominum...: de te, viro tanto tamque insigni, ego, homo vilis" (Hommel). For ἄγροικος, cp. 218 B, *Laws* 880 A *Theaet.* 174 D ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον...γίγνεσθαι.

μὴ οὐχ...ὤμεν. For Platonic exx. of μὴ or μὴ οὐ in "cautious assertions or negations," see Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 265.

ἄλλοις...σοφοῖς. Not "other wise men" but "others who are wise" (sc. unlike us).

ἴσως. This word is probably genuine. Possibly, however, it should be transferred to a place before, or after, τάχ' ἂν (for the combination ἴσως τάχ' ἂν, cp. *Tim.* 38 E, *Laws* 676 C, etc.; Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 14). The ὄν after αἰσχρὸν is sufficiently confirmed by *Rep.* 425 C, *Phaedo* 77 A (see Vahlen, *Op. Acad.* I. 496 f. on the whole passage).

194 D οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει...γίγνεσθαι. For Socrates as φιλόλογος, see *Apol.* 38 A, *Phaedo* 61 E; and for his "cramp-fish" style of dialectic, *Laches* 187.

ἄλλως τε καὶ καλῶ. For Socrates as φιλόκαλος, cp. 213 C, 216 D: it is a mark of the ἐρωτικός.

παρ' ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ὑμῶν τὸν λόγον· ἀποδοὺς οὖν ἐκάτερος τῷ θεῷ  
**E** οὕτως ἤδη διαλεγέσθω. Ἄλλὰ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Φαῖδρε, φάναι τὸν  
 Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐδὲν με κωλύει λέγειν· Σωκράτει γὰρ καὶ αὐθις  
 ἔσται πολλάκις διαλέγεσθαι.

XVIII. Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρή με  
 εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν. δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι πάντες οἱ πρόσθεν εἰρηκότες  
 οὐ τὸν θεὸν ἐγκωμιάζουν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαιμονίζουσιν τῶν  
 ἀγαθῶν ὧν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος· ὁποῖος δέ τις αὐτὸς ὧν ταῦτα  
**195** ἔδωρήσατο, οὐδεὶς εἴρηκεν. εἰς δὲ τρόπος ὀρθὸς παντὸς ἐπαίνου  
 περὶ παντός, λόγῳ διελθεῖν οἷος ὧν <οἷων> αἴτιος ὧν τυγχάνει  
 περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ. οὕτω δὲ τὸν Ἐρωτα καὶ ἡμᾶς δίκαιον  
 ἐπαινέσαι πρῶτον αὐτὸν οἷος ἔστιν, ἔπειτα τὰς δόσεις.

Φημί οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων Ἐρωτα, εἰ θέμις  
 καὶ ἀνεμέσητον εἰπεῖν, εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν, κάλλιστον

**194 E** ὡς BTW: ᾗ vulg. ἐπαινεῖν, ἔπειτ' ἐπαινεῖν Hirschig **195 A** ὀρθὸς  
 om. T παντός om. Bdhm. οἷος ὧν (οἷων) scripsi: οἷος οἷων Sz. Bt.:  
 οἷος οἷων ex emend. T: οἷος ὧν BT: οἷος ὧν vulg., J.-U.: οἷος ὄσων Baiter: οἷος  
 ὧν (ὄσων) Voeg.: οἷος Bdhm. αἴτιος: αὐτὸς Bdhm.

ἀποδοὺς οὖν. Cp. *Politi.* 267 A καλῶς καὶ καθαπερὶ χρέως ἀπέδωκάς μοι τὸν  
 λόγον: *Rep.* 612 B, C; 220 D *infra*.

**194 E** πρῶτον μὲν...ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν. Stallbaum, though reading ὡς, punctuates  
 like Hommel (who keeps the vulgate ᾗ) after the first as well as after the  
 second εἰπεῖν, as if the meaning were "to speak in the way in which I ought  
 to speak," which is nonsense. The first εἰπεῖν (=δηλοῦν) is different in force  
 from the other two (=λόγον ποιῆσαι), the sense being "first to state the  
 proper method I am to adopt in my oration, and secondly to deliver it." Agathon has imbibed a "worship of machinery"—the machinery of method—  
 from the fashionable schools of rhetoric.

δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι. Agathon, like the rest (cp. 180 D, 185 E), adopts the  
 favourite rhetorical device of criticizing the manner or thought of previous  
 speakers: cp. Isocr. *Bucir.* 222 B, 230 A; *Hel.* 210 B φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμων...  
 τυγχάνει δ' ἀπολογία εἰρηκῶς κτλ.: *Panegy.* 41 B ff., 44 C.

**195 A** οἷος ὧν (οἷων). This doubling of relatives is a favourite trick of poets  
 and rhetors; cp. Soph. *Aj.* 923 οἷος ὧν οἷως ἔχεις ("mighty and mightily  
 fallen"), *ib.* 557, *Trach.* 995, 1045; Eur. *Alc.* 144; Gorg. *Palam.* 22 οἷος ὧν  
 οἷφ' λουδορεῖ: *id.* *Hel.* 11 ὅσοι δὲ ὄσους περὶ ὄσων καὶ ἔπεισαν καὶ πείσουσι.

εἰ θέμις καὶ ἀνεμέσητον. For excess in laudation as liable to provoke  
*νέμεσις*, see n. on *φαρμάττειν*, 194 A. For the thought (here and at the end of  
 A.'s speech) cp. Spenser, *H. to Love*, "Then would I sing of thine immortal  
 praise...And thy triumphant name then would I raise Above all the gods, thee  
 onely honoring, My guide, my God, my victor, and my king."

ἄντα καὶ ἄριστον. ἔστι δὲ κάλλιστος ὦν τοιοῦσδε. πρῶτον μὲν νεώτατος θεῶν, ὃ Φαῖδρε. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸς B παρέχεται, φεύγων φυγῆ· τὸ γήρας, ταχὺ ὄν δήλον ὅτι· θάπτον γοῦν τοῦ δέοντος ἡμῖν προσέρχεται. ὃ δὴ πέφυκεν Ἔρως μισεῖν καὶ οὐδ' ἐντὸς πολλοῦ πλησιάζειν. μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς "ὄμοιον ὀμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει." ἐγὼ δὲ Φαῖδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν τούτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ

195 B τῶν λόγων Stob. (ἐν) φυγῆ Stob. ταχὺ...προσέρχεται del. Heusde. ὄν B: οὖν T ἔρωτος B οὐδ' ἐντὸς Stob.: οὐ δόντος B: οὐδ' ὄντος T πλησιάζειν T, Stob.: πλησιάζει B ἔστι (νέος) Sauppe J.-U. Sz.: ἔπεται Winckelmann δεῖ πελάζειν Stob. ἄλλα πολλὰ Hirschig

195 B ὃ Φαῖδρε. Phaedrus is specially addressed because it is his thesis (ἐν τοῖς προσβύτατος ὃ Ἔρως 178 A, c) which is here challenged.

μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον. This serves to echo, and reply to, Phaedrus's τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου 178 B (cp. 192 A). For the attributes youth and beauty, cp. Callim. H. II. 36 καὶ μὲν ἀεὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀεὶ νέος (of Phoebus).

φεύγων φυγῆ. A poetical mode of giving emphasis. "φυγῆ φεύγειν nunquam sic legitur ut simplex φεύγειν de victis militibus, sed per translationem, fugientium modo, h. e. omni contentione aliquid defugere atque abhorrere" (Lobeck *Parall.* II. p. 524). Prose exx. are *Epin.* 974 B, *Epiet.* viii. 354 c; Lucian *adv. indoct.* 16.

ταχὺ ὄν...προσέρχεται. Bast, "motus ἀπορία sententiae," condemned these words; but the presence of sophisticated word-play is no reason for suspicion in A.'s speech. A. argues that Age, in spite of its "lean shrunk shanks," is nimble, only too nimble indeed in its pursuit of men: therefore, *à fortiori*, the god who can elude its swift pursuit must be still more nimble. For the agility of Eros, cp. *Orgh.* H. 58. 1, 2 (κικλήσκω) Ἔρωτα...εὐδρομον ὄρμη.

ἐντὸς πολλοῦ. Cp. Thuc. II. 77 ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῦ χωρίου τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν πελάσαι. For the sense (abhorrence of age), cp. Anacr. 14. 5 ἢ δὲ (νῆνις)...τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην, ἰ'λευκὴ γάρ, καταμύμφεται κτλ.

ἀεὶ ξύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν. Hug adopts Sauppe's addition (νέος), but this spoils the ring of the clause and it is best to leave it to be mentally supplied: for the ellipse, cp. 213 c γελοῖος ἔστι τε καὶ βούλεται. For μετὰ...σύνεστι, cp. *Laus* 639 c; Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 352 A παρ' αὐτῆ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ἄντα καὶ συνόντα.

ὄμοιον ὀμοίῳ. The original of this is Hom. *Od.* XVII. 218 ὡς ἀεὶ τὸν ὀμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὀμοῖον. Cp. 186 B *supra*, *Lysis* 214 A, *Rep.* 329 A; Aristaeen. *Epi.* I. 10: and for a Latin equivalent, Cic. *de Senect.* 3. 7 pares cum paribus, veteres proverbio, facillime congregantur: so Anglicè, "birds of a feather flock together." Similar in sense is ἡλιξ ἡλικα τέρπει (Arist. *Rhet.* I. 11. 25).

Φαῖδρῳ. The reference is to 178 B. Spenser (*H. to Love*) combines these opposite views,—“And yet a chyld, renewing still thy yeares, And yet the eldest of the heavenly Peares.”

Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός. A proverbial expression to denote the

C φημι νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ αἰεὶ νέον, τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεοῦς, ἃ Ἡσιόδος καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκείνοι ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔκτομαι οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βίαια, εἰ Ἔρωσ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, ὥσπερ νῦν, ἐξ οὗ Ἔρωσ τῶν θεῶν βασιλεύει. νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ, πρὸς δὲ τῷ D νέφ ἀπαλός· ποιητοῦ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνδεὴς οἶος ἦν Ὀμηρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδείξαι θεοῦ ἀπαλότητα. Ὀμηρος γὰρ Ἄτην θεὸν τέ φησιν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαλήν—τοὺς γοῦν πόδας αὐτῆς ἀπαλοὺς εἶναι—λέγων

195 C νεώτατον τε Stob. πράγματα T, Stob.: γράμματα B παρμενίδης T: παρμενίδης B: Ἐπιμενίδης Ast εἰ ἐκείνοι om. Stob. λέγουσιν Stob. ἐγένοντο Stob. D οἶός περ ἦν ὁ Ὀμηρος Stob. τοὺς...εἶναι secl. Jn. Sz.: τοὺς...βαίνει secl. Orelli. (φησιν) εἶναι Stob.

“ne plus ultra” of antiquity: cp. Moeris p. 200 Ἰαπετός· ἀντὶ τοῦ γέρον. καὶ Τίθωνος καὶ Κρόνος· ἐπὶ τῶν γερόντων: Lucian *dial. deor.* 2. 1; Ar. *Nub.* 398, *Plut.* 581. Cronus and Iapetus were both Titans, sons of Uranus and Gê (Hes. *Th.* 507), and imprisoned together in Tartarus (*Il.* viii. 479). Iapetus was father of Prometheus, and grandfather of Deucalion, the Greek “Adam”: hence “older than Iapetus” might be rendered “ante-preadamite.”

195 C ἃ Ἡσιόδος καὶ Π. λέγουσιν. These were the authorities adduced by Phaedrus (178 B). Hesiod relates such παλαιὰ πράγματα in *Theog.* 176 ff., 746 ff.; but no such accounts by Parmenides are extant. Accordingly, it has been supposed (e.g. by Schleierm.) that A. is mistaken, and Ast proposed to read Ἐπιμενίδης: but cp. Macrob. *saturn. Scip.* 1. 2 Parmenides quoque et Heraclitus de diis fabulati sunt. If P. did relate such matters in the poem of which portions remain, clearly (as Stallb. observed) it could only have been in Pt. II. (“The Way of Opinion”). Cp. Ritter and Pr. § 101 D, “Generati sunt deinceps (i.e. post Amorem) ceteri dei, de quibus more antiquiorum poetarum παλαιὰ πράγματα narravit, v. Plat. *Symp.* 195 c, Cic. *D. Nat.* i. 11”; Zeller, *Presocr.* p. 596 (E. Tr.); Krische *Forsch.* p. 111 f. For Ἀνάγκη in the cosmogonists, cp. Parmen. 84 K., κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη | πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τὸ μὲν ἀμφὶς ἔργει: *id.* 138 ὧς μιν ἄγουσ' ἐπίδησεν Ἀνάγκη: Emped. 369 ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα κτλ.

εἰ...ἄλεγον. Rettig and Stallb. rightly explain the imperf. as due to the reference to Phaedrus's mention of H. and P. (178 B).

ἐκτομαι οὐδὲ δεσμοί. Cp. *Euthyphro* 5 E ff., *Rep.* 377 E where such tales of divine immorality are criticized.

195 D ἀπαλός. Cp. Theogn. 1341 αἰαί, παιδὸς ἐρῶ ἀπαλόχροος: Archil. 100 θάλλωσ ἀπαλὸν χροά: *Phaedr.* 245 A λαβοῦσα ἀπαλήν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχὴν.

Ὀμηρος γὰρ. See *Il.* xi. 92—3. Schol. πιλναται· προσπελάζει, προσεγγίζει.

τοὺς γοῦν...εἶναι. As Hug observes, the occurrence of καὶ ποσὶ καὶ πάντῃ below is sufficient to establish the soundness of these words.

τῆς μένθ' ἀπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οὐδεις  
 πίνονται, ἀλλ' ἄρα ἢ γε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει.  
 καλῶ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι τεκμηρίῳ τὴν ἀπαλότητα ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι οὐκ  
 ἐπὶ σκληροῦ βαίνει, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μαλθακοῦ. τῷ αὐτῷ δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς  
 χρῆσώμεθα τεκμηρίῳ περὶ Ἐρωτα ὅτι ἀπαλός. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ γῆς **E**  
 βαίνει οὐδ' ἐπὶ κρανίων, ἃ ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ μαλακά, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς  
 μαλακωτάτοις τῶν ὄντων καὶ βαίνει καὶ ρικεῖ. ἐν γὰρ ἦθεσι καὶ  
 ψυχαῖς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν οἴκησιν ἴδρυται, καὶ οὐκ αὐ ἐξῆς  
 ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἀλλ' ἦτινι ἂν σκληρὸν ἦθος ἐχούση ἐντύχη,  
 ἀπέρχεται, ἢ δ' ἂν μαλακόν, οἰκίζεται. ἀπτόμενον οὖν αἰεὶ καὶ ποσὶ  
 καὶ πάντῃ ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μαλακωτάτων, ἀπαλώτατον  
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι. νεώτατος μὲν δὴ ἔστι καὶ ἀπαλώτατος, πρὸς δὲ **196**  
 τούτοις ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἶός τ' ἦν πάντῃ περιπτύσσεσθαι

**195 D** τῆς BT, Stob.: τῆ Aristarchus, Homeri (T 92) codd. οὐδεις BT,  
 Stob.: οἷδε W, vulg., Hom. codd. πίνονται ex πίνονται T: πίνονται B:  
 πινῶται Stob. μοι δοκεῖ Stob. τῷ αὐτῷ TW, Stob.: τὸ αὐτὸ B **E** χρῆ-  
 σώμεθα Stob., vulg. καὶ (ante βαίνει) om. Stob. ἐξῆς T: ἐξ ἧς B ἐνο-  
 κίζεται Naber ἐν μαλακοῖς τ. μ. Naber ἀπαλώτατον om. Stob.

**195 E** ἦθεσι καὶ ψυχαῖς. "In the tempers and souls": here ἦθος seems  
 to be co-ordinate with ψυχή, but below (ἦθος ἐχούση, sc. ψυχῆ) subordinate,  
 i.e. A. uses the word loosely with more attention to sound than sense: cp.  
*Lys.* 222 A κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπου ἢ εἶδος: 183 E  
*surra*, 207 E *infra*. Notice also the material way in which ἦθη and ψυχαί are  
 here conceived: cp. Moschus I. 17 ἐπὶ σπλάχνους δὲ κάθηται: and the figure in  
 such a phrase as "the iron entered into his soul."

καὶ ποσὶ καὶ πάντῃ. "With feet and with form entire," "nicht wie Ate  
 blos mit Füßen" (Wolf): πάντῃ, like αἰεὶ, is A.'s own extension of the Homeric  
 statement.

ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μ. The genitive is governed by ἀπτόμενον, and ἐν  
 μαλακωτάτοις is parallel to ἐν τοῖς (πρεσβύτατον) 178 A: "the most soft of  
 softest things."

**196 A** νεώτατος...ἀπαλώτατος. Cp. *Rep.* 377 A νέφ καὶ ἀπαλῶ ὄφουον.

ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος. ὑγρὸς, here opposed to σκληρὸς, is often used "de rebus  
 lubricis, lentis, flexibilibus, mollibus" (Stallb.): cp. *Theaet.* 162 B τῷ δὲ δὴ  
 νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι (opp. to σκληρῷ ὄντι) προσπαλαίειν: Pind. *Pyth.*  
 I. 17 (11) ὁ δὲ (αἰετός) κνώσσων ὑγρὸν νῶτον αἰωρεῖ: Callistr. *descript.* 3 (of a  
 bronze of Eros) ὑγρὸς μὲν ἦν ἀμοιρῶν μαλακότητος. Another sense of ὑγρὸς, in  
 erotic terminology, is "melting," "languishing," e.g. Anth. Plan. 306 ἐπ'  
 ὄμμασιν ὑγρὰ δεδορκώς: Anacr. xxviii. 21: and in *hymn. Hom.* xviii. 33 ὑγρὸς  
 is an epithet of πόθος. "Supple of form" is the best rendering here. Arist.  
*G. A.* I. 7. 3 applies ὑγρότης (τοῦ σώματος) to serpents.—*περιπτύσσεσθαι* is  
 ἀπ. λεγ. in Plato, and mainly used in poetry.



οὐδὲ διὰ πάσης ψυχῆς καὶ εἰσιῶν τὸ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν καὶ ἐξιῶν, εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. συμμετρου δὲ καὶ ὑγρᾶς ἰδέας μέγα τεκμήριον ἢ εὐσχημοσύνη, ἡ δὲ διαφερόντως ἐκ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως Ἔρως ἔχει· ἀσχημοσύνη γὰρ καὶ Ἐρωτι πρὸς ἀλλήλους αἰεὶ πόλεμος. χροᾶς δὲ κάλλος ἢ κατ' ἄνθη δίαίτα τοῦ θεοῦ σημαίνει· ἀνανθεῖ γὰρ καὶ  
 B ἀπηνθηκότι καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὄτφου οὐκ ἐνίξει Ἔρως, οὐ δ' ἂν εὐανθῆς τε καὶ εὐώδης τόπος ἦ, ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἴζει καὶ μένει.

196 A καὶ (ante εἰσιῶν) om. W καὶ ὑγρᾶς secl. Jn. Sz.: καὶ τρυφερᾶς Verm.: καὶ ἀβρᾶς Schrwald ἰδέας: οὐσίας Stob. ἢ κατ': ἢ καὶ τὰ Stob. δίαίτα: δὴ τὰ Stob. B εὐώδης τε καὶ εὐανθῆς Stob. ἐνταῦθα (δὲ) Stob., Bt.

συμμετρον...ἰδέας. "Acute vidit Astius *σύμμετρον referendum esse ad περιπτύσσεσθαι*. Amor enim, quia potest πάντη περιπτύσσεσθαι, recte *σύμμετρος* vocatur. Itaque ne hic quidem audiendus est Orellius qui *σύμμετρος legendum putabat*" (Stallb., so too Rückert and Hommel). Rettig takes *σύμμετρος* to be merely a synonym for *ὑγρὸς*, supposing that the proof of the statement *ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος*, which was first stated negatively, is here being stated positively—"nun hängt *σύμμετρία* mit der *εὐσχημοσύνη* zusammen und ebenso *ὑγρότης* mit *σύμμετρία*. Vgl. Legg. VI. 773 A, Phileb. 66 B." On the other hand Hug, supposing that *σύμμετρία* is introduced as a new attribute distinct from *ὑγρότης*, follows Jahn in ejecting the words καὶ ὑγρᾶς. Rettig's view, adopted also by Teuffel, seems the most reasonable: A., with sophistical looseness, smuggles in the extra term *σύμμετρος* beside *ὑγρὸς* in order to secure the applicability of *εὐσχημοσύνη*. By *σύμμετρία*, properly used, is meant the perfect proportion of the parts in relation to one another which results in a harmonious whole: see my *Phileb.* p. 176. For *εὐσχημοσύνη*, cp. *Rep.* 400 c ff.

ἐκ πάντων. Cp. *Theaet.* 171 B ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα...ἀμφισβητήσεται, "on all hands, then,...we find it disputed" (so Campbell *ad loc.*, who observes that "this use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others"). Ficinus seems to connect ἐκ π. with διαφ., which is possible but less probable.

χροᾶς δὲ κάλλος κτλ. Possibly we have here a reminiscence of some passage in poetry: χροᾶς...ἄνθη admits, as Hug observes, of being scanned as a "catalectic pentapody" (like Eur. *Phoen.* 294). In the repeated mention in these lines of ἄνθος and its compounds, we may discern an allusion to Agathon's tragedy Ἄνθος. Cp. Plato 32 (*P. L. G.* II. 311) αὐτὸς δ' (sc. δ' Ἔρως) ἐν καλύκεσιν ῥόδων πεπεθημένους ὑπνῶ | εὐδεν μειδιών: Alcman 38 μάργος δ' Ἔρως οἶα παῖς παῖσδει...ἄκρ' ἐπ' ἄνθη καθαίων...τῷ κυφαίρικῳ: Simon. fr. 47 ὄμλιε δ' ἄνθεσιν, (ὅτε) μελισσα ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομένα: Eros, like Titania, loves "a bank where the wild thyme blows" (εὐώδης τόπος), and might echo the song "where the bee sucks, there suck I," etc. For the negative thought ἀνανθεῖ...οὐκ ἐνίξει, cp. Philo *de meretr. merc.* II. 264 ἐξῆρος γενομένης ("when past the flower of their age," sc. ταῖς ἰταίραις) οὐδεὶς ἔτι πρόσειον, ἀπομωρανθείσης ὡσπερ τινῶν ἀνθῶν τῆς ἀκμῆς. For εὐώδης τόπος, cp. *Phaedr.* 230 B. The description of Eros lying soft in Soph. *Antig.* 781 ff. is somewhat similar,

XIX. Περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ταυθ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ λείπεται, περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς Ἐρωτος μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον ὅτι Ἐρως οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται οὐθ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ οὔτε θεόν, οὐθ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου οὔτε ἄνθρωπον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς βία πάσχει, εἴ τι πάσχει· βία γὰρ Ἐρωτος οὐχ ἄπτεται· οὔτε ποιῶν ποιεῖ· πᾶς γὰρ ἐκὼν Ἐρωτι πᾶν ὑπηρετεῖ, ἃ δ' ἂν ἐκὼν ἐκόντι C ὁμολογήσῃ, φασὶν "οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι" δίκαια εἶναι. πρὸς

196 B ἔτι: ὅτι Stob. οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ om. Stob. οὔτε θεῶν Stob. ἀνθρώπων. οὐδέ Stob. C πάνθ' Stob. ἂν BT, Stob.: ἂν τις vulg. τῶν πόλεων Stob. (τῶν om. Stobaei A).

(Ἐρως) δε ἐν μαλακαῖς παρεαῖς | νεανίδος ἐννουχέεις: cp. Hor. C. iv. 13. 6 ff. (Amor) virentis...pulcris excubat in genis. Also the echo of our passage in Aristaen. *Ep.* II. 1.

196 B Περὶ μὲν οὖν...περὶ δὲ κτλ. Cp. Isocr. *Ran.* 47 C περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου...ταυθ' εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους κτλ.: *Phaedr.* 246 A.

περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς. In drawing out this part of his theme Agathon follows the customary four-fold division of ἀρετὴ into δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία. Adam (on *Rep.* 427 E) writes "There is no evidence to shew that these four virtues and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato." Yet it certainly seems probable that these four were commonly recognized as leading ἀρεταί at an earlier date (see the rest of the evidence cited by Adam), and a peculiarly Platonic tenet would hardly be put into the mouth of Agathon. Cp. *Protag.* 329 c ff.; and for a similar use made of this classification in encomiastic oratory, see Isocr. *Hel.* 31 ff., *Nicochl.* 31 ff., 36 ff. (cp. n. on 184 c).

οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται. The maxims "love your enemies, do good to them which despitefully treat you" formed no part of current Greek ethics: cp. *Meno* 71 E αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴ, ...τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: *Crato* 49 B: Xen. *Mem.* II. 3. 14; and other passages cited by Adam on *Rep.* 331 E. See also Dobbs, *Philos.* etc. pp. 39, 127, 243. Notice the chiasmus ἀδικεῖ...ἀδικεῖται...ὑπὸ θεοῦ...θεόν.

βία πάσχει. These words form one notion and are put as a substitute for ἀδικεῖται, just as ποιεῖ (sc. βία) below is a substitute for ἀδικεῖ. Cp. *Polit.* 280 D τὰς βίας πράξεις. There may be a ref. here to the ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαι of Gorgias *Hel.* 19.

πᾶς γὰρ κτλ. With but slight modification this would form an iambic trimeter. Cp. Gorgias *ap. Philob.* 58 A ἢ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας, of which our passage may be a reminiscence.

196 C δ' δ' ἂν κτλ. The argument is that where mutual consent obtains, since βία is absent, there can be no ἀδικία. For a different view of δικαιοσύνη see Arist. *Eth. N.* v. 9. 1136<sup>b</sup> 32 ff. ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κτλ.: *Crato* 52 E: Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 20.

οἱ πόλεως...νόμοι. Apparently a quotation from Alcidas, a rhetor of the

δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνης πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογείται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, Ἐρωτος δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν κρείττω εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἤττους, κρατοῦντ' ἂν ὑπὸ Ἐρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ, κρατῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὁ Ἐρως διαφερόντως ἂν σωφρονοῖ. καὶ μὴ εἷς γε ἀνδρείαν Ἐρωτι “οὐδ' **D** Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται.” οὐ γὰρ ἔχει Ἐρωτα Ἄρης, ἀλλ' Ἐρως Ἄρη, Ἀφροδίτης, ὡς λόγος· κρείττων δὲ ὁ ἔχων τοῦ ἐχομένου· τοῦ δ' ἀνδρειοτάτου τῶν ἄλλων κρατῶν πάντων ἂν ἀνδρειότατος εἴη. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας τοῦ θεοῦ εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ σοφίας λείπεται· ὅσον οὖν δυνατόν, πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ἴν' αὐ καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην

196 C πλείστον Cobet κρατεῖ Stob., Naber: κρατοῖη Bdhm. σωφρονοῖη Stob. ἀνδρίαν BT **D** ἄρην Stob. Ἀφροδίτης del. Naber ἂν om. B ἴν' αὐ T: αὐ B: ἴν' οὖν Stob.

school of Gorgias: see Arist. *Rhet.* III. 1406<sup>a</sup> 18 ff. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθετοῖς, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μειζόσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοισι, οἷον...οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους (see Cope *ad loc.*). Two extant works are ascribed to Alcidas, viz. an *Odyssæus* and a *de Sophistis*: the latter is probably genuine and “seems to justify Aristotle's strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets” (Cope *loc. cit.*). See further Vahlen, *Alcidamas* etc. pp. 508 ff.; Blass, *Att. Bereds.* II. 328.

εἶναι γὰρ...σωφροσύνη. This definition of “temperance” is common to both scientific and popular morals. Cp. *Rep.* 389 D σωφροσύνης...αἰτοῦς (εἶναι) ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδωδας ἡδονῶν (“temperance, soberness and chastity”): *ib.* 430 E, *Phaedo* 68 c: Antiphon *fr.* 6 σωφροσύνην δ' ἀνδρὸς...ὅστις τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰς παραχρήμα ἡδονὰς ἐμφράσσειν κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἡδυνήθη αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. See Dobbs *op. cit.* pp. 149 ff.; Nägelsbach, *Nachhom. Theol.* pp. 227 ff.

Ἐρωτος δὲ κτλ. The argument is vitiated both by the ambiguity in the use of Eros (as affection and as person) and by the ambiguity in κρατεῖ ἡδονῶν, which in the minor premiss is equivalent to ἐστὶν ἡ κρατίστη ἡδονή. For similar fallacies, see *Euthyd.* 276 D ff.; Arist. *soph. el.* 165<sup>b</sup> 32 ff. For ἔρως as a master-passion, cp. *Rep.* 572 E ff. Agathon here again echoes Gorgias (*Hel.* 6 πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι κτλ.).

οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται. This comes from *Soph. (Thyestes)* *fr.* 235 N. πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται. Cp. Anacreontea 27 A, 13 ἔλαβεν βέλεμον (sc. Ἐρωτος) Ἄρης.

196 D ὡς λόγος. See Hom. *Od.* VIII. 266 ff., already alluded to in 192 D.

πάντων ἂν...εἴη. Another illegitimate conclusion. By means of a tacit substitution of the notion ἀνδρεία for κράτος, it is assumed that ὁ κρατῶν τοῦ ἀνδρείου must be ἀνδρειότερος.

τιμήσω ὡσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος τὴν αὐτοῦ, ποιητῆς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως Ε ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι· πᾶς γοῦν ποιητῆς γίγνεται, “κᾶν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ πρίν,” οὐ ἂν Ἐρως ἄψηται. ᾧ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῃ χρήσασθαι, ὅτι ποιητῆς ὁ Ἐρως ἀγαθὸς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν· ἂ γὰρ τις ἢ μὴ ἔχει ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, οὐτ’ ἂν ἐτέρῳ δοίῃ οὐτ’ ἂν ἄλλον διδάξειε. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ζῶων ποίησιν 197 πάντων τίς ἐναντιώσεται μὴ οὐχὶ Ἐρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν, ἢ γίγνεται τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζῶα; ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν τεχνῶν δημιουργίαν οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὅτι οὐ μὲν ἂν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος διδάσκαλος γένηται, ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανὸς ἀπέβη, οὐ δ’ ἂν Ἐρως μὴ ἐφάψηται, σκοτεινός; τοξικὴν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνεύρεν ἐπιθυμίας καὶ

196 Ε κᾶν T: καὶ B χρήσασθαι Stob., Blass: χρῆσθαι BT, cet. τὴν... μουσικὴν del. Sauppe Jn. ἔχη T. 197 Α μὲν δὴ BT: μὴν δὴ W: μὴν Stob. ποίησιν del. Blass πάντως Stob. τε om. Stob. τὰ ζῶα πάντα Blass οὐκ del. Blass

196 Ε ὡσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος. See 186 B.

πᾶς γοῦν κτλ. An allusion to Eurip. (*Sthenoboea*) fr. 663 N. ποιητὴν δ’ ἄρα | Ἐρως διδάσκει, κᾶν ἄμουσος ἢ τὸ πρίν. This last phrase had a vogue: cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 1074; Menander *Com.* 4, p. 146; Plut. *amat.* 17. 762 B, *Symp.* I. 622 c; Longin. *de subl.* 39. 2 (quoted with other passages by Nauck). For the ditties of a love-sick swain, cp. *Lysis* 204 D. See also Aristid. t. I. *Or.* IV. p. 30.

πᾶσαν...μουσικὴν. With A.’s bisection of ποίησις cp. the analysis of the notion by Socrates, 205 B *infra*.

197 Α καὶ μὲν δὴ...γε. *Porro etiam, quin etiam.* (See *Madv. Gr. Synt.* § 236.)

Ἐρωτος...σοφίαν. σοφίαν is here predicate (against Rückert) and stands for σοφίας ἔργον. For Eros as “poetic” in this sense, cp. Spenser (*H. to Love*), “But if thou be indeeds, as men thee call, The worlds great Parent.”

τὴν...δημιουργίαν. This branch of ποίησις is really a distinct kind from the other two, as not involving invention or creation. For “demiurgic arts,” see *Phileb.* 55 D ff., and for ἰατρικὴ as an example *Phileb.* 56 A; cp. 186 c, D *supra*. Cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 B (where H. is eulogized as the cause τεχνῶν καὶ φιλοσοφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὠφελειῶν).

φανός. *Illustris*: Hesych. φανόν· φωτεινόν καὶ λαμπρόν: cp. *Phaedr.* 256 D. For gods as διδάσκαλοι and ἡγεμόνες (197 E), cp. Isocr. *Busir.* 229 B—C τοὺς θεοὺς...ἡγοῦμαι...αὐτοὺς τε πάσας ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φῦναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν καλλίστων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡγεμόνας καὶ διδασκάλους γεγενῆσθαι.

Ἀπόλλων ἀνεύρεν. For Apollo as the inventor of τοξικὴ, see Hom. *Il.* II. 827; of μαντικὴ, *Il.* I. 72; of ἰατρικὴ, 190 E ff. *supra*. See also *h. Hom. Apoll.* 131 ff.; and for μαντικὴ in connexion with the cult of A., Rohde *Psyche* II. pp. 56 ff.

**B** ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος Ἐρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής, καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ἰστοουργίας καὶ Ζεὺς “κυβερνᾶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.” ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κατασκευάσθη τῶν θεῶν τὰ πράγματα Ἐρωτος ἐγγενομένου, δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους· αἰσχει γὰρ οὐκ ἔπι Ἐρωτος· πρὸ τοῦ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπον, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ θεοῖς ἐγίγνετο, ὡς λέγεται, διὰ τὴν τῆς Ἀνάγκης βασιλείαν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ἔφνυ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐράν τῶν καλῶν πάντ' ἀγαθὰ γέγονε καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις.

**C** Οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαίδρε, Ἐρωτος πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὦν κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος μετὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλων τοιούτων αἴτιος εἶναι.

197 B καὶ οὗτος del. Blass (τε) χαλκείας Blass καὶ Ζεὺς...ἀνθρώπων om. Stobaei ed. princ. κυβερνᾶν BTW, Stob.: κυβερνήσεως Vindob. 21, vulg.: κυβερνᾶν τὰ cj. Voeg. ἐγγενομένου Stob. αἰσχους Ast ἔπι Blass Bt. (ἔπι vel ἔτι B): ἔπεισιν T, Stob.: ἐπι corr. b, Porson J.-U.: ἐνεσιν in mg. rec. b: ἴστιν D, Ast πρώτου δὲ Stob. O πρώτων Stob.

197 B ἔρωτος...Ἐρωτος. Here, as elsewhere in these λόγοι, there is a play on the double sense of the word as (1) a mental affection (i.q. ἐπιθυμία), and (2) a personal agent.

καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς. Supply (as Stallb. and Hug) Ἐρωτος ἂν εἴεν μαθηταί. Less probable is the explanation of Ast and Rückert who, regarding ὥστε...μαθητής as parenthetical, supply ἀνεῦρον with Μοῦσαι (and the other nominatives) and take μουσικῆς (and the other genitives) as dependent on ἐπιθυμίας...ἡγεμονεύσαντος mentally repeated. For the double genitive of person and thing, cp. *Rep.* 599 c τίνας μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο.

χαλκείας...ἰστοουργίας. For Hephaestus, cp. 192 D n.; and for Athene as patroness of weavers *Il.* xiv. 178, v. 735; Hes. *Op. D.* 63.

Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν. The sudden change of construction from genitive to bare infin., together with the unusual genit. after κυβερνᾶν, are best explained by assuming (with Usener) that we have here another of Agathon's poetical tags. For Zeus as world-pilot, see *Il.* II. 205, IX. 98: cp. Parmen. *fr.* 128 M. δαίμων, ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾶ: and below, 197 E *ad inii.*, κυβερνήτης is applied to Eros (cp. 186 E).

κατασκευάσθη κτλ. This sentence is quoted later on (201 A) by Socrates. τὰ πράγματα echoes the παλαιὰ πράγματα of 195 c. κάλλους is object. gen. after Ἐρωτος.

αἰσχει γὰρ κτλ. This repeats the assertion of 196 A—B. Rettig reads αἰσχει...ἴστιν, arguing that ἴστιν, not ἐπι, is required by the ref. in 201 A: but αἰσχει ἴστιν as an equiv. for αἰσχους ἴστιν would be a strange use. The restoration ἴστι is as certain as such things can be.

ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπον. See 195 c. Notice that here as there A. refuses to make himself responsible for the ascription of violence to the gods, as shown by the saving clause ὡς λέγεται.

197 C ἄλλων τοιούτων. *Sc. οἷα κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή:* cp. *Rep.* 372 D.

ἐπέρχεται δέ μοι τι καὶ ἔμμετρον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν  
εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ γαλήνην  
νηνεμίαν, ἀνέμων κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

οὗτος δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀλλοτριότητος μὲν κενοῦ, οἰκειότητος δὲ πληροῦ, τὰς D  
τοιάσδε ξυνόδους μετ' ἀλλήλων πάσας τιθεὶς ξυνιέναι, ἐν ἑορταῖς,

197 C ἐμμέτρως Hermog. Method. ἀνέμων BT: τ' ἀνέμων Stob. vulg.:  
δ' ἀνέμοις Hermog. κοίτην BT: κοίτην τ' Stob.: κοίτη Hermog. cod. Monac.:  
κοίτη θ' Dindorf Jn.: κοίτη δ' Herm. τ' ἐνὶ κήδει Stob. Hermog.: τε νικηδε  
B: τε νηκηδῆ T: τε νικῆδει W (in mg. γρ. καὶ νηκηδεῖ): τ' ἐνὶ γῆθει Bast:  
νηκηδῆ Dindf. Herm. Jn.: λαθικηδῆ Winckelmann: τ' ἐνὶ κῆτει Hommel Christ  
(ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κοίτῃ ἀκηδῆ Bdhm.) D οὗτος γὰρ Stob. ἀλλοτριώτατος Stob.

ἐπέρχεται δέ μοι κτλ. Here Agathon breaks out into verse of his own, whereas hitherto he had contented himself with quoting from others (196 c, ε). Observe the alliterative effect, dear to the school of Gorgias, of the play with ρ and ν, γ and λ, in the former, and of ν and μ in the latter of the two verses.

νηνεμίαν...κήδει. Both the punctuation and reading of this verse are doubtful. Rückert, Stallb., and the Zurich edd. print commas after γαλήνην and ἀνέμων, Hug and Burnet only after ἀνέμων, Hommel after γαλήνην and κοίτην. It would appear, however, from the Homeric passage (*Od.* v. 391 = XII. 168, ἀνεμος μὲν ἐπάσατο ἠδὲ γαλήνη | ἔπλετο νηνεμίῃ), of which this is obviously an echo, that no stop should be placed after γαλήνην, but rather after νηνεμίαν or ἀνέμων: while the compound word ἀνεμοκοίται, applied to a sect (γένος) in Corinth who claimed to be able τοὺς ἀνέμους κοιμίζειν (see Hesych. and Suid. *s.v.*; also Welcker *Kl. Schr.* 3. 63; Rohde *Psyche* II. p. 88; and 202 ε n.), makes it probable that ἀνέμων κοίτην are meant to go closely together. Further, although as Zeller argues it is appropriate enough in general to describe Love as "is qui non aequoris solum sed etiam humani pectoris turbas sedat" (cp. *Il.* xxiv. 128 ff., Catull. 68. 1—8), still the reversion to human κῆδος after mentioning waves and winds is a little curious, and it is tempting to adopt Hommel's conjecture ἐνὶ κῆτει which, if κῆτος can bear the sense of "sea-depths" (see L. and S. *s.vv.* κῆτος, μεγακῆτης) would furnish a more satisfactory disposition of ideas—"peace on land and on sea, repose in heaven above and in the depths below." Or, if we assumed that an original

ἐνὶ νεῖκῃ (= νεῖκει) was corrupted by haplography to ἐνὶ κῆ, a fair sense would be obtained. If the ordinary text be kept, we may notice (with Vögelin) how the force of the prepos. in ἐν ἀνθρ...ἐνὶ κήδει varies "in the style of the Sophists." In *Theaet.* 153 c we have a similar combination, νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας, the only other Platonic ex. of νηνεμία being *Phaedo* 77 E. γαλήνως as an adj. occurs in *Ax.* 370 D.

197 D ἀλλοτριότητος κτλ. For Eros as the peace-maker, cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 221 B εὐρήσομεν τοὺς Ἕλληνας δι' αὐτὴν ὁμονοήσαντας καὶ κοινὴν στρατείαν... ποιησαμένους.

τὰς τοιάσδε ξυνόδους. "Haec deικτικῶς dicta sunt: quale est hoc convivium nostrum" (Stallb.).

ἐν χοροῖς, ἐν θυσίαις γιγνόμενος ἡγεμών· πραότιτα μὲν πορίζων,  
ἀγριότητα δ' ἐξορίζων· φιλόδωρος εὐμενείας, ἄδωρος δυσμενείας·  
ἴλεως ἀγανός· θεατὸς σοφοῖς, ἀγαστὸς θεοῖς· ζηλωτὸς ἀμοίροις,  
κτητὸς εὐμοίροις· τρυφῆς, ἀβρότητος, χλιδῆς, χαρίτων, ἡμέρου,  
πόθου πατήρ· ἐπιμελῆς ἀγαθῶν, ἀμελῆς κακῶν· ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν φόβῳ,

197 D *θυσίαις* BT: *θυσίαισι* W: *εὐθυμίας* Stob., Jn.: fort. *θιάσους*  
*ἀγανός* Usener Bt.: *ἀγαθός* BT: *ἀγαθοῖς* Stob., Jn. Sz.: *ἴλεως ἀγαθοῖς* secl.  
Rettig: *ἰμερτὸς ἀγαθοῖς* Schulthess τρυφῆς secl. J.-U. Sz. χλιδῆς T:  
χληδῆς B: χληδῆς W ἡμέρου B πόθου om. Stob., secl. Voeg. Sz.  
ἀνελῆς B

ἐν θυσίαις. For θ. Stob. has *εὐθυμίας*, which looks like a gloss on some word other than *θυσίαις*. I am inclined to suspect that *θιάσους* should be restored: the word would fit in well between *χοροῖς* and *ἡγεμών*, "in festive bands." The corruption might be due to the loss of the termination, after which *θιάς* was mistaken for *θυσιάς*. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 1 πάντες ἐσμεν τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου θιασῶται.

ἀγανός. The *ἀγαθός* of the mss. cannot stand, and Stobaeus's *ἀγαθοῖς* (adopted by most edd. since Wolf) is open to objection both as spoiling the symmetry and because of the occurrence of *ἀγαθῶν* just below. We want a more exquisite word, and Usener's *ἀγανός* is more appropriate in sense than such possible alternatives as *ἀγανός* or *ἀγλαός*. For Agathon's antitheses, cp. Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. 614 D; Athen. v. 11.

τρυφῆς...χλιδῆς. Moeris: χλιδῆ Ἀπτικοί, τρυφή Ἑλληνες. Hence Hug omits *τρυφῆς* as a gloss on *χλιδῆς*, and (to preserve symmetry) omits *πόθου* also.

ἐν πόνῳ κτλ. These words have given rise to much discussion and many emendations (see *crit.* n.). Two main lines of interpretation are possible: either (1) we may suppose that maritime allusions are to be sought in these words to match those in *κυβερνήτης* κτλ.; or (2) we may suppose the latter set of words to be used in a merely metaphorical sense. Badham adopts line (1); so too Schütz regards the whole figure as borrowed "e re nautica. Nautis enim saepe timor naufragii, desiderium terrae, labor in difficultate navigandi, aerymna nauseantibus...accidere solet"; and he takes the following four substt. (*κυβερν.* κτλ.) as referring in order to these four conditions. And, adopting this line, I myself formerly proposed to read (for ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν λόγῳ) ἐν πόρῳ, ἐν ῥόβῳ. The 2nd line of explanation is adopted (a) by those who attempt to defend the vulgate, and (b) by some who have recourse to emendation. Thus (a) Stallb. commends Ast's view that *λόγος* can stand here because Agathon's speech is full of "merus verborum lusus"; while Hommel takes the words ἐν πόνῳ etc. as "e re amatoria depromta," expressing the affections of the lover while seeking the society of his beloved, and connects (in the reverse order) *λόγῳ* with *κυβερν.*, *πόθῳ* with *ἐπιβ.*, *φόβῳ* with *παραστ.*, and *πόνῳ* with *σωτήρ*. On the other hand, (b) Rettig—while altering the second pair to ἐν μόθῳ, ἐν λόγῳ—also disregards the maritime metaphor and

ἐν πότη, ἐν λόγῳ κυβερνήτης, ἐπιβάτης, παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτήρ Ἐ  
ἄριστος, ξυμπάντων τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων κόσμος, ἡγεμὼν κάλ-  
λιστος καὶ ἄριστος, ᾧ χρῆ ἐπεσθαι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐφυμνούνα

197 D ἐν πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ ἐν πύθῳ ἐν λόγῳ scripsi: ἐν πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ ἐν  
πόθῳ ἐν λόγῳ codd.: ἐν φόβῳ ἐν πύθῳ ἐν πόνῳ ἐν μόγῳ Schütz: ἐν πόνῳ ἐν  
φόβῳ ἐν μόθῳ ἐν μόγῳ Jn.: ἐν π. ἐν φ. ἐν μόθῳ ἐν λόγῳ Rettig: ἐν π. ἐν φ. ἐν  
πόθῳ ἐν νόσῳ Winckelmann: ἐν π. ἐν φ. ἐν πύθῳ ἐν σάλῳ Usener: ἐν πλῶ ἐν  
πόνῳ ἐν φόβῳ Bdhm. E ἐπιβάτης del. Bdhm.: ἐπιδότης Usener τε καὶ  
del. Bdhm.

understands the passage "überhaupt von Kriegsgefahren und dem in solchen geleisteten Beistand," comparing the allusions to such matters by Phaedrus (179 A) and Alcibiades (220 D ff.). Here Rettig is, I believe, partly on the right track; since the clue to the sense (and reading) here is to be looked for in Alcibiades' eulogy of Socrates. We find πόνῳ echoed there (219 E τοῖς πόνους...περιῆν), and φόβῳ also (220 E φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει, 221 A ἐν φόβῳ) and ἐν λόγῳ may be defended by the allusions to Socrates' λόγοι (215 C ff., 221 D ff.). Thus the only doubtful phrase is ἐν πύθῳ, which has no parallel in Alcib.'s speech, and is also objectionable here because of the proximity of πόθου. In place of it I propose ἐν πότηῳ (cp. *Phileb.* 48 A), of which we find an echo (in sense if not in sound) in 220 A ἐν τ' αὐ ταῖς εὐωχίαις...καὶ πίνειν... πάντας ἐκράτε. For maritime terms in connexion with λόγος, cp. *Lach.* 194 C ἀνδράσι φίλοις χιμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοηθήσον: *Parm.* 137 A διανεῦσαι...τοσοῦτον πέλαιος λόγων: *Phaedr.* 264 A; *Phileb.* 29 B. So both λόγος and πότης in Dionys. Chalc. 4. 1 ff. ὕμνους οἰνοχοεῖν...τόνδε...εἰρεσίῃ γλώσσης ἀποπέμψομεν...τοῦδ' ἐπὶ συμποσίου· δεξιότης τε λόγου | Φαίαικός Μουσῶν ἐρέτας ἐπὶ σέλματα πέμπει: *id.* 5. 1 ff. καὶ τινες οἶνον ἄγοντες ἐν εἰρεσίῃ Διονύσου, | συμποσίου ναῦται καὶ κυλικῶν ἐρέται | (μάρνανται) περὶ τοῦδε. Cp. also Cic. *Tusc.* IV. 5. 9 quarebam utrum panderem vela orationis statim, an eam...dialecti- corum remis propellerem. For παραστάτης, of Eros, cp. ὁ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονι in later Stoic literature (Rohde *Psyche* II. 316): Epict. *diss.* I. 14. 12; Menander (*ap. Mein. Com.* IV. 238) ἀπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται | εὐθὺς γενομένη μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου: For Socrates as σωτήρ, see 220 D ff.: the term is regularly applied to a ἥρωσ, e.g. Soph. *O. C.* 460 (Oedipus); Thuc. V. 11. 2 (Brasidas); Eur. *Heracl.* 1032 (Eurystheus): Pind. *fr.* 132 has the same combination, σωτήρ ἄριστος: cp. Spenser, "(Love) the most kind preserver Of living wights." ἐν πόνῳ might be a reminiscence of Pind. *Nem.* X. 78 παῦροι...ἐν πόνῳ πιστοί: or used, Homerically, of "the toil of war" (= ἐν μαχαίς, cp. 220 D). For κυβερνήτης used metonymously, cp. 197 B (n. on κυβερνᾶν); so Emerson, "Beauty is the pilot of the young soul." ἐπιβάτης, in the present context, must mean "a marine," *classiarius miles*, and hence, by metonymy, "a comrade" in general.—The general sense of the passage is this: "in the contests both of war and peace the best guide and warden, comrade and rescuer is Eros." Cp. also Procl. *in I Alc.* p. 40.

197 E ξυμπάντων...κόσμος. Cp. Gorg. *Hel.* 1 κόσμος πάλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος.

ἡγεμὼν...ἐφυμνούνα. The image is that of Eros as *coryphaeus* leading a



καλῶς, φῶδης μετέχοντα ἦν ἄδει θέλγων πάντων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων νόημα.

Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγος, ὦ Φαίδρε, τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω, τὰ μὲν παιδιᾶς, τὰ δὲ σπουδῆς μετρίας, καθ' ὅσον ἐγὼ δύναμαι, μετέχων.

- 198 XX. Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀγάθωνος πάντας ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος ἀναθορυβῆσαι τοὺς παρόντας, ὡς πρεπόντως τοῦ νεανίσκου εἰρηκότης καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη εἶπεῖν βλέψαντα εἰς τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Ἄρά σοι δοκῶ, φάναι, ὦ παῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ, ἀδέες πάλαι δέος δεδιέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μαντικῶς ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον εἶπεῖν, ὅτι Ἀγάθων θαυμαστῶς ἐροῖ, ἐγὼ δ' ἀπορήσοιμι; Τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, μαντικῶς μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι, ὅτι Ἀγάθων εὐ ἐρεῖ· τὸ δὲ σὲ ἀπορήσειν, οὐκ οἶμαι.

197 E καλῶς BT: καλῆς Stob.: καλῶς καλῆς vulg.; καλῶς τῆς Ast: καλῶς καὶ τῆς Orelli Teuffel: καὶ Mdvlg. Sz. δι (καὶ) Method. 198 A πρεπόντως b t: πρέποντος BTW ἄρα B ἐροῖη Cobet Jn. δοκεῖς μοι T

procession of singers, and singing ("a song of my beloved") himself (φῶδης ἦν ἄδει). Notice how Agathon repeats the phrase θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων (cp. 197 B). For ἡγεμών, cp. Spenser (*H. to Love*) "Thou art his god, thou art his mighty guide." καλῆς is omitted in Ficinus' transl.

νόημα. Here used, poetically, as equivalent to νοῦς: cp. Pind. *Pyth.* vi. 29; Theogn. 435; Emped. 329 St., αἶμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα. τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω. "Let it be presented as a votive-offering (ἀνάθημα) to the God (sc. Eros)."

παιδιᾶς...σπουδῆς. Possibly an echo of Gorg. *Hel. ad fin.* Ἐλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγιον. For the antithesis, cp. 216 E; *Laws* 647 D; *Phaedr.* 30 E; *Ar. Ran.* 389.

μετρίας. "H.e. κοσμίως" (Stallb.), with, perhaps, a latent play on the other sense of μέτρον, in allusion to the rhythmical style of A.'s oration; cp. 187 D, 205 c, *Phaedr.* 267 A ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν.

198 A ἀναθορυβῆσαι. Cp. *Protag.* 334 C εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὐ λέγοι: *Euthyd.* 276 B; *Cic. Sen.* 18. 64 a cuncto consensu plausus multiplex datus.

πρεπόντως...τῷ θεῷ. Cp. *Laws* 699 D εἰρηκας στανῶ τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι πρεπόντως.

ὦ παῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ. Observe the mock-solemnity of this mode of address: cp. 172 A, 214 B. Socrates addresses Eryx. with allusion to his language in 193 E (εἰ μὴ ξυνήδη κτλ.).

ἀδέες...δέος δεδιέναι. Schol. ἀδέες δέος· ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ μὴ ἀξία φόβου δεδιόντων. ὅμοιον τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ψοφοδῆς ἀνθρώπος (*Phaedr.* 257 D). Observe how Socr. here, in caricature of Agathon's style (e.g. 197 D), combines in one phrase the *figura etymologica* and the figure *oxymoron*: cp. *Eur. I. T.* 216 νύμφαν δύσσυμφον: *ib.* 566 χάριν ἀχαριν: *id. Hel.* 690 γάμον ἄγαμον.

ἂ νῦν δὲ ἔλεγον. The reference is to 194 A.

Καὶ πῶς, ὦ μακάριε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, οὐ μέλλω ἀπορεῖν B καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλος ὅστισούν, μέλλων λέξιν μετὰ καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα; καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; ἐπεὶ ἔγωγε ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ὀλίγου ἀποδράς ῥηχόμεν, εἴ πη εἶχον. καὶ γὰρ με C Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεμίμησκει, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου 198 B καὶ παντοδαπὸν οὕτω TW μὲν om. Vind. 21, vulg. Sz.: (μὲν, θαυμάστα δέ· Bdhm.) ἀκούων om. W

198 B οὐ μᾶλλον κτλ. Notice the change of tense in ἀπορεῖν...λέξιν: Plato uses pres., fut., and aor. infinitives after μέλλω, of which the last is the rarest construction. For the sense, cp. *Soph.* 231 B.

παντοδαπὸν λόγον. There is irony in the epithet. Socr. implies that he regards it as a motley λόγος, "a thing of shreds and patches." Cp. 193 E, and 198 E (πάντα λόγον κινούντες κτλ.).

οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά. The antithesis must be mentally supplied: "the earlier parts were not equally marvellous (although they were marvellous)." Stallb. explains differently, "τὰ μὲν ἄλλα accipi potest absolute pro et quod cetera quidem attinet; quo facto non inepte pergitur sic: οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά, particula μὲν denuo iterata." But the former explanation (adopted by Rettig and Hug, after Zeller) is the simpler and better.

τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς κτλ. τὸ is accus. of respect, going closely with ἐπὶ τελευτῆς, not with τοῦ κάλλους (as Rückert): "quod autem exitum orationis tuae attinet" (Stallb., and so Hommel). τοῦ κάλλους is governed by ἐξεπλάγη, as gen. of causative object (cp. *Madv. Gr. Synt.* § 61 δ). ἀκούων, "as he heard."

τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων. Cp. 199 B ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων. Properly, ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are distinguished as, in logic, the subject and predicate and, in grammar, the noun and verb respectively. But commonly ὄνομα is used of any single word, and ῥῆμα of a clause, or proposition (e.g. *Protag.* 341 E); cp. *Apol.* 17 B; *Cratyl.* 399 A, 431 B. Both here and below, as Athenaeus observes (v. 187 c), Πλάτων χλευάζει τε τὰ ἰσόκωλα τὰ Ἀγάθωνος καὶ τὰ ἀντίθετα. Cp. the criticism of the Sophistic style in Alcibiades. *de Soph.* 12 οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεργασμένοι καὶ μᾶλλον ποιήμασιν ἢ λόγοις εἰκότες καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον καὶ πλεον ἀληθείας ἀποβεβληκότες: Isocr. c. *Soph.* 294 D τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ἔλον τὸν λόγον καταποιεῖν καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν.

οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τούτων. Cp. 221 D ἵψτρα; *Rep.* 378 D τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστίον λογοποιεῖν.

ὀλίγον. I.e. ὀλίγου δέιν. Cp. *Theast.* 180 D; *Euthyd.* 279 D.

198 C Γοργίου...ἀνεμίμησκει. For Agathon as a "Gorgiasist," see *Introduct.* § III. 5. Cp. Philostr. *de vit. Soph.* I. καὶ Ἀγάθων...πολλαχού τῶν ἱαμβείων γοργάζει: *Xen. Symp.* II. 26, IV. 24.

τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου. See *Od.* XI. 632 ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δῖος ἦρει | μῆ μοι γοργεῖν

ἐπεπόνθη· ἐφοβούμην μή μοι τελευτῶν ὁ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν  
 δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας αὐτὸν με  
 λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσειε. καὶ ἐνενόησα τότε ἄρα καταγέλαστος  
 ὦν, ἤνικα ὑμῖν ὁμολόγουν ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκωμιάσσεσθαι  
 D τὸν Ἐρωτα καὶ ἔφην εἶναι δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ  
 πράγματος, ὡς ἔδει ἐγκωμιάζειν ὁτιοῦν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' ἀβελ-  
 τηρίας φῆμιν δεῖν τάληθῆ λέγειν περὶ ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐγκωμιαζομένου,  
 καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν, ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλε-  
 γομένους ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα τιθέναι· καὶ πάνυ δὴ μέγα ἐφρόνου ὡς

198 C ἐν τῷ λόγῳ secl. J.-U.: πελώρου Bdhm. τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ del. Hartmann  
 D ἀβελτηρίας T τοῦ (post ἐκάστου) del. Hommel τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν Bast

κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελώρου | ἐξ Ἰδιδεω πέμψειεν ἀγανὴ Περσεφόνη. Miss  
 Harrison (*Proleg.* p. 191) renders γοργεῖην by "grizzly," with the note  
 "Homer does not commit himself to a definite Gorgon": his Gorgoneion  
 is "an underworld bogey, an ἀποτρόπαιον." That "the Gorgon was regarded  
 as a sort of incarnate evil eye" (*ibid.* p. 196) appears from Athen. v. 64. 221  
 κτείνει τὸν ὑπ' αὐτῆς θεωρηθέντα, οὐ τῷ πνεύματι ἀλλὰ τῇ γιγνομένη ἀπὸ τῆς  
 τῶν ὀμμάτων φύσεως φορᾶ καὶ νεκρὸν ποιεῖ. Rohde (*Psyche* II. 407) points out  
 that "Hekate selbst wird angerufen als Γοργῶ καὶ Μορμῶ καὶ Μῆνη καὶ πολύ-  
 μορφε: *hymn* bei Hippol. *ref. haer.* 4. 35 p. 73 Mill"; and that Γοργῶ appears  
 to be a shorter form for Γοργύρα (Ἀχέρωντος γυνή, Apollod.). For the pun  
 on *Gorgias-Gorgon*, cp. that on ἀγαθῶν (174 B n.). As against Dümmler's  
 inference that Gorgias' previous death is here implied, see Vahlen *op. Acad.*  
 I. 482 ff.

ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Cp. 201 A, *Gorg.* 457 D, *Theaet.* 169 B. To eject these words  
 with Hug, or to substitute πελώρου with Badham, would (as Voegelin and  
 Rettig contend) destroy the antithesis ἐν τῷ λ.) (ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λ., and spoil  
 the "Gorgianische Wortspiel." Further, the phrase serves as a parallel to  
 the Homeric ἐξ Ἰδιδεω. Observe, as a feature of the parody, the different  
 sense in which Socr. uses δεινός: also, how the sentence as a whole forms a  
 playful retort to Agathon's remark in 194 A (φαρμάττειν βούλει με κτλ.). For  
 the adverbial use of τελευτῶν, cp. *Phaedr.* 228 B, C; *Gorg.* 457 D. (See also  
 Vahlen, *l.c.* for a discussion and defence of the text.)

τότε...ἤνικα. The τότε goes with ὦν which is imperf. partic.: the ref. is to  
 177 D.

198 D ἐγὼ μὲν κτλ. The μὲν here is answered by the δέ in τὸ δὲ ἄρα  
 below. For ἀβελτηρία, cp. *Theaet.* 174 C, *Phil.* 48 C (see my note *ad loc.*).

τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν. "That this (viz. the statement of the facts) should be  
 the ground-work": there is no need to insert, with Bast, πρῶτον or μέγιστον  
 after τοῦτο. For this sense of ὑπάρχειν, cp. *Menex.* 237 B. For the thought,  
 cp. Emerson "Veracity first of all and forever. *Rien de beau que le vrai.*"

ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τοῦτων. Rettig's comment on this is "mit Beziehung auf das  
 collective in τοῦτο gedachte τάληθῆ." This is misleading, since τοῦτο means

εὖ ἐρῶν, ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν [τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὅτιοῦν]. τὸ δὲ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὅτιοῦν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς μέγιστα **E** ἀνατιθέναί τῳ πράγματι καὶ ὡς κάλλιστα, ἐάν τε ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐάν τε μὴ· εἰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐδέν· ἄρ' ἦν πρᾶγμα. προυρρήθη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει, οὐχ ὅπως ἐγκωμιάσεται. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, πάντα λόγον κινουύντες

198 D τοῦ... ὅτιοῦν secl. Bdhn. Sz. τούτοις ἦν Bast **E** δόξει Steph.: δόξη BT

τὸ τάληθῆ λέγειν, a singular notion, and αὐτὰ ταῦτα here represents simply τάληθῆ. In the Socratic theory of rhetoric here stated we have the following order of treatment proposed: (1) τὸ τάληθῆ λέγειν, (2) ἡ τῶν καλλίστων ἐκλογή, (3) ἡ εὐπρεπῆς θέσις. But it is implied that the 2nd and 3rd of these—artistic selection and arrangement—are valueless, except in so far as they are based on the 1st requisite: in other words, matter is more important than form. Cp. Procl. in *Tim.* p. 27 αἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας εὐφημῖαι πασῶν προέχουσεν, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἐν τῳ Συμποσίῳ Σωκράτης παραδίδωσιν.

ὡς εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. I follow Badham and Hug in bracketing the next words (τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὅτιοῦν) as an erroneous gloss on ἀλήθειαν, with which we must supply περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος, as required by δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά above and the passage there alluded to (175 D). Cp. *Phaedr.* 259 E ἄρ' οὐκ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τὸ ἀληθές ὧν ἂν ἐρεῖν περὶ μέλλῃ. Rettig defends the traditional text, asking "ist denn ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὅτιοῦν hier nicht identisch mit ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ Ἔρωτος?" To this the answer is "no!": for if the tradition be kept we must take τὴν ἀλήθειαν as equivalent to τὴν ἀληθῆ (or rather ὀρθὴν) μέθοδον, which is a very unlikely equation, especially so soon after τάληθῆ in another sense: Stallb.'s rendering may serve to indicate the difficulty involved,—“utpote *veram tenens laudationis cujuslibet naturam et rationem*”: Jowett's "thinking I knew the nature of true praise" shirks the difficulty.

τὸ δὲ ἄρα. For τὸ δὲ, "but in reality," cp. *Meno* 97 c (with Thompson's note), *Apol.* 23 A (with Stallb.'s note).

198 E οὐ τοῦτο, i.e. οὐ τὸ τάληθῆ λέγειν.

τὸ... ἀνατιθέναί. Perhaps an allusion to the term used by Agathon, ἀνακείσθω 197 E. For Socrates' criticism, cp. *Phaedr.* 272 A, *Menex.* 234 c οἱ οὕτω καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἐκάστου λέγοντες, κάλλιστα πῶς τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς: *Isocr. Busir.* 222 B δεῖ τοὺς μὲν εὐλογεῖν τινὰς βουλομένους πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν προσόντ' ἀποφαίνειν (which sentiment is, perhaps, referred to here).

προυρρήθη. Cp. 180 D. The reference is to 177 D.

ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξα. The emphasis is on δόξει, implying the regular Platonic antithesis δόξα (ἀλήθεια). Cp. Simon. 76 τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται (cited in *Rep.* 365 c).

πάντα λόγον κινουύντες. "Raking up every tale." Cp. *Phileb.* 15 E; *Theaet.* 163 A; *Rep.* 450 A.

ἀνατίθετε τῷ Ἐρωτι, καὶ φατε αὐτὸν τοιοῦτόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοσοῦ-  
 199 των αἰτιον, ὅπως ἂν φαίνηται ὡς κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος, δῆλον ὅτι  
 τοῖς μὴ γιγνώσκουσιν—οὐ γὰρ δὴ που τοῖς γε εἰδόσι—, καὶ καλῶς γ'  
 ἔχει καὶ σεμνῶς ὁ ἔπαινος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤδη ἄρα τὸν τρόπον  
 τοῦ ἐπαινοῦ, οὐ δ' εἰδὼς ὑμῖν ὠμολόγησα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ μέρει  
 ἐπαινέσεσθαι. “ἡ γλῶσσα” οὖν ὑπέσχετο, “ἡ δὲ φρῆν” οὐ·  
 χαιρέτω δὴ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐγκωμιάζω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· οὐ γὰρ  
 ἂν δυναίμην. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τὰ γε ἀληθῆ, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλω  
 B εἰπεῖν κατ' ἑμαυτόν, οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ὑμετέρους λόγους, ἵνα μὴ γέλωτα  
 ὀφλω. ὄρα οὖν, ᾧ Φαῖδρε, εἴ τι καὶ τοιοῦτου λόγου δέη, περὶ  
 Ἐρωτος τάλληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων  
 τοιαύτη ὅποια δὴν τις τύχη ἐπελθοῦσα.

198 E τοιούτων τε εἶναι Steph. 199 A δῆπου Cobet Bt.: ἂν που T:  
 που B, Sz. ἤδη ἄρα T: ἤδη B οὐ δ' Sauppe: οὐδ BT γλῶσσα W:  
 γλῶττα BT ἐγκωμιάσω Wolf Jn. B δέει Bekk. Sz. περι...λεγόμενα  
 del. Hirschig ὀνομάσει W Vind. suppl. 7 δὴν J.-U. Sz. Bt.: δὴ ἂν  
 Stallb.: δ' ἂν B: δ' ἂν T: ἂν apogr. Vat. 1030

199 A ὅπως ἂν φαίνηται. φαίνεσθαι here, as δόξει above, is emphatic. A com-  
 parison with 195 A shows that Socr. is alluding especially to Agathon's oration.  
 οὐ γὰρ δὴ που κτλ. Cp. *Gorg.* 459 A οὐ γὰρ δὴ που ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ  
 πειθανώτερος ἔσται: and for οὐ γὰρ που... 200 B, *Euthyphr.* 13 A.

καὶ καλῶς γ' κτλ. Earlier editors generally print a full stop after εἰδόσι.  
 Socr. here sarcastically endorses the approval with which Agathon's ἔπαινος  
 had been received (ὡς πρεπόντως εἰρηκότος κτλ., 198 A).

ἡ γλῶσσα οὖν κτλ. Euripides' line (ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμῶμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρῆν ἀνόματος  
*Hippol.* 612) soon became a familiar quotation: see Ar. *Thesm.* 275, *Ran.* 101,  
 1471; *Theaet.* 154 D; Cic. *de offic.* III. 29. 108 iuravi lingua, mentem iniuratum  
 gero.

χαιρέτω δὴ. “I say good-bye to it”: cp. *Laus* 636 D τὸ...τοῦ μύθου χαιρέτω:  
*id.* 886 D. Rettig suggests that here the formula may be intended as another  
 echo of Euripides: cp. *Med.* 1044 οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην· χαιρέτω βουλευματα | τὰ  
 πρόσθεν: *Hippol.* 113.

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κτλ. “I withdraw my offer to eulogize.” ἐγκωμιάζω must here  
 be a “present for future” (see *Madv. Gr. Synt.* § 110. 3), since Socr. has not  
 yet begun the eulogy.

199 B κατ' ἑμαυτόν, οὐ πρὸς κτλ. “In my own fashion, not entering into  
 competition with your orations.” For κατὰ c. acc. in this sense, cp. *Apol.* 17 B  
 οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ (“not after their pattern”): *Gorg.* 505 D.

γέλωτα ὀφλω. This resumes the notion in καταγέλαστος ἄν, 198 C.

ᾧ Φαῖδρε. Socrates, like Agathon (197 E), politely appeals to Ph. as the  
 πατήρ λόγου: cp. 194 D.

εἴ τι κτλ. For εἴ τι, *numquid*, cp. *Rep.* 526 E σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ εἴ τι πρὸς  
 ἐκεῖνο τείνει κτλ.

ὀνόμασι δὲ κτλ. See 198 B n. Of ὅποια δὴ Ast cites no instance; the

Τὸν οὖν Φαῖδρον ἔφη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κελεύειν λέγειν, ὅπη αὐτὸς οἴοιτο δεῖν εἰπεῖν, ταύτη. Ἔτι τοίνυν, φάναι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πάρες μοι Ἀγάθωνα σμίκερ' ἄττα ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα ἀνομολογησίμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἤδη λέγω: Ἀλλὰ παρήμι, φάναι τὸν Φαῖδρον, C ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη ἔφη ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἀρξασθαι.

XXI. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, καλῶς μοι ἔδοξας καθηγήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δεοί αὐτὸν ἐπιδείξαι ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρωσ, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν πάνυ ἀγαμαί. ἴθι οὖν μοι περὶ Ἐρωτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰλλα καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς διήλθες οἶός ἐστι, καὶ τότε εἰπέ· D πότερόν ἐστι τοιοῦτος οἶος εἶναί τις ὁ Ἔρωσ ἔρωσ, ἢ οὐδενός; ἐρωτῶ δ' οὐκ εἰ μητρός τις ἢ πατρός ἐστι—γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ

199 C ἀλλ' ἐρώτα Agathon tribut B, Naber D οἶός τ' TW ἔρωσ  
ἔρωσ B: ἔρωσ T

force of δὴ is to heighten the notion of indefiniteness which lies in ὁποῖα (so Hug).

ἔτι τοίνυν κτλ. ἔτι goes with ἐρέσθαι. Socrates appeals thus to Ph. because Ph. had previously (194 D, E) debarred him from catechizing A.

ἀνομολογησίμενος κτλ. Cf. 200 E, *Gorg.* 489 A. For οὕτως ἤδη, cp. 194 D. For ἐνθένδε ποθὲν, 178 A.

199 C καθηγήσασθαι. The ref. is to A.'s exordium, 195 A.

ἴθι οὖν. *agedum*; cp. *Gorg.* 452 D, *Rep.* 376 D.

199 D τινος...ἢ οὐδενός. These are objective genitives to be construed with the second ἔρωσ: "Is Love love for some object or for none?" For the use of the indef. in such phrases, cp. *Phileb.* 35 B ὁ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ.

οὐκ εἰ μητρός τινος κτλ. These words have been variously interpreted: (1) Lehrs and Prantl construe the genitives as subjective ("love felt by a mother"); (2) Ast as objective ("love for a mother"); (3) Rückert, followed by Hommel and Hug, takes them to be gen. of origin; so too Zeller renders "ich meine damit aber nicht, ob er eine Mutter oder einen Vater hat." Of these, (1) seems the least probable in point of sense, and with subjective genitives τινος would be superfluous. It is a serious objection (as Hug admits) to (3) that it compels us to regard the "absurdity" (γελοῖον) of the question as lying in its form rather than its substance. That the "absurdity" lies in the substance of the statement is shown, e.g., by *Lys.* 221 A ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; (cp. *Phaedr.* 274 C). But if so, recourse must be had to textual alteration: we must strike out either the second ἔρωσ, with Sommer, or the whole block of words εἰ Ἔρωσ... πατρός, as Hug (followed by Jowett) suggests. This, however, is a hazardous alternative. On the whole, then, the explanation (2) put forward by Ast seems the most probable. Construing, "I do not ask whether Eros has for its object a father or a mother, since to ask whether Eros is *eros* for a parent

ἐρώτημα, εἰ Ἐρως ἐστὶν ἔρως μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς—ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἠρώτων, ἄρα ὁ πατήρ ἐστὶ πατήρ τινος ἢ οὐ; εἶπες ἂν δὴ πού μοι, εἰ ἐβούλου καλῶς ἀποκρινασθαι, ὅτι ἐστὶν υἱὸς γε ἢ θυγατρὸς ὁ πατήρ πατήρ· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ὡσαύτως; Ὁμολογείσθαι καὶ  
**Ε** τοῦτο. Ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀπόκριναι ὀλίγη πλείω, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθῃς ὁ βούλομαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην, τί δέ; ἀδελφός, αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν, ἐστὶ τινὸς ἀδελφὸς ἢ οὐ; Φάναι εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς; Ὁμολογεῖν. Πειρῶ δὴ, φάναι, καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν. ὁ Ἐρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; Πάνυ μὲν  
**200** οὖν ἐστὶν. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, φύλαξον παρὰ σαυτῷ μεμνημένος ὄτου· τοσόνδε δὲ εἶπέ, πότερον ὁ Ἐρως ἐκείνου

199 D εἰ Ἐρως...πατρὸς secl. Hug εἰ ὁ Hirschig ἔρως del. Sommer ὁμολογείσθαι BTW: ὁμολογήσαι vulg.: ὁμολογεῖν Stallb. Sz. **Ε** ἀδελφός Cobet Sz.: ἀδελφός libri, Bt. ἀδελφός del. Bdhm. **200 A** μεμνημένος del. Bdhm. ὅπου Mdvg.

were an absurd question," the point will be taken to lie in the fact that *ἔρως*, as properly denoting *sexual* passion, cannot naturally have for its object a parent. The same interpretation might be kept if we struck out—as perhaps we ought—the words *μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς*, and construed "the question would be absurd if (or granting that) Eros is (really) *ἔρως* (i.e. sex-love)."

αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἠρώτων. Rettig approves Stallbaum's explanation, "h. e. πατέρα, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστω ut mox loquitur. Vult autem cogitari de patris notione, qualem mente informatum habemus." But the use of the neuter in apposition to the masc. is sufficient to indicate that "cogitari de patris notione"; and it is most natural to regard αὐτὸ τοῦτο as implying a reference to the previous use of "this very word, πατήρ."

εἶπες ἂν. "You would at once reply." (See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 414, Thompson on *Meno* 72 B.)

ἡ μήτηρ ὡσαύτως. Sc. ἐστὶν υἱὸς γε ἢ θυγατρὸς μήτηρ.

199 E Et γὰρ ἐροίμην. For apodosis we may supply τί ἂν φαίης; or the like: cp. 204 D, *Prot.* 311 E.

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν. "Notionally," "in its abstract significance."

**200 A** Τοῦτο μὲν...ὄτου. Rettig, Rückert and Lehms put a comma before μεμνημένος, rendering "hoc igitur apud animum serva (sc. alicujus esse) atque cujus sit, memento." Hommel and Hug, on the other hand, follow Ast and Schleierm. in removing the comma, explaining ὄτου (sc. ὁ Ἐρως ἔρως ἐστὶν) as exegetical of τοῦτο, and construing φύλαξον μεμνημένος closely together: thus Schleierm. renders "Dieses nun, habe Socrates gesagt, halte noch bei dir fest in Gedanken, wovon sie (er) Liebe ist." On this latter view—which is certainly preferable—we must suppose Socrates to be alluding to the definition of the object of love (*viz.* κάλλος) previously given by Agathon (in 197 B), while debarring him from restating it at this point in the discussion.

οὐ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμῆ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, φάναι. Πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐ ἐπιθυμῆ τε καὶ ἐρᾶ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμῆ τε καὶ ἐρᾶ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχων; Οὐκ ἔχων, ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε, φάναι. Σκόπει δὴ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμῆν οὐ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμῆν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεές ᾖ; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὡς ἀνάγκη εἶναι· σοὶ δὲ πῶς; B  
Κάμοί, φάναι, δοκεῖ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἄρ' οὖν βούλοισι' ἂν τις μέγας ὦν μέγας εἶναι, ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ὦν ἰσχυρὸς; Ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων. Οὐ γὰρ που ἐνδεής ἂν εἴη τούτων ὃ γε ὦν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὦν βούλοισι ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ταχύς ὦν ταχύς, καὶ ὑγιής ὦν ὑγιής— ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τούτων ἄπερ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆν, ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, τούτου ἕνεκα λέγω· τούτοις γάρ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, εἰ ἐννοεῖς, ἔχειν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀνάγκη ἂ ἔχουσιν, ἐὰν τε βούλωνται ἐὰν τε μὴ, καὶ τούτου γε δὴ

200 B ὁμολογημένων W: ὁμολογουμένων vulg. εἰ δ' ἄρα Stallb. γὰρ  
καὶ BT: γὰρ W ταυτὶ T O ἕκαστον vulg.

ἐπιθυμῆ αὐτοῦ. For αὐτοῦ resuming ἐκείνου, cp. 195 A, Soph. *O. T.* 248. Observe that the entire argument here is based on the identification of ἔρως with ἐπιθυμία (see 205 D): cp. the use of ἐρᾶν in Theogn. 256 πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾶ, τὸ τυχεῖν. Cp., for the question here discussed, *Lys.* 221 D f.

ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος. Cp. *Phaedr.* 267 A, 269 D; see Blass, *Att. Bereds.* I. 78.

ἐπιθυμῆν οὐ ἐνδεές ἐστιν. Cp. *Lysis* 221 D τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐ ἂν ἐνδεές ᾖ, τούτου ἐπιθυμῆ: *Eryx.* 405 E αἱ δ' ἐπιθυμίαι πᾶσαι οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ ἐνδείαι τινῶν: *Gorg.* 496 D. A similar theory is implied in *Phileb.* 35 A ὁ κενούμενος... ἐπιθυμῆ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾶ πληροῦσθαι (which also illustrates the use of ἐρᾶν and ἐπιθυμῆν as synonyms). Cp. also Isocr. *Hel.* 219 A (quoted below, on 200 c).

200 B θαυμαστῶς...ὡς. For ὡς thus separated from its adverb, cp. *Phaedo* 95 A, 99 D; *Theaet.* 157 D. Thus Bast's suspicions as to the soundness of the text were unfounded.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ κτλ. In this sentence we have an ex. of anaclouthon: after the protasis the sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis (ἴσως...λέγω), then the protasis is resumed in an altered form (ἀλλ' ὅταν τις κτλ.), which leads up finally to the apodosis in the form εἰπομεν ἂν αὐτῷ κτλ. The main purpose of the whole paragraph is to guard against a possible misunderstanding as to the nature of βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία which might arise from carelessness in analyzing the sense of popular phraseology.

ταῦτα οἰηθείη. ταῦτα and πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα are accusatives of "remoter object" with οἰηθείη, "with regard to these and all similar cases."



ποῦ τίς ἂν ἐπιθυμήσειεν; ἀλλ' ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑγιαίνων βούλομαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ πλουτῶν βούλομαι καὶ πλουτεῖν, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἃ ἔχω, εἴπομεν ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι σύ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, D πλοῦτον κεκτημένος καὶ ὑγίαιαν καὶ ἰσχὺν βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτήσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ γε νῦν παρόντι, εἴτε βούλει εἴτε μὴ, ἔχεις· σκόπει οὖν, ὅταν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ὅτι ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν παρόντων, εἰ ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ τὸδε, ὅτι βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον παρῆναι. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ ἂν; Συμφάναι ἔφη τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη, Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ἐρᾶν, ὃ οὐπω ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σφζόμενα καὶ < αἰε > E παρόντα; Πάνυ γε, φάναι. Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ ἐτόιμου ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει

200 C καὶ πλουτεῖν B; πλουτεῖν T D ἔχεις T: ἔχης B ὁμολογοῖς b: ὁμολογοῖ Steph. οὐκοῦν δὴ pr. T τὸ...παρόντα secl. Bdhm. Sz. τὸ T: τὰ B: τὸ τοῦ cj. Usener ταῦτα: τοιαῦτα Liebhold σφζόμενα secl. Liebhold καὶ TW, Bt.: μοι B: τὰ νῦν Vindob. 21: τὰ μὴ Sauppe: μὴ Rettig: οἱ Voeg.: ἦτοι cj. Usener: αἰε Schirlitz: καὶ αἰε scripsi μοι παρόντα secl. Herm. J.-U. Hug E ὁ ἄλλος T

200 C βούλομαι...καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ. The point here emphasized is that βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία, when their sense is investigated, are found to apply only to the future (εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον), not to the present (ἐν τῷ παρόντι). For investigation shows that "I wish for what I have" is really an abbreviated phrase for "I wish to continue having in the future what I now at present have" (βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα παρῆναι). For the force of βούλησις, cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 A τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων, ὧν ἂν ἐν χρεῖα γενώμεθα, τυχεῖν μόνον βουλόμεθα... τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἕως ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται, τοσοῦτ' αἰε τοῦ βούλεσθαι ῥώμην ἔχων, ὄσφπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κρείττον ἐστὶν (with which cp. also 205 D *infra*).

200 D ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ ἂν; For the interrogative ἄλλο τι, ἄλλο τι ἦ, see *Meno* 82 c (with Thompson's note); *Prot.* 353 c (with Adam's note).

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν κτλ. The main construction is rightly explained by Stallb.: "τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρ. κτλ. relativo pronomini per exegesis ad-duntur, nec assentior Rückerto interpunctionem post αὐτῷ ἐστὶν inferenti": τὸ is in the nominative, where we should rather expect τοῦ in apposition to ἐκείνου, owing to assimilation to ὁ. For the reading of the last words in the sentence, see *crit. n.* Rettig reads μὴ παρόντα "in hypothetisch-causalem Sinne." More attractive is Usener's excision of the words μοι παρόντα, adopted by Hug. The objection to καὶ, printed by Burnet, is that it fails to supply an explanation of B's μοι: hence I prefer to read καὶ αἰε, supposing that an abbreviated καὶ blending with αἰε might account for both variants.

200 E Καὶ οὗτος κτλ. οὗτος represents the typical τις and ἄνθρωπος of 200 c; and ἄλλος πᾶς serves to generalise, cp. 192 E.

καὶ ὁ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὐ ἐνδεὴς ἔστι, τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἔστιν ὧν ἡ ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ὁ ἔρωσ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν. Ἴθι δὴ, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ὁ ἔρωσ πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἔπειτα τούτων ὧν ἂν ἔνδεια παρῆ αὐτῷ; **Ναί, φάναι.** Ἐπὶ δὴ τούτοις ἀναμνήσθητι τίνων ἐφησθα ἐν τῷ **201** λόγῳ εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἐγὼ σε ἀναμνήσω. οἶμαι γὰρ σε οὕτωςί πως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς θεοῖς κατεσκευάσθη τὰ πράγματα δι' ἔρωτα καλῶν· αἰσχυρῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἴη ἔρωσ. οὐχ οὕτωςί πως ἔλεγες; Εἰπον γάρ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς γ' ἔλεγες, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρωσ κάλλους ἂν εἴη ἔρωσ, αἰσχυροῦ δ' οὐ; Ὀμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν ὠμολόγηται, οὐ ἐνδεὴς ἔστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τούτου ἔραν; **Ναί, B** εἰπεῖν. Ἐνδεὴς ἄρ' ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἔρωσ κάλλος. Ἀνάγκη, φάναι. Τί δέ; τὸ ἐνδεὴς κάλλους καὶ μηδαμῆ κεκτημένον κάλλος ἄρα λέγεις σὺ καλὸν εἶναι; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἔτι οὖν ὀμολογεῖς ἔρωτα καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει; καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα εἰπεῖν Κινδυνεύω, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν τότε εἶπον. Καὶ μὴν καλῶς

**200 E** τε καὶ **BT**: καὶ **W** ἀνομολογησώμεθα **W** ἂν ἔνδεια κτλ. (usque ad 213 E ὅτι) exstat in Oxyg. Pap. 843 παρην O.-P. **201 A** δι' ἔρωτος O.-P.: δι' ἔρωτα O.-P. corr. ἔρωσ **BT** O.-P.: ὁ ἔρωσ **W** γ' ἔλεγες scripsi: γε λέγεις libri, edd.: γε λέγε[ι]s O.-P. ἄλλο τι ἢ O.-P. corr., Ven. 184 Vind 21 **B** ἔχει **W**: ἔχη **BT** του[τ]ου O.-P. corr.: του O.-P. ὦ Σωκράτες κινδυνεύω O.-P.

ἔνδεια παρῆ. This sounds like a jocular contradiction in terms: in Eros there is a plentiful lack.

**201 A** ἐφησθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. See 197 B: cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 219 A τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἔρωσ ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται.

ἐπιεικῶς γ' ἔλεγες. For ἐπιεικῶς, *probe, recte*, cp. *Rep.* 431 E, *Laws* 635 A. I have ventured to read *ελεγες* for the traditional *λέγεις*. In the present context *λέγεις* seems objectionable because of its ambiguity, since "You say well" would more naturally be taken to refer to A.'s reply (*εἶπον γάρ*) than to his previous statement. This objection is not touched by Rettig's defence of the tense: "auch das Präsens ist ganz an seinem Platze. Da Agathon bestätigt, dass er sich so geäußert habe, wie Sokrates angebe, so gilt seine obige Aeusserung auch jetzt."

**201 B** οὐ...καὶ μὴ ἔχει. "Sic dictum est ut ὁ apud ἔχει repetendum est" (Stallb.).

τὸ ἐνδεὴς κάλλους. With reference to this Proclus (*in Tim.* p. 128) comments: *ἐνδεὴς κάλλους ἐν συμποσίῳ προσεῖπε τὸ μὴ πρῶτως καλὸν ἀλλὰ μετόχον κάλλους*: cp. *ib.* p. 110. For the tautologous form of expression, cp. 185 A n.; Eur. *Ion* 680 αὐτῆ δ' ἄπαις ἢ καὶ λελειμμένη τέκνων: *id. Heracl.* 530, etc. (see Vahlen *op. Acad.* II. 366).

Κινδυνεύω...εἶπον. *εἰδέναι* is past, not present, in sense.

Καὶ μὴν...εἶπες. Not "recte dixisti". (Ficinus), but "praeclare dixisti"

C γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων. ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν ἔτι εἰπέ· τὰγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Ἔμουγε. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ Ἔρωσ τῶν καλῶν ἐνδεής ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλὰ, κὰν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνδεής εἴη. Ἐγὼ, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐχέτω ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Οὐ μὲν οὖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, φάναι, ὦ φιλούμενε Ἀγάθων, δύνασαι ἀντιλέγειν, ἐπεὶ Σωκράτει γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν.

D XXII. Καὶ σὲ μὲν γε ἤδη εἴσω· τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἐρωτος, ὅν ποτ' ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Μαντικῆς Διοτίμας, ἢ ταῦτά τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ, καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὲ θυμαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἢ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ

201 C	εἶπας O.-P. Vat. 227	φιλούμενε: φιλε O.-P.	(οὐ) δύνασαι
Sauppe	D	μαντικῆς BT O.-P.: μαντικῆς W vulg.	Διοτίμας O.-P.
ἦν: εἶναι O.-P. <sup>1</sup>	θυσαμένη Steph.	δεκῆτη Bdhm. Sz.	[ε]ποιήσατο <sup>778</sup>
νοσου O.-P.			

(Wolf). What Socr. alludes to is not A.'s foregoing reply, but his oration (cp. 198 B, 199 C); and the point of his remark is to suggest that formal beauty of diction does not necessarily involve the more essential beauty of ἀλήθεια.

201 C τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλὰ. For the coincidence of these two concepts, cp. *Prot.* 360 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 297 B, C, *Phileb.* 64 E ff. It might be near the truth to say that τὸ καλόν is neither less nor more than τὸ ἀγαθόν in its external aspect, "goodness" as apprehended by the aesthetic faculty, or goodness *quia* attractive and soul-stirring. See also Plotin. *de pulcr.* p. 46; *Procl. in I Alc.* p. 329.

Ἐγὼ...σοι...σὺ. The personal pronouns are, by position and repetition, emphatic. Agathon means to imply that he yields not so much to the force of argument as to the wordplay of Socrates' invincible dialectic: cp. 216 B *infra*: Xen. *Symp.* v. 8.

201 D Καὶ σὺ...εἴσω. "You I will now release": this is said with reference to the phrase used in 199 B ἐτι...πάρες μοι Ἀγάθωνα κτλ.

Μαντικῆς Διοτίμας. Probably both these names are meant to be etymologically significant: the resemblance of the adj. to μαντικῆ is patent (in fact some mss. give μαντικῆς, and Ficin. *fatidica muliere*), while as illustrating the omen of Διοτίμα one might cite Soph. *fr.* 226 N. σοφὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὅν ἂν τιμᾷ θεός. See further *Introd.* § IV. C. Hug quotes an imitative passage from Dio. Chrys. I. p. 59 R. μῦθον...ὅν ἐγὼ ποτὲ ἤκουσα γυναικὸς Ἥλειας ἢ Ἀρκάδιος ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλείου διεγυμένης. See also Max. Tyr. *diss.* XXIV. 4, p. 588; Clem. Al. *Strom.* VI. p. 631 B.

πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ κτλ. For the Great Plague at Athens in 430 B.C. see Thuc. II. 47, Bury *H. G.* p. 407. That the plague had been rife elsewhere for some time previously is implied by Thuc. *l. c.* For similar instances of the averting or postponing of impending evils by divine or prophetic agency, see Hdt. I. 91 τρία γὰρ ἔτεα ἐπανεβάλετο (sc. ὁ Λοξίης) τὴν Σαρδίων δλωσιν:

ἔρωτικά ἐδίδαξεν,—δν οὖν ἐκείνη ἔλεγε λόγον, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διελθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἐμοὶ καὶ Ἀγάθωνι, αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑμαυτοῦ, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι. δεῖ δὴ, ὦ Ἀγάθων, ὥσπερ σὺ διηγήσω, διελθεῖν αὐτὸν πρῶτον, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως καὶ ποῖός τις, ἔπειτα τὰ E ἔργα αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ῥᾶστον εἶναι οὕτω διελθεῖν, ὡς ποτέ με ἡ ξένη ἀνακρίνουσα διῆει. σχεδὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔλεγον ὁλίπερ νῦν πρὸς ἐμὲ Ἀγάθων, ὡς εἶη ὁ Ἔρως μέγας θεός, εἶη δὲ τῶν καλῶν· ἤλεγχε δὴ με τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ὁλίπερ ἐγὼ τούτου, ὡς οὔτε καλὸς εἶη κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον οὔτε ἀγαθός. καὶ ἐγώ, Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφην, ὦ Διοτίμα; αἰσχρὸς ἄρα

201 D λογον εκεινη ελεγεν O.-P. ἐπ' Coisl. corr. Paris 1642 O.-P., Bast: ἀπ' BTW δεῖ δὴ TW O.-P.: δειλη B διηγήσω BT O.-P.: δὴ ἡγήσω Sz. Bt.: καθηγῶ Hirschig: ὑφηγήσω Sauppe: διήρησαι Usener: ἡγήσω olim Herm. E ποῖός: ποῖος O.-P. πατ' ἐμέ vulg. γάρ: δὲ O.-P. εφην λεγεις O.-P. αἰσχρο[ν] O.-P.

Athen. XIII. 602 B: Euseb. *praep. evang.* v. 35, p. 233 B, c: cp. Virg. *Aen.* VII. 313 ff., VIII. 398 ff. (where "decem annos" is the interval named). A specially interesting parallel, as mentioning the same 10 years' interval, is *Laws* 642 D ἀκήκοας ὡς Ἐπιμενίδης γέγονεν ἀνὴρ θείος...ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν δέκα ἔτεσι πρότερον παρ' ὑμᾶς...θυσίας τε ἐθύσατο τινάς...καὶ δὴ καὶ φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον εἶπεν ὅτι δέκα μὲν ἐτῶν οὐχ ἤξουσι κτλ.

αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑμαυτοῦ. Rückert alone retains the lection ἀπ' ἑμαυτοῦ. Cp. *I Alc.* 114 B εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ διεξέλθε: *Soph.* 217 c.

ὥσπερ σὺ διηγήσω. I think the traditional text, supported also by the Papyrus, may stand, taking διηγήσω to imply—with veiled contempt—a lengthy or meticulous disquisition. Schanz's δὴ ἡγήσω is open to a double objection, (1) the repeated δὴ is displeasing, and (2) ἡγήσω is a feeble word to apply to Agathon's dogmatic exposition (in 195 A) of the rules of method. Sauppe's ὑφηγήσω is appropriate enough (cp. *Gorg.* 455 D, *Crat.* 392 D), but does not explain the corruption.

201 E διελθεῖν αὐτὸν κτλ. Here Socrates cites almost verbatim the language used by Agathon in 195 A λόγῳ διελθεῖν...δόσεις. Observe however the significant addition by Socr. of the words τίς ἐστὶν: he requires a statement of the essential notion (τίς ἐστὶ) as well as of the attributes (ποῖός τις).

εἶη δὲ τῶν καλῶν. The genitive is not masc. nor one of origin (=ἐκ τῶν καλῶν) as Wolf thought, but as Stallb. rightly notes "καλῶν pendet ex Ἔρως, quod etiam hic positum est ut p. 196 D": cp. 201 A, 204 D, for similar gen. of the object.

αἰσχρὸς ἄρα κτλ. Socrates represents himself (ironically) as unversed in the rules of logic, and habitually confusing contradictory with contrary notions (οὐ-καλός with αἰσχρός): for the distinction, cp. *Soph.* 257 B, 257 D ff.; *Euthyd.* 283 B, 285 A ff., *Cratyl.* 429 B ff.

ὁ Ἔρωσ ἐστὶ καὶ κακός; καὶ ἦ, Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἔφη· ἡ οἶε, ὃ τι  
**202** ἂν μὴ καλὸν ἦ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρὸν; Μάλιστα γε. Ἡ  
καὶ ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι μεταξὺ  
σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; Τί τοῦτο; Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν [καὶ] ἄνευ τοῦ  
ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι ἐστίν·  
ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἶη ἐπιστήμη; οὔτε ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ  
τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἶη ἀμαθία; ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ που τοιοῦτον  
ἢ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
**B** λέγεις. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε δ μὴ καλὸν ἐστὶν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι,  
μηδὲ δ μὴ ἀγαθόν, κακόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς  
ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ καλόν, μηδὲν τι μᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν  
αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τι μεταξὺ, ἔφη, τούτοιιν.  
Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁμολογεῖται γε παρὰ πάντων μέγας θεὸς εἶναι.  
Τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων, ἔφη, πάντων λέγεις, ἢ καὶ τῶν εἰδόντων; Ξυμ-  
πάντων μὲν οὖν. καὶ ἡ γελᾶσασα, Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

**201 E** ἔφη· ἦ: εἶπεν O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **202 A** ἂν (post καί): (δ) ἂν Ast Mdv. Sz.:  
δ τι ἂν Steph. Hirschig: ὅτι ἂν, delete καί, Reynders: ἂν οἴοιο Hommel τὸ  
ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν T O.-P.: τὸ τὰ ὀρθὰ δ. W: τὸ ὀρθοδοξάζειν B καὶ om. O.-P.,  
del. Stallb. Bdhm. Sz. τοιοῦτο O.-P.: τοιοῦτόν τι Hirschig ἢ ὀρθὴ δόξα del.  
Bdhm. B τουτοῖν εἶπεν O.-P. γε BT O.-P.: μοι W

**202 A** Ἡ καὶ ἂν μὴ κτλ. "H. e. ἂν τι μὴ σοφόν. Nam τι e superiore ὃ τι  
facile intelligas" (Stallb.).

Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν κτλ. This distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is much  
insisted on by Plato; see esp. *Rep.* 477 ff.; *Meno* 99 A: cp. Isocr. *Hel.* 209 A.  
For τὸ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι as the distinctive mark of ἐπιστήμη, cp. *Meno* 98 A;  
but this definition is criticised unfavourably in *Theaet.* 201 c ff. (see Zeller,  
*Plato*, pp. 171 ff.). I bracket καὶ before ἄνευ: if retained, we must render  
with Rückert (and Hug) "auch ohne Rechenschaft geben zu können." For  
this "intensive" use of καί, see Thompson on *Meno* 71 B. Rettig defends the  
Bodleian ὀρθοδοξάζειν thus "ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν ginge auf Einzelnes und Thatsäch-  
liches, nicht auf den Begriff als solchen und die geistige Eigenschaft": but  
this distinction is imaginary, and there is no other evidence, in Plato or  
elsewhere, for the existence of this compound, Aristotle's word (*E. N.* VII.  
8. 4) being ὀρθοδοξία. Possibly we should write καὶ (ἄνευ) δ., cp. *Rep.* 413 A.

μεταξὺ φρονήσεως κτλ. Cp. *Rep.* 477 A μεταξὺ τι...ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης:  
ib. 478 D.

**202 B** Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε. "I. q. μὴ ἀναγκαῖον νόμιζε, v. Heindorf ad  
Euthyd. (sic) p. 432 c" (Stallb.). For this use to denote logical compulsion, cp.  
also *Cratyl.* 432 E μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα...ἀλλ' ἔα κτλ.: *Parmen.*  
133 c.

Τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων. Sc. παρὰ: cp. *Crat.* 408 D, *Soph.* 243 D, etc. A similar  
distinction had been drawn twice by Socr. himself, see 194 B ff., 199 A.

ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἳ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ Ὁ θεὸν εἶναι; Τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰς μὲν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δ' ἐγώ. καὶ γὰρ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφη, λέγεις; καὶ ἦ, Ῥαδίως, ἔφη. λέγε γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φῆς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ καλοὺς; ἦ τολμήσαις ἂν τινα μὴ φάναι καλὸν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεῶν εἶναι; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Εὐδαίμονας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους; Πάνυ γε. Ἄλλὰ μὴν Ἐρωτά γε ὠμολόγηκας δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν D τοῦτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν. Ὁμολόγηκα γάρ. Πῶς δὲν οὖν θεὸς εἶη ὁ γε τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἄμοιρος; Οὐδαμῶς, ὡς γ' ἔοικεν. Ὁρᾶς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ σὺ Ἐρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις;

XXIII. Τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, εἶη ὁ Ἐρωτῆς; θνητός; Ἡκιστά γε.

202 C ἔφη om. O.-P. καὶ καλοὺς secl. Bdhm. Sz. καλὸν τε καὶ secl. Bdhm. Sz. θεῶν BT O.-P.: θεὸν pr. W τοὺς τὰγαθὰ BT Stob. O.-P.: τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς W τὰ καλὰ B O.-P., J.-U.: καλὰ TW Stob., Sz. Bt. D τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Stob. πῶς δὲν scripsi: πῶς ἂν B Stob. O.-P., J.-U.: πῶς δ' ἂν TW, Bt. τῶν TW Stob. O.-P.: γ' ὧν B ὥστ' ἔοικεν Stob. τί οὖν; ἔφη· εἶη ἂν ὁ Ἐρωτῆς θνητός; cj. Steph. ὁ ἔρωτῆς εἶη Stob. ἔφη B Stob., J.-U. Sz. Bt.: ἔφη TW O.-P., Jn.

202 C καὶ γὰρ εἶπον...ἔφη. We might avoid this tautology (for which cp. 177 A) by reading καὶ γὰρ, εἶπον πῶς κτλ., construing εἶπον as 1st aor. imper., as in *Meno* 71 D. Cp. *Rep.* 338 D ἀλλὰ σαφίστερον εἰπὶ τί λέγεις.

Ῥαδίως. Sc. τοῦτο λέγω. For the use of ῥαδίως with λέγω and the like, often with a bad meaning, of ill-timed lightness, cp. *Meno* 94 E (with Thompson's note), *Rep.* 377 B, 378 A. Here, however, the meaning is probably ῥαδιόν ἐστιν ὁ λέγω (so Rettig), or as Stallb. "sic ut res facilem habet explanationem": cp. *Rep.* 475 E ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥαδίως πρὸς γε ἄλλον· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι κτλ. It would also be possible to suppose that Diotima is, playfully, adapting her reply to the form rather than the sense of Socr.'s question: "In what way do you speak thus?" "I speak it lightly" (without compunction): i.e. the λέγω to be supplied with ῥαδίως may mean "I say, utter the word," whereas the λέγεις of Socr. meant "do you mean."

εὐδαίμονας εἶναι κτλ. Badham's excision of both καὶ καλοὺς and καλὸν τε καὶ is plausible: if the words are sound, we must assume the stress in each clause to be laid on the terms here in question, εὐδαίμονας...εὐδαίμονα.

Εὐδαίμονας δι' ἑῆ κτλ. Cp. the phrases used by Agathon in 195 A.

202 D Ὁμολόγηκα γάρ. Socr. represents himself as having already conceded to Diotima exactly as much as Agathon had conceded to him (cp. 201 E σχεδὸν γάρ τι κτλ.): for A.'s concession of the point here in question, see 200 A, E.

ἄμοιρος. This word had already been employed by Agathon, 197 D (cp. 181 c); it is a poetical word rarely used by Plato elsewhere, except in *Laws* (693 E, etc.).

Ἄλλὰ τί μῆν; Ὡσπερ τὰ πρότερα ἔφη, μεταξύ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. Τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα; Δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; Ἐρμηνεύον καὶ διαπορθμεύον θεοὶς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς [τῶν θυσιῶν], ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὃν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυνδεδέσθαι.

202 E τε καὶ BT O.-P.: καὶ W Stob. τίνα δ' ἦν Stob. διαπορθμεύον O.-P. θεοὶς τε τὰ Stob. τῶν θυσιῶν om. Pollux, secl. Sz. (τὸ) ἐν μέσῳ δέον Vermehren ἐμ μεσῳ O.-P.: ἐμμέσῳ Lobeck δὲ ὃν: δῆ ὃν Peipers: ὀδεύου cj. anon. ὃν (τὰ) Bergk (τὰ ὅλα) συμπληροῖ Reynders: ἀμφοτέρους) σ. Bdhm. τὸ πᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸ Orelli αὐτὸ om. Stob.

Ἄσπερ τὰ πρότερα. Viz. the exx. of a mean between extremes given in 202 A, B.

Δαίμων μέγας. The epithet serves to point the correction of Socrates' definition, μέγας θεός (202 B). Cp. Olympiod. *in Alcib. I.* p. 22 "δαίμονα" δὲ ὡς μέσον αὐτὸν προσαγορεύει· μέσος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἔρως οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐρωμένου καὶ ἐραστοῦ. "μέγαν" δέ, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὲρ αἴσθησιν καὶ νοερώς ἐνεργεῖ. Procl. *in Alcib. I.* p. 64 Cr., p. 66. For τὸ δαιμόνιον as μεταξύ, cp. Eur. *Troad.* 55—8; *Med.* 1391; *Hel.* 1137 ὁ τι θεὸς ἢ μὴ θεὸς ἢ τὸ μέσον κτλ. (see Rohde, *Psyche* II. 249 n. 1).

202 E Ἐρμηνεύον κτλ. For the term *ἐρμηνεύειν* to describe the mediating office of δαίμονες, cp. *Epin.* 985 B ἐρμηνεύεσθαι (δαίμονας) πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τοὺς...θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάντα. Hommel bids us take ἐρμηνεύον with ἀνθρ. τὰ παρὰ θεῶν (as "eiusdem atque Ἐρηῆς radicis") and διαπορθμεύον with θεοὶς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων (the office of the πορθμεύς, Charon, being "animas e terra ad sedes deorum transvehere"). This is probably right; but in any case it is a mistake to regard the two words as synonymous, as do L. and S. (*s. v.* διαπορθμεύω, "to translate from one tongue into another, to interpret").

ἀμοιβὰς [τῶν θυσιῶν]. ἀμοιβή as a "return-present" (in transactions between gods and men) is used in Hom. *Od.* I. 318 σοὶ δ' ἄξιον ἔσται ἀμοιβῆς (*sc.* τὸ δῶρον): *ib.* III. 58 ἄλλοισι δίδου χάριεσσαν ἀμοιβήν...ἀγακλειτῆς ἐκατόμβης: cp. Eur. *Or.* 467 οἷς...ἀπέδωκ' ἀμοιβὰς οὐ καλὰς. Pollux (VI. 187) when quoting our passage ignores τῶν θυσιῶν. Cp. also Procl. *in Alcib. I.* p. 46, 63: Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 26, p. 361 B ὁ τε Πλάτων ἐρμηνευτικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνομάζει γένος καὶ διακοικικὸν ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, εὐχὰς μὲν ἐκεῖ καὶ δεήσεις...ἀναπέμποντας, ἐκείθεν δὲ μαντεία δεῦρο καὶ δόσεις ἀγαθῶν φέροντας: Apuleius *de deo Socr.* 6 hos Graeci nomine δαίμονας nuncupant, inter homines caelicolasque vectores hinc precum inde donorum, qui ultro citro portant hinc petitiones inde suppetias, ceu quidam utrisque interpretes et salutigeri. per hos eosdem, ut Plato in symposio autumat, cuncta denuntiata et magorum varia miracula omnesque praesagiorum species reguntur: see also Plut. *de or. def.* 415 A; Philo Jud. *de somn.* p. 586 D (δαίμονες) τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπικελεύσεις τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων χρείας τῷ πατρὶ διαγγέλλουσι.

ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὃν. This calls for no alteration (such as is suggested by

διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν  
 τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιφθὰς καὶ τὴν 203  
 μαγανείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν. θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται,  
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῦ πρὸς  
 ἀνθρώπου < καὶ πρὸς θεοῦ ἀνθρώποις >, καὶ ἐγγηγοροῦσι καὶ

202 E ἱερέων Stob. 203 A τὰς τελετὰς B Stob. O.-P., J.-U.: τελετὰς  
 TW, Bt. καὶ τὰς ἐπιφθὰς...γοητείαν secl. Hug καὶ τὴν...γοητείαν secl. Voeg.  
 μαγανείαν Geel J.-U. Sz.: μαντείαν BT Stob. O.-P.: μαγειάν Bdm. Bt.  
 ἀνθρώπου (καὶ πρὸς θεοῦ ἀνθρώποις). Wolf Usener Sz.: d. (καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς  
 θεοῦ) Heusde: ἀνθρώποις Stobaei P ἐγγηγοροσ[σ] O.-P.

Vermehren): with συμπληροῖ sc. ἀμφοτέρους. The μέσον serves as the δεσμός  
 by which the extremes (here θνητοὶ and ἀθάνατοι) are united into an organic  
 whole (ἔλον). Cp. Procl. in Alc. I. pp. 69, 72, 77.

203 A τὰς τελετὰς. "Ritual": cp. Rep. 365 A λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικη-  
 μάτων...ὅς δὲ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν: Phaedr. 244 E (with Thompson's note): Laws  
 738 C θυσίας τελεταῖς συμμίκτους. That καθαρμοὶ (and τελεταῖ) included περιθειώ-  
 σεις, λουτρά, περιρράνσεις appears from Cratyl. 405 A. Rohde (Psyche II. 70 n. 3)  
 points out that "diese μάνταις entsprechen in allem Wesentlichen den Zaubern  
 und Medicinmännern der Naturvölker. Wahrsager, Arzt, Zauberer, sind hier  
 noch eine Person." E.g. Apis in Aesch. Suppl. 260 ff.; cp. Eur. Heracl. 401,  
 Phoen. 1255 ff., and the part played by Empedocles. In Hippocr. de morb.  
 sacra. p. 591 the μάνταις and καθαρταῖ are witch-doctors, claiming control of  
 the elements, as rain-makers, etc. (καθαροὺς προσφύοντες καὶ ἐπαιδίας...  
 περικαθαίρων καὶ μαγεύων...τε καὶ θύων σελήνην τε καθαίρησι καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανίζει  
 καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ εὐδίην ποιήσει κτλ.): cp. 197 C n.

τὴν μαγανείαν πᾶσαν. Geel's correction μαγανείαν is perhaps slightly  
 preferable, on the ground of Platonic usage, to Badham's μαγειάν. Cp.  
 Laws 908 D ἐξ ὧν μάνταις τε κατασκευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν  
 μαγανείαν κεινημένοι: id. 933 A ἄλλη δὲ (φαρμακεία) ἢ μαγανείας τέ τισι καὶ  
 ἐπιφθὰς καὶ καταδίεσι λεγομέναις πείθει κτλ. (cp. 933 C): Gorg. 484 A τὰ  
 ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγανεύματα καὶ ἐπιφθὰς: also [Dem.] XXV. 79 λαθῶν τὰ  
 φάρμακα καὶ τὰς ἐπιφθὰς...μαγανεύει καὶ φενακίζει. Hug objects to γοητείαν,  
 as elsewhere used by Plato in a bad sense. There is, however, no need to  
 suppose that any of these terms are intended here to convey more than a  
 neutral sense; and to represent ἡ μαντικὴ as a disbeliever in any of the  
 arts of divination or wizardry would be less artistic than pedantic. Moreover,  
 the language used here is supported by the echo it finds in the description of  
 Eros below (203 D ad fin.) as δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής. Rep.  
 364 B, c shows Plato's own low opinion of current μαντικὴ, but Socrates was  
 probably more credulous, see Xen. Mem. I. 1. 9, 4. 15.

θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπου κτλ. Since the participles can neither be construed  
 with θεοῖς, because of the sense, nor with ἀνθρώπου, because of the case, it is  
 necessary to supply some such supplement as that adopted in the text.  
 Rettig accepts Stallbaum's explanation of the traditional text: "Quum enim



καθεύδουσι· καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ περὶ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάνουσος. οὗτοι δὴ οἱ δαίμονες πολλοὶ τε καὶ παντοδαποὶ εἰσιν, εἰς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ Ἔρως.

Πατὴρ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίνας ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός; Μακρότερον μὲν, Β ἔφη, διηγῆσασθαι· ὅμως δέ σοι ἐρῶ. ὅτε γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, εἰσιῶντο οἱ θεοί, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μῆτιδος υἱὸς Πόρος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα οἶον δὴ εὐωχίας οὐσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὁ οὖν Πόρος μεθυσθεὶς

203 A σοφός: σ<sup>σ</sup>φος O.-P.: σφοδρὸς Stob. ὢν om. Stob. περὶ  
χειρουργίας Stob. O.-P.: χειρουργίας BTW, J.-U. Bt. ανουσους O.-P. πολλοί  
τε Stob. O.-P.: πολλοὶ BTW τούτων· O.-P. ἐστὶ om. Stob. τίνος  
ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός BW: καὶ μητρός τίνος ἐστὶ T<sup>1</sup> O.-P. (ἐστίν) Β εἰσιῶντο  
W b t, Hermog., Sz.: ἰστιῶντο O.-P.: ἡσιῶντο T, Bt.: ἡσιῶντο B οἳ τε  
ἄλλοι θεοὶ καὶ Hermog. προσαιτήσουσα T O.-P.: προσαιτῆς οὐσα B: προσαιτῆς  
οὐσα Euseb. Origen

dicatur ὁμλεῖν τινὶ et διαλέγεσθαι τινὶ, etiam ὁμλία καὶ διάλεκτος τινὶ recte dici potuit. Et quum antea...perspicuitatis caussa usus esset praepositione πρὸς addito casu accusativo, nunc ad legitimam constructionem revertens, neglecta grammatica diligentia, dativum post accusativum recte inferri potuit." But at this rate one might justify anything in the way of distorted grammar! Hug marks a lacuna after ἀνθρώπων. For the ref. to divine communications in sleep ("the visions of the head upon the bed"), cp. Pind. fr. 131. 3 ff.; *Rep.* 571 d ff. (with Adam's notes); Rohde, *Psyche* i. 6 ff.

δαμόνιος ἀνὴρ. Compare the etymological definition (δαίμων = δαίμων) in *Cratyl.* 398 c. For Socrates as an example of the δαμόνιος ἀνὴρ, see 219 b.

περὶ τέχνας...βάνουσος. Cp. *Theaet.* 176 c, *Laws* 644 A; Arist. *Rhet.* i. 9. 1367<sup>a</sup> 31 (ἐλευθέρου σημείον) τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάνουσον τέχνην. The question as to why manual labour is held in contempt is asked in *Rep.* 590 c, and answered in *Rep.* 495 d (see Adam's notes ad loc.).

οἱ δαίμονες. Other Platonic passages mentioning these intermediary beings are *Rep.* 392 A, 427 B, 617 d (with Adam's notes), *Laws* 713 d, 717 b. For later developments see esp. Plutarch (*de defect. orac.*, *de Is. et Os.*, *de daem. Socr.*, etc.). Cp. Rohde, *Psyche* i. 153.

Πατὴρ δέ...τίνας κτλ. These are genitives of origin. Here we have it tacitly assumed that Phaedrus's statement (178 B), that Eros is unbegotten, is untrue.

203 B Πόρος. We find in Alcman fr. 16 (with the Schol. ὅτι τὸν Πόρον εἶρηκε τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου μεμυθευμένῳ Χάει) a precedent for this personification of Πόρος. Πενία is personified by Aristophanes in the *Plutus*, *passim*. For Μῆτις, see Hes. *Theog.* 886 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς πρότην ἄλοχον θέτο Μῆτιν, | πλείστα θεῶν τε ἰδυίαν ἰδέ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων: (μῆτις is, in Epic, the especial attribute of Zeus, as μητιέτα): Μῆτις was also an Orphic *alías* of

τοῦ νέκταρος—οἶνος γὰρ οὐπω ἦν—εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κήπον εἰσελθὼν  
 βεβαρημένος ἦδεν. ἡ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς  
 ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου, κατακλίνεται τε παρ'  
 αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν Ἔρωτα. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκό- C  
 λουθος καὶ θεράπων γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρωτος, γεννηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνης  
 γενεθλίοις, καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστής ὢν περὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀφρο-  
 δίτης καλῆς οὔσης. ἄτε οὖν Πόρου καὶ Πενίας υἱὸς ὢν ὁ Ἔρωτος ἐν  
 τοιαύτῃ τύχῃ καθέστηκε. πρῶτον μὲν πένης αἰεὶ ἐστί, καὶ πολλοῦ

203 B ἐξελθὼν O.-P. ἦδεν BTW: εἶδεν O.-P., al. παιδοποιήσασθαι  
 Naber J.-U. C δὴ καὶ BT O.-P.: δὴ W καὶ θεράπων: καὶ om. Orig.  
 ἐκείνων Orig. ἐραστής del. Bdhm. καλὸν καὶ BT O.-P.: καὶ om. W:  
 fort. καλόν, ὡς καὶ τῆς...οὔσης del. Bdhm. πένης TW O.-P.: πενίης B

Eros. For *nectar* as the primeval substitute for wine, cp. Hom. *Il.* v. 341, etc., also *Phaedr.* 247 E τοὺς ἵππους...νέκταρ ἐπόσισε. The celestial δείπνον was, it appears, followed by a συμπόσιον. Spenser, *H. to Love*, speaks of the god as "Begot of Plentie and of Penury." See further *Introd.* § IV. c 2.

εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κήπον. Cp. *Soph. fr. (Ion)* 297 N. ἐν Διὸς κήποις ἀρούσθαι μόνον εὐδαίμονας δέλβους. It is interesting to notice that Origen (*Contra Cels.* IV. 39) identifies the "garden of Zeus" with Paradise, Poros with Adam, Penia with the Serpent. With the intoxication and its results we might compare the O. T. stories of Noah and his sons and of Lot and his daughters. For the neo-Platonic interpretation of the myth, see Plotinus *Enn.* III. 5. 2, 292 F ff., 298 F: cp. also *Introd.* § IV. c 2. A similar Orphic legend is mentioned by Porphyry *de antr. nymph.* 16 (*Orphica* p. 180) παρὰ δὲ τῷ Ὀρφείῳ ὁ Κρόνος μέλιτι ὑπὸ Διὸς ἐνεδρεύεται· πλησθεὶς γὰρ μέλιτος μεθύει καὶ σκοτοῦται ὡς ὑπὸ οἴνου καὶ ὕπνῳ, ὡς παρὰ Πλάτωνι ὁ Πόρος τοῦ νέκταρος πλησθεὶς, οὐπω γὰρ οἶνος ἦν. Another classical example is the trick played by Lady Macbeth on Duncan's "spongy officers" ("his two chamberlains Will I with wine and wassail so convince" etc.).

βεβαρημένος. A later form for the Epic βεβαρηώς (*Od.* III. 139): cp. Theocr. XVII. 61 βεβαρημένα ἄδινεσσιν.

παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ κτλ. So *Andoc.* IV. 22 υἱὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς πεποιήγαι: and παῖδας ποιείσθαι in *Crito* 45 D, *Laws* 674 B, 783 D, as equiv. to the cpd. παιδοποιείσθαι (*Rep.* 449 D, *Laws* 784 A, B, E). These parallels are sufficient to defend the text (see *crit. n.*), without resorting to Rettig's absurd notion that παιδίον π. is "verecundior" than the cpd.

203 C τῆς Ἀφροδίτης...θεράπων. Cp. *Orph. fr.* 139 τὴν γὰρ Ἀφροδίτην παρήγαγεν ὁ δημιουργός...καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ὀπαδὸν αὐτῆς: *Sappho fr.* 74 (λέγει ἡ Ἀφροδίτη) σύ τε καλὸς (κάμῳς Bgk.) θεράπων Ἔρωτος: Hes. *Theog.* 201 τῇ δ' (sc. Ἀφροδίτῃ) Ἔρωτος ὀμάρτησε καὶ Ἴμερος ἔσπετο καλὸς | γεινομένη ταπρῶτα κτλ.: *Max. Tyr. diss.* XXIIV. p. 297.

ἐραστής ὢν περὶ τὸ καλόν. Cp. 204 B, 206 E. For the thought, cp. Sir T. Browne (*Rel. Med.*) "I am naturally amorous of all that is beautiful."

πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. Here follows a list of the properties which attach to Eros in virtue of his descent from Penia. Observe that the order is chiasmic— here Penia-Poros, above Poros-Penia.

δεῖ ἀπαλός τε καὶ καλός, οἶον οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλὰ σκληρὸς  
**D** καὶ αὐχμηρὸς καὶ ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἄοικος, χαμαιπετῆς αἰεὶ ὦν καὶ  
 ἄστρωτος, ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἐν ὁδοῖς ὑπαίθριος κοιμώμενος, τὴν τῆς  
 μητρὸς φύσιν ἔχων, αἰεὶ ἐνδεία ζῦνοικος. κατὰ δὲ αὐτὸν πατέρα  
 ἐπίβουλός ἐστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀνδρείος ὦν καὶ ἴτης  
 καὶ σύντονος, θηρευτῆς δεινός, αἰεὶ τινας πλέκων μηχανάς, καὶ

**203 D** καὶ οἶκος Themistius ὑπαίθριος BW O.-P., Orig.: ὑπαί-  
 θριος T (ἔστι μὲν οὖν) τὴν cj. Sommer τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς libri: ἀγαθοῖς O.-P.  
 δεινός om. apogr. Paris. 1810, del. Kreyenbühl αἰεὶ προσπλέκων Orig.  
 μηχανάς: [α]νας <sup>μχ<sup>α</sup></sup>βας O.-P. (i.e. αμοιβας O.-P.<sup>1</sup>)

οἶον οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται. This popular opinion had been esp. voiced by Agathon, 195 c ff.; and he had used the term *σκληρός* in 195 E, 196 A. The properties of Eros are, as observed by Max. Tyr. *diss.* XXIV. 4. p. 461, ἀτεχνῶς οἷα εἰς αὐτὸν Σωκράτην ἔσκωπτον ἐν Διονυσίοις οἱ κωμῆδοί: cp. Themist. *or.* 13. p. 161 D ff.

**203 D** αὐχμηρὸς. This is evidently intended as the contrary of Agathon's epithet ὑγρός, 196 A. Cp. Ar. *Plut.* 80 ff. (Πλοῦτος) ἀθλίως διακείμενος...αὐχμῶν βαδίσεις; and the echoes in Plut. *de fort.* p. 98 D, *in amat.* 759 A.

ἀνυπόδητος...ἄστρωτος. These, too, are characteristics of the Socratic (and Cynic) way of life. For ἀνυπόδητος, see 173 B, 220 B; for χαμαιπετῆς καὶ ἄστρωτος the account given by Alcibiades in 220 B, c. Compare also the description of the Σελλοί ("fakirs") in *Π.* XVI. 234 ff. Σελλοί, ἀνιπτόποδες, χαμαιεῦναι κτλ. (see Welcker *Kl. Schr.* 3. 90 f.; Rohde, *Psyche* I. 122).

ἐπὶ θύραις κτλ. For the θυραυλία of ἔρασταί, see 183 A, *Anthol.* v. 5; and for this phrase as applicable to Socrates, 175 A, 220 C, Ar. *Nub.* 169 ff. So too Penia was described in 203 B as (οὔσα) περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὑπαίθριος and σύνοικος are words of a poetical flavour: cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 24 ὁ δὲ σύνοικος ἐμοὶ ἔρωσ.

ἴτης. "Energetic" ("go-ahead"): Schol. ἴτης· ἴστωρ, ἐπιστήμων, ὡς ἐνταῦθα. λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰταμοῦ καὶ θρασίου. The Scholiast's ὡς ἐνταῦθα is clearly wrong, and that Plato connected the word with ἵνα is shown by *Protag.* 349 E πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβούνται ἵνα. Cp. *Prot.* 359 C: Callinus I. 9—10 ἀλλὰ τις ἰθὺς ἴτω | ἔγχοσ ἀνασχόμενος κτλ. Here, however, the special sense of intellectual progress (μέθοδος, ἀνοδος) may be implied, cp. 210 A (μετῆ, λόντα, ἵνα), and my note on ἀνδρείαν 212 B (also 205 D).

θηρευτῆς δεινός. "A mighty hunter," a very Nimrod. For the notion of the chase in erotics, cp. the use of ελεῖν and διώκειν in 182 E, etc., and of θήρα in *Soph.* 222 D τῆ τῶν ἐρώτων θήρα (cp. θηρῶμαι in Isocr. *Hel.* 219 D): for the same notion applied to philosophical enquiry, cp. *Phaedo* 66 C τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν: *Gorg.* 500 D, *Theaet.* 198 A ff. So Emerson (*On Beauty*), "The sharpest-sighted hunter in the world is Love, for finding what he seeks and only that."

πλέκων μηχανάς. "Weaving plots," "intriguing": cp. Eur. *Androm.* 66 ποίας μηχανάς πλέκουσιν αὐ; *Orph.* H. 55. 3 ('Αφροδίτη) δολοπλόκε: Aelian *H. A.* III. 30 σοφάτατος ὁ κόκκυξ, καὶ πλέκειν εὐπόρους ἐξ ἀπόρων μηχανάς δεινότατος.

φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητῆς καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστῆς· καὶ οὔτε ὡς ἀθάνατος πέφυκεν οὔτε ὡς θνητός, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας **E** θάλλει καὶ ζῆ, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ, τοτὲ δὲ ἀποθνήσκει, πάλιν δὲ ἀναβιάσκειται διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποριζόμενον αἰεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ· ὥστε οὔτε ἀπορεῖ Ἔρως ποτὲ οὔτε πλουτεῖ, σοφίας τε αὐ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν. ἔχει γὰρ ἄδε. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι—ἔστι γάρ—οὐδ' εἰ τις ἄλλος σοφός, 204 οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ' αὐ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦσι

203 D πόριμος T O.-P. corr.: πορισμος B: φρονιμος O.-P.<sup>1</sup> φιλοσοφῶν T: φιλοσόφων B γόης καὶ: καὶ om. O.-P. **E** αὐτῆς om. O.-P. καὶ ζῆ B O.-P.: τε καὶ ζῆ TW, Orig. ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ secl. Jn. Hug: ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ Hommel πάλιν: παλιν παλιν O.-P. corr., Orig. αναβιοσκε[ι]ται O.-P. ποτ' Ἔρως vulg. Hirschig τε αὐ T, Bt.: τε B, Herm.: δ' αὐ Orig.: αὐ O.-P.: δὲ Sommer Sz.

πόριμος. As son of Πόρος. Agathon, too, had described Eros as (πραγῆτα) ποριζων, 197 D.

δεινὸς γόης κτλ. For γόης, see 203 A n.; and for Socrates as wizard or charmer, 215 c ff., *Meno* 80 A ff., Xen. *Mem.* III. 11. 17—18. For σοφιστῆς, cp. 177 B, 208 c; *Rep.* 596 D; Xen. *Cyrop.* VI. 1. 41 νῦν τοῦτο πεφιλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος: Maxim. Tyr. XXIV. 9 (=Sappho fr. 125) τὸν Ἔρωτα Σωκράτης σοφιστὴν λέγει, Σαπφῶ μυθοπλόκον. The esoteric meaning of these epithets is thus explained by Hermias in *Plat. Phaedr.* p. 97: (εἶπε τὸν Ἔρωτα) φιλόσοφον μὲν ὡς τὸ λογικὸν ἡμῶν διεγείρουσα ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ· γόητα δὲ ὡς τὸν θυμὸν καταστέλλοντα· φαρμακεία (δὲ) ὡς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κηλοῦντα· σοφιστὴν δὲ ὡς τὴν φύσιν ἀπατῶντα καὶ δελεάζοντα—this however must be taken “with a grain of salt.” Cp. also Procl. in *Cratyl.* p. 94, 158 ὅτι οἶδεν ὁ Πλάτων τὸ ὄνομα τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπὶ σεμνῷ τάπτειν πράγματι· τὸν γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὰ ἄλλα δυνάμενον ἐπιστρέφειν οὕτως καλεῖ, οἶον τὸν Δία (*Mén.* 319 c), τὸν Ἄιδην (*Crat.* 403 E), τὸν Ἔρωτα.

203 E θάλλει. Cp. *Cratyl.* 414 A αὐτὸ γε τὸ θάλλειν τὴν αἴχην μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων. For the alternation of life and death in Eros, compare the case of Polydeuces in Pind. *Nem.* x. 87 ff.

ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ. These words are condemned, on no sufficient grounds, by Hug and others as “sehr prosaische und abschwächend.”

αἰεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ. “Die geistigen Güter werden uns zu Theil nur insofern wir sie erwerben” (Rettig). The cpd. ὑπεκρεῖν is ἀπ. λεγ. in Plato, but cp. *Euthyd.* 291 B αἰ δ' (ἐπιστήμαι) αἰεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον.

οὔτε ἀπορεῖ...οὔτε πλουτεῖ. ἀπορία is a quality of the mother of Eros (διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπορίαν 203 B), as πλοῦτος of the father. On the other hand πενία is described as a mean between πλοῦτος and πτωχεία in Ar. *Plut.* 552.

204 A ἔστι γάρ. Sc. σοφός: cp. Simon. 5. 10 θεὸς ἄν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας (sc. ἰσθλὸν ἱμμεναί). For the midway position of the φιλόσοφος, cp. *Phaedr.* 278 D, *Lysis* 218 A; Plotin. *Enn.* VI. 7. 35 ff.

σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν· οὐκ οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἴομενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὐδ' ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεισθαι.

Τίνες οὖν, ἔφη ἐγὼ, ὦ Διοτίμα, οἱ φιλοσοφούντες, εἰ μήτε Β οἱ σοφοὶ μήτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἤδη καὶ παιδί, ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν αὐ καὶ ὁ Ἔρωσ. ἔστι γὰρ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρωσ δ' ἐστὶν ἔρωσ περὶ τὸ καλόν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις· πατὴρ μὲν γὰρ σοφοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐπόρου, μητὴρ δὲ οὐ σοφῆς καὶ ἀπόρου. ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις τοῦ δαίμονος, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, αὐτῆ· C ὄν δὲ σὺ φήθης Ἔρωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθες. φήθης δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τεκμαιρομένη ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τὸ ἐρώμενον Ἔρωτα εἶναι, οὐ τὸ ἐρῶν. διὰ ταῦτά σοι, οἶμαι, πάγκαλος ἐφαίνετο ὁ Ἔρωσ. καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐραστὸν τὸ τῷ ὄντι καλὸν καὶ ἀβρὸν καὶ τέλειον καὶ μακαριστόν· τὸ δὲ γε ἐρῶν ἄλλην ἰδέαν τοιαύτην ἔχον, οἷαν ἐγὼ διήλθον.

204 A σοφοὶ γενέσθαι: σοφοὶς γ. O.-P. αὐτῷ γὰρ τούτῳ Vindob. 21, Sydenham χαλεπὸν del. Hommel Bdhm.: χαλεπῆ O.-P. ἀμαθίας cj. Ast αὐτῷ W b: αὐτῷ T: αὐτῷ O.-P.: αὐτὸ B ἰκανόν del. Hirschig B δῆλον δὴ TW O.-P., vulg. Sz. Bt.: δηλονότι B: δῆλον Herm. J.-U.: δῆλόν ἐστι Rettig δῆλον τοῦτό γ', ἡ δ' ἡ, καὶ Bdhm. αὐ Ven. 184 Vind. 21, vulg. Bt.: ἂν εἴη O.-P.: ἂν BTW: δὴ Usener Sz.: del. Rückert: fort. εἰς μετοξὺ O.-P. Ὁ ὡθης O.-P. τεκμαιρομένη B<sup>1</sup> λέγεις: ελεγεσ O.-P. εἶναι Ἔρωτα O.-P. οἰομαι O.-P. τὸ τῷ: τῷ Bdhm. ἀβρον O.-P. corr.: ἀγαθον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> τελειον O.-P.

αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό κτλ. "Precisely herein is ignorance a grievous thing, (viz.) that" etc. If, with Stallb., we take αὐτὸ τοῦτο as adverbial accus. of respect, with τὸ μὴ...ἰκανόν as an exegetic supplement, no emendation is required. For the neuter-χαλεπὸν in appos. to ἀμαθία, cp. 176 D, *Phileb.* 12 c.

204 B Δῆλον δὴ...καὶ παιδί. Cp. *Euthyd.* 279 D τοῦτο δὲ κἀν παῖς γνοίη: ἰδ. 301 B, *Lys.* 205 c (Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 72). Observe how sharply Diotima snubs Socrates, ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί (208 c). For my cj. ἂν εἴς, cp. 203 A. φιλόσοφον εἶναι. Cp. Procl. in *Tim.* 52 δύο τούτους θεοὺς ὁ Πλάτων φιλοσόφους ἐκάλεσε, τὸν τε Ἔρωτα καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν (*Tim.* 24 D),...ἦν γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς "καὶ Μῆτις πρῶτος γενέτωρ καὶ Ἔρωσ πολυτερπῆς" (*Orph. Theog. fr.* 8. 11), καὶ ὡς μὲν Μῆτις τίκει τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ὡς δὲ Ἔρωσ ἀπογενεῖ τὴν ἐρωτικὴν σειρᾶν.

204 Ὁ ἀβρὸν. Agathon (here alluded to) had used the subst. ἀβρότης (197 D), besides the epithets ἀπαλός and ὑγρός (195 c ff.).

μακαριστόν. The only other Platonic exx. are *Rep.* 465 D, *Phaedr.* 256 c. Cp. the use of μακαρίζω in 216 E *infra*.

XXIV. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Ἐλεν δὴ, ὦ ξένη· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις· τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁ Ἔρως τίνα χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειράσομαι σε διδάξαι. ἔστι μὲν D γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτος καὶ οὕτω γεγονὼς ὁ Ἔρως, ἔστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν, ὡς σὺ φῆς. εἰ δέ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Διοτίμα; ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον ἐρῶ· ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρᾷ; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Γενέσθαι αὐτῶ. Ἄλλ' ἔτι ποθεῖ, ἔφη, ἢ ἀποκρίσις ἐρώτησιν τοιάνδε· τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰ καλά; Οὐ πάνυ ἔφην ἔτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μεταβαλὼν E ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τῶ ἀγαθῶ χρώμενος πυνθάνοιτο· φέρε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα· ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, αὐτῶ. Καὶ τί

204 O (δὲ) ὢν cj. Steph. δὴ (τὰ) μετὰ Bdhm. D και ουτω superscr. O.-P. σὺ φῆς: σύμφης Jn. τε B O.-P.: om. TW ἐρῶ Aldin, edd.: ἐρῶ b: ἐρᾷ BTW: ερα O.-P.: fort. ὅρα (cf. E *infra*) ἔτι ποθεῖ TW O.-P., Bt.: ἐπιποθεῖ B, Sz.: ἔτι ἐπιποθεῖ Rückert τοιανδε O.-P. E πυνθάνοιτο secl. Usener ὅρα scripsi: ἐρᾷ BTW O.-P.: ἐρῶ Aldin. vulg. Bt.: ἔροιτο Herm. J.-U.: om. Ven. 184, Bast Sz.: εἰ γ' ἐρᾷ Rohde τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί distinxit Winckelmann: τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί; olim Voeg. αὐτῶ BT

τίνα χρεῖαν κτλ. Here begins the second section of Socrates-Diotima's exposition. For *χρεῖα*, "utility,"—equiv. here to the *δόσεις* of 195 A, the *ἔργα* of 199 C—cp. *Gorg.* 480 A, etc.

Τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ' κτλ. "Ebenso 180 D, 186 A, 189 D, 194 E. Also wohl parodisch und spöttisch" (Rettig).

204 D ἔστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν. This is object. genitive: cp. 201 E, 206 E. As Rettig notes, Diotima herself affects *περὶ τὸ καλόν* in preference to *τοῦ καλοῦ* (after *ἔρως*, etc.); and this may be used as an argument against Jahn-Usener's *σύμφης*.

εἰ δέ τις κτλ. For the omission of the apodosis, cp. 199 E *εἰ γὰρ ἐροίμην* κτλ. *σαφέστερον ἐρῶ*. The preceding query had been ambiguously worded, since τῶν καλῶν might be taken either as a partitive gen. dependent on *τί*, or as an object. gen. with "Ἔρως (*τί* being adverbial accus.): that the latter was the construction intended is now shown by the revised statement of the query—ὁ ἐρῶν...*τί* ἐρᾷ; I am inclined to suspect that we should read *ὅρα* (see 204 E n.) for *ἐρῶ* (*ἐρᾷ* MSS.).

ἔτι ποθεῖ. If we read *ἐπιποθεῖ* we must ascribe to the proposition its full force, "craves further"; the other exx. of the cpd. in Plato are *Prot.* 329 D *τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ*: *Laws* 855 E. The former of these supports Rückert's *ἔτι ἐπιποθεῖ*.

Οὐ πάνυ...*ἔτι*. For *οὐ πάνυ*, cp. *Meno* 71 C (with Thompson's note).

204 E μεταβαλὼν. Here the participle "adverbii partes agit," cp. *Gorg.* 480 E, *Philos.* 51 A. For the ellipse, cp. 204 D, 199 E.

¶ φέρε, ὦ Σ., *ορα*. Most editors bracket the mss.' *ἐρᾷ*: Stallb., after

ἔσται ἐκείνῳ φ' ἂν γένηται τὰγαθὰ; Τοῦτ' εὐπορώτερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 205 ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαιμών ἔσται. Κτήσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν  
 οἱ εὐδαιμόνες εὐδαιμόνες, καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα τί δὲ  
 βούλεται εὐδαιμῶν εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν  
 ἢ ἀπόκρισις. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, εἶπον ἐγώ. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν βούλησιν  
 καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον πότερα κοινὸν οἶε εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώ-  
 πων, καὶ πάντας τὰγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι αἰεὶ, ἢ πῶς  
 λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων. Τί δὴ οὖν,  
 B ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάντας ἐρᾶν φαμέν, εἶπερ γε πάντες τῶν  
 αὐτῶν ἐρώσι καὶ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ τινὰς φαμεν ἐρᾶν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Θαυμάζω,  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτός. Ἄλλὰ μὴ θαύμαζ', ἔφη· ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα  
 τοῦ ἐρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὄλου ἐπιτιθέντες ὄνομα,  
 ἔρωτα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταχρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν. Ὡσπερ τί; ἦν  
 δ' ἐγώ. Ὡσπερ τόδε. οἴσθ' ὅτι ποιήσις ἐστὶ τι πολὺ· ἢ γὰρ τοι ἐκ

205 A ἀγαθῶν B δὲ τὴν B O.-P., J.-U. Sz.: δὴ τὴν TW, Bt. εἶναι  
 οἶε W B αὐτῶν: ἀγαθῶν cj. Naber γὰρ ἄρα T O.-P., Bt.: γὰρ BW, J.-U.  
 ἐρώτος T (ἐν) τι εἶδος Hirschig τοι Vind. 21, vulg. Sz. Bt.: τι BTW:  
 τω O.-P., ὧ O.-P. mg.

Winckelmann, retains it with the punctuation ἐρᾶ ὁ ἐρώων τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τί  
 ἐρᾶ;—a mode of expression which is “vehementius quam ut aptum videri  
 possit huic loco” (Rettig). Rückert defends the Aldine reading ἐρῶ as a  
 permissible superfluity “in familiari sermone.” I suspect that here, as above,  
 we should read ὄρα: cp. ὄρα τί ποιεῖς 189 A; *Rep.* 596 C; *Crat.* 385 D φέρε...εἰπέ.

205 A ἵνα τί. *Sc. γένηται*: for this colloquial use see Goodwin *G. M. T.*  
 § 331.

τέλος...ἔχειν. Because it is recognized that εὐδαιμονία constitutes in itself  
 the ethical τέλος or “summum bonum”: cp. *Clit.* 410 E ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς  
 τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαιμονα γενέσθαι: *Arist. E. N.* I. 7. 1097<sup>a</sup> 33 ἀπλῶς δὴ  
 τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰε...τοιούτων δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ. Cp.  
 also 210 E πρὸς τέλος ἡδῆ ἰών κτλ.

πάντας...αἰεὶ. Here αἰεὶ goes with βούλεσθαι, not with αὐτοῖς εἶναι (as in  
 206 A *ἐντρα*).

Τί δὴ οὖν κτλ. Diotima here points out an apparent contradiction between  
 the previous conclusion (κοινὸν πάντων) and common opinion, due to the  
 ambiguity of the term ἐρώς (ἐρᾶν) which is used both in a generic and in a  
 specific sense.

205 B Ὡσπερ τί; “For example—?”

ποιήσις. The selection of this term as an ex. of varying connotation is  
 partly, no doubt, due to the fact that it was one of the matters specially  
 emphasized by Agathon, 197 A. For πολὺ, *multitplex*, cp. *Polit.* 282 A.

ἢ γὰρ τοι κτλ. For the definition, cp. *Soph.* 219 B, 265 B ποιητικὴν...πᾶσαν  
 ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἣ τις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὑστερον  
 γίγνεσθαι: also *Phileb.* 26 D; *Xen. Mem.* II. 2. 3; *Procl. inst. theol.* p. 74.

τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν ἰόντι ὄφρουν αἰτία πᾶσα ἐστὶ ποιήσεις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ C τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. Ἄλλ' ὅμως, ἢ δ' ἢ, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ καλοῦνται ποιηταὶ ἀλλ' ἄλλα ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἐν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὄλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται. ποιήσεις γὰρ τοῦτο μόνον καλεῖται, καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ποιήσεως ποιηταί. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ περὶ τὸν βρωτᾶ· τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία D

205 C ἢ δ' ἢ Bekker: η δ η O.-P.: ἦδη BTW οὐ om. W ἔχουσι  
 TW O.-P., Sz: ἔξουσι B, Bt.: ἰσχοῦσι Sauppe μόριον BT O.-P.: μόνον  
 p. W γὰρ τοῦτο: γ. ταῦτα O.-P. εφη[ν] λέγεις O.-P. D πᾶσα...εὐδαι-  
 μονεῖν del. Bdhm.

205 C αἱ...ἐργασίαι. Cp. *Gorg.* 450 C τῶν μὲν (τεχνῶν) ἐργασίαι τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ. The word denotes manufacturing processes: cp. *n.* on *περὶ τέχνας* κτλ., 203 A. For ὑπὸ c. *dat.*, a construction rare in Attic prose, cp. *Philob.* 58 A: *Hipp. Maj.* 295 D τὰ τε ὑπὸ τῆ μουσικῆ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις (ὄργανα): *Rep.* 511 A. Cp. Aristotle's use of ὑπὸ c. *acc.* to denote the subordination of arts, *E. N.* I. I. 1094<sup>a</sup> 10 ff. *δοῦναι δ' εἰς τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν* κτλ.

ἐν μόριον. Equivalent to ἐν εἶδος (205 B): for this logical use of the term cp. *Gorg.* 464 B, *Laus* 696 B. For ἀφορίζω, cp. *Soph.* 257 C, 268 D τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφορισμένον ἐν λόγοις...μόριον.

τὸ περὶ...τὰ μέτρα. Cp. 187 D, 196 E.

205 D τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον κτλ. Opinions are divided as to the construction of τὸ κεφάλαιον: it may be construed (1) as nominative and subject, "the generic concept (*sc.* τοῦ βρωτός) is—"; so Hommel, Vermehren, Hug, Prantl, comparing *Gorg.* 463 A καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ (*sc.* τῆς ῥητορικῆς) τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακίαν: or (2) as adverbial *accus.* (of respect), "in its generic aspect," cp. *Philob.* 48 C ἐστὶ δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον: *Euthyphr.* 8 E. The latter is certainly the more natural mode of construing here, since no genitive (*αὐτοῦ*) is added. But other difficulties remain: what is the subject of ἐστὶ, if τὸ κεφάλαιον is adverbial? Should we (a) construe with Ficinus (followed by Stallb.<sup>3</sup>, Lehrs, Zeller, Jowett and others) "nam summam quidem omnium bonorum felicitatisque appetitio maximus et insidiator amor est cuique"? Or (b) should we rather, with Stallb.<sup>1</sup> and Prantl, supply ὁ βρωτός as the subject of ἐστὶ and construe πᾶσα ἢ...εὐδαιμονεῖν as the predicate? To my mind the latter is the more natural method. Next arises the question, how are we to deal with the last part of the sentence, ὁ μέγιστός...παντί? If with most edd. (except Rückert, Stallb.<sup>3</sup> and Rettig) we regard *δολερός* as corrupt, the best plan is to excise the whole clause with Hug (and Stallb.<sup>1</sup>), since none of the corrections of *δολερός* hitherto proposed (see *crit. n.*) are at all convincing. The chief objection to *δολερός* is, not so much the meaning of the word itself (which may be defended by 203 D), as rather (to quote Stallb.<sup>2</sup>) "conjunctio superlativi μέγιστος cum *δολερός* positivo." But even this objection



καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὁ “ μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερὸς ” ἔρωσ παντί· ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἄλλη τρεπόμενοι πολλαχῆ ἐπ’ αὐτόν, ἢ κατὰ χρηματισμὸν ἢ κατὰ φιλογυμνασίαν ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οὐτ’ ἐρᾶν καλοῦνται οὐτ’ ἐρασταί, οἱ δὲ κατὰ ἓν τι εἶδος ἰόντες τε καὶ ἐσπουδακότες τὸ τοῦ ὄλου ὄνομα ἰσχουσιν, ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐρασταί. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγειν. Καὶ λέγεται μὲν γέ τις, ἔφη, **E** λόγος, ὡς οἱ ἂν τὸ ἥμισυ ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρώσιν· ὁ δ’ ἐμὸς λόγος οὐθ’ ἡμίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὐθ’ ὄλου, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνη γέ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν· ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμεσθαι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς δοκῆ

205 D ὁ...δολερὸς secl. Usener: ὁ...παντί secl. Stallb. (1827) Hug μέγιστός: ὀρμητικός Creuzer δολερὸς: δολερώτατος Stallb. (1852): δεινώτατος Ast: κοινός Hommel: ὀλόκληρος Pflugk Mdvg.: ὀλος Bdhm.: ἀθρόος Verm.: πρῶτος cj. Sz.: τολμηρὸς Creuzer: σφοδρώτατος Sydenham: σφοδρὸς Cobet: μόνος Schirlitz: κερδαλέος Naber πάντη Pflugk αὐτόν: αὐτὸ Voeg. Sz.: ἀγαθὸν Orelli χρηματισμῶ O.-P.<sup>1</sup> εσχον O.-P. ἔρωτά...ἐρασταί secl. Sz. ἔρωσ τε Hertlein ἐρασταί: fort. ἐραστὰς κινδυνευοῦσι O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **E** τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἥμισυ Sz.: τὸ ἥμισυ τὸ ἑαυτῶν Sauppe Jn.: ἑαυτῶν secl. Usener. ἐπεὶ T O.-P.: ἐπὶ B

is not, I think, insuperable; for if we construe παντί closely with δολερὸς as “all-ensnaring,” we get a superlative idea which balances μέγιστος, while in sense it is supported by 203 B, D and Sappho’s δολοπλόκε Ἀφροδίτα. If, adopting this explanation, we retain the traditional text, it seems best to regard the clause ὁ μέγιστός...παντί as an appositional quotation and to construe, with Prantl, “nämlich jene grösste und für jeden verfängliche Liebe.” Hommel is singular in taking τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν (sc. ἡ ἐπιθυμία), as well as τὸ κεφάλαιον, as subject (“und das Streben nach dem höchsten Gute, d. i. nach Glückseligkeit, ist die grösste Liebe”).

ἔρωτα...ἐρασταί. This sequence is irregular. Usually with ὄνομα ἔχειν the name is in the nominative, in apposition with the subject, e.g. Laws 956 c διαίτηται ὄνομα...ἔχοντες (so here ἐρασταί): but the accus. is also possible (in appos. with ὄνομα), as in Plut. Arist. 2. But the combination of the two constructions is certainly awkward, and the words may well be, as Schanz supposes, a gloss.

Καὶ λέγεται κτλ. An allusion to Aristophanes’ speech, esp. 192 B, E ff.: cp. 212 c. For οὐθ’ ὄλου, below, cp. 192 E.

205 E ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γε κτλ. Cp. Xen. Mem. I. 2. 54 ἔλεγε δ’ ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ, δὲ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὃ τι ἂν ἀρχεῖον ἢ καὶ ἀνωφελές αὐτὸς τε ἀφαιρῆι καὶ ἄλλῃ παρέχει. αὐτοὶ τὲ γε αὐτῶν ὄνυχας τε καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι κτλ.: Ev. Matth. 5. 30 καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιὰ σου χεῖρ σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔκκοψον αὐτήν κτλ.

τὰ ἐαυτῶν πονηρὰ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐαυτῶν, οἶμαι, ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκείον καλεῖ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον· ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἐρώσειν ἄνθρωποι 206 ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἢ δ' ἦ, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ λέγειν, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐρώσειν; Ναί, ἔφην. Τί δέ; οὐ προσθετέον, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῖς ἐρώσειν; Προσθετέον. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ οὐ μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ εἶναι; Καὶ τοῦτο προσθετέον. Ἔστιν ἄρα ξυλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρωσ τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις.

XXV. Ὅτε δὴ τούτου ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, ἢ δ' ἦ, τῶν τίνα B τρόπον διωκόντων αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τίνι πράξει ἢ σπουδῇ καὶ ἢ σύντασις ἔρωσ ἂν καλοῖτο; τί τοῦτο τυγχάνει ἢν τὸ ἔργον; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐ

205 E καλεῖ W: καλῆ BT 206 A ἄνθρωποι Bekk. Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωποι BT: ἄνθρωποι O.-P.: οἱ ἄνθρωποι W: del. Baiter ἢ τὰγαθόν Hirschig ἢ σοὶ...ἀγαθοῦ om. O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ἢ δ' ἦ Bekker: η[δ]η O.-P. corr.: ἦδη BT ὅτι ἄνθρωποι Sauppe Jn. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ BW O.-P. corr.: τὰγαθοῦ T, Bt. προσθεταῖον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> (bis) οὖν BT O.-P.: om. W τοῦ τὸ T O.-P.: τοῦτο B αὐτῷ TW O.-P.: αὐτὸ B B δῆ: δε O.-P. Paris 1642 τούτου Bast Sz. Bt.: τοῦτο libri, O.-P. αἰεὶ om. Vat., Bekk. Sz.: ἄγε Usener ἢ δ' ἦ Bekk.: ἦδη BT: ἦ δ' η O.-P. τῶν T b O.-P.: τὸν B αὐτὸν T σύντασις B O.-P.: σύστασις TW

εἰ μὴ εἴ. See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 476<sup>4</sup>.

τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκείον. Cp. *Rep.* 586 E εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκάστω, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκείωτατον (with Adami's note): *Charm.* 163 C, D ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεία τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς: *Arist. E. N.* x. 7.

206 A ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. For the assumption that τὰγαθόν is the final end of desire, cp. *Phileb.* 20 B ff., *Gorg.* 467 D ff., etc. The statement here is referred to by Proclus in *Alcib. I.* p. 129.

ἀπλοῦν. Equivalent to ἄνευ προσθέσεως ἀληθής: cp. 183 D; *Phaedr.* 244 A εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι κτλ. ("true without qualification," Thompson); *Prot.* 331 C.

206 B ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶν αἰεὶ. Most edd. follow Bekker in ejecting αἰεὶ: Rettig, however, rightly keeps it with the note "αἰεὶ=die gegebene Definition gilt überall und für alle Fälle"; cp. 205 A, B.

αὐτὸ. Sc. τὸ τὰγαθὸν αὐτοῖς εἶναι αἰεὶ.

ἢ σύντασις. Cp. 203 D (Ἐρωσ ἐστὶ) σύντονος: *Phileb.* 46 D σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ (with my note): *Euthyd.* 288 D. For the limitation of the notion of Eros here (ἂν καλοῖτο), cp. that in 205 A ff. (καλοῦνται, C, D).

τυγχάνει ἢν. Not "what does it happen to be," but "what in reality is it": see Verrall on *Eur. Med.* 608: cp. *Phaedo* 65 D—E.

Οὐ μαντῶν κτλ. For the suppressed protasis (sc. εἰ τοῦτο εἶχον εἰπεῖν), cp. 175 D.

μεντὰν σέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων  
παρὰ σέ αὐτὰ ταῦτα μαθησόμενος. Ἄλλ' ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ. ἔστι  
γὰρ τοῦτο τόκος ἐν καλῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν.  
Μαντείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖται ὅ τί ποτε λέγεις, καὶ οὐ μανθάνω.  
C Ἄλλ' ἐγώ, ἦ δ' ἦ, σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. κυοῦσι γὰρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ  
ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ γίνωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις.  
τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχροῦ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ [τῷ] καλῷ. [ἦ γὰρ

206 B ἔφην, ἐγὼ *distinxit* Ast καὶ οὐ μανθάνω *del.* Naber C ἦ δ' ἦ  
Bekk.: ἦδη BT: δη O.-P. ἄνθρωποι Sauppe Jn. καὶ κατὰ τὸ TW O.-P.,  
Bt.: κατὰ τὸ B τὴν om. T ἐν τῇ Bdhm. J.-U. Sz.: ἐν τινι libri, Bt.:  
ἐν Naber τίκτειν δὲ...ἔστιν *del.* Rettig καλῷ Bdhm.: καλῶ O.-P.: τῷ  
καλῷ libri ἦ γὰρ...ἔστιν *del.* Ast Sz. Bt.

ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ. φοιτᾶν is the regular word for "attending" lectures or  
a school, see *Prot.* 326 C εἰς διδασκάλων...φοιτᾶν: *Rep.* 328 D δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς  
φοίτα: *Phaedr.* 59 B.

τόκος ἐν καλῷ. The act of procreation appears to be called almost in-  
differently (1) τόκος, as here, (2) γέννησις (206 C, E, 209 D), (3) γέννησις καὶ  
τόκος (206 E), (4) in passive aspect γένεσις (206 D, 207 D). Similarly with the  
verbs: we find τίκτειν (206 C, 210 C, etc.), γεννᾶν (206 D, 207 A, etc.), τίκτειν καὶ  
γεννᾶν (206 D, 209 B, C).

Μαντείας...μανθάνω. Notice the play on the stem-sound. Rettig, citing  
Eur. *Hippol.* 237 (τάδε μαντείας ἀξία πολλῆς), writes "Witzspiel mit Anklang  
an Eur. und Anspielung auf Diotima's Heimath und Beruf": the latter  
allusion is likely enough, but the "Anklang an Eur." is very problematical;  
had it been specially intended we should have had ἀξία or πολλῆς echoed  
as well.

206 C κυοῦσι. κύησις, "pregnancy," is properly the condition intermediate  
between conception (σύλληψις) and delivery (τόκος). Cp. Achill. Tat. I 10  
καὶ νεανίσκος ἔρωτος πρωτοκύμων οὐ δεῖται διδασκαλίας πρὸς τὸν τοκετόν. For  
the language and thought of this whole passage, cp. *Theaet.* 150 ff., *Phaedr.*  
251 A ff., *Tim.* 91 A: also Max. Tyr. *disc.* XVI. 4, p. 179 κυοῦσι δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν  
ψυχαὶ φύσει, εὐδίνουσι δὲ θεῖα, τίκτουσι δὲ λόγῳ κτλ.: Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. 552 B:  
*Themist. or.* XXXII. p. 355 D.

ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ γ. I adopt Badham's correction *τη* for *τινι* since the change  
involved is very slight and ἐν *τινι* ἡλικίᾳ is unexampled in Plato: cp. *Gorg.*  
484 C ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: *Rep.* 461 B; *Phaedr.* 255 A; 209 B *infra*; *Meno* 89 B.  
Plato also uses ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, e.g. *Rep.* 461 B: *Charm.* 154 A: *Laws* 924 E.

τίκτειν δὲ...καλῷ. There is much to be said for Rettig's view that this  
sentence (as well as the next) is a gloss. As he argues, the words "gehören  
also ihrem Inhalte nach nicht an die Stelle, an welcher sie stehen, sondern sie  
müssten nach dem Satze ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κτλ. folgen. An dieser Stelle collidiren  
sie aber mit den gleichbedeutenden Worten τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀναρμοσφ...ἀρμόσφον,

ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συνουσία τόκος ἐστίν.] ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῳῷ ἀθάνατον ἔνεστιν, ἡ κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ἀνάρμοστον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσχροῦ παντὶ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀρμόττον. D Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια ἡ Καλλονὴ ἐστὶ τῇ γενέσει. διὰ ταῦτα

206 O δέ: γὰρ Rohde ἔνεστιν B O.-P.: ἐστὶν TW τὰ B O.-P.: ταῦτα TW D θείῳ TW: θεῷ B O.-P. τῇ γενέσει διὰ ταῦτα. ὅταν κτλ. *distinxit Schirlitz*

für deren Glosse ich sie ansehe. Worauf sollten auch die Worte ἔστι δέ... πρᾶγμα gehen, wenn ihnen die Worte τίκειν δέ...καλῶ unmittelbar vorangingen?" It is just possible, however, to retain the clause as a kind of parenthetic addendum to the preceding sentence, which forestalls, somewhat confusingly, the sentences τὰ δ'...ἀρμόττον. The omission of the article before καλῶ, confirmed by the Papyrus, is certainly an improvement. For the thought, cp. Plotin. *Enn.* III. v. p. 157 v.

[ἡ γὰρ...τόκος ἐστίν.] Most edd. (except Hommel and Stallb.) agree in excising this clause as a meaningless intrusion. Hommel and Stallb. explain the words as intended to introduce the first part of the exposition of τόκος, viz. τόκος κατὰ σῶμα: and Stallb. renders "nam (γὰρ=nemlich) viri et mulieris coitus, est ille nihil aliud nisi τόκος." Susemihl's comment is "die Zeugung werde als die wahrhafte Aufhebung der Geschlechtsdifferenz bezeichnet." But, as Rettig shows, none of these attempts to justify the clause are satisfactory. Perhaps it is a gloss on ἡλικία.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κτλ. Cp. *Laws* 773 E, 721 C γαμῖν δέ...διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύσει τινὶ μετέληφεν ἀθανασίας· οὐ καὶ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμίαν ἴσχειν πᾶς πᾶσαν κτλ.: Cicero *Tusc.* I. 35 quid procreatio liberorum, quid propagatio nominis...significant, nisi nos futura etiam cogitare?: Clem. Al. *Strom.* II. p. 421 C ἐπισκευάσας τὴν ἀθανασίαν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν (sc. διὰ τοῦ γάμου), καὶ οἰονεὶ διαμονὴν τινὰ παισὶ παίδων μεταλαμπαδευομένην.

ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ. For the connexion of Eros with ἀρμονία, see 187 A ff.; for harmony of the body, cp. *Rep.* 591 D; and of the soul, *Rep.* 430 E ff., *Phaedo* 85 E ff.

206 D Μοῖρα...Εἰλείθυια. Cp. Pind. *Ol.* VI. 41 τᾶ μὲν ὁ Χρυσόκομος πρᾶμμητιν τ' Ἐλείθυιαν παρίστασέν τε Μοῖρας: *id. Nem.* VII. 1 Ἐλείθυια πάρεδρε Μοιρᾶν βαθυφρόνων. Μοῖρα ("the Dispenser") is a birth-goddess also in Hom. *Il.* XXIV. 209 τῷ δ' ὡς ποθὶ Μοῖρα κραταίη | γιγνομένη ἐπένησε λίνφ. For Eileithyia, see also *Il.* XII. 270, Hes. *Theog.* 922; and it is noteworthy that Olen made out Eros to be the son of Eileithyia (see Paus. IX. 27). Libanius (*or.* v. t. I. p. 231 R.) identifies Eil. with Artemis.

ἡ Καλλονή. Usener was no doubt right in taking καλλονή here as a proper name, in spite of Rettig's objection that "deren Existenz nachzuweisen ihm aber nicht gelungen ist"; for such a personification, in this context, requires no precedent. "Beauty acts the part of our Lady of Travail at the birth." Possibly we ought to insert ἐπι after ἐστὶ(ν) or read ἐπι in place of ἐστὶ.

ὅταν μὲν καλῶ προσπελάζη τὸ κυοῦν, ἱλεῶν τε γίγνεται καὶ εὐφραινόμενον διαχεῖται καὶ τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ· ὅταν δὲ αἰσχροῦ, σκυθρωπὸν τε καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειράται καὶ ἀποτρέπεται καὶ ἀνέλλεται καὶ οὐ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ἴσχον τὸ κύημα χαλεπῶς φέρει. ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλή ἢ πτοίησις γέγυνε

206 D σκυθρωπὸν τε (γίγνεται) cj. Usener συσπειράται TW: ξυ[ν]σπειραται O.-P.: συσπειρεται B καὶ ἀποτρέπεται secl. Usener Sz. ἀνέλλεται O.-P.: ἀνέλλεται B: ἀνέλλεται W: ἀνέλλεται T σπαργῶντι W πτοίησις TW O.-P., Abresch: ποίησις B: πτόησις Bekk. Sz.: πόνησις Sydenham

προσπελάζη. For this poetical word, cp. Hom. *Od.* ix. 285, and (of sexual converse) Soph. *O. T.* 1101 Πανὸς προσπελασθεῖσα.

ἱλεῶν. Cp. 197 D.

διαχεῖται. This word may signify both physical and emotional effects: for the former cp. *Laws* 775 c τῶν σωμάτων διακεχυμένων ὑπὸ μέθης: for the latter, Suidas (Hesych.) διαχεῖται· χαίρει, διαχέεται, and the Psalmist's "I am poured out like water."

συσπειράται κτλ. Schol. συσπειράται· συστρέφεται. Suid. κυρίως δὲ ἀνέλλεσθαι τὸ ἀπαξιοῦν. They are realistic terms to express aversion, derived perhaps from the action of a snail in drawing in its horns and rolling itself into a ball. Cp. Plotin. *Enn.* I. vi. 2. 51 ἢ ψυχῆ...πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσβαλοῦσα ἀνέλλεται καὶ ἀρνείται καὶ ἀνανεύει ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐ συμφωνοῦσα καὶ ἀλλοτριουμένη. Usener and Hug may be right in bracketing καὶ ἀποτρέπεται, on which Hug comments "Zwischen dem der Gleichnissprache angehörenden συσπειράται und ἀνέλλεται ist das matte, prosaische ἀποτρέπεται unpassend"; but the extra word helps to add emphasis, if nothing more, and Plotinus too uses three verbs. In ἀνέλλεται Rettig sees an "Anspielung auf ἀνελεύθια" (cp. Eur. *Ion* 453). Cp. Plut. *de s. n. v.* p. 562 A.

σπαργῶντι. For σπαργᾶν, *lacte turgere*, cp. *Rep.* 460 c: in *Phaedr.* 256 A (σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ) σπαργῶν = *Venere tumens*. The Scholiast here has σπαργῶντι· ὀρμῶντι, ὀργῶντι, ταρattoμένη, ἢ ἀθροῦντι. λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μαστῶν πεπληρωμένων γάλακτος. Here the realism of the language and the juxtaposition of κυοῦντι compels us to construe "great with child" (as L. and S.) or "with swelling bosom"—not merely "bursting with desire" or excitement. Cp. σφριγῶ as used in Ar. *Lysistr.* 80.

ἢ πτοίησις. "Sic feliciter emendavit Abresch"—his conj. turning out to have some ms. support. The subst. occurs also in *Prot.* 310 D γινώσκων αἰσοῦ τὴν ἀνδρεία καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν: *Crat.* 404 A τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτοίησιν καὶ μανίαν: and the verb (ἐπτοῆσθαι) in *Rep.* 439 D, *Phaedo* 68 c, 108 A. Cp. Mimnermus 5. 2 πτοίωμα δ' ἐσορῶν ἔνθος ὀμηλικίης. It seems a *vox propria* for the condition of the lover "sighing like a furnace": cp. Plotin. *de pulcr.* p. 26 (with Creuzer's note).

περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὠδίνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ἔστι **E** γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρωσ, ὡς σὺ οἶε. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Εἶεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῷ ἢ γέννησις. ἀθανασίας δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπι- 207  
θυμῆν μετὰ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ ἔρωσ ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι.

**XXVI.** Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα ἐδίδασκέ με, ὅποτε περὶ τῶν

**206 E** ἀπολύειν TW O.-P.: ἀπολαύειν B: ἀποπαύειν cj. Naber ἔχοντα: ἐρῶντα Voeg. τίνος μὴν Steph. πάνυ...ἔφη del. Bdhm. τί...γεννήσεως vulgo Socrati tribuunt, Diotimae Herm. (Voeg.) reddidit δὴ BT O.-P.: δέi W γεννήσεως: γενεσεως O.-P. ἀειγενές: αει γενεσις O.-P. **207 A** ἀγαθὸν scripsi: ἀγαθοῦ BT O.-P.: τἀγαθὸν W Vind. Suppl. 7, vulg. Bast (δ) ἔρωσ Bekk. Sz.

**206 E** ὠδίνος ἀπολύειν. This is the office of Καλλονῆ as Εἰλείθυια: cp. *Theaet.* 151 A ταύτην...τὴν ὠδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη (sc. ἢ μαιευτικῆ) δύναται: *Rep.* 490 B ὃ πλησιάζουσ καὶ μιγείς τῷ ὄντως ὄντι, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν...καὶ οὕτω λήγου ὠδίνος: Max. Tyr. *diss.* XVI. 4, p. 179 λόγος μαιεύεται ψυχὴν κρούσαν καὶ ὠδίνων μεστήν.

τὸν ἔχοντα. "Sc. ταύτην τὴν ὠδίνα" (Wolf): but Hommel and Stallb. supply αὐτό, i.e. τὸ καλόν. Cp. *Phaedr.* 252 A τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα ἰατρὸν εὔρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων,—which settles the question.

τί...γεννήσεως; τί, answered by ὅτι, means "why" or "wherein" rather than "what" (as in 204 D), and the genitive, like those preceding, is objective. Supply ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρωσ.

ἀειγενές. This is practically a re-assertion of the statement in 206 C (θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα κτλ.). Cp. *Laws* 773 E ὡς χρὴ τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι τῷ παιδᾶς παιδῶν καταλείποντα κτλ.

**207 A** εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν κτλ. Against Bekker, Dindorf, Ast, Stallb.<sup>1</sup> who adopted τοῦ τἀγαθὸν Rückert wrote: "etiam vulg. proba est. Construe: εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔρωσ ἐστίν, quibus ἐξηγητικῶς addita sunt verba ἑαυτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ. In quibus supplendum est subj. ὁ ἔρωσ." To this Stallb.<sup>2</sup> and Rettig assent, comparing Pind. *Ol.* III. 33 τῶν νιν γλυκὺς ἡμέρος ἔσχεν...φυτεῦσαι: Thuc. v. 15. 1 ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομισσασθαι (where Poppo cites for the exegetical infin. *Crito* 52 c, Xen. *Cyr.* v. 231). None the less, the mss.<sup>3</sup> text seems—if not "sine ullo sensu" as Wolf put it—at least very awkward Greek. The obvious allusion to the former definition, ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶ τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι αἰεὶ (206 A *ad fin.*), supports Bekker's reading here as the right one: but if we read τοῦ τἀγαθὸν here consistency requires that we also read μετὰ τἀγαθοῦ in the preceding line, an easy change but supported by no authority. Hence I content myself with the minimum of alteration, *vis.* ἀγαθὸν for ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐρωτικῶν λόγους ποιοῖτο, καὶ ποτε ἤρετο τί οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, αἴτιον εἶναι τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία, ἐπειδὴν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ, καὶ B τὰ πεζὰ καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ, νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τὸ ξυμμιγῆναι ἀλλήλοις, ἔπειτα περὶ τὴν τροφήν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἔτοιμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ διαμάχασθαι τὰ ἀσθενέστατα τοῖς ἰσχυροτάτοις καὶ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν, καὶ αὐτὰ τῷ λιμῷ παρατεινόμενα ὥστ' ἐκείνα ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιοῦντα; τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους, ἔφη, οἷοιτ' ἂν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν· τὰ δὲ θηρία τίς αἰτία οὕτως ἐρωτικῶς C διατίθεται; ἔχεις λέγειν; καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην· ἢ δ' εἶπε, Διανοεῖ οὖν δεινός ποτε γενήσεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτικά, ἐὰν ταῦτα μὴ ἐννοῆς; Ἄλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά τοι, ὦ Διοτίμα, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ εἶπον, παρὰ σέ ἤκω, γνούς ὅτι διδασκάλων δέομαι. ἀλλά μοι λέγε

207 A αἰσθάνη Bt. ἐπιθυμωσι O.-P.<sup>1</sup> B ἐστιν del. Bdhm. τούτων καὶ BT O.-P.: τούτων W αὐτὰ: αὐτω O.-P. τῷ del. Bdhm. παρατεινομενω O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ἐρωτικῶς del. Naber C αὐτὸν ἔλεγον b, vulg. Sz. Bt.: ἀνέλεγον B: ἂν ἔλεγον TW: ἐλεγον O.-P.

ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται. "In welchem gewaltsamen Zustande sich die Thiere befinden" (Schlei.). The phrase is echoed by Alcibiades in 215 E, cp. 207 B, 208 C. For διάθεσις see *Phileb.* 11 D, with my note.

207 B νοσοῦντα...περὶ. Cp. *Phaedr.* 228 B νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν: *Soph. fr.* 162 (Dindf.) νόσημ' ἔρωτος τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν (but Nauck *fr.* 153 reads the verse otherwise).

καὶ διαμάχασθαι κτλ. This is a correction of Phaedrus's statement (179 B ff.): cp. 220 D ff. For the fact, cp. Aelian *H. A.* I. 18, II. 40: *Lawo* 814 B μὴδ' ὥσπερ ὄρνιθας περὶ τέκνων μαχομένας...ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν κτλ.

καὶ αὐτὰ κτλ. "Schleiermacher: um sie nur zu ernähren. Recte. Fallitur enim Hommel, ὥστε sic usurpari negans ideoque voculam ejectam cupiens. Conf. De Rep. VIII. p. 549 C AL." (Stallb.). As Stallb. explains, αὐτὰ κτλ. depend on αἰσθάνει, the construction being changed, and αὐτὰ = *sponste*. For παρατείνεσθαι, "racked," cp. *Lys.* 204 C: *Ar. fr.* 421.

τίς αἰτία κτλ. For αἰτία with the (anarthrous) infin., cp. *Phaedo* 97 A αἰτία...γενέσθαι. For the foregoing description of the phenomena connected with reproduction in the animal-world, cp. (with Rettig) *Od.* XVI. 216 ff.; *Lawo* 814 B; *Arist. Hist. An.* VIII. 1; *Cic. de fin.* III. 19. 62.

207 C Διανοεῖ. "Do you fancy—?": cp. *Lawo* 755 B μηκέτι...τήν τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν ὡς ἄρξων διανοηθήτω. Notice the tone of indignant scorn in which Diotima speaks, cp. 204 B.

δεινός τὰ ἐρωτικά. Cp. 193 E, 198 D.

ὅπερ νῦν δὴ εἶπον. See 206 B.

καὶ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὰ ἔρωτικά. Εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πιστεύεις ἐκείνου εἶναι φύσει τὸν ἔρωτα, οὐ πολλάκις ὁμολογήκαμεν, μὴ θαύμαζε. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ D λόγον ἢ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν αἰεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι αἰεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐν ἑκάστον τῶν ζώων ζῆν

207 D (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν Hirschig αἰεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος B: αἰεὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος T O.-P., Jn. Bt.: τὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι Sz.: τὸ εἶναι αἰεὶ J.-U. τῇ γενέσει libri, Q.-P.: τῇ γεννήσει Wolf Bdhm. J.-U.: secl. Verm. Sz. Bt. ὅτι: ὄταν Usener καταλείπη Usener ἐν...ζώων del. Ast

οὐ πολλάκις ὁμ. οὐ means ἀθανασίας: πολλάκις refers not only to 206 E f. but also to other conversations such as are implied in 207 A (ἐδίδασκέ με ὅποτε κτλ.).

207 D ἐνταῦθα. "Here," i.e. in the case of τὰ θηρία, as distinguished from that of humans.

τὸν αὐτὸν...λόγον. Adv. accus.; cp. 178 E.

κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. This implies (cp. 208 A *ad fin.*, B) that only partial immortality, at the best, can attach to ἡ θνητὴ φύσις.

ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀθάνατος. I retain the reading of P rejected by recent edd. (see *crit. n.*): αἰεὶ goes with the preceding words, cp. *Rep.* 618 C τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν αἰεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρείσθαι: and 206 A, B *supra*. If, with Burnet, we adopt the reading of T, we must suppose εἶναι to be doing double duty, "both to exist (εἶναι) always and to be (εἶναι) immortal." For the desire of this mortal "to put on immortality," cp. *Eur. fr.* 808 ὃ φιλόζωοι βροτοὶ... οὕτως ἔρωσ βρότοισιν ἐγκείται βίου: Browne *Hydriot.* c. 5 "Restless inquietude for the diuturnity of our memories unto present considerations seems a vanity almost out of date, and superannuated piece of folly."

δύναται κτλ. This introduces the explanation of the saving phrase κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ταύτῃ is adverbial (equiv. to ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ in 208 B *ad init.*), and τῇ γενέσει, if genuine, is an exegetical supplement. Possibly we should excise τῇ γενέσει, with Vermehren; or else alter to τῇ γεννήσει. But the use of τῇ γενέσει above (206 D) in the sense of "the process of generation," combined with the emphasis, by repetition of its moods and tenses, laid on γίγνεσθαι in the sequel (207 D—208 A), may make us hesitate to adopt any change; cp. also the passage quoted in the next note.

αἰεὶ καταλείπει κτλ. Cp. *Laws* 721 C γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων...τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ὃν αἰεὶ γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετεληφέναι: *ib.* 773 E (cited above). On this "conceit" of "a fruitful issue wherein, as in the truest chronicle, they seem to outlive themselves," Sir T. Browne (*Rel. Med.* § 41) observes "This counterfeit subsisting in our progenies seems to me a mere fallacy" etc.

ἐταί καὶ κτλ. We should expect this first clause to be followed by something like οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ νέον αἰεὶ γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι or οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, but, affected by the parenthetical clause οἶον...γίγνηται, the



καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, ὅλον ἐκ παιδαρίου ὁ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως  
 ἂν πρεσβύτης γένηται· οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν  
 αὐτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ  
 Ε ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα καὶ αἷμα καὶ  
 ξύμπαν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν  
 ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἦθη, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἡδοναί, λύπαι, φόβοι,  
 τούτων ἕκαστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἐκάστω, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  
 γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται. πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι  
 208 καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν,  
 καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 μία ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταῦτὸν πάσχει. ὁ γὰρ καλεῖται μελε-

207 D τὰ αὐτὰ: ταυτα O.-P.: ταυτ' Bdhm. ἀλλὰ νέος: ἀλλοίος Steph.:  
 ἀλλὰ νέος τὰ μὲν Sommer: fort. (τὰ μὲν) ἅμα νέος (τὰ μὲν προσλαμβάνων) τὰ  
 δὲ Wolf: τὰ δὲ (παλαιὰ) Bast Ε τρόποι T O.-P.: τόποι B ἴση Fischer  
 ἔτι B O.-P.: ἐστὶν TW

sentence follows a different course. Cp. the cases of anacoluthon in 177 B,  
 182 D.

νέος...τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς. For the omission of τὰ μὲν, cp. *Theaet.* 181 D, *Protag.*  
 330 A, *Rep.* 451 D. I think it not unlikely that for ἀλλὰ we should read ἅμα:  
 the processes of growth and decay are synchronous. For the substance of  
 this passage cp. Heraclitus *fr.* 41 *dis ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης*:  
 (Heraclitus *ap.*) Plut. *de EI Dolorh.* c. 18 ὁ χθές (ἄνθρωπος) εἰς τὸν σήμερον  
 τίθνηκεν, ὁ δὲ σήμερον εἰς τὸν αἴριον ἀποθνήσκει. μένει δ' οὐδεὶς, οὐδ' ἔστιν εἷς,  
 ἀλλὰ γιγνόμεθα πολλοὶ περὶ ἐν φάντασμα: Max. Tyr. *disc.* XLI. 4 μεταβολὴν  
 ὄρας σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως ἀλλαγὴν, ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον  
 κτλ.: Plut. *cons. ad Apoll.* 10: *Cratyl.* 439 D ff.: see also Rohde *Psyche* II. 148.

The influence of "the flowing philosophers" is noticeable also in Epicharm.  
*fr.* 40. 12 ff. (Lorenz)—

Ἰδε νῦν ὄρη  
 καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀβξέθ', ὁ δὲ γὰ μὲν φθίνει.  
 ἐν μεταλλαγῇ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον.  
 ὁ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κωῦποκ' ἐν τωῖτῷ μένει,  
 ἄπερον εἴη κα τὸδ' ἦδη τοῦ παρεξεστακότος.  
 καὶ τὸ δὴ κἀγὼ χθές ἄλλοι καὶ νῦν ἄλλοι τελίβομες,  
 καῦθις ἄλλοι κωῦποχ' οἰτοὶ καττὸν αὐτὸν αὐ λόγον.

Cp. Spenser *F. Q.* VII. 7. 19 And men themselves do change continually, |  
 From youth to eld from wealth to poverty...Ne doe their bodies only flit and  
 fly, | But eeke their minds (which they immortal call) | Still change and vary  
 thoughts, as new occasions fall."

208 A αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. The word is used here in the popular sense—  
 "notitiae rerum in sensus cadentium" (Rückert); cp. *Rep.* 476 D ff.

μελετῶν. See note on ἀμελέτητος 172 A *εἰρητα*.

τῶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης [μνήμην] σφίξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σφίζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον B ἐγκαταλείπειν οἶον αὐτὸ ἦν. ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει, καὶ σῶμα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ. μὴ οὖν θαύμαζε εἰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀποβλάστημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾶ· ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὕτη ἢ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἔπεται.

208 A μνήμην secl. Baiter Sz. Bt.: μνημη O.-P.: μνήμη Sauppe Jn. θνητὸν T O.-P.: ὀνητὸν B οὐ τῷ T O.-P.: οὕτω B τὸ αὐτὸν B O.-P.: ταῦτον Bdhm. J.-U. B τῷ τὸ: τῷ Liebhold: τῷ τὸ ἀεὶ Usener καὶ παλαιούμενον om. Stob., J.-U. ἐγκαταλείπειν: ἐγκαταλείπειν O.-P.: καταλείπειν Stob.: ἀεὶ καταλείπειν Hirschig Jn. ταύτη...ἄλλῃ om. Stob. μετέχει Steph., O.-P.: μετέχειν libri, Voeg. ἀδύνατον Creuzer Sz. Bt.: δυνατὸν, ἀδύνατον Voeg.: ἀθάνατον libri, O.-P. ἅπαν Stob.

λήθη γὰρ κτλ. Cp. *Phaedo* 75 D οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν...ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; *Phileb.* 33 E ἴσθι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος: *Meno* 81 C; *Laus* 732 c. For the πηγή Λήθης (*Μνημοσύνης*) in Hades, see *Pind. fr.* 130; Rohde, *Psyche* II. 209<sup>s</sup>, 390<sup>l</sup>.

[μνήμην]. This word is either interpolated or corrupted (*pace* Rettig who attempts to defend it by citing *Phileb.* 34 B): ἀπιούσης must refer to the same subst. as ἐξιούσης above, viz. τῆς ἐπιστήμης, while καινὴν must qualify the same subst. as ἀπιούσης. For later reff. to this doctrine, see Philo Jud. *de nom. mut.* p. 1060; Nemes. *de nat. hom.* 13, p. 166.

208 B ἀλλὰ τῷ...οἶον αὐτὸ ἦν. This view is reproduced by Aristotle, *de an.* II. 4. 415<sup>a</sup> 26 ff. φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῴσιν...τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό...ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχουσιν...ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ συνεχείᾳ...κοινωνεῖ ταύτη...καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οἶον αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἓν, εἶδει δ' ἓν: cp. *id. Pol.* I. 1252<sup>a</sup> 26 ff.; *de gen. an.* II. 735<sup>a</sup> 17 ff.

ταύτῃ τῇ μ. Cp. ταύτη, 207 D *ad inii.*

ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ. Stallb.<sup>s</sup>, retaining the traditional ἀδύνατον, comments: "haec addita videntur et oppositionis gratia et propter verba extrema καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα: quae ne falso intelligerentur, sane cavendum fuit"—which, as Hommel points out, is unsatisfactory. Against ἀδύνατον Rückert absurdly objects that Plato would have written ἄλλῃ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

παντὶ...ἔπεται. Since ἔπεσθαι is more naturally used of attendance on a divinity (cp. 197 E, *Phaedr.* 248 A etc.) perhaps ἔπεσθαι ought to be read (cp. 183 B *crit. n.*) ἢ σπουδὴ serves to recall 206 B.

XXVII. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας τὸν λόγον ἐθαύμασά τε καὶ εἶπον  
 Εἰεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα, ταῦτα ὡς ἀληθῶς οὕτως  
 C ἔχει; καὶ ἦ, ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί, Εὐ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες·  
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι,  
 θαυμάζοις ἂν τῆς ἀλογίας. [περὶ] ἃ ἐγὼ εἶρηκα εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς, ἐνθυ-  
 μηθεῖς ὡς δεινῶς διάκεινται ἔρωτι τοῦ ὀνομαστοῦ γενέσθαι “καὶ  
 κλέος ἐς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθέσθαι,” καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου  
 D παιδῶν, καὶ χρεῖματ' ἀναλίσκειν καὶ πόνους πονεῖν οὐστυνασοῦν

208 C ἔφη BT O.-P.: om. W ἐπεὶ B O.-P., Sz.: ἐπεὶ γε TW, Bt.  
 ἐθέλοισ Steph. περὶ BT: περί Vind. 21, Bast Herm.: περὶ O.-P.: secl. Ast  
 Sz. ἐς B, Sz. Bt.: εἰς TW O.-P. ἀθάνατον del. Wolf πάντες W  
 μᾶλλον om. T

Εἰεν. “Really!”: “In irrisione verti potest so?” (Ast). This is a some-  
 what rare use; cp. *Rep.* 350 E ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραῦσιν ταῖς τοῖς μύθους  
 λεγούσαις, “εἰεν” ἐρῶ: *ib.* 424 E; *Euthyd.* 290 c. For the doubled “verbum  
 dicendi” (εἶπον...ἦν), cp. 177 A, 202 c.

208 C ὥσπερ οἱ τέλει σοφισταί. We might render “in true professorial  
 style.” The reference may be partly (as Wolf and Hommel suggest) to the  
 fact that the sophistic, as contrasted with the Socratic, method was that of  
 didactic monologue (δύλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου *Prot.* 329 A)—the lecture  
 rather than the conversation. Thus in the sequel (208 C—212 A) Diotima  
 develops her own doctrine without the aid of further question-and-answer.  
 Stallb., however, explains the phrase as intended to ridicule the pretended  
 omniscience of the sophists; Rettig sees in it an indication that what follows  
 is meant, in part, as a parody of the earlier speeches; and by Ast and  
 Schleierm. it is taken to refer only to the dogmatic tone of εὐ ἴσθι. For  
 τέλει σοφιστής, cp. *Crat.* 403 E (applied to Hades); σοφιστής applied to Eros,  
 203 D; οἱ χρηστοὶ σοφισταί, 177 B; οἱ σοφοί, 185 c. It is possible also that in  
 τέλει there may be a hint at the mystery-element in D.’s speech (cp. 210 A  
 and πρὸς τέλει 210 E).

εἰ ἰθέλεισ κτλ. For φιλοτιμία, cp. 178 D. The thought here recalls Milton’s  
 “Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise” etc.

θαυμάζοις ἂν κτλ. Stallb., defending περὶ, says “ad ἐννοεῖς facillime e  
 superioribus intelligitur αὐτά.” But we may justly complain here, as Badham  
 does at *Phileb.* 49 A, of “the dunce who inserted περὶ.”

καὶ κλέος...καταθέσθαι. “Ex poeta aliquo petita esse ipse verborum  
 numerus declarat” (Stallb.): but it is just as probable that Diotima herself  
 is the authoress—rivalling Agathon. Cp. *Tyrtæus* 12. 31—2 οὐδὲ ποτε κλέος  
 ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ' ὄνομ' αὐτοῦ | ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἔων γίγνεται ἀθάνατος:  
*Theogn.* 245—6 οὐδὲ τὸς' οὐδὲ θανάων ἀπολεῖς κλέος, ἀλλὰ μελήσεις | ἄφθιτον  
 ἀνθρώποις αἰὲν ἔχων ὄνομα: *Simon.* 99. 1 ἄσβεστον κλέος...θέντες. For the  
 thought, see also *Cic. Tusc.* I. p. 303; *Cat. Mai.* 22. 3.

καὶ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. ἐπεὶ οἶει σύ, ἔφη, "Ἀλκυστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν, ἢ Ἀχιλλεῦ Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἢ προαποθανεῖν τὸν ὑμέτερον Κόδρον ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας τῶν παίδων, μὴ οἰομένους "ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι" ἑαυτῶν ἔσσεσθαι, ἦν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, ἀλλ', οἶμαι, ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιούσιν, ὄσφ ἂν ἀμεί-

208 D -ἄν...προαποθανεῖν om. W βαλεις O.-P. πέρι Ast Sz. Bt.:  
περι BT

208 D ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. An obvious allusion to 180 A ff.: Diotima corrects Phaedrus by showing the motive for self-sacrifice to be not so much personal *ἔρως* as *ἔρως* for immortal fame. The use of the cognate accus. (*κινδύνους*, *πόνους*) is another poetical feature in this passage—reminiscent of Agathon's style.

Κόδρον. Schol.: πολέμου τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν ὄντος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἔχρησεν ὁ θεὸς τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν αἰρήσειν τὰς Ἀθήνας, εἰ Κόδρον τὸν βασιλέα μὴ φονεύσουσιν. γνοῦς δὲ τοῦτο ὁ Κόδρος, στεῖλας ἑαυτὸν εὐτελεῖ σκευή ὡς ξυλιστήν καὶ δρέπανον λαβῶν, ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα τῶν πολεμίων προΐει. δύο δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπαντησάντων πολεμίων τὸν μὲν ἕνα πατάξας κατέβαλεν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀγνοηθεὶς ὅστις ἦν, πληγείσ ἀπέθανε. This "popular story" is late: "according to the older tradition Codrus fell in battle" (see Bury *Hist. Gr.* p. 169): the traditional date of the event is about 1068 B.C. Notice the rare προαποθανεῖν (once each in Hdt., Antiphon, Xen.), and the "sophistic" jingle in προ-, ἐπ-, ἀποθανεῖν. For later allusions to Codrus, see Cic. *Tusc.* I. 48; Hor. *C.* III. 19, 2.

ἀθάνατον μνήμην κτλ. Cp. Simon. 123 μνήμα δ' ἀποφθιμένοισι πατῆρ Μεγάριτος ἔθηκεν | ἀθάνατον θνητοῖς παισὶ χαριζόμενος: *id.* 4. 8 (Λεωνίδας) ἀρετᾶς λελοιπῶς | κόσμον αἴναον κλέος τε: *id.* 96. Observe how near ἀθάνατον ...ἔσσεσθαι goes to forming a complete hexameter.

ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου. Cp. Soph. *Philoct.* 1419 ὄσους πονήσας καὶ διεξελθὼν πόνους | ἀθάνατον ἀρετῆν ἔσχον: Pind. *Ol.* VII. 163 ἄνδρα τε πύξ ἀρετᾶν εὐρόντα: *id.* *Nem.* X. 2 φλέγεται δ' ἀρεταῖς μυρίαῖς ἔργων θρασέων ἔνεκεν ("countless monuments" J. B. Bury, see *Append.* A in his ed.): *id.* *Isthm.* IV. 17 (with Bury, *App.* F): Thuc. I. 33. 2: *Rep.* 618 B ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς: Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 1. 29: *Anth. Pal.* VII. 252. These passages show that ἀρετῆ can denote not only "excellence" but its result, reward or token, "renown," "distinction," whether or not embodied in a concrete "monument." For the thought cp. Spenser *F. Q.* III. iii. 1 "Most sacred fyre, that burnest mightily In living brests...which men call Love...Whence spring all noble deedes and never dying fame."

εὐκλεοῦς. Cp. Simon. 95 εὐκλέας αἶα κέκευθε, Λεωνίδι, οἱ μετὰ σείο | τῆδ' ἴθανον: *Menex.* 247 D. With the thought of this passage, cp. Sir T. Browne *Hydriot.* c. 5 "There is no antidote against the opium of time....But the iniquity of oblivion blindly scattereth her poppy, and deals with the memory of men without distinction to merit of perpetuity....In vain do individuals

**Ε** νους ὄσι, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀθανάτου ἐρώσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες, ἔφη, κατὰ τὰ σώματα ὄντες πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον τρέπονται καὶ ταύτη ἐρωτικοί εἰσι, διὰ παιδογονίας ἀθανασίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ὡς οἴονται, αὐτοῖς “εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον  
**209** πάντα ποριζόμενοι”· οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν—εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, οἱ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κυοῦσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἃ ψυχῇ προσήκει καὶ κῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν· τί οὖν προσήκει; φρόνησιν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· ὧν δὴ εἰσι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πάντες γεννη-

**208 Ε** κατὰ τὰ O.-P., Paris 1812, vulg. Sz.: κατὰ BTW, Bt. οἶόν τε Vind. 21

**209 Α** ἢ (αἱ) ἐν Naber κυησεται O.-P.: κυησαίτε O.-P. corr.: κνεῖσαι Bdhm. τεκεῖν Hug Sz., O.-P.: κνεῖν libri: τίκειν Jn.: γεννᾶν cj. Teuffel

hope for immortality, or any patent from oblivion, in preservations below the moon.” Also Soph. *Philoct.* 1422 ἐκ τῶν πόνων τῶνδ’ εὐκλεᾶ θέσθαι βίον.

**208 Ε** οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες. Here first the two kinds of pregnancy, bodily and mental,—mentioned together in 206 B, c—*are* definitely separated.

πρὸς τὰς γ. μ. τρέπονται. Cp. 181 c, 191 E.

ἀθανασίαν κτλ. Hug points out that by a few slight alterations this can be turned into an elegiac couplet:—

ἀθάνατον μνήμην κεύδαιμονίαν σφίσις αὐτοῖς  
 εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον πάντα ποριζόμενοι.

Hommel had already printed *eis...χρόνον* as a half-verse.

**209 Α** οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν. Sc. ἐγκύμονες ὄντες: In this anacoluthic period Rettig sees a parody of Phaedrus’s style with its “langathmigen, anakoluthischen und regellosen Perioden.”

καὶ κῆσαι καὶ τεκεῖν. Hug’s conjecture, τεκεῖν for κνεῖν, is fortunate in finding confirmation in the Papyrus. If κνεῖν be read, what is the point of the distinction of tenses? Schleierm. renders by “erzeugen und erzeugen zu wollen”; Schulthees, “zeugen und empfangen”; Rettig explains that “κνεῖν geht auf den dauernden, κῆσαι auf den vollendeten Process”; Stallb. “et concepiisse (quae est actio semel...perfecta) et conceptum tenere.” But there is certainly not much point here in making any such fine-spun distinction, unless it be to imply that Diotima is playing the part of a σοφιστής!

φρόνησιν...ἀρετὴν. “Moral wisdom and virtue in general”: the phrase is an echo of that in 184 D. For φρόνησις, cp. *Rep.* 427 E (with Adam’s note); *Meno* 88 B (with Thompson’s note).

οἱ ποιηταί. That the poets were ethical teachers and the stage a pulpit—just as Homer was the Greek Bible—was an axiom in the Hellenic world. See the appeal to the authority of poets in the *Protagoras* (and Adam’s note on 338 E); *Ar. Ran.* 1009 (Eurip. loquitur) βελτίους τε ποιούμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν: *Lyris* 214 Δ οὗτοι γὰρ (sc. οἱ ποιηταί) ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες. The fact that most kinds of poetry were produced in connexion with, and under the sanction of, religion, had no doubt something to do with this estimate of it. See further Adam *R. T. G.* pp. 9 ff.

τορες καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὐρετικοὶ εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ  
 μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἢ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων  
 τε καὶ οἰκίσεων διακοσμήσεις, ἧ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ  
 δικαιοσύνη· τούτων αὐ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκύμων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν **B**  
θείος ὦν καὶ ἠκούσης τῆς ἡλικίας τίκτειν τε καὶ γεννᾷν ἤδη ἐπι-  
 θυμῆ, ζητεῖ δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ οὗτος περιῶν τὸ καλὸν ἐν ᾧ ἂν γεννή-  
 σειεν· ἐν τῷ γὰρ αἰσχυρῷ οὐδέποτε γεννήσει. τὰ τε οὖν σώματα τὰ  
 καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχυρὰ ἀσπάζεται ἄτε κυῶν, καὶ ἂν ἐντύχη  
 ψυχῇ καλῇ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, πάνυ δὴ ἀσπάζεται τὸ ξυναμ-

209 A τὰς libri, O.-P.: τὰ Sommer Bt. διακοσμήσεις Vind. 21, vulg.  
 Bast Heindorf J.-U. Sz.: διακόσμησις libri, O.-P., Sommer Bt. B αὐ B  
 O.-P., J.-U. Sz.: δ' αὐ TW, Bt. ψυχὴν, (τὴν φύσιν) Heusde θείος libri,  
 O.-P., Sz.: ἡθεος Parmentier Bt.: θείος ὦν del. Jn. ἐπιθυμῆ Steph. J.-U.  
 Sz.: ἐπιθυμῆ O.-P.: ἐπιθυμεί libri, Bt. δὴ BT O.-P.: δὲ W περιῶν T  
 O.-P.: περὶ ὧν B ἐν ᾧ δὴ γεννήση Bdhm. ἢ τὰ αἰσχυρὰ del. Bdhm.  
 ἄτε: ὁ γε Usener

δημιουργῶν...εὐρετικοί. An allusion to 197 A δημιουργίαν...ἀνεῦρεν.  
 μεγίστη...τῆς φρονήσεως. Cp. *Crat.* 391 B ὀρθοτάτη τῆς σκέψεως: *Rep.* 416 B;  
*Thuc.* I. 2 τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη: see *Madv. Gr. S.* § 50 a, R. 3.

σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη. Cp. *Phaedo* 82 A οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολι-  
 τικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ  
 ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγυῖαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ: *Meno* 73 A. For  
 these virtues in the *Republic*, see Adam on 432 A, 434 C. Here they combine  
 to form a description of "ordinary civil virtue."

209 B τούτων αὐ κτλ. Here the main statement is resumed. With  
 Stephens (followed by Ast, Rückert and Hug) I read ἐπιθυμῆ, whereas  
 Burnet prints ἐπιθυμεί. Ζητεῖ δὴ κτλ., with commas after ψυχὴν and ἡλικίας.  
 Stallb. takes καί as intensive rather than connective, and renders θείος ὦν  
 "quippe divinus." Burnet adopts Parmentier's ἡθεος, but there seems little  
 point in emphasizing the celibacy of the youth. If alteration be required,  
 the best would be ἔνθεος, for which cp. 179 A, 180 B. But in *Meno* 99 C ff.  
 θείος, in much the same sense as ἔνθεος, is applied to the very classes here  
 mentioned—ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμοφούς καὶ  
 μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς...φαίμεν ἂν θείους τε  
 εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν κτλ. (see Thompson *ad loc.*): hence the word may well  
 be sound here also. For τῆς ἡλικίας (and θείος) cp. 206 C.

ζητεῖ...περιῶν. Cp. *Prot.* 348 D περιῶν ζητεῖ ὅψ ἐπιδειξήται: *Rep.* 620 C:  
*Apol.* 23 B. περιῶναι occurs also in 193 A, 219 E.

ἐν τῷ γὰρ αἰσχυρῷ. A repetition of 206 C: cp. *Rep.* 402 D, *Phaedr.* 253 A ff.  
 καὶ ἄν...εὐφυσί. Notice the iambic rhythm. For the sense of γενναίος,  
 "well-bred" (of a dog, *Rep.* 375 A), cp. (Eurip. *ap.*) *Gorg.* 485 E. For εὐφυσίς  
 also cp. (Eurip. *ap.*) *Gorg.* 484 C ff.; *Rep.* 409 E. Cp. for the sense Plotin. *de*  
*pulcr.* 309 (Cr.); *Rep.* 620 B; Cic. *Lael.* 14; and esp. *Phaedr.* 276 E.

τὸ ξυναμφότερον. Cp. *I. Alc.* 130 A ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ ξυναμφότερον.

φότερον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ  
**C** ἀρετῆς καὶ [περὶ] οἶον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἂ ἐπιτη-  
 δεύειν, καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ παιδεύειν. ἀπτόμενος γάρ, οἶμαι, τοῦ καλοῦ  
 καὶ ὁμιλῶν αὐτῷ, ἂ πάλαι ἐκείε τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ, καὶ παρὼν καὶ  
 ἀπὼν μεμνημένος, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν συνεκτρέφει κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου,  
 ὥστε πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν [τῆς τῶν παίδων] πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι ἴσχυοσι καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιωτέραν, ἅτε καλλίωνων καὶ  
 ἀθανατωτέρων παίδων κεκοινωνηκότες. καὶ πᾶς ἂν δέξαιτο ἑαυτῷ  
**D** τοιοῦτους παῖδας μᾶλλον γεγενῆσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνοισι, καὶ εἰς  
 "Ὅμηρον ἀποβλέψας καὶ <εἰς> Ἑσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς  
 τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ζηλῶν οἷα ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν, ἂ ἐκείνοις

**209 C** *περὶ* secl. Steph. Mdv. Sz. Bt.: *περὶ* τοῦ Coisl.: *περὶ* οἶου Sommer  
 ἀπὼν καὶ παρὼν T καὶ (ante τὸ) om. Vind. 21, Bast τῆς...παίδων  
 seclusi τῶν παίδων: ἄλλων παίδων Hug<sup>1</sup>: θνητῶν παίδων Schirlitz: τῶν  
 πολλῶν Rohde: τῶν παιδογόνων Bast: fort. τῶν (γῆινων) παίδων καλλίων  
 ὦν B παίδων secl. Creuzer J.-U. **D** *εἰς* Hesiodon O.-P.: Ἑσίοδον libri,  
 edd. ζητῶν ὅσα Proclus: ζηλοῖη οἷα Ast καταλελοίπασιν Method. Bdhm.

*εὐπορεῖ λόγων.* Cp. 223 A; *Τὴν*. 26 D ἵνα εὐποροῖεν λόγων μετ' ἐμοῦ.

**209 C** καὶ [περὶ] οἶον κτλ. *περὶ* is retained by Hommel and Stallb. who renders "quale sit in quo tractando versari debeat is qui boni viri nomen et dignitatem obtinere velit," taking οἶον as neut., and by Rettig who regards the "redundance and tautology" of the words as due to the "sophistical character" of the passage.

τοῦ καλοῦ. This is masc., not neuter, as the context shows.

καὶ παρὼν καὶ ἀπὼν. A rhetorical formula; cp. Soph. *Antig.* 1109 οἱ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἀπόντες: *ιδ.* *El.* 305: *Crat.* 420 A, *Laws* 635 A. As Hommel observes, μεμνημένος (sc. αὐτοῦ) can in strictness apply only to ἀπὼν.

τὸ γεννηθὲν κτλ. Cp. 207 B, *Phaedr.* 276 E.

τῆς τῶν παίδων. Hug prints τῶν × × × παίδων with the note (after Vermehren) "es scheint ein Epitheton wie φύσει ο. ähnl. ausgefallen zu sein." Stallb. explains ἡ κοινωμία τῶν παίδων to mean "conjunctio ex liberorum procreatione oriunda." The simplest remedy is to bracket the words τῆς τῶν παίδων (see *crit. n.*).

|| ἀθανατωτέρων. For this Hibernian comparative cp. *Phaedo* 99 c.

**209 D** ζηλῶν οἷα κτλ. *I.e.* ζηλῶν αὐτοὺς ὅτι τριαῖτα κτλ., "With envy for the noble offspring they leave." For οἶος = ὅτι τοιοῦτος, cp. Xen. *Cyr.* vii. 3. 13 (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 198 R. 3). Rückert punctuates after Ἑσίοδον, Hommel after ἀποβλέψας, and it is evident from Rettig's note,—"Homer kann man nur bewundern, mit andern Dichtern ist es eher möglich zu wetteifern,"—that he too mistakes the construction: we must supply αὐτοὺς (as Stallb.) with ζηλῶν and construe all the accusatives as depending on εἰς: cp. *I. Alc.* 120 A, 122 B, c. This passage is quoted by Proclus *ad Pl. Rep.* p. 393.

ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην παρέχεται αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἔφη, οἴους Λυκούργος παῖδας κατελίπετο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι σωτήρας τῆς Λακεδαίμονος καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. τίμιος δὲ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ Σόλων διὰ τὴν τῶν νόμων γέννησιν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐν Ἑλληνισι καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις, **E** πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνίμενοι ἔργα, γεννήσαντες παντοίαν ἀρετὴν ὦν καὶ ἱερὰ πολλὰ ἤδη γέγονε διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους παῖδας, διὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους οὐδενός πω.

**XXVIII.** Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἄν

**209 D** κατελίπετο b O.-P, J.-U. Sz. Bt. : κατελίπεν...τὸ B: κατελείπετο T: κατέλιπε τοῖς vulg.: κατέλιπεν αὐτοῦ Rettig ὑμῖν TΨ vulg.: ἡμῖν B O.-P. (probab.) (ο) Σολων O.-P. **E** ἐν Ἑλληνισι: Ἑλληνισι O.-P. ἐν βαρβάροις: βαρβάροις Clement πολλὰ...ἔργα secl. Hartmann καλὰ: αλλα O.-P. (καὶ) γεννήσαντες O.-P. (οὐδὲν) οὐδενός πω Hirschig

ἀθάνατον κλέος καὶ μνήμην. Cp. 208 D (note).

αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. Rettig says "sc. ἀθάνατα"; but the words imply κλέος as well as ἀθανασία.

εἰ δὲ βούλει. See on 177 B. This is a brachylogy for εἰ δὲ βούλει, ζηλῶν Λυκούργον οἴους παῖδας κτλ.

παῖδας κατελίπετο. For the middle, cp. *Laws* 721 c, *Rep.* 599 c.

σωτήρας τῆς Δ. "Dadurch, dass sie den revolutionären Bewegungen ein Ende machten" (Rettig). Agathon had already applied *σωτήρ* to Eros (197 E). For Plato's philo-Laconism, see Zeller's *Plato* (E. T.) p. 484. For the mythical lawgiver "Lycurgus" (vulgarly dated at 885 B.C.), see Bury *H. Gr.* p. 135. The statement that his laws were the salvation "practically" of Hellas may be taken to refer to the part played by the Spartans during the Persian invasions, cp. Pind. *Pyth.* i. 77 ff. See also the parallel passage in Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 38—9.

τίμιος δὲ κτλ. For this emphatic position of the adj., cp. *Laws* 730 D τίμιος μὲν δὲ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν.

**209 E** ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ. An echo of 182 B: cp. *Prot.* 326 D. This passage is alluded to by Clem. Al. *Strom.* i. p. 130. 38 ἐν τε τῷ συμποσίῳ ἐπαυῶν Πλάτων τοὺς βαρβάρους κτλ.

πολλὰ...ἔργα. Another rhetorical "tag," as is shown by the parallel in *Menex.* 239 A πολλὰ...καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφώνησαντο εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους: cp. Phaedrus's expressions in 179 B, c.

παντοίαν ἀρετὴν. Cp. *Critias* 112 E κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν παντοίαν ἀρετὴν: Eur. *Med.* 845 (ἔρωτας) παντοίας ἀρετᾶς ξυνέργους.

ἱερὰ πολλὰ. For the shrine of Lycurgus, see Hdt. i. 66, Plut. *Lyc.* 31. The language echoes Aristophanes' μέγιστ' ἂν αὐτοῦ ἱερὰ κατασκευάσαι (189 c); and it is cited by Clem. Al. *Strom.* i. p. 300 P.

Ταῦτα...κἄν σὺ μνησθήης. Here Diotima passes on to the final section of her discourse on erotics (see 210 D n.). Hug and P. Crain (following C. F. Hermann and Schwegler) suppose that κἄν σὺ μ. indicates that what follows is something beyond the ken of the *historical* Socrates, whose view



210 *σὺ μνηθείης· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, εἴαν τις ὀρθῶς μετή, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη. ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω· πειρῶ δὲ <καὶ σὺ> ἔπεισθαι,*

210 A *ἂν post οἶδ' transp. Naber* *εἶπην O.-P.* *καὶ σὺ ἐπεισθαι O.-P.:*  
*ἔπεισθαι libri, edd.*

they regard as correctly represented in Xen. *Symp.* viii. 97 ff. But although we may admit (with Thompson, *Meno* p. 158) that "we often find Plato making his ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held," we are not hereby justified in assuming such criticism on every possible occasion. And, in the case before us, another and more probable explanation of the words lies to hand. Socrates throughout—with his usual irony—depicts himself as a mere tiro in the hands of the Mantinean mistress; but he is still, in spite of his mock-modesty, the ideal philosopher of Alcibiades' encomium. As it was a part of his irony that he had already (201 E) put himself on the level of Agathon and the rest of the unphilosophic, so the contemptuous *κἂν σὺ* here serves to keep up the same ironical fiction,—i.e. it applies neither to the ideal nor to the real (historical) Socrates, but to the hypothetical Socrates—the disguise assumed by the ideal Socrates when he played the part of pupil (cp. Rettig's note, and F. Horn *Platonstud.* p. 248). The attitude of Socr. may be illustrated by the words of S. Paul (1 *Cor.* iv. 6) *ταῦτα δέ, ἀδελφοί, μετεσχημάτισα εἰς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ Ἀπολλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἵνα ἐν ὑμῖν μάθητε κτλ.* For *μνηθείης*, see next note.

210 A *τὰ δὲ...ἐποπτικά.* Cp. *Phaedr.* 260 C *εὐδαιμόνα φάσματα μνούμενοι τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες:* *ib.* 249 C *τελείου ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος.* On the former passage Thompson comments, "*μούμενοι* and *ἐποπτεύοντες* are not to be distinguished here, except in so far as the latter word defines the sense of the former. Properly speaking *μύσις* is the generic term for the entire process, including the *ἐποπτεία*, or *state of the epopi or adept*, who after due previous lustrations and the like is admitted into the adytum to behold the *αὐτοπτικά ἀγάλματα* (Iambl. *Myst.* ii. 10. 53)": "the distinction between the two words (*μύσις* and *ἐποπτεία*), as if they implied, the one an earlier, the other a more advanced stage of imitation, was a later refinement." According to Theo Smyrnaeus (*Math.* p. 18) there were five grades of initiation, viz. *καθαρός, ἡ τῆς τελετῆς παράδοσις, ἐποπτεία, ἀνάθεσις καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπιθεσις, ἡ θεοφιλῆς καὶ θεοῖς συνδιατος εὐδαιμονία.* For the language and rites used in the mysteries, see also Plut. *de Is.* c. 78; *id.* *Demetr.* 26; Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. p. 689; Rohde *Psyche* ii. 284; and the designs from a cinerary urn reproduced in Harrison, *Proleg.* p. 547.

*ἂν ἕνεκα.* "The final cause": cp. 210 E, *Charm.* 165 A.

*ταῦτα.* Repeating *ταῦτα...τὰ ἑρωτικά:* see the recapitulation in 211 C.

*οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη.* *Sc. μνηθῆναι:* this, as Thompson observes, shows that *μύσις* includes *ἐποπτεία.* Notice the emphasis laid, here at the start and throughout, on educational *method*, τὸ ὀρθῶς μετρίνα.

*προθυμίας...ἀπολείψω.* Cp. *Rep.* 533 A τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολείποι.

*πειρῶ δὲ (καὶ σὺ) ἔπεισθαι.* I have added *καὶ σὺ* from the Papyrus; it serves

ἀν οἶός τε ἦς. δεῖ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄρχεσθαι μὲν νέον ὄντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἠγῆται ὁ ἠγούμενος, ἐνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλοῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι, ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὄφρου σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι, B καὶ εἰ δεῖ διώκειν τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν, πολλή ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἔν τε καὶ ταυτὸν ἠγείσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐννοήσαντα καταστήναι πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι καταφρονήσαντα καὶ σμικρὸν

210 A ἄν: εαν O.-P. αὐτὸν TW O.-P.: αὐτῶν B, Sz. Bt.: αὐ του Verm. σώματος necl. (Rückert) Voeg. J.-U. Hug ἔπειτα δὲ libri, O.-P.: ἔπειτα καὶ Themist.: ἔπειτα Usener αὐτὸν: fort. αὐ B κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ BT O.-P.: κ. τῷ ἐπὶ W σώματι τῷ TW O.-P.: σ. τὸ B ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ B O.-P.: ἐτέρῳ T εἰ (δῆ) δεῖ cj. Jn.· τοῦτο δ' BW O.-P.: τούτῳ δ' T

to lay an appropriate stress on the personal effort required on the part of the disciple, the incapacity of whose "natural man" is so persistently emphasized.

δεῖ γάρ κτλ. The sentence runs on without a full stop till we reach the close of 210 D: Rettig sees in this straggling style a parody of the style of Pausanias. The passage following was a favourite with the neo-Platonists; see the reff. in Alcinous *ισαγ.* 5; Plut. *quaest. Plat.* 3. 2. 1002 E; Themist. *or.* 13, p. 168 c; Plotin. *Enn.* I. 6. 1, p. 50; Procl. *in Alcib. I.* p. 330.

ὁ ἠγούμενος. The educational "conductor" is represented as a μυσταγωγός. So we have ἀγαγεῖν 210 C, παιδαγωγῆσθαι 210 E, ἄγεσθαι 211 C.

ἐνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος. If we retain σώματος—and emphasis requires its retention,—it is difficult to justify the Bodleian αὐτῶν: and αὐτὸν, which has the support of the Papyrus, although rather otiose, is preferable to such substitutes as Hommel's αὐ τῶν (σωμάτων) or Vermehren's αὐ του, since αὐ is hardly in place here. Voegelin's objection to αὐτὸν, endorsed by Rettig, that it should involve the repetition of δεῖ, does not strike one as fatal; and I follow Rückert and Stallb. in adopting it.

210 B τὸ ἐπὶ...σώματι. Cp. 186 A.

τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν. This has been interpreted in three ways: (1) "das in der Idee Schöne" (Schleierm.), "das Schöne der Gesamtgattung" (Schulthess); so too Zeller and F. Horn; (2) "quod in specie (opp. to 'summo genere') pulchrum est" (Stallb., after Wytttenbach), so too Hommel; (3) "das in der Gestalt Schöne" (Ruge), "pulcritudo quae in forma est atque sensibus percipitur" (Rückert). The last of these is undoubtedly right, and has the support also of Vermehren, Rettig and Hug; for εἶδος of physical "form" or "outward appearance," cp. 196 A, 215 B.

μὴ οὐχ...ἠγείσθαι. See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 817.

ἐννοήσαντα καταστήναι. See αὐτὸν δεῖ, resuming the oblique construction. τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο. "Idem est quod τοῦτο τὸ σφόδρα ἐρᾶν vel τὸν σφοδρόν τοῦτον ἐρωτά" (Stallb.). We have had a description of this σφοδρότης already, in 183 A ff.

ἡγησάμενον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικῆς ᾖν τὴν C ψυχὴν τις κἂν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοιούτους [καὶ ζητεῖν] οἴτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῆ αὐ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν καὶ τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ὅτι πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυγγενές ἐστιν, ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν σμικρὸν τι ἡγήσῃται εἶναι· μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ αὐ ἐπιστημῶν κάλλος, καὶ βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη D τὸ καλὸν μηκέτι τῷ παρ' ἐνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου

210 C κἂν Herm. Bdhm. Bt.: καὶ ἐὰν BT O.-P.: καὶ ἂν W: καὶ Ast Sz. καὶ ζητεῖν secl. Ast (fort. transp. post αὐτῷ): καὶ secl. Bdhm. Mdv. Sz. Bt. εἴ τις W ἀναγκασθεῖς Ast ἵνα...εἶναι secl. Hug: ἵνα del. Ast ἵνα ἴδῃ T: ἵνα εἶδη O.-P.: ἵν' αἰθεῖ B: fort. ἵνα διίδη αὐ (τὸ τῶν) Hirschig D τῷ Schleierm. Sz. Bt.: τὸ libri, O.-P. οἰκέτης: ὁ οἰκέτης Hommel παιδαρίου del. Ast

ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν κτλ. The uncontracted form καὶ ἐὰν is very rare in Plato, see Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 95. For ἄνθος, cp. 183 E.

210 C [καὶ ζητεῖν]. Ast rightly condemned these words as "ineptum glossema." To excise καὶ only (as Badham) is unsatisfactory, since as Hug justly observes τίκτειν ζητεῖν λόγους "ist unerträglich matt." Stallb. attempts to justify the words thus: "Diotima hoc dicit, talem amatorem non modo ipsum parere quasi et ex se procreare, sed etiam aliunde quaerere et investigare eiusmodi sermones, qui iuvenes reddant meliores"; so. too Rettig. But this is futile.

ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι. "In *Morals*" (Stewart): cp. *Laics* 793 D ὅσα νόμοις ἢ ἔθῃ τις ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλεῖ: *Rep.* 444 E: *Gorg.* 474 E.

ἵνα τὸ...εἶναι. This clause is subordinate to, rather than coordinate with, the preceding ἵνα clause (like the εἴως ἂν clause in D *infra*),—a juxtaposition which sounds awkward. Hence it is tempting either to excise this clause with Hug, or with Ast to read ἀναγκασθεῖς for ἀναγκασθῆ, and delete the second ἵνα. Against Hug's method it may be urged that the words are wanted to correspond to ἐνός...σμικρὸν ἡγησάμενον in 210 B above, and to emphasize the "littleness" of corporeal beauty even when taken in the mass. For this belittling of things of the earth, cp. *Theaet.* 173 E ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησάμενη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα...φέρεται κτλ. Observe how πᾶν...ξυγγενές here balances (πᾶν) κάλλος...ἀδελφόν in 210 B.

ἀγαγεῖν. The construction is still dependent upon δεῖ, but the subject to be supplied (*viz.* τὸν ἡγούμενον) is changed.

210 D μηκέτι τῷ παρ' ἐνί κτλ. τῷ, *sc.* καλῷ, is governed by δουλεύων, and the phrase contains a clear reference to the language of Pausanias in 183 A ff. ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, "like a lackey," is of course contemptuous, as in *Theaet.* 172 D κινδυνεύουσιν...ὡς οἰκείται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. For ἀγαπῶν, "contented with," cp. *Menex.* 240 C. If we retain the *ms.* τὸ παρ' ἐνί the construction is

κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, δουλεύων φαῦλος ἢ καὶ σμικρολόγος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένους τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτη καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεῖς καὶ αὐξηθεῖς κατίδῃ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἣ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε. πειρῶ δέ μοι, ἔφη, τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν ὡς οἶόν τε **E** μάλιστα.

**210 D** κάλλος del. Bdhm. ἢ ἀνθρώπου del. Schirlitz: fort. ἄνου ἑνός: τινος O.-P.<sup>1</sup> δουλεύων del. Bast τίκτη Coisl. corr.: τίκτει BT καὶ διανοήματα del. Bdhm.: ante τίκτη transp. Hommel ἀφθονα Ast ῥωσθεῖς W

awkward, as Stallb.<sup>2</sup> admits—"quod olim accusativum defendendum suscepimus, videtur nunc interpretatio loci quam proposuimus, quamvis Rückerto et Hommelio probata, nimis contorta nec satis simplex esse." I am inclined to suspect the phrase ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινός. Schirlitz proposed to excise ἢ ἀνθρώπου: I suggest παιδαρίου κάλλος [ἢ] ἄνου τινός, "of some witless urchin," and suppose a reference to what Pausanias said in 181 B ἐρώσι...ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων: 181 D οὐ γὰρ ἐρώσι παίδων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν ἤδη ἄρχονται νοῦν ἴσχειν (cp. next n.).

φαῦλος...σμικρολόγος. Cp. 181 B, where those who follow Aphrodite Pan-demos (loving women and boys) are described as οἱ φαῦλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος. πέλαγος of itself connotes vastness; cp. *Rep.* 453 D εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον (ἂν τις ἐμπέσῃ): *Prot.* 338 A φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων. The phrase is alluded to in Clem. Al. *protrept.* 69 A; Plut. *quaest. Plat.* 1001 E; Themist. *or.* XIII. p. 177 C.

θεωρῶν. This should be taken closely (supplying αὐτό) with what precedes, not with πολλοὺς...λόγους (as Ast's Dict. *s.v.* implies). The parable suggests that the spectator, having reached the hill-top, turns himself about and gazes, wonder-struck, at the mighty ocean of beauty which lies spread before him, till the spectacle quickens his soul and moves it to deliver itself of many a deep-lying thought.

καλοῦς...μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. Cp. *Menez.* 247 B: *ib.* 234 C: *Rep.* 503 C νεανικοί τε καὶ μ. τὰς διανοίας: *ib.* 486 A, 496 A γεννᾶν διανοήματα τε καὶ δόξας. Cp. for the sense Plotin. *de pulcr.* 8 C (Cr.).

ἀφθόνῳ. ἀφθονος is used alike of fruits (*Polit.* 272 A) and of soils (*Soph.* 222 A), thus meaning both "abundant" and "bountiful"—"unstinted" and "unstinting."

ῥωσθεῖς. Cp. *Phaedr.* 238 c; 176 B *supra*.

ἐπιστήμην μίαν. This unitary science—ἐπιστήμη in the strict Platonic sense, called also (211 c) μάθημα—is *dialectic*: cp. *Phaedr.* 247 B τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄ ἐστιν ὄν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν. See parallels in Plotin. *de pulcr.* 2 A (Cr.); Procl. *in I. Alc.* p. 246.

**210 E** πειρῶ δέ μοι κτλ. Here again, as at 210 A (πειρῶ δέ ἔπεισθαι κτλ.), a climax in the exposition is marked.

XXIX. Ὅς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά παιδαγωγηθῆ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὃ Σώκράτες, οὐ δὴ ἔνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν

211 πάντες πόνοι ἴσαν, πρῶτον μὲν αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δὲ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μὲν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν

211 A τοδε δε Ο.-Ρ.

ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. "In correct and orderly succession"; see 211 B *ad fin.* τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς...λέναι κτλ., and 210 A where the right order of procedure (πρῶτον...ἔπειτα, etc.) is specially emphasized.

πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰών. "πρὸς τέλος λέναι dicebantur ii, qui superatis gradibus tandem ad spectanda arcana admittebantur" (Hommel). Cp. the use of τέλεια in 210 A, τέλειον 204 C, τέλος 205 A.

ἐξαίφνης. "On a sudden": this suggests the final stage in the mystery-rites, when out of darkness there blazed forth suddenly the mystical φέγγος, and ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρῇ the φάσματα (*Phaedr.* 250 C) or ἱερὰ μυστικά—consisting probably of images of Demeter, Iacchus and Persephone, and other sacred emblems—were displayed to the awe-struck worshipper (μακαρία ὄψις τε καὶ θία). Cp. Plotin. *Enn.* 43. 17 ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ κτλ.; Plato *Ep.* vii. 341 C ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον (sc. the highest μάθημα). See further Rohde, *Psyche* II. 284.

κατόψεται. Cp. 210 D *supra*, and *Phaedr.* 247 D (καθορᾶ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ.), which suggest that καθορᾶν was a vox propria for viewing ritual displays.

θαυμαστὸν...καλόν. Similarly *Phaedr.* 250 B κάλλος δὲ τότε ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν. For θαυμαστὸν cp. 219 B: it often connotes the supernatural, e.g. *Rep.* 398 A προεκκυοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θ. καὶ ἠδύν.

οὐ δὴ ἔνεκεν κτλ. "The goal to which all our efforts have been directed": cp. 210 A; *Phaedr.* 248 B οὐ δ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ κτλ. See the parallel in Plotin. *de pulcr.* 42 C, D (Cr.).

211 A πρῶτον μὲν...ἔπειτα...οὐδ' αὖ κτλ. The Ideal object is distinguished by three leading characteristics, viz. (1) eternity and immutability; (2) absoluteness, or freedom from relativity; (3) self-existence. Compare the accounts of Ideal being given in *Phaedo* 78 C ff., *Phaedr.* 247 C ff., *Cratyl.* 386 D, 439 C ff., *Rep.* 476 A, 479 A ff., *Soph.* 249 B ff., *Phileb.* 15 B, 58 A, *Tim.* 51 D ff. The description has, necessarily, to be conveyed by means of negative propositions, i.e. by way of contrast with phenomenal objects. See also the parallels in Plotin. *Enn.* v. viii. 546 C, vi. vii. 727 C.

τῇ μὲν...τῇ δὲ. "In part...in part": so *Theaet.* 158 E, *Polit.* 274 E, *Laws* 635 D.

πρὸς μὲν τὸ...τὸ. This denotes varying "relation," as in the Aristotelian τὸ πρόστι.

[ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὄν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν]· οὐδ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλόν οἶον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄν σῶμα μετέχει, οὐδὲ τις λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ που ὄν ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινί, οἶον ἐν ζῳῷ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ B αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἶον γυμνομένων τε τῶν

211 A ὡς...αἰσχρόν secl. Voeg. J.-U. Hug Sz. Bt. ὄν om. W αὖ BT O.-P.: αὐτὸ W αὐτῷ BT O.-P.: αὐτὸ W οὐδὲν ὄν libri, edd.: οὐδε ἐν O.-P. B μετ' αὐτου O.-P.: del. Naber τρόπον τινὰ B O.-P.: τινα τρόπον TW

ὡς τισὶ...αἰσχρόν. Rettig defends this clause, quoting Wolf's note, "τισὶ (geht) auf alle vier (vorher genannten) Ideen, Theile, Zeit, Verhältniss, Ort." Teuffel argues that "ausser Platon selbst hätte nicht leicht Jemand einen Anlass gehalt einen Beisatz zu machen." None the less, I believe we have here another "ineptum glossema."

φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ. Sc. τῷ θεωμένῳ. φαντάζεσθαι often connotes illusive semblance; cp. *Phaedo* 110 D, *Rep.* 572 B.

οὐδὲ τις λόγος. It is difficult to be sure of the sense in which λόγος is used here. (1) It is most natural to refer it, and ἐπιστήμη following, to the λόγοι and ἐπιστήμαι of 210 c, and to render by "discourse," "argument" (with Gomperz, Stewart and Zeller). This rendering has in its favour the fact that this is the usual sense of λόγος (λόγοι) throughout this dialogue. (2) Or λόγος may mean "concept"; so Rettig, who comments: "Die Ideen sind nicht blosse Begriffe, sie sind vielmehr Existenzen; χωρισταί, wie Aristoteles sich ausdrückt, und Bedingungen des Seins und Werdens der Dinge der Sinnenwelt." Cp. *Phaedr.* 245 E, *Laws* 895 E, *Phaedo* 78 c, in which places (to quote Thompson) "λόγος is equivalent to ὄρος or ὀρισμός, of which οὐσία is the objective counterpart." This more technical sense is, perhaps, less probable in the present context; but, after all, the difference between the two renderings is not of vital importance. The essence of the statement, in either case, is that the Idea is not dependent upon either corporeal or mental realization, i.e. that it is not subjective, as a quality or product of body or mind, but an objective, self-conditioned entity. A third possible sense of λόγος is "ratio," or mathematical relation. Perhaps "formula" would best render the word here.

οὐδέ που ὄν. που is probably used in a local sense: cp. Arist. *Phys.* III. 4. 203<sup>a</sup> 7 Πλάτων δὲ ἔξω μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι σῶμα, οὐδὲ τὰς ἰδέας, διὰ τὸ μηδέ που εἶναι αὐτάς. But though the Ideas are extra-spatial, it is Platonic (as Aristotle implies, *de An.* III. 4. 429<sup>a</sup> 27) to say τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν.

211 B μονοειδὲς. Cp. *Phaedo* 78 D μ. ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό: *ib.* 80 B μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαιτύῳ: *Theaet.* 205 D: *Tim.* 59 B: *Rep.* 612 A εἶτε πολυειδὴς εἶτε μονοειδὴς (ἢ ἀληθὴς φύσις). Stewart renders "of one Form," but the full force may be rather "specifically unique," implying that it is the sole member of its class.

μετέχοντα. For the doctrine of "participation," see esp. *Phaedo* 100 c ff., *Parmen.* 130 B ff.

τοιοῦτον, οἶον. Equiv. to τοιούτον ὥστε (see Madv. *Gr. S.* § 166 c).

ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκείνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. ὅταν δὴ τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιών ἐκείνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἄπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ C τὰ ἐρωτικά ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὡσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἐνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκείνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ

211 B ἐκείνο B O.-P.: ἐκείνω TW μήτε τι BTW: μήτε Vind. 31 Paris 1642 O.-P. ὅταν δὴ B O.-P.: ὅταν δὲ δὴ TW C ἐπαναβαθμοῖς W: ἐπ' ἀναβαθμοῖς B: ἐπαναβασμοῖς T O.-P. σωμάτων (ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς ψυχάς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ψυχῶν) ἐπὶ Sydenham ἀπὸ τῶν (καλῶν) ἐπιτ. vulg. μαθήματα, καὶ libri O.-P., Bdhm. Usener Hug: μαθ., ὡς Sz. Bt.: μαθ., ἔστ' ἂν vulg.: μ., ἕως ἂν Stallb.: μ. ἕως Herm.: μ., ἵνα Sauppe: μ., ἵνα καὶ Winckelmann τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ del. Bdhm. τελευτήσῃ Usener Hug: τελευτήσῃ libri, Sz. Bt.: ante τελευτήσῃ lacunam statuit Voeg.

ἐκείνο. Sc. (αὐτὸ) τὸ καλόν. So frequently "ἐκείνο et ἐκείνα das Ueber-sinnliche significat, råde vero vel ταῦτα das Sinnliche" (Ast): cp. *Phaedr.* 250 A, *Phaedo* 74 B, etc.

μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. As to the ἀπάθεια of the Idea, see *Soph.* 248 A ff., 251 C ff., and my article on "The Later Platonism" in *Journal of Philol.* xxiii. pp. 189 ff.

ἐπανιών. Cp. *Rep.* 521 C τοῦ ὄντος οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι: ib. 532 B, C.

τοῦ τέλους. This combines the senses "goal" and "sacred symbol": cf. 210 A; *Soph. fr.* 753 N. ὡς τρεῖς δλβιοι | κείνοι βροτῶν, οἱ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη | μὲλωσ' ἐς Αἴδου.

τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ κτλ. Here commences a recapitulation of "the Ascent of Love" as described in 210 A—211 B; cp. *Rep.* vi., vii. for both language and thought.

211 C ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι. This refers to the παιδαγωγός or μυσταγωγός of 210 E, not (as Wolf thought) to the operation of a δαίμων.

ἐπαναβαθμοῖς. For the notion of a ladder of ascent cp. *Rep.* 510 B ff., 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ...οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμας ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν ἰῶν...οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίη κτλ. Cp. Tennyson's "the great world's altar-stairs"; the dream-ladder at Bethel; and the Titanic heaven-scaling of 190 B. Possibly a contrast is intended between the futile attempt of the Earth-born εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάβασιν ποιεῖν, and the successful efforts of the Heaven-born lover ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐπανιέναι. For later parallels, see Plotin. *de pulcr.* 60 B (Cr.); Clem. Al. *Strom.* v. p. 611 D.

καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κτλ. The reading and construction of this passage

ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, <ἵνα> καὶ γινῶ αὐτὸ  
τελευτῶν δ ἔστι καλόν. ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη D  
ἢ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπων, θεωμένῳ  
αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. δ ἂν ποτε ἴδῃς, οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἐσθῆτα  
καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς παῖδας τε καὶ νεανίσκους δόξει σοι εἶναι, οὐς νῦν  
ὀρώων ἐκπέπληξαι καὶ ἔτοιμος εἶ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, ὀρώωντες  
τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ξυνόντες αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς, εἴ πως οἶόν τ' ἦν, μήτε ἐσθίειν  
μήτ' πίνειν, ἀλλὰ θεᾶσθαι μόνον καὶ ξυνεῖναι. τί δῆτα, ἔφη,  
οἰόμεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρὸν, E  
ἄμικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων

211 O (ἵνα) καὶ scripsi: καὶ libri: ἵνα Usener: κᾶν Bdhm.: καὶ γινῶ...καλόν  
secl. Hug αὐτὸ: αὐτῷ O.-P. D μαντική vulg., Themistius ποτε ἴδῃς  
O.-P.: ποτ' εἴδῃς B: ποτ' ἴδῃς T: ποτ' ἴδῃς apographa, Sz. χρυσίον: χρυσον  
O.-P. αἰεὶ post μόνον καὶ transp. Ast θεᾶσθαι μόνον TW: θεάσασθαι  
μόνον B: μόνον θεασασθαι O.-P. E ἄμικτον post θνητῆς, ἀλλ' transp.  
Liebhold ἀλλὰ del. Ast Liebhold ἀναπλεω O.-P.

are uncertain. I follow Usener in changing τελευτήση to the infinitive and in  
inserting ἵνα after μάθημα (retaining, however, καὶ before γινῶ which he need-  
lessly deletes). The objection to Schanz's ὡς (for καὶ) ἀπὸ τῶν μ. is that ὡς,  
in the final use, occurs but once elsewhere in Plato, according to Weber's  
statistics (see Goodwin, *G. M. T.* p. 398), being very rare in all good prose-  
writers except Xenophon. Another possible expedient would be to read  
γινῶναι in place of γινῶ. ἔστ' ἂν is a non-Platonic form.

τελευτήσαι...τελευτῶν. The repetition serves to emphasize the finality of  
the Idea.

αὐτὸ...δ ἔστι. For this formula to express ideality, cp. *Phaedo* 74 B,  
75 B οἷς ἐπισφραγίζόμεθα τοῦτο δ ἔστι: *Theaet.* 146 E.

211 D ἐνταῦθα...εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι. "There above all places"; so *Phaedo*  
67 B ἐκεῖ...εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι: cp. 212 A εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ...ἐκείνῳ. For ἐνταῦθα  
c. gen. cp. *Theaet.* 177 C, *Rep.* 328 E. For βίος βιωτός, cp. *Apol.* 38 A, *Eur.*  
*Alc.* 802.

οὐ κατὰ χρυσίον κτλ. Similar is *Proverbs* viii. 11 "Wisdom is better than  
rubies; and all the things that may be desired are not to be compared to it."  
That Socr. held this view is shown in 216 D, E. For κατὰ c. acc., of comparison,  
cp. *Gorg.* 512 B, *Rep.* 466 B.

ξυνόντες...μήτε πίνειν. Cp. 191 A ff.; also Sappho 2, Archil. 103, Soph. *fr.*  
161 N. (ὀμμάτειος πάθος): *Rel. Med.* "There are wonders in true affection—  
when I am from him I am dead till I be with him," etc.

τί δῆτα...οἰόμεθα. Sc. γενέσθαι αὐτῷ, or the like.

211 E εἰλικρινές κτλ. Cp. *Phileb.* 52 D τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρινές: *Phaedo*  
68 A, *Rep.* 478 E.

μὴ ἀνάπλεων. Tim. ἀνάπλεως· ἀναπεπλησμένος· χρήται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμο-  
λυσμένου: cp. *Phaedo* 83 D and the use of the verb in *Phaedo* 67 A μηδὲ



καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν  
 δύναιτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν; ἄρ' οἶει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον γίγνεσθαι  
 212 ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο φ' δεῖ θεωμένου καὶ  
 ξυνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῆ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ  
 γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι φ' ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκειν οὐκ εἰδῶλα ἀρε-  
 τῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδῶλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς  
 ἐφαπτομένῳ· τέκοντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει

211 E θνητῆς del. Bdhm. ἀλλ'...κατιδεῖν del. Bdhm. ἔφη om. T  
 212 A φ' δεῖ Ast: δ δεῖ B: ὠδι b: ὁ δεῖ T: δῆ Schleierm.: αἰῖ Rohde Sz.  
 ἐφαπτομένῳ del. Voeg.

ἀναμιπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου (sc. τοῦ σώματος) φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ'  
 αὐτοῦ. Also *Rep.* 516 E, *Theaet.* 196 E. This passage is cited by Plotin. *Enn.*  
 I. vi. 7, p. 56.

χρωμάτων. For the Idea as ἀχρώματος οὐσία, see *Phaedr.* 247 c.

φλυαρίας θνητῆς. "Lumber of mortality": cp. *Phaedo* 66 c ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ  
 ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύλησιν ἡμᾶς  
 πολλῆς (sc. τὸ σῶμα); *Gorg.* 490 c; *Rep.* 581 D.

φαῦλον βίον. For the sense, cp. *Soph. fr.* 753 N., *Eur. fr.* 965 D. ὀλβιος ὄστις  
 ...ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως | κόσμον ἀγήρω κτλ.

212 A ἐκεῖνο φ' δεῖ. "With the proper organ," sc. τῷ νῷ: cp. *Phaedr.*  
 247 c ἢ γάρ...ἀναφῆς οὐσία, ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῃ θεατῇ νῷ κτλ.:  
*Phaedo* 65 E; *Rep.* 490 B αὐτοῦ δ' ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι φ' προσήκει  
 ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου: *ib.* 532 A πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ  
 νοήσει λάβῃ. For the organ of intellectual vision (τὸ ὄργανον φ' καταμανθάνει  
 ἕκαστος...οἷον εἰ ὄμμα), see *Rep.* 518 c: cp. *S. Matth.* vi. 22 ff. So Browne  
*Hydriot.* "Let intellectual tubes give thee a glance of things which visive  
 organs reach not": cp. Plotin. *de pulcr.* 60 B (Cr.).

οἷκ εἰδῶλα...ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ. Rettig writes, "εἰδῶλον ist hier nicht *Trugbild*,  
 sondern *Abbild*. εἰδῶλα ἀρετῆς sind...Tugenden zweiten Grades. Vgl. *Pol.* VII.  
 516 A, 534 C, X. 596 A, 598 B...Commentar zu unserer Stelle ist *Symp.* 206 D."  
 On the other hand, cp. *Theaet.* 150 A εἰδῶλα τίκειν, with 150 C πότερον εἰδῶλον  
 καὶ ψεύδος ἀπορίκει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. Evidently here  
 the point of εἰδῶλα lies in the inferiority rather than the similarity of the  
 objects when compared with ὄντως ὄντα. But it is scarcely probable that an  
 allusion is intended, as Zeller suggests, to the myth of Ixion "der seine  
 frevelnden Wünsche zu Here erhob, aber statt ihrer ein Wolkenbild umarmte  
 und mit ihm die Centauren erzeugte."

ἐφαπτομένῳ. Of mental action, cp. *Rep.* 490 B (quoted above). Voegelin  
 proposed to omit the second ἐφαπτομένῳ, but Plato never omits the participle  
 with δεῖ. For parallels, see *Phaedo* 67 B, *Rep.* 534 C; Plotin. *de pulcr.*  
 46 E (Cr.).

θρεψαμένῳ. Cp. 209 c.

θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;

Ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἔφη μὲν Διοτίμα, πέπεισμαι B δ' ἐγὼ πεπεισμένος δὲ πειρώμαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πείθειν ὅτι τοῦτου τοῦ κτήματος τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει συνεργὸν ἀμείνω Ἐρωτος οὐκ ἂν τις βράδιως λάβοι. διὸ δὴ ἐγωγὴ φημι χρῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα τὸν Ἐρωτα τιμᾶν καὶ αὐτὸς τιμῶ, <καὶ> τὰ ἐρωτικά καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρακελεύομαι, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ἐγκωμιάζω τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν τοῦ Ἐρωτος καθ' ὅσον οἶός τ'

212 A θεοφιλεῖ rec. t O.-P., vulg.: θεοφιλή BTW B δ om. O.-P. ἐγὼ χρῆναι φημι Method. (καὶ) τὰ ἐρωτικά καὶ Sz.: καὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά Usener: τὰ δ' ἐρωτικά καὶ Bdhm. ἀσκῶν Vahlen τον ερωτα post ἐγκωμιάζω add. O.-P.<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἀνδρείαν secl. Hug: τε καὶ χρείαν Bdhm.

θεοφιλεῖ. Cp. *Rep.* 612 E, *Phil.* 39 E.

εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ. Cp. *Phaedo* 58 E, 66 A; and 211 D *supra* (*ad inīt.*).

ἀθανάτῳ. Cp. *Soph. fr.* 864 N. οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τῶν σοφῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ νοῦς | θεία ἕνεστιν ἡμέρα θετραμμένος. A passage such as this might have evoked the remark in *Isocr. c. Soph.* 291 E μόνον οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπισχυροῦνται τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσιν.

212 B πέπεισμαι κτλ. "Beachte man das Spiel mit πέπεισμαι, πεπεισμένος, πειρώμαι, πείθειν" (*Rettig.*) Cp. 189 D ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι κτλ.

κτήματος. I.e. αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ. Cp. *Phil.* 19 C τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον: *ib.* 66 A.

συνεργόν. Cp. 180 E; and 218 D τοῦτου δὲ οἶμαί μου συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ.

διὸ δὴ...τιμᾶν. This echoes both *Phaedrus's* οὕτω δὴ ἐγωγὴ φημι Ἐρωτα θεῶν...τιμώτατον (180 B) and *Agathon's* φ' χρῆ ἐπεσθαι πάντ' ἄνδρα (187 E). Probably τιμᾶν here implies practical veneration; cp. the Homeric use of τιμή (*P* 251, λ 304, ω 30, etc.), and *Hes. Theog.* 142.

τὰ ἐρωτικά...ἀσκῶ. For Socrates' devotion to "erotics," see 177 D οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά, 198 D *ad inīt.* Probably ἀσκῶ (like τιμῶ) has a religious connotation here, "I am a devotee of"; cp. *Hezych. ἄσκεια· θρήσκεια, εὐσέβεια*: *Pind. Nem.* ix. 9 (with J. B. Bury's note). In spite of *Rettig's* objection that *Usener's* conj. (see *crit. n.*) "bewirkt eine Tautologie mit dem Folgenden καὶ νῦν...Ἐρωτος," it seems to me—as to *Hug*—an improvement, and (as modified by *Schanz*) I adopt it: a certain amount of tautology is inevitable, unless we resort to excision. For καὶ (intensive) διαφερόντως cp. *Phaedo* 59 A, *Rep.* 528 D. *Vahlen*, reading ἀσκῶν, construes καὶ αὐτὸς τ. and καὶ τ. ἄ. παρακ. as parallel: but in this case I should expect αὐτὸς (τῆ). Most edd. (*Bekk., Bt., etc.*) put commas after τιμᾶν and ἀσκῶ.

τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν. For the δύναμις of *Eros* cp. 188 D (*Eryx.*) πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἔχει...ὁ πᾶς Ἐρως: and for his ἀνδρεία, 179 A (*Phaedr.*), 196 C ff. (*Agathon*) εἰς γε ἀνδρείαν κτλ., 203 D (*Socr.*) ἀνδρείος ἂν (cp. 219 D ff.). The intention here may be (as I find suggested also by *Schirlitz*) that the long

C εἰμί. τούτου οὖν τὸν λόγον, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἔρωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὄπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τούτο ὀνόμαζε.

XXX. Εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Σωκράτους τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὅτι ἐμνήσθη αὐτοῦ λέγων ὁ Σωκράτης περὶ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ ἐξαίφνης τὴν αὔλειον θύραν κρουσμένην πολλὴν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κώμαστῶν, καὶ αὐλητρίδος D φωνὴν ἀκούειν. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, Παιδες, φάναι, οὐ σκέψασθε; καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἦ, καλεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, λέγετε ὅτι οὐ

212 C επιχειρεῖν λεγεῖν τι O.-P. αὔλειον rec. t O.-P., vulg.: αὔλιον BT κρουσμένην T (καὶ) ὡς Bdhm.: ὡς (ὑπὸ) Naber: καὶ Ast D κέψασθε O.-P. ἐὰν: ἀν O.-P.

course of παιδαγωγία described above requires ἀνδρεία in the learner who is to attain πρὸς τὸ τέλος: cp. *Meno* 81 D ἐὰν τις ἀνδρείος ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμη ζῆτων. Neither Badham's *χρεῖαν* (cp. 204 c) nor Hug's athetesis of ἀνδρείαν is probable.

212 C εἰ μὲν βούλει...εἰ δέ. Cp. *Euthyd.* 285 c (with Gifford's n.); Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 478.

ὅτι...χαίρεις ὀνομάζων. Cp. *Prot.* 358 A; *Phaedr.* 273 c; *Eur. fr.* 967 D. σοί... Ζεὺς εἴρ' Ἀΐδης | ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις.

τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινεῖν. Observe that Socr. is not so enthusiastically applauded as Agathon (πάντας ἀναθορυβῆσαι, 198 A): Socrates appealed rather τῷ ἔχοντι δεῖτα ἀκούειν.

λέγων...περὶ τοῦ λόγου. See 205 D ff. καὶ λέγεται...λόγος κτλ.

τὴν αὔλειον θύραν. For this "street-door," which generally opened inwards and gave admittance to a narrow passage (*θυρωρεῖον*), see Smith *D. A.* I. 861 b.

κρουσμένην. As the Porter in *Macbeth* would say, "there was old knocking at the door." For κρούειν cp. *Prot.* 310 A, 314 D; but the usual Attic word is κόπτειν (Μοεῖρις κόπτει τὴν θύραν ἔξωθεν... Ἀπτικῶς, κροτεῖ δὲ Ἑλληνικῶς: Schol. ad *Ar. Nuθ.* 132 ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν κρουόντων κόπτειν λέγουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔσωθεν ψοφεῖν), or πατάσσειν *Ar. Ran.* 38. Cp. Smith *D. A.* I. 990 b.

ὡς κώμαστῶν. "Ut comissatorum, h. e. quasi comissatores eum (*sc. strepitum*) excitarent" (Stallb.). Stallb. rightly removed the comma placed after παρασχεῖν in Bekker's text. κώμασταί, "flown with insolence and wine," would naturally be in a noisy mood. For Alcib. as a reveller, see *Plut. Alcib.* 193 D.

αὐλητρίδος φωνήν. Not "tibicinae vocem," as Wolf, but rather "sonum tibiae, quam illa inflavit," as Stallb. For φωνή thus (poetically) applied to instrumental music, cp. *Rep.* 397 A πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς: similarly Xen. *Symp.* VI. 3 ὅταν ὁ αὐλὸς φθέγγηται. For the αὐλητρίς as a regular accessory of κῶμοι, cp. 176 E, *Theaet.* 173 D: similar are the εἰσάριαι of *Rep.* 373 A, 573 D: cp. Catullus's "cenam non sine candida puella."

212 D καλεῖται. "Invite him in"; cp. 174 D, E, 175 B.

πίνομεν ἀλλὰ ἀναπαύομεθα ἤδη. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον Ἄλκιβιάδου τὴν φωνὴν ἀκούειν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ σφόδρα μεθύοντος καὶ μέγα βοῶντος, ἐρωτῶντος ὅπου Ἀγάθων καὶ κελεύοντος ἄγειν παρ' Ἀγάθωνα. ἄγειν οὖν αὐτὸν παρὰ σφᾶς τὴν τε αὐλητρίδα ὑπολαβοῦσαν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ἀκολουθῶν, καὶ ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐστεφανωμένον αὐτὸν κιττοῦ τέ τιμι στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἴων, E καὶ ταινίας ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνυ πολλάς, καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ἄνδρες, χαίρετε· μεθύοντα ἄνδρα πάνυ σφόδρα δέξεσθε συμπότην,

212 D ἀλλα πανομεθα O.-P. σφόδρα μ. καὶ del. Hartmann (καὶ) ἐρωτῶντος vulg. Hirschig: del. Hommel Hartmann κελεύοντος (ἔ) Hirschig Sz. E ταινίας T O.-P.: τενίας B (et mox) ἄνδρες Sz.: ὧ ἄνδρες Usener δέξεσθε B O.-P. corr.: δέξασθε T: δεξεσθαι O.-P.<sup>1</sup>

ἀναπαύομεθα ἤδη. "We are retiring already," rather than "the drinking is over" (Jowett): cp. *Proi.* 310 c ἐπειδὴ...δεδειπνηκότες ἤμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι κτλ. The statement here would be a social fiction (see 174 D n.).

σφόδρα μεθύοντος κτλ. Hommel and Hartman may be right in regarding ἐρωτῶντος as a gloss: for βοᾶν followed directly by a question the former quotes Asclep. *Epigr.* XIX. 5 τῇ δὲ τοσοῦτ' ἐβόησα βεβρεγμένος· ἄχρι τίνος, Ζεῦ;

ἄγειν οὖν. Evidently the subject of this infin. is not Agathon's παῖδες, as implied in Schleierm.'s transl., but Alcib.'s own attendants.

ὑπολαβοῦσαν. For ὑπολαβεῖν in this physical sense, "casurum sustentare," cp. *Rep.* 453 D (the only other ex. in Plato), and Hdt. I. 24 of the dolphin "supporting" by "getting under" Arion (L. and S.'s "take by the hand" is probably wrong).

ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας. "Intellige fores ipsius domus, in qua convivae erant, sive τὴν μέταυλον θύραν" (Stallb.).

212 E αὐτὸν...ἴων. "More Graecorum abundat αἰτόν propter oppositionem taeniarum quas gestabat in capite" (Wolf). Violets were specially in fashion at Athens, as implied in the epithet ἱσοτίφανοι (Pind. *fr.* 46). Other favourite materials for wreaths were myrtle and roses; cp. Stesich. 29 πολλὰ δὲ μύρσινα φύλλα | καὶ ῥοδίνους στεφάνους ἴων τε κορωνίδας οὐλας.

ταινίας. Cp. Thuc. IV. 121 δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσοῦ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν...ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἑταιρίῳ κτλ.: Pind. *Pyth.* IV. 240; Hor. *Carm.* IV. 11. 2. See Holden on Plut. *Timol.* p. 286: "ταινία, taenia, lemniscus, a sort of fillet or riband, given as a reward of honour, either by itself, or more commonly as a decoration to be fastened upon other prizes, such as crowns, wreaths, which were considered more honourable when accompanied with a *lemniscus* than when they were simply given by themselves. Originally it was made of linden-bark or of wool, but afterwards of gold and silver tinsel (Plin. *N. H.* 21. 4)."

μεθύοντα...πάνυ σφόδρα. The peculiar order—"a drunken fellow right royally (drunk)"—seems intended to indicate that the speaker is, or feigns to be, considerably mixed.

ἢ ἀπίωμεν ἀναδήσαντες μόνον Ἀγάθωνα, ἐφ' ᾧπερ ἤλθομεν; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, φάναι, χθές μὲν οὐχ οἴος τ' ἐγενομένη ἀφικέσθαι, νῦν δὲ ἤκω ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ ἔχων τὰς ταινίας, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς κεφαλῆς τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλῆν †ἐὰν εἶπω† οὕτως ἀναδήσω. ἄρα καταγελάσεσθέ μου ὡς μεθύοντος; ἐγὼ δέ, κἀν 213 ὑμεῖς γελάτε, ὅμως εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἀλλὰ μοι λέγετε αὐτόθεν, ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εἰσὶώ ἢ μή; συμπίεσθε ἢ οὐ;

Πάντας οὖν ἀναθορυβῆσαι καὶ κελεύειν εἰσιέναι καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτόν. καὶ τὸν ἵεναι ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περιαιρούμενον ἅμα τὰς ταινίας ὡς ἀναδήσοντα, ἐπίπροσθε τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχοντα οὐ κατιδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ καθίζεσθαι παρὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα ἐν μέσῳ Σωκράτους τε καὶ

212 E ᾧπερ B: ὅπερ TW O.-P. ἤλθομεν TW O.-P.: ἤχθομεν B ἐχθες O.-P. οἴος τ' T O.-P.: οἴος τ' B ἐπὶ...ταινίας del. Naber ἐὰν εἶπω οὕτως BT: κεφαλῆν add. W: post ἀναδήσω transp. cj. Steph., post ἄρα Ast: secl. Wolf J.-U. Bt.: ἀνειπὼν (vel ἐὰν ἀνειπῶ) οὕτως Winckelmann: ὧν εἶδον οὐτ. Usener: ἐὰν εἰσὶώ οὐτ. Bergk: ἐὰν ἔτι οἴος τ' ᾧ, οὐτ. temptabam καταγελάσασθαι W 213 A κελεύειν T: κελεύει B

χθῆς. I.e. at the main celebration of Agathon's victory, cp. 174 A.

ἐὰν εἶπω οὕτως. Since Wolf most edd. agree in obelizing these words as a (misplaced) gloss on the following clause. Hommel's conj. is ingenious, though far-fetched—ἐὰν εἶπον (addressed to his attendants) "dixi iam saepius, mitti me velle liberum a vestris manibus." I have proposed ἐὰν ἔτι οἴος τ' ᾧ, οὕτως ἀναδήσω, "if I am still capable of doing so," in jesting allusion to his own incapable condition: or perhaps the original had νεανίσκου. The scenic effectiveness of οὕτως, used δεικτικῶς, I should be loth to lose. Jowett's "as I may be allowed to call him" cannot be got out of the Greek.

213 A αὐτόθεν. *Statim, illico* (Stallb.); cp. Thuc. vi. 21. 2.

ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς. "On the terms stated" (cp. *Laws* 850 A), i.e. as a συμπότης. This is made clear by the following clause, συμπίεσθε ἢ οὐ; which repeats the condition already stated in 212 E (μεθύοντα...δέξεσθε συμπότην): Rückert, as Stallb. observes, is wrong in saying "at nullam (conditionem) dixit adhuc." That Alcibiades meant his "conditions" to be taken seriously is shown by the sequel, 213 E ff.

ἀναθορυβῆσαι. Cp. 198 A. For καλεῖν, see 212 D *ad inī*.

ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Including, we may suppose, the αὐλητρίαι, see 212 D.

ἐπίπροσθε...Σωκράτη. "Und da er sie sich vor die Augen hielt, bemerkte er Sokrates nicht" (Zeller). Ficinus, followed by Wolf and Schleierm., wrongly renders "Socratem, licet e conspectu adstantem, non vidit"; so too Hommel writes "ante oculos habuit et vidit Socratem, sed eum non agnovit." For ἐπίπροσθεν ἔχειν, cp. *Critias* 108 c.

παρὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. I.e. on the ἐσχάτη κλίνη: for the disposition of the company see 175 c.

ἐκείνου· παραχωρήσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκείνον κατείδεν. B παρακαθεζόμενον δὲ αὐτὸν ἀσπάζεσθαι τε τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καὶ ἀναδεῖν. εἰπεῖν οὖν τὸν Ἀγάθωνα Ἵπολύετε, παῖδες, Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται. Πάνυ γε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ἀλλὰ τίς ἡμῖν ὄδε τρίτος συμπότης; καὶ ἅμα μεταστρεφόμενον αὐτὸν ὄραν τὸν Σωκράτη, ἰδόντα δὲ ἀναπηδήσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν Ὡ Ἡράκλεις, τοῦτί τί ἦν; Σωκράτης οὗτος; ἐλλοχῶν αὐ με ἐνταῦθα κατέκτισσο, ὥσπερ εἰώθεις ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι ὅπου ἐγὼ ὦμην C ἦκιστά σε ἔσεσθαι. καὶ νῦν τί ἦκεις; καὶ τί αὐ ἐνταῦθα κατεκλίνης, καὶ οὐ παρὰ Ἀριστοφάνει οὐδὲ εἴ τις ἄλλος γελοῖος ἔστι

213 B κατείδεν scripsi: κατιδε[ν] O.-P.: καθίζει libri: ὡς...καθίζειν secl. Bdhm. Sz. Bt. ὄδε τρίτος W O.-P., Sz. Bt.: φῶδε τρίτος B, J.-U.: τρίτος ὄδε T ὄραν T O.-P.: ὄρα B τοῦτί τί ἦν TW O.-P.: τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν B Wmg. Σωκράτης del. Naber ἐνλοχῶν B O εἰώθεις vulg. καὶ οὐ Herm. Sz. Bt.: ὡς οὐ B: πῶς οὐ Hug οὐδὲ B: οὔτε T

213 B παραχωρήσαι. "Locum dedisse": cp. *Prot.* 336 B.

ὡς ἐκείνον κατείδεν. The adoption of this reading from the Papyrus obviates the necessity of bracketing the words (see *crit. n.*). Adan on *Rep.* 365 D writes "ὡς for ὥστε...is a curious archaism, tolerably frequent in Xenophon... but almost unexampled in Plato," citing as instances *Prot.* 330 E, *Phaedo* 108 E, *II. Alc.* 141 B, and our passage: Goodwin, however (*G. M. T.* § 609), recognizes only one instance of ὡς=ὥστε c. *inf.* in Plato (viz. *Rep. l.c.*). Certainly this is no fit context for the introduction of a "curious archaism."

Ἵπολύετε. "Calceos solvite": see Smith *D. A.* I. 393 b. The opposite process is ὑποδεῖν (174 A).

ἐκ τρίτων. Cp. *Gorg.* 500 A, *Tim.* 54 A; *Eur. Or.* 1178.

τοῦτί τί ἦν; "Mirandi formula, qua utuntur, quibus aliquid subito et praeter expectationem accidit" (Stallb.). The idiom is common in Aristophanes, e.g. *Vesp.* 183, 1509, *Ran.* 39, etc. The words Σ. οὗτος are, as Rettig observes, "nicht Ausruf, sondern an sich selbst gerichtete Frage des Alcibiades."

ἐλλοχῶν. Cp. *Prot.* 309 A ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄραν; *I. Alc.* 104 c. See also the description of Eros in 203 D (ἐπίβουλος κτλ.).

213 C ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι. Cp. 210 E; *Theaet.* 162 C εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει κτλ.

καὶ οὐ παρὰ κτλ. I adopt Hermann's καὶ for the ὡς of the mss. Stallb. explains ὡς by "quippe, nam, ut mox in verbis ὡς ἐμοί...γέγονεν": Hommel, putting a question-mark after βούλεται, renders "warum setzest du dich grade dahin, als zum Beispiel nicht neben A." etc.: but, if ὡς be kept, it would be best to mark a question after κατεκλίνης.

γελοῖος...βούλεται. With βούλεται, supply γελοῖος εἶναι. For Aristoph. as γελοῖος, cp. 189 B. The sense is, as Rettig puts it, "Was hast du γελοῖος und

τε καὶ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ διεμηχανήσω ὅπως παρὰ τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν ἔνδον κατακείσῃ; καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη, Ἄγάθων, φάναι, ὄρα εἴ μοι ἐπαμύνεις· ὡς ἐμοὶ ὁ τούτου ἔρωσ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ φαῦλον πρῶγμα γέγονεν. ἀπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου, ἀφ' οὗ τούτου D ἤρασθην, οὐκέτι ἔξεστί μοι οὔτε προσβλέψαι οὔτε διαλεχθῆναι καλῶ οὐδ' ἐνί, ἢ οὔτοσι ζηλοτυπῶν με καὶ φθονῶν θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ λοιδορεῖται τε καὶ τὰ χεῖρε μόγις ἀπέχεται. ὄρα οὖν μὴ τι καὶ νῦν ἐργάσῃται, ἀλλὰ διάλλαξον ἡμᾶς, ἢ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῇ βιάζεσθαι, ἐπάμυνε, ὡς ἐγὼ τὴν τούτου μανίαν τε καὶ φιλεραστίαν πᾶν ὀρρωδῶ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔστι, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ διαλλαγῇ. ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν εἰσαυθίς σε τιμωρή-

213 C βούλεται (εἶναι) Bdhm. διεμηχανήσω: τι εμηχανήσω O.-P. (ὦ) Ἄγάθων vulg. Jn. ἐπαμύνεις libri, Bt.: ἐπαμυνεῖς Steph. J.-U. Sz. οὐ T: οὐ B D οὔτοσι xxx T: οὔτοσι πως Coisl. θαυμαστὰ B O.-P.: θαυμάσια TW ἐπάμυνε T: ἐπάμυνοι B

ύβριστής bei dem liebenswürdigen Tragiker zu thun, du gehörst zu dem Spottvogel Aristophanes": "birds of a feather should flock together." Rückert suggests that the antithesis γελοῖος (κ) κάλλιστος may imply a reflection on "Aristophanis forma."

διεμηχανήσω. For erotic scheming, cp. 203 D ff.

ἐπαμύνεις. "In animated language the present often refers to the future, [to express *likelihood, intention, or danger*]" (Goodwin, *G. M. T.* § 32).

213 D προσβλέψαι. This may have been the *vox propria* for a lover's glance, cp. Ar. *Plut.* 1014 (quoted below).

ἢ οὔτοσι. This (elliptical) use of ἢ, *alioquin*, "but that," is "regular with *δεῖ, προσήκει*, and the like, in the preceding clause" (Adam on *Prot.* 323 A).

ζηλοτυπῶν. This is a *σπ. εἶρ.* in Plato: cp. Ar. *Plut.* 1014 ff. *ὅτι προσέβλεψέν μέ τις, | ἐτυπτόμην διὰ τοῦθ' ὄλην τὴν ἡμέραν. | οὔτω σφόδρα ζηλότυπος ὁ νεανίσκος ἦν.*

θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται. Cp. *Laws* 686 c θ. *ἐργασάμενον*; *Theaet.* 161 a θ. *δρῶντες*; 182 E *supra* θ. *ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ*: similarly 218 A *ποιούσι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὄτιοῦν.*

τὰ χεῖρε. This and 214 D *infra* are the only *exx.* in Plato of *ἀπέχεσθαι* in the sense *continerere (manum)*: elsewhere it occurs mainly in poetry (*Od.* xxii. 316, etc.).

μανίαν. Cp. *Laws* 839 A *λύττης...ἐρωτικῆς καὶ μανίας*: *Soph. fr.* 162 *νόσημ' ἔρωτος τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν*: and 173 D *supra*.

φιλεραστίαν. "Amor quo quis amatorem amplectitur" (Ast); equivalent to *ἀντίρωσ* (*Phaedr.* 255 D): cp. 192 B.

ὀρρωδῶ. *Horresco*, a strong word for "quaking with fear."

διαλλαγῇ. Alcib. catches up Socrates' word *διάλλαξον* and negatives it with a "What hast thou to do with peace?" "But," he proceeds, "I'll have

σομαι· νῦν δέ μοι, Ἀγάθων, φάναι, μετάδος τῶν ταινιῶν, ἵνα ἀναδήσω καὶ τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν, καὶ μὴ Ἐ μοι μέμφηται ὅτι σέ μὲν ἀνέδησα, αὐτὸν δὲ νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους, οὐ μόνον πρόφην ὥσπερ σύ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ, ἔπειτα οὐκ ἀνέδησα. καὶ ἄμ' αὐτὸν λαβόντα τῶν ταινιῶν ἀναδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι.

XXXI. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεκλίνη, εἰπεῖν· Ἐλεν δὴ, ἄνδρες· δοκεῖτε γὰρ μοι νήφειν· οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν οὖν ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ ποτέον· ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ταυτ' ἡμῖν. ἄρχοντα οὖν αἰρούμαι τῆς πόσεως, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς ἱκανῶς πῖητε, ἑμαυτόν. ἀλλὰ φερέτω, Ἀγάθων, εἴ τι ἔστιν ἔκπωμα μέγα. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ φέρε, παῖ, φάναι,

213 D (ὦ) Ἀγάθων Sauppe Jn. Sz.: ὦ γάθων J.-U. E ἀναδήσω καὶ TW O.-P., Sz. Bt.: ἀναδησώμεθα B: ἀναδήσωμεν καὶ Herm. J.-U. τὴν τούτου secl. Jn. ἄνδρες: ὄνδρες Sz. J.-U. οὖν ὑμῖν T, Winckelmann Bt.: ὑμῖν B, J.-U. Sz. φερέτω, Ἀγάθων Bt.: φερέτω Ἀγ. libri: φέρετ', ὦ Ἀγ. Cobet J.-U.: φερέτω, ὦ Ἀγ. Naber: Ἀγάθων secl. Sz. ἔκπωμα T: ἔκπωμα B

that out with you by-and-bye!" (see 214 c *ad fin.* ff.). Then, with a sudden change of tone from bullying and banter to affectionate earnestness, he begins νῦν δέ μοι κτλ.

213 E τὴν τούτου...κεφαλὴν. "Incipit Alc. dicere τὴν τούτου κεφαλὴν, quod priusquam elocutus est, sentit nimis languidum esse; inde revertitur quasi ac denuo progreditur, positus verbis ταυτηνὶ τὴν θ. κ." (Rückert). Perhaps as Alc. says these words (notice the deictic ταυτηνὶ) he playfully strokes the head of Socr. τούτου is expanded by Jowett into "of this universal despot."

νικῶντα. The present symposium was part of Agathon's *epinikian* celebration (see 174 A), and his victory also was gained by λόγοι (cp. 194 B).

ἔπειτα. *Tamen*, "yet after all," i.e. in spite of the fact of his perpetual victoriousness. Cp. *Prot.* 319 D, 343 D.

κατακλίνεσθαι. Ever since he first discovered Socrates, Alcibiades had been standing (see 213 B *ad fin.* ἀναπηδησαι).

Ἐλεν δὴ. "Come now": "die Worte enthalten hier eine Aufforderung" (Rettig). Cp. 204 c, *Phaedo* 95 A. The question to drink or not to drink is now resumed from 213 A *ad init.*

οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν. "This can't be allowed": cp. *Rep.* 379 A and 219 c *infra*.

ὠμολόγηται κτλ. See 212 E f.

ἄρχοντα...τῆς πόσεως. "As symposiarch": cp. the Latin *arbiter* (*magister*) *bibendi* Hor. *C.* I. 4. 17, II. 7. 25. For the qualifications proper in such "archons," see *Laws* 640 c ff.; and for other details, Smith *D. A.* II. 740 b ff. The emphatic position of ἑμαυτόν is to be noticed.

φερέτω, Ἀγάθων. *Sc. ὁ παῖς*: I adopt Burnet's improved punctuation, which renders further change needless.



- 214 τὸν ψυκτῆρα ἐκείνον, ἰδόντα αὐτὸν πλέον ἢ ὀκτῶ κοτύλας χωροῦντα. τοῦτον ἐμπλησόμενον πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκπιεῖν, ἔπειτα τῷ Σωκράτει κελεύειν ἐγγχεῖν καὶ ἅμα εἰπεῖν· Πρὸς μὲν Σωκράτη, ὃ ἄνδρες, τὸ σόφισμά μοι οὐδέν· ὅποσον γὰρ ἂν κελεύῃ τις, τοσοῦτον ἐκπιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μὴ ποτε μεθυσθῆ. τὸν μὲν οὖν Σωκράτη ἐγγχεάντος τοῦ παιδὸς πίνειν· τὸν δ' Ἐρυξίμαχον Πῶς οὖν, φάναί, ὃ Ἄλκιβιάδη, ποιούμεν; οὕτως οὔτε τι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῇ κύλικι **B** οὔτε τι ἄδομεν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ διψῶντες πίομεθα; τὸν οὖν

214 **A** πλέον: πλείν J.-U. τοῦτον (οὖν) Athenaeus κελύη B: κελύση T ποιῶμεν aragr. Laur. ix. 85, Hirschig Naber (ποιῶμεν—λέγομεν—ἄδομεν Sommer) **B** οὔτε τι ἄδομεν T, Bt.: οὐτ' ἐπᾶδομεν B, J.-U. Sz.

214 **A** τὸν ψυκτῆρα. "Yonder wine-cooler." Suid. ψυκτῆρα· κάδδον ἢ ποτήριον μέγα, ἀπὸ τοῦ θάττον ψύχεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν κρᾶσιν: Poll. vi. 99 ὁ δὲ ψυκτῆρ πολυθρύλητος, ἔν καὶ δῖνον ἐκάλου, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ὁ ἀκρατος· οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ ἀκρατοφόρον αὐτὸν καλοῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἔχει πυθμένα ἀλλ' ἀστραγαλίσκους. Other names for it were πρόχυμα (Moeris, Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 617) and κάλαθος (Hesych. s.v.): for details see Smith *D. A. s.v.* Psycter; cp. Xen. *Mem.* II. i. 30 ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πῆς, ... τοῦ θέρους χίνα περιβέουσα ζητεῖς: Xen. *Symp.* II. 23 ff.

ὀκτῶ κοτύλας. The κοτύλη or ἡμίνα (=6 κύαθοι) was .48 of a pint, so that 8 κοτύλαι are nearly equal to 2 quarts. For a ψυκτῆρ this seems to have been a small size, since Athenaeus (v. 199) mentions ψυκτῆρες holding 18 to 54 gallons. Alcib. was not alone in his taste for an ἔκπωμα μέγα: cp. Anacr. 32 τρικύαθον κελύβην ἔχουσα: Alcaeus 41. 2 καθ' ὃ ἄειρε κυλίχνας μεγάλας: Xen. *Symp.* i. c. ὁ παῖς ἐγγχεάτω μοι τὴν μεγάλην φιάλην: Gouffé (*Le Verre*) "Nous devons aux petites gens Laisser les petits verres."

ἐμπλησόμενον. "Ast: implevisse. Immo implendum curasse" (Rückert).

ἐγγχεῖν. Cp. Soph. fr. 149 D φορεῖτε, μασσέτω τις, ἐγγχεῖτω βαθὴν κρητῆρα: Alcaeus 31. 4 ἔγχεε κίρναις ἓνα καὶ δύο κτλ.: Theogn. 487 σὺ δ' ἔγχεε τοῦτο μάταιον | κωτίλλεις ἀεὶ· τοῖνεκά τοι μεθύεις. Notice that Alcib. adopts the order ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ, see 175 E.

τὸ σόφισμά μοι οὐδέν. "My trick avails nothing." For σόφισμα, "a witty invention," cp. *Lach.* 183 D, *Rep.* 496 A; Aesch. *P. V.* 470. Alcib., with his σόφισμα, recalls Eros the σοφιστής (203 D).

οὐδέν... μεθυσθῆ. See Goodwin *G. M. T.* § 295. For Socrates' invincible head for wine, see also 176 c, 220 B, 223 c.

Πῶς οὖν... ποιούμεν. The present indic. differs from the subjunctive, "quod dicitur de eo quod revera iam fit, neque adhuc suscipiendum est" (Stallb.): contrast ἀλλὰ τί ποιούμεν (deliberative) just below. For the indignant οὕτως cp. Hom. *Il.* II. 158 οὕτως δὴ οἰκόνδε... φεύγονται.

214 **B** οὔτε τι ἄδομεν. This lection is preferable to B's οὐτ' ἐπᾶδομεν which is accepted by most later editors. Eryx. would not propose to "chant spells," the only sense in which the compound word is used by Plato. For the idea of trolling a catch over one's cups, cp. Gouffé (*Couplets*) "On boit

Ἄλκιβιάδην εἰπεῖν ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, βέλτιστε βελτίστου πατρός  
καὶ σωφρονεστάτου, χαῖρε. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον·  
ἀλλὰ τί ποιῶμεν; Ὁ τι δάν·σὺ κελεύης. δεῖ γὰρ σοι πείθεσθαι·

ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων·

ἐπιτάττε οὖν ὃ τι βούλει. Ἀκουσον δὴ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον.  
ἡμῖν πρὶν σέ εἰσελθεῖν ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει  
λόγον περὶ Ἐρωτος εἰπεῖν ὡς δύναίτο κάλλιστον, καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι.  
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν· σὺ δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ εἰρηκας  
καὶ ἐκπέπωκας, δίκαιος εἰ εἰπεῖν, εἰπὼν δ' ἐπιτάξαι Σωκράτει ὃ τι  
ἂν βούλη, καὶ τοῦτον τῷ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ καὶ οὕτω τοὺς ἄλλους. Ἀλλὰ,  
φάναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τὸν Ἄλκιβιάδην, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, μεθύοντα  
δὲ ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν μὴ οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦ.

214 B Ἐρυξίμαχε del. Naber δάν Bt.; δ' ἂν T: ἂν B, J.-U. πείθεσθαι  
Bdhm. ἰητρὸς T, Sz. Bt.: ἰατρὸς B O ὡς (ἂν) Sauppe (τοὺς) νηφόντων  
vel νήφοντας cj. Steph. λόγους (λόγον) Bast

chez eux, on boit beaucoup Et de bourgogne et de champagne; Mais rien ne  
vaut un petit coup Qu'un petit couplet accompagne."

! For λόγοι ἐπικυλίκεται, cp. Athen. 2 A; Lucian *Timon*, c. 55.

ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε κτλ. Alcibiades—as if to show how ready he is ἄδειν τι—  
replies with an iambic trimeter—"A noble sire's most noble, sober son!"  
The superlatives are not without irony, cp. 177 B, Xen. *Mem.* III. 13. 2.

χαῖρε. "All hail!" Alcibiades pretends not to have noticed the doctor  
before.

ἰητρὸς γὰρ...ἄλλων. From *Il.* xi. 514: "Surely one learned leech is a  
match for an army of laymen." Pope's rendering—"the wise physician skilled  
our wounds to heal"—hardly deserves the name, although Jowett paid it the  
compliment of borrowing it.

ἐπιτάττε. "Prescribe": the techn. term for a medical prescription, cp.  
*Rep.* 347 A κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων: *Polit.* 294 D, *Laws* 722 E.

ἔδοξε κτλ. See 177 D.

214 C ὡς δύναίτο κάλλιστον. Cp. Thuc. VII. 21 ναὺς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας  
πληροῦσιν (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 96): there is no need to insert ἂν, as Sauppe  
suggested.

καὶ ἐκπέπωκας. "But have finished your draught."

μεθύοντα...παραβάλλειν. "μεθύοντα negligentium dictum est pro λόγον  
ἀνδρὸς μεθύοντος" (Wolf). For the brachylogy cp. 180 c μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον  
κτλ. (see *note ad loc.*); 217 D ἐν τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλινῇ. With παραβάλλειν  
we must supply as subject τινα (with Rettig) rather than σε, i.e. Ἐρυξίμαχον  
(with Wolf). Of conjectures Bast's is the most plausible. Cp. Theogn. 627  
ἀσχρὸν τοι μεθύοντα παρ' ἀνδράσι νηφόσι μείναι.

For a stricture on ἐπαινοὶ μεθύοντος, see *Phaedr.* 240 E.

- D** καὶ ἄμα, ὦ μακάριε, πείθει τί σε Σωκράτης ὦν ἄρτι εἶπεν; ἢ οἶσθα ὅτι τούναντίον ἐστὶ πάντῃ ἢ δ' ἔλεγεν; οὗτος γάρ, εἴαν τινα ἐγὼ ἐπαινέσω τούτου παρόντος ἢ θεὸν ἢ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον ἢ τούτου, οὐκ ἀφέξεταί μου τῷ χεῖρε. Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. Μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, μηδὲν λέγε πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἓνα ἄλλον ἐπαινέσαιμι σοῦ παρόντος. Ἄλλ' οὕτω ποιεῖ, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, εἰ βούλει· Σωκράτη ἐπαίνεσον.
- E** Πῶς λέγεις; εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· δοκεῖ χρῆναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε; ἐπιθῶμαι τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τιμωρήσωμαι ὑμῶν ἐναντίον; Οὗτος, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις; ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερά με ἐπαινέσεις; ἢ τί ποιήσεις; Τάληθῆ ἐρῶ. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ παρήγης. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, φάναι, τά γε ἀληθῆ παρήγῃ καὶ κελεύω λέγειν. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. καὶ μέντοι οὕτως ποιήσον. εἴαν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἂν βούλη, καὶ εἰπέ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι·

214 **D** ἢ οἶσθ' J.-U.      **E** τιμωρήσομαι W      ἐπαινέσει Bekk. Sz.:  
ἐπαινέσεις BTW: ἐπαινίσαι Bt.      παρίεις Schanz

214 **D** ὦ μακάριε. "Gutmuthig-ironisch" (Rettig): cp. 219 A. πείθει...εἶπεν; "H. e. πείθει σέ τι τούτων ἢ Σ. ἄρτι εἶπεν;...h. e. noli quidquam eorum credere quae modo dixit S." (Stallb.). A. is alluding to 213 C—D (ἀπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου κτλ.).

οὐκ ἀφέξεταί κτλ. "Satis lepide iisdem fere verbis hic utitur Alcib. quae Socr. l. l. exhibuit" (Hommel); A. is turning the tables on S.

Μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ. This form of oath is rare in Plato, see Schanz *nov. comm. Plat.* p. 23. The main reason why A. chooses Poseidon to swear by is, no doubt, because P. was the special deity of the ancient aristocracy of Athens (see R. A. Neil's ed. of *Ar. Knights*, p. 83); but A. may also be punning on πόσις, as if Ποσειδῶν meant "drink-giver," and invoking a "deus madidus" as appropriate to his own "madid" condition. Cp. *Euthyd.* 301 E, 303 A.

214 **E** τιμωρήσομαι. This echoes the τιμωρήσομαι of 213 D.

Οὗτος. "Ho, there!" Cp. 172 A.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα. "To make fun of me": cp. *Phileb.* 40 C (ἡδοναὶ) μμιμμεῖναι τὰς ἀληθείς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα ("caricatures"): so ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα *Polít.* 293 E, 297 C.

ἐπαινέσει. Plato always uses the middle form of the future, with the doubtful exception of *Laws* 719 E (where Burnet, after Bekker, corrects ἐπαινέσει to ἐπαινίσαι), see Veitch *Gk. Verbs s.v.*

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι. Sc. τάληθῆ λέγων: *iambiam dicoam*. Cp. 185 E, *Phaedo* 100 C, *Euthyd.* 272 D (in all which places the participle is expressed).

καὶ...ποιήσον. Hommel rashly proposes to read ποιήσων for ποιήσον and remove the stop after the word. For καὶ μέντοι, see *Madv. Gr. S.* § 254.

ἐπιλαβοῦ. "Pull me up," "call me to order." Cp. *Gorg.* 469 C, 506 B ἐπιλαμβάνου εἴαν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.

ἐκὼν γὰρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεύσομαι. ἐὰν μέντοι ἀναμιμνησκόμενος 215  
ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν λέγω, μηδὲν θαυμάσης· οὐ γὰρ τι ῥάδιον τὴν σὴν  
ἀτοπίαν ὧδ' ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμηῆσαι.

XXXII. Σωκράτη δ' ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὡ ἄνδρες, οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω,  
δι' εἰκόνων. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἴσως οἰήσεται ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιώτερα, ἔσται  
δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου. φημί γὰρ δὴ ὁμοιό-  
τατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐρμογλυφείοις

† 215 A τι: τοι vulg. Hirschig ἐρμογλυφείοις T

215 A ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν. "In a wrong order," or "in promiscuous fashion":  
cp. *Il.* II. 75, *Aesch. Ag.* 92, etc. Alcib. forestalls criticism by this apology for  
the "mixed" style of his reminiscences, on the ground of what he calls his  
"present condition" (ἄδ' ἔχοντι=μεθύνοντι, *carpula laboranti*).

οὐ γὰρ τι ῥάδιον. For οὕτι, *haudquaquam*, cp. 189 B.

ἀτοπίαν. Cp. *Gorg.* 494 D; 221 C *infra*. That Socrates is an "out-of-the-  
way" character, a walking conundrum, is, in fact, the main theme of Alc.'s  
speech: it is a mistake to limit this ἀτοπία to the contradiction between his  
outer and inner man, as Susemihl does.

οὕτως...δι' εἰκόνων. For οὕτως with an exegetic phrase, cp. 193 C, *Laws*  
633 D, *Rep.* 551 C οὕτω...ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. For εἰκόνες, "similes," see *Ar. Rhet.*  
III. 4, where they are described as a kind of μεταφοραὶ ("A simile is a metaphor  
*writ large*, with the details filled in," Cope *ad loc.*). εἰκασίαι ("conundrums")  
were also "a fashionable amusement at Greek social gatherings" (Thompson  
on *Meno* 80 C), see for exx. *Ar. Vesp.* 1308 ff., *Av.* 804 ff.: cp. *Rep.* 487 E, *Phaedo*  
87 B; *Xen. Symp.* VI. 8 ff.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιώτερα. Sc. οὕτως ποιήσειν, or the like: cp. 214 E.

τοῖς σιληνοῖς κτλ. These were statuëttes representing a Silenus playing a  
flute or pipe; the interiors were hollow and served as caskets to hold little  
figures of gods wrought in gold or other precious materials. But the precise  
fashion of their construction and how they opened (διχάδε διοιχθέντες) is by no  
means clear. (1) Hug thinks they were made with a double door (δικλίδες):  
similarly Stallb. and Hommel ("in contrariis Silenorum lateribus duobus duo  
foramina erant, quae epistomio quodam claudi poterant"). (2) Schulthess  
supposes that one section telescoped into the other ("Schiebt man sie aus-  
einander, so erblickt man inwendig Götterbilder"). (3) Panofka, with  
Schleiermacher, supposes that the top came off like a lid. (4) Lastly,  
Rettig "denkt an ein Auseinandernehmen in zwei Hälften," though exactly  
how this differs from (3) he does not clearly explain. But—as Rettig himself  
observes—"mag es verschiedene Arten solche Gehäuse gegeben haben," and  
in the absence of further evidence it would be rash to decide which of the  
possible patterns is here intended: the language (διχάδε διοιχθέντες) rather  
favours the idea that the figures split into two, either horizontally or  
vertically—possibly, also, with a hinge. Cp. *Synes. Ep.* 153, p. 292 B ὥσπερ  
ἐπίουον Ἀθήνησιν οἱ δημιουργοὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ Χάριτας καὶ τοιαῦτα κάλλη θεῶν  
ἀγάλμασι σιληνῶν καὶ σατύρων ἀμπύσχοντες: *Maximus comm. in Dion. Aereop.*  
*de div. nom.* c. ix. t. II. p. 201 f. (ed. Cord.) ἐκείνοι γὰρ οἶά τινας ἀνδριάντας

**B** καθήμενοι, οὓς τινὰς ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντας, οἱ διχίαιδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἔνδοθεν ἀγίαματα ἔχοντας θεῶν. καὶ φημί αὐτοῖς εἰκέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τό γε εἶδος ὁμοῖος εἰ τούτοις, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐδ' <ἀν> αὐτὸς δὴ που ἀμφισβητήσῃς· ὡς δὲ καὶ τὰλλα εἰκας, μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. ὑβριστὴς εἶ· ἢ οὐ; ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ὁμολογήῃς, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐλητὴς; πολὺ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνου.

**C** ὁ μὲν γε δι' ὀργάνων ἐκῆλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ δεῖ ἀνὰ τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῆ· ἀ γὰρ Ὀλυμπος ἤλυε,

215 B διχίαιδε: δίχα Steph. Ast οὐδ' (ἀν) αὐτὸς Stallb. δῆπου BT, vulg.: ἀν δῆπου Sauppe: ἀν που Baier Sz. Bt.: om. Stallb. ἀμφισβητήσεις vulg.

ἐποιοῦν μῆτε χεῖρας μῆτε πόδας ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐρμᾶς ἐκάλουν· ἐποιοῦν δὲ αὐτοὺς διακένους, θύρας ἔχοντας, καθάπερ τοιχοπυργίσκους· ἔσωθεν οὖν αὐτῶν ἐτίθεισαν ἀγίαματα ὧν ἔσεβον θεῶν κτλ. (cp. Etym. Magn. s.v. ἀρμάριον): Xen. Symp. iv. 19; Julian Or. vi. p. 187 A.

τοῖς ἑρμογλυφεῖσι. "The statuaries' shops," apparently a ἄπαξ εἰρ.: cp. Luc. Somn. 2. 7.

215 B ἀγίαματα...θεῶν. Cp. 222 A, Phaedr. 251 A.

φημί αὐτοῖς κτλ. This second comparison arises out of the first, since the Satyr is himself akin to the Sileni: on the connexion between the two (as both originally horse-demons) see Harrison, Proleg. p. 388. Schol.: Μαρσύας δὲ αὐλητὴς, Ὀλύμπου υἱός, δε...ἤρισεν Ἀπόλλωνι περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ ἡττήθη, καὶ ποιῆν δέδωκε τὸ δέρμα δαρεῖς, κτλ.

τό γε εἶδος. For the Satyr-like ugliness of Socr., cp. Schol. ad Ar. Nub. 223 ἐλέγγο δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὴν ὄψιν Σειλήνῳ παρεμφαίνειν· σιμός τε γὰρ καὶ φαλακρός ἦν: Theaet. 143 E προσέειπε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων: ib. 209 B, Meno 80 A f.; Xen. Symp. iv. 19, v. 7.—δῆπου (ἀν) ἀμφισβ. (cp. Meno 72 c) is another possible order of words.

ὑβριστὴς εἶ. "You are a mocker" or "a bully" (Jowett): so too Agathon had said, in 175 E. For the present Alcib. forbears to enlarge on this Satyr-like quality, but he resumes the subject in 216 c ff., see esp. 219 c, 222 A. Observe also that Alcib. is here turning the tables on Socr., who had brought practically the same charge against A. in 213 c, d. Schleierm.'s rendering, "Bist du übermüthig, oder nicht?", is based on a wrong punctuation.

οὐκ αὐλητὴς. I.e. (as Schol. B puts it) ἐν ἡθει. ἐκείνου, sc. Μαρσύου.

215 C Ὀλυμπος. For Ὀλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ as τὰ παιδικὰ of Marsyas, cp. Minos 318 B; Paus. x. 30; also Laws 677 D, 790 D ff.; Arist. Pol. v. 5. 1340<sup>a</sup> 8 ff.; Clem. Al. Strom. i. p. 307 c.

For κατέχεσθαι of "possession" (by supernal or infernal powers), cp. Meno 99 D, Phaedr. 244 E; Ion 533 E ff. (Rohde Psyche II. pp. 11, 18 ff., 48<sup>1</sup>, 88). The orgiastic flute-music (having a cathartic effect parallel to that of tragedy) provided, as Aristotle explains, a kind of homoeopathic remedy for the fit of ἐνθουσιασμός.

Μαρσύου λέγω που, τοῦ διδάξαντος· τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἔάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς αὐλῇ ἔάν τε φαῦλη αὐλητρίς, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεία εἶναι. σὺ δ' ἐκείνου τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρεις, ὅτι ἄνευ ὀργάνων ψιλοῖς λόγοις ταύτων τοῦτο ποιεῖς. ἡμεῖς γοῦν ὅταν μὲν τοῦ ἄλλου ἀκού- **D**  
ωμεν λέγοντος καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος ἄλλους λόγους, οὐδὲν μέλει ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενί· ἐπειδὴν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκοῦη ἢ τῶν σῶν λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος, κὰν πάνυ φαῦλος ἢ ὁ λέγων, ἔάν τε γυνὴ ἀκοῦῃ ἔάν τε ἀνὴρ ἔάν τε μειράκιον, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἔσμεν καὶ κατεχόμεθα. ἐγὼ γοῦν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ μὴ ἔμελλον κομιδῇ δόξειν μεθύειν, εἶπον ὁμόσας ἂν ὑμῖν, οἶα δὴ πέπονθα αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου λόγων καὶ πάσχω ἔτι καὶ νυνί. ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολὺ μοι **E**  
μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων ἢ τε καρδιά πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα

215 **C** που, τοῦ scripsi: τούτου BT, Bt.: τοῦ τούτου Voeg.: τοῦ Bdhm. Sz.: τούτου Sommer: αὐτοῦ Liebhold μόνους olim Orelli: μαρία Winckelmann δηλοῖ τοὺς: δ. θνητοὺς Hommel: κηλεῖ τοὺς Orelli **D** τις ἀκοῦη del. Hirschig ἔγωγ' οὖν T κομιδῇ B ἐπομόσας c]. Naber **E** νῦν T

**M. λέγω που, τοῦ δ.** I venture on this slight innovation: otherwise it were best, with Badham, to cut down the τούτου to τοῦ.

**δηλοῖ...δεομένους.** Cp. the imitative passage in *Ménios* 318 B καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρεία ὄντας. θεῶν δεόμενοι is virtually equiv. to κορυβαντιῶντες (215 E); cp. Rohde *Psyche* II. 48<sup>1</sup>. “μόνα = vorzugsweise. Vgl. Symp. 222 A” (Rettig).

**ψιλοῖς λόγοις.** I.e. “in prose,” devoid of metrical form as well as of “musical accompaniment (ἄνευ ὀργάνων).” Cp. *Laus* 669 D λόγους ψ. εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες: *Menez.* 239 C.

215 **D** ὅταν μὲν κτλ. Observe the antitheses σοῦ (του ἄλλου—τῶν σῶν λόγων) (ἄλλους λόγους—πάνυ φαῦλος...λέγων) (πανὺ ἀγαθοῦ ῥήτορος).

ἢ...ἄλλου λέγοντος. A case in point is the *Symposium* itself, where Socrates' λόγος are reported at second-hand.

**ἔάν τε γυνὴ κτλ.** “No sex or age is impervious to the impression”—in antithesis to the preceding universal negative οὐδενί. For ἐκπληξίς as a love-symptom, cp. *Charm.* 154 C.

**κομιδῇ...μεθύειν.** Schol. κομιδῇ ἰσοδυναμεῖ...τῷ σφόδρα καὶ τελείως. Cp. 212 E. **εἶπον ὁμόσας ἂν.** “I would have stated on my oath,” i.e. I would not merely have described the facts, as I am about to do, but would have called Heaven to witness by a ὄρκος (cp. 183 A). Hommel supposes that Alcib. “rem silentio praeterire apud se constituit”; but this is confuted by the context. For a ref. to this passage, see Procl. *in I. Alc.* p. 89.

215 **E** τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων. Τιμ. κορυβαντιῶν· παρεμβαίνεισθαι καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῶς κινεῖσθαι: Schol. ad Ar. *Vesp.* 9 κορυβαντιῶν· τὸ κορύβασι κατέχεσθαι. Cp. *Oratio* 54 D ταῦτα...ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐτῶν

ἐκχείται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου· ὀρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας. Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εὐ μὲν ἠγούμην λέγειν, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδ' ἔτεθορύβητό μου ἢ ψυχὴ οὐδ' ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένον· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τουτουῦ τοῦ Μαρσίου πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω 216 διετέθην, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω. καὶ ταῦτα, Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐρεῖς ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἔτι γε νῦν ξύνοιδ' ἔμαντῶ ὅτι εἰ ἐθέλοισι παρέχειν τὰ ὄτα, οὐκ ἂν καρτερήσαιμι ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἂν πάσχοιμι. ἀναγκάζει γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι πολλοῦ ἐνδεῆς ὢν αὐτὸς ἔτι ἔμαντοῦ· μὲν ἀμελῶ, τὰ δ' Ἀθηναῖων

215 E ὑπὸ...τούτου secl. Voeg. Hug τῶν τούτου TW: τούτου B: τούτου secl. J.-U. ταῦτα (ταῦτα) π. Naber 216 A Σώκρατες B, J.-U.: δ Σ. T, Jn. Bt. (cf. 217 B) ταῦτα: ταῦτα BT ἔτι T: τι B

δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν: *Ion* 533 E, 536 C. Among the symptoms of *κορυβαντισμός* were the hearing of faery flute-notes, visions, hypnotic dreams, dance-motions etc. (see Rohde *Psyche* II. 47 ff.): cp. also *Plut. adv. Coloi.* 1123 D.

ἦ τε καρδία πηδᾷ. Cp. *Ion* 535 C, *Phaedr.* 251 C; *Sappho* 2. 5 τό μοι μάν | καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόασεν: *Ar. Nucl.* 1393 οἶμαί γε τῶν νεωτέρων τὰς καρδίας | πηδᾶν ὅτι λέξει.

ὑπὸ τῶν λ. τ. τούτου. Rettig seems right in arguing that a Glossator would be unlikely to write thus; and repetitions of this kind are characteristic of Alc.'s speech (cp. 221 D).

Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων. For the oratorical powers of Pericles, cp. *Phaedr.* 269 E, *Meno* 94 A, *Menex.* 235 E; *Thuc.* II. 65; *Ar. Ach.* 530 ff.; *Cic. Brut.* XI. 44, *de or.* III. 34; and esp. Eupolis *Δῆμοι* (*fr.* 6. 34) κράτιστος οὗτος (sc. Περικλῆς) ἐγένετο ἀνθρώπων λέγειν | ...πειθῶ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν | οὕτως ἐκήλει, καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις. Comparing this with our passage,—taken in conjunction with 213 D (νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους), 215 B (ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους), 218 A (πληγείς τε καὶ δηγθείς ὑπὸ τῶν...λόγων), 221 C (οἶος αὖ Περικλῆς κτλ.),—it seems probable that Plato has this passage of Eupolis in mind, and represents Alcib. as confuting Eupolis—as a return for the raillery he had suffered at the hands of E. in his *Βαπταί*: cp. the story told in *Cic. Att.* VI. 1 that Alcib. got Eupolis drowned.

μον ἢ ψυχῆ. For this position of the genitive of the pronoun, which gives it nearly the force of an ethic dat., cp. *Rep.* 518 C, *Phaedo* 117 B (cp. *Vahlen op. Acad.* I. 440 ff.).

ὡς ἀνδραποδωδῶς δ. Cp. *Xen. Mem.* IV. 2. 39: 210 D ὥσπερ οἰκίτης... δουλεύων.

216 A μὴ βιωτὸν. This echoes, by way of contrast, 211 D ἐναυθα... βιωτὸν.

ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω. Cp. ὁδ' ἔχοντι, 215 A.

οὐκ...ἀληθῆ. Notice these repeated protestations of veracity: cp. 214 E, 215 B (and see *Introd.* § II. A).

οὐκ ἂν καρτερήσαιμι. Contrast with this the *καρτερία* of Socr., 219 D, 220 A.

πρῶττω. βία οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὄτα  
οἰχομαι φεύγων, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω.  
πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τούτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις οἶοιτο ἐν Β  
ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὄντιν οὖν· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτον μόνον αἰσχύ-  
νομαι. ξύνοϊδα γὰρ ἐμαντῶ ἀντιλέγειν μὲν οὐ δυναμένῳ, ὡς οὐ δεῖ  
ποιεῖν ἂ οὗτος κελεύει, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀπέλθω, ἠττημένῳ τῆς τιμῆς τῆς  
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν. δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω, καὶ ὅταν ἴδω,  
αἰσχύνομαι τὰ ὁμολογημένα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἠδέως ἂν ἴδοιμι  
αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δ' αὖ τούτο γένοιτο, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι C  
πολὺ μείζον ἂν ἀχθοίμην, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρήσωμαι τούτῳ τῷ  
ἀνθρώπῳ.

216 A βία: βύων Abresch J.-U. ἐπισχόμενος secl. J.-U. O ἂν  
μείζον Sauppe χρήσωμαι corr. Ven. 185, Bekk.: χρήσομαι BT

βία...φεύγων. "Invitus mihiq̄ ipsi vim inferens aufugio" (Rückert).  
Hommel wrongly takes βία with ἐπισχόμενος. βύων, the conjecture of  
Abresch, based on Hesych. (βύων τὰ ὄτα· ἐπιφράττων) makes the order  
awkward and produces tautology. ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὄτα is the opposite of  
the foregoing παρέχειν τὰ ὄτα: cp. Plut. *Pomp.* 55; Hor. *Ep.* II. 2. 105  
obtorem patulas impune legentibus aures; *Acts* vii. 57 συνέσχον τὰ ὄτα  
αὐτῶν: *Ps.* lviii. 4, 5 (A.V.) "they are like the deaf adder that stoppeth her  
ear; which will not hearken to the voice of charmers, charming never so  
wisely." For the Σειρήνες, cp. Hom. *Od.* xii. 39 ff., and see Harrison *Proleg.*  
pp. 197 ff.

αὐτοῦ...παρὰ τούτῳ. αὐτοῦ is not really "redundant" (as Ast)—"sitting  
still here beside him," i.e. "müssig und entfernt von Staatsgeschäften" etc.  
(Rettig); cp. Ar. *Ran.* 1490 ff.; *Apol.* 31 c ff.

καταγηράσω. Perhaps a *double entendre*—A. implying that S.'s moralizings  
("rumores senum severiorum") would soon make an old man of him.

216 B δ οὐκ...ἐνεῖναι. This is a specimen of the naive candour which  
characterizes Alcib. throughout. For Alcib.'s self-assurance, cp. Xen. *Mem.*  
I. 2. 47.

ἠττημένῳ...πολλῶν. "Me honori, quo me ornet populi multitudo, suc-  
cumbere" (Stallb.). Cp. *Rep.* 359 A: Xen. *Cyrop.* III. 3. 2 ἡδεσθαι τῇ ὑπὸ  
πάντων τιμῇ: Thuc. I. 130. 1. For the thought, cp. *Rep.* 491 c ff.

δραπετεύω. "I take to my heels," like a runaway slave (*δραπέτης*, *Meno*  
97 E).

τὰ ὁμολογημένα. I.e. the conclusions as to his own ἐνδεῖα forced upon him  
by S.; cp. 216 A ἀναγκάζει...ὁμολογεῖν.

216 C πολὺ μείζον. So μέγα κήδετα *Pl.* II. 26.

οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρήσωμαι. Since Alcib. is here generalizing, the (dubitative)  
subj. seems preferable to the more definite fut., as Hommel argues against  
Stallb.

Alcib. is in the position of a "Dipsychus," "halting between two opinions"



XXXIII. Καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν δὴ τῶν αὐλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοιαῦτα πεπόνθασιν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σατύρου· ἄλλα δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσατε ὡς ὁμοίος τ' ἐστὶν οἷς ἐγὼ ἤκασα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὡς θαυμασίαν ἔχει. εὐ γὰρ ἴστε ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν τοῦτον γιγνώσκει· **D** ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ δηλώσω, ἐπεὶ περ ἠρξάμην. ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται, [καὶ αὐ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα

216 C ἤκασα Fischer: εἴκασα libri **D** καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν secl. Jn. Bdhm. Sz. αὐ B: om. TW ἀγνοεῖ πάντη (καί...οἶδεν deletis) Bast οἶδεν. ὡς distinctit Bt. ὡς: πῶς Ast: ἡ Usener

or rather two instincts. Cp. Soph. fr. 162. 8 οὕτω γε τοὺς ἐρώντας αὐτὸς ἴμερος | δρᾶν καὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν πολλάκις προῖεται: Anacr. fr. 89 ἐρῶ τε δηῦτε κούκ ἐρῶ | καὶ μαίνομαι κού μαίνομαι.

οἷς ἐγὼ ἤκασα αὐτὸν. Sc. τοῖς σιληνοῖς. ἤκασα recalls the δι' εἰκόνων of 215 A. οὐδεὶς...γιγνώσκει. Plato may mean by this, as Hug suggests, that the majority of the admirers and followers of Socr. possessed a very dim insight into the sources of his real greatness—ἀλλ' ἐγὼ (Plato, behind the mask of Alcib.) δηλώσω.

216 D ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται κτλ. For Socrates as (professing to be) subject to intense erotic emotion, see the vivid description in *Charm.* 155 c ff. ἐγὼ ἦθη ἠπόρου, καὶ μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο...καὶ ἐφλέγομην καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν κτλ.

καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν. Most of the later critics (including Voeg, Teuffel, Hug) agree in ejecting this clause. Rettig, who defends it, writes: "die Worte gehen auf den vermeintlichen Stumpfsinn des S., wie er so häufig mit roher Sinnlichkeit verbunden ist...Die Worte *εἰρωνευόμενος...διατελεῖ* den obigen καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν gegensätzlich gegenüberstanden...Da nicht blos die *Silene ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται* κτλ., so würde ohne unsere Worte die folgende Frage ὡς τὸ σχῆμα...οὐ σιληνώδες; kaum motivirt sein." But (as generally interpreted) the clause seems hardly pertinent to the main argument, which is the contrast between the outward appearance of eroticism and the inner *σωφροσύνη* of Socr.: the clause *εἰρωνευόμενος* κτλ. does nothing to strengthen the case for the reference to *γνώσις* here; while there is no reason to suppose that professions of ignorance were specially characteristic of Sileni (in spite of the story of Midas and Silenus in Plut. *ad Ap. de consol.* 115 c (Σειλ.) οὐδὲν θέλειν εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ σιωπᾶν ἀρήτως). If retained as it stands the clause is best taken closely with the previous words, as expressing an erotic symptom. [Possibly, however, for πάντα we should read πάντας and for οὐδὲν, οὐδέν, taking the words as masc. (sc. τοὺς καλοῦς).] This implies of course that οἶδεν bears the sense "agnoscit" (and ἀγνοεῖ the opposite), for which cp. Eur. *H. F.* 1105 ff. ἔκ τοι πέπληγμαι...τίς...δύσγνωιαν ὅστις τὴν ἐμὴν ἰάσεται; σαφῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν εἰωθῶτων.: *id. El.* 767 ἔκ τοι δείματος δύσγνωσιαν | εἶχον προσώπου· νῦν δὲ γιγνώσκω σε δῆ. (Cp. for this sense, Vahlen *op. Ac.* II. 63 f.)

|| ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ. "Which is the rôle he affects." For this use of σχῆμα

αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο οὐ σιληνώδες; σφόδρα γε. τοῦτο γὰρ οὗτος ἔξωθεν περιβέβληται, ὥσπερ ὁ γεγλυμμένος σιληνός· ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει, ὧ ἄνδρες συμπόται, σωφροσύνης; ἴστε ὅτι οὐτ' εἴ τις καλὸς ἐστί μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καταφρονεῖ τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς οἰηθείη, οὐτ' εἴ τις πλούσιος, οὐτ' εἴ **E** ἄλλην τινα τιμὴν ἔχων τῶν ὑπὸ πλήθους μακαριζομένων· ἡγεῖται δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδέν εἶναι—

¶216 D αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο disting. vulg. Schleierm. Sz. τοῦτο· οὐ distinctit Bernhardy ἐγλυμμένος J.-U. (εὔ) ἴστε cj. Bdm. **E** ἡμᾶς· τιμὰς Heusde

of an acted part, cp. *I. Alc.* 135 D, *Rep.* 576 A: similarly σχηματίζω, *simulo*, *Phaedr.* 255 A οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἐρώντος, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος. This is preferable to rendering by "forma et habitus," as Stallb. The punctuation of the passage has been disputed: "vulgo enim legebatur καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὐ σιληνώδες σφόδρα γε, quod Stephanus ita corrigebat ut pro οὐ σιληνώδες scriberet ὃν σειλ." (Stallb.): Stallb., Rückert, Badham, Schanz and Hug follow Bekk. and Schleierm. in putting a comma after οἶδεν and a full stop after αὐτοῦ (so too Hommel, but proposing οὐδέ for οὐδέν): Rettig follows Bernhardy in putting the full stop after τοῦτο, with a comma at οἶδεν: Burnet puts a full stop at οἶδεν, and no further stop before σιληνώδες; Ast proposed πῶς for ὡς. Bast, reading πάντη for πάντα and ejecting καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, construed ὡς...σφόδρα γέ as dependent on ἀγροεῖ: and Stephens's οὐδέ involves a similar construction.

περιβέβληται. "Has donned" as it were a "cloak" of dissimulation: cp. *Xen. Oec.* II. 5 εἰς δὲ τὸ σὸν σχῆμα ὃ σὺ περιβέβλησαι: *Ps.* cix. 18 "he clothed himself with cursing like as with his garment."

ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς. Cp. 215 B: *Soph. Antig.* 709. The word ἔνδοθεν recalls Socrates' prayer in *Phaedr.* 279 B ὦ...θεοί, δοιητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνδoθεν.

ἴστε ὅτι κτλ. For the general sense, cp. *Charm.* 154 B.

216 E ὅσον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς. Cp. 214 D.

πλούσιος...τιμὴν ἔχων. Stallb. renders "aut praeterea honore aliquo ornatus," distinguishing τιμὴ from κάλλος and πλοῦτος; whereas Rückert states that "τιμὴ dicta est h. l. de re, quae honorem habet efficitque τιμίαι, ita ut κάλλος et πλοῦτος etiam τιμαί esse possint." Rettig supports Stallb., but probably the other two ἀγαθά are also classed in A.'s mind as τιμία. Cp. 178 c, 216 B: *Pind. fr. inc.* 25.

τῶν...μακαριζομένων. Sc. τιμῶν.

καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι. "h. e. atque nos, qui talia magni facimus nullo in numero habendos censet" (Stallb.). This,—or Rückert's "nos ipsos qui pulcri, qui divites sumus,"—seems to bring out rightly the point of the personal reference; in spite of Rettig, who writes "völlig fremd ist der Platonischen Stelle der Zusatz, welchen Stallb. hier macht." For this use of οὐδέν (= οὐδενὸς ἀξίους) cp. 219 A, 220 A. The attitude here ascribed to Socr. is very like that ascribed to his admirer Apollodorus in 173 c, d.

λέγω ὑμῖν,—εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ. σπουδάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνοιχθέντος οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἑώρακε τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἤδη ποτ' 217 εἶδον, καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν οὕτω θεία καὶ χρυσᾶ εἶναι καὶ πάγκαλα καὶ θαυμαστά, ὥστε ποιητέον εἶναι ἔμβραχυν ὃ τι κελεύει Σωκράτης. ἡγούμενος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐσπουδακέναι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὥρᾳ ἔρμαιον ἡγήσασθαι εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχημα ἐμὸν θαυμαστόν, ὡς ὑπάρχον μοι χαρισαμένῳ Σωκράτει πάντ' ἀκούσαι ὅσα περ οὗτος ἦδει· ἐφρόνου γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ ὥρᾳ θαυμάσιον ὄσον. ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθείς, πρὸ τοῦ

216 E λέγω ὑμῖν BT: λέγων μὲν οὖν Herm.: ἡγούμενος Bdhm.: ἵνα λέγω ὑμῖν Sz.: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ὑμῖν Usener: del. Voeg.: fort. transp. post ἀλλὰ infra τε καὶ Usener 217 A καὶ μοι T, J.-U. Bt.: καὶ ἐμοὶ B: κάμοι Hirschig Sz. ἔμβραχυν Cobet Sz. Bt.: ἐν βραχεῖ BT ὃ τι (ἀν) Sauppe Jn. οὗτος: αὐτὸς Bdhm. δὴ B: ἦδη TW: ἔτι cj. Wolf.

λέγω ὑμῖν. There is no objection, at least in A.'s speech, to this kind of parenthetic interjection (cp. οἴεσθε, D *supra*); cp. *Apol.* 30 A, *Thuc.* vi. 37. 2, *Eur. Med.* 226. Similarly in *Gorg.* 464 c, 526 c "asseverandi causa orator ad ea quae maxime attendi vult addit illa φημί, λέγω" (see Vahlen *op. Acad.* i. 479). I am, however, inclined to suspect that the words are misplaced, and originally stood after ἀλλά, three lines lower down; if so, we should read ἀλλά—λέγω ὑμῖν—ἐγὼ κτλ., or perhaps ἀλλά ἃ λέγω ὑμῖν ἐγὼ: this would serve to echo the ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δηλώσω of D *ad initt.* Cp. also 222 B ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω.

εἰρωνευόμενος. Schol. *ειρων.*: ὑποκρινόμενος, χλευάζων. Cp. 218 D; *Rep.* 337 A αὕτη ἐκείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους.

τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα. See 215 A n.: ἀγαλμα, as ἐφ' ᾧ τις ἀγάλλεται, can fitly be applied to spiritual as well as material treasures: cp. the use of ἱερὸν in *Eur. Hel.* 1002. This passage is cited in *Procl. in Alc. I.* p. 89; *Clem. Alex. Strom.* vii. 5, p. 846 P.: cp. *Cic. de Legg.* i. 22 "ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dedicatum putabit."

217 A χρυσᾶ. "Nur ein poetischer mit καλός synonymer Ausdruck" (Bettig); no doubt the material ἀγάλματα referred to were of gold or gilt, cp. *Critias* 116 D χρυσᾶ...ἀγάλματα ἐνέστησαν. For the metaph. use, cp. *Hipp. Mai.* 301 A, *Phædr.* 235 E φίλτατος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς: *Gorg.* 486 D χρυσοῦν ἔχων...τὴν ψυχὴν: and Shakspeare's "Golden lads and lasses."

ἔμβραχυν. "In short," used to qualify a universal statement expressed by a relative such as ὅστις: cp. *Gorg.* 457 A (with Heindorf *ad loc.*), *Hipp. Min.* 365 D; *Ar. Vesp.* 1120.

ἐσπουδακέναι ἐπὶ κτλ. Observe how this contrasts with the παίζειν of 216 E: A., we are to infer, had not as yet (at the date of the incident following) learnt the "irony" of Socr. With the attitude of Alcib. here cp. what Pausanias says in 184 B ff.

ἔρα. ἔρα as *flos aetatis* is nearly equiv. to *ἄνθος* (183 E, 210 c): cp. 219 c, *Phædr.* 234 A, *I. Alc.* 131 E τὰ...σὰ λήγει ἔρας, σὺ δ' ἄρχει ἀνθεῖν.

ἐφρόνου κτλ. For Alc.'s vanity, cp. *I. Alc.* 104 A.

οὐκ εἰωθὸς ἄνευ ἀκολούθου μόνος μετ' αὐτοῦ γίγνεσθαι, τότε ἀποπέμπων τὸν ἀκόλουθον μόνος συνεγιγνόμενην· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς B πάντα τάληθ' εἰπεῖν· ἀλλὰ προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, καὶ εἰ ψεύδομαι, Σώκρατες, ἐξέλεγε· συνεγιγνόμενη γάρ, ὡ ἄνδρες, μόνος μόνῳ, καὶ ᾄμην αὐτίκα διαλέξεσθαι αὐτόν μοι ἅπερ ἂν ἐραστῆς παιδικοῖς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ διαλεχθείη, καὶ ἔχαιρον. τούτων δ' οὐ μάλα ἐγίγνετο οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει διαλεχθεῖς ἂν μοι καὶ συνημερεύσας ᾄχετο ἀπίων. μετὰ ταῦτα ξυγγυμνάζεσθαι προῦκαλούμην αὐτόν καὶ συνεγυμναζόμεν, ὡς τι ἐνταῦθα περανῶν. συνεγυμνάζετο οὖν μοι C καὶ προσεπάλαιε πολλάκις οὐδενὸς παρόντος· καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; οὐδὲν γὰρ μοι πλέον ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδαμῆ ταύτη ἦντων, ἔδοξέ μοι ἐπιθετέον εἶναι τῷ ἀνδρὶ κατὰ τὸ καρτερόν καὶ οὐκ ἀνετέον, ἐπειδήπερ ἐνεκεχειρήκη, ἀλλὰ ἰστέον ἤδη τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. προκαλοῦμαι δὴ αὐτόν πρὸς τὸ συνδειπνεῖν, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ

217 A μόνος secl. Hirschig J.-U. Hug B (ὦ) Σώκρατες Sz. δ' οὐ: δη O.-P. ἂν BT: αὐ Wolf: δὴ Sauppe Sz.: ἄρα Ast: ἄλλα Rettig: del. Hommel Hirschig: fort. αἰεὶ καὶ συνεγυμναζόμεν secl. Sauppe Sz. Hug C ἐνταῦθα (γε) Naber ἀνετέον: ανεταιον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> ἰτέον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρ. Wytttenbach

217 B τάληθ'...ψεύδομαι. Cp. 216 A, 214 E for similar protestations. Observe the effectiveness of this pause in the narration, and of the challenge to contradiction, as marking an approaching climax: cp. *Phaedo* 85 D.

ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. "Tête-à-tête": cp. *Rep.* 604 A, *Phaedr.* 236 C ἐσμὲν...μόνῳ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ.

ἄν...ᾄχετο. If ἄν is right we must take it to denote repeated action, "solebat identidem discedere" (Stallb.): cp. *Apol.* 22 B (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 117 b, R. 3; L. and S. s.v. ἄν c).

συνημερεύσας. The only other ex. in Plato is *Phaedr.* 240 c παιδικοῖς...ἐραστῆς...εἰς τὸ συνημερεῖν πάντων ἀηδέστατον.

ξυγγυμνάζεσθαι. For this practice, cp. 182 c, *Menex.* 236 D, *Rep.* 452 A ff.; and *Xen. Symp.* II. 16 ff., where Socr. treats of public and private gymnastics.

217 C οὐδὲν...πλέον ἦν. "Nihil enim proficiebam" (Stallb.): cp. 222 D.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ κτλ. Rettig supposes an allusion to Eur. *Hipp.* 390 ff. ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦδ' οὐκ ἐξήντων Κύπρω | κρατήσαι, καθανεῖν ἔδοξέ μοι. For other reff. to Eurip., see 177 A, 189 c, 196 E.

ἰτέον...πρᾶγμα. Reynders is alone in approving of Wytttenbach's "restoration," ἰτέον ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα: for, as Rückert argues, this must imply either that A. had as yet made no "conamen alliciendi S.," which is untrue, or that he had not as yet begun his narration, which is equally untrue. The sense of the text is "I must get to the bottom of the matter without more ado," i.e. discover the real ground of Socrates' indifference. Cp. *Apol.* 20 c τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα;

προκαλοῦμαι δὴ κτλ. Here comes the third and most desperate expedient,

**D** ἐραστής παιδικοῖς ἐπιβουλεύων. καὶ μοι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταχὺ ὑπήκουσεν, ὅμως δ' οὖν χρόνῳ ἐπέισθη. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφίκετο τὸ πρῶτον, δειπνήσας ἀπιέναι ἐβούλετο. καὶ τότε μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος ἀφήκα αὐτόν· αὐθις δὲ ἐπιβουλεύσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐδεδειπνήκαμεν, διελεγόμενον αἰεὶ πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐβούλετο ἀπιέναι, σκηπτόμενος ὅτι ὄψε εἴη, προσηνάγκασα αὐτὸν μένειν. ἀνεπαύετο οὖν ἐν τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ, ἐν ἧπερ ἐδείπνει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι

**E** ἄλλος καθῆυδεν ἢ ἡμεῖς. μέχρι μὲν οὖν δὴ δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς ὄντινον λέγειν· τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἂν μου ἠκούσατε λέγοντος, εἰ μὴ πρῶτον μὲν, τὸ λεγόμενον, οἶνος—ἄνευ

217 **D** ἐδεδειπνήκαμεν Bt.: 'δεδειπνήκαμεν Usener: δεδειπνήκαμεν Bekk. anecd.: ἐδεδειπνήκει BT O.-P. αἰεὶ add. Bekk. anecd.: om. BT O.-P. ἐπειδὴ (γε) O.-P. αὐτὸν: αὐτοῦ Sauppe μένειν: μονον O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **E** οὖν δὴ B O.-P. Tmg.: οὖν TW καὶ (ἐξείη) πρὸς cj. Liebhold

in which Alcib. reverses their respective rôles and acts towards Socr. no longer as παιδικά but as ἐραστής (cp. 213 c, 222 b, and see *Introd.* § VI. 3). For three as a climacteric number cp. *Phil.* 66 d, *Euthyd.* 277 c, *Rep.* 472 a. For ἐπιβουλεύων, cp. 203 b, 203 d.

217 **D** αἰεὶ...νυκτῶν. "Usque ad multam noctem" (Stallb.). For this force of αἰεὶ, cp. αἰεὶ διὰ τοῦ βίου *Phaedo* 75 b, etc.; so with πόρρω, *Gorg.* 486 a τοὺς πόρρω αἰεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας. For the plural νύκτες, "night-watches," cp. 223 c, *Prot.* 310 c πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν: *Phil.* 50 d.

ἐν τῇ...κλίνῃ. ἐμοῦ is short for τῆς ἐμῆς (or ἐμοῦ) κλίνης: cp. the similar brachylogy in 214 c: *Hom. Od.* vi. 308.

οἰκήματι. "Room": cp. *Prot.* 315 d, *Phaedo* 116 a.

217 **E** μέχρι...δεῦρο. So *Laus* 814 d τῆς...δυναμῆως τὸ μέχρι δεῦρο ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω.

καὶ πρὸς ὄντινον λέγειν. This reminds one of Diotima's language in 209 e ff. (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτλ.).

τὸ λεγόμενον κτλ. Photius explains thus: οἶνος ἄνευ παιδῶν δύο παροιμίαι· ἡ μὲν οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια, ἡ δὲ οἶνος καὶ παῖδες ἀληθείς. For the first of these, cp. *Alcaeus fr.* 57  $\beta$ , *Theocr. Id.* xxix. 1. We might render "In wine and wean is candour seen." Cp. *Schol. ad h. l.*; *Athen.* ii. 37  $\epsilon$  Φιλόχορος δὲ φησιν ὅτι οἱ πινοντες οὐ μόνον ἑαυτοὺς ἐμφανίζουσιν οἰτινές εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀνακαλύπτουσι, παρρησιαν ἄγοντες. ὅθεν "οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια" λέγεται: *Alcaeus fr.* 53 οἶνος γὰρ ἀνθρώποις δίοπτρον: *Hor. Sat.* i. 4. 89 condita cum verax aperit praecordia Liber. Similar sayings about the effects of wine are *Ar. Plut.* 1048 μεθύων ὀξύτερον βλέπει: *Theogn.* 479 ff. οἶνος...κοῦφον ἔθηκε νόον. The explanations of H. Müller ("Trunkene sagten die Wahrheit, mochten Diener zugegen sein oder nicht") and of Hommel ("si proverbio illo vinum, quod neque praesentiam neque absentiam servorum curat (alluding to the ἀκόλουθος of 217 a), non esset veridicum") are clearly wrong. Cp. *Xen. Symp.* viii. 24.

τε παίδων καὶ μετὰ παίδων—ἦν ἀληθής, ἔπειτα ἀφανίσαι Σωκράτους ἔργον ὑπερήφανον εἰς ἔπαινον ἐλθόντα ἀδικόν μοι φαίνεται. ἔτι δὲ τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχως πάθος καμὲ ἔχει. φασὶ γάρ πού τινα τοῦτο παθόντα οὐκ ἐθέλειν λέγειν οἶον ἦν πλὴν τοῖς δεδηγμένοις, ὡς μόνοις γνωσομένοις τε καὶ συγγνωσομένοις, εἰ πᾶν 218 ἐτόλμα δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀδύνης. ἐγὼ οὖν δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον ὧν ἂν τις δηχθείη—τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ψυχὴν [γὰρ] ἢ ὅ τι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνομάσαι πληγείς τε καὶ

218 A τε καὶ ὑπὸ W ἀλγεινοτάτου Steph. δηχθείη T O.-P.: δειχθῆ B ἢ ψυχὴν γὰρ B: γὰρ ἢ ψ. TW O.-P.: ἢ ψ. non legit Schol.-B, secl. Usener Sz. Bt.: ἢ ψ. γὰρ secl. Christ: γὰρ seclusi: fort. ἢ ψ. τᾶρα

ἀφανίσαι. "To keep dark": notice the play ἀφανίσαι...φαίνεται, which Lehrs represents by "eine helle That des S. ins Dunkle zu setzen." φαίνεται after the impf. ἦν is one of Alc.'s anacolutha.

ὑπερήφανον. The adj. here, though *prima facie* eulogistic, evidently contains (as Rückert notes) "grata quaedam ambiguitas," as alluding to the ὕβρις of Socr., cp. the use of ὑπερηφανία to denote "superbia cum contemtione coniuncta" (Ast) in 219 c. For the good sense of the word, cp. *Phaedo* 96 A, *Gorg.* 511 D. .

τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος κτλ. For this proverbial case, cp. Aristides *or.* 15, I. p. 234 ὥσπερ τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐχίδνης φασὶ πληγέντα μὴ ἐθέλειν ἐτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅστις πεπειράται: *id. or.* 49, II. p. 395: Xen. *Symp.* IV. 28 ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίου τινὸς δεδηγμένος...ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὥσπερ κνήσμά τι ἐδόκουν ἔχειν: *id. Mem.* I. 3. 12 ff. ἐνίσει γὰρ τι τὰ φαλάγγια κατὰ τὸ δῆγμα...ὥστε μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν. This last passage refers to the "bite of love," for which cp. *Soph. fr.* 721 ἔρωτος δῆγμα: Socrates (*Bergk P. L. G.* II. p. 288) πρόβω δηχθείς. Rückert is no doubt right in holding that there is allusion here "ad certam fabellam, nobis licet ignotam." Cp. also Aesch. *Cho.* 996.

218 A πᾶν...λέγειν. "Alii de remediis totoque curationis genere (haec) verba intelligunt, alii de motibus, gestibus furibundis, dictisque quae doloris magnitudo elicitur, sanis hominibus nil nisi risum moturis" (Rückert). The former of these views is adopted by Stallb. and Rettig (who takes the phrase to refer to the superstitious use of charms, amulets, etc.), the latter by Hommel. The phrase recalls 182 E θαυμαστά ἔργα...τολμῶη ποιεῖν: 208 D πάντα ποιοῦσιν: cp. *Rhp.* 576 A. It seems best here to interpret it broadly of the results of the δῆγμα, whether or not directly aiming at a cure: i.e. as covering both the senses indicated above.

τὸ ἀλγεινότατον. "In my most sensitive part."

τὴν καρδίαν. Schol. B, ὅτι τὴν καρδίαν (καρδίαν τὴν Herm.) ψυχὴν καλεῖ. This implies—as Usener inferred—that the words ἢ ψυχὴν were absent from the Scholiast's text: none the less, in view of the context, I think it rash to expunge the words, and content myself with obelizing γὰρ. For ἢ ὅτι κτλ., cp. 212 c.

δηχθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων, οἱ ἔχονται ἐχίδνης ἀγριώ-  
τερον, νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφυοῦς δταν λάβωνται, καὶ ποιούσι δρᾶν τε  
καὶ λέγειν ὅτιοῦν—καὶ ὄρων αὐ Φαίδρους, Ἀγάθωνας, Ἐρυξι-  
B μάχους, Πausανίας, Ἀριστοδήμους τε καὶ Ἀριστοφάνους· Σωκράτη  
δὲ αὐτὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι; πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνή-  
κατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας· διὸ πάντες ἀκούσεσθε·  
συγγνώσεσθε γὰρ τοῖς τε τότε πραχθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις·  
οἱ δὲ οἰκέται, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐστὶ βέβηλός τε καὶ ἄγροικος, πύλας  
παμμεγάλας τοῖς ὤσιν ἐπίθεσθε.

XXXIV. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὃ τε λύχνος ἀπεσβήκει  
C καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἔξω ἦσαν, ἔδοξε μοι χρῆναι μηδὲν ποικίλλειν πρὸς  
αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρως εἰπεῖν ἅ μοι ἐδόκει· καὶ εἶπον κινήσας

218 A μὴ B O.-P.: καὶ μὴ T, Bt. B δεῖ καὶ vulg. τοῖς τε B (?):  
τοῖς T (?) εἴ τις T O.-P.: εἴ τι B παμμεγάλας Naber J.-U.: πάνυ μεγάλας  
libri, Sz. Bt. C (καὶ) κινήσας O.-P.

ὑπὸ τῶν...λόγων. Cp. 210 D λόγους...ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ. For πληγεῖς, cp.  
*Euthyd.* 303 A ὥσπερ πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἀφανος ἐκέκμη: *Erist.* vii. 347 D.  
νέου ψυχῆς. Rost, removing the comma before νέου, connected ν. ψυχῆς  
with ἔχονται, wrongly: for ἔχεται without a genitive, cp. *Gorg.* 494 E.

Observe the word-play ἔχονται ἐχ-ίδνης.

μὴ ἀφυοῦς. Cp. 209 B ψυχῆ...εὐφυνεῖ.

Φαίδρους κτλ. For a similar (generalizing) use of the plural of proper  
names, cp. *Menax.* 245 D, *Ar. Ran.* 1040 ff., *An.* 558 f.

218 B συγγνώσεσθε. This echoes the συγγνωσομένοις of 218 A supra.

οἱ δὲ οἰκέται. This echoes Diotima's ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, 210 D *ad inii.*: cp. *Ar.*  
*Ach.* 242, *Ran.* 41 for the nomin. of address.

βέβηλός. Cp. Schol. *Aristid.* III. p. 471 ἔστι δὲ κήρυγμα μυστικὸν τὸ "θύρας...  
βέβηλοι," ὡς πού καὶ Ὀρφεὺς δηλοῖ "φθέγγομαι οἷς θέμυς ἐστὶ· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε  
βέβηλοι." Tim. βέβηλοι· ἀμύητοι. Alcib.'s language, like Diotima's, is sugges-  
tive of mystery-lore: cp. *Theaet.* 155 E; *Eur. Bacch.* 70 ff., 472; Horace's "odi  
profanum volgus et arceo."

πύλας...τοῖς ὤσιν. Cp. *Theogn.* 421 πολλοῖς ἀνθρώπων γλώσση θύρα οὐκ  
ἐπικεύεται | ἀρμόδια.

ὃ τε λύχνος ἀπεσβήκει. Cp. *Ar. Plut.* 668 ὡς δὲ τοὺς λύχνους ἀποσβέσας...  
ἐγκαθεύδειν: *Juv.* ix. 104, *Hor. C.* III. 6. 28.

218 C ποικίλλειν. "Artificiose, h. e. obscure vel ambigue loqui" (Ast):  
"to beat about the bush." Cp. the use of ποικίλος in 182 B: *Laus* 863 E τό  
τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον...σαφῶς ἂν διορισαίμην οὐδὲν ποικίλλων: *Soph. Trach.*  
421, 1121.

Ἐλευθέρως εἰπεῖν. Cp. *Pind. Nem.* ix. 49 θαρσαλέα δὲ παρὰ κρατῆρι φωνὰ  
γίνεται. Notice the word-play ἔδοξε...ἐδόκει. For κινήσας, cp. *Rep.* 329 D  
βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον κτλ.

αὐτόν, Σώκρατες, καθεύδει; Οὐ δῆτα, ἢ δ' ὄς. Οἶσθα οὖν ἄ μοι δέδοκται; Τί μάλιστα; ἔφη. Σὺ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμοῦ ἐραστῆς ἄξιος γεγονέναι μόνος, καὶ μοι φαίνη ὀκνεῖν μνησθῆναι πρὸς με. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐτως ἔχω· πᾶν ἀνόητον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι σοὶ μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἢ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἐμῆς δέοιο ἢ τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον D τοῦ ὡς ὃ τι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι, τούτου δὲ οἶμαι μοι συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ. ἐγὼ δὲ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν μὴ χαριζόμενος αἰσχυνοίμην τοὺς φρονίμους, ἢ χαριζόμενος τοὺς τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἄφρονας. καὶ οὗτος ἀκούσας μάλα εἰρωνικῶς καὶ σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ εἰωθότως ἔλεξεν Ὁ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, κινδυνεύεις τῷ ὄντι οὐ φαῦλος εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ

218 C ἔχω B O.-P.: ἔχων TW χαρισασθαι O.-P. εἴ τι B O.-P.: εἴ τι TW D ὡς ὃ τι TW O.-P.: ὅσῳ τι B μοι Vind. 21 O.-P. (prob.), vulg.: μου BTW (παρ') ἑαυτοῦ Stallb.: (πρὸς) ἑαυτοῦ Herwerden ἑαυτῷ εἰωθότως vulg. φίλε om. O.-P.<sup>1</sup> κινδυνεύει...φαῦλ' εἶναι Bdhm.

ἐμοῦ...ἄξιος. Whether ἐμοῦ goes closely with ἐραστῆς or with ἄξιος is open to doubt: Jowett renders "the only one who is worthy of me," whereas Rettig writes "ἄξιος absolut = würdig, beachtenswerth."

ὀκνεῖν κτλ. "To be shy of mentioning (your love) to me": cp. I. Alc. 103 A οἶμαι σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστῆς σου γενόμενος...τοσοῦτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσείπον.

τῆς οὐσίας...τῶν φίλων. Cp. 183 A ἢ χρήματα...ὑπὸ φίλων. For ἢ τῶν φίλων = ἢ τῆς τῶν φίλων, cp. the brachylogy in 217 D (ἐμοῦ).

218 D πρεσβύτερον. Poll. II. 12 καὶ πρεσβεῖν τὸ τιμᾶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ τὸ "οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον" ἀντὶ τοῦ "οὐδὲν τιμώτερον": 186 B, 188 C *surra*.

συλλήπτορα. For the ἐραστῆς as an aid to ἀρετῇ, see 185 A; cp. Socrates' description of Eros as *συνεργός*, 212 B. μοι was taken by Stallb. with συλλήπτορα, by Rückert with εἶναι, but it is better to say with Hommel that, as an ethic dat., "ad totum verborum complexum refertur."

κυριώτερον. "More competent": cp. *Theaet.* 161 D.

τοὺς φρονίμους...ἄφρονας. Compare the similar aristocratic sentiment of Agathon, 194 B. It is worth noticing that whereas Pausanias had spoken of those who disapprove of χαρίζεσθαι as *τινές*, here they are termed οἱ πολλοί. Cp. Xen. *Mem.* I. 6. 13. Similarly Browne, *Rel. Med.* "This noble affection falls not on vulgar and common constitutions."

σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ. "Very characteristically": cp. "sum illud est" Cic. *Tusc.* I. 42. 99.

οὐ φαῦλος. "Kein Dummkopf" (Hug); cp. 174 C, 175 E. Socr. means that if Alcib. proposes to make such a profitable bargain, hartering his own cheap κάλλος for the rare κάλλος of Socr., he evidently is a "cute" man of



- E** τυγχάνει ὄντα ἃ λέγεις περὶ ἐμοῦ, καὶ τις ἔστ' ἐν ἐμοὶ δύναμις, δι' ἧς ἂν σὺ γένοιτο ἄμεινων· ἀμήχανόν τοι κάλλος ὀρώης ἂν ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ εὐμορφίας πάμπολυ διαφέρων. εἰ δὴ καθορῶν αὐτὸ κοινώσασθαι τέ μοι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ ἀλλάξασθαι κάλλος ἀντὶ κάλλους, οὐκ ὀλίγω μου πλεονεκτεῖν διανοῆ, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ δόξης
- 219 ἀλήθειαν καλῶν κτᾶσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ τῷ ὄντι "χρῦσα χαλκείων" διαμείβασθαι νοεῖς. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄμεινον σκόπει, μὴ σε λανθάνω οὐδὲν ὦν. ἢ τοι τῆς διανοίας ὄψις ἄρχεται ὀξὺ βλέπειν ὅταν ἡ τῶν ὀμμάτων τῆς ἀκμῆς λήγειν ἐπιχειρῆ· σὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι πόρρω. κἀγὼ ἀκούσας, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἔφην, ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦν οὐδὲν ἄλλως εἴρηται ἢ ὡς διανοοῦμαι· σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς οὕτω βουλευόμενος ὅ τι σοὶ τε ἄριστον καὶ ἐμοὶ ἡγεῖ. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, τοῦτό γε εὐ λέγεις·
- B** ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιόντι χρόνῳ βουλευόμενοι πράξομεν ὃ ἂν φαίνηται ὑφ' ἡμῶν περὶ τε τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄριστον.

218 **E** τοι BTW O.-P.: τι al., Bekk.: τε vulg. τέ μοι BT O.-P.: μοι W  
 219 **A** καλῶν del. Bdhm. νοεῖς secl. Voeg., J.-U. ἢ τοι W, Steph.: ἦτοι BT ὄψις ἄρχεται om. Stob. ἐμοῦ TW O.-P.: ἐμοί B [σοι τε] σι O.-P.

business. Cp. Diog. L. III. 63 ὁ γοῦν φαῦλος λέγεται παρ' αὐτῷ (sc. Platoni) καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ, ὡς καὶ παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ ἐν Λικυμνίῳ κτλ. (see Eurip. fr. 476 N. φαῦλον, ἄκομψον, τὰ μέγιστ' ἀγαθόν κτλ.).

218 **E** ἀμήχανόν κτλ. Supply from the context, with Stallb., "nam hoc ita si sit." Rückert, after Schleierm., wrongly connects this clause with the preceding, "qua fiat, ut tu melior evadas, atque exinde immensam in me pulcritudinem cernas"; while Hommel makes it depend upon εἴπερ. Cp. *Rep.* 509 B, 608 D; *Charm.* 155 D.

εὐμορφίας. For the notion of a beauty-competition here suggested, cp. Xen. *Symp.* v. 1. Cp. also the σοφία-match of 175 E.

ἀντὶ δόξης ἀλήθειαν κ. "Real for sham beauties": ἀλήθειαν καλῶν = ἀλήθινα καλά. Cp. *Phil.* 36 c ff.; and for the antithesis, cp. 198 E, 212 A *supra*.

219 **A** χρῦσα χαλκείων. A "familiar quotation" from *Il.* vi. 235—6 (Γλαῦκος) δεῖπρὸς Τυδείδῃν Διομήδεα τεύχε' ἄμειβεν | χρῦσα χαλκείων, ἐκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων. Later reff. to the proverb are frequent, e.g. Plut. *adv. Stoic.* 1063 E; Clém. Alex. *Cohort. ad Gent.* 71 c. Cp. *Winter's Tale* I. 2 "take eggs for money." In χρῦσα there is an obvious allusion to the ἀγάλματα χρυσᾶ of 216 E.

ἢ τοι...ὄψις. For this idea of the inverse development of vision, cp. *Laws* 715 D, *II. Alc.* 150 D. Rettig thinks that in this passage there may lie a ref. to *Phaedr.* 253 D ff., and an indication that the views there put forward are crude and the book itself "eine jugendliche Schrift."

219 **B** ἐν γὰρ τῷ κτλ. Thus Socr. practically defers the consideration of the matter to "the Greek Kalends." Rettig calls attention to the catalectic hexameter in ἐν γὰρ...βουλευόμενοι, which gives a touch of jocular liveliness.

Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τε καὶ εἰπὼν, καὶ ἀφείς ὥσπερ βέλη, τετρώσθαι αὐτὸν ᾤμην· καὶ ἀναστάς γε, οὐδὲ ἐπιτρέψας τούτῳ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀμφιέσας τὸ ἰμάτιον τὸ ἔμαντοῦ τούτου— καὶ γὰρ ἦν χειμῶν—ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλινεῖς τὸν τουτουί, περιβαλὼν τὸ χεῖρε τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ, C κατεκείμεν τὴν νύκτα ὄλην. καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα αὐτῷ, ὦ Σώκратες, ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι. ποιήσαντος δὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ οὗτος τοσοῦτον περιεγένητό τε καὶ κατεφρόνησε καὶ κατεγέλασε τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας καὶ ὕβρισε καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο <ὅ> γε ᾤμην τί εἶναι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—

219 B βέλει TW O.-P. τούτῳ T, Thiersch: τοῦτο B: τούτου W τουτουί TW O.-P. (prob.), Bt.: τούτου B, J.-U. Sz. C αὐτῷ B: om. TW καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο (ὅ) γε scripsi: [καὶ] περὶ ἐκεῖνο γε O.-P.: καίπερ ἐκεῖνο γε TW: καίπερ κείνο γε B: καὶ κείνο γε Sz.: καίτοι κείνο γε Bt.: καίπερ...εἶναι secl. Hug

ἀφείς ὥσπερ βέλη. Sc. τοὺς λόγους. For this image applied to "winged words," cp. the use of βαλῶν 189 B; *Phileb.* 23 B βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἐμ-προσθεν λόγων: *Theaet.* 180 A; Pind. *Ol.* i. 112.

τετρώσθαι. "I thought I had winged him." Cp. Theogn. 1287 ἀλλὰ σ' ἐγὼ τρώσω φεύγοντά περ: and the description of Eros as θηρευτῆς δεινός, 203 D.

τρίβωνα. Cp. *Prot.* 335 D; *Ar. Ach.* 184, etc. The vogue of the "philosopher's cloak" (*pallium*) seems to date from Socrates: cp. *Plut. de disc. ad.* 56 c. For the incident, see also *Lysias in Alcib.* xiv. 25 (*Teichmüller Litt. F.* ii. 287 ff.); *Theocr. Id.* xviii. 19; cp. *Theogn.* 1063 ff. ἐν δ' ἦβη πάρα μὲν ξὺν ἠμήλικι καλ λιθ' εὔδειν | ἱμερτῶν ἔργων ἐξ ἔρον ἰέμενον. Notice the stylistic effect produced both by the row of successive participles, mostly asyndetic ("der Sturmhauf ist vergeblich" Rettig); and by the repetition of the pronoun (τούτῳ, -τον, -τουί, -τῳ, οὗτος). "Forsan haec illustrat *Soph. Trach.* 944. Respexit Alciphron i. 38" (Wytenb.).

219 C δαιμονίῳ. Cp. 202 D.

καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα κτλ. Alcib.'s fourth appeal to Socr. for confirmation, cp. 217 B.

τοσοῦτον. "Dictum est *δεικτικῶς* et p̄r quendam exclamationem ut significet: *mirum quantum me vici*" (Stallb.): Rückert and Hommel, on the other hand, suppose that "sequi debebat ὥστε" so as to give the sense "ut non aliter ab eo surrexerim," etc. (Rückert), or ὥστε καὶ καταφρονῆσαι κτλ. (Hommel). Rückert's view, which explains the change of construction as due to the intervening parenthesis, seems the most probable.

περιεγένητό κτλ. Alcib. is fond of piling up synonyms by way of emphasis; cp. 207 A, 219 D, 221 E.

ὕβρισε. ὕβρις is a *vox propria* in erotic literature for the "spretae iniuria formae"; cp. *Anthol. Pal.* v. 213 οὐκ οἶσω τὰν ἀπάλαιστρον ὕβριν.

Anacreon fr. 129 ὕβρισταὶ καὶ ἀτάσθαλοι (Ἀνακρέων ἀπειλεῖ τοῖς Ἐρωσιν... ἐπειδήπερ ἑώρα τὸν ἔφηβον ὀλίγον αὐτοῦ φροντίζοντα... ἐμὴ αὐτῷ τιτρώσκειν

δικασταί γάρ ἐστε τῆς Σωκράτους ὑπερφηφάνιας. εὐ γὰρ ἴστε μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς, οὐδὲν περιττότερον καταδεδαρθηκώς ἀνέστην μετὰ D Σωκράτους, ἢ εἰ μετὰ πατρὸς καθηύδον ἢ ἀδελφοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.

XXXV. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἶσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν, ἡγούμενον μὲν ἡτιμάσθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐντετυχηκότα ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ ὧς ἐγὼ οὐκ

219 D ἢ εἰ B O.-P.: ἢ TW

αὐτίκα τὸν ἔφηβον κτλ.). Cp. Spenser's, "Thou hast enfrosen her disdainfull brest," and "Whilst thou tyrant Love doest laugh and scorne At their complaints, making their paine thy play, Whylest they lie languishing like thrals forlorne" (cp. καταδεδουλωμένος 219 E *infra*).

καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο (δ) γε κτλ. So I have ventured to write on the strength of the evidence of the Papyrus.

Rettig keeps the Bodleian κείνο, as tolerable "in hac Alcibiadis oratione singularia amantis," and refers to Poppo *ad* Thuc. VIII. 86, Lob. *ad* Phryn. p. 7, and other authorities: but to bolster up the double anomaly "vain is the strength of man": if κείνο be retained we must assume prodelision (κείνο).

τὶ εἶναι. "Maghī quid esse" (Rückert): cp. *Gorg.* 472 A: it is the opposite of οὐδὲν εἶναι, 216 E, 219 A.

δικασταί. Alcib. appeals to the audience to try the case, the notion of a lawsuit (γραφὴ ὑβριεως) having been suggested by the word ὑβριεσεν. We have already had, in this speech, terms suggestive of legal proceedings, viz. 214 D τιμωρήσῃμαι ὑμῶν ἐναντίον: 215 B μάρτυρας παρίξομαι: and δικαστής itself was already used by Agathon in 175 E.

μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς. Such an invocation of the whole pantheon is unusual, but cp. *Tim.* 27 c.

οὐδὲν περιττότερον. *Haud aliter*, cp. Isocr. III. 43.

καταδεδαρθηκώς. Cp. 223 c, *Apol.* 40 D. For the incident cp. Petron. 128 non tam intactus Alcibiadis in praeceptoris sui lecto iacuit: Lucian *vit. auct.* 15; Corn. Nep. *Alcid.* c. ii.

219 D εἶνα...διδόναι. A.'s feelings were a blend of chagrin and veneration: cp. the perplexity described in 216 c; Theogn. 1091 ff. ἀργαλῆος μοι θυμὸς ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότῃτος· | οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι, κτλ. ἡτιμάσθαι. Cp. Theogn. 1313 ἐμὴν δὲ μεθῆκας ἀτίμητον φιλότῃτα.

ἀγάμενον. This is an echo, both of Phaedrus's language in 179 c, 180 A, and of ἀγαστός applied to Eros (197 D). Observe the assonance ἡγούμενον... ἀγάμενον. Cp. Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 8.

τὴν τούτου φύσιν κτλ. Hommel renders "des Mannes ganzem Wesen besonders seiner Besonnenheit und Charakterfestigkeit" etc.; Rettig explains φύσις as "die geistige Naturanlage des S., seine theoretische und spekulative Begabung, ingenium, σοφία (vgl. Theaet. 144 A)." The former seems the more natural interpretation; φύσις may be intended also as an echo of Aristophanes' use of the word (189 D etc.).

ἀν ὧμην ποτέ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν; ὥστε οὐθ' ὄπως οὖν ὀργιζοίμην εἶχον καὶ ἀποστερηθείην τῆς τούτου συνουσίας, οὐθ' ὅπῃ προσαγαγίμην αὐτὸν ἠπόρου. εὐ γὰρ ἦδη ὅτι **E** χρήμασί γε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄτρωτος ἦν πανταχῆ ἢ σιδήρῳ ὁ Αἴας, ᾧ τε ὧμην αὐτὸν μόνῳ ἀλώσεσθαι, διεπεφεύγει με. ἠπόρου δῆ, καταδεδουλωμένος τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλον περιῆα. ταῦτά τε γὰρ μοι ἅπαντα προυγεγόνει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατεία ἡμῖν εἰς Ποτιδαίαν ἐγένετο κοινῆ καὶ συνεσιτοῦμεν ἐκεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῖς πόνοις οὐ μόνον ἐμοῦ περιῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων· ὅπότε' ἀναγκασθείμεν ἀποληφθέντες που,

**219 D** ὠμην O.-P. corr. καρτερίαν: εγκρατειαν O.-P. οὐθ': ουδ O.-P. corr. εἰ καὶ O.-P. συνηθείας O.-P.<sup>1</sup> **E** ὅποι vulg. ἦδη B: ἦδειν W O.-P. γε TW O.-P., Jn.: τε B, J.-U. Sz. Bt. δῆ BT O.-P.: τε W ταῦτά τ' ἄρα Bdm. κοινῆ vulg. J.-U. Naber: κοινῆ BT O.-P., Sz. Bt. οὖν libri, Bt.: οὖν (έν) Winckelmann J.-U. Sz. ὅπότε' W, Herm.: ὅπότεν BT O.-P.: ὅπότεν γούν vulg.: ὅπότε δ' Sauppe Jn.: ὅπότε' αὐ Rohde: οἶον ὅπότε' cj. Usener ἀποληφθέντες Cornarius, Sz. Bt.: ἀπολειφθέντες libri, O.-P.: ἀπολειφθέντες σίτου, οἶα Heusde

φρόνησιν...καρτερίαν. "φρόνησις verbunden mit καρτερία ist doch nichts Anderes als die Auflösung des Begriffs der σωφροσύνη in seine beiden Bestandtheile. Vgl. Pol. iv. 430 E, Phädr. 237 E, Krat. 411 E" (Rettig).

οὐθ'...εἶχον. Of moral impossibility, as in 190 c, *Phaedr.* 241 A.

**219 E** ἄτρωτος. "Invulnerable on all sides": cp. τετρώσθαι 219 B. For the incorruptibility of Socr., shown by his sending back Alcib.'s presents, see Stob. *Flor.* xvii. 17, Ael. v. h. ix. 29.

σιδήρῳ ὁ Αἴας. For the impregnable seven-fold shield of Ajax, see Pind. *Isthm.* v. 45; Soph. *Aj.* 576; Welcker *Kl. Schr.* ii. p. 267.

ᾧ τε ὧμην. Sc. τῆ ὥρα (cp. 219 c): the antecedent, κατὰ τοῦτο (διαπεφ.), has to be supplied.

καταδεδουλωμένος. Cp. *Euthyd.* 303 c. Above, 215 E, we had ἀνδραποδωδὸς διακείμενος.

περιῆα. "I wandered about," suggestive of aimless despair: cp. *Prot.* 348 D, *Rep.* 620 c: so περιτρέχων 173 A.

στρατεία...κοινῆ. Potidaea revolted from Athens in 435 B.C. and after 5 years of war was reduced in 430 (see Bury's *Hist. Gr.* pp. 392—3): Socr.'s part in the campaign is alluded to also in *Apol.* 28 E, *Charm.* 163 A, c: cp. *Plut. adv. Colot.* p. 1117 E.

συνεσιτοῦμεν. "We were mess-mates" (σύσσιτοι). This implies personal friendship rather than proximity of origin; for Socr. and Alcib. belonged to different φυλαί and to different τάξεις.

τοῖς πόνοις. Cp. 197 E ("Ἐρως ἐν πόνῳ...ἄριστος).

ἀποληφθέντες. "Cut off," "a commeatu intercepti et prohibiti" (Stallb.): cp. *Hdt.* ii. 115. 2; *Thuc.* vi. 22; *Gorg.* 522 A.

220 οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν, οὐδὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν. ἐν τ' αὖ ταῖς εὐχαίαις μόνος ἀπολαύειν οἶός τ' ἦν τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ πίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλων, ὅποτε ἀναγκασθεῖη, πάντας ἐκράτει, καὶ ὁ πάντων θαυμαστότατον, Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν ἀνθρώπων. τούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτίκα ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσεσθαι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τὰς τοῦ χειμῶνος καρτερήσεις—δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες—θαυμάσια εἰργάζετο τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ ποτε ὄντος Β πάγου οἴου δεινοτάτου, καὶ πάντων ἢ οὐκ ἐξιόντων ἐνδοθεν ἢ εἰ τις ἐξίοι ἡμφιεσμένων τε θαυμασὰ δὴ ὅσα καὶ ὑποδεδεμένων καὶ ἐνειλιγμένων τοὺς πόδας εἰς πῖλους καὶ ἀρνακίδας, οὗτος δ' ἐν

220 A πρὸς τὸ: πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ Sauppe; πρὸς αὐτὸν τῷ Bdhm. ἐν δ' αὖ Wolf ἀπολλυεῖν O.-P.<sup>1</sup> οἶός τ' ἦν del. Bdhm. τε τὰλλα Bdhm. πίνων Usener πάντας: πάντων Hirschig ὁ πάντων TW O.-P.: ὅποτε B θαυμασιωτάτου O.-P. Vind. 21 ἑώρακεν TW O.-P.: ἑώρακει B χειμῶνες del. Naber B πάγου B O.-P.: τοῦ πάγου TW ἢ οὐκ B O.-P.: οὐκ TW δὴ TW O.-P.: ἢ B οὗτος δ' BTW: οὗτος O.-P. Vind. 21

220 A οἷα δὴ κτλ. Sc. φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, or the like; cp. *Rep.* 467 B οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ (sc. γίγνεσθαι); *Euthyd.* 272 A. οὐδὲν ἦσαν...πρὸς κτλ. Cp. 195 D οἶος ἦν...πρὸς κτλ., and 216 E οὐδὲν εἶναι.

εὐχαίαις. Cp. *Laws* 666 B ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐχαηθέντα: 203 B εὐρα.

τὰ τ' ἄλλα κτλ. The construction is loose; we may either explain it (with Stallb.) as a brachylogy for τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι...ἐκράτει, or say (with Wolf) that ἐκράτει is carelessly put for κρατῶν. Hug construes πίνειν closely with ἀναγκασθεῖη, marking οὐκ ἐθέλων as a parenthesis; but it is simpler to regard πίνειν as a kind of accus. of respect ("at drinking") with ἐκράτει. For the ἀνάγκη of the "symposiarch's" ruling cp. 176 A, 223 B.

ἑώρακεν. The plpf. ἑώρακει (in spite of Rettig, etc.) is inconsistent with πώποτε. For Socr.'s invincibility in carousals, see 176 C, 214 A, 223 C; and cp. *Theogn.* 491 ἀνίκητος δέ τοι οὗτος | ὅς πολλὰς πίνων μὴ τι μάταιον ἐρεῖ.

αὐτίκα...ἔσεσθαι. I.e. we shall have proof, before the night is over, of Socr.'s καρτερία in this regard.

δεινοὶ...χειμῶνες. Cp. *Thuc.* II. 70 ὄρωντες μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν τυλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ: *Aesch. Pers.* 495 ff.

θαυμάσια εἰργάζετο. An echo of 182 E and 213 D.

220 B οἴου δεινοτάτου. I.e. τοιοῦτου οἴος δεινοτάτος ἐστίν: cp. *Apol.* 23 A (*Madv. Gr. S.* § 96. 1).

πῖλους. Schol. πῖλος· ἰμάτιον ἐξ ἐρίου πιλήσεως γινόμενον, εἰς ὑπέων καὶ χειμῶνων ἄμυναν. Cp. *Laws* 942 D; *Hes. Op.* 541 ff. "Had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces" (Jowett).

ἀρνακίδας. Schol. ἀρνακίδες δὲ ἀρνῶν κώδια: *Suid.* ἀρνακίς· τὸ τοῦ ἀρνὸς κώδιον, τὸ μετὰ τῶν ἐρίων δέρμα. Cp. *Themist. or.* IV. 50 B.

τούτοις ἐξήκει ἔχων ἰμάτιον μὲν τοιοῦτον οἶόνπερ καὶ πρότερον εἰώθει φορεῖν, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ῥᾶον ἐπορευέτο ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑποδεδεμένοι. οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονούντα σφᾶν.

XXXVI. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα·

C

οἶον δ' αὖ τὸδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖ ποτὲ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι. ξυννοήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι ἔωθέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ προυχῶρει αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἀνίει ἀλλὰ εἰστήκει ζητῶν. καὶ ἤδη ἦν μεσημβρία, καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἠσθάνοντο, καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἔλεγον ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐξ ἔωθινοῦ φροντίζων τι ἔσθηκε. τελευτῶντες δὲ τινες τῶν Ἴωνων,

220 B οἶόνπερ B O.-P.: οἶον TW C αὖ τὸδ' W O.-P., Cornarius: αὐτὸ BT ἔρρεξε B στρατιᾶς O.-P., Cobet Sz. Bt.: στρατείας libri, J.-U. εἰστήκει vulg. O.-P.: ἐστήκει libri προχῶρει B ἀνίει: ἀνειη O.-P. ἄνθρωποι Mehler Cobet Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωποι libri ἔλεγον Mehler Cobet Sz.: ἔλεγον libri, O.-P., Bt. ἐξ: ὡς ἐξ O.-P. καὶ ante τελευτῶντες add. W Ἴωνων libri, O.-P.: νέων Mehler Hug Sz.: ἰδόντων Schmidt: Παιόνων Rettig

ἰμάτιον...φορεῖν. Cp. 220 A n.; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 1, 6. 2 καὶ ἰμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρουσ τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ καὶ ἀχίτων διατελείς. For ἀνυπόδητος, see also 174 A, 203 D.

ὑπέβλεπον. "Looked askance (suspiciously) at him," i.e. "quippe quem ipsos despiciere opinarentur" (Stallb.). Cp. *Eryx.* 395 A ὑποβλέψας...ὥσπερ τι ἀδικοῦμενος: *Crito* 53 B ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορία ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων.

220 C Καὶ ταῦτα...ταῦτα. For this formula of transition, dismissing the subject, cp. *Laus* 676 A.

οἶον δ' αὖ...ἀνὴρ. From Hom. *Od.* iv. 242, with the slight alteration οἶον δ' αὖ for δὴ οἶον: there it is spoken by Helen in describing Odysseus.

ξυννοήσας. Rettig holds that the following section is an illustration of the "spekulative Begabung" (φύσις 219 D) of Socr.; but it describes, primarily, another phase of his *καρτερία*. For S.'s habit of thought-immersion, cp. 174 E ff., Gell. *N. A.* ii. 1; similarly, in Indian gymnosophists, Plin. *H. N.* vii. 2. 22. The similar incident in 174 E ff. is there construed by Agathon as a symptom of σοφία (see 175 C—D).

Ἴωνων. Rückert comments "Iones illo tempore sub Atheniensium ditione erant, unaque militabant"; but most recent editors suspect corruption after Mehler (*ad Xen. Symp.* p. 75) "Nequē fuisse eorum in ordinibus, neque Platonis haec sunt verba." To Mehler's restoration, τῶν νεῶν, Rettig objects that "den Athenern gleichviel ob jung oder alt diese Weise des Sokrates kaum auffallend war, da mau ihn genugsam kannte"; while in favour of his own conj. Παιόνων, he cites Thuc. i. 59, 61, etc. But I agree with Usener (*Rhein. Mus.* lxxx. p. 372) that Ἴωνων may well be genuine.

Δ ἐπειδὴ ἑσπέρα ἦν, δειπνήσαντες—καὶ γὰρ θέρος τότε γ' ἦν—χαμύνια ἐξενεγκάμενοι ἅμα μὲν ἐν τῷ ψύχει καθυῦδον, ἅμα δὲ ἐφύλαττον αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἐστήξοι. ὁ δὲ εἰστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἔπειτα ὄψchet' ἀπιῶν προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ.

Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ δίκαιόν γε αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι· ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν, ἐξ ἧς ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰριστεία ἔδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοί, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρω-  
**E** μένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τὰριστεία τοὺς στρατηγούς, καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι οὔτε μέμψη

220 D προσευξόμενος b ἐν ταῖς: καὶ ἐν ταῖς O.-P. οὐκ ἐθέλων  
 τετρωμένον T E Σωκρατην O.-P.

220 D χαμύνια. ταπεινὰ κλινίδια (Schol.); τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς στρωννύμενα (Tim.): cp. (Eros) χαμαιπετής, 203 D: Hipponax 67 ἐν σταθμίῳ τε καὶ χαμυνίῳ γυμνόν.

προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ. Hesiod (*Op.* 339) prescribes prayer at sunrise and sunset; cp. *Laus* 887 E, 966 D; Soph. *O. C.* 477; Ar. *Plut.* 771 καὶ προσκυνῶ γε πρῶτα μὲν τὸν ἥλιον. The suggestion here may be that the Sun-god (*Phoebus*, the revealer, "the light of the world") brings mental illumination, and that Socr.'s *eúchē* was in part a thanksgiving therefor. As a parallel to Socr., we may refer to "the devotion of Orpheus to Helios" as pointed out in *Harrison Proleg.* p. 462. Moreover, Socr. regarded Apollo as his special patron-god, see *Apol.* 39 D ff., *Phaedr.* 85 B, *Tim.* 40 A (Adam, *R. T. G.* pp. 325, 434 ff.): and the sun is the symbol of ideal Good, see *Rep.* 530 A, *Phileb.* 28 D. For the content of a Socratic prayer, see *Phaedr.* 279 B—C; Xen. *Mem.* I. 3. 2 ἤσχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τάγαθὰ διδόναι. Of prayers to Helios we have exx. in Soph. *Aj.* 845 ff.; *id. fr.* 772 Ἥλιος οἰκτείρειέ με | ὄν οἱ σοφοὶ λέγουσι γεννητὴν θεῶν | καὶ πατέρα πάντων.

Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε. Sc. ἀκούσαι ὅλος ἦν, or the like; cp. 177 B. Alcib. here passes on to treat of the ἀνδρεία of Socr.

ἀποδοῦναι. "Tanquam debitum persolvere" (Stallb.).

ἡ μάχη. "Illa pugna (omnibus nota)" (Rückert); i.e. the fight (in 432 B.C.) which preceded the blockade of Potidaea, cp. 219 E n., Thuc. I. 62 ff., II. 2.

ἔσωσεν. With this, and συνδιέσωσεν below, cp. Eros as σωτήρ ἀριστος, 197 E.

220 E οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν. This passage echoes the language of Phaedrus in 179 A: ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ κτλ., and ὄπλα ἀποβαλόν. To rescue a man's arms was to save him from the disgrace attaching to ὄπλων ἀποβολή.

ὅτι μέμψη. Here for the fifth time Alcib. challenges Socr. to contradict him (cf. 219 c): for μέμφομαι, cp. 213 E.

οὔτε ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν ἀξίωμα ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλομένων ἐμοὶ διδόναι τάριστεία, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτὸν. ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου 221 φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον· ἔτυχον γὰρ παραγενόμενος ἵππον ἔχων, οὗτος δὲ ὄπλα. ἀνεχώρει οὖν ἐσκεδασμένων ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτός τε ἅμα καὶ Λάχης· καὶ ἐγὼ περιτυγχάνω, καὶ ἰδὼν εὐθὺς παρακελεύομαι τε αὐτοῖν θαρρεῖν, καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτῶ. ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ κάλλιον ἔθεασάμην Σωκράτη ἢ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ—αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦττον ἐν φόβῳ ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἵππου εἶναι—πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχηςτος τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἔμοιγε Β ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορεύεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε, “βρενθύμενος καὶ τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλον,”

221 A σωκράτην T ἢ B: ἢ TW: η O.-P.: ἦν vulg. B ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε secl. Jn. J.-U. τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ T O.-P.: τῷ φθαλμῷ B: τ' ὀφθαλμῷ W

**ἀξίωμα.** “Social standing”: “erat genere *Alcmaeonida*...ipse Periclis in tutela erat” (Rückert). Cp. *I. Alc.* 104 B; *Thuc.* II. 37, v. 43, etc.

**ἢ σαυτὸν.** We should expect μάλλον ἢ αὐτός, but the accus. is put in order to balance ἐμὲ, “propter oppositionis gravitatem” (Stallb.). For the omission of μάλλον after words “denoting a wish or choice,” see *Madv. Gr. S.* § 93 c.

221 A ἀπὸ Δηλίου. For this famous battle in Boeotia (424 B.C.), when the Athenians under Hippocrates were routed by the Thebans under Pagondas, see *Thuc.* iv. 76 ff., Bury's *Hist. Gr.* pp. 442—3.

καὶ Λάχης. Cp. *Lach.* 181 B. Athenæus (v. 329 ff.) perversely contends that Socr. took part in no battle.

περιτυγχάνω. Cp. Hermann on *Ar. Nub.* 196, “ἐπιτυγχάνειν dicitur qui quaerit, περιτυγχ. qui non quaerens in aliquid incidit.”

κάλλιον ἔθεασάμην. “I got a finer view of”: cp. *Rep.* 467 E ἐφ' ἵππων... κάλλιστά τε θεάσονται...καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα κτλ.

ἐν φόβῳ. Cp. 197 D.

ἔμφρων. “Cool,” “collected”; cp. *Ion* 535 B πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ, ἢ ἔξω σαυτοῦ γίνεαι; *Laws* 791 B ἀντὶ ματικῶν...ἔξεις ἔμφρονος ἔχειν.

221 B τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο. An accus. absol., like τὸ λεγόμενον: “ut tuo illo utar” (Stallb.). Cp. *Soph.* 233 B, *Euthyd.* 284 c (with Schanz, *nov. comm.* pp. 76 f.). The ref. is to *Ar. Nub.* 362 ὅτι βρενθύει τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλεις. The *Clouds* was not produced until the year after the battle of Delium, viz. 423 B.C.

βρενθύμενος. “Stalking like a pelican” (Jowett): Schol. *ad Nub.* 362 βρενθύει· ἀποσεμνύει σαυτὸν ἐν τῷ σχήματι καὶ ταυρηδὸν ὄρῃς· κομπάζεις καὶ ὑπεροπτικῶς βαδίσεις: cp. Schol. *ad Pax* 25, *ad Lysist.* 887. “Nimirum ductum est verbum a βρῖνθος, quod significat avem aquaticam, frequenter ad paludes commorantem altisque pedibus incedentem” (Stallb.).

τῷφθαλμῷ παραβάλλον. “H. e. torvo vultu oculos in obliquum vertens”



ἡρέμα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φιλίους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, δῆλος ὢν παντὶ καὶ πάνυ πόρρωθεν, ὅτι εἴ τις ἄψεται τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀμυνεῖται. διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπῆει καὶ οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος· σχεδὸν γάρ τι τῶν οὕτω διακειμένων ἐν τῷ C πολέμῳ οὐδὲ ἄπτονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προτροπάδην φεύγοντας διώκουσι.

Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἂν τις καὶ ἄλλα ἔχοι Σωκράτη ἐπαινέσαι καὶ θαυμάσια· ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τάχ' ἂν τις καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοιαῦτα εἴποι, τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὁμοῖον εἶναι, μήτε τῶν παλαιῶν μήτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων, τοῦτο ἄξιον παντὸς θαύματος. οἶος γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ

221 B περισκοπῶν Ast Bekk. Sz. φιλίους BTW: φίλους al., O.-P., Steph. ἀψαιτο O.-P. ἀμύνεται B διὸ...διώκουσιν secl. Hartmann διὸ δὴ καὶ Arist. οὗτος: αὐτος O.-P. ἑταῖρος Arist., Sz. Bt.: ἕτερος libri, O.-P., J.-U. ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ante ἀλλὰ ponit Arist. C μάλλον post φεύγοντας addit Arist. θαυμάσαι Hirschig τῶν μὲν: τῶν O.-P. (ut videtur) δέ: δε δη O.-P. εἶναι μήτε TW O.-P.: εἶναί με B

(Stallb.). Rettig objects that this rendering is inconsistent with ἡρέμα φιλίους, and explains by "oculis prope admotis intueri, also scharf ansehen," cp. *Phaedo* 103 A, *Rep.* 531 A. Ast gives "oculos in aliquid immotos habere intentos": Reynders, τὸ βλέμμα ἄνω καὶ κάτω κινεῖν: Jowett, "rolling his eyes."

ἡρέμα παρασκοπῶν. This verb is ἀπ. εἶρ. in Plato, and perhaps conveys a literary allusion: Rückert explains it to mean "oculis quasi comitari, observare, ut omnes motus lento oculorum motu notare videaris."

δῆλος...πόρρωθεν. "Similiter Apollodorus, qui Socratis incessum imitatus est, τῶν οὖν...πόρρωθεν ἐκάλεσεν κτλ." (Hommel).

ὁ ἑταῖρος. So Jahn, after Aristides t. II. p.<sup>72</sup>: the more definite term is preferable, as Rettig argues against Feuffel. For confusion of the two words in the codd., cp. 183 C (*crit. n.*), and see Schanz, *nov. comm.* p. 59.

221 C προτροπάδην. "In headlong rout"—an Epic (*Il.* xvi. 304) word, ἀπ. εἶρ. in Plato. For the sense, ἐρ. Tyrt. 11. 11—13 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τολμῶσι... πανρῆτεροι θνήσκουσι κτλ.: Seneca, *Ep.* 94 audentes fortuna iuvat (see Bergk, ad Simon. *fr.* 227): *Il.* v. 531 f. αἰδομένων δ' ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σοοὶ ἢ ἐπέφανται· | φευγόντων δ' οὐτ' ἄρ κλέος ἔρρυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή: *ib.* xv. 561 ff.

Πολλὰ...καὶ ἄλλα κτλ. Cp. 195 B, 201 D. Hirschig's θαυμάσαι gives us (as Rettig argues) "einen matten Gedanken."

θαύματος. "Of wonder" (the subjective feeling), cp. *Phil.* 36 D, *Lawo* 987 A: elsewhere in Plato θαῦμα means "quod mirum est."

οἶος γὰρ κτλ. For Achilles, see *Od.* iv. 267 ff.; and cp. 179 ε f.

Βρασίδαν. For this famous Spartan leader, who fell fighting at Amphipolis in 422 B.C., see Thuc. II. 26, 85 ff., v. 6; Bury, *Hist. Gr.* pp. 445 ff.

ἄλλους, καὶ οἶος αὐτὸν Περικλῆς, καὶ Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνορα, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι· καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ ταῦτ' ἂν τις ἀπεικάζοι· οἶος D δὲ οὔτωσι γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἐγγὺς ἂν εὔροι τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἰ οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω ἀπεικάζοι τις αὐτὸν, ἀνθρώπων μὲν μηδενί, τοῖς δὲ σιληνοῖς καὶ σατύροις, αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς λόγους.

XXXVII. Καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις παρέλιπον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ὁμοιώτατοί εἰσι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τοῖς διοιογμένοις. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλοι τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκούειν λόγων, φανείεν E ἂν παγγέλοιοι τὸ πρῶτον· τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἐξῶθεν περιαιμπέχονται, σατύρου [ἂν] τινὰ ὕβριστοῦ δοράν. ὄνους γὰρ

221 O εἰσὶ...ἕτεροι secl. Jn. J.-U. εἰσὶ: οἶοι Bdhm. D τοὺς del. Bdhm.: τοὺς (μὲν) Hirschig ταῦτ': ταῦτ' B: τοῦτ' W ἄνθρωπος Sauppe Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωπος BT οὔτε τῶν νῦν...παλαιῶν del. (Hommel) Hirschig Jn. ἄρα εἰ B: ἄρα TW O.-P. λέγω TW O.-P.: λέγων B αὐτὸν τε καὶ vulg. E ἐθέλοι B: ἐθέλει T τῶν...λόγων TW O.-P.: τὸν...λόγον B παγγέλοιοι scripsi: πάνυ γελοῖοι TW O.-P., vulg. Bt.: γελοῖοι B, J.-U. Sz. τινὰ B O.-P., J.-U. Sz.: ἂν τινὰ TW: δὴ τινὰ Baiter Cobet Bt.: αὐτὰ Rückert

Περικλῆς. See 215 E n., *Gorg.* 515 c ff., 519 A.

Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνορα. Comparable to Pericles on the ground of eloquence (cp. 215 E, Pericles as ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ). For Nestor, see Hom. *Il.* i. 247 ff.; for Antenor, *Il.* vii. 347 ff.; Hor. *Ep.* i. 2. 9.

221 D τὴν ἀτοπίαν. "Originalität" (Wolf): see 215 A n.

ἀνθρώπων μὲν κτλ. See 215 A, B, 216 E.

221 E παγγέλοιοι. Cp. 189 B, 215 A; the context shows that -γέλοιοι here is nearly equiv. to καταγέλαστος. Of Socr., as of S. Paul, it was said that "his speech was contemptible."

ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα. See 198 B n.

ἐξῶθεν περιαιμπέχονται. Cp. 216 B ἐξῶθεν περιβέβηται.

σατύρου [ἂν] τινὰ. Stallb. vainly argues in a long note "ἂν tenendum et per ellipsin verbi (i.e. οὖσαν) explicandum esse."

ὕβριστοῦ. Cp. 215 B, 175 E. In δοράν, the satyr's "hide," there is an allusion, no doubt, to the flaying of Marsyas by Apollo.

ὄνους γὰρ κτλ. "His talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and courriers" (Jowett). Schol. *κωνθηλίου*: τοὺς βραδείς νοῆσαι ἢ ἀφρῆς. ἀπὸ κἀθωνος, ὅς ἐστιν ὄνος, εἰρημένοι, κτλ.: cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 170 ff., 177 ff. For ὄνοι in Plato, cp. *Gorg.* 516 A, *Rep.* 563 c; for χαλκείς, *Prot.* 319 D, *Crat.* 388 D, 389 E. Cp. *Gorg.* 490 c ff., where Callicles objects ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ λατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει κτλ.: Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 37 ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, Ἄλλα τῶνδ' εἰ σὲ ἀπέχῃσθαι, ἔφη, δέήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκῶν: *ib.* iv. 4. 5—8: Max. Tyr. *diss.* ix. 1.

κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκείας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέξας, καὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν.

222 διοικομένους δὲ ἰδὼν αὐτὸς καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὐρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειοτάτους καὶ πλείστ' ἀγάματ' ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῶ κἀγαθῶ ἔσεσθαι.

Ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἃ ἐγὼ Σωκράτη ἐπαινῶ· καὶ αὐτὸς ἃ μέμφομαι συμμίξας ὑμῖν εἶπον ἃ με ὕβρισεν. καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαῦκωνος καὶ Εὐθύδημον τὸν Διοκλέους καὶ ἄλλους πάντων πολλοὺς, οὗς οὗτος ἐξαπατῶν ὡς ἐραστής παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καθίσταται ἀντ'

221 E κανθηλίους O.-P. 222 A διοικομένους B αὐ Bekk. Hug Bt.: ἄν libri, O.-P.: δὴ Sz. ἐγγὺς αὐτῶν γε Hommel εὐρήσει Usener τῶν λόγων TW O.-P.: τὸν λόγον B: del. Wagner Voeg. τείνοντας TW: τινοντας O.-P.: τείναντας B· ἐπὶ TW O.-P.: ἔτι B B πάντων om. O.-P.

222 A ἰδὼν αὐτὸς. "ἂν cum participio cohaeret hoc sensu, ἐάν τις ἴδῃ... si quis forte viderit" (Rückert); Stallb., too, defends ἂν, citing *Rep.* 589 E, *Phaedo* 61 c, *Euthyd.* 287 D; the objection of Rückert and Rettig, that αὐτὸς ought to stand after διοικομένους rather than after ἰδὼν, is not fatal.

μόνους...τῶν λόγων. For the contrast implied, cp. Homer's οἶος πέπνυται, ται δὲ σκίαι αἰσσοσιν (*Meno* 100 A). A similar ascription of life to λόγοι is to be found in *Phaedr.* 276 A.

θειοτάτους κτλ. Cp. 216 D—E. The whole of this account of Socrates' λόγοις is virtually an encomium of his σοφία.

τείνοντας...ἐπὶ πάντων. Cp. 188 B ἐπὶ πάντων ὁ θεὸς τείνει: *Rep.* 581 B. For echoes of phrases in the previous speeches here, and throughout Alcib.'s speech, see *Introd.* § vi (3).

ἃ μέμφομαι κτλ. "Verba ita connectenda sunt: καὶ συμμίξας αὐτὸς ἃ μέμφομαι εἶπον ὑμῖν ἃ με ὕβρισε" (Stallb.). Stephens erroneously put a comma, Wolf a full stop, after μέμφομαι. Rückert, agreeing with Stallb., put a comma after συμμίξας, and Hommel added another after αὐτὸς. Jowett's transl.,—"I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me"—seems to imply a different view of the construction. The points alluded to are those mentioned in 217 B ff., 219 c.

222 B Χαρμίδην. For Charmides, Plato's avunculus, see *Charm.* 154, 157; *Xen. Mem.* III. 7, *Symp.* III. 9 etc.

Εὐθύδημον. This Euthydemus, son of Diocles (see *Xen. Mem.* IV. 2. 40), is not to be confounded with his namesake the sophist, who appears in the dialogue *Euthyd.*

παιδικὰ...δυν' ἐραστοῦ. "The object rather than the subject of love." This may fairly be construed, with Rettig, as an indication that Socr., the

ἐραστοῦ. ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω, ὦ Ἀγάθων, μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθημάτων γνόντα εὐλαβηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι.

XXXVIII. Εἰπόντος δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου γέλωτα C γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐδόκει ἔτι ἐρωτικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ Σωκράτους. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη, Νήφειν μοι δοκεῖς, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποθ' οὕτω κομψῶς κύκλω περιβαλλόμενος ἀφανίσαι ἐνεχέρις οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτι πάντα εἴρηκας, καὶ ὡς ἐν παρέργῳ δὴ λέγων ἐπὶ τελευτῆς αὐτὸ ἔθηκας, ὡς οὐ πάντα τούτου

222 B ἐξαπατᾶσθε B ἀλλ' ὑπο O.-P.<sup>1</sup> γνῶντα B C παρρησια O.-P. ἐδοκε τ[ι] O.-P.<sup>1</sup> κομψῶς pr. B οὐ ἔνεκα TW: οὐδ' ἔνεκα B: ουνεκα O.-P. (ν e δ corr.): οὐ δὴ ἔνεκα Usener

embodiment of the ideal κάλλος, is exalted above Eros (cp. 201 A): contrast 180 B θεϊότερον ἐραστῆς παιδικῶν. For the reversal of the rôles of Alc. and Socr., cp. *I. Alc.* 135 D κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγῆσω σε κτλ. Cp. also Xen. *Symp.* VIII. 5; and see *Introd.* § VI. 3.

ἃ δὴ...ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. Hommel and Rettig, after Stallb., take the infin. clause to be exegetical of ἃ: Rückert construes ἐξαπ. as a second accus. depending on λέγω: Hug makes the infin. depend on ἃ λέγω (equiv. to "I give you this warning") as on a "verbum voluntatis." It may be simply an oblique imperative.

κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν. Cp. Hom. *Il.* XVII. 33 ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω: *ib.* XX. 198: Hes. *Op.* 218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω: Hdt. I. 207 παθήματα μαθήματα: Aesch. *Ag.* 177, *Cho.* 313: Soph. *O. C.* 143: and our English proverb "a burnt child dreads the fire." Schol. ῥεχθὲν...ἔγνω· ἐπὶ τῶν μετὰ τὸ παθεῖν συνιέντων τὸ ἀμάρτημα. ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕτερα παροιμία· ὁ ἀλιεὺς πληγεὶς νοῦν φύσει· κτλ.

222 C παρρησίᾳ. "Naivetät" (Wolf); see A.'s excuses for it in 217 E.

Νήφειν μοι δοκεῖς. Echoing the phrase previously used by Alcib. (δοκείτε γὰρ μοι νήφειν 213 E), Socr. jocosely derides his repeated plea of intoxication 212 E, 214 C, etc.), saying in effect: "It's sober you are, not drunk; otherwise you could never have excogitated so deep a scheme."

κομψῶς. Of a "pretty" trick; cp. *Theaet.* 202 D, *Soph.* 236 D.

κύκλω περιβαλλόμενος. See Ast *ad Phaedr.* 272 D "imago desumpta est ab amictu, quem rhetores, priusquam perorarent, componere solebant: V. Quintil. XI. 3. 116": Cic. *de or.* III. 39. 138 se circumvestit dictis. For κύκλω cp. Ar. *Rhet.* I. 9. 33 (with Cope's note), III. 14. 10, and Virgil's "per ambages" (*G.* II. 45).

ἐπὶ τελευτῆς. *I.e.* as if it were an after-thought only: cp. 198 B, *Phaedr.* 267 D.

- D** ἔνεκα εἰρηκώς, τοῦ ἐμέ καὶ Ἀγάθωνα διαβάλλειν, οἰόμενος δεῖν ἐμέ μὲν σοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ μηδεὸς ἄλλου, Ἀγάθωνα δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι καὶ μηδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἄλλου. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἀλλὰ τὸ σατυρικόν σοῦ δράμα τοῦτο καὶ σιληνικὸν κατάδηλον ἐγένετο. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων, μηδὲν πλέον αὐτῷ γένηται, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως ἐμέ καὶ σὲ μηδεὶς διαβαλεῖ. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα εἰπεῖν, Καὶ μὴν,
- E** ὦ Σώκратες, κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ καὶ ὡς κατεκλίνῃ ἐν μέσῳ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς διαλάβῃ. οὐδὲν οὖν πλέον αὐτῷ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ παρὰ σὲ ἐλθὼν κατακλινήσομαι. Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, δεῦρο ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ κατα-

222 D διαβαλεῖ Hirschig Cobet Sz. Bt.: διαβαλεῖ O.-P.: διαβάλλῃ BTW

222 D ἐμ...διαβάλλειν. "To set us at variance": cp. 222 D, *Rep.* 498 c. οἰόμενος δεῖν κτλ. *I.e.* thinking that you must at once monopolise Socr. as your ἐραστής and Agathon as your παιδικά. For δεῖν, cp. 222 E.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες κτλ. For the conversational carelessness of the repeated ἀλλά, cp. 175 B (four times).

τὸ σατυρικόν σου δράμα κτλ. A playful allusion to the εἰκόνες employed by Alcib. in his encomium (see 215 B). For "satyr-drama" see Smith, *D. A.* II. 860 b: "The satyr-drama was so-called because the Chorus consisted of satyrs attendant on Dionysus...it was aptly described as παίζουσα τραγωδία": Jevons, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* p. 186.

μηδὲν πλέον κτλ. An echo of the language of Alcib. in 217 c.

222 E χωρὶς διαλάβῃ. "Dictum hoc eleganter cum amphibolia quadam, ut et de spatio possit cogitari et de animorum disiunctione" (Stallb.): cp. *Phil.* 55 D.

ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ. The original order of the places on this (ἐσχάτη) κλίνη was (1) Agathon, Socrates (see 175 c—D): then Alcibiades on his entrance had seated himself in the middle (213 B *ad inī.*), thus making the order (2) Agathon, Alcib., Socr.: now Socrates invites Agathon to shift his position so as to change the order to (3) Alcib., Socr., Agathon: presently, in the sentence following, Alcibiades suggests that, instead of this, Agathon should take the middle place (ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν), which would result in the order (4) Alcib., Agathon, Socrates. But the adoption of this last order is, as Socr. hastens to point out, impossible, inasmuch as it would cause serious dislocation in the series of λόγοι which are bound to proceed in order from left to right (see 214 c), each speaker taking for his theme his next neighbour on the right. If the order (4) were adopted, it would be the duty of the next speaker, Agathon, to eulogize Socrates, a task already performed by Alcib. himself; whereas by adopting the order (3), the next speech would fall to Socr., and he would have for his theme Agathon, an arrangement unobjectionable in itself and well-pleasing to Socr. (πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάσαι, 223 Δ) as well as to Agathon (λοῦ λοῦ κτλ., 223 Δ).

κλίνου. ὦ Ζεῦ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, οἷα αὐτὸν πάσχω ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. οἶεται μοι δεῖν πανταχῇ περιεῖναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τι ἄλλο, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσφ' ἡμῶν ἕα Ἀγάθωνα κατακεῖσθαι. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἐπήνεσας, δεῖ δ' ἐμὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δεξιῇ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν ὑπὸ σοὶ κατακλινῇ Ἀγάθων—οὐ δὴ που ἐμὲ πάλιν ἐπαινέσεται, πρὶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεθῆναι; ἀλλ' ἔασον, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ μὴ φθονήσης τῷ 223 μειρακίῳ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπαινεθῆναι· καὶ γὰρ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωμιάσαι. Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, φάναι τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, Ἀλκιβιάδη, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν ἐνθάδε μείναιμι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον μεταναστήσομαι, ἵνα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐπαινεθῶ. Ταῦτα ἐκέλευε, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, τὰ εἰωθότα· Σωκράτους παρόντος τῶν καλῶν μεταλαβεῖν ἀδύνατον ἄλλῃ. καὶ νῦν ὡς εὐπόρως καὶ πιθανὸν λόγον ἤρρει, ὥστε παρ' ἑαυτῷ τουτονὶ κατακεῖσθαι.

222 E περιεῖναι: περιεῖναι O.-P. γὰρ ἐμὲ B O.-P.: γάρ με TW αὐτὸν Bekk.: αὐτὸν B O.-P.: αὐτὸν T: αὐτὸνδ' Ast κατακλιθῆ O.-P. οὐ δὴ που: οὕτω δήπου Bdhm.: fort. οὐ δεῖ που ἐπαινέσεται: fort. ἐπαινεῖσαι vel ἐπαινέσθαι πρὶν: δεῖν Usener Hug: παρὸν (vel παρεῖς...ἄλλον) Bdhm. 223 A μᾶλλον B O.-P.: :: μᾶλλον T: om. Vind. 21: ἄλλον Mdv. ἐπαινεθῆναι; distinxit Ast ἰοῦ ἰοῦ T παντὸς: παντοσ[α] O.-P. ευπορω O.-P.

οἷα αὐτὸν πάσχω. "How I am fooled" (Jowett). This echoes 215 D οἷα δὴ πείπονθα κτλ.: cp. 184 B κακῶς πάσχων (sc. ὁ ἐρώμενος).

ὑπὸ σοῦ. ὁ ὑπὸ τινι (or ὑποκάτω τινος) is equiv. to ὁ ἐπὶ δεξιῇ (cp. 175 c n.).

οὐ δὴ που κτλ. If we retain the ms. reading, this clause is best printed as interrogative (so Bt. and Lehrs)—taking the place of a regular apodosis, such as δείξει αὐτὸν ἐμὲ πάλιν ἐπαινεῖν. Against Badh.,—who wrote "monstri vero simile est, πρὶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεθῆναι,"—Rettig attempts to defend the text thus: "Statt der Worte: 'er wird eher wollen von mir gelobt werden, als mich loben,' setze man: es wird nicht verlangt werden können, dass er mich lobe, bevor ich vielmehr ihn gelobt habe"; i.e. οὐ δήπου ἐπαινέσεται is equiv. to οὐ δήπου ἐπαινεῖν ἐθελήσει. This, however, is awkward; and some corruption must, I believe, be assumed: if so, the changes I have proposed seem the most plausible.

223 A Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ. For a distinction between ἰοῦ, as a cry of joy, and ἰού, of pain, see Schol. on Ar. *Nub.* 1170. Here it denotes jubilation, not commiseration as Hommel suggests ("Wehe, wehe, armer Alkibiades" etc.).

Ταῦτα ἐκέλευε. Cp. 210 E, *Charm.* 166 B (Schanz *nov. comm.* p. 16).

εὐπόρως. This echoes phrases in the description of Eros, son of Πόρος, see 203 D (πόριμος), 203 E (εὐπορήση), 204 B (πατρὸς...εὐπόρου). Similarly πιθανὸν suggests the plausible tongue of the γόης and σοφιστῆς of 203 D.

πιθανὸν λόγον ἤρρει. For this "inventiveness of plausible argument" as belonging to the art of the sophistical rhetor, cp. *Gorg.* 457 A ff., *Phaedr.* 269 D.

**B XXXIX.** Τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα ὡς κατακείσόμενον παρὰ τῷ Σωκράτει ἀνίστασθαι· ἐξαίφνης δὲ κωμαστὰς ἤκειν παμπόλλους ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, καὶ ἐπιτυχόντας ἀνεωγμέναις ἐξιόντος τινὸς εἰς τὸ ἀντικρυς πορεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς καὶ κατακλίεσθαι, καὶ θορύβου μεστὰ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πίνειν πάμπολον οἶνον. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἐρυξίμαχον καὶ τὸν Φαῖδρον καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οἴχεσθαι ἀπίοντας, ἃ δὲ **C** ὕπνον λαβεῖν, καὶ καταδαρθεῖν πᾶν πολὺ, ἅτε μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν οὐσῶν, ἐξεγρέσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἡμέραν ἤδη ἀλεκτρυόνων ἀδόντων, ἐξεγρόμενος δὲ ἰδεῖν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους καθέδοντας καὶ οἴχομένους, Ἀγάθωνα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνη καὶ Σωκράτη ἔτι μόνους ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ πίνειν ἐκ φιάλης μεγάλης ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη αὐτοῖς

223 B αναιωγμεναι O.-P.<sup>1</sup> εἰς τὸ: εἰσω O.-P. (τους) αλλους O.-P.  
 ἃ δὲ BW: ἔαθε T: εαυτον δε O.-P. Ο καταδάρθειν Rettig πᾶν: ate  
 O.-P.<sup>1</sup> Σωκρατη και Αριστοφανη O.-P. Ven. 184 Vind. 21 μεγαλης  
 φι[λ]αλης O.-P. Paris 1642 Vat. 229

223 B ἐξαίφνης δὲ κτλ. Cp. the "sudden" tumultuous entrance of Alcibiades (212 C καὶ ἐξαίφνης κτλ.). The incursion here is devised in order to save the situation. For the sake of artistic effect, the series of λόγοι must now stop: the climax having been reached in the encomium of Socr. by Alcib., to add a eulogy of any lesser personage would be bathos.

ἐξιόντος τινὸς κτλ. Hommel comments: "imaginem proponit commissatorum contra nitente eo, qui iam exiturus erat, aditum vi expugnantium." But, as Rettig remarks, there is no hint in the text of *vis* or of *nisus*. The words ἐξιόντος τινὸς are merely put in to explain how it was that they found the doors open. εἰς τὸ ἀντικρυς is connected by Hommel and Stallb.<sup>2</sup> with ἐξιόντος, but by Rückert, Ast and Stallb.<sup>1</sup> with πορεύεσθαι: the former view is preferable.

Ἐρυξίμαχον. Eryx. and Phaedrus are represented throughout as "hunting in couples"; and it is characteristic of the former, as an authority on health, and of the latter, as a valetudinarian, that they should be the first to escape from the scene of θόρυβος and πάμπολος οἶνος: cp. 176 B ff., 214 A ff.

223 C μακρῶν τῶν νυκτῶν. This indication of date would suit either the *Lenaea* in January or the *Great Dionysia* in March, though rather favouring the former (cp. *Introd.* § VIII a).

ἀλεκτρυόνων ἀδόντων. Cp. *Theaet.* 164 C ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην... ἄδειν. The hour of cock-crow was, theoretically, the 3rd watch (12—3 a.m.): cp. *En. Mc.* xiii. 35. Jowett's "he was awakened by a crowing of cocks" misses ἤδη, which goes with ἀδόντων.

καὶ οἴχομένους. We should expect ἢ rather than καί: but (as Rückert observes) αἱ μὲν ἄλλοι fall into two subdivisions,—those absent in spirit (καθεῖδ.), and those absent in body (οἴχομ.).

ἐγρηγορέναι κτλ. Cp. *Athen.* v. 192 A Σωκράτης... ἐγρήγορε... καὶ πίνει ἐξ ἀργυροῦ φέριτος· καλῶς γάρ τις τὰ μέγала ποτήρια οὕτως ὠνόμασε κτλ.

διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁ Ἀριστοδῆμος οὐκ ἔφη μεμνήσθαι τῶν λόγων—οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγενέσθαι ὑπονυστάζειν τε· τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, πρόσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγωδοποιῶν ὄντα <καὶ> κωμωδοποιῶν εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ ἀναγκαζομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους νυστάζειν, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν καταδαρθεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἥδη δὲ ἡμέρας γιγνομένης τὸν Ἀγάθωνα. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη, κατακοιμίσαντ' ἐκείνους, ἀναστάντα ἀπιέναι, καὶ <ἐ> ὥσπερ εἰώθει ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἐλθόντα εἰς Λύκειον, ἀπονιψάμενον, ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε τὴν ἄλλην

223 D καὶ κωμωδοποιῶν Vind. 21, vulg. Sz. Bt.: κωμωδοποιῶν BTW O.-P.

πρῶτον B: πρότερον TW O.-P. Ἀριστοφάν[ους]<sup>πρ</sup> O.-P. γενομένης vulg.  
Hirschig κατακοιμίσαντ' BW O.-P.: κατακοιμήσαντ' T καὶ ἔ Herm. Sz.  
Bt.: καὶ libri, O.-P.: καὶ ἰ Bekker ἄλλην: ὄλην Ficinus

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κτλ. This is artistic selection disguised under the cloke of imperfect recollection, cp. 178 A, 180 c.

223 D τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον. "The gist of it was...": cp. 205 D *ad inii*. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς κτλ. Cp. *Ion* 534 B *τέχνη ποιοῦντες*. Here both *τέχνη* and *ἐπίστασθαι* are emphatic, with no distinction between them implied. The point of Socrates' argument is that the *scientific* poet must be master of the art of poetry in its universal, generic aspect, and therefore of both its included species, tragedy and comedy. This thought, if developed, might be shown to mean that full knowledge both of *λόγοι* and of *ψυχαί*, and of the effects of the one on the other, is requisite to form a master-poet. Which is equivalent to saying that, just as the ideal State requires the philosopher-king, so ideal Art is impossible without the *φιλόσοφος-ποιητής*. The thesis here maintained by Socrates finds in the supreme instance of Shakspeare both illustration and confirmation: "The Merry Wives" came from the same hand as "Othello" and "Lear."

The statement in Schol. *ad Ar. Ran.* 214 and Philostr. (*vit. soph.* i. 9, p. 439) that Agathon wrote comedies as well as tragedies is probably due to a blunder: see Bentley, *opusc. phil.* p. 613.

οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους. "Erant enim vino languidi. Ad ἐπομένους intelligi potest τοῖς λεγομένοις *Euthyphr.* p. 12 A οὐχ ἔπομαι τοῖς λεγομένοις" (Stallb.).

κατακοιμίσαντα. An allusion, perhaps, to Agathon's *κοίτην ὑπνον τ' ἐνὶ κῆδει*, 197 c. Cp. *Laws* 790 D *κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσπνούντα τῶν παιδίων*.

<†>. *I.e.* Aristodemus, the narrator: for his practice (*εἰώθει*) of dogging the footsteps of the Master, cp. 173 B, 174 B (*ἔπουν*).

Λύκειον. This was a gymnasium, sacred to Apollo Lyceus, situated in the eastern suburbs of Athens, though the exact site—whether s.e. or n. of the



ἡμέραν διατρίβειν, καὶ οὕτω διατρίψαντα εἰς ἑσπέραν οἴκοι ἀναπαύεσθαι.

223 D καὶ κ[α]κ[α] οὕτω O.-P.

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Cynosarges—is uncertain. The Lyceum is mentioned also in the beginning of the *Lysis* and of the *Euthyphro*; cp. Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 10, Paus. i. 19. 4. “Ibi Socr. versabatur propterea quod sophistae in eo scholas habebant, quorum inscitiam solebat convincere, et quod plurimos illic adolescentes nanciscebatur, quibus cum sermones instituere posset” (Stallb.).

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